Scientific Challenge
Jeremy Caplan
This is impossible. Without metaphysics, there can be no entities to
examine, there can be no scientist to examine and reason, there can be no
existence of ANYTHING. Without the law of causality, there can be no
action, by the entities being examined nor the scientist. Without
epistemology, there can be no scientific method, and even if something were
to occur, there would be no objective methodology for interpreting it.
Without ethics, this "experiment" could consist of the destruction of a
continent with no moral ramifications. Without an understanding of the mind
itself, the scientist would no more recognize the data he should record than
his own imagination.
Now someone try to tell me that philosophy is 'impractical.' Philosophy has
veto power over science.
$ "Man by nature wants to know." | Jeremy Caplan j...@casbah.acns.nwu.edu $
$ ARISTOTLE | Philosophy Northwestern University $
$-Metallica-RUSH-Sting-Bird-JAdderly-Trane-BMarsalis-Miles-ASandoval-Monk-$
$ "We are born unarmed. Our mind is our only weapon." Ayn Rand $
Mike Hurben
Implicit in your argument is that we scientists use the "correct" philosophy,
not just ANY philosophy. Of course, you hold that YOUR philosophy is the
correct one, therefore it is YOU hold holds veto power over MY life's work.
No thank you. I agree with your fundamental idea that one must have a
philosophic base to build science upon. That much is clear, and I have made
no assumptions otherwise. But which philosophic base shall we use, eh?
Lets suppose I create some sophmoric, half-assed philosophy and then demand
that it correctly describes the world. Then I go out and do experiments
that directly violate my philosophy. Can I then proclaim "Philosophy has
veto power over science." ???? Of course not. Reality doesn't give a damn
about your philosophy. Reality is what is. Rand made such a big deal about
how HER philosophy was so damn flawless because it is supposedly based on
objectively observing reality. But I disagree. I find her metaphysics too
limiting and restricive. Thus I do not accept your vetos over my results,
because I do not recognize Oism as being a valid tool for comprehending the
universe. The only philosophy that can veto science is a CORRECT philosophy.
Mike Hurben "Why does it happen? Because it happens...
Roll the bones...." - Rush
Dept of Physics
Colorado State University
Barry Ortlip
: Now someone try to tell me that philosophy is 'impractical.' Philosophy has
: veto power over science.
Really? Can you give an example of one of these vetos?
Barry Ortlip
Pirate
>From: ort...@astro.ocis.temple.edu (Barry Ortlip)
Oh, history is filled with numerous examples. Galileo, for one. Didn't
he get excomunicated for some of his (relatively scientific) findings?
Darwin was ridiculed at first. There have been people burned at the
stake for claiming the world revolved around the sun. Any time science goes
against the common philosophy, philosophy has veto power.
Doesn't mean it's _right_......
KRESSJA
Doesn't sound like philosophy to me. Religious doctrine, superstition, and
prejudice do not equal philosophy. Galileo was doing philosophy-- natural
philosophy to be precise. The philosophy/science distinction didn't exist
at the time. Even so, how was this veto power? Seems like Galileo is
nothing if not completely vindicated (even by the church). Last time I
checked, a veto killed something.
-JK
Pirate (Anthony Taylor)
>Doesn't sound like philosophy to me. Religious doctrine, superstition, and
>prejudice do not equal philosophy. Galileo was doing philosophy-- natural
>philosophy to be precise. The philosophy/science distinction didn't exist
>at the time. Even so, how was this veto power? Seems like Galileo is
>nothing if not completely vindicated (even by the church). Last time I
>checked, a veto killed something.
>
>-JK
In all honesty, I was being facetious. The fact is, the philosophy of the
academics is rarely the philosophy of the masses. Anytime philosophy
becomes dogma, it becomes stifling and sometimes dangerous. (Believe it or
not, those last two sentences are related.)
But I digress. Mostly I was just agreeing with Barry. Simple as that. But
even if you count veto as completely killing an idea, there was a man (can't
remember his name) who was tortured to death during the inquisition in
scotland because he claimed the world revolved around the sun. His idea
died with him. Bam. Veto power. It wasn't an original idea, and others
thought the same thing even then. So my statement stands.
BUT! Isn't there anybody out there with a sense of humor? Even poor humor?
---------------------------------------------------------------
Pirate (Anthony Taylor) fn...@elmer.alaska.edu
---------------------------------------------------------------
You wake up one day and find you won't go back to sleep. -j.j.
Pirate (Anthony Taylor)
Just thought of this. Science is just a subset of epistomology. But saying
that ANY philosophy is like giving Kant veto power over Rand, or the other
way around. The only thing that can veto science is a change in the
fundamental assumptions of the philosophy of science, like "We _can_ know
things about the world around us," or "The results of an experiment _can_ be
repeated."
So the only philosophy that can veto science is the philosophy _of science_!
Sound okay?
Brian K. Yoder
>And another thing.... :)
>Just thought of this. Science is just a subset of epistomology. But saying
>that ANY philosophy is like giving Kant veto power over Rand, or the other
>way around. The only thing that can veto science is a change in the
>fundamental assumptions of the philosophy of science, like "We _can_ know
>things about the world around us," or "The results of an experiment _can_ be
>repeated."
Exactly. This applies more widely to ANY system of thought from science to
religion to politics to art. No such system can ever be valid AND deny the
more fundamental premises it is based on (that is the fallacy of the the
stolen concept).
>So the only philosophy that can veto science is the philosophy _of science_!
>Sound okay?
That plus the metaphysics that science assumes, yes. That is all we
have been saying.
--Brian
KRESSJA
>BUT! Isn't there anybody out there with a sense of humor? Even poor humor?
Sorry Pirate. I was following the Rand thing, and that's enough to strain
anyone's sense of humor... :)
-JK
____________________________________________________________________________
| | |
| John Kress | "Who of us is Oedipus here? Who the Sphinx? It is a |
| | rendezvous, it seems, of questions and question marks." |
| | -Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil |
|________________|___________________________________________________________|
KRESSJA
>And another thing.... :)
>
>Just thought of this. Science is just a subset of epistomology. But saying
>that ANY philosophy is like giving Kant veto power over Rand, or the other
>way around. The only thing that can veto science is a change in the
>fundamental assumptions of the philosophy of science, like "We _can_ know
>things about the world around us," or "The results of an experiment _can_ be
>repeated."
>So the only philosophy that can veto science is the philosophy _of science_!
>Sound okay?
Sorry again Pirate, but I have to disagree with you here. Most scientists
think somewhat better of Phil of Sci than other Phil, but it's never really
exerted that much control. I've just been reading on Tarski's theory of
truth, and it seems that most scientists are quite comfortable with rough
philosophical guidelines and simply fill in where they need to with a
pragmatic approach.
As for epistemology, it has only been around as long as the splintering of
the sciences into the various disciplines and more or less follows science
to see how it knows what it knows about its various objects. When speaking
of veto power, it seems to me that other types of philosophy might have a
greater effect in science, in the form of a critique of scientific knowledge.
Philosophy of science is by and large too science-friendly to really veto
anything.
Neil Rickert
>And another thing.... :)
>
I believe philosophy of science is trying to define what scientists
do, rather than set rules for scientists.
Alfredo Soldati
the rules for doing science. However, I would stick with the old
assumption that science and philosophy are the same thing (see ancient
greeks) for sofia (greek) and science (latin) translate both in
the english word knowledge. In fact avery scientist has to be
a philosopher (etimologically), also in the attitude of criticizing
himself and his results.
_______ _______
[...] et quam non
facile Latina ei homini verba succurrant quem barbarorum inconditus
et barbaris quoque humanioribus gravis fremitus circumsonat.
====================================================
Alfredo Soldati alf...@anemone.ucsb.edu
sol...@uduniv.cineca.it
====================================================
Barry Ortlip
: >: Now someone try to tell me that philosophy is 'impractical.' Philosophy has
: >: veto power over science.
: >
: > Really? Can you give an example of one of these vetos?
: >
: > Barry Ortlip
: Oh, history is filled with numerous examples. Galileo, for one. Didn't
: he get excomunicated for some of his (relatively scientific) findings?
: Darwin was ridiculed at first. There have been people burned at the
: stake for claiming the world revolved around the sun. Any time science goes
: against the common philosophy, philosophy has veto power.
My mistake. I thought that philosophy having veto power over science
meant that due to philosophy, certain scientific theories can be found to be
invalid. Apparently, it means that due to religious beliefs, scientific
theories will not be accepted immediately, but will take a number of years
to be accepted. Correct?
Barry Ortlip
PETER L. RUBENSTEIN
>Article: 7421 of sci.philosophy.meta
>From: ort...@astro.ocis.temple.edu (Barry Ortlip)
>Subject: Re: Scientific Challenge
>Date: 11 Aug 93 08:57:48 GMT
> Barry Ortlip
How about a third interpretation: due to philosophical direction, certain
scientific theories will never even be PROPOSED? Philosophy IS the
highest science.
Peter Rubenstein | prub...@cair.diana.du.edu
philosophy undergrad | University of Denver
Ignorance is no excuse for the law.
Brian K. Yoder
>Pirate (fn...@elmer.alaska.edu) wrote:
>: Oh, history is filled with numerous examples. Galileo, for one. Didn't
>: he get excomunicated for some of his (relatively scientific) findings?
>: Darwin was ridiculed at first. There have been people burned at the
>: stake for claiming the world revolved around the sun. Any time science goes
>: against the common philosophy, philosophy has veto power.
> My mistake. I thought that philosophy having veto power over science
>meant that due to philosophy, certain scientific theories can be found to be
>invalid. Apparently, it means that due to religious beliefs, scientific
>theories will not be accepted immediately, but will take a number of years
>to be accepted. Correct?
No No No. I don't know who posted that other stuff or why, but when
Objectivists claim that philosophy has veto power over science, it is meant
in the sense that you described. Scince metaphysics and epistemology are
more fundamental than scientific conclusions and methods, and therefore
if there are contradictions between the two, the scientific conclusions are
the wrong ones.
--Brian
Michael L. Siemon
writes:
>Scince metaphysics and epistemology are
>more fundamental than scientific conclusions and methods, and therefore
>if there are contradictions between the two, the scientific conclusions are
>the wrong ones.
snicker, snicker; guffaw, snicker.
--
Michael L. Siemon "Of course, our Bibles are not guaranteed
m...@panix.com against ordinary wear or abuse."
m...@ulysses.att.com - Oxford University Press
Mike Hurben
>>Pirate (fn...@elmer.alaska.edu) wrote:
>
>
>No No No. I don't know who posted that other stuff or why, but when
>Objectivists claim that philosophy has veto power over science, it is meant
>in the sense that you described. Scince metaphysics and epistemology are
>more fundamental than scientific conclusions and methods, and therefore
>if there are contradictions between the two, the scientific conclusions are
>the wrong ones.
>
>--Brian
>
Oh? How can that always be true? What if your philosophy is _wrong_?????
I mean, will you at least consider that possibility? This is not a flame,
I'm just trying to understand this - but this seems just so closed-minded
that I blush to read it. I might agree with you about phil being more
"fundamental" - but that does not mean that if a contradiction occurs that
the fundamentals are not perhaps the cause of the problem......!
I would also like to know just exactly what IS this correct metaphysics
that my experiments must conform with - and I don't want Rand's slogans, I
want real, understandable explanations. Thanks.
Mike Hurben
Brian K. Yoder
>In article <byoderCB...@netcom.com> byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>>No No No. I don't know who posted that other stuff or why, but when
>>Objectivists claim that philosophy has veto power over science, it is meant
>>in the sense that you described. Scince metaphysics and epistemology are
>>more fundamental than scientific conclusions and methods, and therefore
>>if there are contradictions between the two, the scientific conclusions are
>>the wrong ones.
>Oh? How can that always be true? What if your philosophy is _wrong_?????
If it is wrong then that proof will not come from any scientific experiment,
it will come from a philosophical argument. The reason for this is that
the validity of science COMES FROM philosophy and therefore, to deny that
philosophical base invalidates the claim itself.
Of course I don't accept the proposition that Objectivism ought to be considered
wrong just for the sake of argument, but if you want to attack it, be my
guest, but I am offering a bit of friendly advice: No scientific claim
or evidence can ever invalidate the Objectivist metaphysics (although
conceiveably it could call into question certain political or aesthetic
conclusions at least in principle).
>I mean, will you at least consider that possibility? This is not a flame,
>I'm just trying to understand this - but this seems just so closed-minded
>that I blush to read it. I might agree with you about phil being more
>"fundamental" - but that does not mean that if a contradiction occurs that
>the fundamentals are not perhaps the cause of the problem......!
If you can show that there are contradictions there then you have a point. My
point is that no such contradiction can ever come from a scientific
experiment. That's all I am saying here.
>I would also like to know just exactly what IS this correct metaphysics
>that my experiments must conform with - and I don't want Rand's slogans, I
>want real, understandable explanations. Thanks.
We can save that for a separate thread. Have you at least read what Rand
wrote on this subject?
--Brian
Robert J. Kolker
In the realm of ideas and intellect connected to the real world, theories
are kings, philosophies are emporors, but facts are gods. Like any gods
they can overthrow kings and emporors.
Conan the Libertarian
--
"If you can't love the Constitution, then at least hate the Government"
Pirate
I did. (Anthony Taylor, exactly as the header said). I did it because
everybody here seems to make the assumption that THEY have the "right"
philosophy. Well, not everybody, but a lot of people. The truth (as I see
it) is that there is nothing to indicate that there is a "right"
philosophy. I believe there are many wrong ones; but only one right one?
Hmm......
However, science is pretty well defined. Science is (supposed to be) a
philosophy of scepticism: "prove to me your model works. When you have
proven (through established methodology) it works, it will be admitted as
one of the possible models. When it is the last model that works, then
perhaps will we accept it as the best model."
The paradox of philosophy ruling science is this: when philosophy actually
proves something about the way the world really works, it crosses over to
being science. And until philosophy actually proves something about the way
the world really works, it can't touch science.
Well, it does effect science, but mostly as someone has already suggested:
through the minds of the scientist. But then, isn't that were science
REALLY resides? I'll have to consider this......
Philosophy is like ice cream; there's a million different flavors, and
everybody has a favorite.
But which flavor is best?
TTFN
(Oh, yeah... I cut out some of the newsgroups.)
H.A. TANG
>>>No No No. I don't know who posted that other stuff or why, but when
>
>I did. (Anthony Taylor, exactly as the header said). I did it because
>everybody here seems to make the assumption that THEY have the "right"
>philosophy. Well, not everybody, but a lot of people. The truth (as I see
>it) is that there is nothing to indicate that there is a "right"
>philosophy. I believe there are many wrong ones; but only one right one?
>Hmm......
>
>However, science is pretty well defined. Science is (supposed to be) a
>philosophy of scepticism: "prove to me your model works. When you have
>proven (through established methodology) it works, it will be admitted as
>one of the possible models. When it is the last model that works, then
>perhaps will we accept it as the best model."
>
>The paradox of philosophy ruling science is this: when philosophy actually
>proves something about the way the world really works, it crosses over to
>being science. And until philosophy actually proves something about the way
>the world really works, it can't touch science.
Can philosophy cross over to being science? If it can, it's not
philosophy from the beginning -- it's the science. Therefore some
philosophic problems puzzled our ancestors long ago were actually
scientific problems...Like problems regarding the universe...
-Huang
KRESSJA
> We could agree that philosophy is metascience in the sense that sets
>the rules for doing science. However, I would stick with the old
>assumption that science and philosophy are the same thing (see ancient
>greeks) for sofia (greek) and science (latin) translate both in
>the english word knowledge. In fact avery scientist has to be
>a philosopher (etimologically), also in the attitude of criticizing
I believe that the best translation of the Greek 'sophia' is by the English
'wisdo,' rather than 'knowledge.' The Greek word translated as knowledge
(sometimes as scientific knowledge, although that's reaching) is 'episteme,'
whence 'epistemology,' 'the science of knowledge.' The Latin 'scientia' on
the other hand, does carry all sorts of connotations of an organised,
disciplined body of knowledge--e.g. like the science of physics.
It seems of critical importance to me that something like 'scientia' should
have become historically predominant over 'sophia.' If science is not the
final arbiter of all questions, then from what other basis can it be
critiqued, if not from a love of (friendship with) wisdom (sophia)?
Stephen Grossman
>In article <243aa3$9...@news.acns.nwu.edu> j...@casbah.acns.nwu.edu (Jeremy Caplan) writes:
>Implicit in your argument is that we scientists use the "correct" philosophy,
>not just ANY philosophy. Of course, you hold that YOUR philosophy is the
>correct one, therefore it is YOU hold holds veto power over MY life's work.
>No thank you. I agree with your fundamental idea that one must have a
>philosophic base to build science upon. That much is clear, and I have made
>no assumptions otherwise.
A scientist who knows the philosophical context of his work has that much more
intellectual control over his work.
But which philosophic base shall we use, eh?
>Lets suppose I create some sophmoric, half-assed philosophy and then demand
>that it correctly describes the world. Then I go out and do experiments
>that directly violate my philosophy. Can I then proclaim "Philosophy has
>veto power over science." ???? Of course not.
but you just recognized that science has a philosophical base!
Reality doesn't give a damn
>about your philosophy. Reality is what is. Rand made such a big deal about
>how HER philosophy was so damn flawless because it is supposedly based on
>objectively observing reality. But I disagree. I find her metaphysics too
>limiting and restricive. Thus I do not accept your vetos over my results,
>because I do not recognize Oism as being a valid tool for comprehending the
>universe. The only philosophy that can veto science is a CORRECT philosophy.
>
Now you've returned to recognizing that philosophy is the context of science.
THat's a step in the right direction. I hope you find the "correct" philosophy.
Should you get lost in some variety of subjectivism, there is always
Objectivism.
********************************************************************************
"He looked at the granite. To be cut, he thought, and made into walls. He looked
at a tree. To be split and made into rafters. He looked at a streak of rust on
the stone and thought of iron ore under the ground. To be melted and to emerge
as girders against the sky....These rocks, he thought, are here for me, waiting
for the drill, the dynamite and my voice; waiting to be split, ripped, pounded,
reborn; waiting for the shape my hands will give them." Ayn Rand
________________________________________________________________________________
KRESSJA
>everybody here seems to make the assumption that THEY have the "right"
>philosophy. Well, not everybody, but a lot of people. The truth (as I see
>it) is that there is nothing to indicate that there is a "right"
>philosophy. I believe there are many wrong ones; but only one right one?
>Hmm......
What I have a problem with, Pirate, is the use of philosophy as a concrete
noun in the first place--"a philosophy," "my philosophy," etc. The Greek
philosophia is an abstract noun meaning love of wisdom. Philosophy is
about the engagement of thinking in discourse and in reflection and in
argument. I don't think philosophy should be regarded as any sort of a
doctrine or system of dogma. The "right" philosophy lies in practice,
rather than in maintaining this or that belief.
Socrates himself had no doctrines that he didn't constantly question and test.
-JK
KRESSJA
>
>
>If it is wrong then that proof will not come from any scientific experiment,
>it will come from a philosophical argument. The reason for this is that
>the validity of science COMES FROM philosophy and therefore, to deny that
>philosophical base invalidates the claim itself.
>
Actually, the validity of science is itself a philosophical problem. This
hardly means that science is dependant upon philosophy. Scientific realism
is still around (sample quote: "Philosophy validates science? Not at all!
science happens to empirically tell us the way the world is. We deal in
facts and objects, my friend, and not arguments..."). The statement that
to deny the philosophical base, invalidates the scientific claim is simply
mistaken. No one has yet been able to establish an unquestionable
philosophical basis for science, thus the basis is ALWAYS in dispute. And
since science gets on just fine in this situation, instead of grinding to
a halt until fundamental principles have been clarified, this shows quite
a good deal of independance from philosophy.
Pirate (Anthony Taylor)
>>everybody here seems to make the assumption that THEY have the "right"
>>philosophy. Well, not everybody, but a lot of people. The truth (as I see
>>it) is that there is nothing to indicate that there is a "right"
>>philosophy. I believe there are many wrong ones; but only one right one?
>>Hmm......
>What I have a problem with, Pirate, is the use of philosophy as a concrete
>noun in the first place--"a philosophy," "my philosophy," etc. The Greek
>philosophia is an abstract noun meaning love of wisdom. Philosophy is
>about the engagement of thinking in discourse and in reflection and in
>argument. I don't think philosophy should be regarded as any sort of a
>doctrine or system of dogma. The "right" philosophy lies in practice,
>rather than in maintaining this or that belief.
>
>Socrates himself had no doctrines that he didn't constantly question and test.
>
>-JK
>
Yes. Philosophy as an ideal. You're right, of course; I've been trying to
point a doctrine and saying, "This is philosophy." I've been using the word
too loosely.
Please forgive me. I have not been able to engage in philosophical debate
much before. I'm still learning..... (Truly I'm an 'armchair philosopher.')
However, I still believe my argument holds; that is, no single
philosophical idea or system of ideas rules science. When science is used
correctly it provides insight to the way the universe works. I think that
historically science has actually led philosophy; for instance, since
Newton's time it has been fashionable to view the universe as a vast
machine. Before Newton, humanity had free will by virtue of God. Only
recently has free will again been discussed with any seriousness-- now it
turns out we may have free will by virtue of randomness. Or, at least,
randomness by virtue of randomness. This recent paradigm is a result of
quantum physics.
Science was a tool born from philosophy, but I think science has become
somewhat independent.
Samir Chopra
>Objectivists claim that philosophy has veto power over science, it is meant
>in the sense that you described. Scince metaphysics and epistemology are
>more fundamental than scientific conclusions and methods, and therefore
>if there are contradictions between the two, the scientific conclusions are
>the wrong ones.
>
Any Logical Positivists out there? No one to be offended by this attack on
empiricism?
Samir
--
It only gets stranger..
Brian K. Yoder
I am certainly not an empiricist, but this argument applies just as well to
empiricism, religion, and any other philosphy which is not overtly anti-
rational at a fundamental level. Can you tell me what empirical evidence
an empiricist could discover which would disprove empiricism? There cold
be no such evidence.
--Brian
Brian K. Yoder
>Replying to Brian:
>In the realm of ideas and intellect connected to the real world, theories
>are kings, philosophies are emporors, but facts are gods. Like any gods
>they can overthrow kings and emporors.
Sigh. A fact can't overthrow any theory, only a fact interpreted according
to some principles or premises. You seem to be ignoring the fact that to
understand the facts in the first place you must have a method OF SOME KIND.
Facts don't just force concepts into your mind in some kind of automatic
way that can be distinduished from concepts developed through the application
of some epistemology.
Empiricism *IS* an epistemological theory, it is not something above and beyond
epistemology.
--Brian
Roger Lustig
>In article <Aug11.17...@yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU> hur...@lamar.ColoState.EDU (Mike Hurben) writes:
>>In article <byoderCB...@netcom.com> byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>>>No No No. I don't know who posted that other stuff or why, but when
>>>Objectivists claim that philosophy has veto power over science, it is meant
>>>in the sense that you described. Scince metaphysics and epistemology are
>>>more fundamental than scientific conclusions and methods, and therefore
>>>if there are contradictions between the two, the scientific conclusions are
>>>the wrong ones.
>>Oh? How can that always be true? What if your philosophy is _wrong_?????
>If it is wrong then that proof will not come from any scientific experiment,
>it will come from a philosophical argument. The reason for this is that
>the validity of science COMES FROM philosophy and therefore, to deny that
>philosophical base invalidates the claim itself.
Sorry, that won't do. After all, even the prettiest philosophy rests on
axioms, and O'ists are quite fondof telling us that their axioms come
from direct observation.
Now, can we not do observation without a philosophy? If that's the case,
then there can't *be* any philosophy, because it would have to be in
place prior to its own axioms.
And if science leads us to a new observation, one that contradicts the
basic observations on which the philosophy was built, then we *can't*
apply the philosophy to the observation .
>Of course I don't accept the proposition that Objectivism ought to be considered
>wrong just for the sake of argument,
*Everything* should be considered wrong for the sake of argument, until
argument makes considering it right the thing to do.
>but if you want to attack it, be my
>guest, but I am offering a bit of friendly advice: No scientific claim
>or evidence can ever invalidate the Objectivist metaphysics (although
A statement that immediately renders it worthless. If it's not falsifiable
by reality, it can exist independent of reality. Do you *want* a metaphysics
like that?
>conceiveably it could call into question certain political or aesthetic
>conclusions at least in principle).
You're taking a 100% religious attitude.
>>I mean, will you at least consider that possibility? This is not a flame,
>>I'm just trying to understand this - but this seems just so closed-minded
>>that I blush to read it. I might agree with you about phil being more
>>"fundamental" - but that does not mean that if a contradiction occurs that
>>the fundamentals are not perhaps the cause of the problem......!
>If you can show that there are contradictions there then you have a point. My
You just did it yourself. You stated that no evidence can invalidate O'ist
metaphysics. Unless that metaphysics is merely tautology, you're contradicting
the very definition of what you're doing.
>point is that no such contradiction can ever come from a scientific
>experiment. That's all I am saying here.
Well, perhaps you'd like to *prove* that rather drastic (and universal-negative)
assertion.
>>I would also like to know just exactly what IS this correct metaphysics
>>that my experiments must conform with - and I don't want Rand's slogans, I
>>want real, understandable explanations. Thanks.
>We can save that for a separate thread. Have you at least read what Rand
>wrote on this subject?
Some of us have, but that's beside the point. Better address the inviolability
of metaphysics first.
mfG,
Roger
Richard Wilson
>>Replying to Brian:
>
>>In the realm of ideas and intellect connected to the real world, theories
>>are kings, philosophies are emporors, but facts are gods. Like any gods
>>they can overthrow kings and emporors.
>
>Sigh. A fact can't overthrow any theory, only a fact interpreted according
A fact can overthrow some or all of a scientific theory.
>to some principles or premises. You seem to be ignoring the fact that to
>understand the facts in the first place you must have a method OF SOME KIND.
>Facts don't just force concepts into your mind in some kind of automatic
>way that can be distinduished from concepts developed through the application
>of some epistemology.
>
>Empiricism *IS* an epistemological theory, it is not something above and beyond
>epistemology.
The strong point about science is that, in general, it works: technology,
like this computer and the network we are using, performs.
A philosophy which, for instance, maintains that this is all illusion is, of
course, tenable and not vulnerable to scientific refutation. But then
how do we choose between philosophies?
Brian K. Yoder
>In article <byoderCB...@netcom.com> byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>>In article <CBM7M...@world.std.com> r...@world.std.com (Robert J. Kolker) writes:
>>>Replying to Brian:
>>>In the realm of ideas and intellect connected to the real world, theories
>>>are kings, philosophies are emporors, but facts are gods. Like any gods
>>>they can overthrow kings and emporors.
>>Sigh. A fact can't overthrow any theory, only a fact interpreted according
>A fact can overthrow some or all of a scientific theory.
Not without an epistemological theory to evaluate it, it can't. If you have
some observed fact which contradicts some established theory, you would
never know it unless you applied some kind of analysis to it according to
some kind of epistemological rules. Do you think that if some fact were
shown to a Catholic that Mary wasn't a virgin, they would agree to it or
abandon Catholocism? Of course not, because his method of determining the
truth is to accept church doctrine on blind faith, so facts and evidence
don't really matter. (The same would be true if you were dealing with
an uncomfortable fact and a subjectivist, or an abstract fact to a
concrete-bound person.) It is observations plus a method which yeild
conclusions, not just facts alone.
>>to some principles or premises. You seem to be ignoring the fact that to
>>understand the facts in the first place you must have a method OF SOME KIND.
>>Facts don't just force concepts into your mind in some kind of automatic
>>way that can be distinduished from concepts developed through the application
>>of some epistemology.
>>Empiricism *IS* an epistemological theory, it is not something above and
>>beyond epistemology.
>The strong point about science is that, in general, it works: technology,
>like this computer and the network we are using, performs.
How do you know it works? According to some people, science merely
produces gadgets which are the work of the devil. In that sense it doesn't
"work" at all. Look, I am not claiming that science isn't true or valid.
I'm not claiming that it isn't based on reality. I am just saying that
the validity of science and scientific observations is not based on
"just the facts" but on the facts and certain metaphysical premises, and that
therefore no scientific conclusion can ever successfully invalidate
those premises AND be true. Why is it that I get the impression that
you think that when we say that philosophy has veto power over science,
you see this as an attack on the validity of science? It isn't.
>A philosophy which, for instance, maintains that this is all illusion is, of
>course, tenable and not vulnerable to scientific refutation. But then
>how do we choose between philosophies?
But it isn't SCIENCE which refutes such a claim (and it isn't really "tenable"
either, but that's another story), it is the premises of science. Your
claim seems to be that science proves a philosophy to be right or wrong.
The problem with that is that sciencce is itself based on certain
philosophical views, and those views can't be proven by science without
becoming circular.
--Brian
KRESSJA
>In article <CBppr...@carmen.logica.co.uk> Wil...@LILHD.Logica.com (Richard Wilson) writes:
>>>Sigh. A fact can't overthrow any theory, only a fact interpreted according
>>A fact can overthrow some or all of a scientific theory.
>Not without an epistemological theory to evaluate it, it can't. If you have
>some observed fact which contradicts some established theory, you would
>never know it unless you applied some kind of analysis to it according to
>some kind of epistemological rules. Do you think that if some fact were
Actually there are a large number of cases wherein a fact can cause trouble
to theory. Consider the case when an anomaly crops up in such a way as to
cause experimental instruments to behave in an unanticipated manner. The
scientist only knows that something *unknown* has appeared; he must now
try to isolate it without recourse to theory, because anomalies, by
definition, aren't encompassed by the theory. If the fact (or phenomenon)
is significant enough, it could cause a complete re-thinking of theory.
Speaking of the epistemology of the philosophy of science, who have you read
on the subject?
>>>Empiricism *IS* an epistemological theory, it is not something above and
>>>beyond epistemology.
Whose concept of empiricism? Classical or new empiricism?
>therefore no scientific conclusion can ever successfully invalidate
>those premises AND be true.
I have to agree with you that science cannot invalidate philosophical
claims, but that isn't really the business of science. The business of
science is to investigate demarcated ontological regions of natural
phenomena. Such investigations, however, might be useful to one
philosopher trying to argue against another.
>Why is it that I get the impression that
>you think that when we say that philosophy has veto power over science,
>you see this as an attack on the validity of science? It isn't.
Because it seems like a self-righteous claim in favor of philosophy; "veto
power" suggests that philosophy possesses the right to dismiss the results
of science through some sort of fiat. It is certainly the case that science
requires a philosophical foundation which it is unable to supply to itself;
however, philosophy has heretofore been unable to settle the matter
definitively. And, in the meantime, science proceeds apace.
Brian K. Yoder
>In article <byoderCB...@netcom.com>, byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder) writes...
>>In article <CBppr...@carmen.logica.co.uk> Wil...@LILHD.Logica.com (Richard Wilson) writes:
>>>>Sigh. A fact can't overthrow any theory, only a fact interpreted according
>>>A fact can overthrow some or all of a scientific theory.
>>Not without an epistemological theory to evaluate it, it can't. If you have
>>some observed fact which contradicts some established theory, you would
>>never know it unless you applied some kind of analysis to it according to
>>some kind of epistemological rules. Do you think that if some fact were
>Actually there are a large number of cases wherein a fact can cause trouble
>to theory.
Only if your epistemology says that you ought to look at the facts.
>Consider the case when an anomaly crops up in such a way as to
>cause experimental instruments to behave in an unanticipated manner. The
>scientist only knows that something *unknown* has appeared; he must now
>try to isolate it without recourse to theory, because anomalies, by
>definition, aren't encompassed by the theory. If the fact (or phenomenon)
>is significant enough, it could cause a complete re-thinking of theory.
Quite true, but only regarding scientific theories, not the theory of science
itself.
>Speaking of the epistemology of the philosophy of science, who have you read
>on the subject?
Various folks, Popper, Kuhn, Rand, and a smattering of others.
>>>>Empiricism *IS* an epistemological theory, it is not something above and
>>>>beyond epistemology.
>Whose concept of empiricism? Classical or new empiricism?
Any empiricism is essentially epistemological.
>>therefore no scientific conclusion can ever successfully invalidate
>>those premises AND be true.
>I have to agree with you that science cannot invalidate philosophical
>claims, but that isn't really the business of science.
I never claimed it was! I am not arguing against science, I am arguing against
confusing science with philosophy.
>The business of
>science is to investigate demarcated ontological regions of natural
>phenomena. Such investigations, however, might be useful to one
>philosopher trying to argue against another.
In some areas of philosophy they certainly would be (and also for a lone
philosopher trying to figure things out). The areas in which philosophy
has "veto power" are limited to metaphysics and epistemology. If you were
able to somehow prove through science that human beings are unable to
perceive art, or that human beings are incapable of counting money past
$100 or something then you could perhaps disprove certain conclusions
in in aesthetics or politics, but the claims most philosophies make in
these areas are fairly simple and either blatantly obvious or sufficiently
vague as to be impossible to verify or dispute by science. But in principle
at least, science can point to problems in these "application" areas of
philosophy.
>>Why is it that I get the impression that
>>you think that when we say that philosophy has veto power over science,
>>you see this as an attack on the validity of science? It isn't.
>Because it seems like a self-righteous claim in favor of philosophy; "veto
>power" suggests that philosophy possesses the right to dismiss the results
>of science through some sort of fiat.
If by "fiat" you mean "by arbitrary assertion", then that's not what I mean.
If you mean "merely by reaching a conclusion", then yes, but only on a certain
class of philosophical claim (such as so-called scientists who claim
experiments deny the obvective nature of reality).
>It is certainly the case that science
>requires a philosophical foundation which it is unable to supply to itself;
>however, philosophy has heretofore been unable to settle the matter
>definitively.
What matter is that? How it is that scientific experiments and the application
of reason relates to reality? It is my claim that Objectivism makes that
connection where other philosophical approaches have failed.
>And, in the meantime, science proceeds apace.
True, and it does so because it makes certain correct assumptions without
being able to thoroughly prove them or know clearly why they must be
so. That does lend certain credence to the truth of these premises (which
I agree with), but a philosophical justification for these premises is needed,
and Objectivism offers the best one I have seen.
--Brian
KRESSJA
>In article <14AUG199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu> kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
>>Actually there are a large number of cases wherein a fact can cause trouble
>>to theory.
>Only if your epistemology says that you ought to look at the facts.
Part of what I wish to argue (following Ian Hacking and Joseph Rouse) is
that science operates first and foremost as a practice of organizing and
manipulating its subjects experimentally. Epistemology is important, but
no questions epistemology have ever been settled, and science procedes
without the need for such settling. If an epistemological theory says,
"we cannot have any knowledge of X," and the scientist responds "I don't
know what X is, but look what I can do by assuming X," then which has the
veto power? The scientist will quite happily keep doing what he can do,
trying to see what else he can do, based on X. Meanwhile the epistemologist
had better damn well take account of X in the future.
>>Consider the case when an anomaly crops up in such a way as to
>>cause experimental instruments to behave in an unanticipated manner. The
>>scientist only knows that something *unknown* has appeared; he must now
>>try to isolate it without recourse to theory, because anomalies, by
>>definition, aren't encompassed by the theory. If the fact (or phenomenon)
>>is significant enough, it could cause a complete re-thinking of theory.
>Quite true, but only regarding scientific theories, not the theory of science
>itself.
What is the "theory of science itself"? As far as I know, there is no single
unitary theory of science. There are, however, scientific practices that
show a constancy across even major upheavals in theory.
>>Speaking of the epistemology of the philosophy of science, who have you read
>>on the subject?
>Various folks, Popper, Kuhn, Rand, and a smattering of others.
What did you thing of Kuhn's position about the incommensurabilty of
differing paradigms?
>>>>>Empiricism *IS* an epistemological theory, it is not something above and
>>>>>beyond epistemology.
>>Whose concept of empiricism? Classical or new empiricism?
>Any empiricism is essentially epistemological.
Not so. The new empiricism is less a theory of knowledge than a shift in the
locus of scientific verification. In Hacking's phrase, it's a shift from
representing (along with its epistemological baggage) to intervening. This
is a kind of radical epistemology, but it is far different from a theory
centered epistemology. Since when did you believe in an "essense of
epistemology"? I thought that Randians generally discounted such things.
>>Because it seems like a self-righteous claim in favor of philosophy; "veto
>>power" suggests that philosophy possesses the right to dismiss the results
>>of science through some sort of fiat.
>If by "fiat" you mean "by arbitrary assertion", then that's not what I mean.
>If you mean "merely by reaching a conclusion", then yes, but only on a certain
>class of philosophical claim (such as so-called scientists who claim
>experiments deny the obvective nature of reality).
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
But many scientists either DO deny this, or claim that it really doesn't
matter to science one way or the other. Unless you are begging the question,
it is up to you to show that 1) such people are not REALLY scientists (whatever
that may mean) and 2) that this sort of metaphysical claim is important to
science.
RE: 2, I have offer counter-evidence, specifically that science works, and
continues, even in the absense of any accepted metaphysical doctrine.
>>It is certainly the case that science
>>requires a philosophical foundation which it is unable to supply to itself;
>>however, philosophy has heretofore been unable to settle the matter
>>definitively.
>
>What matter is that? How it is that scientific experiments and the application
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
See Re: 2, above.
>of reason relates to reality? It is my claim that Objectivism makes that
>connection where other philosophical approaches have failed.
You must now support this claim with a reasoned argument, and we'll discuss
it. (You still have to show me that ANY theory is needed, before you show
me that this is the best one.)
>>And, in the meantime, science proceeds apace.
>True, and it does so because it makes certain correct assumptions without
>being able to thoroughly prove them or know clearly why they must be
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Again, I dispute that there are certain "tacit assumptions" made by all
scientists. My position that science is first of all a practice is at
least a plausible alternative.
Matthew W Cushman
Challenge by Brian K. Yo...@netcom.co
(Richard Wi
> lson) writes:
> >In article <byoderCB...@netcom.com> byo...@netcom.com (Brian K.
Yoder) wri
> tes:
> >>In article <CBM7M...@world.std.com> r...@world.std.com (Robert J.
Kolker) wri
> tes:
> >>>Replying to Brian:
>
> >>>In the realm of ideas and intellect connected to the real world, theories
> >>>are kings, philosophies are emporors, but facts are gods. Like any gods
> >>>they can overthrow kings and emporors.
>
> >>Sigh. A fact can't overthrow any theory, only a fact interpreted according
>
> >A fact can overthrow some or all of a scientific theory.
>
> Not without an epistemological theory to evaluate it, it can't. If you have
> some observed fact which contradicts some established theory, you would
> never know it unless you applied some kind of analysis to it according to
> some kind of epistemological rules. Do you think that if some fact were
> shown to a Catholic that Mary wasn't a virgin, they would agree to it or
> abandon Catholocism? Of course not, because his method of determining the
I've been reading Brian's attempts to shore up his doctrine for a little
while, and this post just moved me to respond. I think this quote just
about sums up his view. So, is any theory (scientific or
epistemological) is at about equal footing with Catholocism in regards
to plausibility? No wonder he runs off to Rand - she gives the
comfortable dogma of an "objective" existence where some try to face the
harsh reality of the dogma of reality.
> truth is to accept church doctrine on blind faith, so facts and evidence
> don't really matter. (The same would be true if you were dealing with
> an uncomfortable fact and a subjectivist, or an abstract fact to a
> concrete-bound person.) It is observations plus a method which yeild
> conclusions, not just facts alone.
I guess the Earth is flat and Aristotle's physics are correct after all.
All this time I thought that direct observation had disproved them, but
I guess I was just mistaken by my dogmatic empiricism. Gee, ain't
philosophy great.
It's true that scientific interpretations (NOT observations) are built
upon some sort of epistemological or metaphysical theory, but where do
these "more basic" (to use Brian's words) theories come from? No doubt
they themselves come from some sort of direct experience. It has been
shown (as much as one can show these things) that infants don't have
quite the same intuitions about "reality" that adults do (e.g. object
permenence). Where do they eventually get these notions that seem like
common-sense to us adults? Do you need a philosophy to interpret the
statement "I see a red patch here"?
The most interesting thing about Brian's postition is that it is in
direct conflict with Rand's views (who he is trying to defend). How
does "A is A" fit in with your theory? Interpreting the statement in
the only non-vacuous way I know how, it seems to be entirely based on
empirical observation (which, by the way, seems to conflict with deeper
empirical evidence i.e. QM).
> >>to some principles or premises. You seem to be ignoring the fact that to
> >>understand the facts in the first place you must have a method OF
SOME KIND.
> >>Facts don't just force concepts into your mind in some kind of automatic
> >>way that can be distinduished from concepts developed through the
application
>
> >>of some epistemology.
>
> >>Empiricism *IS* an epistemological theory, it is not something above and
> >>beyond epistemology.
>
> >The strong point about science is that, in general, it works: technology,
> >like this computer and the network we are using, performs.
>
> How do you know it works? According to some people, science merely
> produces gadgets which are the work of the devil. In that sense it doesn't
Again, I guess the work of thousands of scientists is about as certain
and as worthwhile as the religious beliefs of thousands of people who
believe science is the "work of the devil." For an objectivist, you see
to be taking a very subjective view of truth....
> "work" at all. Look, I am not claiming that science isn't true or valid.
> I'm not claiming that it isn't based on reality. I am just saying that
What is it based on? Imagination?
> the validity of science and scientific observations is not based on
> "just the facts" but on the facts and certain metaphysical premises, and that
That are based on "just the facts".
> therefore no scientific conclusion can ever successfully invalidate
> those premises AND be true. Why is it that I get the impression that
> you think that when we say that philosophy has veto power over science,
> you see this as an attack on the validity of science? It isn't.
> >A philosophy which, for instance, maintains that this is all illusion is, of
> >course, tenable and not vulnerable to scientific refutation. But then
> >how do we choose between philosophies?
>
> But it isn't SCIENCE which refutes such a claim (and it isn't really
"tenable"
> either, but that's another story), it is the premises of science. Your
> claim seems to be that science proves a philosophy to be right or wrong.
What makes you think the dividing line between science and philosophy is
so sharp? It wasn't clear at all in Aristotle's time that what we call
physics now wasn't philosophy. His philosophy (or his physics)
predicted events that ended up being counter-factual (when the facts
were still interpreted by his philosophy). I don't think that Aristotle
would have denied the validity, or "reality", or "existence" of Galileo
and his little experiment off the tower at Pisa. Yet, this contradicted
a part of his philosophy. It is possible to find situations where
experiemntal evidence, interpreted within the framework of a given
philosophy, can still contradict the claims of another part of that same
philosophy.
It isn't entirely clear to me that there is a place where science ends
and the "Foundations of Science" begin.
> The problem with that is that sciencce is itself based on certain
> philosophical views, and those views can't be proven by science without
> becoming circular.
>
> --Brian
Ditto for epistemology.
-Matt
James F. Hranicky
>>are kings, philosophies are emporors, but facts are gods. Like any gods
>>they can overthrow kings and emporors.
>
>Sigh. A fact can't overthrow any theory, only a fact interpreted according
>to some principles or premises. You seem to be ignoring the fact that to
[del]
So when Galileo discovered the fact that bodies of different weights fell at
the same speed, this did not overturn the theory that bodies of different
weights fell at different speeds?
This is a clear cut case of a fact which clearly contradicts a given
theory, and the theory must be scrapped. Galileo discovered that he
*had no philosophic viewpoint to explain this*.
When this happens, sorry, the philosophy must be overturned.
Reality has veto power over philosophy. Period.
-----
Jim Hranicky (j...@reef.cis.ufl.edu)
KRESSJA
>So when Galileo discovered the fact that bodies of different weights fell at
>the same speed, this did not overturn the theory that bodies of different
>weights fell at different speeds?
>This is a clear cut case of a fact which clearly contradicts a given
>theory, and the theory must be scrapped. Galileo discovered that he
>*had no philosophic viewpoint to explain this*.
>When this happens, sorry, the philosophy must be overturned.
>
>Reality has veto power over philosophy. Period.
I don't agree with Brian's position in this matter, but your clear cut
case is badly chosen. Bodies of different weights DO NOT fall at the
same speed, at least in an atmosphere. Galileo's (philosophical) projection
of results was not borne out by the facts. The heavier bodies did hit the
ground sooner; the observers he had invited took this as confirmation of
Aristotle's doctrine; and Galileo? He just ignored that veto power of
reality (Period.) and kept on acting as if his model of motion was better
than Aristotle's. I guess he should just have bowed to the facts,
although I for one am glad he didn't. :)
"no, it is precisely facts that do not exist, only interpretations...."
-Nietzsche
Sara Larson
>From: byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder)
>In article <CBM7M...@world.std.com> r...@world.std.com (Robert J. Kolker) writes:
>>Replying to Brian:
>>In the realm of ideas and intellect connected to the real world, theories
>>are kings, philosophies are emporors, but facts are gods. Like any gods
>>they can overthrow kings and emporors.
>Sigh. A fact can't overthrow any theory, only a fact interpreted according
>to some principles or premises. You seem to be ignoring the fact that to
>understand the facts in the first place you must have a method OF SOME KIND.
So, how do you interpret circumnavigation of Earth with
respect to the flat Earth theory? It would seem to me
that just the fact that it happened would throw the
whole flat Earth theory out of the water, so to speak.
-Sara
Stephen Grossman
>Replying to Brian:
>
>In the realm of ideas and intellect connected to the real world, theories
>are kings, philosophies are emporors, but facts are gods. Like any gods
>they can overthrow kings and emporors.
Yes, in the context of objectivity (mind-real relation), facts have priority.
However, this context is already a philosophical conclusion, ie, you have
limited your concern to the philosophy of objectivity (perhaps, Objectivism).
Facts are facts because a particular philosophy allows them. There is no
metaphysical essence as a philosophical Supreme court. Facts, theories,
philosophies, fish, computers, Plato's nagging wife, etc, all exist equally.
Pick your philosophy carefully to get the facts you want, lest some unpleasant
facts sneak in some logical back door. Each philosophy says something about
everything, in only in implication.
Stephen Grossman
>In article <byoderCB...@netcom.com>, byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder) writes...
>>If it is wrong then that proof will not come from any scientific experiment,
>>it will come from a philosophical argument. The reason for this is that
>>the validity of science COMES FROM philosophy and therefore, to deny that
>>philosophical base invalidates the claim itself.
>
>Actually, the validity of science is itself a philosophical problem. This
>hardly means that science is dependant upon philosophy. Scientific realism
>is still around (sample quote: "Philosophy validates science? Not at all!
>science happens to empirically tell us the way the world is. We deal in
>facts and objects, my friend, and not arguments..."). The statement that
>to deny the philosophical base, invalidates the scientific claim is simply
>mistaken. No one has yet been able to establish an unquestionable
>philosophical basis for science, thus the basis is ALWAYS in dispute. And
>since science gets on just fine in this situation, instead of grinding to
>a halt until fundamental principles have been clarified, this shows quite
>a good deal of independance from philosophy.
Within what philosophy does all this exist?
Gene W. Smith
>Facts, theories, philosophies, fish, computers, Plato's nagging wife,
>etc, all exist equally.
"Plato's nagging wife". Let me guess--he was a Kantian, right?
--
Gene Ward Smith/Brahms Gang/IWR/Ruprecht-Karls University
gsm...@kalliope.iwr.uni-heidelberg.de
Michael LeBlanc
>In article <CBwsx...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>
>>Facts, theories, philosophies, fish, computers, Plato's nagging wife,
>>etc, all exist equally.
>
>"Plato's nagging wife". Let me guess--he was a Kantian, right?
>
No, silly, Plato was a Marxist... Diogenes was the Kantian... ;)
>--
> Gene Ward Smith/Brahms Gang/IWR/Ruprecht-Karls University
> gsm...@kalliope.iwr.uni-heidelberg.de
--
:mjleblanc (Opinions are mine. I in no way speak for CSDL)
"I would rather be a man of paradoxes than a man of prejudices" (Rousseau)
Gene W. Smith
(Michael LeBlanc) writes:
>>"Plato's nagging wife". Let me guess--he was a Kantian, right?
>No, silly, Plato was a Marxist... Diogenes was the Kantian... ;)
I wasn't referring to Plato, I was referring to his wife.
Michael LeBlanc
>In article <1993Aug17.1...@draper.com> m...@picchu.draper.com
>(Michael LeBlanc) writes:
>
>>>"Plato's nagging wife". Let me guess--he was a Kantian, right?
>
>>No, silly, Plato was a Marxist... Diogenes was the Kantian... ;)
>
>I wasn't referring to Plato, I was referring to his wife.
>
Whoops, sorry... I think *she* was a Pragmatist...
>--
> Gene Ward Smith/Brahms Gang/IWR/Ruprecht-Karls University
> gsm...@kalliope.iwr.uni-heidelberg.de
Richard Wilson
In article <byoderCB...@netcom.com> byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>In article <CBppr...@carmen.logica.co.uk> Wil...@LILHD.Logica.com (Richard Wilson) writes:
>>In article <byoderCB...@netcom.com> byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>>>In article <CBM7M...@world.std.com> r...@world.std.com (Robert J. Kolker) writes:
>>>>Replying to Brian:
>
>>>>In the realm of ideas and intellect connected to the real world, theories
>>>>are kings, philosophies are emporors, but facts are gods. Like any gods
>>>>they can overthrow kings and emporors.
>
>>>Sigh. A fact can't overthrow any theory, only a fact interpreted according
>
>>A fact can overthrow some or all of a scientific theory.
>
>Not without an epistemological theory to evaluate it, it can't. If you have
>some observed fact which contradicts some established theory, you would
>never know it unless you applied some kind of analysis to it according to
>some kind of epistemological rules. Do you think that if some fact were
>shown to a Catholic that Mary wasn't a virgin, they would agree to it or
This is a belief, not a (scientific) theory.
>abandon Catholocism? Of course not, because his method of determining the
>truth is to accept church doctrine on blind faith, so facts and evidence
>don't really matter. (The same would be true if you were dealing with
>an uncomfortable fact and a subjectivist, or an abstract fact to a
>concrete-bound person.) It is observations plus a method which yeild
>conclusions, not just facts alone.
And so a fact can overthrow some or all of a scientific theory (as opposed
to a non-refutable theory which is invulnerable to facts).
>>The strong point about science is that, in general, it works: technology,
>>like this computer and the network we are using, performs.
>
>How do you know it works? According to some people, science merely
>produces gadgets which are the work of the devil. In that sense it doesn't
>"work" at all. Look, I am not claiming that science isn't true or valid.
Note your use of quotes.
>I'm not claiming that it isn't based on reality. I am just saying that
>the validity of science and scientific observations is not based on
>"just the facts" but on the facts and certain metaphysical premises, and that
>therefore no scientific conclusion can ever successfully invalidate
>those premises AND be true. Why is it that I get the impression that
Not *those* premises, no. So what?
>you think that when we say that philosophy has veto power over science,
>you see this as an attack on the validity of science? It isn't.
Of course the axioms of science hold a veto over science. Surely, if the
axioms are wrong then science is invalidated.
>>A philosophy which, for instance, maintains that this is all illusion is, of
>>course, tenable and not vulnerable to scientific refutation. But then
>>how do we choose between philosophies?
>
>But it isn't SCIENCE which refutes such a claim (and it isn't really "tenable"
>either, but that's another story), it is the premises of science. Your
Oh yes it is tenable: defendable against refutation.
>claim seems to be that science proves a philosophy to be right or wrong.
I have not claimed that science proves a philosophy right or wrong. You seem
to be claiming the reverse.
>The problem with that is that sciencce is itself based on certain
>philosophical views, and those views can't be proven by science without
>becoming circular.
It's not a problem to me as I am aware of this and I agree with these views.
I don't have this hangup with proof which, even confined to maths and logic,
does not apply to axioms.
KRESSJA
Keywords:
>>Actually, the validity of science is itself a philosophical problem. This
>>hardly means that science is dependant upon philosophy. Scientific realism
>>is still around (sample quote: "Philosophy validates science? Not at all!
>>science happens to empirically tell us the way the world is. We deal in
>>facts and objects, my friend, and not arguments..."). The statement that
>>to deny the philosophical base, invalidates the scientific claim is simply
>>mistaken. No one has yet been able to establish an unquestionable
>>philosophical basis for science, thus the basis is ALWAYS in dispute. And
since science gets on just fine in this situation, instead of grinding to
>>a halt until fundamental principles have been clarified, this shows quite
>>a good deal of independance from philosophy.
GROSSMAN:
> Within what philosophy does all this exist?
Perhaps you have misunderstood me. My point is that science is not dependent
upon philosophy because it can and does go on with its practice without
needing to adopt a SET philosophical position. This is not the same as
claiming that one can ever avoid having a philosophical position.
My comment was an OBSERVATION, not an argument. A philosophical issue or
problem necessarily "exists" in as many philosophies as have a position or
analysis of the issue or problem. You could give me more than a sentence
to work with here; your statement is rather enigmatic...
Richard Wilson
>What matter is that? How it is that scientific experiments and the application
>of reason relates to reality? It is my claim that Objectivism makes that
>connection where other philosophical approaches have failed.
>
>.. a philosophical justification for these premises is needed,
>and Objectivism offers the best one I have seen.
I am not familiar with Objectivism: can you go through the Objectivist
position on science, please?
Stephen Grossman
>In article <byoderCB...@netcom.com>, byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder) writes...
>
>>In article <CBppr...@carmen.logica.co.uk> Wil...@LILHD.Logica.com (Richard Wilson) writes:
>
>>>>Sigh. A fact can't overthrow any theory, only a fact interpreted according
>
>>>A fact can overthrow some or all of a scientific theory.
>
>>Not without an epistemological theory to evaluate it, it can't. If you have
>>some observed fact which contradicts some established theory, you would
>>never know it unless you applied some kind of analysis to it according to
>>some kind of epistemological rules. Do you think that if some fact were
>
>Actually there are a large number of cases wherein a fact can cause trouble
>to theory. Consider the case when an anomaly
within what limit (context, theory) is it an anomaly?
crops up in such a way as to
>cause experimental instruments to behave in an unanticipated
within what limit is it unanticipated?
>manner. The
>scientist only knows that something *unknown*
within waht limit is it unknown?
has appeared; he must now
>try to isolate it without recourse to theory, because anomalies, by
>definition, aren't encompassed by the theory.
THat's right, they are outside that specific theory and thus identified as
anomalies; they are within the limit of not-this-theory and thus identified.
If the fact (or phenomenon)
>is significant enough,
within what limit of significance.
it could cause a complete re-thinking of theory.
Facts do not cause thinking. Human choice causes thinking. You are using naive
realism. You have a context of theory but do not identify and evaluate it.
THus you need philosophy.
>
>Speaking of the epistemology of the philosophy of science, who have you read
>on the subject?
>
>>>>Empiricism *IS* an epistemological theory, it is not something above and
>>>>beyond epistemology.
>
>Whose concept of empiricism? Classical or new empiricism?
Mental chaos is mental chaos, regardless of details.
>Because it seems like a self-righteous claim in favor of philosophy; "veto
>power" suggests that philosophy possesses the right to dismiss the results
>of science through some sort of fiat.
Fiat?! Most people cannot handle the extraordinarily profound and sometimes
systematic study of evidence typical of philosophy. Brain surgery is tit by
comparison.
KRESSJA
>Facts do not cause thinking. Human choice causes thinking. You are using naive
>realism. You have a context of theory but do not identify and evaluate it.
>THus you need philosophy.
You obviously have no idea what you are talking about. I don't believe you
even know what realism is, much less the arguments for and against it. I am
NOT a scientific realist. But anything more subtle than blunt assertions and
trite slogans seems to slide right off you.
>>Speaking of the epistemology of the philosophy of science, who have you read
>>on the subject?
Still a good question, although clearly rhetorical: You have read no one on
this subject.
>>>>>Empiricism *IS* an epistemological theory, it is not something above and
>>>>>beyond epistemology.
>>Whose concept of empiricism? Classical or new empiricism?
>Mental chaos is mental chaos, regardless of details.
Mental chaos? I call it sheer stupidity to discuss something without knowing
the slightest thing about it. You cannot even understand the basic need to
make distinctions, much less recognize relevant distinctions.
>>Because it seems like a self-righteous claim in favor of philosophy; "veto
>power" suggests that philosophy possesses the right to dismiss the results
>>of science through some sort of fiat.
>Fiat?! Most people cannot handle the extraordinarily profound and sometimes
>systematic study of evidence typical of philosophy. Brain surgery is tit by
>comparison.
It is also clear that you are one of these people. You don't seem to know
what the word "fiat" means; you ignore the context while claiming to have a
"philosophy of contexts (as you say above, limit = context); you have not
troubled to examine the evidence, much less study it; and you have never,
in this entire discussion, uttered anything profound.
More than one person has written to me suggesting the futility of responding
to your unconnected pronouncements; therefore, unless and until you can say
something reasonable (e.g. prove to me that you do know the distinction
between classical and new empiricism, and demonstrate that you have rejected
both for good reasons, or show how I am a realist (after defining it in a
philosophically and traditionally acceptable fashion, of course))
I won't be responding to you with anything of any length or substance,
because it would be an obvious waste of time and effort.
Ciao, Mr. Grossman,
Stephen Grossman
>In article <CBwsx...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>
>>Facts, theories, philosophies, fish, computers, Plato's nagging wife,
>>etc, all exist equally.
>
>"Plato's nagging wife". Let me guess--he was a Kantian, right?
Who? Plato's nagging wife?!
Stephen Grossman
>In article <1993Aug17.1...@sun0.urz.uni-heidelberg.de> gsm...@lauren.iwr.uni-heidelberg.de (Gene W. Smith) writes:
>>In article <CBwsx...@umassd.edu> pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes:
>>
>>>Facts, theories, philosophies, fish, computers, Plato's nagging wife,
>>>etc, all exist equally.
>>
>>"Plato's nagging wife". Let me guess--he was a Kantian, right?
>>
>
>No, silly, Plato was a Marxist... Diogenes was the Kantian... ;)
Humor must be structured by Objectivism or we won't invite you back.
Stephen Grossman
>In article <1993Aug18.1...@sun0.urz.uni-heidelberg.de> gsm...@lauren.iwr.uni-heidelberg.de (Gene W. Smith) writes:
>>In article <1993Aug17.1...@draper.com> m...@picchu.draper.com
>>(Michael LeBlanc) writes:
>>
>>>>"Plato's nagging wife". Let me guess--he was a Kantian, right?
>>
>>>No, silly, Plato was a Marxist... Diogenes was the Kantian... ;)
>>
>>I wasn't referring to Plato, I was referring to his wife.
>>
>
>Whoops, sorry... I think *she* was a Pragmatist...
Is that why Plato was always looking for the Form (Hey! Hey!) of the Good?
Charles Perez
If science seems to have no philosophical basis, then I would say that its
basis is Pragmatism.
--
==========================================================================
That which is necessary is never evil. If an evil seems necessary, look
to your context; that's where its root lies.
Brian K. Yoder
natural world.
Somewhat more detailed response:
That's quite a request. To understand the Objectivist foundation for science it is first necessary
to understand Objectivist epistemology in general, and also Objectivist
metaphysics. If you really want to understand the Objectivist foundations of science,
I recommend (if you like modestly technical philosophy) "Introduction to Objectivist
Epistemology" by Ayn Rand. Anything I can write in a brief posting is only going to
give the barest outlines, so if you are really interested you ought to read the
stuff in depth.
The general method Rand uses is to start by asking what ideas, issues, or
questions are the most fundamental and deal with derivative ones later. For example,
it makes no sense to consider whether the earth goes around the sun or the other
way around until one understands what a planet is, what a sun is, how
gravity works, etc. Likewise, before you can address any of these issues, it
is necessary to deal with issues like how to gather data, how to organize it,
how to draw conclusions, etc. Before these questions can be addressed, one must
know things like what the relationship between consciousness and reality, whether
sense perception is valid, what truth is, and what consciousness is. Ultimately,
there are a surprisingly small number of issues at the lowest level which
all other knowledge relies on. These few issues, because they lie at the root
of all other knowledge can't be proven on the basis of other knowledge (because
that would beg the question of whether that knowledge was valid in the first
place). Fortunately, because all claims or ideas (even those that attempt to
deny them) depend on the validity of the axioms they are also irrefutable. The
important ones are (and this is only a generalization for clarity, and not
technically rigorous) that reality exists independent of our knowledge of it,
that things are what they are, and not something else, and that consciousness,
knowledge, and free will exist. Any philosophical position which denies
these can't help but reaffirm them (a concept Aristotle called "Reaffirmation
through denial").
With these premises in hand, we can address issues like whether sense
perception is valid (Rand said that it was), whether the law of excluded
middle is valid, how it is that we organize that sensory data into conceptual
generalizations (the age old problem of universals, which Rand answers
by claiming that knowledge is a relationship between an idea and reality
rather than being in the object only, in the consciousness only, or in some
alternate universe or something). Rand developed these into an elaborate
epistemological system, a special application of which is the formation of
scientific theories and the analysis of scientific data. Rand didn't write
extensively on the specifics of the philosophy of science per se (although
some of her associates have, particularly Harry Binswanger), but that is
why I said that Rand's philosophy offered the best foundation for the
philosophy of science rather than the best philosophy of science per se.
I am afraid that the above probably doesn't address the specific questions
you had to be gin with, but it is hard to summarize an entire philosophical
system without making the coverage superficial. If you have any
specific questions (such as how Rand addresses the problem of universals,
her theory of concepts, the concept of primacy of existence, the validity
of the axioms, the hierarchical structure of knowledge, the stolen
concept fallacy, or anything else) I would be happy to discuss them, but
there's just no way to cover all of that material in a few paragraphs.
In addition to Rand's "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology", I
also recommend "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" by
Leonard Peikoff will give you a good summary of the technical issues.
at issue (although not in a form an intelligent layman can't digest).
Both should be available in the philosophy section of your local
bookstore.
--Brian
Stephen Grossman
>KRESS:
>Keywords:
>
>>>Actually, the validity of science is itself a philosophical problem. This
>>>hardly means that science is dependant upon philosophy. Scientific realism
>>>is still around (sample quote: "Philosophy validates science? Not at all!
>>>science happens to empirically tell us the way the world is. We deal in
>>>facts and objects, my friend, and not arguments..."). The statement that
>>>to deny the philosophical base, invalidates the scientific claim is simply
>>>mistaken. No one has yet been able to establish an unquestionable
>>>philosophical basis for science, thus the basis is ALWAYS in dispute. And
>since science gets on just fine in this situation, instead of grinding to
>>>a halt until fundamental principles have been clarified, this shows quite
>>>a good deal of independance from philosophy.
>
>GROSSMAN:
>
>> Within what philosophy does all this exist?
>
>Perhaps you have misunderstood me. My point is that science is not dependent
>upon philosophy because it can and does go on with its practice without
>needing to adopt a SET philosophical position. This is not the same as
>claiming that one can ever avoid having a philosophical position.
Within what context does science "go on with its practice without needing to
adopt a SET philosophical position."
>
>My comment was an OBSERVATION, not an argument.
Obseervation is theory-laden. I replied to theory/argument implicit in your
observation.
>A philosophical issue or
>problem necessarily "exists" in as many philosophies as have a position or
>analysis of the issue or problem. You could give me more than a sentence
>to work with here; your statement is rather enigmatic...
Sorry. we metaphysicians forget to drop the shop-talk when we descend from the
mountain.
I have considered your comments not merely singly but as a whole. THis "whole"
is a claim just as much as each individual claim tho it may not be explicit.
And in our Pragmatist,empiricist, postmodern, analytic, positivist era in the
history of philosoophy, it very often is not explicit. Its there, tho. The ONE
exists just as much as the MANY. Synthesis exists as much as analysis. THe
integration of knowledge into a system exists just as much as isolated,
out-of-context claims. Knowing the system in which claims are made is a veery
powerful method of knowledge. One can study the system and accept or reject it
without knowing all the details. THe essence is, of course, needed as an item
of knowledge; and a few details.
With that as context, I wondered about the system in which your remarks about
phil of science was made. Details are important but so is an overview. I want
to see the forest and the trees.
It may very well be that you do not know the system, a situation in which its
difficult to identify a context for reply. Thus philosophy brings people out
of the cave, gives them sunglasses for awhile and we stare in awe at the
knowledge-giving sun. I have spoken.
KRESSJA
(GROSSMAN)
>It may very well be that you do not know the system, a situation in which its
>difficult to identify a context for reply. Thus philosophy brings people out
>of the cave, gives them sunglasses for awhile and we stare in awe at the
>knowledge-giving sun. I have spoken.
Yes, but you haven't said anything.
-JK
P.S. "I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to a system
is a lack of integrity."
-Nietzsche, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
Mikhail Zeleny
pe...@mgr.hjf.org (Charles Perez) writes:
>If science seems to have no philosophical basis, then I would say that its
>basis is Pragmatism.
Why not instrumentalism or naive realism or methodological anarchism?
>--
>==========================================================================
>That which is necessary is never evil. If an evil seems necessary, look
>to your context; that's where its root lies.
cordially, | Why is it that all those who have become eminent
mikhail | in philosophy or politics or poetry or art
zel...@husc.harvard.edu | are clearly of an atrabilious temperament?
Barry Ortlip
: > My mistake. I thought that philosophy having veto power over science
: >meant that due to philosophy, certain scientific theories can be found to be
: >invalid. Apparently, it means that due to religious beliefs, scientific
: >theories will not be accepted immediately, but will take a number of years
: >to be accepted. Correct?
: No No No. I don't know who posted that other stuff or why, but when
: Objectivists claim that philosophy has veto power over science, it is meant
: in the sense that you described. Scince metaphysics and epistemology are
: more fundamental than scientific conclusions and methods, and therefore
: if there are contradictions between the two, the scientific conclusions are
: the wrong ones.
Again, I ask for an example of this.
Barry Ortlip
Barry Ortlip
: In article <24m44t...@no-names.nerdc.ufl.edu>, j...@beach.cis.ufl.edu (James F. Hranicky) writes...
: >So when Galileo discovered the fact that bodies of different weights fell at
: >the same speed, this did not overturn the theory that bodies of different
: >weights fell at different speeds?
: >This is a clear cut case of a fact which clearly contradicts a given
: >theory, and the theory must be scrapped. Galileo discovered that he
: >*had no philosophic viewpoint to explain this*.
: >When this happens, sorry, the philosophy must be overturned.
: >
: >Reality has veto power over philosophy. Period.
: I don't agree with Brian's position in this matter, but your clear cut
: case is badly chosen. Bodies of different weights DO NOT fall at the
: same speed, at least in an atmosphere. Galileo's (philosophical) projection
: of results was not borne out by the facts. The heavier bodies did hit the
: ground sooner; the observers he had invited took this as confirmation of
: Aristotle's doctrine; and Galileo? He just ignored that veto power of
: reality (Period.) and kept on acting as if his model of motion was better
: than Aristotle's. I guess he should just have bowed to the facts,
: although I for one am glad he didn't. :)
I don't know where you learned the history of science, but that aint
the way it happened. Galileo played with inclines. It is very easy to see
that two objects with the same size and shape but different weights roll down
an incline at the same rate (easy to see, that is, if the incline is not that
steep).
Barry Ortlip
Harley Davis
(Mike Hurben) writes:
>(Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>> No No No. I don't know who posted that other stuff or why, but
>> when Objectivists claim that philosophy has veto power over
>> science, it is meant in the sense that you described. Scince
>> metaphysics and epistemology are more fundamental than scientific
>> conclusions and methods, and therefore if there are contradictions
>> between the two, the scientific conclusions are the wrong ones.
>Oh? How can that always be true? What if your philosophy is _wrong_?????
If it is wrong then that proof will not come from any scientific
experiment, it will come from a philosophical argument. The reason
for this is that the validity of science COMES FROM philosophy and
therefore, to deny that philosophical base invalidates the claim
itself.
Of course I don't accept the proposition that Objectivism ought to
be considered wrong just for the sake of argument, but if you want
to attack it, be my guest, but I am offering a bit of friendly
advice: No scientific claim or evidence can ever invalidate the
Objectivist metaphysics (although conceiveably it could call into
question certain political or aesthetic conclusions at least in
principle).
As I understand objectivism, it relies on a certain understanding of
human character in order to derive morality. Science could certainly
intervene here; it could determine that objectivism's understanding of
human needs and character is just wrong. For example, it could be
shown that volition does not exist, or that people really are more
satisfied as hunter/gatherers. (I don't actually believe the latter.)
Studies in cognitive science could also show problems with objectivist
epistemology. For instance, it could turn out that categories are
"hierarchical", whatever that means --- they could be complex networks
of various relations of equal importance.
By the way, what specific claims does objectivism make about human
nature which imply objectivist morality? How are these claims
justified?
-- Harley Davis
PS Why do you capitalize "objectivism"? If it is a philosophy rather
than a religion, it should be uncapitalized. Or is this a tacit
admission?
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
nom: Harley Davis ILOG S.A.
net: da...@ilog.fr 2 Avenue Gallie'ni, BP 85
tel: (33 1) 46 63 66 66 94253 Gentilly Cedex, France
Harley Davis
As I understand objectivism, it relies on a certain understanding of
human character in order to derive morality. Science could certainly
intervene here; it could determine that objectivism's understanding of
human needs and character is just wrong. For example, it could be
shown that volition does not exist, or that people really are more
satisfied as hunter/gatherers. (I don't actually believe the latter.)
Studies in cognitive science could also show problems with objectivist
epistemology. For instance, it could turn out that categories are
"hierarchical", whatever that means --- they could be complex networks
of various relations of equal importance.
I meant not hierarchical, of course.
-- Harley Davis
KRESSJA
> I don't know where you learned the history of science, but that aint
>the way it happened. Galileo played with inclines. It is very easy to see
>that two objects with the same size and shape but different weights roll down
>an incline at the same rate (easy to see, that is, if the incline is not that
>steep).
The incident to which I was refering is widely believed to be apocryphal, but
the point still stands. Galileo's theory of acceleration is empirically
false; he did not predict a terminal velocity. If you chart the curve of
an accelerating body as it moves from 0 to termial velocity, and map over it
both Aristotle's and Galileo's Theoretical outcomes, you will note that
Aristotle's theory better describes the majority of cases which are observed
in day to day life.
Of course, science isn't in the business of investigating day to day life, but
my point is that Aristotle had certainly taken account of the facts when he
gave his theory. Aristotle was NOT a pre-scientific idiot; major shifts in
the philosophical understanding of nature were required before Galileo COULD
do an experiment with inclined planes that would be meaningful, i.e. the
inclined plane as a model of falling bodies only works if its the same kind of
motion; the theoretical presupposition that such different motions would be
ultimately the same was new in the world.
Don't you think the Greeks had inclined planes? The question is why did they
not and could they not do what Galileo did; there is more going on than a
"clear-cut" case of a simple experimental fact overthrowing an unscientific
old theory.
-JK
Brian K. Yoder
OK, for example, there are folks who say:
"Experiments demonstrate that light is simulatneously a particle and a wave.
We can determine from this observation that contradictions are possible
and that reason isn't valid."
I am sure you must have heard people say such things, haven't you?
Leaving aside for the moment what the particular error in that point of
view is, would you not say that it is objectinable on philosophical grounds
(because among other things, it is self-refuting) regardless of the details?
--Brian
Brian K. Yoder
That is true, although the objectivist claims about human nature are rather
modest. You are right though, in principle some claims in politics and
ethics may be open to scientific disproof.
>For example, it could be
>shown that volition does not exist,
Actually it couldn't prove that, because volition (in the sense Objectivism
focuses on) is a requirement prior to reason/science. One could never
prove that volition in this sense doesn't exist.
>or that people really are more
>satisfied as hunter/gatherers. (I don't actually believe the latter.)
Do you believe the former? How strange.
Anyway, I don't see how you could prove people happier (or rather "more
pro-life" (using happiness as the standard implies hedonism)) as
hunter-gatherers, but I suppose that in principle it isn't automatically
out of court (sort of in the same sense that the claim that the Earth
goes around the Sun could be disproven in principle, but given the available
evidence it would require that almost everything we know be wrong).
>Studies in cognitive science could also show problems with objectivist
>epistemology.
For certain non-fundamental epistemological principles, yes. CogSci is a
little unusual though since it is to a great degree dealing with philosophy
and not just science. I don't object it that at all, but yu must admit
that it isn't just science. True?
>By the way, what specific claims does objectivism make about human
>nature which imply objectivist morality? How are these claims
>justified?
That's more than I have time to discuss in this post, but a few of the
highlights are:
The observation that all living things pursue values (they are goal-directed).
The observation that the fundamental alternative for living things (the
alternative on which all others rely) is that between life and death.
That human beings use reason as their primary means of survival.
That humans can make choices between alternatives.
That the fundamental need of reasoning beings is to be free to exercise
that reasoning freely without restraint.
That's certainly not an exhaustive list, but it ought to get you started.
>PS Why do you capitalize "objectivism"? If it is a philosophy rather
>than a religion, it should be uncapitalized. Or is this a tacit
>admission?
No, of course not. I am capitalizing it because I am refering to a specific
philosophy (Rand's) rather than a less rigorous definition of the "school"
which might imply more than that is I didn't capitalize.
--Brian
KRESSJA
>OK, for example, there are folks who say:
>
>"Experiments demonstrate that light is simulatneously a particle and a wave.
>We can determine from this observation that contradictions are possible
>and that reason isn't valid."
That experimental datum doesn't justify THAT epistemological assertion, no.
But doesn't the empirical wave behavior of light refute the theoretical
position, "light is a particle"? And vice versa?
I don't think anyone is arguing that empirical data positively determines
philosophical endeavor; just that it can force the reconsideration of
philosophical doctrines; philosophy, after all, isn't in the doctrines;
it's in the effort of thinking that arrives at doctrines and in the
courage that is willing to leave them behind, when honesty demands it.
KRESSJA
>...although objectivism's claims about human nature are rather modest.
>>By the way, what specific claims does objectivism make about human
>>nature which imply objectivist morality? How are these claims
>>justified?
>That's more than I have time to discuss in this post, but a few of the
>highlights are:
>The observation that all living things pursue values (they are goal-directed).
>The observation that the fundamental alternative for living things (the
>alternative on which all others rely) is that between life and death.
>That human beings use reason as their primary means of survival.
>That humans can make choices between alternatives.
>That the fundamental need of reasoning beings is to be free to exercise
>that reasoning freely without restraint.
Even for a brief list, this is an interesting statement of principles.
But to go into it in this context would only disrupt the thread.
Do you feel like discussing this at greater length, Brian?
Just let me know...
Brian K. Yoder
>In article <byoderCC...@netcom.com>, byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder) writes...
>>...although objectivism's claims about human nature are rather modest.
>>>By the way, what specific claims does objectivism make about human
>>>nature which imply objectivist morality? How are these claims
>>>justified?
>>That's more than I have time to discuss in this post, but a few of the
>>highlights are:
>>The observation that all living things pursue values (they are goal-directed).
>>The observation that the fundamental alternative for living things (the
>>alternative on which all others rely) is that between life and death.
>>That human beings use reason as their primary means of survival.
>>That humans can make choices between alternatives.
>>That the fundamental need of reasoning beings is to be free to exercise
>>that reasoning freely without restraint.
>Even for a brief list, this is an interesting statement of principles.
>But to go into it in this context would only disrupt the thread.
>Do you feel like discussing this at greater length, Brian?
>Just let me know...
Sure, that would probably make more sense than the interminable ravings by
Grossman, Lustig, LeBlanc, and friends.
As I said, the above list is certainly far from exhaustive (and also just
off the top of my head) but it's probably not bad as a list of items to
discuss. What do you thing of it? Do you think that these are pretty
straight-forward and obvious? Do you basically agree with all of them?
Or do you have some problems with some of them? Want clarification?
--Brian
Roger Lustig
>In article <1993Aug23....@cronkite.ocis.temple.edu> ort...@astro.ocis.temple.edu (Barry Ortlip) writes:
>>Brian K. Yoder (byo...@netcom.com) wrote:
>>: > My mistake. I thought that philosophy having veto power over science
>>: >meant that due to philosophy, certain scientific theories can be found to be
>>: >invalid. Apparently, it means that due to religious beliefs, scientific
>>: >theories will not be accepted immediately, but will take a number of years
>>: >to be accepted. Correct?
>>: No No No. I don't know who posted that other stuff or why, but when
>>: Objectivists claim that philosophy has veto power over science, it is meant
>>: in the sense that you described. Scince metaphysics and epistemology are
>>: more fundamental than scientific conclusions and methods, and therefore
>>: if there are contradictions between the two, the scientific conclusions are
>>: the wrong ones.
>> Again, I ask for an example of this.
>OK, for example, there are folks who say:
>"Experiments demonstrate that light is simulatneously a particle and a wave.
>We can determine from this observation that contradictions are possible
>and that reason isn't valid."
Uh, Brian, is that a *scientific* conclusion? "Reason isn't valid" isn't
a scientific observation or anything like one.
Also, the question was whether *you* had heard of such a case, in a
scientific context. May we take it that the answer is no?
Making up a quotation, atrributing it to "somebody out there" and then
rejecting it isn't really all that impressive.
We're also waiting for your argument -- as opposed to repeated assertion --
that metaphysics, etc. is more fundamental than scientific results. Seems
to me that someone quite ignorant of philosophy can still -- even at
a naive level -- design and carry out an experiment and reach a
conclusion.
>I am sure you must have heard people say such things, haven't you?
No, Brian, most of us have *not* heard people say that. Certainly
not scientists or philosophers who know any science, which is surely
the group of people we're talking about. You'll have to do better:
something along the lines of an actual quote.
>Leaving aside for the moment what the particular error in that point of
>view is, would you not say that it is objectinable on philosophical grounds
>(because among other things, it is self-refuting) regardless of the details?
If you take the last part as hyperbole, it's all of a sudden somewhat trickier.
Roger
Roger Lustig
>In article <DAVIS.93A...@passy.ilog.fr> da...@passy.ilog.fr (Harley Davis) writes:
>>In article <byoderCB...@netcom.com> byo...@netcom.com (Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>> (Mike Hurben) writes:
>> >(Brian K. Yoder) writes:
>>As I understand objectivism, it relies on a certain understanding of
>>human character in order to derive morality. Science could certainly
>>intervene here; it could determine that objectivism's understanding of
>>human needs and character is just wrong.
>That is true, although the objectivist claims about human nature are rather
>modest.
Never impressed *me* that way...
>You are right though, in principle some claims in politics and
>ethics may be open to scientific disproof.
>>For example, it could be shown that volition does not exist,
>Actually it couldn't prove that, because volition (in the sense Objectivism
>focuses on) is a requirement prior to reason/science. One could never
>prove that volition in this sense doesn't exist.
So, since when does O'ism have a monopoly on which sense of a word to use?
>>or that people really are more
>>satisfied as hunter/gatherers. (I don't actually believe the latter.)
>Anyway, I don't see how you could prove people happier (or rather "more
>pro-life" (using happiness as the standard implies hedonism)) as
Oh, please. This is a classic O'ist misunderstanding, for the purpose
of dismissing John Stuart Mill. "Happiness" (or "pleasure" as Mill says)
is *not* necessarily hedonistic pleasure.
On the other hand, it's a little easier to gauge than "sense of life,"
which is a 100% malleable term that O'ists use to show that the things
they like are objectively good.
>hunter-gatherers, but I suppose that in principle it isn't automatically
>out of court (sort of in the same sense that the claim that the Earth
>goes around the Sun could be disproven in principle, but given the available
>evidence it would require that almost everything we know be wrong).
Uh, what's the available evidence regarding the hunter-gatherers? And
what's our metric of "lifeness" or whatever for comparing? (Hint:
it's not Brian Yoder's perferred way of living.)
>>Studies in cognitive science could also show problems with objectivist
>>epistemology.
>For certain non-fundamental epistemological principles, yes. CogSci is a
>little unusual though since it is to a great degree dealing with philosophy
>and not just science. I don't object it that at all, but yu must admit
>that it isn't just science. True?
I'm not sure what "just science" might mean to you, given that you view
it as entirely subordinate to philosophy -- that one can't do science without
phil.
As for the epistemological principles, why can't they be rejected? Unless
O'ism is a religion, even axioms need to be rejected as soon as they
can be seen as not corresponding to "the facts of reality" or common
sense or whatever else you use to choose axioms. *anything* can be
rejected in a philosophy, given new evidence that the world isn't
as we thought; saying that certain things aren't open to question
is basically the same as chartering a religion.
>>By the way, what specific claims does objectivism make about human
>>nature which imply objectivist morality? How are these claims
>>justified?
>That's more than I have time to discuss in this post, but a few of the
>highlights are:
>The observation that all living things pursue values (they are goal-directed).
Not an observation; more like a definition of "living thing."
>The observation that the fundamental alternative for living things (the
>alternative on which all others rely) is that between life and death.
Irrelevant to many human issues, though, because undecidable -- can't
tell which alternative leads to life. Also not necessarily useful
for morals discussions in every case.
>That human beings use reason as their primary means of survival.
Again, a matter of definition. If not, highly questionable.
>That humans can make choices between alternatives.
No problem with that one. Volition.
>That the fundamental need of reasoning beings is to be free to exercise
>that reasoning freely without restraint.
Need? Preference, perhaps; and "without restraint" is highly qualified
anyway, given that the environment, etc. restrain us quite a bit.
>That's certainly not an exhaustive list, but it ought to get you started.
Don't get me started...
>>PS Why do you capitalize "objectivism"? If it is a philosophy rather
>>than a religion, it should be uncapitalized. Or is this a tacit
>>admission?
>No, of course not. I am capitalizing it because I am refering to a specific
>philosophy (Rand's) rather than a less rigorous definition of the "school"
>which might imply more than that is I didn't capitalize.
Actually, it's more like a brand name. Lots of people you disagree with,
Brian, *also* claim -- with at least as much reason -- to be using Rand's
philosophy.
But your point, that it's Rand's philosophy, period, *does* raise some
uncomfortable questions about independent derivation. I've never met
anyone who actually did philosophy and who agreed 100% with any other
philosopher.
Roger
Robert J. Kolker
[snip][snip] <Yoder invokes goal directedness as one of the central attributes
of living thingies>
Have a care. My house's heating system is goal directed. Its goal is to
keep the ambient temperature near the thermostates within an interval
defined by the lower setting and the upper setting. It is also, non living.
In fact any sysem controlled by negative feedback is goal directed. Goal
directedness, in short, is a characteristic of several *non-living*
systems as well as living systems. The generic term used by Norbert
Wiener, I belive, is >homeostastic<.
The aspect of living systems by which they make corrections through a
negative feedback loop lends itself to the reductionist paradigm, thanks
to the work of N. Wiener. One of the results of Wiener's insight was the
strategy used to control Parkinson's disease. Do to a lack of neural
imhibitor the corrective motions are multiplied by a factor greater than
1.0, that is the errors are overcompenated. This produces the
characteristic tremors. A chemical means was found to "damp" the
corrections (temporarily) to produces some relief for the sufferers.
The matter that concerns me is that Objectivism might be sneaking vitalism
back into serious thinking, through the back door. The *facts* seem to
indicated that living thingies like our selves are meat that walks. There
is nothing in our functioning that could not be duplicated (piecemeal) by
a system that is clearly non-living. Shades of the Golem!. If that is
shown to be true of complex living behaviour, yea even *rational*
behaviour, then we would have to deal with intelligent machines as moral
rational beings. Or turn it around. If "living" thingies like ourselves
are just wet machines, whither morality? (pun alert).
Conan the Libertarian
--
"If you can't love the Constitution, then at least hate the Government"
KRESSJA
>>>That's more than I have time to discuss in this post, but a few of the
>>>highlights are:
1. The observation that all living things pursue values (are goal-directed).
2. The observation that the fundamental alternative for living things (the
alternative on which all others rely) is that between life and death.
3. That human beings use reason as their primary means of survival.
4. That humans can make choices between alternatives.
5. That the fundamental need of reasoning beings is to be free to exercise
that reasoning freely without restraint.
I've numbered them for convenience's sake. So much clarification is in
order that I think I'll adress only one at a time.
RE: #1 It is possible that I agree with this, depending on how "value" is
to be taken. You says "all living things pursue values;" is the oak tree
a value of the acorn? I would say that all living things show will (not,
however, in the sense of volition; in the sense of striving, i.e. what
Nietzsche calls the will to power, which, as you know, applies to acorns
and oak trees rather than large bullies beating people up, as some hasty
people have claimed).
Living things have a goal? Yes, but in what sense? I do not think that
living things have a proper goal assigned them by God or Nature; rather,
the goal is necessary for the excercise of willing, but doesn't cause it.
As Ortega y Gasset says of hunting, "One does not hunt in order to kill;
one kills in order to have hunted." Life does not have fixed goals, insofar
as goals are often attained, and then discarded. A goal is necessary; but
not any one particular goal.
In the sphere of morality, such goals are known as values. It is not
clear however, that such values are posited by human beings, any more
than the acorn posits the oak tree as its goal. Such things often have
an external character; Aristotle considers ethics to be an invitation or
a challenge (as opposed to Kant's imperative); Aristotle considers ethics
to be difficult (as opposed to Mill, who wanted to make everyone comfortable)
I believe Aristotle is correct. Ethics is an invitation; an ethical life
must be taken up as challenge (and sometimes a burden); making things
difficult for oneself is the hallmark of ethics; ethical life often entails
a loss of choice, in sense that one must do what one must do, or else
become a coward to oneself and one's choice to live in a certain fashion.
More later.
KRESSJA
>That's more than I have time to discuss in this post, but a few of the
>highlights are:
1. The observation that all living things pursue values (are goal-directed).
2. The observation that the fundamental alternative for living things (the
alternative on which all others rely) is that between life and death.
3. That human beings use reason as their primary means of survival.
4. That humans can make choices between alternatives.
5. That the fundamental need of reasoning beings is to be free to exercise
that reasoning freely without restraint.
RE: #2 This is less of an observation than a theoretical assertion. It
isn't clear what sort of an alternative is present here. In my acorn/oak
tree example, for instance, certainly its either dead or alive, but living
is not the goal of the thing per se. The living don't seek life, because
they have it already; and the dead don't for a different reason. Life
doesn't seek life, it seeks greater accumulation of life energy, i.e. it
seeks to become other than it is.
When humans seek such, it may be called ethics; at least in Aristotle's or
Nietzsche's sense. Not Kant's. The choice between life and death is NOT
in my view the fundamental choice. Why? Because the value of life cannot
be judged; all valuing and willing, PRESUPPOSE life. Now, it is the case
that some men find life not worth living, while others love life and
living and still others never consider the matter. But such judgements have
value only as symptoms, as indications of the psychological type which
each man is. We do well to be suspicious of those who tell us that life
is no good, but not because they have made an error in reasoning; rather,
life seems to them to be no good, because life is already failing in
such cases.
Therefore the question of ethics is NOT "Life or death?" but rather, "What
kind of life? What kind of death?" C.f. Nietzsche's contrast between the
noble death of Socrates and the pitiful death of Jesus, in this regard.
But, keeping to the subject of life, the question is what type of life?
What type of man? But it is not the case that such a typology presuppose
that a man may choose himself. Now, since I claimed last time that ethics
is something that presents itself as a challenge/invitation, the question
is what type takes up such a challenge? Who attempts to lead the ethical
life (and remember, for Socrates, and Plato, and Aristotle, the highest
form of the ethical life is the philosophical life)?
It is difficult to go into enough detail in such short postings. However,
I have one final thought on the life/death alternative. It is base. There
are a number of circumstances in which it would be better to die than to
live. The case of the death of Socrates is ideal. To live, and he could
easily have done so, he needed only to provide a reasonable offer to his
judges, or later to have escaped; he did not. Why? Did he mistake his
rational self-interest? No, he concluded that the fundamental ethical
choice is to live the ethical life, and that meant dying the ethical
death, rather than renouncing himself and his life.
Barry Ortlip
: OK, for example, there are folks who say:
: "Experiments demonstrate that light is simulatneously a particle and a wave.
: We can determine from this observation that contradictions are possible
: and that reason isn't valid."
Actually, what the experiments show is that the 'philosophy' that
something must be either a particle or a wave is wrong. That is why science
has veto power over philosophy - the opposite of what you (or someone - I
forget who) said.
My thinking/assumption that something must be either a particle or a
wave was invalidated by the experiment. Now I can choose to not believe the
experiment, but that doesn't change the reality: things can be a combination
of wave and particle.
: I am sure you must have heard people say such things, haven't you?
No, I haven't. There is no contradiction.
: Leaving aside for the moment what the particular error in that point of
: view is, would you not say that it is objectinable on philosophical grounds
: (because among other things, it is self-refuting) regardless of the details?
If an experiment repeatedly shows reality to be different from what
I thought it should be like, I change my views/philosophy of reality. I
don't discard the experiments as this 'veto power' seems to suggest.
I would think that if this veto power exists, then out of the thousands
of scientific laws, theories, equations, etc... you should be able to come up
with atleast half a dozen good examples. The QM example above is a very bad
one, in fact it is a counter one. People haven't discarded the facts that
light (and all elementary particles, I think...) behaves as both a particle
and a wave; they have changed their thinking to accommodate them.
Barry Ortlip
Harley Davis
>For example, it could be
>shown that volition does not exist,
Actually it couldn't prove that, because volition (in the sense Objectivism
focuses on) is a requirement prior to reason/science. One could never
prove that volition in this sense doesn't exist.
This I don't understand. Is volition in the objectivist sense related
to determinism? If not, how are we to understand it?
>or that people really are more
>satisfied as hunter/gatherers. (I don't actually believe the latter.)
Do you believe the former? How strange.
I don't see what's strange about believing in determinism.
>Studies in cognitive science could also show problems with objectivist
>epistemology.
For certain non-fundamental epistemological principles, yes. CogSci is a
little unusual though since it is to a great degree dealing with philosophy
and not just science. I don't object it that at all, but yu must admit
that it isn't just science. True?
Some is, some isn't. I would distinguish the two into cognitive
science and cognitive philosophy. In cognitive science we have
experimental results dealing with memory, perception, and so on. In
cognitive philosophy, we have (more or less) speculative theorizing
about cognitive possibilities. I was referring to cognitive science.
>By the way, what specific claims does objectivism make about human
>nature which imply objectivist morality? How are these claims
>justified?
That's more than I have time to discuss in this post, but a few of the
highlights are:
The observation that all living things pursue values (they are
goal-directed).
The observation that the fundamental alternative for living things (the
alternative on which all others rely) is that between life and death.
That human beings use reason as their primary means of survival.
That humans can make choices between alternatives.
That the fundamental need of reasoning beings is to be free to exercise
that reasoning freely without restraint.
That's certainly not an exhaustive list, but it ought to get you started.
It gets me started wondering how you get from this list to objectivist
morality. What in this list would restrain somebody from unrestricted
egoism? In particular, how do you justify limits from exercising
reason to putting the results of that reason into action, given that
the reasoning might be wrong?
Is there any limit in objectivist morality on what a person can do to
save his life? Does it involve observations not in this list?
>PS Why do you capitalize "objectivism"? If it is a philosophy rather
>than a religion, it should be uncapitalized. Or is this a tacit
>admission?
No, of course not. I am capitalizing it because I am refering to a specific
philosophy (Rand's) rather than a less rigorous definition of the "school"
which might imply more than that is I didn't capitalize.
Are there any precedents for this usage? Would Peikoff's philosophy
just be objectivism, or he is so well-aligned with Rand that what he
expresses is also Objectivism?
-- Harley
Stephen Grossman
>In article <CC17n...@umassd.edu>, pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes...
>
>>>Whose concept of empiricism? Classical or new empiricism?
>
>>Mental chaos is mental chaos, regardless of details.
>
>Mental chaos? I call it sheer stupidity to discuss something without knowing
>the slightest thing about it. You cannot even understand the basic need to
>make distinctions, much less recognize relevant distinctions.
within which limit, Objectivism or another?
>>>Because it seems like a self-righteous claim in favor of philosophy; "veto
>>power" suggests that philosophy possesses the right to dismiss the results
>>>of science through some sort of fiat.
>
>>Fiat?! Most people cannot handle the extraordinarily profound and sometimes
>>systematic study of evidence typical of philosophy. Brain surgery is tit by
>>comparison.
>
>It is also clear that you are one of these people. You don't seem to know
>what the word "fiat" means; you ignore the context while claiming to have a
>"philosophy of contexts (as you say above, limit = context);
Fiat-Italian car.
you have not
>troubled to examine the evidence, much less study it; and you have never,
>in this entire discussion, uttered anything profound.
Many people say I am troubled...........I would have uttered something
profound but lacking evidence of being understood...........
>
>More than one person has written to me suggesting the futility of responding
>to your unconnected pronouncements;
For futility, a pro-reason philosophy and/or a pro-reason psychology is hereby
recommended; or, failing that, a good stiff brandy and a Havana ceegar, all
while bending the maid over one's knee. Perhaps they were atomists or empiricists or Pragmatists for whom
existence is disconnected bits and pieces ("Bits and Pieces," a 60s Dave Clark
Five ditty, is still a rousing rock anthem).
therefore, unless and until you can say
>something reasonable (e.g. prove to me that you do know the distinction
>between classical and new empiricism,
I would not jump over a cliff in either Argentina or China, tho, to be sure, I
don't know the difference. Once having learned to think in principles, it is
possible to recognize absurdity wherever one finds it, despite differences in
details.
>and demonstrate that you have rejected
>both for good reasons, or show how I am a realist
you found a computer so you it is presumed that you have some realism. now, if
you can find the toilet before its too late, this may demonstrate additional
understanding. But seriously,........................
(after defining it in a
>philosophically and traditionally acceptable fashion, of course))
Whoa there, Pilgrim! Traditional!? But Obj is a radically anti-traditional
philosophy so I won't concede the premise of our dispute. Recall, philosophy
covers everything. However, the gods have taken due note of your confusion and
thus offer, online, a 16p essay, "Existence 2," a radically systematic,
non-epistemological, metaphysics; not Objectivism, not philosophy, a view of
philosophy.
>I won't be responding to you with anything of any length or substance,
>because it would be an obvious waste of time and effort.
And yet waste exists as much as efficiency. All work and no play makes Jack a
jerk! Not that I'm acusing you, of course, that would be...rude and
ungentlemanly.
>Ciao, Mr. Grossman,
Luigi Chinetti.
Stephen Grossman
>In article <CC4zG...@umassd.edu>, pmsc...@UMASSD.EDU writes...
>
>(GROSSMAN)
>
>>It may very well be that you do not know the system, a situation in which its
>>difficult to identify a context for reply. Thus philosophy brings people out
>>of the cave, gives them sunglasses for awhile and we stare in awe at the
>>knowledge-giving sun. I have spoken.
>
>Yes, but you haven't said anything.
There you go again, disconnecting.
>
>P.S. "I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to a system
>is a lack of integrity."
> -Nietzsche, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
He ended, syphilitic and wrapped in a sheet by his sister, for intellectual
tourists to see.
Let us note that your understanding of science is not connected, as a result
of your rejection of system, to any other knowledge.
################################################################################
"Wink, wink. Nudge, nudge."
[Kant, _Critique of Pure Reason_]
################################################################################
Brian K. Yoder
> >For example, it could be
> >shown that volition does not exist,
> Actually it couldn't prove that, because volition (in the sense Objectivism
> focuses on) is a requirement prior to reason/science. One could never
> prove that volition in this sense doesn't exist.
>This I don't understand. Is volition in the objectivist sense related
>to determinism? If not, how are we to understand it?
It is (relatively) simple, Objectivism recognizes that determinism is
incompatible with reason and knowledge, and therefore to assert that
determinism (of a certain kind admittedly) is true is self-refuting.
> >or that people really are more
> >satisfied as hunter/gatherers. (I don't actually believe the latter.)
> Do you believe the former? How strange.
>I don't see what's strange about believing in determinism.
I guess that depends on what you mean by determinism. The Objectivist view
is probably better characterized as "causalism" (my term). The bugbear
here is the brand of determinism that claims that there is no such thing as
human choice. If that's not what you mean by determinism then we aren't
necessarily in disagreement.
> >By the way, what specific claims does objectivism make about human
> >nature which imply objectivist morality? How are these claims
> >justified?
> That's more than I have time to discuss in this post, but a few of the
> highlights are:
> The observation that all living things pursue values (they are
> goal-directed).
> The observation that the fundamental alternative for living things (the
> alternative on which all others rely) is that between life and death.
> That human beings use reason as their primary means of survival.
> That humans can make choices between alternatives.
> That the fundamental need of reasoning beings is to be free to exercise
> that reasoning freely without restraint.
> That's certainly not an exhaustive list, but it ought to get you started.
>It gets me started wondering how you get from this list to objectivist
>morality. What in this list would restrain somebody from unrestricted
>egoism?
Well, nothing. Objectivism advocates an egoist ethics. What do you mean by
"unrestricted" egoism? Unrestricted by what? If one does what is ACTUALLY in
his own best interests (as opposed to just acting as his whims dictate, which
I would claim isn't egoism) then it is necessarily restricted to things which
can be shown to actually be truly self-interest by a process of reason
(thus the more specific Objectivist advocacy "rational egoism" although I can't
think of what egoism could be if not rational).
>In particular, how do you justify limits from exercising
>reason to putting the results of that reason into action, given that
>the reasoning might be wrong?
I am not sure what you are getting at. Wouldn't it be arbitrary to assert
that the result of a reasoning process is wrong? Of course the application
of reason to some problem may well yeild the answer "I'm not sure.", but
I don't know what else you might be wondering about. Perhaps you are wondering
about the existence of error? Errors certainly happen, but that's no reason
to refrain from ever reaching a conclusion. To do so would be to grant undue
weight to arbitrary claims.
>Is there any limit in objectivist morality on what a person can do to
>save his life? Does it involve observations not in this list?
Yes, the things which ACTUALLY promote his life. The way you pose this
seems to imply that people would live better if they did certain bad things
to others (say, murdering and stealing). Did you mean to imply that?
> >PS Why do you capitalize "objectivism"? If it is a philosophy rather
> >than a religion, it should be uncapitalized. Or is this a tacit
> >admission?
> No, of course not. I am capitalizing it because I am refering to a specific
> philosophy (Rand's) rather than a less rigorous definition of the "school"
> which might imply more than that is I didn't capitalize.
>Are there any precedents for this usage? Would Peikoff's philosophy
>just be objectivism, or he is so well-aligned with Rand that what he
>expresses is also Objectivism?
Peikoff IS an Objectivist, although he also has had some ideas and insights
of his own which he has written about and spoken about. I don't think that
those are extensive enough to call "a philosophy", particularly since so
much of it is directly associated with Rand's philosophy, but if one did
decide to talk about "Peikoffianism" (more appropriately a description of
a few books than a complete philosophy) then I do think that it would be
proper to capitalize it. Don't you?
--Brian
Stephen Grossman
>making things difficult for oneself is the hallmark of ethics;
So you reject rational selfishness because it makes happiness possible? You
actually value difficulty as an end in itself?! You value pain, perhaps (I
manfully resist the obvious ad hominem, tho its struggling to get out)?
why do you like difficulties? why is "comfort" and happiness immoral? Will you
force others into difficult situations if they seek happiness? And will you
tell people not to seek life and happiness? Heil Hitler!
do you hate life or regard it as amoral? Is death your goal?
Do you have the intellectual courage to understand how Nazis would love your
"ethics" of difficulties? If life is evil, then, as Plato advised, learn to
die well. Or, at least, in style. Maybe you could go on a TV talk show and
reveal your hatred of happiness. Oprah or Phil would just love to talk to
you. THat would certainly be making things difficult for oneself.
KRESSJA
>In article <24AUG199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>, kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
>
>>making things difficult for oneself is the hallmark of ethics;
>So you reject rational selfishness because it makes happiness possible? You
>actually value difficulty as an end in itself?! You value pain, perhaps (I
>manfully resist the obvious ad hominem, tho its struggling to get out)?
Au contraire, O Grossman, I reject the pain/happiness distinction because it
is base. Nobility of spirit has simply nothing to do with petty utilitarian
scheming about this or that interest. Aristotle's eudaimonia comes closer to
the mark of virtue, but "happiness" it isn't.
>why do you like difficulties? why is "comfort" and happiness immoral? Will you
>force others into difficult situations if they seek happiness? And will you
>tell people not to seek life and happiness? Heil Hitler!
1. The overcoming of difficulties improves one.
2. Comfort and happiness are not immoral: they simply are not the ultimate moral
standard.
3. No; unlike Zeleny, I do not consider ethics to about universal moral goals.
4. No; each man must decide; it is YOU who claim that ALL people should live
by your standard, to which I object.
>do you hate life or regard it as amoral? Is death your goal?
No, I like life. Death is not my goal. I just feel that there is more to
life than the seeking of selfish happiness. (Note well: thinking that there
are more important things does not imply that I do not value happiness or
pleasure; I just don't consider them the only or highest standard.)
>Do you have the intellectual courage to understand how Nazis would love your
>"ethics" of difficulties? If life is evil, then, as Plato advised, learn to
>die well. Or, at least, in style. Maybe you could go on a TV talk show and
>reveal your hatred of happiness. Oprah or Phil would just love to talk to
>you. THat would certainly be making things difficult for oneself.>
Your ability to derive so much garbage from such a little statement may well
be your best (and only) talent.
Harley Davis
>I don't see what's strange about believing in determinism.
I guess that depends on what you mean by determinism. The Objectivist view
is probably better characterized as "causalism" (my term). The bugbear
here is the brand of determinism that claims that there is no such thing as
human choice. If that's not what you mean by determinism then we aren't
necessarily in disagreement.
Well, we certainly seem to choose. But it could be an illusion,
simply because we have no ability to see the future (and perhaps could
not have such an ability). However, this is not in contradiction with
determinism; there could be a God's-eye view which would reveal all of
our choices which is inaccessible to us. Even if such an oracle were
impossible, it wouldn't mean that we really have volition. But for
all practical purposes, we can certainly agree that there is volition.
Well, nothing. Objectivism advocates an egoist ethics. What do
you mean by "unrestricted" egoism? Unrestricted by what? If one
does what is ACTUALLY in his own best interests (as opposed to just
acting as his whims dictate, which I would claim isn't egoism) then
it is necessarily restricted to things which can be shown to
actually be truly self-interest by a process of reason (thus the
more specific Objectivist advocacy "rational egoism" although I
can't think of what egoism could be if not rational).
For example, what *is* the rational argument that stealing or
murdering is not in one's self-interest? There are lots of situations
where this is obvious; you could get caught, etc. But is there a line
of argument which proposes to conclude that murder and stealing are in
general against one's self interest?
>Is there any limit in objectivist morality on what a person can do to
>save his life? Does it involve observations not in this list?
Yes, the things which ACTUALLY promote his life. The way you pose this
seems to imply that people would live better if they did certain bad things
to others (say, murdering and stealing). Did you mean to imply that?
I didn't say promote one's life; I said save it. For example, there
is a famous case in the Talmud: If you are held prisoner with another
person, and your captors ask you to choose which will be killed, who
should you choose? Does the situation change if you have to kill the
other person personally? There are two of you in a desert, and there
is only enough water in the canteen to save one person. Who drinks
the water? Should you kill the other person to get the canteen? Is
there anything you just couldn't do in an extreme situation like this?
>Are there any precedents for this usage? Would Peikoff's philosophy
>just be objectivism, or he is so well-aligned with Rand that what he
>expresses is also Objectivism?
Peikoff IS an Objectivist, although he also has had some ideas and insights
of his own which he has written about and spoken about. I don't think that
those are extensive enough to call "a philosophy", particularly since so
much of it is directly associated with Rand's philosophy, but if one did
decide to talk about "Peikoffianism" (more appropriately a description of
a few books than a complete philosophy) then I do think that it would be
proper to capitalize it. Don't you?
Only because it has his name in it. Look, there is materialism,
idealism, pragmatism, logical positivism, etc. None of these are
capitalized. On the other hand, we have Aristotelian ethics,
Heideggerian existentialism, etc. The person's name is capitalized.
And if a word dervied from a person's name comes into common use, it
is no longer capitalized: platonic love, for example. Religions,
however, are systematically capitalized: Christianity, Hinduism,
Islam. Thus I conclude that objectivism, insofar as it is a
philosophy, should be uncapitalized. The fact that it is associated
primarily with a single person is irrelevent as long as that person's
name is not directly associated with the term naming the philosophy.
I would write Randian objectivism if there is a distinction to be made
between regular objectivism and some concepts near and dear only to
Ayn herself.
-- Harley Davis
Frank Casper
to Grossman...
|>
|> Your ability to derive so much garbage from such a little statement may well
|> be your best (and only) talent.
|>
|> -JK
Damn, this is perfect!
Luke M Kaven
To Yoder and Davis:
I found the discussion so far interesting. I thought it might be useful
if I made note of some recent trends in "Scientific Realism" and its
attendant "Moral Realism", as well as the issue of free will.
Richard Boyd at Cornell has been carefully laying out pieces of
Scientific and Moral Realism, as has been Nicholas Sturgeon. Of
particular note are essays by these two in a volume called
_Essays on Moral Realism_. See first Boyd's "How To Be A Moral Realist".
The moves are somewhat difficult to summarize, but I may be able to
characterize it. [Caveat: This is not intended as a synopsis of the
argument, but rather a characterization of some of its features.]
(1) Accept a version of the causal theory of reference. This theory
-- sometimes called "externalism" -- was argued by Hilary Putnam
in "The Meaning of Meaning".
Synopsis: There is a Twin Earth identical to ours where all water is
really XYZ instead of H2O. Transport me to Twin Earth, and all my
beliefs about water are now about Twin Water even though my mental
state is numerically identical to a corresponding situation on Real Earth
where I am really referring to H2O. Putnam concludes that intension does
not determine extension, and that meanings "ain't in the head".
A version of this has it that one can actually refer to
things if one stands in the appropriate causal relation to them, even if
one does not know all of the contingent facts about a given thing's identity
or properties. People have referred to water, for example, before there
was a chemical theory to describe it; there may be further discoveries
to be made about the structure of water. [This view is not totally
unassailable, but still retains its appeal to
its critics. Some (viz, Michael Devitt), argue for a combined
causal/descriptive theory of reference.]
(2) Use the causal theory of reference to argue against Thomas Kuhn's
claim of "semantic incommensurability" among competing "paradigms" in
scientific inquiry. This is a cornerstone of Kuhn's Social Constructivism.
In Kuhn's theory, there is no semantic basis to ground disputes about
claims made in competing paradigms. The causal theory of reference
(as an instance of naturalistic semantics), provides the promise of
such a basis in which to ground disputes about the meaning of terms
in competing paradigms.
Remember, Scientific Realists do not argue against paradigms, but rather
against the semantic incommensurability thesis. Kuhn's semantic claims
rest upon a form of Empiricist Semantics whereby scientific terms are
to be identified with observation sentences; this semantics is
incompatible with the causal theory of reference.
(3) Argue, by a clever set of moves, that one should accept a
non-Humean theory of causation. [See Sydney Shoemaker's
_Identity, Cause, and Mind_ for these arguments.] This theory
individuates entities by their causal powers. An entity's
"genuine properties" are monadic (viz, "is fragile") as opposed
to relational, or "mere Cambridge" properties (viz, "is 50 miles
south of a burning barn"), which are not genuine.
Argue further
that one is licenced to infer to the existence of unobservables in
virtue of the fact that one may stand in the appropriate causal relations
to an unobservable entity such that reference may be achieved.
(4) Argue that by the use of naturalistic epistemology, one can
tend toward better and better explanations up to an ideal limit.
This process is term "reflective equillibrium". Boyd does not
completely explain the semantics of his metaphors of thermodynamics,
but does suggest that there may be some deep relationship.
It is because of this claim that this theory is sometimes called
"Convergent Realism".
(5) And, it is also important to argue that the way that initial
scientific theories do not just begin with random claims, but somehow
hook into reality in such a way that convergence may succeed. We
might be wrong about the identity and contingent properties of
the entities we refer to in our theories, but somehow, in virtue of
being causally subject to genuine entities, our theories are better
than random. This part of the thesis is the part that I am currently
trying to understand better, so the present defense will not strike
most of you as satisfactory. Please excuse.
(note) There is a component in all of this of "Conceptual Analysis"
which comes from a tradition of G.E. Moore ("A Defence of Common Sense"),
Wittgenstein, and Malcolm. (Shoemaker was a pupil of Malcolm's.)
As this concerns Moral Realism:
Those value properties, such as "good" and "bad" are genuine properties
-- or families of properties. As such, they have genuine causal powers.
And, according to externalism, their identity and contingent properties
are a matter of empirical investigation.
Remember also, that these are meta-ethical claims. As far as which
ethical theory is correct, that is partly an empirical question which
Boyd does not try to answer. He does defend his meta-ethical claim in
the context of a "sample" ethical theory called "homeostatic
consequentialism". See "HTBAMR" for Boyd's statement.
Again, thanks for taking an interest in this fascinating area. If
I can be of any further exegetical service, please do not hesitate
to ask.
As for free will, might I recommend Carl Ginet's book _On Action_
(Cambridge University Press) as an excellent discussion of
compatibilism versus incompatibilism.
Regards, Luke M Kaven
Robert J. Kolker
way that Galileo did:
This is hard to say. The Greeks clearly knew about inclined planes. Look
at any book in ancient geometry. Consider the work of Archimedes. Of whom
speaking, if he (Archimedes) were not such a snob as to disdain practical
applications, he very well might had done what Galileo did. He did some of
what Newton did, to with develop the basis of calculus and limiting processes.
The Greeks knew about the mechnical uses of inclined planes if not by
their own efforts, then from the Egyptians for whom the inclined plane was
the main mechanism for lifting heavy stones.
Galileo's main breakthrough was the isolation of forces (gravitational from
frictional) and an understanding that motion per se, did not require a
push or a pull. Aristotle, who never played ice hockey, took the more
superficial and common sense view which clearly shows that things slow
down if you don't push. Galileo also realized, as Aristotle did not, that
motion is relative. That is one of the ways he defended the notion that we
would all get swept off the earth if it moved through space. On the other
hand Galileo did not have it all down right. Vide Galileo's theory of
tides. He explained tides as analogous to water sloshing about in bathtub
that was being moved this way and that.
KRESSJA
>Concerning Kress's question why the Greeks did not use inclined planes the
>way that Galileo did:
>
>This is hard to say. The Greeks clearly knew about inclined planes. Look
>at any book in ancient geometry. Consider the work of Archimedes. Of whom
>speaking, if he (Archimedes) were not such a snob as to disdain practical
>applications, he very well might had done what Galileo did. He did some of
>what Newton did, to with develop the basis of calculus and limiting processes.
I don't think that snobbery is the reason. This is another case in point:
the Greeks had a much different understanding of what practical applications
were. (Even so, this is the Archimedes who saved Syracuse by using polished
brass mirrors to set fire to enemy sails from a distance; sounds pretty
darn practical to me...;)
>The Greeks knew about the mechnical uses of inclined planes if not by
>their own efforts, then from the Egyptians for whom the inclined plane was
>the main mechanism for lifting heavy stones.
But even here, the Egyptians never began to philosophize concerning the
mathematics that they grasped, which is why they became very good at a
number of things, but the Greeks became expert in many.
>Galileo's main breakthrough was the isolation of forces (gravitational from
>frictional) and an understanding that motion per se, did not require a
>push or a pull. Aristotle, who never played ice hockey, took the more
>superficial and common sense view which clearly shows that things slow
>down if you don't push.
What interests me is what had to have happened in the realm of human
understanding of the world, before G. could conceive of matters in this way.
>Galileo also realized, as Aristotle did not, that
>motion is relative. That is one of the ways he defended the notion that we
>would all get swept off the earth if it moved through space. On the other
>hand Galileo did not have it all down right. Vide Galileo's theory of
>tides. He explained tides as analogous to water sloshing about in bathtub
>that was being moved this way and that.
Again, I hesitate to call it a realization: G. was able to conceive of things
in this way only by radically rethinking (or better, articulating what had
already implicitly occured in human thought) all the concepts involved. I
just can't keep hitting the point hard enough that when you look at a body,
you see something which makes sense to you only in terms of a framework of
meaning; A.'s framework and G.'s are utterly different.
-JK
"ever eager to enlighten and clarify"
______________________________________________________________________________
| | |
| John Kress | "Two things fill my mind with ever-increasing awe and wonder: |
| | The starry heavens above me, and the moral law within me." |
| | -Kant, Critique of Pure Reason |
|______________|_______________________________________________________________|
Gene C. Miller
Yes, although the "meanings" of perception may in some aspects be
hard-wired--cf. Oliver Sacks, _The Man Who Mistook His Wife For a Hat_ .
But, setting aside malfunctioning brains, how does A.'s notion of progress
compare to G.'s?...Gene
KRESSJA
>Yes, although the "meanings" of perception may in some aspects be
>hard-wired--cf. Oliver Sacks, _The Man Who Mistook His Wife For a Hat_ .
>But, setting aside malfunctioning brains, how does A.'s notion of progress
>compare to G.'s?...Gene
1. What do you mean by "hard-wired"?
2. I'm not sure what you are asking with respect Galileo vs. Aristotle.
-JK
"ever eager to enlighten and clarify"
______________________________________________________________________________
| | |
| John Kress | "Very well; I hear; I admit, but I have a voice, too, and for |
| | good or evil mine is the speech that cannot be silenced." |
| | -Conrad, Heart of Darkness |
|______________|_______________________________________________________________|
Gene C. Miller
kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) wrote:
>
> In article <sassociation...@gmiller.worldbank.org>, sassoc...@worldbank.org (Gene C. Miller) writes...
>
> >Yes, although the "meanings" of perception may in some aspects be
> >hard-wired--cf. Oliver Sacks, _The Man Who Mistook His Wife For a Hat_ .
> >But, setting aside malfunctioning brains, how does A.'s notion of progress
> >compare to G.'s?...Gene
>
> 1. What do you mean by "hard-wired"?
Sacks is a neurologist who writes thoughtful bits from his clinical
experiences with disordered brains. One of his more recent pieces was about
a surgeon who suffered from Gilles de la Tourette's syndrome, but who was,
astonishingly enough, tic-free in the operating room.
The gentleman in question had suffered a brain injury (I forget if it
was a stroke or what) that left him unable to distinguish between his
wife's face and his hat. He saw them both as being shapes, planes, solids,
colors, and so on, but was no longer able to connect them with the concepts
that we identify them by. The suggestion seems clear that damage to the
circuits, if we'll permit the metaphor for the moment, damaged his
conceptualizing abilities. He was able to see all the raw materials, as it
were, but was unable to integrate them into "face" or "wife's face" or
"glove." Nor was he able to relearn them. I hadn't before seen such a
dramatic demonstration of the biological basis for conceptualization.
> 2. I'm not sure what you are asking with respect Galileo vs. Aristotle.
After re-reading your post, I thought that perhaps you may have been simply
pointing up the contrast between them as a rhetorical device. But on the
substance, I suspect that G. will have differed from A. on his ideas of
nature and man, for starters. I am curious about whether or not the idea of
some sort of progress was part of any difference....Gene
KRESSJA
>In article <13SEP199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>,
>kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) wrote:
>>
>> In article <sassociation...@gmiller.worldbank.org>, sassoc...@worldbank.org (Gene C. Miller) writes...
>>
>> >Yes, although the "meanings" of perception may in some aspects be
>> >hard-wired--cf. Oliver Sacks, _The Man Who Mistook His Wife For a Hat_ .
>> >But, setting aside malfunctioning brains, how does A.'s notion of progress
>> >compare to G.'s?...Gene
>>
>> 1. What do you mean by "hard-wired"?
>
> Sacks is a neurologist who writes thoughtful bits from his clinical
>experiences with disordered brains. One of his more recent pieces was about
>a surgeon who suffered from Gilles de la Tourette's syndrome, but who was,
>astonishingly enough, tic-free in the operating room.
>
> The gentleman in question had suffered a brain injury (I forget if it
>was a stroke or what) that left him unable to distinguish between his
>wife's face and his hat. He saw them both as being shapes, planes, solids,
>colors, and so on, but was no longer able to connect them with the concepts
>that we identify them by. The suggestion seems clear that damage to the
>circuits, if we'll permit the metaphor for the moment, damaged his
>conceptualizing abilities. He was able to see all the raw materials, as it
>were, but was unable to integrate them into "face" or "wife's face" or
>"glove." Nor was he able to relearn them. I hadn't before seen such a
>dramatic demonstration of the biological basis for conceptualization.
I'm not certain that a necessary biological component is the same as a
basis. After all, I presume that this unfortunate gentleman still KNEW
the difference between his wife and his hat, but was not longer capable
of performing this conceptual classification, due to his physical inability
to process the sensory imput. Not even Descartes maintained that the mind
was independant of the brain. The issue is, whether or not the mind is
*merely* the brain...which is much more difficult to establish.
>> 2. I'm not sure what you are asking with respect Galileo vs. Aristotle.
>
>After re-reading your post, I thought that perhaps you may have been simply
>pointing up the contrast between them as a rhetorical device. But on the
>substance, I suspect that G. will have differed from A. on his ideas of
>nature and man, for starters. I am curious about whether or not the idea of
>some sort of progress was part of any difference....Gene
I wasn't making a rhetorical point: the difference is essential; but, yes,
I imagine that the did conceive of progress differently. I would expect
Aristotle to have conceived of progress as clarification, whereas Galileo
realized that Aristotelian conceptions of nature didn't need to clarified,
but rather supplanted, by the new science. Aristotle lacked a conception of
knowledge that would have allowed him to demand new ways of interpretation;
he usually corrects the excesses and shortcomings of his predecessors.
Gene C. Miller
kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) wrote:
>
>dramatic demonstration of the biological basis for conceptualization.
>
> I'm not certain that a necessary biological component is the same as a
> basis. After all, I presume that this unfortunate gentleman still KNEW
> the difference between his wife and his hat, but was not longer capable
> of performing this conceptual classification, due to his physical inability
> to process the sensory imput. Not even Descartes maintained that the mind
> was independant of the brain. The issue is, whether or not the mind is
> *merely* the brain...which is much more difficult to establish.
Yes, quite. I realized after I posted that I was confusing the question of
the locus of conceptualizing with the question of its origins and its
composition.
> >> 2. I'm not sure what you are asking with respect Galileo vs. Aristotle.
> >
> >After re-reading your post, I thought that perhaps you may have been simply
> >pointing up the contrast between them as a rhetorical device. But on the
> >substance, I suspect that G. will have differed from A. on his ideas of
> >nature and man, for starters. I am curious about whether or not the idea of
> >some sort of progress was part of any difference....Gene
>
> I wasn't making a rhetorical point: the difference is essential; but, yes,
> I imagine that the did conceive of progress differently. I would expect
> Aristotle to have conceived of progress as clarification, whereas Galileo
> realized that Aristotelian conceptions of nature didn't need to clarified,
> but rather supplanted, by the new science. Aristotle lacked a conception of
> knowledge that would have allowed him to demand new ways of interpretation;
> he usually corrects the excesses and shortcomings of his predecessors.
>
I get really impatient sometimes because my knowledge of Aristotle
and Plato and, for that matter, Galileo, has so many gaps. Anyway, part of
my understanding of Aristotle is that he rejected Plato's metaphysical
approach to chairs in favor of the chairs that he could sit on, so to
speak. And, based on motion, he arrived at the notion of the Prime Mover,
whereas Plato arrived somewhere else. Yet you say that Aristotle's
conception of knowledge could not allow him to demand new ways of
interpretation. So I'm confused.
Can we distinguish the key points in Galileo's outlook that
permitted him to dare to supplant Aristotle? How significant is Xtianity in
providing a context (aside from its, shall we say, prosecutorial
approach)?...Gene
KRESSJA
>> I imagine that the did conceive of progress differently. I would expect
>> Aristotle to have conceived of progress as clarification, whereas Galileo
>> realized that Aristotelian conceptions of nature didn't need to clarified,
>> but rather supplanted, by the new science. Aristotle lacked a conception of
>> knowledge that would have allowed him to demand new ways of interpretation;
>> he usually corrects the excesses and shortcomings of his predecessors.
> I get really impatient sometimes because my knowledge of Aristotle
>and Plato and, for that matter, Galileo, has so many gaps. Anyway, part of
>my understanding of Aristotle is that he rejected Plato's metaphysical
>approach to chairs in favor of the chairs that he could sit on, so to
>speak. And, based on motion, he arrived at the notion of the Prime Mover,
>whereas Plato arrived somewhere else. Yet you say that Aristotle's
>conception of knowledge could not allow him to demand new ways of
>interpretation. So I'm confused.
All I mean to say about that is that Aristotle tends to view the work of
his predecessors as incomplete and fragmentary. He lacked the context of
a well-established competing theory which he needed to overturn, such as
his own would become for Galilieo. Aristotle certainly does place
epistemological primacy on individual entities, as opposed to their form.
> Can we distinguish the key points in Galileo's outlook that
>permitted him to dare to supplant Aristotle? How significant is Xtianity in
>providing a context (aside from its, shall we say, prosecutorial
>approach)?...Gene
I would say that Xianity is quite significant. The notions of heaven and
earth had changed somewhat, such that both could be considered a creations,
as opposed to divine in themselves. The Xian notion of everything as
created places heavenly things and earthly things in unitary class, collapsing
the Greek contradistinction. Aristotle's empiricism was challenged by
Gilileo, although not in the manner of Plato; Galilieo begins not by looking
at entities, but by conceptualizing how they would ideally behave, and THEN
experimenting to test this conception. This is what is really new in
Galileo...
That's off the top of my head, anyway...
Gene C. Miller
kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) wrote:
> > Can we distinguish the key points in Galileo's outlook that
> >permitted him to dare to supplant Aristotle? How significant is Xtianity in
> >providing a context (aside from its, shall we say, prosecutorial
> >approach)?...Gene
>
> I would say that Xianity is quite significant. The notions of heaven and
> earth had changed somewhat, such that both could be considered a creations,
> as opposed to divine in themselves. The Xian notion of everything as
> created places heavenly things and earthly things in unitary class, collapsing
> the Greek contradistinction. Aristotle's empiricism was challenged by
> Gilileo, although not in the manner of Plato; Galilieo begins not by looking
> at entities, but by conceptualizing how they would ideally behave, and THEN
> experimenting to test this conception. This is what is really new in
> Galileo...
It would seem so. If one believes that the rocks and trees partake in
the realm of the sacred, one may be less inclined to cut them open to see
what they are made of. And certainly, Xtianity revalued man in the world by
having as tenets the notions that man alone was created in the divine image
and that he was to have dominion over the rest of the creation.
On the other hand, all the raw materials for the pendulum had been
lying about for centuries, waiting for Galileo. Was it something in the
pasta that made him do it? Or was it the olive oil? Thanks again...Gene
KRESSJA
>the realm of the sacred, one may be less inclined to cut them open to see
>what they are made of. And certainly, Xtianity revalued man in the world by
>having as tenets the notions that man alone was created in the divine image
>and that he was to have dominion over the rest of the creation.
>
> On the other hand, all the raw materials for the pendulum had been
>lying about for centuries, waiting for Galileo. Was it something in the
>pasta that made him do it? Or was it the olive oil? Thanks again...Gene
My God! Do you realize that yours is the only non-Zeleny related post!?
AAAAAAAAAAARRRRRRRRRRRRRGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH!
But at least there's one "uninfected" thread...
Anyway, re: pendulum, it's difficult to say. I would suppose that it has to
do with Greek conceptions of motion as an intrinsic property of types of
bodies, such that studying motion in terms of force would have made little
sense.
-JK
"ever eager to enlighten and clarify"
______________________________________________________________________________
| | |
| John Kress | "Philosophy, as I have so far understood and lived it, means |
| | living voluntarily among ice and high mountains--seeking out |
| | everything strange and questionable in existence..." |
| | -Nietzsche, Ecce Homo |
|______________|_______________________________________________________________|
Gene C. Miller
kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) wrote:
>
> My God! Do you realize that yours is the only non-Zeleny related post!?
> AAAAAAAAAAARRRRRRRRRRRRRGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH!
>
Sorry, I've always been a little out of step with the times. Rediscovered
my copies of Science in the Modern World (A.N.W.) and The Idea of Nature
(Collingwood) to keep me occupied for a bit. What else would you
recommend?...Gene
Kermit Rose
> In article <sassociation...@gmiller.worldbank.org>, sassoc...@worldbank.org (Gene C. Miller) writes...
> >
> > Sacks is a neurologist who writes thoughtful bits from his clinical
> >experiences with disordered brains. One of his more recent pieces was about
> >a surgeon who suffered from Gilles de la Tourette's syndrome, but who was,
> >astonishingly enough, tic-free in the operating room.
> >
> > The gentleman in question had suffered a brain injury (I forget if it
> >was a stroke or what) that left him unable to distinguish between his
> >wife's face and his hat. He saw them both as being shapes, planes, solids,
> >colors, and so on, but was no longer able to connect them with the concepts
> >that we identify them by. The suggestion seems clear that damage to the
> >circuits, if we'll permit the metaphor for the moment, damaged his
> >conceptualizing abilities. He was able to see all the raw materials, as it
> >were, but was unable to integrate them into "face" or "wife's face" or
> >"glove." Nor was he able to relearn them. I hadn't before seen such a
> >dramatic demonstration of the biological basis for conceptualization.
>
> I'm not certain that a necessary biological component is the same as a
> basis. After all, I presume that this unfortunate gentleman still KNEW
> the difference between his wife and his hat, but was not longer capable
> of performing this conceptual classification, due to his physical inability
> to process the sensory imput. Not even Descartes maintained that the mind
> was independant of the brain. The issue is, whether or not the mind is
> *merely* the brain...which is much more difficult to establish.
How could the mind be more than the functioning of the body?
ro...@fsu1.cc.fsu.edu To be sure I see your response, use e-mail.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
You may post, repost, or publish ANY communication received from me.
male female common neuter
nomitive he she sie it
genitive his her hir its
objective him her hym it
Kermit Rose
> In article <14SEP199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>,
> kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) wrote:
> >
> >dramatic demonstration of the biological basis for conceptualization.
> >
> > I'm not certain that a necessary biological component is the same as a
> > basis. After all, I presume that this unfortunate gentleman still KNEW
> > the difference between his wife and his hat, but was not longer capable
> > of performing this conceptual classification, due to his physical inability
> > to process the sensory imput. Not even Descartes maintained that the mind
> > was independant of the brain. The issue is, whether or not the mind is
> > *merely* the brain...which is much more difficult to establish.
>
> Yes, quite. I realized after I posted that I was confusing the question of
> the locus of conceptualizing with the question of its origins and its
> composition.
>
It seems to me that the locus of conceptualizing IS its origin and composition.
Gene C. Miller
Rose) wrote:
>
> In <sassociation...@gmiller.worldbank.org> sassoc...@worldbank.org writes:
>
> > In article <14SEP199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>,
> > kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) wrote:
> > >
> > >dramatic demonstration of the biological basis for conceptualization.
> > >
> > > I'm not certain that a necessary biological component is the same as a
> > > basis. After all, I presume that this unfortunate gentleman still KNEW
> > > the difference between his wife and his hat, but was not longer capable
> > > of performing this conceptual classification, due to his physical inability
> > > to process the sensory imput. Not even Descartes maintained that the mind
> > > was independant of the brain. The issue is, whether or not the mind is
> > > *merely* the brain...which is much more difficult to establish.
> >
> > Yes, quite. I realized after I posted that I was confusing the question of
> > the locus of conceptualizing with the question of its origins and its
> > composition.
> >
>
> It seems to me that the locus of conceptualizing IS its origin and composition.
Well, maybe I didn't write that very well. I was trying to distinguishing
in gross terms between the place (anatomically speaking) certain concepts
are created and stored--which is what Sacks was writing about--versus how
we acquire concepts and what makes them up. A related question could well
be the extent to which the shape of the box determines the shape of the
concept. But it doesn't seem helpful to me in this particular instance to
think about the origins of my concept of nature by referring to the
particular part of the brain where my concept of nature seems to be
stored...Gene
KRESSJA
No complaint with you, Gene. Rather the scream was that Zeleny is
everywhere else. It's good that at least one thread is not centered
around M.Z.
KRESSJA
>
>How could the mind be more than the functioning of the body?
A very old tradition maintains that the human being is a devided being,
possessing a body and a soul. The soul thought in philosophy loses its
religious dimensions and becomes the subject, or the mind.
In general, the mind is thought of as the locus of volition, i.e. human
freedom, whereas the body is thought to be determined--indeed, often
determined by the mind. If I choose to kick my leg, what is the difference
from a reflex? Both are functions of the body. But the difference of my
decision, and the status of the 'I' that decided are what needs to be
addressed. This is often called the mind.
With a more specific or detailed question, I could answer better, but this
at least the general history of the question.
-JK
> male female common neuter
>nomitive he she sie it
>genitive his her hir its
>objective him her hym it
P.S. What is this? ^^^^^^
Where are these words derived?