The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
Gordon Fitch
> ...
> Having read Rand's political and ethical writings, I have found
> nothing of sufficient intellectual rigor to form the basis of
> anything relevant to the discussion. Her work is incredibly flawed
> and empty for someone who has attracted so much attention. (Although
> it should be noted that the attention she attracts is among "middle-
> brows", sophomore philosophy students and the like; she has little
> following among serious philsophers or political thinkers.) ...
First of all, let's dispense with the notion, implicit in so
much that I see written here, that one philsophical text can
be determined in some objective or absolute way to be better
or truer than another. For instance, Peter asserts that
Rand's work is bad because no academic philosophers take it
seriously. But that is not because there is something
inherently wrong with Rand's work, it's because it doesn't
serve their needs.
This is because Rand's philosophy is, as noted,
fundamentally middlebrow. That is, it is more rationalized
than vulgar philosophy, which is almost always characterized
by simple assertions, and yet it requires almost no effort to
understand beyond the initial reading. It is ideally
attuned, then, to persons whose formal intellectual training
is at about a high-school or college freshman level, and who
are not really interested in abstract thought. The academic,
on the other hand, needs heavier stuff both for aesthetic
reasons and also because, to maintain the respect of her
profession, she must prove she can manipulate and
interpret difficult texts and complex ideas.
Now, middlebrowness itself would not explain the enduring
popularity of Rand's writing; every year, hundreds, if not
thousands, of resolutely middlebrow texts appear, telling
their readers what to think and how to get through life,
to be soon replaced by more of their kind. Few of them,
however, deal as well with guilt as Rand's.
The function which Rand's philosophy admirably serves is
the extrusion of guilt. I say this because of the prominent
place given to the idea that selfishness is a good thing.
Most people would not think in these terms because they
would already regard selfishness as a necessary thing. But
many parents teach their children rather impractical ideas,
including the idea that selfishness is evil, others
(especially the parents, or a favored sibling) come first,
and so forth. There may also be some kind of biological
programing towards altruism. In any case, guilt about
selfishness obviously is an important problem for many
people.
In order to extrude guilt, Rand sets up a logical engine
which can operate only in a solid, mechanical universe with
well-defined components. Hence, Objectivism. Once the
premises (the worldview) are set up, the engine can be run
and the guilt can be extruded -- can be shown to be not only
irrelevant, but evil. Thus, Rand's philosophy actually
accomplishes something useful, which is more than can be
said about a great many philosophers. The fact that it is
not of the highest quality from an academic or aesthetic
point of view is unimportant. The only thing I really see
"wrong" with it -- from my point of view -- is that the
deterministic performance of the logical engine, along
with the strong emotional need for it, produce a kind of
totalitarianism in many of its adherents. For instance,
this article may well draw _angry_ rebuttals because it will
seem insufficiently reverent.
On the whole, I think philosophies should be judged on how
well they serve those who consume them, as judged by the
consumer. Not everyone can metabolize Wittgenstein or
Heidegger, nor should they.
--
)*( Gordon Fitch )*( g...@panix.com )*(
( 1238 Blg. Grn. Sta., NY NY 10274 * 718.273.5556 )
Michael Zeleny
g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
>Peter Nelson (I think):
PN:
>> ...
>> Having read Rand's political and ethical writings, I have found
>> nothing of sufficient intellectual rigor to form the basis of
>> anything relevant to the discussion. Her work is incredibly flawed
>> and empty for someone who has attracted so much attention. (Although
>> it should be noted that the attention she attracts is among "middle-
>> brows", sophomore philosophy students and the like; she has little
>> following among serious philsophers or political thinkers.) ...
GF:
>First of all, let's dispense with the notion, implicit in so
>much that I see written here, that one philsophical text can
>be determined in some objective or absolute way to be better
>or truer than another.
Only if you can suggest a more convincing reason to dispense with it
than your say-so. On second thought, such a reason would have to be
"objective or absolute", wouldn't it?
GF:
> For instance, Peter asserts that
>Rand's work is bad because no academic philosophers take it
>seriously. But that is not because there is something
>inherently wrong with Rand's work, it's because it doesn't
>serve their needs.
>
>This is because Rand's philosophy is, as noted,
>fundamentally middlebrow. That is, it is more rationalized
>than vulgar philosophy, which is almost always characterized
>by simple assertions, and yet it requires almost no effort to
>understand beyond the initial reading. It is ideally
>attuned, then, to persons whose formal intellectual training
>is at about a high-school or college freshman level, and who
>are not really interested in abstract thought. The academic,
>on the other hand, needs heavier stuff both for aesthetic
>reasons and also because, to maintain the respect of her
>profession, she must prove she can manipulate and
>interpret difficult texts and complex ideas.
Could she be looking for *truer* stuff instead? nah, she wouldn't dare
to interfere with your pleasant pragmatist preconceptions.
GF:
>Now, middlebrowness itself would not explain the enduring
>popularity of Rand's writing; every year, hundreds, if not
>thousands, of resolutely middlebrow texts appear, telling
>their readers what to think and how to get through life,
>to be soon replaced by more of their kind. Few of them,
>however, deal as well with guilt as Rand's.
>
>The function which Rand's philosophy admirably serves is
>the extrusion of guilt. I say this because of the prominent
>place given to the idea that selfishness is a good thing.
>Most people would not think in these terms because they
>would already regard selfishness as a necessary thing. But
>many parents teach their children rather impractical ideas,
>including the idea that selfishness is evil, others
>(especially the parents, or a favored sibling) come first,
>and so forth. There may also be some kind of biological
>programing towards altruism. In any case, guilt about
>selfishness obviously is an important problem for many
>people.
How amusing. Would you like to tell me about your preferred
techniques for dealing with your own guilt of this sort?
GF:
>In order to extrude guilt, Rand sets up a logical engine
>which can operate only in a solid, mechanical universe with
>well-defined components. Hence, Objectivism. Once the
>premises (the worldview) are set up, the engine can be run
>and the guilt can be extruded -- can be shown to be not only
>irrelevant, but evil. Thus, Rand's philosophy actually
>accomplishes something useful, which is more than can be
>said about a great many philosophers. The fact that it is
>not of the highest quality from an academic or aesthetic
>point of view is unimportant. The only thing I really see
>"wrong" with it -- from my point of view -- is that the
>deterministic performance of the logical engine, along
>with the strong emotional need for it, produce a kind of
>totalitarianism in many of its adherents. For instance,
>this article may well draw _angry_ rebuttals because it will
>seem insufficiently reverent.
Actually, I find it insufficiently irreverent, but after all,
mealy-mouthed liberal sententiousness is just what I have come to
expect from you.
GF:
>On the whole, I think philosophies should be judged on how
>well they serve those who consume them, as judged by the
>consumer.
After you finish compiling your Consumer Satisfaction Index, perhaps
you can take some time off to explain to me whether a happy National
Socialist ought to be regarded as evidencing the philosophical merits
of his _Weltanschauung_ in comparison with a Humanist, who is
perpetually rendered uncomfortable by the incongruity of his
philosophical ideals with the actual state of affairs.
GF:
> Not everyone can metabolize Wittgenstein or
>Heidegger, nor should they.
Indeed, I would recommend an emetic to anyone who thinks otherwise.
>--
>
> )*( Gordon Fitch )*( g...@panix.com )*(
>( 1238 Blg. Grn. Sta., NY NY 10274 * 718.273.5556 )
cordially,
mikhail zel...@husc.harvard.edu
" -- I shall speak bluntly, because life is short."
Dani Zweig
>First of all, let's dispense with the notion...that one philsophical text
>than another.
You're joking, yes? You're *not* joking?
Of course there are objective criteria for comparing philosophical
texts. We think less of one that is self-contradictory. We think
less of one that is implicitly self-contradictory, by virtue of not
having worked through the implications of its arguments. We think
less of one whose premises accord poorly with our observations of the
world around us.
Even without considering whether there are right philosophies and
wrong philosophies (there are certainly wrong ones), one can distinguish
between good and shoddy philosophical workmanship.
>On the whole, I think philosophies should be judged on how well they
>serve those who consume them, as judged by the consumer. Not everyone
>can metabolize Wittgenstein or Heidegger, nor should they.
If a philosophy purports to tell people how they should lead their
lives, I'd rather judge it on the quality of the advice -- and on
the quality of the lives of those who take that advice -- than on
the degree to which it flatters or pleases its adherents.
-----
Dani Zweig
da...@netcom.com
God helpe the man so wrapt in Errours endless traine -- Edmund Spenser
Peter Nelson
>> ...
>> Having read Rand's political and ethical writings, I have found
>> nothing of sufficient intellectual rigor to form the basis of
>> anything relevant to the discussion. Her work is incredibly flawed
>> and empty for someone who has attracted so much attention. (Although
>> it should be noted that the attention she attracts is among "middle-
>> brows", sophomore philosophy students and the like; she has little
>> following among serious philsophers or political thinkers.) ...
>
>First of all, let's dispense with the notion, implicit in so
>much that I see written here, that one philsophical text can
>be determined in some objective or absolute way to be better
>or truer than another.
See below.
>well-defined components. Hence, Objectivism. Once the
>premises (the worldview) are set up, the engine can be run
>and the guilt can be extruded -- can be shown to be not only
>irrelevant, but evil. Thus, Rand's philosophy actually
>accomplishes something useful, which is more than can be
>said about a great many philosophers.
Well, I admit this is a novel analysis that had never
ocurred to me before. I mean, true, she HAS found a
market niche.
>On the whole, I think philosophies should be judged on how
>well they serve those who consume them, as judged by the
>consumer.
The only way I might fault this (and what would be the
point of posting to Usenet if not to fault some other
poster?) is this:
"Twinkies" has a successful market niche meeting the snack
needs of millions. They are junk food, of course, but
they cheerfully admit this. They don't claim to be of
gourmet quality, nor do they claim to be health food.
The problem is that Randianism is not content to serve
a middlebrow market as a middlebrow philosophy. They
*claim* to be of a rigorous calibre. They claim to
have an exacting, logical, provable model on which to
base their conclusions. I attack them not just because
their model is wrong, but because they misrepresent
themselves.
One the question of whether "one philsophical text can
be determined in some objective or absolute way to be
better or truer than another", I agree, if we limit our
discussion to ethics. But this is the whole point:
Randianism claims that they ARE better or truer than
another.
But I would note that what today we call "science" used to
be called "natural philosophy", and that by some criteria
it CAN be shown to be better or truer than others, even when
we're talking about meeting the same people's same needs.
E.g., chemistry works better than alchemy at doing the
things alchemy purported to do. Scientific medicine can
cure diseases that medicine relying on spirits and magic
cannot.
---peter
Tim Starr
}the extrusion of guilt.
That's funny, I've seen Randian egoism attacked on this very newsgroup on the
grounds that it's a means for making people feel guilty for not really acting
in their interests. It seems to me that both of these are false, and that
Objectivism merely proposes a different standard of guilt which rejects the
deterinistic notion of Original Sin that altruism bases itself in.
}In order to extrude guilt, Rand sets up a logical engine
}which can operate only in a solid, mechanical universe with
}well-defined components. Hence, Objectivism. Once the
}premises (the worldview) are set up, the engine can be run
}and the guilt can be extruded -- can be shown to be not only
}irrelevant, but evil.
Are we talking about the same woman? Rand rejected mechanism, although she
was a bit too rationalistic at times.
Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! - Think Universally, Act Selfishly
st...@genie.slhs.udel.edu
"True greatness consists in the use of a powerful understanding to enlighten
oneself and others." - Voltaire
Tim Starr
}This is true, there is a certain quality about Objectivist writing and
}discussion that lends an excessive certainty to its own conclusions.
}Anyone touting any philosophy must understand that their basic metaphysical
}assumptions ARE IN DISPUTE. No one can ever agree or approve as fact the
}basic assumptions of the philosophy.
That's an anti-foundationalist position. Foundationalists disagree.
Brian K. Yoder
>> Having read Rand's political and ethical writings, I have found
>> nothing of sufficient intellectual rigor to form the basis of
>> anything relevant to the discussion. Her work is incredibly flawed
>> and empty for someone who has attracted so much attention. (Although
>> it should be noted that the attention she attracts is among "middle-
>> brows", sophomore philosophy students and the like; she has little
>> following among serious philsophers or political thinkers.) ...
>First of all, let's dispense with the notion, implicit in so
>much that I see written here, that one philsophical text can
>be determined in some objective or absolute way to be better
>or truer than another.
What a crock! Implicit in your response is that in some sense, your
writings are better than Peter's. If yours are no better, then why bother
posting anymore? If you really believed this neo-pragmatist/deconstructionist
nonsense, you would stop writing.
Here's a simple example:
#1: Gordon Fitch is an ignoramus.
#2: You are reading something right now.
Do you think that these are equally true? Do you not deny #1? Do you dare
deny #2 without being seen as a fool?
>For instance, Peter asserts that
>Rand's work is bad because no academic philosophers take it
>seriously.
Clearly an appeal to authority. I should point out that there ARE academic
philosophers who take Rand seriously (I know several personally). It is
true that she's not terribly popular, but that unpopularity is not
universal.
>But that is not because there is something
>inherently wrong with Rand's work, it's because it doesn't
>serve their needs.
Look, when Rand (or anyone else) takes a position, it is either right or
it is wrong. Even to deny this requires that you accept it as true.
Taking the other side of the argument for a moment though, just what needs
does this view of yours serve? The need to be able to put down any idea
as naive? It is certainly of value to court jesters who want to poke fun
at everything, but of what value is that?
If I have a belief that my neighbors are aliens and this helps me put my
petty personal problems into perspective, does that mean that such a
position is true? Why bother with all the effort of trying to find the
truth is just fantasy is just as effective?
>This is because Rand's philosophy is, as noted,
>fundamentally middlebrow. That is, it is more rationalized
>than vulgar philosophy, which is almost always characterized
>by simple assertions, and yet it requires almost no effort to
>understand beyond the initial reading.
What's so bad about clarity? Actually, I find that every time I read
Rand's stuff I spot a new point I had missed previously, but it IS
very clear for the most part. It sounds like you would prefer Nietzsche's
poets (who muddy their waters to make them appear deep).
>It is ideally
>attuned, then, to persons whose formal intellectual training
>is at about a high-school or college freshman level, and who
>are not really interested in abstract thought.
This sounds to me like just an ad hominem argument against anyone who
agrees with Rand. I certainly don't fit into any of the categories you
mentioned, and neither do most of the other objectivists I know. (Most
people disinterested in abstract thought are more interested in Andrew
Dice Clay philosopy. ;-)
>The academic,
>on the other hand, needs heavier stuff both for aesthetic
>reasons
Such as? The need to write ponderous academic papers in order to get tenure?
>and also because, to maintain the respect of her
>profession, she must prove she can manipulate and
>interpret difficult texts and complex ideas.
I don't get your point here. Is this another claim that clarity is
a sign of simplemindedness? Do you really think it is intellectually valuable
to write the kind of dense nonsense that fills today's academic journals
(in more fields than just philosophy)?
It is interesting too that this is more of a criticism of Rand than of her
ideas, is that what you intended?
>Now, middlebrowness itself would not explain the enduring
>popularity of Rand's writing; every year, hundreds, if not
>thousands, of resolutely middlebrow texts appear, telling
>their readers what to think and how to get through life,
>to be soon replaced by more of their kind. Few of them,
>however, deal as well with guilt as Rand's.
There's more to the appeal than just dealing with guilt, but I agree (!)
that Rand's criticism of unwarranted guilt is quite attractive. On the
other hand, I hear people criticize her for using guilt and being too much
of a moral dogmatist. Which do you agree with?
>The function which Rand's philosophy admirably serves is
>the extrusion of guilt.
Sez who? It serves a lot of other "functions" as well. Do you agree?
>I say this because of the prominent
>place given to the idea that selfishness is a good thing.
In the area of morality, that is true, but objectivism hardly treats
morality as a primary. Actually, I consider the biggest attraction to
be the reality-orientation and rigorous application of reason Rand advocated.
There are lots of philosophies which absolve people of guilt, but none
of them seem to have the following Rand does.
>Most people would not think in these terms because they
>would already regard selfishness as a necessary thing.
On the contrary, MOST people consider selfishness to be the epitomy of evil.
>But
>many parents teach their children rather impractical ideas,
>including the idea that selfishness is evil, others
>(especially the parents, or a favored sibling) come first,
>and so forth. There may also be some kind of biological
>programing towards altruism.
Such as? Where's your evidence that there are ANY innate ideas, altruistic
or othrwise? If anything, the biological basis of pleasure would seem to
be the foundation for a natural selfishness.
>In any case, guilt about
>selfishness obviously is an important problem for many
>people.
That's true, but it wouldn't seem ot account for Rand's popularity, and
even if it did, would not reflect on whether her ideas are true or not.
If you insist that the truth of a statement is irrelevant, then I suggest
that you practice what you preach, and stop claiming to have anything
important to say.
>In order to extrude guilt, Rand sets up a logical engine
>which can operate only in a solid, mechanical universe with
>well-defined components.
Well, she does use reason consistently, I'm glad you agree, but
hat's wrong with "setting up a logical engine"? What's wrong
with the idea that the universe is composed of well-defined
components? I suspect that your view of what a "mechanical universe"
is probably is based on assumptions we don't share. If by "mechanical",
you mean "causal", then there's nothing wrong with that either.
>Hence, Objectivism. Once the
>premises (the worldview) are set up, the engine can be run
>and the guilt can be extruded -- can be shown to be not only
>irrelevant, but evil. Thus, Rand's philosophy actually
>accomplishes something useful, which is more than can be
>said about a great many philosophers.
Indeed, but you seem really hung up on Rand's ethics. How much of
her stuff have you actually read? It sounds like you just read
The Virtue of Selfishness and nothing more.
So, tell me, what positive value have the non-middlebrow philosphers
offered? That is, aside from generating material for lots of
academic publications or justifying political movements?
>The fact that it is
>not of the highest quality from an academic or aesthetic
>point of view is unimportant.
What's your aesthetic gripe? Are you talking about her fiction? I thought
you were one of those people who think that aesthetic value is arbitrary
can cannot be objectively judged.
>The only thing I really see
>"wrong" with it -- from my point of view -- is that the
>deterministic performance of the logical engine, along
>with the strong emotional need for it, produce a kind of
>totalitarianism in many of its adherents.
Totalitarianism? I don't think that word means what you think.
If you mean that a lot of people get very excited about her ideas, I agree.
Do you think that's bad? Are you excited about your ideas?
>For instance,
>this article may well draw _angry_ rebuttals because it will
>seem insufficiently reverent.
Am I angry? I'm not angry, I'm just exasperated that anyone posessing
even a middlebrow level of intelligence can actually believe some of the
things you seem to insist on (all the relativist, pragmatist, and
deconstructionist nonsense). People get flamed whenever they post something
others disagree with, and there's often a bit of fire in flames.
>On the whole, I think philosophies should be judged on how
>well they serve those who consume them, as judged by the
>consumer. Not everyone can metabolize Wittgenstein or
>Heidegger, nor should they.
Well excuse me, but *I* care whether their positions are true or not. If that
is not a concern of yours, why not just retreat to your fantasies and be happy?
--Brian
Peter Nelson
>In article <BxBLJ...@apollo.hp.com> nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>> "Twinkies" has a successful market niche meeting the snack
>> needs of millions. They are junk food, of course, but
>> they cheerfully admit this. They don't claim to be of
>> gourmet quality, nor do they claim to be health food.
>
>> The problem is that Randianism is not content to serve
>> a middlebrow market as a middlebrow philosophy. They
>> *claim* to be of a rigorous calibre.
>
>of academic philosophers? Whether it's rigorous by your definition or not,
>does that mean it's false? Or do you even believe in falsehood?
Well, I've been quite clear what my criteria are: testability,
falsifiability, operational definitions, objective metrics, etc.
Rand's theories meet none of these criteria, so yes, they are
false.
>> They claim to
>> have an exacting, logical, provable model on which to
>> base their conclusions. I attack them not just because
>> their model is wrong, but because they misrepresent
>> themselves.
>
>Do you think that claims can be true? false? Your attack on objectivism
>is that it claims to be completely true. Are you completely sure that your
>criticism is valid? See any contradictions there?
Again I'm defining "true" by the same criteria that I apply to the
physical sciences. I have no problem saying that, say, physics,
or chemistry, is "true", even though what they both consist of is
abstract models of what is regarded to be an objective external
universe. "Progress" is defined as refining the precision of the
model. This is consistent with the underlying epistemology of
science which is essentially logical empiricism or logical posi-
tivism.
>> Randianism claims that they ARE better or truer than
>> another.
>
>Any you claim YOUR philosophy is better and truer than objectivism.
>Should I complain about your philosophy on that basis?
"True" is a function of what your epistemology is! I've at least
been quite clear what mine is. I believe Randiansim is based on
some variation of Aristotelianism. If you want to claim that
your epistemological model presents a better, more accurate, or
more repeatable picture of the universe, or even that these
criterai are irrelevant, you're welcome to try.
>> E.g., chemistry works better than alchemy at doing the
>> things alchemy purported to do. Scientific medicine can
>> cure diseases that medicine relying on spirits and magic
>> cannot.
>
>So, why not criticize science on the basis that it claims to be better than
>superstition?
Why would that be a critique of science?
>It would seem that your gripe is that you bring a presumption that ethical
>issues are inherently subjective to the table before you start.
Look, you're being dense about this: from a logical positivist point
of view it's up to YOU to show that ethical issues are objective
since YOU'RE the one making the claim. Even Randianism/Aritotelianism
does not default to assuming that all unproven claims are automatically
true!
> The fact that you "feel" that ethics is a subjective matter does not
> constitute proof that you are right.
Again, I make no such assertion. All I assert is that no evidence
has been presented that ethics DOES have some objective reality.
This is freshman logic; you've either been out of college too long
or you never studied logic in the first place.
---peter
Gary Strand
pn> All I assert is that no evidence has been presented that ethics DOES have
some objective reality.
However, it is fairly obvious from empirical grounds that certain ideas about
ethics have had more success than others. Since the test of an ethical idea
is whether or not it "works" in the real world, you cannot say that all ideas
about ethics have no connection to objective reality.
--
Gary Strand Opinions stated herein are mine alone and are
stra...@ncar.ucar.edu not representative of NCAR, UCAR, or the NSF
Peter Nelson
>pn> Peter Nelson
>
>pn> All I assert is that no evidence has been presented that ethics DOES have
> some objective reality.
>
> However, it is fairly obvious from empirical grounds that certain ideas about
> ethics have had more success than others. Since the test of an ethical idea
> is whether or not it "works" in the real world, you cannot say that all ideas
> about ethics have no connection to objective reality.
Oh, no question about it. But this idea is called "pragmatism"
and Rand hated pragmatists. Naturally, I'm a pragmatist.
The thing is that pragmatism doesn't have to be based on
people having rational beliefs. In a highly religious
society, for instance, the religion may serve the function
of maintaining social order, transmitting values, resolving
disputes, etc. Such a society may "work better" in the
sense of having less crime, less drug addiction, fewer
marital breakups, and so forth, but this does not mean
that the particular god(s) they worship are objectively
real.
The other problem for the pragmatist, as I'll readily
admit, is identifying causality. If I look at a society
in western Europe and note that they have fewer problems
with drugs and crime, less endemic poverty, lower health
care costs, and a much more elaborate social welfare sys-
tem, I'm naturally curious to know if any of these are
related. Since pragmatists are guided by RESULTS and
not philosophy, we need to demand a much more rigorous
mechanistic model than the social "sciences" can usually
offer.
It is easy to note that, in general, societies sharing some
characteristic tend to do better than those which to not.
For instance, the US, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand,
which inherited a mainly English culture have "done better"
in terms of prosperity and political stability over the last
century than, say, nations in South and Central America
which inherited a Spanish culture. But is this due to
particular features of the culture and value system, and if
so which one(s)? Or is it due to some other historical
factors? So it's not easy being a pragmatist.
---peter
Paul Barton-Davis
>assumptions or demands on the individuals within the world view.
The nasty thing about 'libertarianism' and its ilk, is that it takes a
very complex system of interdependency between independently complex
biological systems and reduces it to a set of conscious choices
covering only explicit and immediate interractions between empowered
individuals.
-- paul (never use a commenusurate diminutive when a long word will do)
--
There is hardly anything in the world that some man cannot make a
little worse and sell a little cheaper, and the people who consider
price only are this man's lawful prey.
John Ruskin
Bill Riggs
>
>> The problem is that Randianism is not content to serve
>> a middlebrow market as a middlebrow philosophy. They
>> *claim* to be of a rigorous calibre. They claim to
>> have an exacting, logical, provable model on which to
>> base their conclusions. I attack them not just because
>> their model is wrong, but because they misrepresent
>> themselves.
>
>discussion that lends an excessive certainty to its own conclusions.
>Anyone touting any philosophy must understand that their basic metaphysical
>assumptions ARE IN DISPUTE. No one can ever agree or approve as fact the
>basic assumptions of the philosophy.
Some of you all may recall a posting I did a few weeks back which
identified most non-liberal political ideologies (i.e. Marxism, National
Socialism, feminism) with the ancient Gnostics. One of the characteristics
of Gnosticism is that it definitively prohibits questions from being asked
(which challenge its basic assumptions). Furthermore, this feature of
Gnostic thinking enables a particular ideology to be logically consistent,
but yet incapable of answering those questions it prohibits. Objectivism
clearly meets these criteria for "Gnostic" thinking. As does libertarianism,
to whit:
>
>The neat thing about 'libertarianism' and its ilk, is that it makes minimum
>assumptions or demands on the individuals within the world view. This position
>allows people to voluntarily fulfill obligations created by their own beliefs,
>without foisting these obligations upon those who dispute them. If you can't
>convince someone that they are obligated to help those in need, why should you
>legally require it of them? Because a majority of citizens view the denial of
>this obligation as selfishness and define selfishness as a mortal sin, should
>those who merely have different metaphysical assumptions be coerced into
>participating in that which they oppose? I think not.
I would submit that laws to enforce certain types of "altruistic"
behavior exist in order to cause people to take actions which they would not
otherwise engage in. The most obvious example which comes to mind is the
German "assistance" law on the Autobahn, which legally requires a driver
to offer assistance to a stopped vehicle. Anyone who has the least bit of
experience with Autobahn driving etiquette understands that altruism does
not arise spontaneously in that culture.
>
>I think a minimum social order can be constructed that allows citizens to
>voluntarily support their particular moral obligations without denying anyone
>of their generally agreed upon rights. And I must assert that one's right
>shouldn't create a demand for affirmative effort upon another individual,
>merely a requirement for individuals to abstain from injurious behavior.
I'm not sure that even died-in-the-wool libertarians would go
along with this kind of distinction. Clearly, SOME kind of affirmative
effort is frequently necessary in order *to abstain from injurious behavior.*
If I am on the Autobahn, and fail to yield to that madman who is overtaking
me at a speed of 150 kph, it matters little whether I am standing on my
*rights* or not. In the Dodge 'Em Car game of life, it is often not enough
to say you're sorry.
>
>But of course one is certainly able to construct an argument philisophical in
>appearance that will blast my particular assertion to shreds. Rest assured,
>it will not bend me as I don't agree with the basic principles behind any
>such argument. 8^)
Spoken like a true Objectivist. Did I get the joke, then ?
Bill R.
"My opinions do not represent those of my employer or any
government agency."
--
Bill R.
Ian Sutherland
>In article <1992Nov6.1...@panix.com> g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
>>Peter Nelson (I think):
>>many parents teach their children rather impractical ideas,
>>including the idea that selfishness is evil, others
>>(especially the parents, or a favored sibling) come first,
>>and so forth. There may also be some kind of biological
>>programing towards altruism.
>
>Such as? Where's your evidence that there are ANY innate ideas, altruistic
>or othrwise? If anything, the biological basis of pleasure would seem to
>be the foundation for a natural selfishness.
I don't claim to be conversant with the details of this work, but there
is work in sociobiology which suggests that it may be evolutionarily
advantageous to be "altruistic" (in some sense) towards people you are
related to. This idea makes some sense biologically on the face of
it. As for evidence of any innate ideas at all, I don't see that the
burden of proof is on either side of the argument in this case. Some
sort of innate disposition towards altruism might help explain why
ANYONE is altruistic IN DEFIANCE of logic.
>>The only thing I really see
>>"wrong" with it -- from my point of view -- is that the
>>deterministic performance of the logical engine, along
>>with the strong emotional need for it, produce a kind of
>>totalitarianism in many of its adherents.
>
>Totalitarianism? I don't think that word means what you think.
>
>If you mean that a lot of people get very excited about her ideas, I agree.
>Do you think that's bad? Are you excited about your ideas?
I can tell you from experience that there are many people walking
around calling themselves "Objectivists" who can't reproduce the
arguments for Objectivism's moral principles, but who quote those
principles the way religious people quote the Bible, and who speak
about Ayn Rand in almost the way religious people speak about Jesus
Christ. I think Ayn Rand would be disgusted by these people if she
were alive, but the fact remains that many people interested in
Objectivism are very dogmatic about it. I don't think I'd call it
totalitarianism, but it certainly goes way beyond "being excited about
[Rand's] ideas".
Actually, I'd say the causality is the opposite of that proposed by
Mr. Fitch (or whoever the hell said it). Objectivism doesn't CAUSE
this dogmatism in people. Rather, Objectivism tends to ATTRACT people
who want to be able to assert their principles with a great deal of
certainty, but who are repelled by traditional religious morality (and
so cannot simply assert their principles based on divine origin).
Those who are truly rational will do this in a nondogmatic way. Note
that I do not consider the dogmatic assertion of the moral principles
of Objectivism to be in keeping with the philosophy.
--
Ian Sutherland
i...@eecs.nwu.edu
Sans Peur
Ray Mendonsa
>In article <921107...@rgm.com> ro...@rgm.com (Ray Mendonsa) writes:
>}This is true, there is a certain quality about Objectivist writing and
>}discussion that lends an excessive certainty to its own conclusions.
>}Anyone touting any philosophy must understand that their basic metaphysical
>}assumptions ARE IN DISPUTE. No one can ever agree or approve as fact the
>}basic assumptions of the philosophy.
>That's an anti-foundationalist position. Foundationalists disagree.
Fogive my lack of familiarity with "foundationalism", but I'm curious about
how they can believe that everyone must/will agree with their own premises?
Anyone can (and many do) assert that the supernatural has 'leapt into their
hearts and shown them the truth'. Arguing against that assertion is impossible
and a futile effort. One is forced to merely request not be held accountable
for the revelations of others.
--
------------------------------------------------------------->
Ray Mendonsa ---- ro...@rgm.com ---- Admin., rgm.com --------->
916/923-5013 8n1,HST -- login: new -- Public access Usenet -->
"I've voted and I can't get up!"
Svein Olav G. Nyberg
There are many who do not call themselves Randians that still
have pretty much use for Objectivism. I am one, but probably
not notable enough to you [yet]. Others are include Nozick,
who is not exactly "middlebrow", and the "Rasmussens". On the
Objectivist list of Jimbo, who probably has wisely departed
from this list, there are more, including even a professional
british neo-Platonist[!], who have interest in Rand.
I could also mention David Kelley, whose willingness to let
go of Time as any kind of primary, in a discussion of QM, shows
Objectivism as it is developing to be far from "middlebrow".
Kelley is the leader of "Institute for Objective Studies".
Next, the assertion that Objectivism embraces Determinism is
simply false. This is seen from the Objectivist position on
Free Will.
Though I am not to be called an Objectivist, and did some
"Rand-bashing" in my unknowing youth [mostly due to a certain
person who misrepresented Objectivism so that it looked like
a real monster. He even called himself Objectivist!], I have
long since found that Rand-bashing is not only stupidly
childish, but also counterproductive. Rand has a lot of interesting
ideas that would be worth a look into. If you do not agree, you
will at least get to widen your perspective beyond the aqyired
scepticism that is so prevalent among MIDDLEBROW academics.
Solan
(so...@math.uio.no)
jimmy donal wales
about the relationship between Rand's epistemology and the philosophy
of science. In the second part, I issue a plea for calmness.
> Well, I've been quite clear what my criteria are: testability,
> falsifiability, operational definitions, objective metrics, etc.
> Rand's theories meet none of these criteria, so yes, they are
> false.
The above exhibits a rather mistaken notion of Rand's ideas.
Rand completely rejected any kind of 'theoretical/practical' dichotomy.
She made what I think is a very important point: it is senseless to say
that something 'works in theory but not in practice'. Such a
statement would mean that there is some criterion for 'works' that
has nothing to do with 'practice', i.e. reality.
Rand's theory of concepts includes (inter alia) an implicit theory
of science, including such notions as 'testability', 'falsifiability',
etc. Her theory of measurement omission as foundational to valid
concept formation fits well with what I understand of your notion
of 'objective metrics'. As for _operational_ definitions, Rand would
settle for none other!
Take a look at Rand's _Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_, before
you jump to unwarranted conclusions.
------------
Now.
Let's please discuss things calmly. Non-Objectivists, please
realize that we Objectivists are rather sensitive... it gets a
little old to have to repeatedly defend against charges of
'sophomore!' and 'MADMAN!' everytime we open our mouths.
(By the way, Peter Ny. sent me a very nice letter about his
'madman' quote. He said (basically) that he got carried away
with his 'cute' quote about arguing with madmen. I'm convinced
that he is sincere. Heck, I guess we do sound pretty mad sometimes.
*grin*)
Objectivists, please realize that there are plenty of rational
opponents of Objectivist ideas who simply will NOT be convinced of
ANYTHING if you accuse them of 'irrationality' or 'not even
believing in true and false' at every turn. Don't jump to
conclusions.
And for goodness sake, both sides, learn a little bit about your
opponent's position before jumping in with a fiery attack.
--Jimbo
Ray Mendonsa
>In article <921107...@rgm.com> ro...@rgm.com (Ray Mendonsa) writes:
>>The neat thing about 'libertarianism' and its ilk, is that it makes minimum
>>assumptions or demands on the individuals within the world view.
>The nasty thing about 'libertarianism' and its ilk, is that it takes a
>very complex system of interdependency between independently complex
>biological systems and reduces it to a set of conscious choices
>covering only explicit and immediate interractions between empowered
>individuals.
And naturally you have philosophized somehow that artificially empowered
individuals in government are better suited to make these decisions?
Duh. . . <-- ad hominem can be fun sometimes, but only if you recognize it as
such. . .
Gordon Fitch
| Just a little protest to Gordon Fitch:
|
| There are many who do not call themselves Randians that still
| have pretty much use for Objectivism. I am one, but probably
| not notable enough to you [yet]. Others are include Nozick,
| who is not exactly "middlebrow", and the "Rasmussens". On the
| Objectivist list of Jimbo, who probably has wisely departed
| from this list, there are more, including even a professional
It's okay with me if you dig up "respectable" philosophers
who take Rand seriously. I was defending Rand's
middlebrowness, which I think valuable in the functioning
of her philsophy, for the reasons I gave. Many serious
people have been interested in middlebrow or even vulgar
philosophy. The New Testament, for example, can be called
vulgar -- it makes simple assertions and tells simple
stories. The level of learnedness and complexity of a text
has nothing to do with its ability to function in many
environments or its beauty or its "truth." Obviously.
| Next, the assertion that Objectivism embraces Determinism is
| simply false. This is seen from the Objectivist position on
| Free Will.
I was referring to Rand's use of logic. Logic is created
by freezing or killing language so that it can be used
mechanically: that is, unlike almost anything in nature,
the same initial state will always yield the same result.
The same premises will always yield the same conclusion.
(This situation does not occur in normal language, which is
fuzzy and flexible.) In that sense, it is mechanistic. In
the Randian world, one is free to do as one wills but one
is not free to believe as one wills. For some, this is
obviously a pleasure, if not a blessed relief. For
others, it would be a prison.
| Though I am not to be called an Objectivist, and did some
| "Rand-bashing" in my unknowing youth [mostly due to a certain
| person who misrepresented Objectivism so that it looked like
| a real monster. He even called himself Objectivist!], I have
| long since found that Rand-bashing is not only stupidly
| childish, but also counterproductive. Rand has a lot of interesting
| ideas that would be worth a look into. If you do not agree, you
| will at least get to widen your perspective beyond the aqyired
| scepticism that is so prevalent among MIDDLEBROW academics.
I recommend reading Rand until you feel like reading
something else. You will receive what you need.
Tim Starr
}st...@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
}
}>In article <921107...@rgm.com> ro...@rgm.com (Ray Mendonsa) writes:
}>}This is true, there is a certain quality about Objectivist writing and
}>}discussion that lends an excessive certainty to its own conclusions.
}>}Anyone touting any philosophy must understand that their basic metaphysical
}>}assumptions ARE IN DISPUTE. No one can ever agree or approve as fact the
}>}basic assumptions of the philosophy.
}
}>That's an anti-foundationalist position. Foundationalists disagree.
}
}Fogive my lack of familiarity with "foundationalism", but I'm curious about
}how they can believe that everyone must/will agree with their own premises?
}Anyone can (and many do) assert that the supernatural has 'leapt into their
}hearts and shown them the truth'. Arguing against that assertion is impossible
}and a futile effort. One is forced to merely request not be held accountable
}for the revelations of others.
I don't think you're leaving room for a sort of foundationalist position that
accepts the law of non-contradiction and perceptual realism. By this, it
wouldn't be expected that others necessarily would agree, but that if they
disagree, they're contradicting the truth, and thus wrong.
Tim Starr
}
} Some of you all may recall a posting I did a few weeks back which
}identified most non-liberal political ideologies (i.e. Marxism, National
}Socialism, feminism) with the ancient Gnostics. One of the characteristics
}of Gnosticism is that it definitively prohibits questions from being asked
}(which challenge its basic assumptions). Furthermore, this feature of
}Gnostic thinking enables a particular ideology to be logically consistent,
}but yet incapable of answering those questions it prohibits. Objectivism
}clearly meets these criteria for "Gnostic" thinking. As does libertarianism,
}to whit:
Oh, nonsense. And by that, I don't mean that you should be barred from
making your claim, but that it fails on its face. You've made a non-sequitur.
It doesn't follow from any principle of libertarianism that people are to be
prohibited from questioning the fundamentals. You appear to have made the
common error of attributing the characteristic of statist or totalitarian
ideologies to non-statist or totalitarian ideology.
} I would submit that laws to enforce certain types of "altruistic"
}behavior exist in order to cause people to take actions which they would not
}otherwise engage in. The most obvious example which comes to mind is the
}German "assistance" law on the Autobahn, which legally requires a driver
}to offer assistance to a stopped vehicle. Anyone who has the least bit of
}experience with Autobahn driving etiquette understands that altruism does
}not arise spontaneously in that culture.
This is beside the point. The point is, if it won't be done unless required
by law, why should the law so require? You've failed to address the
challenge for justification at all. All you've done is described how it is
required in one case. So what?
}>I think a minimum social order can be constructed that allows citizens to
}>voluntarily support their particular moral obligations without denying anyone
}>of their generally agreed upon rights. And I must assert that one's right
}>shouldn't create a demand for affirmative effort upon another individual,
}>merely a requirement for individuals to abstain from injurious behavior.
}
} I'm not sure that even died-in-the-wool libertarians would go
}along with this kind of distinction. Clearly, SOME kind of affirmative
}effort is frequently necessary in order *to abstain from injurious behavior.*
}If I am on the Autobahn, and fail to yield to that madman who is overtaking
}me at a speed of 150 kph, it matters little whether I am standing on my
}*rights* or not. In the Dodge 'Em Car game of life, it is often not enough
}to say you're sorry.
Your hypothetical is again off the point. In this case, it's the "speeder"
who's threatening injury. They needn't commit a positive act to refrain
from doing so, they merely need negate the positive act that constitutes
the threat.
Peter Nelson
>In article <BxGC...@apollo.hp.com> nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>} Well, I've been quite clear what my criteria are: testability,
>} falsifiability, operational definitions, objective metrics, etc.
>} Rand's theories meet none of these criteria, so yes, they are
>} false.
>
>operational definitions, and objective metrics.
>
>Is this statement testable? Is it falsifiable? It doesn't seem to contain
>any operational definitions or objective metrics :-).
Nor does it contain an assertion or claim about objective reality, idjit!
I am merely stating MY epistemology. You are welcome to define what
you mean by "true" and explain why you think your standards are better
than anyone else's. As I've said, I'm a pragmatist. I look for
what seems to work. The epistemology that I've chosen has an excellent
track record ever since the Enlightenment and is the basis of all modern
science. No other epistemology can show such a large and continuous
track record of improvements, refinements, and applicability of its
theoretical models. Note that the ethical issues Rand discusses are
precisely the same ones the Greeks debated 2500 years ago and we are
no closer to closure today. Thus epistemology based on subjectivism
doesn't work.
>Seriously, though, Peter, you should read Mario Rizzo's critique of positivism
>in "Austrian Economics: A Reader," edited by Richard Ebeling and published
>by Hillsdale College Press. He argues that positivism is simply incoherent.
There are many "positivisms"; what exactly was he criticizing? Try
summarizing it here for those of us who don't have access to it.
The bottom line is that logical empiricism works better than anything
else. What people don't like about it is that it's "messy", it leaves
loose ends, they are more like engineering than pure theoretics.
In logical empiricism I can't really have the infinite lines and dimen-
sionless points of geometry without caveats: having to always point
out that such geometry is artificial but we keep it around because it
has practical applicability. This irritates some people no end;
they WANT nice neat simple theories (a la Randianism) and insist
that the real world match their theories. Note that you don't
have to be a theoretician to be irritated by logical empiricism:
a pure empiricist could poke holes in it in his sleep! The
only thing that saves us is that he has to spend all his time
checking to see if gravity still works and the air is still
breathable (just because these things were true a millisecond
ago doesn't mean they're true now) so he never gets around to it!
---peter
Charley Wingate
>>First of all, let's dispense with the notion...that one philsophical text
>>can be determined in some objective or absolute way to be better or truer
>>than another.
>Of course there are objective criteria for comparing philosophical texts.
>We think less of one that is self-contradictory. We think less of one that
>is implicitly self-contradictory, by virtue of not having worked through the
>implications of its arguments. We think less of one whose premises accord
>poorly with our observations of the world around us.
The problem in this is the word "we". I defy you to find me a text which
someone doesn't disagree with.
The fact that the same arguments appear month after month in these groups is
indicative of more than just that waves of new college students and
programmer types get new accounts each year.
--
C. Wingate + "The peace of God, it is no peace,
+ but strife closed in the sod.
man...@cs.umd.edu + Yet, brothers, pray for but one thing:
tove!mangoe + the marv'lous peace of God."
Michael A. Thomas
> I was referring to Rand's use of logic. Logic is created
> by freezing or killing language so that it can be used
> mechanically: that is, unlike almost anything in nature,
> the same initial state will always yield the same result.
??! Are you actually saying that, in nature, that given
the same initial condition and process you will not necessarily
get the same result? This flies in the face of all of science!
> The same premises will always yield the same conclusion.
> (This situation does not occur in normal language, which is
> fuzzy and flexible.) In that sense, it is mechanistic.
Is this a fault of nature or a fault in language? To say
that language does not exactly model nature is obvious, and
has to do with man not being omniscient. It does not alter
the fact that nature is reproducible and "mechanical".
> In
> the Randian world, one is free to do as one wills but one
> is not free to believe as one wills. For some, this is
> obviously a pleasure, if not a blessed relief. For
> others, it would be a prison.
To the extent that man cannot just dismiss nature because
he "believes" or "wishes" it otherwise, this is true. A person
who practices this sort of life plan is not long for the world
though.
--
Michael Thomas (mi...@gordian.com)
"I don't think Bambi Eyes will get you that flame thrower..."
-- Hobbes to Calvin
USnail: 20361 Irvine Ave Santa Ana Heights, Ca, 92707-5637
PaBell: (714) 850-0205 (714) 850-0533 (fax)
Charles L Isbell
|pa...@cs.washington.edu (Paul Barton-Davis) writes:
|>In article <921107...@rgm.com> ro...@rgm.com (Ray Mendonsa) writes:
|>>The neat thing about 'libertarianism' and its ilk, is that it makes minimum
|>>assumptions or demands on the individuals within the world view.
|>The nasty thing about 'libertarianism' and its ilk, is that it takes a
|>very complex system of interdependency between independently complex
|>biological systems and reduces it to a set of conscious choices
|>covering only explicit and immediate interractions between empowered
|>individuals.
|And naturally you have philosophized somehow that artificially empowered
|individuals in government are better suited to make these decisions?
|Duh. . . <-- ad hominem can be fun sometimes, but only if you recognize it as
|such. . .
And *this* is why Libertarians all over the net are so against judges
and lawyers (and suing and all that): they are artificially empowered
individuals in government.
--
Peace.
"I not going to focus on what I have done in the past
what I stand for, what I articulate to the American people.
The American people will judge me on what I am saying and what I
have done in the last 12 years in the Congress."
-- Vice President Dan Quayle
-\--/-
Don't just adopt opinions | \/ | Some of you are homeboys
develop them. | /\ | but only I am The Homeboy From hell
-/--\-
Gordon Fitch
| > I was referring to Rand's use of logic. Logic is created
| > by freezing or killing language so that it can be used
| > mechanically: that is, unlike almost anything in nature,
| > the same initial state will always yield the same result.
mi...@gordian.com (Michael A. Thomas) writes:
| ??! Are you actually saying that, in nature, that given
| the same initial condition and process you will not necessarily
| get the same result? This flies in the face of all of science!
On the contrary, one never gets quite the same result
(unless one has some means of covering over small-
scale variation.)
See _How_the_Laws_of_Physics_Lie_ by Nancy Cartwright.
Or, if that's too much trouble, consider observational
error, noise, and, of course, good old Relativity and
Quantum Mechanics. The "Laws of Physics" are nothing
but abstractions from phenomena which seem useful.
gf:
| > The same premises will always yield the same conclusion.
| > (This situation does not occur in normal language, which is
| > fuzzy and flexible.) In that sense, it is mechanistic.
mike:
| Is this a fault of nature or a fault in language? To say
| that language does not exactly model nature is obvious, and
| has to do with man not being omniscient. It does not alter
| the fact that nature is reproducible and "mechanical".
It's not necessarily a fault; under some circumstances,
as when wants the same result to come up reliably every
time, it's a virtue.
gf:
| > In
| > the Randian world, one is free to do as one wills but one
| > is not free to believe as one wills. For some, this is
| > obviously a pleasure, if not a blessed relief. For
| > others, it would be a prison.
|
| To the extent that man cannot just dismiss nature because
| he "believes" or "wishes" it otherwise, this is true. A person
| who practices this sort of life plan is not long for the world
| though.
I am not speaking of dismissing Nature, but of believing
passionately that it is mechanistic, logical. That might
be as much of a deficit as believing in a number of
other improbable things.
Brian K. Yoder
>>In article <BxBLJ...@apollo.hp.com> nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>>> The problem is that Randianism is not content to serve
>>> a middlebrow market as a middlebrow philosophy. They
>>> *claim* to be of a rigorous calibre.
>>And it's true too...it's just not presented in the unintelligible style
>>of academic philosophers? Whether it's rigorous by your definition or not,
>>does that mean it's false? Or do you even believe in falsehood?
> Well, I've been quite clear what my criteria are: testability,
> falsifiability, operational definitions, objective metrics, etc.
> Rand's theories meet none of these criteria, so yes, they are
> false.
Depending on how you define these, you are right. Objectivism DOES fail
when analyzed from a logical positivist point of view. If it didn't
it would just be a special application of LPism. On what basis do you
conclude that these criteria are correct? A simple example of where
falsifiability fails is in the area of the objectivist axioms. The
fact that you are conscious is certainly not falsifiable (since nothing
could constitute evidence to the contrary) yet you are unjustified
in claiming that such a presupposition is false since consciousness is
a precondition of that denial. What do you think the status of such
statements is? False?
How do you claim to ground these criteria? How do you know they are right?
Of course, if you look at it from a certain point of view, objectivist ideas
often do meet your criteria (given some presumptions you cannot deny like
identity, and consciousness). You want to test out Rand's ethics?
Look at people you have known. Who lives better lives? Thieves? Slaves?
Murderers? Liars? Dictators? Or honest free independent men? When you
look at social systems, which promote the lives of the citizens? Fascism?
Monarchy? Socialism? Military dictatorship? or Capitalist Republics?
>>> They claim to
>>> have an exacting, logical, provable model on which to
>>> base their conclusions. I attack them not just because
>>> their model is wrong, but because they misrepresent
>>> themselves.
>>Do you think that claims can be true? false? Your attack on objectivism
>>is that it claims to be completely true. Are you completely sure that your
>>criticism is valid? See any contradictions there?
> Again I'm defining "true" by the same criteria that I apply to the
> physical sciences. I have no problem saying that, say, physics,
> or chemistry, is "true", even though what they both consist of is
> abstract models of what is regarded to be an objective external
> universe.
Ah, but is the existence of objective external reality falsifiable?
>"Progress" is defined as refining the precision of the
> model. This is consistent with the underlying epistemology of
> science which is essentially logical empiricism or logical posi-
> tivism.
>>> Randianism claims that they ARE better or truer than
>>> another.
>>Any you claim YOUR philosophy is better and truer than objectivism.
>>Should I complain about your philosophy on that basis?
> "True" is a function of what your epistemology is!
Quite true. The question is whether any epistemology is better than any other
and if so, how can that be determined. I have my answer to this. Do you?
> I've at least
> been quite clear what mine is. I believe Randiansim is based on
> some variation of Aristotelianism.
More or less. To generalize, I would say it is Aristotle minus the remnants
of Plato.
> If you want to claim that
> your epistemological model presents a better, more accurate, or
> more repeatable picture of the universe, or even that these
> criterai are irrelevant, you're welcome to try.
Well, the most straight-forward attack I can think of is that the
falsifiability theory of truth has to deny self-evident truths (such as
that you are conscious and that reality exists, and that everything
has identity).
>>> E.g., chemistry works better than alchemy at doing the
>>> things alchemy purported to do. Scientific medicine can
>>> cure diseases that medicine relying on spirits and magic
>>> cannot.
>>So, why not criticize science on the basis that it claims to be better than
>>superstition?
> Why would that be a critique of science?
I was pointing out that anyone who attacks objectivism on the basis that it
claims to be better than other philosophies, would also have to
criticize science on the basis that it claims to be better than alchemy.
It would by definition be a "critique" (a false one of course).
>>It would seem that your gripe is that you bring a presumption that ethical
>>issues are inherently subjective to the table before you start.
> Look, you're being dense about this: from a logical positivist point
> of view it's up to YOU to show that ethical issues are objective
> since YOU'RE the one making the claim. Even Randianism/Aritotelianism
> does not default to assuming that all unproven claims are automatically
> true!
Of course. I never said any such thing. Have you ever read the arguments
yourself? Or do you want me to restate them?
>> The fact that you "feel" that ethics is a subjective matter does not
>> constitute proof that you are right.
> Again, I make no such assertion. All I assert is that no evidence
> has been presented that ethics DOES have some objective reality.
Again I have to ask whether you are aware of the objectivist argument
in favor of it's ethics? Are you making the claim that there are no
ethical positions any better or worse than any others? Say, that the
ethical ideas of Charlie Manson are no better or worse than yours?
If you have not encountered the objectivist arguments in ethics, I can
synopsize them for you.
--Brian
Brian K. Yoder
>Brian Yoder writes:
>>In article <1992Nov6.1...@panix.com> g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
>>>Peter Nelson (I think):
>>>But
>>>many parents teach their children rather impractical ideas,
>>>including the idea that selfishness is evil, others
>>>(especially the parents, or a favored sibling) come first,
>>>and so forth. There may also be some kind of biological
>>>programing towards altruism.
>>Such as? Where's your evidence that there are ANY innate ideas, altruistic
>>or othrwise? If anything, the biological basis of pleasure would seem to
>>be the foundation for a natural selfishness.
>I don't claim to be conversant with the details of this work, but there
>is work in sociobiology which suggests that it may be evolutionarily
>advantageous to be "altruistic" (in some sense) towards people you are
>related to.
I think that the "sense" in which it is meant is vitally important.
In one sense, the actions are detrimental to the life of the organism.
THAT is altruism. In another sense, the actions of the organism amount
to a "trade" in which the net benefit is helpful to the life of the
organism. That is NOT altruism. It is self-interest expressed in a
trade.
>This idea makes some sense biologically on the face of
>it. As for evidence of any innate ideas at all, I don't see that the
>burden of proof is on either side of the argument in this case. Some
>sort of innate disposition towards altruism might help explain why
>ANYONE is altruistic IN DEFIANCE of logic.
Oh, come on. People defy logic all the time. Look at the lottery.
People defy logic by buying lottery tickets all the time, but I don't
think even you would say that there is "lottery gene".
>>If you mean that a lot of people get very excited about her ideas, I agree.
>>Do you think that's bad? Are you excited about your ideas?
>I can tell you from experience that there are many people walking
>around calling themselves "Objectivists" who can't reproduce the
>arguments for Objectivism's moral principles, but who quote those
>principles the way religious people quote the Bible, and who speak
>about Ayn Rand in almost the way religious people speak about Jesus
>Christ.
Sure, there are such people, but there are fools in any movement.
>I think Ayn Rand would be disgusted by these people if she
>were alive,
So am I.
>but the fact remains that many people interested in
>Objectivism are very dogmatic about it. I don't think I'd call it
>totalitarianism, but it certainly goes way beyond "being excited about
>[Rand's] ideas".
>Actually, I'd say the causality is the opposite of that proposed by
>Mr. Fitch (or whoever the hell said it). Objectivism doesn't CAUSE
>this dogmatism in people. Rather, Objectivism tends to ATTRACT people
>who want to be able to assert their principles with a great deal of
>certainty, but who are repelled by traditional religious morality (and
>so cannot simply assert their principles based on divine origin).
>Those who are truly rational will do this in a nondogmatic way. Note
>that I do not consider the dogmatic assertion of the moral principles
>of Objectivism to be in keeping with the philosophy.
I quite agree. Unfortunately, many people (on both sides) can't
tell the difference between forceful argumentation and dogmatism.
--Brian
Peter Nelson
>In article <BxGC...@apollo.hp.com> nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>>>of academic philosophers? Whether it's rigorous by your definition or not,
>>>does that mean it's false? Or do you even believe in falsehood?
>
>> Well, I've been quite clear what my criteria are: testability,
>> falsifiability, operational definitions, objective metrics, etc.
>> Rand's theories meet none of these criteria, so yes, they are
>> false.
>
>Depending on how you define these, you are right. Objectivism DOES fail
>when analyzed from a logical positivist point of view. If it didn't
>it would just be a special application of LPism. On what basis do you
>conclude that these criteria are correct?
On the basis of pragmatism -- systems of knowledge based on these
seem to "work" the best and have the best track record of achieving
closure and progress (e.g., compare the track record of science trying
to answer the questions under its domain and improve the precision
of its models with those of religion trying to deal with the issues
under its domain. Religion is still wrestling with the same issues
they have been for thousands of years with no mechanism for resolving
differences of opinion. Science gets past its disputes and moves
onward) . But I'm well aware that this leads to the regression:
"On what basis do I choose "what works" as my criteria, <etc>?"
That's why I have repeatedly asked others who use different criteria
what THEY think are good epistemological criteria, and why.
>a precondition of that denial. What do you think the status of such
>statements is? False?
I would call it axiomatic.
> You want to test out Rand's ethics? >Look at people you have known.
> Who lives better lives? Thieves? Slaves? >Murderers? Liars? Dictators?
> Or honest free independent men?
I can certainly think of plenty of thieves, dictators, liars, etc,
who live far better than I or anyone I personally know. And
therein lies the problem: If objectivism had the weight of
something like a law of physics there would be NO exceptions.
Moreover, the fact that people, whether thieves, dictators,
and liars, or honest free independent men, do as they do, is
easily explained via any number of philosophies. The fact
that most societies adopt the ethical systems they do and attempt
to enforce them is perfectly consistent with pragmatism, for
instance.
> When you look at social systems, which promote the lives of the
> citizens? Fascism? Monarchy? Socialism? Military dictatorship?
> or Capitalist Republics?
But all you're doing is building the argument for pragmatism, and
Rand hated pragmatism.
>Ah, but is the existence of objective external reality falsifiable?
No, it's axiomatic. It's also not at issue here since none of
us, as far as I know, fails to accept the existence of objective
external reality as axiomatic. One problem with Randians is that
they choose as axioms things which are highly debatable.
>Again I have to ask whether you are aware of the objectivist argument
>in favor of it's ethics? Are you making the claim that there are no
>ethical positions any better or worse than any others? Say, that the
>ethical ideas of Charlie Manson are no better or worse than yours?
Again, this begs the question we're discussing here which is "on
what basis can we say that one set of ethical ideas is better or
worse than another?" I certainly *prefer* my ideas to Manson's
but this is subjectivism. I can argue that a society based on
Mansonic principles would not work as well as one based on my
ideas, but even if that's true it's just pragmatism.
So in absolute terms no I do NOT claim that my ethics are better
than Manson's. However, as I've pointed out before, the lack
of objective ethics is a double-edged blade: Just as I would
argue that the Jews and others had no absolute right to not be
subject to force and fraud by the NAZIs, likewise I would argue
that the NAZIs had no right to not be subject to force and fraud
by us. Ethics-as-social-convention, where that convention is
sometimes enforced by force, is a simple, consistent model which
easily accounts for all of this without resorting to metaphysics.
---peter
Paul Barton-Davis
>In article <1992Nov10....@eecs.nwu.edu> i...@nasser.eecs.nwu.edu (Ian Sutherland) writes:
>>I don't claim to be conversant with the details of this work, but there
>>is work in sociobiology which suggests that it may be evolutionarily
>>advantageous to be "altruistic" (in some sense) towards people you are
>>related to.
>
>I think that the "sense" in which it is meant is vitally important.
>In one sense, the actions are detrimental to the life of the organism.
>THAT is altruism. In another sense, the actions of the organism amount
>to a "trade" in which the net benefit is helpful to the life of the
>organism. That is NOT altruism. It is self-interest expressed in a
>trade.
Mr. Yoder speaks of that which he does not know.
Evolutionary advantage is conferred on genotypes, not phenotypes. The
notion of altruism being advantageous when directed towards relations
is based on the fact that they share some amount of your genotype, and
has nothing to do with things that benefit your "life".
To take a concrete example. A genotype that somehow encourages saving
several siblings from drowning at the expense of its carrier will do
quite well in an environment where such events are common. A
particular instance of the phenotype (maybe the organism that is Mr.
Yoder) may die as a result of this altruistic effort (and this is
presumably bad for the organism that is Mr. Yoder), but good for its
genotype (or some subset thereof).
Since it seems rather meaningless to use moral terms like
self-interest in the context of genotypic frequency, I suggest that we
drop this line of argument.
-- paul
Gregg Jaeger
>Depending on how you define these, you are right. Objectivism DOES fail
>when analyzed from a logical positivist point of view. If it didn't
>it would just be a special application of LPism. On what basis do you
>conclude that these criteria are correct? A simple example of where
>falsifiability fails is in the area of the objectivist axioms. The
>fact that you are conscious is certainly not falsifiable (since nothing
>could constitute evidence to the contrary) yet you are unjustified
>in claiming that such a presupposition is false since consciousness is
>a precondition of that denial.
The proposition that a given person is conscious certainly _is_
falsifiable, though the proposition that no-one is conscious isn't.
> You want to test out Rand's ethics?
>Look at people you have known. Who lives better lives? Thieves? Slaves?
>Murderers? Liars? Dictators? Or honest free independent men?
Well in many places in the world murderers, liars, dictators
and thieves _do_ have the best lives. Look at Somalia for example.
> When you
>look at social systems, which promote the lives of the citizens? Fascism?
>Monarchy? Socialism? Military dictatorship? or Capitalist Republics?
An individual need not have any concern about the wellbeing of the
populace as a whole. Monarchs usually live better than the average
American citizen.
Gregg
--
Gregg Jaeger (jaeger@buphy) Dept. of Physics (and Philosophy), Boston Univ.
"You see, the quantum mechanical description is in terms of knowledge" -Peierls
"One can _not_ put the psi-function... in place of the... thing" -Schroedinger
"You may _not_ touch my monkey" -Dieter
Paul Barton-Davis
>pa...@cs.washington.edu (Paul Barton-Davis) writes:
>| Since it seems rather meaningless to use moral terms like
>| self-interest in the context of genotypic frequency, I suggest that we
>| drop this line of argument.
>
>investigation in politics. Suppose the sociobiologists
>are at least partly right, and we have coding for
>altruism and also less pleasant forms of communal
>behavior in our genes: a politics which does not
>deal with this coding [ ... ] is doomed to disaster.
>
>I suspect it is the intuitive apprehension of such
>emotions which leads people to believe that theories
>based on rational self-interest are naive or
>irrelevant.
I didn't mean to imply that the notion of some social behaviour having
its root in biochemistry was irrelevant. I meant merely that
discussing it in terms of "the self-interest of the organism" was
pointless. Either talk about frequency in the genepool, or about
morality, but don't imagine that the two are equivalent, even if they
are, in fact, related.
Eric Forbis
>Path: news.cis.umn.edu!umn.edu!spool.mu.edu!caen!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!darwin.sura.net!haven.umd.edu!mimsy!afterlife!tecsun1!descartes.tec.army.mil!riggs
>From: ri...@descartes.tec.army.mil (Bill Riggs)
>Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
>Subject: Re: The Enduring Rand (was: Re: Theory?)
>Message-ID: <15...@tecsun1.tec.army.mil>
>Date: 10 Nov 92 00:48:08 GMT
>References: <1992Nov6.1...@panix.com> <BxBLJ...@apollo.hp.com> <921107...@rgm.com>
>Sender: ne...@tecsun1.tec.army.mil
>Followup-To: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books
>Organization: LNK Corporation, Riverdale, MD
>Lines: 76
>Nntp-Posting-Host: descartes.tec.army.mil
>In article <921107...@rgm.com> ro...@rgm.com (Ray Mendonsa) writes:
>>nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>
> Some of you all may recall a posting I did a few weeks back which
>identified most non-liberal political ideologies (i.e. Marxism, National
>Socialism, feminism) with the ancient Gnostics. One of the characteristics
I hope you're using the older historical meaning of "liberal", rather than
the leftist politically- correct kiss-my-special-interest-group's-collective-
ass variety of political nonsense that liberalism has deevolved to. Most
Marxists are feminists, and are extremely liberal (in the pejorative sense).
>of Gnosticism is that it definitively prohibits questions from being asked
>(which challenge its basic assumptions). Furthermore, this feature of
>Gnostic thinking enables a particular ideology to be logically consistent,
>but yet incapable of answering those questions it prohibits. Objectivism
>clearly meets these criteria for "Gnostic" thinking. As does libertarianism,
>to whit:
Gnosticism (greek _gnostikos_, knowledge) was a semitic/Judean mystical
tradition that taught that the creator mentioned in Genesis was actually the
devil, that the material world is evil, and that only by meditating on God
(the real one) could you know truth. There were a zillion gnostic cult
variations from about 600-700 BC onward in Israel; the cult was highly
individualistic, and no specific canon was ever formed. Gnosticism doesn't
prohibit the asking of any questions that I'm aware of, and it most
certainly isn't even remotely similar to Objectivism. I don't think that the
gnostics cared much for logic; they were utterly focused on revealed
religion, where the individual undergoes the experience. It survived until
the 1300's in France, where the Knights Templars brought back this "
heretical" creed from their Holy Crusades. This creed, Albigensianism,
became moderately popular in France; the Pope decided that their wealth and
power would be better under his god's control, and uttered the famous "Kill
them all- God will know his own", after which they were massacred. Not Ayn's
type at all.
---------
Eric Forbis forb...@student.tc.umn.edu
Ian Sutherland
>Tell me. Let's say you have iron-clad proof that slave societies are
>more stable or more prolific (genetically) than free ones, would you
>suggest that I submit to slavery even though my life under slavery is
>worse than as a free man? What kind of arguments could you offer? Why should
>I want to clamp on the manacles? What's in it for me?
Let's say you have iron-clad proof that it's somehow "irrational" or
"immoral" for me to sacrifice my life to save that of my child. Would
you suggest that I stand aside and let my child die even though it is
against my nature to do so? You could of course say that the ultimate
benefit to me is negative if I stand aside but am miserable for the
rest of my life because I went against my nature. This just amounts to
defining "altruistic" in such a way that such "superficially
altruistic" actions are in fact selfish. I'd be perfectly happy with
this response. I just want to know if this is your response or not.
Ian Sutherland
dialogue. I did not say "Mr. Yoder speaks of that which he does not
know", or indeed most of the rest of the text he replies to.
In article <BxrAL...@quake.sylmar.ca.us> br...@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>>The concept of
>>biological altruism has been strongly attacked by reductionists, who believe
>>that an altruistic genotype will simply eliminate itself from the gene pool.
>
>That will be true for anything but critters like social insects where
>everyone is geneticall related and intellectual action is unimportant.
You are now making a scientific claim Mr. Yoder. Would you please
tell us your arguments for why there won't be selection for altruistic
behavior in anything but social insects or "critters like" them?
Also, could you please be more specific about what "critters like"
them means? Exactly what biological characteristics determine, in
your view, whether a species can develop a biological disposition
towards altruism?
>Tell me. Let's say you have iron-clad proof that slave societies are
>more stable or more prolific (genetically) than free ones, would you
>suggest that I submit to slavery even though my life under slavery is
>worse than as a free man? What kind of arguments could you offer? Why should
>I want to clamp on the manacles? What's in it for me?
I almost wish I had saved the postings which started all this, because
I can't remember what led me to bring up the topic of the biological
advantage of altruism in the first place. It certainly wasn't an
attempt to show that a biological predisposition to altruism had any
moral consequences.
jimmy donal wales
>Let's say you have iron-clad proof that it's somehow "irrational" or
>"immoral" for me to sacrifice my life to save that of my child. Would
>you suggest that I stand aside and let my child die even though it is
>against my nature to do so? You could of course say that the ultimate
>benefit to me is negative if I stand aside but am miserable for the
>rest of my life because I went against my nature. This just amounts to
>defining "altruistic" in such a way that such "superficially
>altruistic" actions are in fact selfish. I'd be perfectly happy with
>this response. I just want to know if this is your response or not.
No one could ever create some kind of 'iron-clad' proof that it is
somehow "irrational" or "immoral" for someone to sacrifice their life
in an attempt to save those values which make life worth living.
Many 'superficially altruistic' actions ARE in fact selfish.
Many confusions about ethical egoism arise out of a too simplistic view
about what is, in fact, in a person's rational self-interest. Rand's
view of human nature is precisely in line with your intuition here:
eudaimonia (flourishing, the good life) requires full recognition
of the entire context of our life. That includes the irreplacable
value of our own loved ones.
The moral purpose of our lives is to achieve our own happiness. But
such happiness can not be achieved in any old willy-nilly irresponsible
manner. Achieving values sometimes requires taking risks... even very
serious risks with our own lives. I would risk my life to save the
life of my wife, or the life of a few close friends... because they are
so valuable to me that the risk is worth it.
Naive views of human nature lead to silly ideas about altruism being
moral.
--Jimbo
Ian Sutherland
>In article <1992Nov13.2...@eecs.nwu.edu> i...@nasser.eecs.nwu.edu (Ian Sutherland) writes:
>>>In one sense, the actions are detrimental to the life of the organism.
>>>THAT is altruism. In another sense, the actions of the organism amount
>>>to a "trade" in which the net benefit is helpful to the life of the
>>>organism.
>
>
>Well, that depends on the organism. For plants, water, soil, sunlight, and
>protection from being eaten (among other things) contribute to the plant's
>life. For humans, food, tools, shelter, education, companionship, and a
>host of other things are helpful in similar ways. I can't believe that you
>don't the difference between things that lead to life and the things which
>do not. It sounds like you have a deeper question in mind.
I claimed that certain actions that are altruistic "in some sense" are
biologically advantageous. You said some of those actions are a trade
which is not altruistic at all. I should have made myself clearer:
the actions I'm talking about could not be a trade to benefit the
organism performing them. I'm talking about people sacrificing their
own lives to save those of their children. Is there some notion of
"helpful to the life of the organism" with respect to which you think
that this kind of behavior is helpful to the life of the organism?
>>In some
>>examples of the behavior this theory attempts to explain, the organism
>>literally destroys its own life. This is helpful to that organism's
>>genotype, but it's not helpful to the organism's LIFE.
>
>OK. So what? For ants to sacrifice themselves for the good of the colony
>makes sense from an evolutionary point of view. I can understand why the
>genetics of ants would encourage such behavior. But human beings are not
>ants. What's your point.
Human beings are among the organisms I'm talking about.
>
>>At any rate, I think
>>there are more examples of illogical altruistic behavior than are
>>accountable for by sheer illogic among people.
>
>Sure, religion and peer pressure account for a lot of such behavior.
And what accounts for the existence of THOSE things, Mr. Yoder?
Steve Thomas
>
> [...]
> I believe Randiansim is based on
> some variation of Aristotelianism.
Hark! It's the muffled sound of somebody talking through their hat!
________
Steve Thomas
Oliver Sharp
> Most Marxists are feminists,
Ah, but is this in fact true? It depends, of course, on what you mean by
"feminist". Marxism (in its purest form) insists that inequalities in
treatment of workers is caused by an absence of true communism ... i.e. it
has a purely economic basis. This caused a great deal of trouble to the
Soviets, who paid lip service to Marx, because there were clear gender
based inequities in Soviet society. These were caused by a variety of
factors, the most important of which was cultural expectations. In a
society without access to childcare facilities, labor-saving devices,
or good medical service, there is of necessity a large amount of time
devoted to domestic duties. Make the assumption paramount that these
duties devolve entirely on women, include the fact that women were
strongly encouraged to marry and bear (many) children, and top it off with
poor access to contraception, and you have inevitable inequalities that
economic restructuring will not fix.
It is certainly true that Marxism seeks to gainfully employ all workers,
including women, and in this sense it could be termed "feminist". However,
if by "feminism" you mean (as I do) having the goal of raising the lot of
women, by addressing the aspects of society that hold them down or
discriminate against them, then I quarrel with your characterization.
A purely Marxist analysis is incapable of accounting for many of the
characteristics of a complex society. Of course, you might respond that
modern "Marxists" are not so simplisitic. Based on the people I've met
who call themselves Marxist, I'm not convinced ...
- Oliver
Peter Nelson
>In article <BxJx6...@apollo.hp.com> nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>As I've said, I'm a pragmatist. I look for
>} what seems to work. The epistemology that I've chosen has an excellent
>} track record ever since the Enlightenment and is the basis of all modern
>} science.
>
>didn't exist until even later.
The basic methodology existed -- it just didn't get formalized into
and "ism" until later.
>} The bottom line is that logical empiricism works better than anything
>} else.
>
>Not outside the natural sciences, it doesn't, because we can't do controlled
>experiments elsewhere.
This doesn't mean it doesn't work -- it just means that you are
unable/unwilling to use its methods. The bottom line is that it's
the only approach that works.
> In the social sciences, for example, all we have to go on are case studies
> and theories based upon axioms.
Excatly. And look how well the social "sciences" work!
>What I don't like about it is that it's incoherent, thus unsuccessful in
>fields like economics.
It's never been *tried* in economics, for exactly the reasons you
state! It's too hard to set up the appropriate experiments. And
the results are obvious: economics as a science is a joke!
So this is the bottom line: forming testable, falsifiable models
using rigorously defined terms and metrics, and using experiments
and objective metrics to compare those models to reality, and to
refine those models (. . . repeat . . . ) is the only methodology
that humans have ever devised with a consistent track record for
getting at the truth or resolving differences of opinion about
reality.
It does not follow from this that because people have thus far
been unable/unwilling to apply these methods to certain areas
that this methodology is wrong or flawed, or even inapplicable.
That would be like saying that because science has not yet found
a cure for AIDS that witch doctors or sacrifices to various
deities are a better bet than science for future investigations.
---peter
James F. Hranicky
>investigation in politics. Suppose the sociobiologists
>are at least partly right, and we have coding for
>altruism and also less pleasant forms of communal
>behavior in our genes: a politics which does not
>deal with this coding, which will express itself
>most likely as very powerful, irrational emotions,
>like those associated with sex, is doomed to
>failure -- to disaster.
>
>I suspect it is the intuitive apprehension of such
>emotions which leads people to believe that theories
>based on rational self-interest are naive or
>irrelevant.
>--
>
> )*( Gordon Fitch )*( g...@panix.com )*(
>( 1238 Blg. Grn. Sta., NY NY 10274 * 718.273.5556 )
Seems to me that a society based on rational self-interest would take
any "coding" into account *if* such coding exists. In other words, if
this is "coded" genetically into people's personalities, then it will be
in their rational self-interest to help others. Whether it is coded or not
is beside the point. If it is coded, however, then enforcing it at the
point of a gun is unnecessary.
Some people seem to think that a society based on rational self-interest
would remove compassion. Not even close. A society based on allowing
each individual to lead his life according to his rational self-interest
would simply remove compassion *forced* upon others at the point of a
gun. People would be free to help others if they so desired, but they
would not be *forced* to.
Many people on the net say something to the effect that living by the
principles of individual rights is to "simple" for such a complex world.
But it seems to me that this is the best way to handle such a complex
world. Each person is different, and should be left free to decide what
is best for him, rather than letting others do it for him, or having others
do it for him regardless of his will.
So, a politics based on rational self-interest would certainly deal with
any individual`s need to help others, and as far as I am concerned, would
eventually be relatively free from violent actions based on irrational
emotions.
Jim Hranicky (j...@reef.cis.ufl.edu)
James F. Hranicky
>> When you look at social systems, which promote the lives of the
>> citizens? Fascism? Monarchy? Socialism? Military dictatorship?
>> or Capitalist Republics?
>
> But all you're doing is building the argument for pragmatism, and
> Rand hated pragmatism.
>
I belive this shows you know less about Rand's ideas than you claim.
The pragmatism that Rand hated was the short-sighted "do whatever works
for the short run, don't think about the consequences, don't think
long term, just act now" type of attitude. I pointed out here on
the net last week (I don't know if it made it) that von Mises was
a fierce advocate of capitalism because he knew that it worked best.
However, because he held this belief, he became a very *principled* man,
unyielding and uncompromising in his espousal of capitalism. What von
Mises advocated was *long-term* pragmatism--what works best in the long run
for the largest amount of people. While Rand probably still had problems
with this, she and the Objectivists whose works I've read still had and
have great respect for von Mises. What the Objectivists despise is the
*short-term* pragmatism.
>>Again I have to ask whether you are aware of the objectivist argument
>>in favor of it's ethics? Are you making the claim that there are no
>>ethical positions any better or worse than any others? Say, that the
>>ethical ideas of Charlie Manson are no better or worse than yours?
>
> Again, this begs the question we're discussing here which is "on
> what basis can we say that one set of ethical ideas is better or
> worse than another?" I certainly *prefer* my ideas to Manson's
> but this is subjectivism. I can argue that a society based on
> Mansonic principles would not work as well as one based on my
> ideas, but even if that's true it's just pragmatism.
>
> So in absolute terms no I do NOT claim that my ethics are better
> than Manson's. However, as I've pointed out before, the lack
> of objective ethics is a double-edged blade: Just as I would
> argue that the Jews and others had no absolute right to not be
> subject to force and fraud by the NAZIs, likewise I would argue
> that the NAZIs had no right to not be subject to force and fraud
> by us. Ethics-as-social-convention, where that convention is
> sometimes enforced by force, is a simple, consistent model which
> easily accounts for all of this without resorting to metaphysics.
>
>
>---peter
The basis for deciding which ethical premise is better is its effect
on all individuals in the long run. Which set of ethics allows the greatest
amount of opportunity for each individual to live his life as he sees fit?
Obviously, this is a society based on idividual rights--each person has the
equal guarantee that force will not be initiated against him. This society
is *objective*, in that no one person is granted more rights or priveleges
than another--each person will be equally free to pursue his own happiness,
and equally constrained from initiating force.
The Nazis deserved to be the target of retaliatory force, as they were
engaged in wholesale binges of intiatory force.
So in absolute terms, I DO claim Manson's (or Hitler's, or any form of
statist's) ethics are bad, and consequently worse than ethics
based on individual rights, as they grant power over the lives of some
individuals to others.
Jim Hranicky (j...@reef.cis.ufl.edu
Brian K. Yoder
But that is quite true. Rand often pointed to Aristotle as providing
the foundations for many of her ideas.
--Brian
Tim Starr
}In article <1992Nov15.1...@genie.slhs.udel.edu> st...@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
}>In article <BxJx6...@apollo.hp.com> nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
}>As I've said, I'm a pragmatist. I look for
}>} what seems to work. The epistemology that I've chosen has an excellent
}>} track record ever since the Enlightenment and is the basis of all modern
}>} science.
}>
}>Pragmatism didn't even exist until the late 19th century. Logical positivism
}>didn't exist until even later.
}
} The basic methodology existed -- it just didn't get formalized into
} and "ism" until later.
There's plenty of reason to believe that the founders of positivism such as
Saint-Simon and Comte were mostly ignorant of the practice of natural science,
and that their attempt to capture it failed. See Hayek's "The Counter-
Revolution of Science" on this.
}>} The bottom line is that logical empiricism works better than anything
}>} else.
}>
}>Not outside the natural sciences, it doesn't, because we can't do controlled
}>experiments elsewhere.
}
} This doesn't mean it doesn't work -- it just means that you are
} unable/unwilling to use its methods. The bottom line is that it's
} the only approach that works.
If it's impossible to apply the methods of the natural sciences, as Hayek
and many others have argued, then this indeed mean that they don't work.
How could they possibly work where they can't be applied?
Furthermore, the praxaeological method works fine for the purpose of
explaining such things as why diamonds have a higher price than water.
So, once again, your claims have been falsified, unless you challenge my
rebuttals. Thus far, you appear to fit the positivist stereotype: you don't
know what you're talking about in any depth whatsoever.
}> In the social sciences, for example, all we have to go on are case studies
}> and theories based upon axioms.
}
} Excatly. And look how well the social "sciences" work!
}
}
}>What I don't like about it is that it's incoherent, thus unsuccessful in
}>fields like economics.
}
} It's never been *tried* in economics, for exactly the reasons you
} state! It's too hard to set up the appropriate experiments. And
} the results are obvious: economics as a science is a joke!
Again you reveal your ignorance. Milton Friedman is probably the most famous
person to attempt economics with a positivist method. Many, if not most,
present economists are positivists. They use historical case studies in
place of controlled experiments, assume a determinist rational utility-
maximizer theory of man ("homo oeconomicus"), make falsifiable and testable
claims, and are largely responsible for the sad state of economic illiteracy
we're in.
However, the growth of the Austrian or market-process school is accelerating.
It does quite well without your vaunted positivism.
} It does not follow from this that because people have thus far
} been unable/unwilling to apply these methods to certain areas
} that this methodology is wrong or flawed, or even inapplicable.
} That would be like saying that because science has not yet found
} a cure for AIDS that witch doctors or sacrifices to various
} deities are a better bet than science for future investigations.
You're assuming that it's potentially possibly for there to be controlled
experiments in the social sciences, which it isn't. Only then could you
hold this analogy. We can do controlled experiments in the attempt to test
the hypothesis that AIDS is caused by HIV, for example (we've never found a
cure for ANY virus, by the way). We don't, but we could.
However, witch doctors and sacrifices to deities would work about as well as
the AIDS treatments which have been promulgated by the National Institute of
Health, so on your pragmatist grounds you must grant them equal truth.
Throughout your claims you rely on implicit assumptions inconsistent with
them. Logic isn't falsifiable, so you should reject it in order to not be
a hypocrite, for example.
jimmy donal wales
> Logic does not represent a set of scientific *conclusions* so it doesn't
> HAVE to be. The "rules" that we call logic (i.e., the axioms and
> methods of deriving theorems) are (to be tautological) "axiomatic".
> I.e., we have already agreed upon them as a practical matter. You'll
> notice that even Rand hardly ever violates them (except with "a=a"
> which is unabashedly tautological and which any decent optimizing
> compiler would optimize out of existence). We are not discussing
> whether logic is valid, we are discussing whether Rand is logical.
I think that we should all interpret this last sentence as a
description of intension on the part of Peter Nelson. We can
reasonably assume that he _intends_ to be talking about whether
or not Rand is logical.
Unfortunately, his words tell a different story. I find the previous
paragraph to be, for the most part, a telling confession on Peter's
part that he understands neither Rand nor logic nor the foundations
of scientific knowledge nor... I could go on and on.
What Peter winds up discussing, ad infinitum, is his own ignorance.
--Jimbo
Don Pajerek
>In article <1992Nov19.0...@genie.slhs.udel.edu> st...@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>>In article <Bxv9L...@apollo.hp.com> nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>
>>However, the growth of the Austrian or market-process school is accelerating.
>>It does quite well without your vaunted positivism.
>
> industrial production, etc?
>
Scientific theories need not predict, though many do. What they must do
is explain.
Don Pajerek
Standard disclaimers apply.
Peter Nelson
I notice this as a recurring theme of both Mr. Starr and Mr. Wales:
they attack posters who criticize their views but make no attempt to
defend Rand's positions. They have had ample opportunity here
to try to construct a cogent defense of her ideas, methods, or even
any one particular term or definition. Note, for instance, that both
have completely retreated from any effort to define "rational" or
"reason" in any terms that can de measured or even detected.
Both have also retreated from any effort to defend Rand's utter
*leap* to the conclusion that removing what is central to one's
survival (reason, freedom, oxygen, whatever) has any moral
significance at all in an absolute or transcendent sense.
I've argued with religionists (Christians, Moslems, etc) about
contradictions, silliness and so forth in their religions who
would claim that my arguments meant I "didn't understand"
their religions, either. Because to a follower of a True
Faith to "understand" something is to have internalized their
belief. It has nothing to do with being able to mount a cogent
defense of it.
---peter
Charley Wingate
> This [Tim Starr's observations on economics] is a bit like saying that
> science doesn't work because we don't have a cure for AIDS. Just because
> someone has attempted and failed to grasp something scientifically does
> not invalidate science.
One might observe that, on these terms, science cannot be "invalidated" (i.e.,
no area of knowledge can be put outside the scope of natural science).
Surely this means that such invalidation is beside the point. In the case
of economics, one might argue quite strongly that the economy is necessarily
a moving target and that as such it is not truly amenable to scientific
study. One might also point to Galbraith's observations that economic
theory finds itself in a tension between affirming the prosperous and
cleaming up after the messes they leave.
> Logic does not represent a set of scientific *conclusions* so it doesn't
> HAVE to be.
The *use* of logic, however, is predicated on assertions about the
orderliness of the domain of its use. It's also dependent on putting one's
cards on the table.
Tim Starr
} I notice this as a recurring theme of both Mr. Starr and Mr. Wales:
} they attack posters who criticize their views but make no attempt to
} defend Rand's positions. They have had ample opportunity here
} to try to construct a cogent defense of her ideas, methods, or even
} any one particular term or definition. Note, for instance, that both
} have completely retreated from any effort to define "rational" or
} "reason" in any terms that can de measured or even detected.
You've yet to make any breach in Objectivism to require any defense. Your
charge: things like rationality and reason can't be measured quantitatively.
So what? Why should they be? Your answer to this: because that's what
science is or should be. We've cited evidence which disproves, even falsifies
this desriptive claim, and proceeded to the implicit normative claim, which
has no justification that I know of, nor have you attempted to provide any.
You merely reiterate some of the cliche ritual cant of positivism dogmatically,
perfectly fitting the stereotype of a member of your school of thought.
Peter Nelson
>In article <Bxz04...@apollo.hp.com> nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>}>and many others have argued, then this indeed mean that they don't work.
>}
>} babies and divide them into study and control groups and perform
>} experiments of their personality or social development
>
>No, I'm denying that any factor, X, could be proven to necessarily cause
>behavior, Y, because of the fact that humans are volitional, another thing
>you deny, not only making you a positivist but a believer in psychological
>determinism.
This is a nonsequitor. Neurological systems are not closed loops and
according to QM theory the universe contains nondeterministoc events,
so I cetrainly can't be accused of "psychological determinism". Actually,
since I claim there is no decent science of psychology I can't be accused
of any position about what determines human behavior.
>Lets review: you claimed that positivism's never been tried in economics.
Really? Quote the posting in question. What I said was that there
is/was no science of economics. The fact that people have tried and
failed to generate rigorous economic models in no way invalidates my
claim. Science, as I said before, is nothing more than an effort
to create conceptual, theoretical models of the real world and
verify/refine those models with appropriate tests or experiments.
Positivism is not science; it's just an occasionally employed philo-
sophical underpinning. That's why I refer to it and it's cousin,
logical empiricism, as "fellow travelers" of science.
>cited evidence which refutes your claim. Thus it has been, dare I say it,
>FALSIFIED!
Since I never claimed that it had never been tried, it is your
refutation that is false.
>Quantitative prediction is outside the scope of economics. However, history
>combined with the theory of human action does lead to the prediction that
>we'll be looking at double-digit price inflation within a few years.
Except that any of a number of models make the same prediction. And
all of them are predicated on the same assumption: that the national
debt will be monetized. If the assumption holds true then the prediction
is trivial, and no more validates the Austrian school than predicting
a sudden decline in the deer population on a tiny island following the
detonation of a thermonuclear device on it, would validate some ecological
theory.
---peter
Peter Nelson
>You've yet to make any breach in Objectivism to require any defense. Your
>charge: things like rationality and reason can't be measured quantitatively.
>So what? Why should they be?
Because otherwise you have no way of verifying that your theories
describe anything about the real world.
> Your answer to this: because that's what science is or should be.
As you can see, above, this is incorrect.
If you don't define your terms precisely then how do you know whether
what Rand says has anything to do with reality? If I make the
claim that e=mc^2 and someone expresses doubt about this, the fact
that the terms and conditions are clearly defined create the conditions
for verifying my claim. If Rand (or Starr or Wales) makes the claim
that "man is rational", in the lack of a metric for rationality,
how do you propose this claim be verified?
---peter
Tim Starr
}In article <1992Nov20.0...@genie.slhs.udel.edu> st...@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
}>In article <Bxz04...@apollo.hp.com> nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
}>}>If it's impossible to apply the methods of the natural sciences, as Hayek
}>}>and many others have argued, then this indeed mean that they don't work.
}>}
}>} Are you saying *it's impossible* to round up thousands of newborn
}>} babies and divide them into study and control groups and perform
}>} experiments of their personality or social development
}>
}>No, I'm denying that any factor, X, could be proven to necessarily cause
}>behavior, Y, because of the fact that humans are volitional, another thing
}>you deny, not only making you a positivist but a believer in psychological
}>determinism.
}
} This is a nonsequitor.
Translation: Peter can't follow it. Suppose you conduct the "experiment"
you propose, and you observe that some of them exhibit behavior X. How can
you determine what caused it? How can you control for volition? How can
you then formulate a hypothesis of: If X, then babies behave Y?
}>Lets review: you claimed that positivism's never been tried in economics.
}
} Really? Quote the posting in question.
Please! I don't save your posts, and I'm certainly not going to search for
the quote you made. It was bad enough reading you the first time. I don't
care about persuading you anymore. You're bloody hopeless. I just want to
ensure that innocents won't be suckered into taking your claims seriously.
}>Quantitative prediction is outside the scope of economics. However, history
}>combined with the theory of human action does lead to the prediction that
}>we'll be looking at double-digit price inflation within a few years.
}
} Except that any of a number of models make the same prediction. And
} all of them are predicated on the same assumption: that the national
} debt will be monetized. If the assumption holds true then the prediction
} is trivial, and no more validates the Austrian school than predicting
} a sudden decline in the deer population on a tiny island following the
} detonation of a thermonuclear device on it, would validate some ecological
} theory.
Like which "models"? How are they distinct from praxaeology? Since when is
there a standard in your proposal from which to obtain such a measurement as
"trivial". What's your metric? How is triviality quantified?
N E Horne
>} If Rand (or Starr or Wales) makes the claim
>} that "man is rational", in the lack of a metric for rationality,
>} how do you propose this claim be verified?
>Introspect to see if you behave purposively; see if the behavior of others
>matches the external characterstics of your purposive behavior. If so, then
>the subject being observed is behaving rationally.
Sounds a bit like a half-hearted Turing test going on here. Surely
"purposive" behaviour is neither unique (cf. the lives of higher primates,
bees and ants) nor essential (e.g the "man on the Clapham omnibus", who commutesto and fro each day with little purpose other than the monthly acquisition of a salary cheque, and a little hedonism added in between) to "man".
The objectivist characterisation of "man as a rational
animal" is either too inclusive (if a weak notion of rationality is entertained)or too exclusive otherwise. At best, it could provide a statement of how we
*ought* to be, but the requirement of rationality (weak or otherwise) seems
rather arbitrary.
Neil Horne ( 'scuse the bad formatting )
Charley Wingate
>Yet this is patently false for other sciences such as biology or economics,
>as we've shown. They remain verifiable sans quantitative measurement.
I see little evidence of any verification of economics, which, incidentally,
is eminently quantitative.
Tim Starr
}>Introspect to see if you behave purposively; see if the behavior of others
}>matches the external characterstics of your purposive behavior. If so, then
}>the subject being observed is behaving rationally.
}
}Sounds a bit like a half-hearted Turing test going on here. Surely
}"purposive" behaviour is neither unique (cf. the lives of higher primates,
}bees and ants) nor essential (e.g the "man on the Clapham omnibus", who commutesto and fro each day with little purpose other than the monthly acquisition of a salary cheque, and a little hedonism added in between) to "man".
According to the strict definition of "purposive," it is essential to man.
No other species of animal has ever been shown capable of it as far as I know,
including attempts at chimpanzee sign language teaching.
}The objectivist characterisation of "man as a rational
}animal" is either too inclusive (if a weak notion of rationality is entertained)or too exclusive otherwise. At best, it could provide a statement of how we
}*ought* to be, but the requirement of rationality (weak or otherwise) seems
}rather arbitrary.
It isn't merely Objectivist, but Aristotelian, so this definition is shared
throughout the Aristotelian tradition, albeit with possible exceptions. He
put it in Greek over 2 millenia ago: man is a "zoon logikon."
It doesn't mean that we're always totally rational, it means that we have
a rational faculty, the capacity or power of reason - conceptual identifi-
cation of the evidence of the senses. With it, we can do syllogisms, create
Art, invent life-saving drugs, generate electricity, develop ethical,
legal, and political notions of rights, and recognize them.
Without reason, we'd be little more than hairless apes, and perhaps less.
Peter Nelson
>Yet this is patently false for other sciences such as biology or economics,
>as we've shown. They remain verifiable sans quantitative measurement.
Shows what Mr. Starr knows about biology -- modern biology is based
on chemistry and physics. You won't see too many biology papers published
in peer-reviewd journals that don't have "quantitative verification".
As for economics -- this is hilarious. Since when is economics a
"science"? Economics is about as scientific as art appreciation!
>} If you don't define your terms precisely then how do you know whether
>} what Rand says has anything to do with reality?
>
>Precision is distinct from quantitative measurement.
Not in the sciences it isn't. How do you specify HOW precise
your model is without using a number?
>} If Rand (or Starr or Wales) makes the claim
>} that "man is rational", in the lack of a metric for rationality,
>} how do you propose this claim be verified?
>
>Introspect to see if you behave purposively;
Ahh, "introspection". Like, "look into your heart and see if Jesus
isn't really there". Right. Real rigorous. If I introspect
about Ralph Von William's music I find it to be beautiful and
moving. So I guess that proves it! Clearly al those other
people who think it's auditory wallpaper just didn't introspect
hard enough!
---peter
Peter Nelson
>In article <By0pp...@apollo.hp.com> nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>}In article <1992Nov20.0...@genie.slhs.udel.edu> st...@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>}>In article <Bxz04...@apollo.hp.com> nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>}>}>If it's impossible to apply the methods of the natural sciences, as Hayek
>}>}>and many others have argued, then this indeed mean that they don't work.
>}>}
>}>} Are you saying *it's impossible* to round up thousands of newborn
>}>} babies and divide them into study and control groups and perform
>}>} experiments of their personality or social development
>}>
>}>No, I'm denying that any factor, X, could be proven to necessarily cause
>}>behavior, Y, because of the fact that humans are volitional, another thing
>}>you deny, not only making you a positivist but a believer in psychological
>}>determinism.
>}
>} This is a nonsequitor.
>
>Translation: Peter can't follow it.
It's a nonsequitor because determinism is not the only alternative
to free will. I.e., the universe has nondetermistic events.
Also, you haven't *established* the "the fact that humans are volitional".
How do you account for such a "fact", given human biology? If the
brain is nothing but physics/chemistry where does the free will come
from? I can see where determined events would arise; I can see
where nondetermined events would arise; but free will? An immortal
soul, maybe?
> Suppose you conduct the "experiment" you propose, and you observe that
> some of them exhibit behavior X. How cany you determine what caused it?
> How can you control for volition? How can you then formulate a hypothesis
> of: If X, then babies behave Y?
The same way you do in any other experiment. What's the big deal?
---peter
jimmy donal wales
Peter Nelson writes:
>>} This is a nonsequitor.
Tim Starr responds:
>>Translation: Peter can't follow it.
Peter repeats:
> It's a nonsequitor because determinism is not the only alternative
> to free will. I.e., the universe has nondetermistic events.
Peter: the Latin term you are groping for is 'non sequitur'.
Note that this is TWO words, the second ending with 'ur'.
The Objectivist position on free will is elaborated in a recent
article by Harry Binswanger, "Volition as Cognitive Self-Regulation"
in _Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes_, December
1991.
Unless I've misinterpreted either Randall Holmes or the Objectivist
theory, then Randall's explanation of free will (in which free will
is not inconsistent with which might be called 'deterministic
causality') as epistemological is the Objectivist view. In any case,
I agree with Randall's view.
--Jimbo
Gordon Fitch
| How do you account for such a "fact", given human biology? If the
| brain is nothing but physics/chemistry where does the free will come
| from? I can see where determined events would arise; I can see
| where nondetermined events would arise; but free will? An immortal
It's easy to account for free will by supposing that
existence wills itself into being. Will, in this view,
is the primordial fact of the universe. And this is
consistent with the definition of free will as will
which is not caused by something else.
In this view, human biology, physics, and chemistry
are simply manifestations of some mind or other. As
would be an immortal soul, if anyone came across one.
Note that the primordial-will theory is consistent
with our immmediate perceptions and experience, while
the "facts" of physics, chemistry, biology, the
determination of events, and so forth, are objects
constructed upon sensation, and, generally,
language, and are therefore -- I would think --
rather suspect.
Brian K. Yoder
>In article <By4CE...@casper.cs.uct.ac.za> nho...@casper.cs.uct.ac.za (N E Horne) writes:
>}>Introspect to see if you behave purposively; see if the behavior of others
>}>matches the external characterstics of your purposive behavior. If so, then
>}>the subject being observed is behaving rationally.
>}Sounds a bit like a half-hearted Turing test going on here. Surely
>}"purposive" behaviour is neither unique (cf. the lives of higher primates,
>}bees and ants) nor essential (e.g the "man on the Clapham omnibus", who
>}commutes to and fro each day with little purpose other than the monthly
>}acquisition of a salary cheque, and a little hedonism added in between) to
>}"man".
>According to the strict definition of "purposive," it is essential to man.
Absolutely not! All living things exhibit purposive behavior. It is possible
to say that "Plants grow away from the direction of gravity IN ORDER TO reach
a light source." or "Cheetahs run after antelopes IN ORDER TO eat them.".
Inanimate changes such as rocks rolling down hill cannot be said to move
"IN ORDER TO" reach the foot of the hill.
>No other species of animal has ever been shown capable of it as far as I know,
>including attempts at chimpanzee sign language teaching.
Chimps are perfectly capable of purposive behavior. What they are not
capable of is concept formation. You need to get your terms straight.
Rand did not take the position you described.
>}The objectivist characterisation of "man as a rational
>}animal" is either too inclusive (if a weak notion of rationality is
>}entertained)or too exclusive otherwise. At best, it could provide a
>}statement of how we
>}*ought* to be, but the requirement of rationality (weak or otherwise) seems
>It isn't merely Objectivist, but Aristotelian, so this definition is shared
>throughout the Aristotelian tradition, albeit with possible exceptions. He
>put it in Greek over 2 millenia ago: man is a "zoon logikon."
>It doesn't mean that we're always totally rational, it means that we have
>a rational faculty, the capacity or power of reason - conceptual identifi-
>cation of the evidence of the senses. With it, we can do syllogisms, create
>Art, invent life-saving drugs, generate electricity, develop ethical,
>legal, and political notions of rights, and recognize them.
We are "rational animals" in the same sense as rattlesnakes are "poisonous
reptiles". The claim is not that this is the only thing true about
rattle snakes, nor that rattle snakes do nothing but exhibit their
poisonousness.
--Brian
Mike Godwin
>Chimps are perfectly capable of purposive behavior. What they are not
>capable of is concept formation.
What's your source for this claim? (You should probably define "concept"
while you're at it.)
--Mike
--
Mike Godwin, |"I can solve this Orient Express thing without
mnem...@eff.org| breaking a sweat. It's that simple."
(617) 864-0665 |
EFF, Cambridge | --Hercule Perot
Peter Nelson
>nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>| ...
>| Also, you haven't *established* the "the fact that humans are volitional".
>| How do you account for such a "fact", given human biology? If the
>| brain is nothing but physics/chemistry where does the free will come
>| from? I can see where determined events would arise; I can see
>| where nondetermined events would arise; but free will? An immortal
>| soul, maybe? ...
>
>It's easy to account for free will by supposing that
>existence wills itself into being.
Sure, it's easy to "account" for any A by assuming A already
exists.
I guess I meant, by "account": how do square the assumption of
free will with what we already know or believe we know about
the universe?
---peter
Peter Nelson
>Chimps are perfectly capable of purposive behavior. What they are not
>capable of is concept formation.
Care to explain this? All a "concept" consists of is a set of general
attributes associated with some taxon or other category so that when a
new instance of that item is encountered it can be recognized and
interacted-with appropriately. Once a cat has learned the concept
of a "door" it can can recognize new doors it has never before seen and
push it open, or meow outside of it, or whatever.
Just about any animal with a neocortex can do such things -- that's one
of the basic aspects of learning. They may not develop a metaphysics
but let's not flatter ourselves in thinking that we are the only animals
whose behavior goes beyond mere instinct and reflex. Chimps and cats and
dogs are not planaria worms.
---peter
Tim Starr
}In article <1992Nov21.1...@genie.slhs.udel.edu> st...@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
}>Yet this is patently false for other sciences such as biology or economics,
}>as we've shown. They remain verifiable sans quantitative measurement.
}
} Shows what Mr. Starr knows about biology -- modern biology is based
} on chemistry and physics. You won't see too many biology papers published
in peer-reviewd journals that don't have "quantitative verification".
Observe the context-dropping: prediction was under discussion. The claim
was that predictions needn't be quantitative in biology, as in the case of
evolutionary theory, which didn't even make any predictions for some time.
Consistency would require that Petey Positivist now deny that this would
be an example of a truly "scientific" theory by his norms. This would leave
him vulnerable to defending his normative theory of science, which would
contradict his position that normative theory is "non-cognitive" as those
positivists who at least knew what they were talking about, like A.J. Ayer,
called it.
Expect continued hypocritical evasion from this subject.
} As for economics -- this is hilarious. Since when is economics a
} "science"? Economics is about as scientific as art appreciation!
N.B. the further reliance on the prejudice of what does and doesn't constitute
"science," which now appears to exclude the social sciences entirely.
}>Precision is distinct from quantitative measurement.
}
} Not in the sciences it isn't. How do you specify HOW precise
} your model is without using a number?
And yet again.
} Ahh, "introspection". Like, "look into your heart and see if Jesus
} isn't really there". Right. Real rigorous. If I introspect
} about Ralph Von William's music I find it to be beautiful and
} moving. So I guess that proves it! Clearly al those other
} people who think it's auditory wallpaper just didn't introspect
} hard enough!
Note the prejudice against the possibility of there being any universal
introspective conclusion, such as the purposefulness of agents.
Expect to see such responses as: "Claiming you aren't purposeful is
purposeful" to be rejected with repeated assertions that axioms are
"tautological" and thus meaningless.
Tim Starr
} It's a nonsequitor because determinism is not the only alternative
} to free will. I.e., the universe has nondetermistic events.
Observe the purpose of the tactic of introducing this claim, which is the
subject of much controversy and little agreement among physicists: to permit
the positivist to rebut denials of it with the appeal to the authority of
these very same physicists. Upon pointing out the controversy, the positivist
will dismiss any who disagree with him by asserting that the dissent is
"unscientific," once again resorting to the hidden normative theory of
science which contradicts the positivists position that normative claims are
non-cognitive.
} Also, you haven't *established* the "the fact that humans are volitional".
} How do you account for such a "fact", given human biology? If the
} brain is nothing but physics/chemistry where does the free will come
} from? I can see where determined events would arise; I can see
} where nondetermined events would arise; but free will? An immortal
} soul, maybe?
Observe the appeal to opponents that they remedy the ignorance of the
positivist. Note that this is a well-known topic of philosophical study,
and that if the positivist had any true desire to learn about it he could
begin with a trip to his local library.
}> Suppose you conduct the "experiment" you propose, and you observe that
}> some of them exhibit behavior X. How cany you determine what caused it?
}> How can you control for volition? How can you then formulate a hypothesis
}> of: If X, then babies behave Y?
}
} The same way you do in any other experiment. What's the big deal?
Note the positivists' determinist expectation that agents must respond to
factor X with similar behavior.
Gordon Fitch
| >| ...
| >| Also, you haven't *established* the "the fact that humans are volitional".
| >| How do you account for such a "fact", given human biology? If the
| >| brain is nothing but physics/chemistry where does the free will come
| >| from? I can see where determined events would arise; I can see
| >| where nondetermined events would arise; but free will? An immortal
| >| soul, maybe? ...
g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
| >It's easy to account for free will by supposing that
| >existence wills itself into being.
pn:
| Sure, it's easy to "account" for any A by assuming A already
| exists.
|
| I guess I meant, by "account": how do square the assumption of
| free will with what we already know or believe we know about
| the universe?
What we know about the universe starts with our experience:
of being, of will, of phenomena, of thought. Those are what
is real. The idea that the universe does _not_ exhibit will,
that it is either determined or accidental, must be
constructed in contradiction to our primary experience. I
see no reason to do this, since it produces silly questions
like "if the universe is a determined, mechanical being,
then who started it up?" or "if the universe is an accident,
how come its parts have such complicated relationships?"
Frank O'Dwyer
There's nothing to square. There is no inconsistency. Whether an apple
falls because it has to, or because it wants to, is not present in the data
of what an apple does.
>---peter
--
Frank....@ap.mchp.sni.de "You take slaves when you make us free,
when you make us free your way"
World Party - 'Ain't going to come til I'm ready'
Paul Barton-Davis
> The claim
>was that predictions needn't be quantitative in biology, as in the case of
>evolutionary theory, which didn't even make any predictions for some time.
>Consistency would require that Petey Positivist now deny that this would
>be an example of a truly "scientific" theory by his norms.
Most scientists would tell you that in fact, there is no binary
divison between a "scientific theory" and a "nonscientific theory".
Instead, any given theory can move through stages of reliability and
certainty, with the movement being both up and down.
Evolution is a good example of this, in that many scientists have
continued to express some disquiet over its status as a "scientific
theory", even while simultaneously agreeing that its the best thing we
have to date.
Anyway, all this has changed with the arrival of Artificial Life. You
can now watch evolution in action, in real time. Whether or not you
believe that such examples justify the extension of this proof to the
emergence of biological systems is to some extent a scientific
question and to some extent a question of faith.
But lets stop pretending that something either is or is not "science".
-- paul
--
hybrid rather than pure; compromising rather than clean; distorted
rather than straightforward; ambiguous rather than articulated;
both-and rather than either-or; the difficult unity of inclusion
rather than the easy unity of exclusion.
James P. H. Fuller
>hybrid rather than pure; compromising rather than clean; distorted
>rather than straightforward; ambiguous rather than articulated;
>both-and rather than either-or; the difficult unity of inclusion
>rather than the easy unity of exclusion.
Sounds like the East River. Quick, call the Sierra Club before
something rises out of the compost....
-- jf
Ron Nadel
>Evolution is a good example of this, in that many scientists have
>continued to express some disquiet over its status as a "scientific
>theory", even while simultaneously agreeing that its the best thing we
>have to date.
A point of detail: evolution is not considered to be a theory in the
scientific community. That organisms have evolved is a fact proven with
the fossil record. Natural Selection is the theory I think you are
actually alluding to here (the theory that seeks to explain the
mechanism for evolution). "The Theory of Evolution" is something
that we have common misuse to thank for.
>But lets stop pretending that something either is or is not "science".
There is definately a line that can be drawn between what is science and
what is not. Science is not a body of facts so much as a process, or
"method" if you will, of explaining. Guesses that can be subjected to
this process are scientific theories (the results determine if they are
correct or not), guesses that cannot be tested by this method are not.
Ron
Gordon Fitch
| Free will, in the sense in which humans have it, is important for
| robots as well. A successful robot will require an attitude toward
| its possible actions similar to that taken by humans. This was
| discussed in 1969 in McCarthy and Hayes "Some Philosophical Problems from
| the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence". It is reprinted in various
| AI readers and in my Formalizing Common Sense, Ablex 1991.
How would you implement free will in a robot? This is
not a rhetorical question; I'm interested in the idea,
but I'm not sure what you mean.
Tim Starr
}to say that "Plants grow away from the direction of gravity IN ORDER TO reach
}a light source." or "Cheetahs run after antelopes IN ORDER TO eat them.".
}Inanimate changes such as rocks rolling down hill cannot be said to move
}"IN ORDER TO" reach the foot of the hill.
Oh, dear. Brian, for someone who professes to be an Objectivist, your
knowledge thereof is deficient. Perhaps we can take a short cut past
citing the Oxford English Dictionary by going to a source which you would
presumably take to be authoritative: Rand's discussion of goal-oriented
behavior as contrasted from purposive behavior in "The Objectivist Ethics,"
reprinted in the book "The Virtue of Selfishness." You'll discover
that the confusion is yours.
Tim Starr
}le0...@portal.lasc.lockheed.com (Ron Nadel) writes:
}
}>There is definately a line that can be drawn between what is science and
}>what is not. Science is not a body of facts so much as a process, or
}>"method" if you will, of explaining. Guesses that can be subjected to
}>this process are scientific theories (the results determine if they are
}>correct or not), guesses that cannot be tested by this method are not.
}
}clear cases of what is and what is not science and suppressing intermediate
}cases. Chemistry is an experimental science; astrology is not. But several
}fields in which classical controlled experiments are seldom if ever possible
}still claim with justification to be respectable sciences; e.g. cosmology,
}archaeology, palaeontology.
Wouldn't Astronomy also fall into this class? It's amusing to think how
positivists would respond to Galileo: "What do you mean, craters on the
moon? Define your terms so that we can measure them objectively. You
can't verify your claims except by the subjective judgement of people who
look through telescopes!" Etc.
Having let the nose of the camel of non-experi-
}mental science into the tent, we are less certain which parts of him we
}should spurn. I myself draw the line at all of sociology and almost all of
}psychology, considering these Velikovskian in spite of their pretense of
}doing experiments.
I'd agree with these, but what's "Velikovskian"?
Jeff Dalton
>Gnostic thinking enables a particular ideology to be logically consistent,
>but yet incapable of answering those questions it prohibits. Objectivism
>clearly meets these criteria for "Gnostic" thinking. As does libertarianism,
Julian Jaynes had something worthwhile to say about something in this
general area when discussing "scientisms" (marxism, psychoanalysis,
etc.) in his _Origin of Consciousness_ (based in part on George
Steiner's account of "mythologies"):
... They differ from classical science and its common debates
in the way they invoke the same response as did the religions
which they seek to supplant. And they share with religions
many of their most obvious characteristics: a rational splendor
that explains everything, a charismatic leader or succession
of leaders who are highly visible and beyond criticism, a
series of canonical texts ..., certain gestures of idea and
rituals of interpretation, and a requirement of total commitment.
In return the adherent receives what the religions had once given
him more universally: a world view, a hierarchy of importances, and
an auguring place where he may find out what to do and think, in
short, a total explanation of man. And this totality is obtained
not by actually explaining everything, but by an encasement of its
activity, a severe and absolute restriction of attention, such that
everything that is not explained in not in view.
-- jd
Jack Campin
> Julian Jaynes had something worthwhile to say about something in this
> general area when discussing "scientisms" (marxism, psychoanalysis,
> ... They differ from classical science and its common debates
> in the way they invoke the same response as did the religions
> which they seek to supplant. And they share with religions
> many of their most obvious characteristics: a rational splendor
> that explains everything, a charismatic leader or succession
> of leaders who are highly visible and beyond criticism, a
> series of canonical texts ..., certain gestures of idea and
> rituals of interpretation, and a requirement of total commitment.
> In return the adherent receives what the religions had once given
> him more universally: a world view, a hierarchy of importances, and
> an auguring place where he may find out what to do and think, in
> short, a total explanation of man. And this totality is obtained
> not by actually explaining everything, but by an encasement of its
> activity, a severe and absolute restriction of attention, such that
> everything that is not explained in not in view.
Sub-Popperian glibness which is either dead wrong or misses the point about
both of its targets. Anyone who supposes that either Marx or Freud were
not criticized by their followers is substituting fantasy for research;
*all* of their successors decided they were wrong on central positions,
while still managing to retain the guts of their programme; there would
have been no Russian Revolution if Lenin hadn't disagreed with Marx on the
revolutionary potential of the Slav world, and I don't think a single one
of Freud's school followed him on the "death instinct".
"Canonical texts"? With Freud?? Hasn't Jaynes ever heard of training
analyses? Given that social process, the text was irrelevant. He's not
much more on target with Marx, most of whose life work was prompted by
occasional concerns; he never regarded even "Capital" as a final summation
and it is quite unusable as the sort of totalizing statement Jaynes has in
mind (the "Grundrisse" might have been, but he never finished it).
His "gestures of idea and rituals of interpretation" is nearer the mark,
but only for the most mindless foot-soldiers in each movement - American
potty-training fetishists and Maoist cadres.
More importantly, what conceptual schemes like this do is provide you with
new connections between things that previous (Christian-feudalist or
Enlightenment-rationalistic) schemes didn't, and these connections can be
shown to have some sort of reality very simply. With Freud, the idea that
early experiences are not simply erasable by subsequent education or
willpower was immediately obvious on the analyst's couch when you saw the
patient's reaction to having them brought up again: this makes a complete
nonsense of the idea that psychoanalysis has no empirical foundation. (It
might not be very effective as therapy, but that's a different matter).
Everybody uses this idea all the time: because it works. And the Marxian
idea that the development of class-ordered economic systems are what really
induce historical change is now so deeply embedded in scientific practice
that no archaeologist would now even think of not looking for relics of the
mode of production when digging up an ancient site. That they aren't just
looking for signs of military conquest and the dynastic lineage of kings is
mainly due to Marxism having widened the perceptions of all the social
sciences.
I decided not to bother with Jaynes' book when it first came out because
its treatment of both philosophy and psychology looked like "Sunday Sport"
anti-intellectual crap. From this quote it looks like the superficiality
runs a lot deeper than I thought. The guy just can't be bothered to read
anything.
--
-- Jack Campin room G092, Computing Science Department, Glasgow University,
17 Lilybank Gardens, Glasgow G12 8RZ, Scotland TEL: 041 339 8855 x6854 (work)
INTERNET: ja...@dcs.glasgow.ac.uk or via nsfnet-relay.ac.uk FAX: 041 330 4913
BANG!net: via mcsun and uknet BITNET: via UKACRL UUCP: ja...@glasgow.uucp
John McCarthy
I looked in my paper with Hayes to see if there was a short passage I
could quote. Alas there wasn't. I built up a mathematical formalism
before saying what it was intended to be good for - a common
mathematicians' failing.
Here's a summary.
We want our robots to decide what to do by considering a variety of
alternative courses of action and deciding which best achieves the
goals we have given it and then choosing and performing that action.
We don't want a robot to argue, "What do you mean choose an action?
I'm a robot and what I do is entirely determined by my computer
program. I don't have any choices." That way it will never do
anything useful. So how do we want it to reason?
Moreover, our method must apply to entirely deterministic robots
without randomization, and in fact we used as our model finite
automata interacting with other finite automata representing the
world.
What the robot must reason about in simple cases does not involve
at all its own internal structure or internal state. It involves
only the robots position in the world and the state of the
external world. In the automaton model, we consider a non-autonomous
system in which the robot's outputs have been detached from the
robot and constitute external inputs to the system. What the
robot can achieve is computed by considering this system of
automata. Thus we consider the effects of different sequences of
outputs from the robot without worrying about whether the
robot will actually generate them. What the robot *can* do
is determined by its position in the world and not by its
internal structure or state.
Contentions:
1. That's the kind of reasoning we want the robot to do - to
consider the effects of various sequences of outputs.
2. That's what humans do when we consider our choices.
Remarks:
1. This says nothing about praise or blame.
2. It probably won't make anybody feel good.
3. It requires elaboration to handle the common case in
which the robot has to get information from the outside.
These elaborations don't change the fundamental character
of the notion of *can*.
4. This makes free will simply the ability to choose among
a set of future actions.
The paper "Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of
artificial intelligence" by John McCarthy and Patrick J. Hayes
has somewhat more, but this is probably enough to argue about
if anyone wants to argue with such an obviously correct point
of view.
--
John McCarthy, Computer Science Department, Stanford, CA 94305
*
He who refuses to do arithmetic is doomed to talk nonsense.
Jeff Dalton
>Absolutely not! All living things exhibit purposive behavior. It is possible
>to say that "Plants grow away from the direction of gravity IN ORDER TO reach
>a light source."
>Inanimate changes such as rocks rolling down hill cannot be said to move
>"IN ORDER TO" reach the foot of the hill.
What's the difference? (I agree with you about animals, BTW.)
Ron Nadel
>The division [between what is science and what is not] can be made to
>seem clear only by selecting perfectly
>clear cases of what is and what is not science and suppressing intermediate
>cases. Chemistry is an experimental science; astrology is not. But several
>fields in which classical controlled experiments are seldom if ever possible
>still claim with justification to be respectable sciences; e.g. cosmology,
>archaeology, palaeontology.
The only division that may be blurred is the one between what you would
describe as "hard" vs. "soft" science - not what is science and what is
not. To begin with there is much of cosmology, archeology, and paleontology
that submit to controlled experimentation in a laboratory setting (both
archeology and paleontology now have the tools of modern genetics providing
a context for testing hypotheses for example) and these sciences can no
longer be thought of as strictly "soft". Nonetheless, as some of the
historical and descriptive sciences await new technologies to satisfy what
Stephen J. Gould quite aptly derides as "physics envy", the point to keep
in mind is that all these sciences have a process of review and self-
correction, with repeatable controlled experiments being one of many
strategies, there is mathematics and prediction as well, for example (that is
not to say that scientists are rigorous, totally rational, gladly-self-
correcting individuals - they're not, and that is why a system that seeks to
constantly correct itself is needed, AND is considered more valuable).
Systems that seek to explain but cannot be subjected to this self-correcting
process of review, experiment, etc. are not science. People may be un-
satisfied with some of the explanations that the sciences put forth, or
with those areas that science ignores. Whether an individual considers
scientific explanations as more valid and appealing or not is a different
issue from what is science and what isn't. To me, it is this very dis-
satisfaction that leads people to try (in vain) to validate their own
system of explanation by trying to blurr the line between their system
and science.
>Having let the nose of the camel of non-experi-
>mental science into the tent, we are less certain which parts of him we
>should spurn. I myself draw the line at all of sociology and almost all of
>psychology, considering these Velikovskian in spite of their pretense of
>doing experiments.
I don't agree with your estimation of psychology or your single-minded
reliance on experimentation. I think of the current state of the
psychological sciences as "Mental Meteorology", with little power to
predict at the moment, but with great ability to explain. Meteorology
is finding its predictive powers to be weak but gaining strength with the
assistance of Chaos theory and mathematics, and psychology may similarly
benefit. Whether or not this is true, both meteorological and psychological
theories are constantly subjected to the scientific processes of self-
correction, therefore they ARE sciences.
If people don't like the fact that science cannot explain everything, or
don't like the explanations that science does provide, they're free to
believe in magic instead...just don't call it science.
Ron
Michael Zeleny
In article <1992Nov27....@athena.cs.uga.edu>
ful...@athena.cs.uga.edu (James P. H. Fuller) writes:
>je...@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>br...@quake.sylmar.ca.us (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
BY:
>>>Absolutely not! All living things exhibit purposive behavior. It is possible
>>>to say that "Plants grow away from the direction of gravity IN ORDER TO reach
>>>a light source."
>>
>>>Inanimate changes such as rocks rolling down hill cannot be said to move
>>>"IN ORDER TO" reach the foot of the hill.
JD:
>>What's the difference? (I agree with you about animals, BTW.)
JPHF:
> There isn't any. Here's another case of someone assuming that behavior
>that can be described by a rule must be governed by a rule -- or to put that
>another way, that behavior that *might* actually be purposive if carried out
>by a conscious creature must necessarily be purposive wherever we see an
>instance.
>
> In the case of entities like plants and rocks, the phrase "in order to"
>expands to "in the correct order to" and is manifestly true for the rock as
>well as the plant. The rock rolls down the hill in the proper order to
>reach the bottom. The plant grows upward in the proper order to reach a
>light source.
>
> In any case of behavior we can give two forms of account: one organized
>in terms of antecedent conditions will sound like a causal explanation; one
>oriented toward end states will sound teleological or purposive. A causal
>account of the rolling rock will involve gravitational physics and geo-
>logy; a causal account for the plant will involve physics, biochemistry,
>genetics and natural selection. We *could* give a teleological account
>in either case, as a shorthand method of communicating the behavior we
>observed; but when we give a teleological account of a rock rolling or the
>grass growing, it's pretty clear that the implied purpose is a feature of
>the description, not of the thing described.
This is, of course, a view which has been utterly discredited among
professional philosophers, for the same reason and in the same way as the
logical positivist program of reducing all meaningful propositions to the
terms of the observables. There is absolutely no reason to suppose that a
given type of final causation on the molar level, such as might be denoted
by the term `the signing of the Maastricht treaty' has to correspond to
*any* sort of specifiable necessary and sufficient antecedent conditions
formulated in terms of types of efficient causation on the molecular
level. There exists a classic article by Peters and Taifel, "Hobbes and
Hull -- Metaphysicians of Behaviour" (British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, vol 8, 1957-8), dedicated to spelling out this very point.
> -- jf
cordially,
mikhail zel...@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
Peter Nelson
>}In article <1992Nov21.1...@genie.slhs.udel.edu> st...@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>}>Yet this is patently false for other sciences such as biology or economics,
>}>as we've shown. They remain verifiable sans quantitative measurement.
>}
>} Shows what Mr. Starr knows about biology -- modern biology is based
>} on chemistry and physics. You won't see too many biology papers published
> in peer-reviewd journals that don't have "quantitative verification".
>
>Observe the context-dropping: prediction was under discussion. The claim
>was that predictions needn't be quantitative in biology, as in the case of
>evolutionary theory, which didn't even make any predictions for some time.
Evolutionary theory predicts, for instance, that you will never
find fossils of a newer species in an older strata, and these are
quantifiable.
>} As for economics -- this is hilarious. Since when is economics a
>} "science"? Economics is about as scientific as art appreciation!
>
>N.B. the further reliance on the prejudice of what does and doesn't constitute
>"science," which now appears to exclude the social sciences entirely.
Correct. The social "sciences" are not scientific, although for
years they have attempted to be.
>}>Precision is distinct from quantitative measurement.
>}
>} Not in the sciences it isn't. How do you specify HOW precise
>} your model is without using a number?
>
>And yet again.
>
>} Ahh, "introspection". Like, "look into your heart and see if Jesus
>} isn't really there". Right. Real rigorous. If I introspect
>} about Ralph Von William's music I find it to be beautiful and
>} moving. So I guess that proves it! Clearly al those other
>} people who think it's auditory wallpaper just didn't introspect
>} hard enough!
>
>Note the prejudice against the possibility of there being any universal
>introspective conclusion, such as the purposefulness of agents.
Again, rather than ad hominem attacks, you are welcome to try to
provide examples to support your views.
---peter
Jeff Dalton
>not a rhetorical question; I'm interested in the idea,
>but I'm not sure what you mean.
You can't unless you take a (broadly) compatiblist approach to
free will. For instance, if Dennett is right about free will
in _Elbow Room_, then it's hard to see much objection (in principle)
to a robot having free will. If you look at _Elbow Room_, it
should be fairly clear what sort of things would be involved.
However, I don't think Dennett is, ultimately, all that convincing.
-- jd
Tim Starr
}>Observe the context-dropping: prediction was under discussion. The claim
}>was that predictions needn't be quantitative in biology, as in the case of
}>evolutionary theory, which didn't even make any predictions for some time.
His reply:
} Evolutionary theory predicts, for instance, that you will never
} find fossils of a newer species in an older strata, and these are
} quantifiable.
Note his ignorance of the tense of my claim: past. The theory had no
predictive power, not that it has none. For more on the possibility that
predictive power may be unnecessary in biological scientific theory, see
Ernst Mayr's "Toward a New Philosophy of Biology."
The Positivist's behavior continued, unabated:
}>} As for economics -- this is hilarious. Since when is economics a
}>} "science"? Economics is about as scientific as art appreciation!
}>
}>N.B. the further reliance on the prejudice of what does and doesn't constitute
}>"science," which now appears to exclude the social sciences entirely.
}
} Correct. The social "sciences" are not scientific, although for
} years they have attempted to be.
Direct address seems required at this point: Hey! Peter! You've never
bothered to defend your standard of what is and isn't science, you've only
reiterated it! I've cited many cases in which your stipulation of its
meaning hasn't been shared in an attempt to get you to do so. Your only
response thus far: obtuseness bordering upon negligence.
I challenge you once and for all to define "science" in your view and to
justify it against any other one. Until you do this, attempts to defend
ethics as a science, which you've challenged us Objectivists to do, will
leave you with the cheap escape clause of arbitrary definition.
Given your record, as well as the typical positivist responses to this,
we can expect that you'll ignore this, and continue on your merry way,
dogmatically saving the appearances of a philosophy originated by dropouts
of L'Ecole Polytechnique who proposed that society be ruled by "Councils
of Newton" much like the Soviets.
Ken Arromdee
>> Evolutionary theory predicts, for instance, that you will never
>> find fossils of a newer species in an older strata, and these are
>> quantifiable.
>which they are found, so this isn't really a prediction as far as new finds
>are concerned.
The prediction does _not_ mean "we will never find a fossil in old rocks,
said fossil being new in the sense that we just found it in new rocks". It is
of course not much of a prediction to predict that a fossil will not be in new
rocks and old rocks at the same time. What it means is "we will never find a
fossil in old rocks, _other_examples_of_which_ we have only found in new rocks".
It's a prediction.
--
"the bogosity in a field equals the bogosity imported from related areas, plus
the bogosity generated internally, minus the bogosity expelled or otherwise
disposed of." -- K. Eric Drexler
Ken Arromdee (arro...@jyusenkyou.cs.jhu.edu, arro...@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu)
Christopher J Carne
>In article <1992Nov25.0...@genie.slhs.udel.edu> st...@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>>
>>N.B. the further reliance on the prejudice of what does and doesn't constitute
>>"science," which now appears to exclude the social sciences entirely.
>
> Correct. The social "sciences" are not scientific, although for
> years they have attempted to be.
>
>
my shelves and I can't find a single claim of scientificity in one of
them. I can, however, find explicit rejections of the scientific
paradigm as being an appropriate model for social research.
Chris Carne,
Centre for Research into Innovation, Culture and Technology,
Brunel University,
Uxbridge,
Middlesex
Peter Nelson
>} Correct. The social "sciences" are not scientific, although for
>} years they have attempted to be.
>
>Direct address seems required at this point: Hey! Peter! You've never
>bothered to defend your standard of what is and isn't science, you've only
>reiterated it!
What constitutes a "defense" of it? Science is a methodology, not
a philosophy. My adoption of science's criteria for the validity
of models and theories -- testability, falsifiability, repeatability --
is that of the pragmatist: it works. It allows us to create models
which map ever more closely to objectively-measurable reality, it
allows us make predictions and manipulate our environment in useful
and practical ways, and allows us to achieve closure and resolution
on theoretical issues.
The social "sciences", for the most part fail on these bases.
If you can show us some other methodology which offers these
benefits I'll be happy to adopt it.
---peter
Peter Nelson
>In article <ByJC9...@apollo.hp.com> nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>>In article <1992Nov25.0...@genie.slhs.udel.edu> st...@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>>>
>>>N.B. the further reliance on the prejudice of what does and doesn't constitute
>>>"science," which now appears to exclude the social sciences entirely.
>>
>> Correct. The social "sciences" are not scientific, although for
>> years they have attempted to be.
>>
>>
>That's odd. I must have at least 50 books of sociology sitting on
>my shelves and I can't find a single claim of scientificity in one of
>them. I can, however, find explicit rejections of the scientific
>paradigm as being an appropriate model for social research.
Well, as I said, biopsych was my undergraduate major, and this
was taught by the Psychology department and I was constantly
exposed to complaints by the faculty that psychology wasn't
taken seriously as a science by the physics and chemistry
departments. In _The Closing of the American Mind_ the
author (Bloom?) gives examples from several colleges of
complaints from sociologists, anthropologists, and economists
that they are not taken seriously as sciences by the hard
sciences. As a freshman I first, naively, majored in socio-
logy and there I was first exposed to SPSS. If sociology
is not at least playing at science what are they using statistics
for?
Also, note that right here in this thread we apparently have
Mr. Starr claiming that economics is a "science".
---peter
Michael A. Thomas
> In article <1992Dec1.0...@genie.slhs.udel.edu> st...@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
>
> >} Correct. The social "sciences" are not scientific, although for
> >} years they have attempted to be.
> >
> >Direct address seems required at this point: Hey! Peter! You've never
> >bothered to defend your standard of what is and isn't science, you've only
> >reiterated it!
>
> What constitutes a "defense" of it? Science is a methodology, not
> a philosophy. My adoption of science's criteria for the validity
> of models and theories -- testability, falsifiability, repeatability --
> is that of the pragmatist: it works. It allows us to create models
> which map ever more closely to objectively-measurable reality, it
> allows us make predictions and manipulate our environment in useful
> and practical ways, and allows us to achieve closure and resolution
> on theoretical issues.
>
> The social "sciences", for the most part fail on these bases.
Which implies that the social sciences must be subjective and
essentially unknowable? Come on Peter, this is where your argument
falls absolutely flat. Just because the methodology is not identical
to the scientific method (whatever that might be) does not in any
way imply that no knowledge is possible.
That a methodology exists for the hard sciences for repeatability
etc, and this methodology is rather ghoulish when applied to the
socials sciences does not imply that alternative methods of creating
theories and models of reality are doomed to subjectivism. You seem
to be creating a false dichotomy where the "hard" sciences ought to
be enshrined and untouchable and the social sciences, since they
cannot use the same method, are doomed. This begs the question of why
the hard sciences are above reproach. You can't have it both ways.
Let me give you a hint: it is the same epistemological principles
which produced the scientific method which give rise to the possibility
that other, equally efficacious, methods might exist.
--
Michael Thomas (mi...@gordian.com)
"I don't think Bambi Eyes will get you that flame thrower..."
-- Hobbes to Calvin
USnail: 20361 Irvine Ave Santa Ana Heights, Ca, 92707-5637
PaBell: (714) 850-0205 (714) 850-0533 (fax)
Peter Nelson
>> What constitutes a "defense" of it? Science is a methodology, not
>> a philosophy. My adoption of science's criteria for the validity
>> of models and theories -- testability, falsifiability, repeatability --
>> is that of the pragmatist: it works. It allows us to create models
>> which map ever more closely to objectively-measurable reality, it
>> allows us make predictions and manipulate our environment in useful
>> and practical ways, and allows us to achieve closure and resolution
>> on theoretical issues.
>>
>> The social "sciences", for the most part fail on these bases.
>
> Which implies that the social sciences must be subjective and
>essentially unknowable? Come on Peter, this is where your argument
>falls absolutely flat. Just because the methodology is not identical
>to the scientific method (whatever that might be) does not in any
>way imply that no knowledge is possible.
We already had this discussion in reference to the arts. I "know"
that a minor chord often produces a somewhat melancholoy emotional
response in me, but I don't know it in any objective, rigorous
sense. I'm going to Tahiti in a couple of weeks and I'm bringing
a book of Gauguin's paintings to inspire my photography -- I hope
to capture the "feel" of his work in mine. I'll "know" it when
I see it, but I can't objectively demonstrate it.
So I'm not saying that nothing is "knowable" outside of a scientific
framework -- science as we use the term today is a recent development
but people have "known" things for millenia. All I'm saying is that
scientific knowledge is a more rigorous sort of knowledge and that
the social sciences, try as they might, are not up to it.
> That a methodology exists for the hard sciences for repeatability
>etc, and this methodology is rather ghoulish when applied to the
>socials sciences does not imply that alternative methods of creating
>theories and models of reality are doomed to subjectivism.
But, for the most part they are. Look at the difficulties psy-
chology, or even economics, which is arguably the most rigorous
social science, has in resolving basic theoretical disputes.
Among economists there is STILL no consensus on, say, what
caused the 1930's Depression, an event which has been studied to
death for 60 years and for which a great wealth of hard data
exists. Someone on sci.econ recently quoted John Kenneth
Galbraith as asaying that "economics is the only profession
where you can have a perfectly successful career and never
once be right". I'm not saying that no one in the social
sciences has ever uttered a nontrivial truth; just that most
of what passes for knowledge in those fields is soft, subjective,
and subject to considerable controversy and dispute. Of course
there's controversy and dispute in, say, chemistry and physics
too, but only on the theoretical frontiers. Pick up a basic
college chemistry or physics text and you'll find maybe a
chapter's worth of material that is still being debated; pick
up a college psychology text and you'll hardly find a major
section that other major figures in the field won't dispute.
>to be creating a false dichotomy where the "hard" sciences ought to
>be enshrined and untouchable and the social sciences, since they
>cannot use the same method, are doomed. This begs the question of why
>the hard sciences are above reproach. You can't have it both ways.
What "both ways"? And why do you think I'm making the hard sciences
"enshrined and untouchable". As I said, science is merely a methodology.
This methodology has changed over time; there's nothing magical
about it. As new methodologies come along they meet the usual
suspicions and resentments of the existing crowd of scientists,
but if they work better they eventually overcome this, often with
a new generation of scientists (see Kuhn). You are free to suggest
some alternative methodology and explain why you think it allows
us to construct better or more precise models.
> Let me give you a hint: it is the same epistemological principles
>which produced the scientific method which give rise to the possibility
>that other, equally efficacious, methods might exist.
Nobody denies this for a second. As I said, it comes down to
pragmatism -- if a better model works better it will be adopted.
But first you have to show that it works better.
---peter
Michael A. Thomas
> In article <1992Dec2.1...@gordian.com> mi...@gordian.com (Michael A. Thomas) writes:
> >> What constitutes a "defense" of it? Science is a methodology, not
> >> a philosophy. My adoption of science's criteria for the validity
> >> of models and theories -- testability, falsifiability, repeatability --
> >> is that of the pragmatist: it works. It allows us to create models
> >> which map ever more closely to objectively-measurable reality, it
> >> allows us make predictions and manipulate our environment in useful
> >> and practical ways, and allows us to achieve closure and resolution
> >> on theoretical issues.
> >>
> >> The social "sciences", for the most part fail on these bases.
> >
> > Which implies that the social sciences must be subjective and
> >essentially unknowable? Come on Peter, this is where your argument
> >falls absolutely flat. Just because the methodology is not identical
> >to the scientific method (whatever that might be) does not in any
> >way imply that no knowledge is possible.
>
> We already had this discussion in reference to the arts. I "know"
> that a minor chord often produces a somewhat melancholoy emotional
> response in me, but I don't know it in any objective, rigorous
> sense. I'm going to Tahiti in a couple of weeks and I'm bringing
> a book of Gauguin's paintings to inspire my photography -- I hope
> to capture the "feel" of his work in mine. I'll "know" it when
> I see it, but I can't objectively demonstrate it.
(!) So let me see if I've got this straight. The social
sciences are completely subjective since they can't use the
hallowed scientific method. Thus in economics, for example,
Kaynes would be just as valid as, say, Jackson Pollac is to the
visual arts? Just purely a matter of opinion. Nothing more need
be said, it's my opinion vs. yours?
Suppose we relate this to say, the subject of child
rearing. Since it is a social science, my opinion is just
as valid as yours and we can uneqivocably state that my
nurturing, goal based method of child rearing is going to
produce equal results to your regimented, stiffling, give
them 40 lashes just on the principle of the matter, method
of child rearing?
Since it cannot be reproduced, falsified, and tested
there is *no* *way* to qualitatively say that my method
would produce better results then yours? Are you *sure*?
Question: If a Mengele did do "real science" with the
social sciences would that bring it back into the scientific
domain?
> > That a methodology exists for the hard sciences for repeatability
> >etc, and this methodology is rather ghoulish when applied to the
> >socials sciences does not imply that alternative methods of creating
> >theories and models of reality are doomed to subjectivism.
>
> But, for the most part they are. Look at the difficulties psy-
> chology, or even economics, which is arguably the most rigorous
> social science, has in resolving basic theoretical disputes.
So what. Much the same can be said about science. Until knowledge
is properly assimilated, abstracted and inductions made, *all* knowledge
suffers from these problems. You are only stating that man is not
omniscient. This does not imply, however, that just because a
problem cannot use your hallowed scientific method that it is
subjective/unsolvable by definition as you claim.
Just because we have a relatively good method for solving
problems in the hard sciences does not in any way imply that
it is the *only* method possible of obtaining knowledge. Why is
this so hard to understand?
> and subject to considerable controversy and dispute. Of course
> there's controversy and dispute in, say, chemistry and physics
> too, but only on the theoretical frontiers. Pick up a basic
> college chemistry or physics text and you'll find maybe a
> chapter's worth of material that is still being debated; pick
> up a college psychology text and you'll hardly find a major
> section that other major figures in the field won't dispute.
Oh please. The hard sciences have no religous wars? No disputes?
The day this happens is the day that science has gone to hell in a
hand basket. Gad, have you actually done science?
Perhaps the problem with the soft sciences is that we are still
pretty much in the dark ages since we haven't come to common ground
some of the basic premises? Clearly this has happened in the hard
sciences, but really only since the Renaissance. What was so magical
about that time that something similar is *impossible* today wrt
the "soft" sciences?
> > Let me give you a hint: it is the same epistemological principles
> >which produced the scientific method which give rise to the possibility
> >that other, equally efficacious, methods might exist.
>
> Nobody denies this for a second. As I said, it comes down to
> pragmatism -- if a better model works better it will be adopted.
> But first you have to show that it works better.
But you have stated in a previous paragraph that the social sciences
are expressly off limits. Which is it?
Peter Nelson
>In article <BynAn...@apollo.hp.com>, nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>> In article <1992Dec2.1...@gordian.com> mi...@gordian.com (Michael A. Thomas) writes:
>> >> What constitutes a "defense" of it? Science is a methodology, not
>> >> a philosophy. My adoption of science's criteria for the validity
>> >> of models and theories -- testability, falsifiability, repeatability --
>> >> is that of the pragmatist: it works. It allows us to create models
>> >> which map ever more closely to objectively-measurable reality, it
>> >> allows us make predictions and manipulate our environment in useful
>> >> and practical ways, and allows us to achieve closure and resolution
>> >> on theoretical issues.
>> >>
>> >> The social "sciences", for the most part fail on these bases.
>> >
>> > Which implies that the social sciences must be subjective and
>> >essentially unknowable?
>> We already had this discussion in reference to the arts. I "know"
>> that a minor chord often produces a somewhat melancholoy emotional
>> response in me, but I don't know it in any objective, rigorous
>> sense. I'm going to Tahiti in a couple of weeks and I'm bringing
>> a book of Gauguin's paintings to inspire my photography -- I hope
>> to capture the "feel" of his work in mine. I'll "know" it when
>> I see it, but I can't objectively demonstrate it.
>
> (!) So let me see if I've got this straight. The social
>sciences are completely subjective since they can't use the
>hallowed scientific method.
I don't know whether I would use the adverb "completely". They
certainly TRY to be scientific -- they use hard data when they
can get it, they employ statistics, and so forth. I'm just saying
they haven't *succeeded*. I would compare them somewhat to
to medieval alchemists -- they discovered a few things, a few
rules of thumb or relationships that seem to produce somewhat
consistent results, but they haven't gotten to the point of
formal, testable, rigorous theories and models.
Yesterday on APR's "Marketplace" Robert Reich, an economist,
and head of Clinton's economic transition team, said "economists
exist to make astrologers look good".
> Suppose we relate this to say, the subject of child
>rearing. Since it is a social science, my opinion is just
>as valid as yours and we can uneqivocably state that my
>nurturing, goal based method of child rearing is going to
>produce equal results to your regimented, stiffling, give
>them 40 lashes just on the principle of the matter, method
>of child rearing?
> Since it cannot be reproduced, falsified, and tested
>there is *no* *way* to qualitatively say that my method
>would produce better results then yours? Are you *sure*?
Considering thast some societies with these latter techniques
produce children with lower rates of drug use, teenage pregnancy,
crime, and so forth, then I would say ,at best, the answer is
undecided. But note that I've also implicitly defined some
of the terms.
So the larger problem is this: the terms in use ("stifling"
"nurturing", "equal results", etc), are undefined. And so
you are correct that my answer would really be that you _can't
tell_ which approach is "better".
>> and subject to considerable controversy and dispute. Of course
>> there's controversy and dispute in, say, chemistry and physics
>> too, but only on the theoretical frontiers. Pick up a basic
>> college chemistry or physics text and you'll find maybe a
>> chapter's worth of material that is still being debated; pick
>> up a college psychology text and you'll hardly find a major
>> section that other major figures in the field won't dispute.
>
> Oh please. The hard sciences have no religous wars? No disputes?
Where did I say this? Did you read the above? Of course physics
has its disputes, too, but they are at the frontiers of the field.
The problem with the social sciences is that EVERYTHING is the on
the frontier. There is no dispute in physics about, say, the
relationship between force, mass, and acceleration or about the
existence of electrons, protons, and neutrons. The hard sciences
GET PAST their disputes and move on.
> Perhaps the problem with the soft sciences is that we are still
>pretty much in the dark ages since we haven't come to common ground
>some of the basic premises?
Exactly. But what I'm claiming is that their lack of rigorousness
especially in matters of clear definitions, is what's preventing them
from doing so. Take the concept of a "recession" in economics --
there are several definitions floating around out there, some based
on GDP, some based on other measures of output, some based on other
"indicators". So while some people talk about having been out of a
recession for a year, other say we are still in one.
> But you have stated in a previous paragraph that the social sciences
>are expressly off limits. Which is it?
Off limits to what? If they can produce models with strong predictive
or other practical benefits using some different methodology, then
great! It's not like we've got a really strong economics or social
psychology but it just doesn't happen to meet my standards of a
"science". As a society we desperately NEED strong economic and
psychological models.
---peter
Steve Thomas
> [...]
> It's not like we've got a really strong economics or social
> psychology but it just doesn't happen to meet my standards of a
> "science". As a society we desperately NEED strong economic and
> psychological models.
If we need such models, how do you, Peter Nelson, plan to define them? Can you
do it, Peter? No? Damn shame then, huh? Since we NEED them (this much I
agree with you on)...
(Mabey Nelson will amuse us all by starting an attempt at defining what might
be "scientific models" for ethics, economics, psycology, etc.)
If somebody came up to me with an ethical system that I did not agree with
(viz. Christian Ethics), I would attempt to refute said ethical system along
with explaining my own position on the subject. Doesn't it bother you that
you are unable to come up with an alternative? I agree this is off the
subject of defending Objectivist Ethics, but I think it's worth noting...
_________
Steve Thomas
ste...@rossinc.com
Tim Starr
}In article <1992Dec1.0...@genie.slhs.udel.edu> st...@genie.slhs.udel.edu (Tim Starr) writes:
}
}>} Correct. The social "sciences" are not scientific, although for
}>} years they have attempted to be.
}>
}>Direct address seems required at this point: Hey! Peter! You've never
}>bothered to defend your standard of what is and isn't science, you've only
}>reiterated it!
}
} What constitutes a "defense" of it? Science is a methodology, not
} a philosophy. My adoption of science's criteria for the validity
} of models and theories -- testability, falsifiability, repeatability --
} is that of the pragmatist: it works.
How do you know? You haven't practiced what you preach: defined your
terms in metrics. Where did you get your "workometer"? Where can we
get one to verify your findings?
Until then, you're no more talking about anything scientific by your
criteria than are we Objectivists.
Tim Starr
}>That's odd. I must have at least 50 books of sociology sitting on
}>my shelves and I can't find a single claim of scientificity in one of
}>them. I can, however, find explicit rejections of the scientific
}>paradigm as being an appropriate model for social research.
That's the science-as-physics monist paradigm. The Positivists tried to
come up with such a "social physics" - how does Petey reconcile this with
his positivism? He admits that they failed. Then he claims that this
means that there are no social sciences. The possibility that he's
operating with an unjustifiably narrow construction of "science" that didn't
appear in history until about 1840 never occurs to him.
Tim Starr
}
}> > Let me give you a hint: it is the same epistemological principles
}> >which produced the scientific method which give rise to the possibility
}> >that other, equally efficacious, methods might exist.
}>
}> Nobody denies this for a second. As I said, it comes down to
}> pragmatism -- if a better model works better it will be adopted.
}> But first you have to show that it works better.
}
} But you have stated in a previous paragraph that the social sciences
}are expressly off limits. Which is it?
He doesn't have to keep from contradicting himself. He only has to do
what "works," whatever the hell that means. He's free to pick and choose
which principles to uphold as he likes, and nothing else matters. All he
wants to do is attack others, not defend his own position, because he can't.
It's untenability is the reason why academic philosophy has progressed past
even logical positivism.
Tim Starr
} We already had this discussion in reference to the arts. I "know"
} that a minor chord often produces a somewhat melancholoy emotional
} response in me, but I don't know it in any objective, rigorous
} sense.
You don't know that science as you construe it "works" "in any objective,
rigorous sense" either. It's entirely "subjective" and contingent upon
you.
} All I'm saying is that
} scientific knowledge is a more rigorous sort of knowledge and that
} the social sciences, try as they might, are not up to it.
Without bothering to define "rigorous" or how to measure it; you don't
practice what you preach. You are a hypocrite.
} Among economists there is STILL no consensus on, say, what
} caused the 1930's Depression, an event which has been studied to
} death for 60 years and for which a great wealth of hard data
} exists.
This is only within those economists trying to practice your vaunted
social physics, Petey. The "market-process" methodological school has
consensus that it was caused by the Fed's credit expansion. See "America's
Great Depression" by Murray Rothbard on this.
Peter Nelson
>(Mabey Nelson will amuse us all by starting an attempt at defining what might
>be "scientific models" for ethics, economics, psycology, etc.)
>
>If somebody came up to me with an ethical system that I did not agree with
>(viz. Christian Ethics), I would attempt to refute said ethical system along
>with explaining my own position on the subject. Doesn't it bother you that
>you are unable to come up with an alternative?
An alternative *what*? Where does this obligation to derive an
alternative come from? Lots of people think they've been abducted
onto alien spaceships. Others believe they've had conversations with
God. I have no reason to believe their accounts are objectively
true but this doesn't mean I'm obligated to provide some alternative
explanation. I'm perfectly happy to admit that I don't have an
"explanation" for most things.
As for my own ethical beliefs, I imagine they're a product of my
environment, my upbringing, all the things I've experienced in my
life, maybe even genetic or biological factors, who knows? Of
course I have to make ethical decisions about things, but I'd be
very surprised if I make the same decisions as a late 20th century
software engineer, that I would if were an 11th century Mongol
tribesman, a good little NAZI in 1938, or a Massachusetts Puritan
in 1635.
> I agree this is off the subject of defending Objectivist Ethics
Exactly.
> but I think it's worth noting...
If you say so.
---peter
Peter Nelson
>In article <BynAn...@apollo.hp.com> nels...@apollo.hp.com (Peter Nelson) writes:
>} We already had this discussion in reference to the arts. I "know"
>} that a minor chord often produces a somewhat melancholoy emotional
>} response in me, but I don't know it in any objective, rigorous
>} sense.
>
>You don't know that science as you construe it "works" "in any objective,
>rigorous sense" either. It's entirely "subjective" and contingent upon
>you.
Sure I do. "e=mc^2" is not contingent on me; it would be just
as true if I never existed.
>Without bothering to define "rigorous" or how to measure it; you don't
>practice what you preach. You are a hypocrite.
But I have defined rigorous: testable, falsifiable, objectively measurable.
>} Among economists there is STILL no consensus on, say, what
>} caused the 1930's Depression, an event which has been studied to
>} death for 60 years and for which a great wealth of hard data
>} exists.
>
>This is only within those economists trying to practice your vaunted
>social physics, Petey. The "market-process" methodological school has
>consensus that it was caused by the Fed's credit expansion.
Lots of "schools" have a consensus! Among Catholics there is a
consensus in the existence of the Holy Trinity! Among Freudians
there is consensus that "id", "ego", etc describe something real.
But neither religion not the social "sciences" have the power to
convince other "schools" within their field. A Freudian can't
convince a behaviorist, a Catholic can't convince a Hindu, etc.
But because the hard sciences have an agreed-upon standard for
"proof", or at least "evidence" they eventually get past their
disputes.
---peter