PHILOSOPHIC CHALLENGE!
Mike S Vandy
out there on the network.
Show that Ayn Rand's philosophy of objectivism is wrong in some philosophically
material way, by reference to a philosophic issue and a critique of the Objectivist
response. In other words, critique Objectivism by the same standards that are used
for other philosophic systems. Please take care to give depth to your critique,
and depth to the Objectivist position you critique.
I am serious in this challenge, although my impetus to post this challenge was
born out of the frustration I have felt to the offhanded critiques of Objectivism
that populate this, and other, groups. Most critiques seem actually to be attacks
on the public image of Ayn Rand, personal attacks on Rand based upon statements
about her private life, or convenient dismissals of her philosophc positions by claims
of their triviality.
It smacks of a philosophic filabuster when philosophers resort to these indirect
approaches in an attempt to dismiss a writer/philosopher who, like it or not,
occupies a considerable place in the thought of millions of people in this world.
The incidence of Rand's name on this network demands a reasoned response by those
able to deliver it. That is my challenge.
Jeff Dalton
>I would like to advance the following challenge to the philosophic community
>out there on the network.
>
>Show that Ayn Rand's philosophy of objectivism is wrong in some
>philosophically material way, by reference to a philosophic issue
>and a critique of the Objectivist response.
Ok. In the discussion of analytic vs synthetic in the _Introduction
to Objectivist Epistemology_, Peikoff tries to attach the certainty
that he claims is associated with the analytic to statements about
the world, i.e. to statements commonly regarded as synthetic. He
wants to eliminate the analytic/synthetic distinction (the "death
carrier") to get the best of both. But the idea that there is no
distinction is advanced in part by a very selective use of examples.
Nonetheless, there is a difference between statemants such as
the following:
(1) All red things are red.
(2) There is a coffee cup on my desk.
Simply consider what would have to be the case for them to be
false.
Peikoff's examples are poor in another respect. For instance:
(3) Ice is frozen water.
(4) Water freezes at 32 degrees F.
(3) is supposedly analytic while (4) is supposedly synthetic. In
fact, (3) could be synthetic (after all, someone _discovered_ that
this odd solid white stuff was water) and (4) could be analytic
(given how temperature scales tend to be defined these days).
That we can shift between these senses, making either analytic
or synthetic as we wish, does nothing to show that supposedly
analytic statements actually have the desirable properties of
synthetic ones and vice versa.
----------
Earlier in the _Introduction_, Rand claims that all tables are the
same in that they have the same measurements and that the differences
consist in having different values for the measurements. E.g.,
one table might have three legs, another four; one table might be
made out of wood, another out of stone; one might have tall legs
and a wide top, another short legs and a narrow top. That is, if
we look at actual differences, it's clear that the measurements
must include such things as the marterial used to make the table,
the number of legs, etc. This is moderately plausible, if
uninteresting, but Rand goes on to say that the measurements
can take on _any_ value, which is simply false. For instance,
if you "table" with long legs and a small diameter circular
top what you actually have is a stool, not a table. By similar
means, we can see that the following are all "tables": chairs,
beds, wooden blocks, ice cubes.
To generate further examples, simply start with a randon table
and start changing the values of various measurements (material,
leg length, number of legs, heights of border segments on the
table top, etc) remembering that they can take on _any_ value.
-- jd
Christopher Green
>out there on the network.
>
>Show that Ayn Rand's philosophy of objectivism is wrong in some philosophically
>material way, by reference to a philosophic issue and a critique of the Objectivist
>response. In other words, critique Objectivism by the same standards that are used
>for other philosophic systems.
>
group, and Stubblefield runs a mailing list for this purpose. We've
made it clear about a million times that interminable debates about
objectivism are not welcome on sci.philosophy.tech.
Death to multiple cross-posters!
--
Christopher D. Green chr...@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department cgr...@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
Gary Merrill
In article <38...@castle.ed.ac.uk>, je...@castle.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
|> In article <1993Jul20.2...@telesciences.com> mva...@telesciences.com (Mike S Vandy) writes:
|> >I would like to advance the following challenge to the philosophic community
|> >out there on the network.
|> >
|> >Show that Ayn Rand's philosophy of objectivism is wrong in some
|> >philosophically material way, by reference to a philosophic issue
|> >and a critique of the Objectivist response.
... [ Rather precise and telling criticisms of
Rand and Peikoff omitted. ] ...
I suspect that the response you will get is that your criticisms
don't address the "philosophy of objectivism", or that they are
nitpicking and inessential (I would be pleased to be wrong in this
prediction). However, without addressing that issue, one thing
that the criticisms *do* expose is the extraordinary naivety with
which Rand et al. approach matters philosophical. Anyone with
even a modicum of training in philosophy would either already
be aware of the types of problems you raise or would be able
to see them immediately in the views advanced by Rand. The fact
that Rand's (and her followers') writings are full of such
elementary blunders and failures to see obvious flaws goes
a long way toward explaining why professional philosophers do
not like to devote a lot of time to "refuting" these positions.
The situation is akin to the case of the crackpot in science
who at this time advances a complex theory according to which the
earth really is the center of the universe and all else revolves
around it. You won't get many physicists or astronmers to spend
the time to "refute" such a view. They know it is wrong, know
why it is wrong, and know that even beginning to consider all
the places it errs would require an incredible amount of time.
So after looking briefly at such a view, identifying some of
the fundamental flaws in it, and forming an impression of the
overall quality of the work, they toss it. The crackput retains
his group of followers who continue to maintain that the view
has not been given a "fair hearing", has not been examined
in sufficient detail, and has not been "refuted".
--
Gary H. Merrill [Principal Systems Developer, Compiler and Tools Division]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC 27513 / (919) 677-8000
sas...@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm
Chris Holt
>I would like to advance the following challenge to the
>philosophic community out there on the network.
I'm not a philosopher, but I'll join in. :-)
>Show that Ayn Rand's philosophy of objectivism is wrong in
>some philosophically material way, by reference to a
>philosophic issue and a critique of the Objectivist
>response. In other words, critique Objectivism by the
>same standards that are used for other philosophic systems.
>Please take care to give depth to your critique,
>and depth to the Objectivist position you critique.
Let's start at the beginning. Objectivists like to assert
3 "axioms", having to do with existence, identity, and
consciousness. These are formulated in such a way as to
be tautological. They are then interpreted in such a way
that non-trivial consequences can be inferred. I claim that
this involves a sloppy use of language; I would welcome a
formulation of the "axioms" that clearly allows such
deductions to be made, and I would like to see a list of
the inference rules used in such derivations. [This
doesn't necessarily have to be formal; it just has to
be tighter than I've seen it, and not in the form of
slogans.]
As an attempt at helping, I offer my (undoubtedly mistaken)
understanding of these axioms:
1. Existence. We cannot deny the validity of our sensory
experience. [There is then some mumbo-jumbo about how
this proves the external world exists and roughly corresponds
to what we perceive; it seems that some people interpret
this axiom as meaning "There is an external world that
roughly corresponds to our perceptions."]
2. Identity. It is useful and valuable to interpret
sensory experience in terms of interacting objects; we
determine the nature of these objects by observation.
Whenever an observation contradicts our internalized
model of an object's nature, the model must be revised.
[This is the axiom that seems to make people worry about
QM, because "objects" at the microscopic level don't
have the same behavioural characteristics as those at
the macroscopic level. I've never understood why it
made people uneasy, myself.]
3. Consciousness. Our only means of apprehending the
"world" is via conscious awareness. [I'm not too sure
about this one, since conditioned reflexes can be induced
in people when they are asleep, I believe. It undoubtedly
means I fail to understand what is being meant.]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk Computing Lab, U of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chameleons feed on light and air: / Programmers' food is life and pain.
Michael Feld
>I would like to advance the following challenge to the philosophic community
>out there on the network.
>
>Show that Ayn Rand's philosophy of objectivism is wrong in some philosophically
>material way, by reference to a philosophic issue and a critique of the Objectivist
>response. In other words, critique Objectivism
No flame, ok? You ask a serious, principled question, and I'll strive
for the same sort of reply.
First phase: what do YOU take to be Rand's philosophical
contributions? What does she say that was not said before, or never
before so well? Much of the criticism of Objectivism is simply that
it makes no philosophical claims at all; that it is evangelistical,
but lacks a gospel.
Fair enough?
--
Michael Feld | E-mail: <fe...@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
Dept. of Philosophy | FAX: (204) 261-0021
University of Manitoba | Voice: (204) 474-9136
Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada
Karl Kluge
From: mva...@telesciences.com (Mike S Vandy)
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 1993 20:14:47 GMT
Show that Ayn Rand's philosophy of objectivism is wrong in some
philosophically material way, by reference to a philosophic issue
and a critique of the Objectivist response.
How about these as two starting points:
1) In Leonard Peikoff's attempt to refute the existance of the
Analytic/Synthetic distinction in his essay "The Analytic-Synthetic
Dichotomy", he assumes the existance of correct procedures for infering
universal physical laws from finite samples of data; as it was precisely the
question of whether such correct inference procedures exist which led to the
formulation of the dichotomy, his reply begs the question.
2) Rand's theory of concept formation is not sufficiently well defined to
serve as a theory of human concept formation. To pick one of her examples from
the second edition of _An Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_, the
refinement of a child's definition of _man_ from "something which moves and
makes noise" to "rational animal" -- how does child know that original units
that were abstracted to form concept were rational animals? Ties into failure
to discuss conceptual identification in any depth. Given that whole point of
concept formation is to lose need to keep all individual units of concept in
mind, how can similarity to previously encountered units in concept be judged
except through definition/previous knowledge? How is soundness of definition
update guaranteed?
It smacks of a philosophic filabuster when philosophers resort to
these indirect approaches in an attempt to dismiss a writer/philosopher
who, like it or not, occupies a considerable place in the thought of
millions of people in this world.
Velikovsky and Von Daniken, like it or not, also occupy a considerable place
in the thought of millions of people in this world. That does not somehow
confer a mantle of dignity or presumption of correctness on their work.
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> I suspect that the response you will get is that your criticisms
>don't address the "philosophy of objectivism", or that they are
>nitpicking and inessential (I would be pleased to be wrong in this
>prediction).
See my criticisms of the posting, I think you will be at least slightly
pleased. The posting had some basic factual errors about Objectivist
epistemology, but addressed important issues that deserve to be discussed.
>Anyone with
>even a modicum of training in philosophy would either already
>be aware of the types of problems you raise or would be able
>to see them immediately in the views advanced by Rand. The fact
>that Rand's (and her followers') writings are full of such
>elementary blunders and failures to see obvious flaws goes
>a long way toward explaining why professional philosophers do
>not like to devote a lot of time to "refuting" these positions.
This is all simply false, and is in fact a personal insult to those
of us you have had polite and hopefully substantial conversations with
in the past.
The falsity of the position can be demonstrated by production of
counter-examples. Shall I list the academic philosophers who are
interested in Rand? Should I produce copies of their resumes to
illustrate that they have a "modicum of training"? Do PhDs from major
universities count? Chairmanship of major philosophy departments?
--Jimbo
Gary Merrill
In article <CAJ13...@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu>, jwa...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales) writes:
|> This is all simply false, and is in fact a personal insult to those
|> of us you have had polite and hopefully substantial conversations with
|> in the past.
Okay, I don't see how what I said can be a personal insult, but I'll
say that none was intended. What part of it is false? That Rand's
writings are full of such elementary blunders? This in fact is
true. That it goes a long way toward explaining why professional
philosophers do not like to devote a lot of time to "refuting"
these positions? This too is true (both the *fact* that professioanl
philosophers do not like to do so and the claim that an explanation
of this fact has been made).
|> The falsity of the position can be demonstrated by production of
|> counter-examples. Shall I list the academic philosophers who are
|> interested in Rand? Should I produce copies of their resumes to
|> illustrate that they have a "modicum of training"? Do PhDs from major
|> universities count? Chairmanship of major philosophy departments?
Okay, I'll bite (just out of interest to see who and how many).
I'll pass on the resumes, as I think these would be pretty difficult
or time consuming for you to compile. However, a list of articles
in refereed journals would go a long way towards indicating both
the nature and seriousness of the "interest" you claim.
I thought it obvious that my claim was not "There are *no*
professional philosophers who have an interest in Rand" just
as I would not claim that "There are *no* physicists who
have an interest in terra-centric theories of the universe."
I thought it was accepted by you and others that *most* (by
a *wide* margin) professional philosophers act toward Rand's
work as I indicated (certainly this complaint has been made
often enough here). Are there *some* who don't? Sure.
Would you be happier if I had said "most professional philosophers"
rather than just "professional philosophers"? Okay.
So suppose that you are able to produce a list of, say, a dozen
professional philosophers who are "interested" in Rand? Does
this deflate my claim? I don't think so.
Chris Walker
requests:
Just look at the bibliography that I posted. Every person listed
has some interest in Rand, and additionally, those who have been selected
in the FAQ definitely have a positive interest in Rand. Most have
faculty positions in US and Canadian Universities.
Of those individuals who are not listed in the FAQ, many, preponderantly
academics, find value in Rand's ideas, though to put it mildly, I disagree
with what they find valuable or their interpretation, nevertheless,
many do present themselves as advocates of her ideas.
--
Chris Walker
cwa...@zycor.lgc.com
Michael R. Hand
> Shall I list the academic philosophers who are
> interested in Rand? Should I produce copies of their resumes to
> illustrate that they have a "modicum of training"? Do PhDs from major
> universities count? Chairmanship of major philosophy departments?
PLEASE DO. I'd really like to see this. I think you're full of hot air,
but I could be wrong.
B-o} M
-------------------------------------------------------------------
These are things that we shall try and discover.
But these are things we must not take seriously.
-- Samuel Beckett
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Hand (409)845-5660, fax (409)845-0458
Philosophy Dept, Texas A&M Univ, College Station TX 77843-4237, USA
ha...@tamuts.tamu.edu mh...@tamu.edu
mi...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
> Ok. In the discussion of analytic vs synthetic in the _Introduction
> to Objectivist Epistemology_, Peikoff tries to attach the certainty
> that he claims is associated with the analytic to statements about
> the world, i.e. to statements commonly regarded as synthetic. He
> wants to eliminate the analytic/synthetic distinction (the "death
> carrier") to get the best of both. But the idea that there is no
> distinction is advanced in part by a very selective use of examples.
> Nonetheless, there is a difference between statemants such as
> the following:
>
> (1) All red things are red.
> (2) There is a coffee cup on my desk.
>
> Simply consider what would have to be the case for them to be
> false.
I'm no Objectivist, but didn't W. V. O. Quine argue against the
analytic/synthetic distinction?
Here's the way I'd do it: suppose the set of all red things happens to
coincide with the set of all soft things. In that case (a) and (b)
below should both be analytic:
(a) All red things are red (your (1) above)
(b) All red things are soft.
But (b) looks rather informative.
The usual example is (given what most of us know about Superman and Clark
Kent): the following should both be analytic (and synonymous) ,
but (d) is in fact informative and could be used to tell someone
who didn't know the story what's going on in it:
(c) Superman is Superman.
(d) Superman is Clark Kent.
Generally on Objectivism: a lot of its critics concentrate on *Ayn
Rand's* ideas, pretty much as she presented them. That's not fair.
Any system develops. Rand wasn't an academic and she died years ago;
it would be more fair to critique her and Peikoff's ideas as developed
by someone like David Kelly. I do not favor Objectivism, but there's
absolutely no denying its impact and its future development. There's
hardly any literate person in the country to the right of Nina Totenberg
who hasn't been touched by it.
Ken
--
+---------------------------+----------------------------------+
| mi...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu | You have freedom of thought and |
| opinions are my own, not | don't use it. Why do you want |
| my employer's | freedom of speech? - Unamuno |
+---------------------------+----------------------------------+
Gary Merrill
In article <1993Jul22....@lgc.com>, c...@zycor.lgc.com (Chris Walker) writes:
|> Specifically regarding those interested in Rand ideas which Merrill
|> requests:
|>
|> Just look at the bibliography that I posted. Every person listed
Could you say which post this is so I can track it down a bit more
easily (number or date)? Thanks.
|> has some interest in Rand, and additionally, those who have been selected
But aren't we drifting into at least a bit of equivocation here?
Having "some interest in Rand" is pretty weak. Even *I* have *some*
interest in Rand.
|> Of those individuals who are not listed in the FAQ, many, preponderantly
|> academics, find value in Rand's ideas, though to put it mildly, I disagree
Again, "find value in Rand's ideas" is open to a number of interpretations
and is pretty weak. A lot of Rand's ideas, lifted out of context
and stated without the objectivist baggage *she* thinks supports them,
are found to have value by *many* philosophers throughout history.
John Locke, for example, thought pretty highly of the idea of private
property. A lot of empiricists had approaches to epistemology with
striking similarities to what Rand says.
As a number of us have pointed out, we often *agree* with a lot of
the views espoused by Rand (and hence can be said to find value in
Rand's ideas -- or in the ideas espoused by Rand). The issue most
frequently pertains to the quality of her exposition and the coherence
precision, and completeness of arguments.
|> with what they find valuable or their interpretation, nevertheless,
|> many do present themselves as advocates of her ideas.
Advocates of her ideas, or advocates of ideas she also advocates?
(This gets back to the question of a recent poster who has asked for
an account of the distinguishing features of Rand's position.)
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
For the record, I retract my rather hastily written and rather fiesty
comments directly toward Gary Merrill. He and I have serious disagreements
about the validity and value of Rand's philosophical work, but that at least
leaves me in a position to try to explain and elaborate my own views on the
matter. What I objected to (and will continue to object to) are attempts
at rhetorical 'exclusion' based on a fallacious appeal to majority of the
form "Most philosophers don't like X, therefore X is false."
I particularly was offended by the following sentence. But upon a
second reading, I discover that I misread it. As it stands, it seems
actually quite incoherent to me, so that I can't really see what it
is that Merrill is trying to say.
>Anyone with
>even a modicum of training in philosophy would either already
>be aware of the types of problems you raise or would be able
>to see them immediately in the views advanced by Rand.
What kind of 'either/or' is this? If I read it literally, it divides
those with a modicum of training in philosophy into two subgroups:
(a) those who are aware of the types of problems raised
(b) those able to see them immediately in the views advanced by Rand.
Surely this can't be a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
classification. Surely those who are not aware of these kinds of
problems can't see them immediately!
Anyhow, I think that the sentence, as written, doesn't make the claim
that Gary wanted to make. He is, in general, trying to establish that
(a) there is a lack of academic interest in Rand and that (b) this is
caused by the poor quality of her work. Leaving aside the value of such
an exercise, we may simply observe that every academic philosopher who
agrees with Rand fits into the category of people "aware of the types
of problems" AND WHO think that Rand has a novel and interesting approach
to solving those problems.
I will respond separately with a "short list" of academics with a serious
philosophical interest in Rand. As I have made no comprehensive survey,
this will be strictly off the top of my head.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
newsgroups line. This discussion does not 'fit' there.
Michael R. Hand writes, quoting me:
>Some demented Rand freak offered,
Once again, I retract my statements to Gary Merrill about his supposed
offered insult. I actually had forgotten how ugly insults can be!
One would think those seeking to demonstrate that Rand's ideas are
unimportant and that those who agree with Rand are simply confused or
ill-educated would strive to achieve at least a certain minimal level
of argumentative competence themselves. One of the first rules of authentic
discussion and debate is the passionate commitment to leave aside the
"ad hominem" fallacy.
Michael, it is simply childish and rude to call me names.
> > Shall I list the academic philosophers who are
> > interested in Rand? Should I produce copies of their resumes to
> > illustrate that they have a "modicum of training"? Do PhDs from major
> > universities count? Chairmanship of major philosophy departments?
>
>PLEASE DO. I'd really like to see this. I think you're full of hot air,
>but I could be wrong.
Well, I question the value of such an exercise. But if it will clear
aside these endless pointless accusations and convince people to think
about _ideas_ rather than _academic popularity_, then it will have at
least *some* purpose.
This list is composed off the top of my head and consists of people
either known (however slightly!) to me personally, or people who are
"famous" in these circles. The criterion for inclusion is a degree of
interest in Rand, evidenced by either publications in referred
journals on Rand, or by presentations of such papers at conferences, etc.
Most of these people are in agreement with Rand on at least some issues.
Others are critics who found her work worthy of comment.
Because I am composing this list from memory, the tidbits of information
available on each are somewhat random.
James Lennox, philosophy of science, Pitt, dept. chairman
John Hospers, UCLA
Roderick Long, UNC - Chapel Hill
Chris Sciabarra, NYU (in political science, maybe)
Tibor Machan, Auburn University.
Douglas Rasmussen, St. John's University.
Eric Mack, Tulane
Robert Nozick, Harvard (seems less interested these days!)
Douglas Den Uyl, U. of Louisville (I think!), recent _Monist_ publication
Fred Sommers, Bowling Green State
David Kelley, PhD Princeton, director of IOS
Leonard Peikoff, PhD (somewhere!), ARI.
Harry Binswanger, PhD Columbia, recent _Monist_ publication on teleology
Allan Gotthelf, author of _Philsophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology_
Gary Hull, PhD (somewhere)
John Ridpath, York University (might be in history?)
George Brakas (somewhere!)
George Walsh (emeritus prof., Salisbury)
George Mavrodes, Michigan (published on Rand in the 70s)
Stephen Hicks, Rockford College (PhD, Indiana)
Well, that is 20, just off the top of my head. Of course, I have a
good memory. *grin*
I hope you've enjoyed this list. In closing I want to make _absolutely_
clear that I do not think that such a list shows anything interesting
about whether or not Rand's ideas are _correct_. Instead, all I seek
is to refute the premise of the anyhow fallacious appeal-to-majority
argument against reading or thinking about Rand.
--Jimbo
Gary Merrill
In article <CAKKt...@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu>, jwa...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales) writes:
|> I particularly was offended by the following sentence. But upon a
|> second reading, I discover that I misread it. As it stands, it seems
|> actually quite incoherent to me, so that I can't really see what it
|> is that Merrill is trying to say.
I guess I would rather you be offended than that I be convicted of
incoherence. The syntax in the latter part of the sentence is less
than elegant, but I don't think it is incoherent.
|> >Anyone with
|> >even a modicum of training in philosophy would either already
|> >be aware of the types of problems you raise or would be able
|> >to see them immediately in the views advanced by Rand.
|>
|> What kind of 'either/or' is this? If I read it literally, it divides
|> those with a modicum of training in philosophy into two subgroups:
|> (a) those who are aware of the types of problems raised
|> (b) those able to see them immediately in the views advanced by Rand.
|> Surely this can't be a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
|> classification. Surely those who are not aware of these kinds of
|> problems can't see them immediately!
You were pretty much okay up to this last part. As a somewhat more
easily understood paraphrase of your last sentence I offer:
If you are not already aware of these kinds of problems,
then you won't be able to see them immediately.
Not to put too much weight on "immediately", this is false. The
intention was to express the view that the sorts of problems mentioned
are typically covered in introductory classes in philosophy, logic, or
epistemology. So many people with a modicum of training would simply
recognize such problems as something they had seen before. (We have,
I believe, seen instances of this already from some posters commenting
on this thread -- posters who do not appear to be professional
philosophers.) But suppose that in your modicum of training precisely
the problem in question was not covered explicitly. Nonetheless, I
maintain that as a consequence of more general instruction in, say,
logic or epistemology, you would quickly (immediately?) recognize
the flaw. Nothin more complicated than this.
|> Anyhow, I think that the sentence, as written, doesn't make the claim
|> that Gary wanted to make. He is, in general, trying to establish that
|> (a) there is a lack of academic interest in Rand and that (b) this is
|> caused by the poor quality of her work.
Right.
|> Leaving aside the value of such
|> an exercise, we may simply observe that every academic philosopher who
|> agrees with Rand fits into the category of people "aware of the types
|> of problems" AND WHO think that Rand has a novel and interesting approach
|> to solving those problems.
Oops! Not so fast. Too broad a brush is being used to do the painting
here. As I urged in a previous posting "agrees with Rand" is subject to
a variety of wider or narrower interpretations. Locke would agree with
Rand. In places, Kant (!) would agree with Rand. It does *not* follow
that someone who agrees with Rand in this or similar senses thinks that
Rand has a novel or interesting approach to anything. There is also the
"Well, her positions aren't well presented and they are not supported
very well by her arguments, but fundamentally she is right about ...".
If in fact you present the criticisms made of Rand in this thread to
an academic philosopher, I suggest that he *must* concede their force.
He *might* then go on to say, "But there are some fundamental ideas here
that are worthy of exploration." Okay, but again, this does not argue
(or certainly argues very little) that it is worthwhile to spend time
Torkel Franzen
(Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales) writes:
>One of the first rules of authentic
>discussion and debate is the passionate commitment to leave aside the
>"ad hominem" fallacy.
This fine sentiment might be more convincing, did you not yourself have
an unfortunate penchant for quickly resorting to the crudest abuse in
off-line communication. But I quite agree that the fact that only an
insignificant fraction of professional philosophers take Rand seriously
does not tell us anything about the quality of her work. There are many
philosophers, and for any given cult you will most likely find several
philosophers who think it's hot stuff. So let's consider arguments
instead of statistics.
Chris Auld
>In article <CAKMA...@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwa...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu
> (Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales) writes:
>
> >One of the first rules of authentic
> >discussion and debate is the passionate commitment to leave aside the
> >"ad hominem" fallacy.
>
> This fine sentiment might be more convincing, did you not yourself have
>an unfortunate penchant for quickly resorting to the crudest abuse in
>off-line communication.
I would like to interject here and note that Mr. Wales and I have engaged
in semi-frequent email discussions, and he has never resorted to
any sort of abuse, much less the ``crudest'' variety.
--
-- Chris Auld | Dep't of Economics | au...@econ01.econ.queensu.ca --
``Jupiter's moons are invisible to the naked eye and therefore can
have no influence on the earth, and therefore would be useless, and
therefore do not exist.'' F. Sizzi, Prof. of Astronomy, 1610
Jeff Dalton
-In article <38...@castle.ed.ac.uk>, je...@castle.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
-- Nonetheless, there is a difference between statemants such as
-- the following:
-- (1) All red things are red.
-- (2) There is a coffee cup on my desk.
-- Simply consider what would have to be the case for them to be
-- false.
-I'm no Objectivist, but didn't W. V. O. Quine argue against the
-analytic/synthetic distinction?
Yes. But not everyone agrees with him. Moreover, Quine argued
that so-called analytic statements were subject to revision. In
effect, we end up with everything being synthetic. (This depends on
exactly what's meant by "synthetic", but is roughly right.) Peikoff,
on the other hand, aims to give "synthetic" the certainty that is
normally associated with things true by definition and at the same
time protect certain claims (eg, that monopoly is impossible under
capitalism) from the charge that they are true only by definition.
-Here's the way I'd do it: suppose the set of all red things happens to
-coincide with the set of all soft things. In that case (a) and (b)
-below should both be analytic:
- (a) All red things are red (your (1) above)
- (b) All red things are soft.
But they wouldn't both be analytic. Your "happens" is very important
here. So is my repetition of "red".
-But (b) looks rather informative.
Sure, but it's not analytic.
-The usual example is (given what most of us know about Superman and Clark
-Kent): the following should both be analytic (and synonymous) ,
-but (d) is in fact informative and could be used to tell someone
-who didn't know the story what's going on in it:
- (c) Superman is Superman.
- (d) Superman is Clark Kent.
Do you recall my remarks on "ice is frozen water"? Your (d) is
similar.
See Kripke's _Naming and Necessity_ for an interesting discussion of
such issues and also of related terms such as necessary and a priori.
-Generally on Objectivism: a lot of its critics concentrate on *Ayn
-Rand's* ideas, pretty much as she presented them. That's not fair.
Many Objectivists stick close to Rand and many will not accept
that she made any errors in her philosophy. David Kelly is more
reasonable and much more willing to connect to developments in
the rest of phiosophy (e.g., he refers to Kripke). But he was
virtually excommunicated by Peikoff et al.
-- jd
Jeff Dalton
>Specifically regarding those interested in Rand ideas which Merrill
>requests:
>Just look at the bibliography that I posted.
I've looked. I'm not even slightly impressed. If you subtract
the libertarians and Objectivists (no surprise there), what's left?
-- jd
Jeff Dalton
This is not a very strong recommendation. Creationists make similar
claims!
mi...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
> Many Objectivists stick close to Rand and many will not accept
> that she made any errors in her philosophy.
But is this true of all of them? I doubt it. One would hardly judge
Montessori education by listening only to those to cultify Maria
Montessori; etc.
David Kelly is more
> reasonable and much more willing to connect to developments in
> the rest of phiosophy (e.g., he refers to Kripke). But he was
> virtually excommunicated by Peikoff et al.
I would love to see some discussion of David Kelly. _The Evidence of
the Senses_ might be a good place to start.
Would any of the Objectivist readers like to present a few of the
major arguments of this book? Or anybody else? (I'm acquainted only
with his thinking of about a decade ago--taped lectures from when he
still saw Peikoff as his mentor.)
Bill Turkel
>
>To generate further examples, simply start with a randon table
>and start changing the values of various measurements (material,
>leg length, number of legs, heights of border segments on the
>table top, etc) remembering that they can take on _any_ value.
Let's see
Material: Water
Number-of-legs: 0
Temperature: -4 degrees C
Table-top-shape: Cube
Location: My refrigerator
Yup,
TABLE = ICE CUBE
Chris Walker
Bill Turkel tries to debunk Rand's statement on measurements
as presented by Jeff Dalton:
>>To generate further examples, simply start with a randon table
>>and start changing the values of various measurements (material,
>>leg length, number of legs, heights of border segments on the
>>table top, etc) remembering that they can take on _any_ value.
>Let's see
> Material: Water
> Number-of-legs: 0
> Temperature: -4 degrees C
> Table-top-shape: Cube
> Location: My refrigerator
>Yup,
> TABLE = ICE CUBE
A person can do anything with words he wants, but if he leaves
out "similarity" and purpose in forming concepts, then word
play is the only possibility.
Bill Turkel, are concepts tied to reality or not, ie. is there any
basis in reality and in the way that the human mind works to form
them? Where are concepts anyway? Do they serve any purpose at all?
Do you have a better solution?
--
Chris Walker
cwa...@zycor.lgc.com
Gary Merrill
Is this series of questions and vague claims about similarity and purpose
intended to show how Turkel's example is *not* a problem for the
position set forward? If so, how does it do that? Far from doing
just "anything" with words, Turkel seems to have imposed an obvious
and literal interpretation on the statement of the position and
drawn a simple and direct consequence from this.
Turkel's reasoning here is of course quite familiar to anyone who
has dealt with the problem of universals in virtually any of its
myriad forms. This is the sort of thing I meant earlier in
referring to a "modicum" of training in philosophy.
Is the final question, "Do you have a better solution?" really
intended as a response to Turkel's criticism of the original
"solution"? Do we need to review the classic material fallacies
of relevance?
Roger Lustig
>[for courtesy, sci.philosophy.tech has been removed from the list]
>Bill Turkel tries to debunk Rand's statement on measurements
>as presented by Jeff Dalton:
No, he doesn't. He's merely giving an egregious example of something
Jeff already pointed out.
>>>To generate further examples, simply start with a randon table
>>>and start changing the values of various measurements (material,
>>>leg length, number of legs, heights of border segments on the
>>>table top, etc) remembering that they can take on _any_ value.
>>Let's see
>> Material: Water
>> Number-of-legs: 0
>> Temperature: -4 degrees C
>> Table-top-shape: Cube
>> Location: My refrigerator
>>Yup,
>> TABLE = ICE CUBE
>A person can do anything with words he wants, but if he leaves
>out "similarity" and purpose in forming concepts, then word
>play is the only possibility.
That wasn't the issue. The issue was what Rand said, and Rand
didn't say that the values of the measurements had to be tempered
with "similarity" and purpose.
Which would cause all kinds of new problems, because it
won't do to qualify things with "we all know what a table is,
anyway." The trick is showing how one *does* form concepts,
and why; and in noting how measurement interacts with the other
parts of the process. It's not independent of the dimensions/
materials/etc. part.
A better example: pebble. Certain values for the measurements
just won't do.
>Bill Turkel, are concepts tied to reality or not, ie. is there any
>basis in reality and in the way that the human mind works to form
>them?
Two different questions. "Tied to" suggests a specific set of
relationships. "Any basis" does not.
(Also, I'm not sure what the second half of that last sentence is
referring to.)
Obviously, concepts have some relation to reality, via observation,
etc. Just what that relationship necessarily is, is another question.
>Where are concepts anyway? Do they serve any purpose at all?
They serve a whole lot of *different* purposes. Do all the purposes
have something in common?
>Do you have a better solution?
To what?
Roger
PS: careful with words and concepts. They're two different things.
Chris Walker
>Turkel's reasoning here is of course quite familiar to anyone who
>has dealt with the problem of universals in virtually any of its
>myriad forms. This is the sort of thing I meant earlier in
>referring to a "modicum" of training in philosophy.
The questions merely indicate that as I see it, he has dropped
the context.
If an individual trains for years in a field, reaches his goal
to be certified an expert in the field or presents himself as
one, and then concludes that the field doesn't exist, then
then there is a basis to question the assumptions upon which he
is working, including his understanding of 'literal' and start
over.
>Is the final question, "Do you have a better solution?" really
>intended as a response to Turkel's criticism of the original
>"solution"? Do we need to review the classic material fallacies
>of relevance?
I interpret Turkel's criticism as leading to skepticism. As to
relevance, let us his his response.
--
Chris Walker
cwa...@zycor.lgc.com
Bill Turkel
>
>Bill Turkel tries to debunk Rand's statement on measurements
>as presented by Jeff Dalton:
>
>
>Bill Turkel, are concepts tied to reality or not, ie. is there any
>basis in reality and in the way that the human mind works to form
>them? Where are concepts anyway? Do they serve any purpose at all?
>Do you have a better solution?
>
>
>--
>Chris Walker
>cwa...@zycor.lgc.com
Hi Chris,
I'd like to answer you questions, but I won't until I have a better idea
of where you are coming from. Do you take me for a Randian? Or the
opposite? I was merely working through Jeff's little thought experiment.
In the system he described (whether it is faithful to Rand or a straw
man) I have a hard time distinguishing tables and ice cubes.
Do you?
Bill
Chris Walker
formulating a response to what I see as wrong in your understanding
of measurement-omission. I think that it'll be enlightening for
me to scrutinize this much more closely and plan on discussing this
issue at length with another Objectivist friend of mine.
Rand's concept of measurement omission, which rests upon the
orderliness of nature and the assertion of the mathematical
process of concept-formation, as already identified by some
moderns, IS the central issue which ties the Objectivist
theory of concepts to reality. If it is indefensible, then
the Objectivist theory of concepts become indefensible too.
I'm not a professional philosopher but rather a computer programmer,
so my response won't be philosophically rigorous. Most of my
knowledge of philosophy comes from:
A) direct first-hand experience
B) Rand and Peikoff
C) reading the original sources but no in-depth study except
for a few points as necessary
D) reading general statements of specific philosophers from
standard histories of philosophy and other guides.
Rand provided an outline of her epistemology, but noone has completed
the work, nor have the issues scientific induction been fully
addressed. Her legacy is a challenge to those who agree with her
to demonstrate the correct application of her fundamental ideas
to other fields and to be able to successfully understand every
aspect of what she has said in this field.
--
Chris Walker
cwa...@zycor.lgc.com
br...@quake.sylmar.ca.us
>Let's start at the beginning. Objectivists like to assert
>3 "axioms", having to do with existence, identity, and
>consciousness. These are formulated in such a way as to
>be tautological.
They absolutely are not! They refer to the way things actually are and
serve to forestall a host of errors apparent in other philosophical views.
For example, if some mystical type says that "There is nothing real out
there but our naive beliefs that there is something, and our goal should be
to eliminate such errors, and leave the universe clean of our pollution."
This implicitly denies that there is a real existence out there. Wouldn't
you agree that such a person would be violating that principle? If so,
can you really say that "Existence exists." is a vacuous statement? And if
you meaning of "tautological" doesn't imply vacuousness, why is it bad to be
tautological?
>They are then interpreted in such a way
>that non-trivial consequences can be inferred. I claim that
>this involves a sloppy use of language; I would welcome a
>formulation of the "axioms" that clearly allows such
>deductions to be made, and I would like to see a list of
>the inference rules used in such derivations. [This
>doesn't necessarily have to be formal; it just has to
>be tighter than I've seen it, and not in the form of
>slogans.]
You might want to read Leonard Peikoff's formulations in Objectivism: The
Philosophy of Ayn Rand. The derivation there is quite clear althought longer
than I would like to transcribe here. I think that the way you formulated
your question implies a misunderstanding of Rand's metaphysics. Inference
rules and deductions are all epistemological concepts which depend on
certain metaphysical premises. One does not and CAN not prove axioms, one
needs to recognize that they are undeniable and what they mean and that's it.
Metaphysics is a very simple subject and there is not really much to be said
about it. You seem to want to pull a whole bunch of epistemological issues
in as well as a much of other unnamed premises which don't belong there.
I CAN try to make clear the real meaning of the axioms by using a bit looser
language rather than more specific and technical since it is the broad issues
you seem confused by rather than some technical detail. Try these on for size:
1. Existence: There is a real world out there. It is composed of real things
not imaginary fantasies. It is not a creation of our minds. It is not
not an indeterminate hereclitian flux. Any claim that there is nothing
out there is self-refuting.
2. Identity: Those things out there are what they are, moreover, they are
something specific, not something different for different people. Those things
have a causal nature such that they act in accordance with that nature rather
than just for no reason. That nature just is and is not subject to changing
because we wish it to change or for no reason at all. This nature cannot
be evaluated and analyzed into some prior or more fundamental facts, they ARE
the fundamental facts. Any claim that a thing is not what it is, is self-
refuting.
3. Consciousness: You are conscious of reality. Any claim that knowledge
of reality is impossible is self-refuting.
>As an attempt at helping, I offer my (undoubtedly mistaken)
>understanding of these axioms:
>1. Existence. We cannot deny the validity of our sensory
>experience.
This is not at all what the axiom of existence says (although the validity of
sense perception is a proper metaphysical concept, just a secondary one).
The axiom of existence has nothing to do with sense perception, it has to
do with the fact that for any statement, observation, or idea to have any
validity, it must presuppose that there is something to be referred to,
something real.
>[There is then some mumbo-jumbo about how
>this proves the external world exists and roughly corresponds
>to what we perceive; it seems that some people interpret
>this axiom as meaning "There is an external world that
>roughly corresponds to our perceptions."]
Actually, at this point it says nothing about the validity of the senses.
The senses ARE valid (and we can talk about just what that means), but that
is not part of the existence axiom.
>2. Identity. It is useful and valuable to interpret
>sensory experience in terms of interacting objects; we
>determine the nature of these objects by observation.
>Whenever an observation contradicts our internalized
>model of an object's nature, the model must be revised.
This whole view of mental concepts as "models" of reality has no
place in Objectivism and certainly has no place in metaphysics.
Just as sensory experience is not part of the axiom of existence it also
is not a part of the axiom of identity either.
>[This is the axiom that seems to make people worry about
>QM, because "objects" at the microscopic level don't
>have the same behavioural characteristics as those at
>the macroscopic level. I've never understood why it
>made people uneasy, myself.]
The problem is that the way certain people interpret certain QM
principles denies that everything is what it is, they are all
excited about this because it is an example of something which
is not subject to reasoning. For example, if I said that "There is
an elephant in my kitchen and there is not an elephant in my
kitchen." this simpy could not be. I don't care whether you are talking about
microscopic or macroscopic objects, for a thing to be, it has to be something
in particular. "Behavior" is not the issue, existence and facts are the
issue and no such thing could be. I have never seen anything to actually
show that a serious interpretation of QM leads one to that conclusion,
but many people claim it does and whether such an interpretation is QM or
"Neo-QM", it IS wrong.
>3. Consciousness. Our only means of apprehending the
>"world" is via conscious awareness. [I'm not too sure
>about this one, since conditioned reflexes can be induced
>in people when they are asleep, I believe. It undoubtedly
>means I fail to understand what is being meant.]
That is a (loose) definition of consciousness, but the axiom says something
more specific, that you ARE conscious. To claim that you are not
conscious is nonsensical.
Does this make more sense? Perhaps you should read Peikoff's "Objectivism:
The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" for a more thorough exposition of this stuff.
Otherwise you won't know what you are talking about and won't have the
possibility to make any valid objections.
--Brian
br...@quake.sylmar.ca.us
>First phase: what do YOU take to be Rand's philosophical
>contributions? What does she say that was not said before, or never
>before so well?
An exhaustive list would be tough to compile, but a few come to mind:
Her formulation of the three fundamental axioms.
Her overall approach of addressing the most fundamental issues first, and
identifying her particular set of fundamental issues.
The philosophical defense of capitalism.
The concept of the "Sanction of the Victim".
Her theory of concepts.
Her theory of the objective nature of knowledge (as opposed to the intrinsic
or subjective).
Her philosophical defense of romanticism in art.
Her defense of egoism was quite different from those few who had advocated
it before.
Her analysis of the realtionship between reason, egoism, rights, and economics.
Her theory that the driving force behind history is philosophy (as opposed
to grand design, great men, technology, disease, fate, dialectical
materialism, physical determinism, etc.)
Is that enough?
Of course other had said something like some of these things before, but
you can hardly say that she just copied a lot of things other had said before.
I find it curious that in this newsgroup we simultaneously have people saying
that Rand was inconsequential because her ideas were wild-eyed nonsense while
others are saying that she was inconsequential because she was saying nothing
new and that everyone already knows everything she said.
--Brian
kuanjin
: I would like to advance the following challenge to the philosophic community
: out there on the network.
: Show that Ayn Rand's philosophy of objectivism is wrong in some philosophically
: material way, by reference to a philosophic issue and a critique of the Objectivist
: response. In other words, critique Objectivism by the same standards that are used
: for other philosophic systems. Please take care to give depth to your critique,
: and depth to the Objectivist position you critique.
Objectivism is not subject to the same type of scrutiny as academic
philosophy.
: I am serious in this challenge, although my impetus to post this challenge was
: born out of the frustration I have felt to the offhanded critiques of Objectivism
: that populate this, and other, groups. Most critiques seem actually to be attacks
: on the public image of Ayn Rand, personal attacks on Rand based upon statements
: about her private life, or convenient dismissals of her philosophc positions by claims
: of their triviality.
Competent users of the language do not include objectivism as an exemplary
member of the set denoted by "philosophy."
: It smacks of a philosophic filabuster when philosophers resort to these indirect
: approaches in an attempt to dismiss a writer/philosopher who, like it or not,
: occupies a considerable place in the thought of millions of people in this world.
Lots of things occupy considerable spaces in the thought of millions of
people ie., sailors and cartographers think that the world is the center
of the universe.
: The incidence of Rand's name on this network demands a reasoned response by those
: able to deliver it. That is my challenge.
Leave agitation propoganda out of this newsgroup
Michael Feld
>In article <CAIw...@ccu.umanitoba.ca> fe...@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:
>
>>First phase: what do YOU take to be Rand's philosophical
>>contributions? What does she say that was not said before, or never
>>before so well?
>
>An exhaustive list would be tough to compile, but a few come to mind:
>
>Her formulation of the three fundamental axioms.
>Her overall approach of addressing the most fundamental issues first, and
>identifying her particular set of fundamental issues.
>
>
Well, no; and not because there is anything tawdry about the list, but
only because you do not tell me/us what you think the topic titles
refer to. What do the axioms mean, if they are not tautologous? How
does she defend her version of realism? And so on.
In short, if anyone is to undertake the task of a non-flaming
explanation of why conventional academic philosophers give Rand a wide
birth, let's have one of her fans set out Rand's program. "Existence
exists" could mean anything, just as Quine's "what exists? everything"
could.
See?
--
Michael Feld | E-mail: <fe...@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
Dept. of Philosophy | FAX: (204) 261-0021
University of Manitoba | Voice: (204) 474-9136
Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada
Robert J. Kolker
Like a 10 dimensional spere, which is a valid (i.e. well defined,
and consistent)idea for which there is no concreate referent.
Furthermore, that validity of sense perception is highly contingent
on its consistency with other sense perception (through different
sense modalities) and with prior sense perception *as remembered* or
recorded (this is where brains come in). For sense perception to be
validated, it has to be intergratable into the corpus of other
sensory experience both as experienced by the observer himself and
other observers. If I see a pink elephant, it may be because of the
booze. If you and I see a pink elephant at the same time and the
same place, we may have the real thing.
>>[There is then some mumbo-jumbo about how
>>this proves the external world exists and roughly corresponds
>>to what we perceive; it seems that some people interpret
>>this axiom as meaning "There is an external world that
>>roughly corresponds to our perceptions."]
>Actually, at this point it says nothing about the validity of the senses.
>The senses ARE valid (and we can talk about just what that means), but that
>is not part of the existence axiom.
>>2. Identity. It is useful and valuable to interpret
>>sensory experience in terms of interacting objects; we
>>determine the nature of these objects by observation.
>>Whenever an observation contradicts our internalized
>>model of an object's nature, the model must be revised.
>This whole view of mental concepts as "models" of reality has no
>place in Objectivism and certainly has no place in metaphysics.
>Just as sensory experience is not part of the axiom of existence it also
>is not a part of the axiom of identity either.
How about 4 dimesional space-time?. This is a mental concept which
coherently and accurately accounts for particular sensory experiences
(for example laboratory experimental results). In terms of known
experience, it can be asserted that physical space IS a four dimen-
sional space time continuum.
>>[This is the axiom that seems to make people worry about
>>QM, because "objects" at the microscopic level don't
>>have the same behavioural characteristics as those at
>>the macroscopic level. I've never understood why it
>>made people uneasy, myself.]
>The problem is that the way certain people interpret certain QM
>principles denies that everything is what it is, they are all
>excited about this because it is an example of something which
>is not subject to reasoning. For example, if I said that "There is
>an elephant in my kitchen and there is not an elephant in my
>kitchen." this simpy could not be. I don't care whether you are talking about
>microscopic or macroscopic objects, for a thing to be, it has to be something
>in particular. "Behavior" is not the issue, existence and facts are the
>issue and no such thing could be. I have never seen anything to actually
>show that a serious interpretation of QM leads one to that conclusion,
>but many people claim it does and whether such an interpretation is QM or
>"Neo-QM", it IS wrong.
A Quantum Mechanic would not make any such assertion. He might say
there is a probabilty amplitude measuring the likelihood of the
the elephant being in your kitchen. Also electron manage to be both
waves and particles. When on observation does measure an electron,
depending on the mode of observation the electron will be either
a wave or a particle, but not both. Prior to the observation, electron
exhibit (by inference of course) wave-like behaviour.
>>3. Consciousness. Our only means of apprehending the
>>"world" is via conscious awareness. [I'm not too sure
>>about this one, since conditioned reflexes can be induced
>>in people when they are asleep, I believe. It undoubtedly
>>means I fail to understand what is being meant.]
>That is a (loose) definition of consciousness, but the axiom says something
>more specific, that you ARE conscious. To claim that you are not
>conscious is nonsensical.
What are we, under anesthetic?
>Does this make more sense? Perhaps you should read Peikoff's "Objectivism:
>The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" for a more thorough exposition of this stuff.
>Otherwise you won't know what you are talking about and won't have the
>possibility to make any valid objections.
I have read LP on the A/S dichotomy and I still cannot understand
his claim that there is no inherent difference of kind in the follow-
ing two statements.
(1) A square (in the Euclidean sense) has 4 corners .
(2) The peak of Mt. Everest is 29,030+-2 feet MSL.
The first is true by definition and deduction. To find that (2)
is true you need Shirpas and instruments.
>--Brian
Conan the Libertarian
--
"If you can't love the Constitution, then at least hate the Government"
br...@quake.sylmar.ca.us
Well, if you are looking for philosophers who agree (more or less) with Rand
but who are not Objectivists (or faux Objectivists) I think you shouldn't
be surprised to not find ANY. After all, how many people agree with Hegel
but aren't hegelians?
--Brian
Chris Holt
I suppose I can pursue this further:
br...@quake.sylmar.ca.us writes:
>Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk (Chris Holt) writes:
>>Let's start at the beginning. Objectivists like to assert
>>3 "axioms", having to do with existence, identity, and
>>consciousness. These are formulated in such a way as to
>>be tautological.
>They absolutely are not! They refer to the way things actually are and
>serve to forestall a host of errors apparent in other philosophical views.
Well, I'm afraid that if they are not tautological, then there
is no way of determining that they refer to the way things
actually are. Let's see what we have:
[Chris]
>>1. Existence. We cannot deny the validity of our sensory
>>experience.
[Brian]
>1. Existence: There is a real world out there. It is composed of real things
>not imaginary fantasies. It is not a creation of our minds. It is not
>not an indeterminate hereclitian flux. Any claim that there is nothing
>out there is self-refuting.
The only things we have direct awareness of are sensory
experiences. If "real world" is defined as these, my
statement is good enough. If "real world" is defined to be
something else, e.g. the 3D(ish) space with material objects,
then this is pure inference, and one that cannot be justified
ab initio. The claim that it need not exist (as in Descartes'
evil demon) is not self-refuting, because the refutation only
necessarily affects the world of sensory experience; it need
not affect the world of "material objects".
[Chris]
>>2. Identity. It is useful and valuable to interpret
>>sensory experience in terms of interacting objects; we
>>determine the nature of these objects by observation.
>>Whenever an observation contradicts our internalized
>>model of an object's nature, the model must be revised.
[Brian]
>2. Identity: Those things out there are what they are, moreover, they are
>something specific, not something different for different people. Those things
>have a causal nature such that they act in accordance with that nature rather
>than just for no reason. That nature just is and is not subject to changing
>because we wish it to change or for no reason at all. This nature cannot
>be evaluated and analyzed into some prior or more fundamental facts, they ARE
>the fundamental facts. Any claim that a thing is not what it is, is self-
>refuting.
I don't see how this is really different from what I said,
except that I didn't require the actual existence of the
objects (for reasons discussed above) and I didn't require
a notion of causality (being a good Humean :-).
[Chris]
>>3. Consciousness. Our only means of apprehending the
>>"world" is via conscious awareness.
[Brian]
>3. Consciousness: You are conscious of reality. Any claim that knowledge
>of reality is impossible is self-refuting.
This looks like a definition of "reality" as that which we
are conscious of; but, that is exactly the world of sensory
experience. It is only when you want to claim knowledge of
the world of material objects (which are what they are,
regardless of our perceptions) that disagreements arise;
and disagreements w.r.t. this latter realm are not self-
refuting.
-----
In responding to my suggestions, Brian offered some additional,
contentious remarks:
>>1. Existence. We cannot deny the validity of our sensory
>>experience.
>This is not at all what the axiom of existence says (although the validity of
>sense perception is a proper metaphysical concept, just a secondary one).
>The axiom of existence has nothing to do with sense perception, it has to
>do with the fact that for any statement, observation, or idea to have any
>validity, it must presuppose that there is something to be referred to,
>something real.
This means little unless you can explain what "real" means, and also
what "validity" means in an independent fashion. Otherwise, you
are merely introducing a definition and adding nothing to our
knowledge.
>>2. Identity. It is useful and valuable to interpret
>>sensory experience in terms of interacting objects; we
>>determine the nature of these objects by observation.
>>Whenever an observation contradicts our internalized
>>model of an object's nature, the model must be revised.
>This whole view of mental concepts as "models" of reality has no
>place in Objectivism and certainly has no place in metaphysics.
But our concepts of objects are necessarily incomplete, and
often mistaken. If you don't want to call them "models",
what would you rather we call them?
>>3. Consciousness. Our only means of apprehending the
>>"world" is via conscious awareness.
>That is a (loose) definition of consciousness, but the axiom says something
>more specific, that you ARE conscious. To claim that you are not
>conscious is nonsensical.
Sometimes I am not conscious (sleep). Sometimes I am more
conscious than others. Sometimes I am more conscious in some
ways, and other times in other ways. To assert that I am
conscious means what, if not that I am engaging in sensory
experience (where this can include the feedback of self-
awareness)?
>Does this make more sense? Perhaps you should read Peikoff's "Objectivism:
>The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" for a more thorough exposition of this stuff.
>Otherwise you won't know what you are talking about and won't have the
>possibility to make any valid objections.
However, it might be an interesting exercise for objectivists
to paraphrase their arguments for non-objectivists; otherwise,
it's easy to give an impression of being a parrot, somewhat
like a dogmatic marxist.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk Computing Lab, U of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chameleons feed on light and air: / Programmers' food is life and pain.
mi...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
> explanation of why conventional academic philosophers give Rand a wide
> b[e]rth
I've long felt about Ayn Rand the way I've felt about Mortimer Adler:
anybody whose work is almost completely ignored by the present academic
establishment can't be all bad...
(sorry, sitting duck :)
Roger Lustig
>In article <CAnDw...@ccu.umanitoba.ca>, fe...@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:
>> explanation of why conventional academic philosophers give Rand a wide
>> b[e]rth
>I've long felt about Ayn Rand the way I've felt about Mortimer Adler:
>anybody whose work is almost completely ignored by the present academic
>establishment can't be all bad...
Do you feel that way about Erich von Daeniken and Velikovsky and Lawson
and Otto Weininger?
>(sorry, sitting duck :)
Ditto.
Roger
mi...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
Who's afraid of the big bad wolf :)
I don't know anything about the last two. Von Daeniken asked
interesting questions that nobody else was asking; Velikovsky is
somewhat vindicated in that cataclysm seems (rightly or wrongly) today
more acceptable as explanation (still a last resort, I assume).
Though you may see it as a great triumph, I think it's very sad that
today the *mere* fact that some speculation or other has not been
academicized counts as an argument against it. It was not always so.
As for my "anybody" indeed that would be a sitting duck if meant
literally; but surely it's obvious that it's a W.C.Field
take-off and not meant literally.
Roger Lustig
>In article <1993Jul25.0...@Princeton.EDU>, ro...@faust.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig) writes:
>> In article <1993Jul24.1...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu> mi...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu writes:
>>>I've long felt about Ayn Rand the way I've felt about Mortimer Adler:
>>>anybody whose work is almost completely ignored by the present academic
>>>establishment can't be all bad...
>> Do you feel that way about Erich von Daeniken and Velikovsky and Lawson
>> and Otto Weininger?
>>>(sorry, sitting duck :)
>> Ditto.
>Who's afraid of the big bad wolf :)
>I don't know anything about the last two. Von Daeniken asked
>interesting questions that nobody else was asking;
And made up evidence to answer them. Wich questions do you find so
interesting?
>Velikovsky is
>somewhat vindicated in that cataclysm seems (rightly or wrongly) today
>more acceptable as explanation (still a last resort, I assume).
Actually, Velikovsky is in no way vindicated, because *his* notions
of cataclysm were so obviously wrong from the start, and were poorly
worked out. Don't give him credit for other people's work.
Lawson was a crackpot in the 19th century who tried to reinvent
physics, a sort of McElwaine before his time. He still has one or
two followers.
Otto Weininger's _Geschlecht und Charakter_ was a million-seller
in its time, though the author offed himself at age 23, before most
of the bucks rolled in. It tried to explain everything in terms
of sex/gender; Jews, it seems, were feminine by nature, which was
a Bad Thing. (Perhaps he killed himself when he noticed that he
himself was Jewish!) Anyway, the book was highly influential in
Germany and Austria in the early part of the century. Nowadays
everyone dismisses it for the tripe that it is, and studies it
only as a cultural artifact.
>Though you may see it as a great triumph, I think it's very sad that
>today the *mere* fact that some speculation or other has not been
>academicized counts as an argument against it.
In the cases of Velikovsky and Daeniken, you're off the mark. _Scientists
Confront Velikovsky_ certainly counts as an academicization; it made
plain that he was not being ignored.
In Daeniken's case, academic geologists and archaeologists cooked
him so fast you may not have noticed; but their refutations were
pretty convincing.
In *both* cases, as with things like Dianetics, a refusal to argue
scientifically in the first place has a good deal to do with their
acceptance in academia. If you start a book with "All doctors are
fools and crooks," you may not get a great deal of respect when the
book is reviewed in JAMA.
The *mere* fact you speak of isn't so mere, in other words: Velikovsky
et al. generally *work* at getting ignored by the establishment. Note,
for instance, V.'s antagonistic attitude toward everyone who disagreed,
and his refusal to acknowledge his own obvious errors when they were
pointed out.
The academic establishment cooked Daeniken inadvertently, you may
remember. An April Fools issue of _Nature_ told of the discovery of
a manna machine that the Israelites had used. EvD swallowed the hoax
whole...
>It was not always so.
Yes, it was. Velikovsky and Daeniken are not the innocents you make
them out to be. It was *they* who started it: *they* who decided
a priori that the scientific establishment knew nothing.
>As for my "anybody" indeed that would be a sitting duck if meant
>literally; but surely it's obvious that it's a W.C.Field
>take-off and not meant literally.
Also has some Groucho overtones...not wanting to belong to a club
that would have him for a member...
Roger
mi...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
>>Though you may see it as a great triumph, I think it's very sad that
>>today the *mere* fact that some speculation or other has not been
>>academicized counts as an argument against it.
[major part of response deleted]
You misunderstand me. Three points and I'm finished:
(a) At the present time there is almost no intellectual life at all
outside of academe. That's an unhealthy situation.
(b) A crackpot can get a Ph.D. However
(c) most academics aren't interesting enough to be crackpots, and
what we have instead is officially sanctioned pseudo-science, which is
what IMO ought to be discussed in a newsgroup like this, instead of
gleefully beating dead and nearly expired horses from a past era.
> Note,
> for instance, V.'s antagonistic attitude toward everyone who disagreed,
> and his refusal to acknowledge his own obvious errors when they were
> pointed out.
Sounds like an academic to me; are you *sure* V. didn't have a Ph.D.?
:)
Torkel Franzen
edu writes:
>(c) most academics aren't interesting enough to be crackpots, and
On the other hand, most crackpots are very boring.
>what we have instead is officially sanctioned pseudo-science, which is
>what IMO ought to be discussed in a newsgroup like this,
So discuss it. What particular pseudo-science did you have in mind?
Gary Merrill
In article <1993Jul25....@Princeton.EDU>, ro...@faust.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig) writes:
|> In the cases of Velikovsky and Daeniken, you're off the mark. _Scientists
|> Confront Velikovsky_ certainly counts as an academicization; it made
|> plain that he was not being ignored.
Let me add to this the following: I recall a biennial meeting of the
Philospohy of Science Association (I believe this was in 1974) held
at the University of Notre Dame in which a major symposium was devoted
to Velikovsky. The panel consisted of a couple of Velikovsky
supporters, at least one non-supportive philosopher (I forget who
this was) and an astrophysicist (from Harvard, I think, but I could
be wrong).
I remember being quite surprised that such a significant portion
of the PSA program would be devoted to a (let's be honest) crank.
Apparently this came about as the result of a vocal minority voicing
the same types of complaints we have seen here, and people got
fed up enough to actually organize a symposium. The symposium
was well attended, and by those in the upper reaches of academic
philosophy (I ended up sitting beside Carl Hempel, for example).
I confess that I don't at this time recall any of the details (I
would probably recall even less were it not that this was the
single opportunity I ever had to meet and talk with Hempel). But
I do recall that things went very badly for the Velikovsky folks.
(I remember that the physicist, in particular, though he seemed
very even-handed and as neutral as possible, delivered some major
blows.) Be that as it may, this again is a clear counterexample
to claims that people such as Velikovsky are simply ignored or
not given a "fair hearing" by the academic community.
Gary Merrill
|>
|> >Turkel's reasoning here is of course quite familiar to anyone who
|> >has dealt with the problem of universals in virtually any of its
|> >myriad forms. This is the sort of thing I meant earlier in
|> >referring to a "modicum" of training in philosophy.
|>
|> The questions merely indicate that as I see it, he has dropped
|> the context.
Is the following an Objectivist principle?
I you make a specific claim and someone offers what
is obviously a telling criticism of it, respond that
he has not considered sufficient context. Do *not*
under any circumstances attempt to respond to the
criticism directly and do *not* be specific about
the context that *would* be sufficient or in what
manner the critic's context is not.
I like it! (Of course, such a principle has been used by
centruies. Sometimes, people who adopt such a principle are
called "sophists".)
|> If an individual trains for years in a field, reaches his goal
|> to be certified an expert in the field or presents himself as
|> one, and then concludes that the field doesn't exist, then
|> then there is a basis to question the assumptions upon which he
|> is working, including his understanding of 'literal' and start
|> over.
Huh?
I think we *do* need to review the material fallacies of relevance!
|> >Is the final question, "Do you have a better solution?" really
|> >intended as a response to Turkel's criticism of the original
|> >"solution"? Do we need to review the classic material fallacies
|> >of relevance?
|>
|> I interpret Turkel's criticism as leading to skepticism. As to
So? It's not Turkel's *criticism* that leads to skepticism. It's
the *original* position that leads to skepticism -- and Turkel's
criticism demonstrates this. Rationality requires that you reject
the original position -- not the criticism. Don't kill the messenger
just because you don't like the message.
Gary Merrill
|> I'm not a professional philosopher but rather a computer programmer,
|> so my response won't be philosophically rigorous. Most of my
|> knowledge of philosophy comes from:
|>
|>
|> A) direct first-hand experience
|> B) Rand and Peikoff
|> C) reading the original sources but no in-depth study except
|> for a few points as necessary
|> D) reading general statements of specific philosophers from
|> standard histories of philosophy and other guides.
I've been picking on your responses in terms of their relevance.
Let me offer a positive suggestion that would be well worth
following for you:
Get (or borrow) a copy of _Fundamentals of Logic_ by Carney and
Sheer. Read (indeed, study) the first part of this book. It
is devoted to the analysis of arguments and a very detailed
account of classical fallacies (not stuff in terms of syllogistic
-- standard fallacies of relevance and such). A lot of examples
drawn from actual texts are provided.
|> Rand provided an outline of her epistemology, but noone has completed
|> the work, nor have the issues scientific induction been fully
|> addressed. Her legacy is a challenge to those who agree with her
|> to demonstrate the correct application of her fundamental ideas
|> to other fields and to be able to successfully understand every
|> aspect of what she has said in this field.
What you say here, and the language in which it is phrased, has a
strong flavor of zealotry. If in fact you do fancy yourself an
objectivist, then ipso facto you are required to apply objectivist
methods to the evaluation of objectivism and Rand's writings
themselves -- rather than dogmatically defending a "legacy". This
in turn requires that you know how to objectively evaluate
arguments and analyze positions and their consequences. One thing
that this requires is an understanding of the structure of arguments
and what the distinction is between good and bad arguments.
Another thing required is a sincere commitment in seeing what are
both the strengths and weaknesses of the positions of interest
to you. This can be gained by examining similar positions and
attempted solutions to the problems in question.
Despite your claims to C and D above, I suspect that you have devoted
relatively little time to this and virtually all of your time to A and
B. Why do I suspect this? Because Turkel gave a *standard* response
to the kind of position you set forth and it is clear that you
neither anticipated it nor were prepared to deal with it directly.
Turkel's type of criticism is as standard in philosophy as is the
usual knight response to a P-K4 opening in chess.
Concerning the issues currently under dispute, you would profit
greatly from some familiarity with what in philosophy is called
"the problem of universals". You would also benefit from looking
at what Wittgenstein has to say about "family resemblances". If
you do this you may discover that what Rand has to say is neither
innovative nor especially successful. Or you may discover how
to repair or extend the position you currently want to defend.
Stephen Grossman
>In article <1993Jul20.2...@telesciences.com> mva...@telesciences.com (Mike S Vandy) writes:
>>I would like to advance the following challenge to the philosophic community
>>out there on the network.
>>
>>Show that Ayn Rand's philosophy of objectivism is wrong in some
>>philosophically material way, by reference to a philosophic issue
>>and a critique of the Objectivist response.
>
>to Objectivist Epistemology_, Peikoff tries to attach the certainty
>that he claims is associated with the analytic to statements about
>the world, i.e. to statements commonly regarded as synthetic. He
>wants to eliminate the analytic/synthetic distinction (the "death
>carrier") to get the best of both. But the idea that there is no
>distinction is advanced in part by a very selective use of examples.
>Nonetheless, there is a difference between statemants such as
>the following:
>
>(1) All red things are red.
>(2) There is a coffee cup on my desk.
The a-s/d is based on the existence/identity distinction. But there is no
existence/identity distinction since existence is identity. Peikoff is placing
epistemology witthin metaphysics, criticizing the metaphysics, and then
applying it to epistemology. You should read his metaphysical comments.
********************************************************************************
Beyond and back of the wind, | Stephen Grossman
Little birds fly into the sea, | pmsc...@umassd.edu
Morning light shine on me. |
|
[Marianne Faithfull & Wally Baderou] |
********************************************************************************
br...@quake.sylmar.ca.us
>In article <CALqI...@quake.sylmar.ca.us> br...@quake.sylmar.ca.us writes:
>>In article <CAIw...@ccu.umanitoba.ca> fe...@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:
>>>First phase: what do YOU take to be Rand's philosophical
>>>contributions? What does she say that was not said before, or never
>>>before so well?
>>An exhaustive list would be tough to compile, but a few come to mind:
>>Her formulation of the three fundamental axioms.
>>Her overall approach of addressing the most fundamental issues first, and
>>identifying her particular set of fundamental issues.
>>Is that enough?
Why did you just pick these three out of my list?
>Well, no; and not because there is anything tawdry about the list, but
>only because you do not tell me/us what you think the topic titles
>refer to.
What was requested was not a systematic exposition of the entire Objectivist
philosophy at length, but to provide a few examples of her original
ideas.
>What do the axioms mean, if they are not tautologous? How
>does she defend her version of realism? And so on.
If you REALLY want to know what these things are in depth, you ought to read
Rand's original writings or perhaps Peikoff's systematized exposition of
them in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (for your purposes that
may be best). This medium (USENET) is good for discussing ideas we
already both know something about or discussing generalities on subjects
we are not both familiar with, but if you really want to get a full picture
in depth, news articles a few pages long are not a good way to go about
learning about the subject. I could write a 15 page exposition on all of the
variants of realism that have been proposed over the ages and where Rand's
version is different and where it is the same (although strictly speaking,
I don't consider Rand to be a realist) but what would it accomplish? Ten
people would criticize my analysis of those other philosophers, they would
deny that anybody with such a distorted view of <insert your favorite
philosopher here> could have anything interesting to say, and Rand would
never be mentioned. Another important point is that when considering
whether Rand is right or wrong, the positions of other philosophers, while
interesting, is not vitally important, and trying to interpret Rand from
the premises of some other philosophy will fail. For example, if some
philosopher (oh, say Wittgenstein) STARTS his philosophy in a different place
(oh, say with language) then at every step along the way his philosophy will
at least implicitly be in contradiction with another philosophy (oh, say
Objectivism) which has a different starting point (and therefore different
fundamental assumptions).
>In short, if anyone is to undertake the task of a non-flaming
>explanation of why conventional academic philosophers give Rand a wide
>birth, let's have one of her fans set out Rand's program. "Existence
>exists" could mean anything, just as Quine's "what exists? everything"
>could.
That is true, and that's why so many of us here keep having to explain it
again and again. I would be glad to explain some of this to anyone who is
interested and discuss any disagreements (in a non-flaming way), although
it is going to be MUCH more helpful if I don't have to re-type hundreds of
pages of text to get you up to speed. I'll make you a deal. If you read
the first 4 Chapters of Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (just 150
pages) I'll explain and discuss anything you want. If you don't, we are
not likely to get beyond some simple definitions and disagreements. Deal?
--Brian
Gary Bourque
In article <CAIqq...@unx.sas.com>, sas...@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
> I suspect that the response you will get is that your criticisms
> don't address the "philosophy of objectivism", or that they are
> nitpicking and inessential (I would be pleased to be wrong in this
> prediction). However, without addressing that issue, one thing
> that the criticisms *do* expose is the extraordinary naivety with
> which Rand et al. approach matters philosophical.
> Anyone with
> even a modicum of training in philosophy would either already
> be aware of the types of problems you raise or would be able
> to see them immediately in the views advanced by Rand. The fact
> that Rand's (and her followers') writings are full of such
> elementary blunders and failures to see obvious flaws goes
> a long way toward explaining why professional philosophers do
> not like to devote a lot of time to "refuting" these positions.
This an instance of what Ayn Rand called the "argument from intimidation".
No facts, no examples, just a condescending, pompous attitude aimed at the
insecurities of listeners. Ayn Rand would have spotted it in a second.
Roger Lustig
>> Get (or borrow) a copy of _Fundamentals of Logic_ by Carney and
>> Sheer. Read (indeed, study) the first part of this book. It
>> is devoted to the analysis of arguments and a very detailed
>> account of classical fallacies (not stuff in terms of syllogistic
>> -- standard fallacies of relevance and such). A lot of examples
>> drawn from actual texts are provided.
> Does this book (or any similar book any of you know of) cover
>what I call "Argumentum ad Logicam"? (I'm told there are other labels
>for it.)
> This is the fallacy of pronouncing the conclusion of an
>argument false on the ground that the argument is invalid.
That's a fallacy, all right, but it comes up less than you may think.
After all, one may correctly use that reasoning if the conclusion
under discussion is "I'm right and you/everybody else are/is wrong."
And, especially around here, that *is* often the gist of conclusions.
Roger
Roger Lustig
>In article <CAIqq...@unx.sas.com>, sas...@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>> I suspect that the response you will get is that your criticisms
>> don't address the "philosophy of objectivism", or that they are
>> nitpicking and inessential (I would be pleased to be wrong in this
>> prediction). However, without addressing that issue, one thing
>> that the criticisms *do* expose is the extraordinary naivety with
>> which Rand et al. approach matters philosophical.
>> Anyone with
>> even a modicum of training in philosophy would either already
>> be aware of the types of problems you raise or would be able
>> to see them immediately in the views advanced by Rand. The fact
>> that Rand's (and her followers') writings are full of such
>> elementary blunders and failures to see obvious flaws goes
>> a long way toward explaining why professional philosophers do
>> not like to devote a lot of time to "refuting" these positions.
>This an instance of what Ayn Rand called the "argument from intimidation".
No.
>No facts, no examples, just a condescending, pompous attitude aimed at the
>insecurities of listeners.
And what you have here is "argument from deletion of context." There have
been *plenty* of arguments against Rand posted here and published elsewhere,
and if you look closely at what's left of Gary's posting, you'll note that
he's referring toa variety of substantial critiques.
Or perhaps it's "argument from impossible standards": all critique of Rand,
no matter how informal, must be accompanied by long discourse, and may be
dismissed with "Read this or that book by Rand or Peikoff."
The critiques are out there. Why not do what real philosophers do and
*tackle* those critiques in good faith and attempt to understand why
they take the approaches they do? Rand, it should be noted, did *not*
do this; her followers have raised her practice to "argument from
paranoia," it would seem. Rand on at least one occasion criticized a
book she had not read; Peikoff seems to have repeated this practice
by the dozens. Most Randian critques of other philosophy are based on
distortions and redefinitions of words, if not outright errors.
>Ayn Rand would have spotted it in a second.
What a gal.
Roger
Michael Feld
>
> Does this book (or any similar book any of you know of) cover
>what I call "Argumentum ad Logicam"? (I'm told there are other labels
>for it.)
>
> This is the fallacy of pronouncing the conclusion of an
>argument false on the ground that the argument is invalid.
>
This is a version of the traditional fallacy of "denying the
antecedent"; it falls under the usual clarification of what we mean by
"logical validity". Every Intro logic text I've ever seen covers the
error.
--
Michael Feld | E-mail: <fe...@cc.umanitoba.ca>
Karl Kluge
From: pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman)
Reply-To: pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 1993 15:13:38 GMT
The a-s/d is based on the existence/identity distinction. But there is no
existence/identity distinction since existence is identity. Peikoff is
placing epistemology witthin metaphysics, criticizing the metaphysics,
and then applying it to epistemology. You should read his metaphysical
comments.
The a-s/d is based on the question "what warrent is there for making
universally quantified statements?" To answer that by saying "existance
is identity" misses the thrust of the question, which is not to dispute
the existance of an objective reality, but to ask whether/how valid
universal laws can be derived from a finite number of experimental
samples. Thus, if Peikoff had really resolved the issue, he should be
able to answer the following question and offer a proof of the correctness
of his answer:
Is the relativistic correction to F = ma correct, or is it
merely an approximation valid in the set of examined conditions
in the same way F = ma was?
Peikoff, as I said before, instead begs the question, saying things like "To
establish that something is a fact, one employs observation and the
appropriate inductive procedures..." (pg 107, _Introduction to Objectivist
Epistemology_, 2cd edition, "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy") and "The
initial similarities, on the basis of which certain concretes were isolated
and conceptually integrated, were grasped by a process of observation; all
subsequently discovered characteristics of these concretes are discovered by
the same method (no matter how complex the inductive procedures involved may
become)." (ibid, pg 98)
Since the core question is whether sound inductive procedures exist for
infering universal laws from finite samples, his implicit assumption that
they do renders his conclusion (that the analytic/synthetic distinction is
invalid) incorrect.
Gary Merrill
I don't think what Ken is getting at is denying the antecedent.
Denying the antecedent is typically phrased as:
If P, then Q.
Not P
____________
(Therefore) Not Q
This is a fallacy because it is an invalid argument form. What
I took Ken to mean was something like:
The argument
[Insert an argument here. It should consist
of premises, conclusion, and perhaps justifications
for intermediate steps, etc.]
is not valid
________________________
(Therefore) It's conclusion is false.
An example demonstrating both types of fallacious reasoning:
Argument A:
If Sam is a beagle, then Sam is a dog.
Sam is not a beagle.
____________________
[Therefore] Sam is not a dog.
Argument A is itself an instance of denying the antecedent. I
think that the argument Ken is complaining about is the "meta"
argument:
Argument A is invalid [Note that this is true.]
--------------------
[Therefore] Sam is a dog.
(I.e., therefore "Sam is not a dog" is false.)
Stephen Grossman
>
>In article <CAsG3...@austin.ibm.com>, gbou...@austin.ibm.com (Gary Bourque) writes:
>
>|> This an instance of what Ayn Rand called the "argument from intimidation".
>|> No facts, no examples, just a condescending, pompous attitude aimed at the
>|> insecurities of listeners. Ayn Rand would have spotted it in a second.
>
>I offer _The Virtue of Selfishness_ in which Rand expertly wields
>the argument from intimidation and then includes a chapter on how
>inappropriate it is. Perhaps she was capable of spotting it in
>others -- certainly not in herself.
Do you ever feel constrained by the need to offer arguments? _Virtue_ is a
systematic presentation of ethics. Since Rand makes explicit her ethical
principles, she has no need for intimidation.
Gary Merrill
In article <CAu5q...@umassd.edu>, pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU (Stephen Grossman) writes:
|> In article <CAts4...@unx.sas.com>, sas...@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
|> >
|> >In article <CAsG3...@austin.ibm.com>, gbou...@austin.ibm.com (Gary Bourque) writes:
|> >
|> >|> This an instance of what Ayn Rand called the "argument from intimidation".
|> >|> No facts, no examples, just a condescending, pompous attitude aimed at the
|> >|> insecurities of listeners. Ayn Rand would have spotted it in a second.
|> >
|> >I do not believe that this last claim is true. As evidence for it
|> >I offer _The Virtue of Selfishness_ in which Rand expertly wields
|> >the argument from intimidation and then includes a chapter on how
|> >inappropriate it is. Perhaps she was capable of spotting it in
|> >others -- certainly not in herself.
|>
|> Do you ever feel constrained by the need to offer arguments? _Virtue_ is a
|> systematic presentation of ethics. Since Rand makes explicit her ethical
|> principles, she has no need for intimidation.
[I'm not really sure what the point of the above paragraph is, but ...]
Well, when I offer arguments, Objectivists complain that I offer no facts
or examples. When I offer facts and examples, they complain that I offer
no arguments. When I offer facts, examples and arguments, they say I am
"dropping context".
She may not have a *need* for it, but it is there nonetheless.
In reading _The Virtue of Selfishness_ when I first got it (many years ago)
I had the following experience:
I read the chapters from front to back. As I read through the first few
chapters I made marginal notes on a number of the positions and arguments
and I came more and more to realize that one of Rand's primary rhetorical
techniques was to say things along the lines of "If you don't believe this,
you are not rational.", "If you don't agree with what I am saying, you are
not rational." This theme is repeated throughout the book: If you don't
agree with the author, you're just not very smart -- and you don't deserve
to call yourself "rational".
I then got to the chapter on the argument from intimidation (which is,
of course, simply one of the classical fallacies of relevance to which
Rand has given a new name) where this very type of argument is *criticized*.
I was astonished. I continue to be astonished that Objectivists, who pride
themselves so much on rationality, seem to spend so little time actually
developing skills of argumentation, analysis, and logic. If it is facts,
examples, and arguments you want in support of that claim, simply review
the reactions in this thread to Turkel's criticisms.
Stephen Grossman
>Gary Merrill writes:
>
>> I suspect that the response you will get is that your criticisms
>>don't address the "philosophy of objectivism", or that they are
>>nitpicking and inessential (I would be pleased to be wrong in this
>>prediction).
>
>pleased. The posting had some basic factual errors about Objectivist
>epistemology, but addressed important issues that deserve to be discussed.
>
>>Anyone with
>>even a modicum of training in philosophy would either already
>>be aware of the types of problems you raise or would be able
>>to see them immediately in the views advanced by Rand. The fact
>>that Rand's (and her followers') writings are full of such
>>elementary blunders and failures to see obvious flaws goes
>>a long way toward explaining why professional philosophers do
>>not like to devote a lot of time to "refuting" these positions.
>
>of us you have had polite and hopefully substantial conversations with
>in the past.
>
>The falsity of the position can be demonstrated by production of
>counter-examples. Shall I list the academic philosophers who are
>interested in Rand? Should I produce copies of their resumes to
>illustrate that they have a "modicum of training"? Do PhDs from major
>universities count? Chairmanship of major philosophy departments?
You should not encourage his argument from authority.
Erin Fleet, MP-9
>>sensory experience in terms of interacting objects; we
>>determine the nature of these objects by observation.
>>Whenever an observation contradicts our internalized
>>model of an object's nature, the model must be revised.
>
>This whole view of mental concepts as "models" of reality has no
>place in Objectivism and certainly has no place in metaphysics.
>is not a part of the axiom of identity either.
>
>>QM, because "objects" at the microscopic level don't
>>have the same behavioural characteristics as those at
>>the macroscopic level. I've never understood why it
>>made people uneasy, myself.]
>
>The problem is that the way certain people interpret certain QM
>principles denies that everything is what it is, they are all
>excited about this because it is an example of something which
>is not subject to reasoning. For example, if I said that "There is
>an elephant in my kitchen and there is not an elephant in my
>kitchen." this simpy could not be. I don't care whether you are talking about
>microscopic or macroscopic objects, for a thing to be, it has to be something
>in particular. "Behavior" is not the issue, existence and facts are the
>issue and no such thing could be. I have never seen anything to actually
>show that a serious interpretation of QM leads one to that conclusion,
>but many people claim it does and whether such an interpretation is QM or
>"Neo-QM", it IS wrong.
>
from how you looked? Take a photon. If you do the standard dual-slit
experiment, you get an interference pattern (wave-like behaviour), and you don't
know which slit the photon went through. However, if you place an apparatus
at a slit such that you know if a photon went through (hence you know which slit
the photon passed through), you get know interference pattern. My question is,
why? Does this contradict your premise that something is yet is not?
Erin
Stephen Grossman
>mva...@telesciences.com (Mike S Vandy) writes:
>
>understanding of these axioms:
>
>this proves the external world exists and roughly corresponds
>to what we perceive; it seems that some people interpret
>this axiom as meaning "There is an external world that
>roughly corresponds to our perceptions."]
Existence is everything, including, but not limited to, sensory experience.
>2. Identity. It is useful and valuable to interpret
>sensory experience in terms of interacting objects; we
>determine the nature of these objects by observation.
>Whenever an observation contradicts our internalized
>model of an object's nature, the model must be revised.
>[This is the axiom that seems to make people worry about
>QM, because "objects" at the microscopic level don't
>have the same behavioural characteristics as those at
>the macroscopic level. I've never understood why it
>made people uneasy, myself.]
You have almost made identity a subjective thing.
>3. Consciousness. Our only means of apprehending the
>"world" is via conscious awareness. [I'm not too sure
>about this one, since conditioned reflexes can be induced
>in people when they are asleep, I believe. It undoubtedly
>means I fail to understand what is being meant.]
Consciousness refers to all states of consciousness, not just
self-consciousness. It includes reason, perception, sensation, emotion, memory,
imagination, hallucination, etc. Awareness, experience are merely different
words for consciousness. I am conciousess of the blond in the bikini. I
experience the blond in the bikini...........
You limit your understanding of Objectivism to your subjectivist view. But
there are other limits.
Will Ballard
|> >Specifically regarding those interested in Rand ideas which Merrill
|> >requests:
|>
|> >Just look at the bibliography that I posted.
|>
|> I've looked. I'm not even slightly impressed. If you subtract
|> the libertarians and Objectivists (no surprise there), what's left?
|>
There is a fundamental differnece between objectivists and your main stream philosophers.
Philosophers must justify new ideas (correct or not) in order to have jobs, along the same line, they
must study a broad slice of philosophy (including the writings that contain little value by an
objective standard) In order to be employable as professors, they must know the accepted body of
work.
An objectivist studies it because he wants too, not because of some outside pressure. Objectivists,
and those who seriously study it LIVE IT. This can not be conclusively said of a 'main stream'
philosopher, who is more interested in the existence of ideas instead of their value.
As a side posit, how are your main stream philosophers of any value. How do they make lives better?
How do they make my life richer? How do they make anything? I KNOW, by proof through examples in my
life, that following the objectivist tenents has given me GREAT happiness. Philosophy is primarily
about people ( people made it for themselves). In order for a system to be of value, it MUST HELP US
LIVE OUR LIVES, not convince us that we are lucky pond scum.
mi...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
> Get (or borrow) a copy of _Fundamentals of Logic_ by Carney and
> Sheer. Read (indeed, study) the first part of this book. It
> is devoted to the analysis of arguments and a very detailed
> account of classical fallacies (not stuff in terms of syllogistic
> -- standard fallacies of relevance and such). A lot of examples
> drawn from actual texts are provided.
Does this book (or any similar book any of you know of) cover
what I call "Argumentum ad Logicam"? (I'm told there are other labels
for it.)
This is the fallacy of pronouncing the conclusion of an
argument false on the ground that the argument is invalid.
Ken
Stephen Grossman
>In article <1993Jul20.2...@telesciences.com> mva...@telesciences.com (Mike S Vandy) writes:
>>I would like to advance the following challenge to the philosophic community
>>out there on the network.
>>
>>Show that Ayn Rand's philosophy of objectivism is wrong in some philosophically
>>material way, by reference to a philosophic issue and a critique of the Objectivist
>
>No flame, ok? You ask a serious, principled question, and I'll strive
>for the same sort of reply.
>
>First phase: what do YOU take to be Rand's philosophical
>contributions? What does she say that was not said before, or never
>it makes no philosophical claims at all; that it is evangelistical,
>but lacks a gospel.
Existence is identity.
Concepts are logically and volitionally formed from our
perception of objective reality.
Selfishness is not hedonism.
Capitalism is moral.
Romantic art is based upon volition.
The criticism of Objectivism is mostly dishonest because, like Kant, most
philosophers want sacrifice without rational limit. Branden challenged Rand's
opponents to honestly state that they were opposed to life and happiness and so
opposed Rand.
********************************************************************************
"Do you want to assess the rationality of a person, a theory, or a
philosophical system? Do not inquire about his or its stand on the validity of
reason. Look for the stand on axiomatic concepts."
Rand
Identify the metaphysical limit, rather than the epistemological truth, of a
claim.
Calvin Bruce Ostrum
| In article <CAts4...@unx.sas.com>
| sas...@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
| >I do not believe that this last claim is true. As evidence for it
| >I offer _The Virtue of Selfishness_ in which Rand expertly wields
| >the argument from intimidation and then includes a chapter on how
| >inappropriate it is. Perhaps she was capable of spotting it in
| >others -- certainly not in herself.
|
| Do you ever feel constrained by the need to offer arguments? _Virtue_ is a
| systematic presentation of ethics. Since Rand makes explicit her ethical
| principles, she has no need for intimidation.
The first two sentences in the Introduction to "The Virtue of
Selfishness" read as follows:
| The title of this book may evoke the kind of question that I hear
| once in a while: "Why do you use the word 'selfishness' to denote
| virtuous qualities of character, when that word antagonizes so many
| people to whom it does not mean the things you mean?"
|
| To those who ask it, my answer is: "For the reason that makes you
| afraid of it".
So, not only does Miss Rand use arguments from intimidation, but she
admits to using them in response to what she calls with "moral cowards".
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calvin Ostrum c...@cs.toronto.edu
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One further suggestion: if you undertake the task of philosophical
detection, drop the dangerous little catch phrase which advises you
to keep an "open mind". -- Ayn Rand
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roger Lustig
>>In article <CAsG3...@austin.ibm.com>, gbou...@austin.ibm.com (Gary Bourque) writes:
>>|> This an instance of what Ayn Rand called the "argument from intimidation".
>>|> No facts, no examples, just a condescending, pompous attitude aimed at the
>>|> insecurities of listeners. Ayn Rand would have spotted it in a second.
>>I do not believe that this last claim is true. As evidence for it
>>I offer _The Virtue of Selfishness_ in which Rand expertly wields
>>the argument from intimidation and then includes a chapter on how
>>inappropriate it is. Perhaps she was capable of spotting it in
>>others -- certainly not in herself.
>Do you ever feel constrained by the need to offer arguments? _Virtue_ is a
>systematic presentation of ethics. Since Rand makes explicit her ethical
>principles, she has no need for intimidation.
And what do you call *this* argument, Stephen?
Do *you* present any evidence?
Gary pointed to a place that he felt represented an argument by intimidation.
Your response? No, it's not, plus a little sneering.
Btw, whether Rand has a *need* for intimidation is entirely beside the
point!
Roger
Roger Lustig
>In article <CAJ13...@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu>, jwa...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales) writes:
>>The falsity of the position can be demonstrated by production of
>>counter-examples. Shall I list the academic philosophers who are
>>interested in Rand? Should I produce copies of their resumes to
>>illustrate that they have a "modicum of training"? Do PhDs from major
>>universities count? Chairmanship of major philosophy departments?
>You should not encourage his argument from authority.
Spoken like a true authority, Stephen!
Roger
Gary Merrill
|> This an instance of what Ayn Rand called the "argument from intimidation".
|> No facts, no examples, just a condescending, pompous attitude aimed at the
|> insecurities of listeners. Ayn Rand would have spotted it in a second.
I do not believe that this last claim is true. As evidence for it
I offer _The Virtue of Selfishness_ in which Rand expertly wields
the argument from intimidation and then includes a chapter on how
inappropriate it is. Perhaps she was capable of spotting it in
others -- certainly not in herself.
Gary Merrill
In article <1993Jul26.2...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu>, mi...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu writes:
|> In article <CAs0J...@unx.sas.com>, sas...@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
|> Does this book (or any similar book any of you know of) cover
|> what I call "Argumentum ad Logicam"? (I'm told there are other labels
|> for it.)
|>
|> This is the fallacy of pronouncing the conclusion of an
|> argument false on the ground that the argument is invalid.
I am not familiar with the "Argumentum ad Logicam" terminology and
do not believe that this is one of the classic fallicies of material
relevance. I haven't checked in C&S, but any decent logic book should
at least cover this issue in its discussion of validity vs. soundness.
mi...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
I do not know whether it is practically possible. The beginning topic
must be method and approach. Then, maybe, specifics.
It's not enough that the professoriate has a near monopoly
on intellectual life (I speak only of the U.S.); each discipline
has a monopoly on its particular turf. Whence "qualificationism"
-- I'm not "qualified" to claim somebody else's academic
discipline is pseudo-science. So this particular type of
debunking can only be done convincingly by honest and forthright
souls who are willing to assert that their *own* disciplines are
pseudo-science.
I am ready and willing to assert that the two core areas
of my own social-sci (now called, of course, "cognitive") discipline
are definitely pseudo-science big time. These are the most
central areas of my discipline, where most of the grants go,
and where what there is of interface with other disciplines and with
the public takes place. Moreover, one of them is my own specialty.
Now, how am I going to argue this before people in other
disciplines? I would rather play three-dimensional chess without
a board, or translate _Sailing to Byzantium_ into Navajo. And do
they care? And why should they?
On the other hand, how many within my discipline can I
convince? Many are already convinced, but being typical of the
late 20th century they are silent before a powerful, though naked,
emperor. Their silence makes it nearly impossible to convince
the rest. Nor can I blame them; it's their (and my) bread & butter.
You see the problem. Your favorite targets, the
Velikovskys, the von Daenikens, the Ayn Randians--they are not
the problem! Pseudo-science quite as vulnerable as these is
enthroned everywhere in ivy today. And hundreds of us are aware
of it. But what does one do?
This is why I tend to defend the intellectual pariahs. Everybody
can agree that Objectivism is not physics. That it is particularly
less worthy than some of the stuff that's wearing robes & mortarboards
today, I cannot agree.
Put the whole question another way: do my personal valuations
have such a death-grip on my imagination that I simply cannot
conceive of a future time when there will be departments of Objectivism
in universities? No. Yours?
mi...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
> In article <1993Jul26.2...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu> mi...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu writes:
>> This is the fallacy of pronouncing the conclusion of an
>>argument false on the ground that the argument is invalid.
> This is a version of the traditional fallacy of "denying the
> antecedent"; it falls under the usual clarification of what we mean by
> "logical validity". Every Intro logic text I've ever seen covers the
> error.
A quibble. Denying the antecedent is interpreting p --> q as
p <--> q. Argumentum ad Logicam is pronouncing the conclusion of an
argument false, not on the ground that the premisses are false, but
on the ground that the conclusion does not follow from the premisses.
The first sort of leap is thought to be part of natural language
understanding and is explained in pragmatics as an I-implicature; the
second as far as I know plays no such role.
Michael Feld
No conflict: here is how it goes --
If the argument were sound (i.e., valid, and with all its
premises true), then the conclusion would be true.
The argument is not sound.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The conclusion is not true.
See? Special case.
Torkel Franzen
edu writes:
>You see the problem. Your favorite targets, the
>Velikovskys, the von Daenikens, the Ayn Randians--they are not
>the problem! Pseudo-science quite as vulnerable as these is
>enthroned everywhere in ivy today. And hundreds of us are aware
>of it. But what does one do?
Well, what would you like to be able to do? Inevitably there is a
lot of poor philosophy, doubtfully scientific science, very boring
mathematics, and so on, produced at universities. There is also a
lot of squabbling, and the charge that whole fields of study are
pseudo-science is made from time to time. I don't see how any of
this is to be avoided if we are to have lots of big universities.
>This is why I tend to defend the intellectual pariahs. Everybody
>can agree that Objectivism is not physics.
Nor is it pseudo-science. Objectivism has never claimed to be any
kind of science. It is a system of philosophy, providing answers to
all life's questions and cures for the ills of society. No doubt
there will arise whole universities of Objectivism in the US if there
is a market for them.
Gary Merrill
In article <CAuL6...@ccu.umanitoba.ca>, fe...@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:
|>
|> No conflict: here is how it goes --
|> If the argument were sound (i.e., valid, and with all its
|> premises true), then the conclusion would be true.
|> The argument is not sound.
|> --------------------------------------------------------------
|> The conclusion is not true.
Well, again, this certainly is an instance of denying the antecedent,
but it is *not* an instance of the fallacy under discussion.
The fallacy and it's description makes no reference to nor use
of *soundness* -- it is phrased purely in terms of *validity*.
In order to reduce the fallacy to an instance of denying the
antecedent you need the principle
If the argument is valid, then its conclusion is true.
This, of course, doesn't hold up -- and it has not been suggested.
The fact that soundness implies validity does not help you here.
I do agree, however, that if it were *soundness* in terms of which
the fallacy were phrased it would reduce (in the sense you describe)
to denying the antecedent.
Stephen Grossman
>In article <38...@castle.ed.ac.uk>, je...@castle.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
I do not favor Objectivism, but there's
>absolutely no denying its impact and its future development. There's
>hardly any literate person in the country to the right of Nina Totenberg
>who hasn't been touched by it.
This optimism about Objectivism, from a non-Objectivist, is highly encouraging.
br...@quake.sylmar.ca.us
>br...@quake.sylmar.ca.us writes:
>>This whole view of mental concepts as "models" of reality has no
>>place in Objectivism and certainly has no place in metaphysics.
>>Just as sensory experience is not part of the axiom of existence it also
>>is not a part of the axiom of identity either.
> How about 4 dimesional space-time?. This is a mental concept which
> coherently and accurately accounts for particular sensory experiences
> (for example laboratory experimental results).
The theory that all mechanical activity is caused by invisible angels
who have studied heavenly physics texts does the same thing. Why reject
that one too?
> In terms of known
> experience, it can be asserted that physical space IS a four dimen-
> sional space time continuum.
There is no evidence of this at all. What is the relationship between
spacial dimensions and the relative rates of causation? You could
say that life is a 4th dimension too, and that mass is a 5th dimension
too, but what would that mean in practical terms? What evidence is there
that time is a dimension?
> A Quantum Mechanic would not make any such assertion. He might say
> there is a probabilty amplitude measuring the likelihood of the
> the elephant being in your kitchen. Also electron manage to be both
> waves and particles. When on observation does measure an electron,
> depending on the mode of observation the electron will be either
> a wave or a particle, but not both. Prior to the observation, electron
> exhibit (by inference of course) wave-like behaviour.
Sine we have never seen an electron being both a wave and a particle, what
evidence do such observations provide in favor of your theory? Have you read
my criticism of wave/particle duality regarding the fact that a wave is not
a primary entity? Do you have a response to it?
>>That is a (loose) definition of consciousness, but the axiom says something
>>more specific, that you ARE conscious. To claim that you are not
>>conscious is nonsensical.
> What are we, under anesthetic?
Unconscious (though capable of consciousness). Have you even philosophised
while unconscious? I didn't think so.
> I have read LP on the A/S dichotomy and I still cannot understand
> his claim that there is no inherent difference of kind in the follow-
> ing two statements.
> (1) A square (in the Euclidean sense) has 4 corners .
> (2) The peak of Mt. Everest is 29,030+-2 feet MSL.
How do you know what a square is? How do you know what "4" is? How
do you know what a corner is? "Analytically" or "synthetically"?
--Brian
Thomas Price
>jwa...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales) writes:
>>The falsity of the position can be demonstrated by production of
>>counter-examples. Shall I list the academic philosophers who are
>>interested in Rand? Should I produce copies of their resumes to
>>illustrate that they have a "modicum of training"? Do PhDs from major
>>universities count? Chairmanship of major philosophy departments?
>You should not encourage his argument from authority.
Stephen is right. This newsgroup has seen quite enough pompous credentialism
recently. I've read too many stupid papers and books and met too many
tenured morons with beautiful vitae to have much patience with this sort of
thinking. Arguments are the thing, not social position.
Tom Price | heaven and earth regard the 10,000 | tp...@cs.cmu.edu
****************** | things as straw dogs and I feel fine | ******************
gregory m. byshenk
Some things that baffle me.
>There is a fundamental difference between objectivists and your main stream
>philosophers. Philosophers must justify new ideas (correct or not) in order
>to have jobs,
Now this statement could mean two different things. If it means:
philsophers must _justify_ new ideas, then it hardly seems something
to be upset about; indeed, it seems a good standard for just about
anyone. If it means: philosophers must justify _new_ ideas in order
to have jobs, then it is just wrong. Many professional philosophers
are teachers or interpreters whose primary job is conveying ideas,
not creating them.
>along the same line, they must study a broad slice of philosophy
>(including the writings that contain little value by an objective standard)
>In order to be employable as professors, they must know the accepted body of
>work.
First, by what 'objective standard' are the writings of 'little value'?
Yes, philosophy has a canon, but works are in the canon because they are
considered to be of value.
Yes, philosophers are expected to know the canon, but I fail to see how
this is a bad thing (at least in the absence of some demonstration of
the lack of 'value by an objective standard' of the works in the canon).
Indeed, even learning something about errors has value, in that it
can keep people from making the same errors themselves.
>An objectivist studies it because he wants too, not because of some outside
>pressure.
Is the claim there that people become philosophers 'because of some outside
pressure'? If so, I've never seen this pressure. Philosophers study
logic, or ethics, or Hegel, or Plato (etc.) because they _want_ to. I
suppose they are under 'pressure' to know what they are talking about,
and also what some other people think, but this seems to be something
less than a damning criticism.
>Objectivists, and those who seriously study it LIVE IT. This can
>not be conclusively said of a 'main stream' philosopher, who is more
>interested in the existence of ideas instead of their value.
>As a side posit, how are your main stream philosophers of any value. How do
>they make lives better? How do they make my life richer? How do they make
>anything? I KNOW, by proof through examples in my life, that following the
>objectivist tenents has given me GREAT happiness. Philosophy is primarily
>about people ( people made it for themselves). In order for a system to be
>of value, it MUST HELP US LIVE OUR LIVES, not convince us that we are lucky
>pond scum.
This is not meant to be nasty, so I will try to tread carefully...
However, this seems to me to be a religious view. Do philosophers 'live'
their philosophy? In most cases, and to some degree, the answer would
be 'yes'. The difference is that few philosophers are convinced that
they are in posession of the one true answer to all of life's questions.
I am glad that objectivism makes some people happy, but the same thing
could be said of New Age Metaphysics, Catholicism, Zen, and many other
things. Defending objectivism as the Truth using a defense which
works for other truths seems somewhat weak.
--
Gregory Byshenk | The University? Hah! Half the time
gbys...@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu | *I'm* not responsible for my opinions!
"Says Red Molly to James: 'That's a fine motorbike...'" R.T.
Gary Bourque
In article <1993Jul27....@Princeton.EDU>, ro...@faust.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig) writes:
> In article <CAsG3...@austin.ibm.com> gbou...@austin.ibm.com (Gary Bourque) writes:
>
> >In article <CAIqq...@unx.sas.com>, sas...@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill) writes:
>
> >> Anyone with even a modicum of training in phlosophy ...
>
> >This an instance of what Ayn Rand called the "argument from intimidation".
>
Why not?
>
> >No facts, no examples, just a condescending, pompous attitude aimed at the
> >insecurities of listeners.
>
> And what you have here is "argument from deletion of context." There have
> been *plenty* of arguments against Rand posted here and published elsewhere,
> and if you look closely at what's left of Gary's posting, you'll note that
> he's referring to a variety of substantial critiques.
>
No, I was referring to only Mr. Merrill's post. How can you be so
presumptuous to say otherwise?
> Or perhaps it's "argument from impossible standards": all critique of Rand,
> no matter how informal, must be accompanied by long discourse, and may be
> dismissed with "Read this or that book by Rand or Peikoff."
>
No. The originator of this thread wanted the critiques of Rand discussed *here*.
If you remember, his post was very open-minded to criticism. He just wanted
to know see what they were *here*. To simply say. "Oh, she's been refuted."
or "*Aaaanyone* with a *moooodicum* of *traaaaining*, ba-blah, ba-blah,
ba-blah ...", is at the least not responding correctly to the poster and at the
most irresponsible and misleading.
If you think the subject is beneath you, don't participate. But, don't sashay
through the thread like Queen of Sheebah and pooh-pooh anyone who would be
stupid enough to even consider the subject worthy of discussion. That's not
doing anyone any good, besides you own ego.
And no one expects *all* examples, or *all* facts. Just a few. How about one.
Without presenting anything other than an attitude, its the "argument from
intimidation". And that's what it was and that's why I said it was.
>
> >Ayn Rand would have spotted it in a second.
>
> What a gal.
>
If you had read her essay, you would have spotted it, too.
--Gary
Russell Turpin
In article <CArpx...@quake.sylmar.ca.us> br...@quake.sylmar.ca.us writes:
> How do you know what a square is? How do you know what "4" is? How
> do you know what a corner is? "Analytically" or "synthetically"?
The first three questions are ambiguous, each having several
different interpretations. The last is appropriate to only some
of these interpretations. Consider the first question: How does
one know what a square is? This can mean:
1) How does one learn what the word "square" means, in the
context of geometry?
2) How does one recognize a geometric square?
3) How does one know the truth of various claims about squares?
The answers might be (1) a math teacher taught me the definition
when I was in 4th grade, (2) through any of several tests, and
(3) analytically, by proving that the claims follow from the
definition. Note that the question of analyticity concerns
*only* truth claims, *not* knowing definitional or operational
claims.
Rand, throughout her writings, commonly conflates issues in this
way and equivocates in her subsequent exposition. Unfortunately,
many people who do not move beyond Objectivism in their study of
philosophy pick up the bad examples that go along with her rhetoric.
Russell
--
An atheist doesn't have to be someone who thinks he has a proof that
there can't be a god. He only has to be someone who believes that
the evidence on the God question is at a similar level to the evidence
on the werewolf question. -- John McCarthy
Gary Merrill
In article <CAw36...@austin.ibm.com>, gbou...@austin.ibm.com (Gary Bourque) writes:
|> No. The originator of this thread wanted the critiques of Rand discussed *here*.
|> If you remember, his post was very open-minded to criticism. He just wanted
|> to know see what they were *here*. To simply say. "Oh, she's been refuted."
|> or "*Aaaanyone* with a *moooodicum* of *traaaaining*, ba-blah, ba-blah,
|> ba-blah ...", is at the least not responding correctly to the poster and at the
|> most irresponsible and misleading.
|>
|> If you think the subject is beneath you, don't participate. But, don't sashay
|> through the thread like Queen of Sheebah and pooh-pooh anyone who would be
|> stupid enough to even consider the subject worthy of discussion. That's not
|> doing anyone any good, besides you own ego.
Again, one of the things I find so fascinating about so many
Randians is their ability (indeed enthusiasm) to commit the
very sins they so vigorously deplore. Did Rand in fact employ
the "argument from intimidation" throughout _The Virtue of
Selfishness_? You bet (another poster has even supported this
with a reference to the text). Is her identification of this
"fallacy" innovative? Well, try reading any decent book in
informal logic or classical rhetoric. Look around the area of
the fallacy known as "ad populum". Is the above set of remarks
an excellent example of "dropping context" ("special pleading"
is the time honored term) and straw man arguments? No, I'm sure
they are not. No Objectivist could be so irrational. I must have
dropped some context somewhere ...
Stephen Grossman
>In article <CAIw...@ccu.umanitoba.ca> fe...@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:
>I find it curious that in this newsgroup we simultaneously have people saying
>that Rand was inconsequential because her ideas were wild-eyed nonsense while
>others are saying that she was inconsequential because she was saying nothing
>new and that everyone already knows everything she said.
Why curious? Modern phil is nonsense on stilts. Also, James said a philosphers
reputation passed thru 3 stages: wild-eyed nonsense, already known, correct!
********************************************************************************
Do you suffer from Humean irregularity?
Try fast, fast relief with Aristotle's Substance.
________________________________________________________________________________
Stephen Grossman pmsc...@umassd.edu
********************************************************************************
Roger Lustig
>In article <1993Jul31.1...@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu> mi...@kuhub.cc.ukans.
>edu writes:
> >But I hope no reader really
> >believes that you can successfully demolish a system of thought merely by
> >finding flaws in its original exposition *if it is academically
> >sanctioned* -- experto crede :)
> This applies just as much to systems of thought that have no academic
>sanction.
More to the point, is academic sanction independent of the status of its
exposition? Seems to me you can *change* the academic sanction, even
remove it entirely, with a sufficiently trenchant critique.
How trenchant is sufficiently trenchant, I hear you ask? Oh, about the
strength of a medium-sized h-bom, on average, is my guess. 8-)
It all boils down to Fudd's First Law.
Roger
Bill Turkel
> Does this book (or any similar book any of you know of) cover
>what I call "Argumentum ad Logicam"? (I'm told there are other labels
>for it.)
> This is the fallacy of pronouncing the conclusion of an
>argument false on the ground that the argument is invalid.
I agree that it would be fallacious to make any judgement about the truth
value of the conclusion of an invalid argument, but surely it makes sense
to withhold assent until a valid argument comes along?
Bill
Will Ballard
AHH, but don`t you understand, if it is obvious and true then it must be tautological, otherwise the
great philosophy profesorrs have no papers to write in order to keep their jobs. Tautology is a
silly attemp to pass off reality by insulting it.
Gee, altruist are mean and smeely so therefore they are worng!
:-)
Will Ballard
|> In article <38...@castle.ed.ac.uk> je...@castle.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
|> >
|> >To generate further examples, simply start with a randon table
|> >and start changing the values of various measurements (material,
|> >leg length, number of legs, heights of border segments on the
|> >table top, etc) remembering that they can take on _any_ value.
|>
|>
|> Let's see
|>
|> Material: Water
|> Number-of-legs: 0
|> Temperature: -4 degrees C
|> Table-top-shape: Cube
|> Location: My refrigerator
|>
|>
|> Yup,
|>
|> TABLE = ICE CUBE
|>
Guys, read page twelve of Intorduction to Objectivist Epistemology (at least I thnk that is the
page). She never even suggest what you are trying to argue!
Will Ballard
|> -*----
|> Someone wrote:
|> > ... I do not favor Objectivism, but there's absolutely no denying
|> > its impact and its future development. There's hardly any literate
|> > person in the country to the right of Nina Totenberg who hasn't
|> > been touched by it.
|>
|> "There's hardly any literate person in the country to the right
|> that does not make him a significant philosopher. Over Rand,
|> Rush Limbaugh has the advantage of seeming to know much better
|> where he excels; he does not pretend to be a great philosopher.
|>
|> Many of the people I know, myself included, are those who have
|> "been touched by" Rand. Those who have a modicum of serious
|> interest in philosophy usually outgrow her. For those who are
|> not seriously interested in philosophy, her writings serve more
|> as entertainment than philosophy. Those who are serious about
|> philosophy yet who take her to heart are doomed to
|> marginalization. Like Korzibski, Von Daniken, and Velikovsky,
|> there is no reason to think that Rand will have a great impact on
|> the future of intelligent discourse unless this deteriorates
|> significantly. (An exception: Rand and her followers may prove
|> an interesting *subject* of study.)
|>
|> Russell
|> --
|> An atheist doesn't have to be someone who thinks he has a proof that
|> there can't be a god. He only has to be someone who believes that
|> the evidence on the God question is at a similar level to the evidence
|> on the werewolf question. -- John McCarthy
Of course, it can't be philosophy unless it is so esoteric that it is unrealistic. We just have a
bad definition of philosophy and for some inane reason we subjugate our common sense (the real
philosophy of everyday life) to the lofty tower of PHILOSOPHY. So Rand publishes a lot of common
sense and suddenly the philosophers can't stand to have their gorgeous philosophy sullied by eveyday
people who use common sense!
Gary Merrill
|> Of course, it can't be philosophy unless it is so esoteric that it is unrealistic. We just have a
|> bad definition of philosophy and for some inane reason we subjugate our common sense (the real
|> philosophy of everyday life) to the lofty tower of PHILOSOPHY. So Rand publishes a lot of common
|> sense and suddenly the philosophers can't stand to have their gorgeous philosophy sullied by eveyday
|> people who use common sense!
I've always been quite happy to have my philosophy sullied by
common sense. I do like the sullier to *have* common sense and
to be willing to sully *her* philosophy with truth and accuracy.
Instead of indulging in argument by slogan (see -- I can make
up new fallacies just like Ayn does!) why not respond to the
specific issues that have been raised?
Russell Turpin
In article <-020893...@129.200.154.234> @UM.PHYSICS (Barry J Forster) writes:
> Professor Turpin:
>
> In reading your comments, I remember what Mark Twain once said:
> [parable of sheep deleted]
>
> Who is you local churchlady (Department Head), Professor Turpin. ...
First, I am not a professor. Second, were I a professor in the
computer science department here, I can assure you that the
department head still wouldn't give a rat's ass about my views on
Rand and Objectivism. Third, if you've read my posts over the
years in soc.feminism, alt.sex.bondage, talk.religion.misc, etc.,
you would know I toe no party line. Fourth, it is stupid to
accuse someone of being a sheep because they do not toe your
favored party line, especially when the criticism is made by
quoting another author.
Chris Walker
> If she did a poor job of proving them, that doesn't make them false or
>true, just unproven. If you feel an idea of hers is not valid,
>please give an alternative and state why it is better. Thanks.
Amen.
--
Chris Walker
cwa...@zycor.lgc.com
Chris Walker
praxeology IS NOT Von Mises's term for economics. Praxeology is a
methodological term. Read the book.
[mises quote deleted]
> If Rand really admired the works of the author of this tripe, that's
>just more evidence that she wasn't serious about her praise of
>philosophy and standards of argument. Rather her criteria for a
>writer's worth seems to have been a willingness to join her in
>distortion and ignorance, while building up one's supposed
>final system as a justification for leading a movement of right wing
>political cranks.
Rand admired many of Mises views in economics, but she specifically
attacked several ideas in Austrian economics including:
-Use of Kantian epistemology...implication of intrinsic knowledge
in the use of a priori reasoning
-the non-connection of ethics and economics, ie. there is no connection
between the conclusions of economics and ethics. he held that
economics are value-free.
-the subjective theory of value
> I don't think the admiration was mutual. If I remember rightly,
>von Mises was the one who explained the popularity of _Atlas_Shrugged_
>by claiming people read it for the "dirty parts."
Where did you hear that one? Perhaps you're thinking of Hayek?
> Oh well, a century ago Randians would have had Herbert Spencer as
>their prophet. Today nobody studies him seriously or takes Social
>Darwinism as a defensible political philosophy. This too will pass
>away.
Objectivism isn't Social Darwinism nor does Rand follow Spencer and
probably didn't hear about him until she came to the West.
Robert Vienneau
--
Chris Walker
cwa...@zycor.lgc.com
Russell Turpin
Gary Borque says:
>> If she did a poor job of proving them, that doesn't make them false
>> or true, just unproven. If you feel an idea of hers is not valid,
>> please give an alternative and state why it is better. Thanks.
This is the last defense of those who believe on faith. True,
lack of a good argument does not make an idea false. But neither
is there reason to hold something true until a good argument has
been advanced for it. We do *not* have to accept a claim until
something better comes along. That is the route of the religious
believer. Reason withholds assent until and to the degree that
good arguments are offered.
For all its claim to rationality, Objectivism often seems to
operate as a religion.
In article <1993Aug2.2...@lgc.com> c...@zycor.lgc.com (Chris Walker) writes:
> Amen.
An appropriate response.
Sara Larson
How about this? Rand does not always develop her ideas very well, so
sometimes it is difficult to understand just exactly what they are.
One example: with all this talk of rational men and supreme right of
the individual, why do I have to witness the male lead character in
each of two of her novels (the two that I happen to have read) raping
the female lead character? One could say that sexuality must be
awakened in some way, that people like Rand were too *repressed*.
I do not know, but I certainly am not, and violence against my
person does not open my viewpoint toward the violator. Of course,
it might increase my feelings of self-preservation, but not necessarily.
I guess I got kind of closeminded toward Rand at the point forced
sex entered the scenes of her fiction.
-Sara
Erin Fleet, MP-9
I'm certainly no philosopher, but at the same time I know my philosophy of life
has been affected by Rand's works. I've certainly utilized her message of self-
reliance, yet at the same time I will concede the validity of Mr. Merrill's
points. I myself found on numerous occasions that Rand had a disposition to
make sweeping attacks on broad classes of philosophies (mystics, irrationalists,
etc.) without any specific mentioning of who she was talking about or what
"they" had said. Yet, while Mr. Merrill has shown very good evidence for this,
I was wondering what he thought of her conclusions?
Erin
Mark P Mccullagh
>> Oh well, a century ago Randians would have had Herbert Spencer as
>>their prophet. Today nobody studies him seriously or takes Social
>>Darwinism as a defensible political philosophy. This too will pass
>>away.
>Objectivism isn't Social Darwinism nor does Rand follow Spencer and
>probably didn't hear about him until she came to the West.
The writer was drawing an ANALOGY between S.D. and O'm. He said that the
kind of people who today are attracted to the latter would probably, had
they lived a century ago, have been attracted to the former. This is NOT
AT ALL to claim that Rand had heard of S.D. or Spencer.
Maybe we should rename this thread, "PHILOSOPHICALLY CHALLENGED".
Brian K. Yoder
[In response to a Grossman Rant...]
>Do you ever feel constrained to make sense?
Apparently not. Believe me, Grossman has no clue about what Rand actually had
to say (note the general lack of real content in his postings and his
severe misconceptions of Rand's positions). No doubt when he figures out that
his "science of limits" nonsense is contrary to Rand's metaphysics and her
meta-philosophical approach, he'll become one of those "ex-Objectivists"
you like so much. Actually, he already is, but he's apparently not bright
enough to know it.
--Brian
Roger Lustig
>Of course, it can't be philosophy unless it is so esoteric that it is
>unrealistic. We just have a
>bad definition of philosophy and for some inane reason we subjugate
>our common sense (the real
>philosophy of everyday life) to the lofty tower of PHILOSOPHY. So
>Rand publishes a lot of common
>sense and suddenly the philosophers can't stand to have their gorgeous
>philosophy sullied by eveyday
>people who use common sense!
Absolutely classic Randspeak.
Who *are* these esoteric philosophers? Care to name them? Are all the
philosophers Rand critiques "esoteric"? Rand's inability to name the
philosophers to whom she claims to provide an alternative, or to
present recognizable arguments as the things she's attacking, makes
your claim much weaker.
In fact, many of them proceed from really down-to-earth common sense.
As for "Everyday people," note that the vast majority of *them* think
in ways that Rand finds totally unacceptable. Do you really want to
use them as a yardstick?
Or are you defining "everyday people" (a term Rand would have disdained
mightily, I might add) as "people who think like Ayn Rand & Co."?
Lots of people do philosophy outside the lofty tower. Lots of people
do down-to-earth philosophy. Once again, you're substituting
caricature of some ghostly (stereo-)types for actual argument.
(And you haven't shown that Rand does very well with common sense,
either--certainly not that her way has a monopoly on it.)
Roger
Gary Merrill
|> I'm certainly no philosopher, but at the same time I know my philosophy of life
|> has been affected by Rand's works. I've certainly utilized her message of self-
|> reliance, yet at the same time I will concede the validity of Mr. Merrill's
|> points. I myself found on numerous occasions that Rand had a disposition to
|> make sweeping attacks on broad classes of philosophies (mystics, irrationalists,
|> etc.) without any specific mentioning of who she was talking about or what
|> "they" had said. Yet, while Mr. Merrill has shown very good evidence for this,
|> I was wondering what he thought of her conclusions?
I'll respond to this question quite briefly. Keep in mind that it asks
merely for what I *think* of her conclusions. So at this point I'll
give you an opinion/impression rather than an argument and support of
a position.
I think your question concerning conclusions begs the question in a
significant sense that I was trying to illustrate with my previous
postings. What you describe as her "conclusions" I would describe
rather as her "beliefs". It is quite an open question as to whether
these are *conclusions* of anything. And in particular, it is far
from obvious that they are conclusions of various arguments she offers.
Do I share some of Rand's beliefs about, for example, ethics,
responsibility, the proper role of government, etc. Yes, indeed.
(These are also beliefs shared by the likes of Hobbes, Locke, Jefferson,
et al.) But nothing at all follows from this concerning the foundation
upon which Rand wants to anchor those beliefs. I do not need to reject
nominalism in order to support a free market economy, for example.
I do not need to reject the analytic/synthetic distinction in order to
believe in minimalist government.
Chris Walker
>I'm certainly no philosopher, but at the same time I know my philosophy of life
>has been affected by Rand's works. I've certainly utilized her message of
>self-reliance, yet at the same time I will concede the validity of Mr.
>Merrill's points. I myself found on numerous occasions that Rand had a
>disposition to make sweeping attacks on broad classes of philosophies
>(mystics, irrationalists, etc.) without any specific mentioning of who
>she was talking about or what "they" had said. Yet, while Mr. Merrill
>has shown very good evidence for this, I was wondering what he thought of
>her conclusions?
I discussed this issue of Rand commenting on philosophers and philosophies
without providing complete references of whom she was speaking. He
made an excellent point and I'll repeat it here. Rand did not pretend
to be an academic philosopher and had no desire to be one. She said
this repeatedly and people really should take her at her word. She
was a populizer of philosophy and her target was non-academics. Save
your criticisms for her scholarly standards for professional Objectivist
philosophers, especially those who are currently working in the
academic environment and want to do so.
Rand developed her philosophy as a consequence of needing a basis
for the type of novel that she was trying to write: a novel of this-worldly
success and happiness. Her intended achievement was her novels.
That she presented her ideas and taught them to others is a reflection
that indeed she had more to say than "Atlas Shrugged." However, it
was only after she had accomplished her big goal in life that she did
so. At that point, it had been over 35 years since she had stepped
foot in any academic environment and naturally, if she were to blame
academics and intellectuals for the state of the world today, why should
she want to partake in it or accept academic methods?
Though she expressed no desire to do this herself, she did encourage others
to obtain professional credentials. As to those who don't, such as
myself, I still depend on the high quality work of professionals,
Objectivists and non-Objectivists to popularize Rand's ideas. I do
this because I like it. If I were to "go professional," I would only
engage in those activities which would enhance my career and might not
have time for USENET or any other mailing list.
--
Chris Walker
cwa...@zycor.lgc.com
Gary Bourque
In article <m5r26t...@saltillo.cs.utexas.edu>, tur...@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin) writes:
> -*----
> >> If she did a poor job of proving them, that doesn't make them false
> >> or true, just unproven. If you feel an idea of hers is not valid,
> >> please give an alternative and state why it is better. Thanks.
>
> This is the last defense of those who believe on faith. True,
> lack of a good argument does not make an idea false. But neither
> is there reason to hold something true until a good argument has
> been advanced for it. We do *not* have to accept a claim until
> something better comes along. That is the route of the religious
> believer. Reason withholds assent until and to the degree that
> good arguments are offered.
>
> For all its claim to rationality, Objectivism often seems to
> operate as a religion.
>
OK, fair enough. But, consider this. What really can be proven? What can
you really be sure of? And which philosophies that claim to offer a way of
living "prove" everything they claim.
I would be willing to bet you yourself live by many tenets that cannot be
"proven", yet somehow instinctively you "know" or "believe" or "accept" them
to be true or accurate. For example, most parents, atheists to fundementalists,
believe they should love their kids. If you would tell them that such a
belief cannot be proven most parents (even philosophers) would not say, "I guess
that's right, so I can stop loving my kids if I want." The point
is we all accept things "on faith", even if its just in our own ability to
rationalize.
Philosophies that claim we can't be sure of much seem to provide people with
a carte blanche to do whatever they see fit. Where is the rigor in this?
So do we suspend all our decisions until something is "proven"? They fact is
that we all take our "best guesses" every day. Any philosophy, if it is
actually applicable to your daily living (i.e. useful) contains on some
level, some, if not many, best guesses. If they didn't why is there still so
much debate?
Philosophy has not, for all its fine considerations over the years, really
produced anything that definitive, besides skepticism. Thousands of years
after the first philosophers, the debates rage. The only things I have heard
that seem to be fairly rock solid seem to be Descartes' "I think, therefore I am",
and Socrates' "I know that I do not know." Everything else seems pretty much
still open to debate. Philosophy, quite frankly, has still not had the effect
on the general public that something more provable, like mathematics, has. Our
government is still based primarily on Judeo-Christian law rather than
Western Philosophy. A lot of interesting and a few useful theories have
been produced, but, let's face it, nothing definitive on how the human life
is to be led has been.
Objectivism, to its credit, tries to define a philosophy which can be applied
to one's living, rather than as a toy (or bauble as Leonard Peikoff called it)
for one's amusement. In doing so some risks are taken, because the Objectivists
have allowed themselves to be "pinned down" by stating things in an absolute
sense rather than in a relative sense.
Such are easy targets for those who consider everything, but believe nothing.
--Gary
Neil Rickert
>In article <m5r26t...@saltillo.cs.utexas.edu>, tur...@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin) writes:
>> For all its claim to rationality, Objectivism often seems to
>> operate as a religion.
>OK, fair enough.
Is this an admission? Is Objectivism, that philosophy which heralds
rationality, nothing but a religion, and therefore irrational (or at
best arational)?
> But, consider this. What really can be proven? What can
>you really be sure of? And which philosophies that claim to offer a way of
>living "prove" everything they claim.
Perhaps you should read some traditional philosophy before you criticize.
You might find that the question "what can you really be sure of?" is
what has engaged much of traditional philosophy.
Gary Merrill
In article <1993Aug3.1...@lgc.com>, c...@zycor.lgc.com (Chris Walker) writes:
|> Erin Fleet says:
|> made an excellent point and I'll repeat it here. Rand did not pretend
|> to be an academic philosopher and had no desire to be one. She said
|> this repeatedly and people really should take her at her word. She
To the contrary, I would argue that she *did* pretend to be an academic
philosopher -- just one without an academic job. The problem is, as
we have seen, that it is nothing *more* than a pretence. Her followers,
at least in this newsgroup, have in addition been maintaining that she
*should* be taken seriously by academic philsophers and offering explicit
challanges to show why she should not. This has now been done.
|> was a populizer of philosophy and her target was non-academics. Save
|> your criticisms for her scholarly standards for professional Objectivist
|> philosophers, especially those who are currently working in the
|> academic environment and want to do so.
This is quite a change of tune from the one being sung by you guys
earlier on.
She certainly was not a popularizer of any philosophy other than her own.
I think it has been made clear that "proselytizer" is the correct
description.
|> Rand developed her philosophy as a consequence of needing a basis
|> for the type of novel that she was trying to write: a novel of this-worldly
|> success and happiness. Her intended achievement was her novels.
|> That she presented her ideas and taught them to others is a reflection
|> that indeed she had more to say than "Atlas Shrugged." However, it
|> was only after she had accomplished her big goal in life that she did
|> so. At that point, it had been over 35 years since she had stepped
|> foot in any academic environment and naturally, if she were to blame
|> academics and intellectuals for the state of the world today, why should
|> she want to partake in it or accept academic methods?
Well, if any degree of integrity was involved she might want to learn
just what those academics and intellectuals *were* saying and just what
methods they *were* using prior to blaming them for imagined evils
and misunderstood positions.
Torkel Franzen
writes:
>Rand did not pretend
>to be an academic philosopher and had no desire to be one. She said
>this repeatedly and people really should take her at her word. She
>was a populizer of philosophy and her target was non-academics. Save
>your criticisms for her scholarly standards for professional Objectivist
>philosophers, especially those who are currently working in the
>academic environment and want to do so.
I don't quite follow your reasoning. Is it OK to make any unsubstantiated
assertions as long as they are directed at "non-academics"? For example,
Rand's sweeping assertions about "modern philosophers", or her mysterious
remark about Russell? In what sense is this "popularizing philosophy"?
Unless the author takes "non-academics" to be a bunch of nitwits who can be fed
anything, even a popular exposition of a subject will try to respect the
reader's intelligence.