Moral_Realism_vs_Relativism
There's a seeker born every minute.
ethical relativism. (moral realism without the supernatural please, e.g.
no God)
Ethical relativism is so trendy today, especially with the general
academic community (other people in the humantites). Prima facie, the
arguments for ethical relativism seem plausible, and the anthropological
lore is fascinating, but I suspect ethical relativism can't stand-up to
scrutiny.
The strongest defense of ER I can think of is the existence of principles
such as: generally, pain is bad... living is better than dying... etc.
Of course, these sorts of principles/statements come with qualifications,
(oops, defense of moral realism I mean... can't edit here)...
Another 'defense' would be to ask: Is what Hitler did wrong? I don't think
anyone but a white-power person would disagree that what Hitler did was
wrong. I suppose the ER could respond something like the following:
"Of course I believe what Hitler did was wrong, but that does not mean
that eternal, handed-down-from-god moral laws exist." etc. etc.
Signed,
X
CARL BROCK SIDES
In <940118140...@asylum.sf.ca.us> x...@asylum.sf.ca.us writes:
> I'm looking for any good recent book that argues for moral realism against
> ethical relativism. (moral realism without the supernatural please, e.g.
> no God)
Try David O. Brink's _Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics_.
It reads like a dissertation, but I guess that's forgivable since it *is*
his dissertation from Cornell.
He defends (as best I recall, I haven't got the book on hand) as mutually
supporting:
(1) Moral realism
(2) Externalism in moral psychology
(3) Coherentist moral epistemology
(4) Consequentialism
Brock
Godfrey Daniels
>I'm looking for any good recent book that argues for moral realism against
>ethical relativism. (moral realism without the supernatural please, e.g.
>no God)
There can be no good or evil without a god--logically speaking, that is.
_Good_ and _evil_ assume the concept of _telos_: end, nature, purpose.
Without a creator/god, there is nothing to measure by; each person's
"standard" is on equal footing (morally) with every other person. This
includes Hitler, Jeff Dahmer, whatever. You could say that you don't
_like_ their behavior, but you cannot say it is _wrong_.
> Ethical relativism is so trendy today, especially with the general
>academic community (other people in the humantites). Prima facie, the
>arguments for ethical relativism seem plausible, and the anthropological
>lore is fascinating, but I suspect ethical relativism can't stand-up to
>scrutiny.
> The strongest defense of ER I can think of is the existence of principles
>such as: generally, pain is bad... living is better than dying... etc.
You are correct--ER doesn't stand up to scrutiny, because all it can do
is try to elevate pleasure and pain to "principles."
> Another 'defense' would be to ask: Is what Hitler did wrong? I don't think
>anyone but a white-power person would disagree that what Hitler did was
>wrong. I suppose the ER could respond something like the following:
> "Of course I believe what Hitler did was wrong, but that does not mean
>that eternal, handed-down-from-god moral laws exist." etc. etc.
But if those "laws" do _not_ exist, then what? That is what you have
to consider. What is life really like, then? Which makes more sense
when compared with observed reality--theistic morality, or none at all?
g. daniels
--
Mr Robin J Faichney
>In article <940118140...@asylum.sf.ca.us> x...@asylum.sf.ca.us writes:
>>I'm looking for any good recent book that argues for moral realism against
>>ethical relativism. (moral realism without the supernatural please, e.g.
>>no God)
>There can be no good or evil without a god--logically speaking, that is.
>_Good_ and _evil_ assume the concept of _telos_: end, nature, purpose.
>Without a creator/god, there is nothing to measure by; each person's
>"standard" is on equal footing (morally) with every other person. This
>includes Hitler, Jeff Dahmer, whatever. You could say that you don't
>_like_ their behavior, but you cannot say it is _wrong_.
In Buddhism there is no god, but compassion is good, in that it both
facilitates and is facilitated by Enlightenment, which is the ultimate
goal. (The historical Buddha was merely the first to reach
Enlightenment and effectively communicate about it.) Not only
compassion of course, but everything else, is judged on that basis. And
Enlightenment can be viewed as a psychological, rather than a
supernatural, phenomenon--though one of which it will always be more
appropriate (or at least much easier) to seek personal, rather than
objective, understanding. Thus we have a rational, though not an
objective, basis for ethics.
--
Robin Faichney rj...@stirling.ac.uk (+44)/(0) 786 467482
Environmental Economics Research Group, University of Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK
Michael Feld
>I (Godfrey Daniels; god...@indirect.com) wrote:
>
>>>There can be no good or evil without a god--logically speaking, that is.
>>>_Good_ and _evil_ assume the concept of _telos_: end, nature, purpose.
>>>Without a creator/god, there is nothing to measure by; each person's
>>>"standard" is on equal footing (morally) with every other person. This
>>>includes Hitler, Jeff Dahmer, whatever. You could say that you don't
>>>_like_ their behavior, but you cannot say it is _wrong_.
>
Now, why should anyone prefer God's notion of a proper goal, rather
than her or his own preferred goal?
If your answer is, "God will spank those who go their own ways", then
you advocate prudence in the face of tyrrany, not morals.
If you answer, as we expect you to , "God knows which goals are
appropritate, and you do not", then there must be some goal that is
correct, and which God recognizes to be correct.
But note: that goal's being correct is logically and metaphysically
independent of God's seeing it as such.
It follows that even if God did not exist, the goal (that God would
recognize as correct if God, pace our hypothesis, did exist) still
would exist.
So: questions of good and evil are independent of God.
What's left? You hope for reward for obeying God's will, and you
expect that God will punish sinners. Not very Christian of you, but
hwo is to say that you are wrong?
Best,
Michael
-
--
Michael Feld | E-mail: <fe...@cc.umanitoba.ca>
Dept. of Philosophy | FAX: (204) 261-0021
University of Manitoba | Voice: (204) 474-9136
Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada
Gardar Arnason
(There's a seeker born every minute.) [whoever] writes:
>I'm looking for any good recent book that argues for moral realism against
>ethical relativism. (moral realism without the supernatural please, e.g.
>no God)
By 'moral realism' you mean the idea that moral values are objective,
I take it. Which they indeed are.
Try Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics". It's not that recent, being
about 2500 years old, but by far the best book written on ethics. If
you want more modern versions of Aristotelian ethics, may I suggest
you read Alisdair MacIntyre; or a book called "Beginning Lives" by
Rosalind Hursthouse. "Beginning Lives" focuses on the ethics of
abortion but has a rather nice introduction to virtue ethics. There
must be quite a number of other recent books on virtue ethics, try
your library.
> I suspect ethical relativism can't stand-up to scrutiny.
But of course it can't.
> The strongest defense of ER I can think of is the existence of principles
>such as: generally, pain is bad... living is better than dying... etc.
>Of course, these sorts of principles/statements come with qualifications,
>(oops, defense of moral realism I mean... can't edit here)...
why should there be moral principles at all?
>
> Signed,
>
> X
~~~ Malcolm, is that you?
Gardar
Mr Robin J Faichney
>>>There can be no good or evil without a god--logically speaking, that is.
>>>[..]
>Mr. Robin J. Faichney wrote:
>>In Buddhism there is no god, but compassion is good, in that it both
>>facilitates and is facilitated by Enlightenment, which is the ultimate
>>goal. (The historical Buddha was merely the first to reach
>>Enlightenment and effectively communicate about it.) Not only
>>compassion of course, but everything else, is judged on that basis. And
>>Enlightenment can be viewed as a psychological, rather than a
>>supernatural, phenomenon--though one of which it will always be more
>>appropriate (or at least much easier) to seek personal, rather than
>>objective, understanding. Thus we have a rational, though not an
>>objective, basis for ethics.
>I don't think so. Buddishm cannot account for _evil_. After all,
>people don't talk about the problem of _good_, but the problem of
>_evil_. Suppose I don't give a great Buddha's fat behind about
>compassion? Does Buddhism have a basis for knowing that I am
>doing evil?
1) Buddhist ethics is primarily practical, not theoretical, so it
is about suggesting how we should behave, not about answering such
moral-philosophical questions as "why does evil exist" or the like.
2) On the other hand, there is a fairly clear implication that, as that
which leads to Enlightenment is good, so that which prevents us from
moving towards it is bad, and it is also clear that most if not all
things which most of us would consider "evil" fall into the latter
class. (This is not coincidence, of course, but evidence of what
underlies most religious belief.)
3) Regarding the judgement of others (as in knowing that you are doing
evil in not giving a... about compassion), I think you'll find most
Buddhists not too keen on it. Beyond the need to protect ourselves and
our loved ones, which we can generally do without too much moralising,
why do we need to decide that others are "bad people"?
4) Another thing I think you'll find in modern Buddhism if you care to
look into it is that most will not believe in evil as such. In general
terms, destructive personalities are better handled using a combination
of law and psychology, than religion, though these are not mutually
exclusive.
5) If your only aim in posting here is to do PR for God, then, in the
spirit of your reply above, and because Buddha is a venerated figure
even though not considered supernatural, I will say that I do not give
a plastic Jesus's skinny butt for Christian apologetics.
--
Robin Faichney rj...@stirling.ac.uk (+44)/(0) 786 467482
*Don't ask me, I only mind the machines around here.*
Jim Kalb
>If you answer, as we expect you to , "God knows which goals are
>appropritate, and you do not", then there must be some goal that is
>correct, and which God recognizes to be correct.
>
>But note: that goal's being correct is logically and metaphysically
>independent of God's seeing it as such.
>
>It follows that even if God did not exist, the goal (that God would
>recognize as correct if God, pace our hypothesis, did exist) still
>would exist.
>
>So: questions of good and evil are independent of God.
How do you rule out the possibility that there would be no distinction
between good and evil if there were no God, but given that there is a
God the distinction necessarily follows? Someone might hold the view,
for example, that if there were no God the universe would not exist, or
would be utterly chaotic, or wouldn't contain any qualia, but the
universe does exist, and it's rationally ordered, and it contains qualia
of pain and pleasure, so torturing children for the sheer fun of it is
necessarily bad. That view might be wrong, but it don't strike me as
necessarily wrong, which what you say seems to require since the
independence you mention is logical independence.
--
Jim Kalb (j...@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
Robert H. Bell Jr./018448/burlingt/B00008
gregory m. byshenk
>(There's a seeker born every minute.) [whoever] writes:
>>I'm looking for any good recent book that argues for moral realism against
>>ethical relativism. (moral realism without the supernatural please, e.g.
>>no God)
In article <2hl3ag$q...@epas.utoronto.ca>
gar...@epas.utoronto.ca (Gardar Arnason) writes:
>By 'moral realism' you mean the idea that moral values are objective,
>I take it. Which they indeed are.
>Try Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics". It's not that recent, being
>about 2500 years old, but by far the best book written on ethics. If
>you want more modern versions of Aristotelian ethics, may I suggest
>you read Alisdair MacIntyre; or a book called "Beginning Lives" by
>Rosalind Hursthouse. "Beginning Lives" focuses on the ethics of
>abortion but has a rather nice introduction to virtue ethics. There
>must be quite a number of other recent books on virtue ethics, try
>your library.
I'm not sure that Aristotle is the best choice for moral realism.
The problem is that Aristotle's moral values are made "objective"
only by using some rather questionable natural science (i.e.:
living in a _polis_ is the best life for man, etc.).
I would agree that pure ethical relativism or subjectivism becomes
difficult to sustain. For example, "private language" arguments
apply with little or no alteration to "private morality."
However, it may be helpful to interpret Aristotelian ethics
intersubjectively, thus avoiding the pitfalls of both "objective"
and "subjective" approaches. Indeed, it seems that MacIntyre
has accepted that the attempt to make Aristotelian ethics
"objective" does not succeed (see the final pages of _Whose
Justice? Which Rationality?_)
BTW: as far as recommendations go, I will recommend a little
book by a professor here: _Virtures and Vices_, James D.
Wallace (Cornell, 1978). It is not particularly recent,
but does lay out virtue ethics rather well.
--
Gregory Byshenk | The University? Hah! Half the time
gbys...@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu | *I'm* not responsible for my opinions!
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Philosophy
"Says Red Molly to James: 'That's a fine motorbike...'" R.T.
gregory m. byshenk
>>It follows that even if God did not exist, the goal (that God would
>>recognize as correct if God, pace our hypothesis, did exist) still
>>would exist.
>>So: questions of good and evil are independent of God.
j...@panix.com (Jim Kalb) writes:
>How do you rule out the possibility that there would be no distinction
>between good and evil if there were no God, but given that there is a
>God the distinction necessarily follows? Someone might hold the view,
>for example, that if there were no God the universe would not exist, or
>would be utterly chaotic, or wouldn't contain any qualia, but the
>universe does exist, and it's rationally ordered, and it contains qualia
>of pain and pleasure, so torturing children for the sheer fun of it is
>necessarily bad. That view might be wrong, but it don't strike me as
>necessarily wrong, which what you say seems to require since the
>independence you mention is logical independence.
I don't think this response is to the point.
How do you cash out the idea that the distinction between good
and evil is dependent upon God? The example presented doesn't
succeed, because it speaks to a different issue.
One might say that God created the universe, and thus, without
God there would be no _application_ of the concepts of good and
evil, but good and evil would still be what they are, even without
the possibility of application. If, for example, "torturing children
for the sheer fun of it is necessarily bad," then doing so is
bad/evil regardless of whether or not anyone actually does so, and
even regardless of whether or not children exist to be tortured.
Jim Kalb
>One might say that God created the universe, and thus, without God
>there would be no _application_ of the concepts of good and evil, but
>good and evil would still be what they are, even without the
>possibility of application. If, for example, "torturing children for
>the sheer fun of it is necessarily bad," then doing so is bad/evil
>regardless of whether or not anyone actually does so, and even
>regardless of whether or not children exist to be tortured.
"Good" and "evil" not only classify but also obligate. Someone might
claim that those concepts are independent of God insofar as they
classify (ignoring the possibility that in the absence of God they might
not apply to anything) but not insofar as they obligate.
I think the original point was that God is necessarily irrelevant to
morality because the classification of things as good or bad does not
depend on his existence, and to say that moral obligation depends on the
existence of God if classification as good or evil is already given is
necessarily to reduce obligation to the threat of divine punishment or
the promise of divine reward.
I don't see why that's so, though. For example, someone might think
that moral obligation depends on an objective moral order that is
entirely independent of the existence and purposes of human beings, and
that such an order can best be understood by viewing it as the will of
a perfect being that (being perfect) necessarily wills the good. Or
someone might think that it makes no sense to claim that moral
obligations exist that might never be suspected to exist, so the only
way to achieve objectivity is to postulate a perfect knower. Again, a
person who thought such things might be wrong, but I think the original
claim was that the existence of God could not possibly be necessary for
morality, so all I need is for such views to be coherent.
Randy Metcalfe
In a previous article, gbys...@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (gregory m. byshenk) says:
>>In article <940118140...@asylum.sf.ca.us> x...@asylum.sf.ca.us
>>(There's a seeker born every minute.) [whoever] writes:
>>>I'm looking for any good recent book that argues for moral realism against
>>>ethical relativism. (moral realism without the supernatural please, e.g.
>>>no God)
>
>In article <2hl3ag$q...@epas.utoronto.ca>
>gar...@epas.utoronto.ca (Gardar Arnason) writes:
>>By 'moral realism' you mean the idea that moral values are objective,
>>I take it. Which they indeed are.
>
>>Try Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics". It's not that recent, being
>>about 2500 years old, but by far the best book written on ethics. If
>>you want more modern versions of Aristotelian ethics, may I suggest
>>you read Alisdair MacIntyre; or a book called "Beginning Lives" by
>>Rosalind Hursthouse. "Beginning Lives" focuses on the ethics of
>>abortion but has a rather nice introduction to virtue ethics. There
>>must be quite a number of other recent books on virtue ethics, try
>>your library.
>
>I'm not sure that Aristotle is the best choice for moral realism.
>The problem is that Aristotle's moral values are made "objective"
>only by using some rather questionable natural science (i.e.:
>living in a _polis_ is the best life for man, etc.).
>
>I would agree that pure ethical relativism or subjectivism becomes
>difficult to sustain. For example, "private language" arguments
>apply with little or no alteration to "private morality."
>
>However, it may be helpful to interpret Aristotelian ethics
>intersubjectively, thus avoiding the pitfalls of both "objective"
>and "subjective" approaches. Indeed, it seems that MacIntyre
>has accepted that the attempt to make Aristotelian ethics
>"objective" does not succeed (see the final pages of _Whose
>Justice? Which Rationality?_)
>
>BTW: as far as recommendations go, I will recommend a little
>book by a professor here: _Virtures and Vices_, James D.
>Wallace (Cornell, 1978). It is not particularly recent,
>but does lay out virtue ethics rather well.
>
>--
> Gregory Byshenk | The University? Hah! Half the time
> gbys...@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu | *I'm* not responsible for my opinions!
> University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Philosophy
> "Says Red Molly to James: 'That's a fine motorbike...'" R.T.
>
Perhaps a nice book for the beginner on moral realism is David
McNaughton's _Moral Vision_. It is written towards undergraduates and
moves dialectically between the cognitivist and non-cognitivist camps.
The result is a fairly good impression of the British school of moral
realism (i.e. Sabina Lovibond, John McDowell etc.). Stick with David
Brink for the Cornell brand of moral realism.
Cheers
--
Randy Metcalfe
Ottawa, Ontario