Reconstruction in philosophy
Michael Greer
It has come to my attention lately that we have some vigorous
discussion at this site which is basically headed in the wrong
direction for lack of training and due preparation. I will now rememdy
this confusion by performing a surgical intervention. This
intervention will constitute a "reconstruction" of philosophy as it is
now practiced at this Internet site. By reconstruction I mean that all
philosophical puzzles can be expressed in ordinary language and until
they are so expressed I cannot help the "philosopher" who expresses
himself "philosophically." Philosophy is in error whenever the common
sense core of philosophy is not appreciated. In order to retake the
common sense core of philosophy we will need to develop an appropriate
ontology: an account of what is and of what it means to speak of what
is real.
Anyone who considers the task at hand will first have to acknowledge
our esteemed predecessors: the Cambridge School of Analysis and the
Vienna Circle. This is not to say that both camps didn't make
mistakes, because they did. In fact I watched many of them fumble the
ball, so to speak. At least we were protected by the coffee house
atmosphere, so common in Eastern European locales.
Anyone who proceeds to do philosophy today must encounter (a.) Hume's
account of causality and induction; (b.) insist on the tautological
nature of logical truths; (c.) see philosophy itself as a form of
logical analysis; and (d.) and reject "metaphysics" as
"unintelligible" at least in the traditional forms of
realism, idealism, and phenomenalism. Much of this wisdom grows out of
the work of Wittgenstein in the early work, the Tractatus. Call it the
"linguistic turn."
What happened at Cambridge that we should still speak of it? A
revolution was underway at Cambridge when W. arrived there. It came in
the form of G. E. Moore's defense of common sense against a tide of
badly written Hegelianism.
Moore's temper was logical, analytical, commonsensical. The importance
of Moore can be seen in his resistence to the effort to prove
"metaphysical" theses. We don't do metaphysics. Metaphysics is usually
bad philosophy, caused by a misunderstanding of language. Moore saw
the business of philosophy to be what it means to say "lions exist"
and "tables are real." Not to doubt these simple truths but to give an
account of what it means to say such things.
IN Vienna the turn to language became ruthless in its Puritanism. This
is typical of the Germanic temper. Philosophy just was another way of
doing positive science. Instead of dealing with philosophy on its own
terms, the Vienna thinkers wished to do science as philosophy. This is
why we see so much of a positivist tone in their work. Instead of
propounding philosophical theses, the Vienna thinkers were interested
in doing a form of the methodology of science, the philosophy of
science.
Now, how can we do "reconstruction" in philosophy? We must first
define the form of our language. I hold that to do philosophy properly
we need an ideal language, a purely logical language. This should be
obvious. Anyone else will be doing linguistics. I am not now doing
linguistics, though I am writing in language about language. I am an
empiricist. I hold that all thinking must begin with what we first are
aware of: that which comes through the senses. There is a handy
grammatical model for this kind of empiricism: it's called the
principle of acquaintance. We know many things, or at least claim to.
But how do we know that we know? Because we have direct sensory
experience of them. But beyond the particulars of experience, language
also yields its own power: these are the grammatical particles. The
simples. The ideal language of philosophy must be formal, complete, at
it must resolve all the nonsense that has traditionally been labelled
philosophy: phenomenalism, realism, and idealism.
We have the schema and the empiricist temper in place. What do we do?
We salvage from traditional philosophy what can be salvaged and we
dump the rest.
Let's take the verb "to be." This little word has caused so many
problems in philosophy. In the ideal language we can provide four
different transcriptions: the be of predication, the be of class
inclusion, the be of existential clause, and the be of identity. Let
me spell out how "be" is analogically spoken/written.
"Mr. Bachynski is a man." This is the is-of predication.
"Mr. Bachynski is a pseudo-philosopher." This is the is-class
inclusion.
"Mr. Bachynski is the son of that dog." This is the is-identity.
"There is someone who is called Mr. Bachynski and that thing rarely
makes sense." This is existential is.
Now the rule in the ideal language is that an existential clause
joined to a constant makes grammatical nonsense is plainly evident.
This way we avoid "metaphysical realism" a nonsense position.
Michael Greer
Madonna
In other words.........
Be like me.
Josh Bachynski
> account of causality and induction; (b.) insist on the tautological
> nature of logical truths; (c.) see philosophy itself as a form of
> logical analysis; and (d.) and reject "metaphysics" as
> "unintelligible" at least in the traditional forms of
> realism, idealism, and phenomenalism. Much of this wisdom grows out of
> the work of Wittgenstein in the early work, the Tractatus. Call it the
> "linguistic turn."
To know what 'good' things have come about recently or what terrible
mistakes we've had to suffer through recently? Just curious.
> Metaphysics is usually
> bad philosophy, caused by a misunderstanding of language. Moore saw
> the business of philosophy to be what it means to say "lions exist"
> and "tables are real." Not to doubt these simple truths but to give an
> account of what it means to say such things.
Can you give me an example of the 'bad' metaphysics and the 'good'
metaphysics?
> IN Vienna the turn to language became ruthless in its Puritanism. This
> is typical of the Germanic temper. Philosophy just was another way of
> doing positive science. Instead of dealing with philosophy on its own
> terms, the Vienna thinkers wished to do science as philosophy. This is
> why we see so much of a positivist tone in their work. Instead of
> propounding philosophical theses, the Vienna thinkers were interested
> in doing a form of the methodology of science, the philosophy of
> science.
This is due to Neitzsche and Heidigger I'd think. What about you?
> principle of acquaintance. We know many things, or at least claim to.
> But how do we know that we know? Because we have direct sensory
> experience of them.
You are kidding right? Mr. Greer, I would expect some others here to
make this mistake... but not you. You are being facetious here right?
> But beyond the particulars of experience, language
> also yields its own power: these are the grammatical particles. The
> simples. The ideal language of philosophy must be formal, complete, at
> it must resolve all the nonsense that has traditionally been labelled
> philosophy: phenomenalism, realism, and idealism.
I also imagine you are going to quickly show how these 3 things are so
totally wrong?
> "Mr. Bachynski is a man." This is the is-of predication.
True!
> "Mr. Bachynski is a pseudo-philosopher." This is the is-class
> inclusion.
Uhh... if 'pseudo' means 'becoming' then true! (See, you *are* doing
metaphysics ;)
> "Mr. Bachynski is the son of that dog." This is the is-identity.
False.
> "There is someone who is called Mr. Bachynski and that thing rarely
> makes sense." This is existential is.
Tru-flooey!
> Now the rule in the ideal language is that an existential clause
> joined to a constant makes grammatical nonsense is plainly evident.
> This way we avoid "metaphysical realism" a nonsense position.
Isn't that a rule in any language that makes sense? Why do you need an
ideal language? Why don't you just grab Frege's Concept Script and go
to work?
Oh yes, and when are you going to stuff your strawman with straw?
josh
Michael Greer
> gilwo...@hotmail.com (Michael Greer) wrote in message
> > Anyone who proceeds to do philosophy today must encounter (a.) Hume's
> > account of causality and induction; (b.) insist on the tautological
> > nature of logical truths; (c.) see philosophy itself as a form of
> > logical analysis; and (d.) and reject "metaphysics" as
> > "unintelligible" at least in the traditional forms of
> > realism, idealism, and phenomenalism. Much of this wisdom grows out of
> > the work of Wittgenstein in the early work, the Tractatus. Call it the
> > "linguistic turn."
>
> To know what 'good' things have come about recently or what terrible
> mistakes we've had to suffer through recently? Just curious.
Reconstruction in philosophy cuts both ways. We can now do philosophy
for the first time, because now we have an adequate language to work
with, one that Wittgenstein provides us with. This is "bad" only in
the sense that those who are familiar with doing philosophy in one way
will have to change once they see that their way of proceeding is
flawed. This holds for all the traditional forms of realism,
phenomenalism, and idealism.
> > Metaphysics is usually
> > bad philosophy, caused by a misunderstanding of language. Moore saw
> > the business of philosophy to be what it means to say "lions exist"
> > and "tables are real." Not to doubt these simple truths but to give an
> > account of what it means to say such things.
>
> Can you give me an example of the 'bad' metaphysics and the 'good'
> metaphysics?
Good metaphysics: This is a green dot. Bad metaphysics: Tables exist.
> > IN Vienna the turn to language became ruthless in its Puritanism. This
> > is typical of the Germanic temper. Philosophy just was another way of
> > doing positive science. Instead of dealing with philosophy on its own
> > terms, the Vienna thinkers wished to do science as philosophy. This is
> > why we see so much of a positivist tone in their work. Instead of
> > propounding philosophical theses, the Vienna thinkers were interested
> > in doing a form of the methodology of science, the philosophy of
> > science.
>
> This is due to Neitzsche and Heidigger I'd think. What about you?
Well, you might read Carnap's refutation of Heidegger's work that way.
> > principle of acquaintance. We know many things, or at least claim to.
> > But how do we know that we know? Because we have direct sensory
> > experience of them.
>
> You are kidding right? Mr. Greer, I would expect some others here to
> make this mistake... but not you. You are being facetious here right?
One question: are there sense data or no?
> > But beyond the particulars of experience, language
> > also yields its own power: these are the grammatical particles. The
> > simples. The ideal language of philosophy must be formal, complete, at
> > it must resolve all the nonsense that has traditionally been labelled
> > philosophy: phenomenalism, realism, and idealism.
>
> I also imagine you are going to quickly show how these 3 things are so
> totally wrong?
>
> > "Mr. Bachynski is a man." This is the is-of predication.
>
> True!
>
> > "Mr. Bachynski is a pseudo-philosopher." This is the is-class
> > inclusion.
>
> Uhh... if 'pseudo' means 'becoming' then true! (See, you *are* doing
> metaphysics ;)
No, pseudo here means poseur.
> > "Mr. Bachynski is the son of that dog." This is the is-identity.
>
> False.
>
> > "There is someone who is called Mr. Bachynski and that thing rarely
> > makes sense." This is existential is.
>
> Tru-flooey!
>
> > Now the rule in the ideal language is that an existential clause
> > joined to a constant makes grammatical nonsense is plainly evident.
> > This way we avoid "metaphysical realism" a nonsense position.
>
> Isn't that a rule in any language that makes sense? Why do you need an
> ideal language? Why don't you just grab Frege's Concept Script and go
> to work?
I have to lay it out for the novices first.
> Oh yes, and when are you going to stuff your strawman with straw?
There is more than enough straw here.
Michael Greer
Madonna
Be like me, be like me, be like me!
John Jones
the use of the ideal logical language see all other approaches 'vanish'. A
logical analysis is a vanishing trick.
Offhand like.
JJ
Michael Greer <gilwo...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:fb14c691.0203...@posting.google.com...
Michael Greer
> An ideal language, and a 'logical' language.. as opposed to what? Or does
> the use of the ideal logical language see all other approaches 'vanish'. A
> logical analysis is a vanishing trick.
> Offhand like.
>
> JJ
Mr. JJ, I will make this short, sweet: ideal, logical language as opposed to
ordinary language.
Michael Greer
Michael Greer
***************** Mr. Madonna writes:
> In other words.........
>
> Be like me.
Well, this is unfair. First, it assumes a generally cynical motivation
to someone you don't know and can't know. Second, it begs the
question: it would be better to be like me on these matters. Third, it
exemplifies a generalized malevolence, common in these times. I will
treat each in turn.
1. Why do people asssume cynical motivations on the part of others?
This is true when they themselves have little to offer. Having little
to offer they look around and they ask themselves this question, a
question which Mr. Nowells has had to confront recently, "Why can't I
offer anything but a pooper scooper?"
Realizing that life behind the scooper is undesirable, but also
realizing that no other life is possible for them, they then demand
that those who do offer something are really just putting on a show
for attention because there is no genuine reason for anyone to really
do or offer anything. If we may, for a moment, go back into the
species pre-history, the woman was waiting for the male to do his
killing and the male was out doing his killing and more than happy to
return to his female. This is the story of homo erectus. Please excuse
my language. Now, a woman might wait and then again she might wait.
But a killer can't wait. He must act. People who wait and people who
act can't do philosophy. They don't have time. They also can't imagine
anyone else doing these things.
2. It is possible that some people have made better choices than
others. Mr. Madonna and Mr. Nowells have made bad choices in their
posts. They choose to write about dog crap and about influence.
Neither activity, picking up dog crap or exerting influence is
possible on the Internet. Therefore, both of them are "resident
aliens" so to speak. Having nothing to do, since crap is waiting
elsewhere and having no chance at influence, since it lies elsewhere,
there is basically a case of not setting the right example.
3. People are angry. People have very small lives. I understand this.
This is what happens in a democracy. Most people are angry in a
democracy. Most people know they want more than any democracy can give
them. People want influence, but influence is always checked in a
democracy. People want to clean up the crap in their neighborhoods,
but democracy affords few opportunities. People are angry. Mr. Madonna
is angry. Mr. Nowells is out picking up dog crap. The world continues
on its way. And so it goes.
Michael Greer
Josh Bachynski
> > Can you give me an example of the 'bad' metaphysics and the 'good'
> > metaphysics?
>
> Good metaphysics: This is a green dot. Bad metaphysics: Tables exist.
isn't 'metaphysics' that which is beyond the physical? How can a green
dot be beyond the physical? I guess you are stating a) there really is
no good metaphysics, or b) metaphysics is all in our head (like
color).
Please clarify.
> > You are kidding right? Mr. Greer, I would expect some others here to
> > make this mistake... but not you. You are being facetious here right?
>
> One question: are there sense data or no?
What is a 'sense data'? Do you mean do people sense things? Most
likely. Do I personally sense things - even more likely. What are you
getting at?
josh
Michael Greer
********************************(snip)
> isn't 'metaphysics' that which is beyond the physical? How can a green
> dot be beyond the physical? I guess you are stating a) there really is
> no good metaphysics, or b) metaphysics is all in our head (like
> color).
No. Metaphysics, according to the Greek term, means, as you write,
"beyond the physics." Beyond here has two senses: after the physics
and transcending the physical. Literally, the metaphysics as a course
of lectures came after the exploration of the four causes in the
physical world. Figurately, it means all those investigations which
take place of things beyond the natural world. Consider a green dot.
Such an experience may be given to any of us. Green dots are given in
an ineffable manner, while we may debate the existence, badly, of the
tables and chairs about us. Call that the "Phenomenalist Headache."
Now, if a green dot is given we know two things about what is: an
instance of something and green. An instance of something is a
particular. Green is a universal. Therefore, there are two things in
reality: particulars and universals.
****************************************(snip)
> What is a 'sense data'? Do you mean do people sense things? Most
> likely. Do I personally sense things - even more likely. What are you
> getting at?
What is this "stuff" that we sense? This is the classical problem of
epistemology--getting from sensory input to the world of experience.
Some have called it "sense data." Is there such stuff or no?
Michael Greer
Josh Bachynski
> > dot be beyond the physical? I guess you are stating a) there really is
> > no good metaphysics, or b) metaphysics is all in our head (like
> > color).
>
> No. Metaphysics, according to the Greek term, means, as you write,
> "beyond the physics." Beyond here has two senses: after the physics
> and transcending the physical. Literally, the metaphysics as a course
> of lectures came after the exploration of the four causes in the
> physical world. Figurately, it means all those investigations which
> take place of things beyond the natural world. Consider a green dot.
> Such an experience may be given to any of us. Green dots are given in
> an ineffable manner, while we may debate the existence, badly, of the
> tables and chairs about us. Call that the "Phenomenalist Headache."
> Now, if a green dot is given we know two things about what is: an
> instance of something and green. An instance of something is a
> particular. Green is a universal. Therefore, there are two things in
> reality: particulars and universals.
The color or concept 'green-ness' is that what you are referring to
when you say it is universal? Are you referring to Plato's Form of
Green?
How can we have a universal of something that does not exist in the
universe? Green is not in the thing we see, it is in our head. Unless,
you are referring to the wave length frequency of light that I 'read'
or 'interpret' as green in my head. Which one do you mean?
> > What is a 'sense data'? Do you mean do people sense things? Most
> > likely. Do I personally sense things - even more likely. What are you
> > getting at?
>
> What is this "stuff" that we sense? This is the classical problem of
> epistemology--getting from sensory input to the world of experience.
> Some have called it "sense data." Is there such stuff or no?
Hobbes said it best - we sense the quallities of objects. It doesn't
really matter exactly what it is that we sense, because we can never
really know what that is. Our sensory organs and the processes of mind
which deal with this information is liable to err - therefore, we can
never be certain about the knowledge we derive from our senses. Not to
mention that we can be certain that our sense don't tell us absolutely
everything about the object either - only limmited things in uncertain
ways.
If the impressions (used loosely - not actual physical impressions)
left upon my consciousness by the physical things I sense you want to
call 'sense data' then ok.
josh
Michael Greer
> The color or concept 'green-ness' is that what you are referring to
> when you say it is universal? Are you referring to Plato's Form of
> Green?
Color is one thing, concept another. You must be careful to avoid any
form of psychologism. I don't traffic with psychology, especially on
these matters.
Color may be taken on the empiricist interpretation as "wave length."
I don't take it that way. Therefore, my intention is to claim that
"green" is a form, a universal. This universal is part of the
furniture of the world. Aristotle would deny this, unless you include
the account of subject-predication as analogous.
> How can we have a universal of something that does not exist in the
> universe? Green is not in the thing we see, it is in our head. Unless,
> you are referring to the wave length frequency of light that I 'read'
> or 'interpret' as green in my head. Which one do you mean?
Now, this claim you've made right here: "Green is not in the thing we
see, it is in our head." is tied to the Lockean turn toward the
subject. In fact, it's the fatal mistake of all modern philosophy. "In
the head." Very, very damaging.
And then you went for "wave-length," another mistake. I am trying to
get around the entire "turn to the subject of perception" model. I may
be able to do it
dialectially.
> Hobbes said it best - we sense the quallities of objects. It doesn't
> really matter exactly what it is that we sense, because we can never
> really know what that is. Our sensory organs and the processes of mind
> which deal with this information is liable to err - therefore, we can
> never be certain about the knowledge we derive from our senses. Not to
> mention that we can be certain that our sense don't tell us absolutely
> everything about the object either - only limmited things in uncertain
> ways.
Another mistake. The reports of the senses are never wrong. ONLY our
judgments can be mistaken. This is why Descartes located "will" as the
source of error.
Are the qualities of things "in" them or only in the "relationship" we
have with them? This is an important question. It leads to materialism
eventually.
Michael Greer
Josh Bachynski
> > when you say it is universal? Are you referring to Plato's Form of
> > Green?
>
> Color is one thing, concept another. You must be careful to avoid any
> form of psychologism. I don't traffic with psychology, especially on
> these matters.
> Color may be taken on the empiricist interpretation as "wave length."
> I don't take it that way. Therefore, my intention is to claim that
> "green" is a form, a universal. This universal is part of the
> furniture of the world. Aristotle would deny this, unless you include
> the account of subject-predication as analogous.
But 'green' is not a universal. It is a perception within my mind. In
Plato's line, it should exist in the realm of imagination. My 'green'
is not your 'green'. True the same frequency of light flows into our
eyes, but each of our sensory apparati (sp) renders that frequency
differently. Some people's sensory apparati are great at rendering
that wave length, and can do so with incredible variation of tone and
depth, some are not so good (like me - I'm green-red colorblind), some
are totally inadequte at reading green (they are totally colorblind
like some animals, or they are totally blind period).
For those beings 'green' as a color does not exist. It is not an
eternal form, only an 'imagination'.
Either way, I think I get what you mean. Right now, we are just
disagreeing on your example of color, some other universal things
(like the good, perfection, Equality, justice, God, principle of
self-contradiction, etc) we might agree on and then move on. Yes?
> > How can we have a universal of something that does not exist in the
> > universe? Green is not in the thing we see, it is in our head. Unless,
> > you are referring to the wave length frequency of light that I 'read'
> > or 'interpret' as green in my head. Which one do you mean?
>
> Now, this claim you've made right here: "Green is not in the thing we
> see, it is in our head." is tied to the Lockean turn toward the
> subject.
If you say so - I've never read Locke.
> In fact, it's the fatal mistake of all modern philosophy. "In
> the head." Very, very damaging.
I'm fairly cognisscant (sp) of the problems in modern philo and I
don't see how I'm making any mistakes that way. I'm certainly open to
your interpretation however.
> And then you went for "wave-length," another mistake. I am trying to
> get around the entire "turn to the subject of perception" model. I may
> be able to do it
> dialectially.
>
You know that's what I likes ;)
> > Hobbes said it best - we sense the quallities of objects. It doesn't
> > really matter exactly what it is that we sense, because we can never
> > really know what that is. Our sensory organs and the processes of mind
> > which deal with this information is liable to err - therefore, we can
> > never be certain about the knowledge we derive from our senses. Not to
> > mention that we can be certain that our sense don't tell us absolutely
> > everything about the object either - only limmited things in uncertain
> > ways.
>
> Another mistake. The reports of the senses are never wrong.
I'd say 'Yes they are' but that would be wrong. However, saying 'they
are not' is also wrong. The correct answer is: because we have
absolutely no way of verifying our sensory perceptions with anything
deductively certain, the knowledge derived from ALL sensory perception
must be considered 'probable', as sensory perceptions must be subject
to possible error.
Truth is we can never really 'know' (have entire 100% certainty) if
our sensory input is accurate or not as there is no way to verify with
certainty if it is faulty or not.
> ONLY our
> judgments can be mistaken. This is why Descartes located "will" as the
> source of error.
That can fail as well. Descartes was partly right, and partly wrong.
Augustine in Contra-Academicos shows this clearly.
> Are the qualities of things "in" them or only in the "relationship" we
> have with them? This is an important question. It leads to materialism
> eventually.
Why do I feel like Polemarhcus about to be setup? Truthfully, I'm not
sure I'd put it in those terms. I guess I'd choose 'relationship' and
add that the 'qualities' that we observe from objects is an effect
from that object in which that object was only a sufficient cause.
There are many other possible causes which combine concomitantly, or
not, to produce said effect. It is the relationship our sensory
apparati have with the object in and effected by the world, and then
our sensory apparati have with our consciousness (perceiving thinking
part).
It seems to me, in most cases, we are actually sensing the external
quallities of these objects as mediated by particles which originate
from another source (light waves, sound waves). Now in the case of
touch, and olfactory senses, again we are only sensing external
quallities, the particles that the object is shedding, and then we
detect how quickly those particles are vibrating (heat / cold). Etc.
Long story short is, my argument is that our senses cannot be known to
be faulty or not (as we have no sure way to verify it - they could be
dead on, they could be right out - but probably inbetween somewhere),
but they CAN be known to be limmited. For example, I cannot look at an
object and tell you the exact number and type of atoms that it
consisted of that instant I looked at it by some cosmic awareness.
This is more or less what I'm getting at. I appologise to any
physicists in the audience if I have done violence to any physical
theories.
It seems to me where you and I differ most is on Augustine - The
Confessions and Contra-Academicos. Perhaps we should just avoid all
the preamble and get to critiquing each other's understandings of
those arguments as that, I suspect, would show us both a) where we may
differ and b) where we both may be wrong or right.
josh
ursus major
Here is the problem I am having, and it is related to my mode of thinking
and my previous training.
> Mr. JJ, I will make this short, sweet: ideal, logical language as >opposed
to ordinary language.
Is there not a problem with an 'ideal, logical language' (such as that
proposed by Wittgenstein in the Tractus), which with internal consistency,
proves logically that philosophy cannot be discussed?
I know the W and the Vienna Circle repudiated portions of the Tractus which
later made them uncomfortable, but for the sake of this question let us
ignore that.
The engineer recognizes that if the experimental data does not match his
thesis, eventually (sometimes with much anguish and denial) the thesis must
be changed.
If the internal logic of a philosophical thesis is consistent, can't the
philosopher simply deny the existence of contradictory data. Isn't that what
W is doing?
I know that terms like 'my own senses', and 'common sense' have no place
within many philosophical 'sects'. But haven't been I reading you, and Josh,
and a few others here discussing philosophy? Or do you exist only in my
imagination .. Or am I a figment of ....
Help me here, Mr. Greer.
Alan Walkington
An engineer, and proud of it.
John Jones
> account of causality and induction
I had begun to think lately that philosophy was particular social
adherences, not guides.
b.) insist on the tautological
> nature of logical truths;
you said.
but you can't insist on a representation, except to work towards one.
c.) see philosophy itself as a form of
> logical analysis.
Well we could, but ..well we could anything else as well..
(d.) and reject "metaphysics" as
> "unintelligible" at least in the traditional forms of
> realism, idealism, and phenomenalism
Unintelligible, -but how is that 'rejected'? Is unintelligibility connected
to intelligibility through the act of rejection? We CAN reject it, but what
are we to count as unintelligible? And how do I define an intelligible act,
such as reason, to define an unintelligible one? The concepts 'intelligible'
and 'unintelligible' don't even meet each other! Social nuances like -'ere
hes nuts he is, can't make sense of him' aren't philosophies.
You want to dump intelligibility. Phew. Thats a hairy kettle of fish.
ayeanall
jj
Madonna <mia_m...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:691f64ff.02032...@posting.google.com...
Michael Greer
(snip)
> Is there not a problem with an 'ideal, logical language' (such as that
> proposed by Wittgenstein in the Tractus), which with internal consistency,
> proves logically that philosophy cannot be discussed?
The answer: W wasn't impressed with what passes for philosophy. In
fact, there are no "philosophical" problems, only problems of
language. I put quotes around any word which is suspect. The early W
wanted to remove the confusion that revolves around the term
"philosophy." He considered most of it a trap set by the improper use
of language. So, in a sense, you're right; "philosophy" can't be
discussed. There is no such topic. There IS grammatical and logical
confusion that goes under the name "philosophy."
> I know the W and the Vienna Circle repudiated portions of the Tractus which
> later made them uncomfortable, but for the sake of this question let us
> ignore that.
Here you need to recognize what has been called the early and the
later W.
> The engineer recognizes that if the experimental data does not match his
> thesis, eventually (sometimes with much anguish and denial) the thesis must
> be changed.
I think Mr. Bachynski has disciplined you properly on this score.
> If the internal logic of a philosophical thesis is consistent, can't the
> philosopher simply deny the existence of contradictory data. Isn't that what
> W is doing?
Strange. Philosophers don't argue about "data." in your sense of the
word. We are not trying to prove hypotheses in philosophy; here I use
philosophy in the traditional, non-Wittgensteinian sense. WE argue
about propositions, not hypotheses. I wonder if you've ever read any
philosophy?
> I know that terms like 'my own senses', and 'common sense' have no place
> within many philosophical 'sects'. But haven't been I reading you, and Josh,
> and a few others here discussing philosophy? Or do you exist only in my
> imagination .. Or am I a figment of ....
>
> Help me here, Mr. Greer.
Mr. Walkington, you do need help. As I have attempted to show, all any
human being needs is the live according to Stoic principles I have
already announced in other posts. Why should you? My arguments are
dialectical. "Common senses" and "my own sense" need to be parsed.
> Alan Walkington
> An engineer, and proud of it.
I'm not sure why you'd be proud to be an engineer. When engineers do
philosophy that often make mistakes. Sometimes, for civil engineers,
the bridges start to come down.
Michael Greer
Michael Greer
(snip)
> I had begun to think lately that philosophy was particular social
> adherences, not guides.
There is something to that. You might sense that philosophy is defined
by the company you keep. It's not my position, but I see that point.
> but you can't insist on a representation, except to work towards one.
This is not clear. In a certain sense, you can't do anything without a
representation. Of course, our representations are always in need of
refinement, so you'd be right, we are working toward them. So?
> Well we could, but ..well we could anything else as well..
This reveals a lack of rhetorical sophistication. First, "we could
anything else as well" is not a properly formed English expression.
You leave your reader in the lurch. But our effort here is not
vagueness for the sake of vaguenss.
> Unintelligible, -but how is that 'rejected'? Is unintelligibility connected
> to intelligibility through the act of rejection? We CAN reject it, but what
> are we to count as unintelligible? And how do I define an intelligible act,
> such as reason, to define an unintelligible one? The concepts 'intelligible'
> and 'unintelligible' don't even meet each other! Social nuances like -'ere
> hes nuts he is, can't make sense of him' aren't philosophies.
> You want to dump intelligibility. Phew. Thats a hairy kettle of fish.
Yes, something can be put forth poorly and then rejected in the name
of "unintelligibility." It would go like this: Person A is speaking
about something. It isn't clear to anyone what Person A is trying to
say. Therefore, Person B takes the time to say, in response, "Sir,
whatever you have said makes no sense so I'll have to reject it for
now, until you can get it together to start making some sense." True,
rejection as such is not a philosophy, but the act of rejecting
another's position, or pseudo-position, has everything to do with
philosophy.Is the expression "you want to dump intelligibility"
intelligible. If it is, you've contradicted yourself. If it isn't,
then it must be rejected.
Michael Greer
ursus major
<snip>
> The engineer recognizes that if the experimental data does not match his
> > thesis, eventually (sometimes with much anguish and denial) the thesis
must
> > be changed.
>
> I think Mr. Bachynski has disciplined you properly on this score.
>
Indeed I have been properly disciplined. But I've been an engineer for 35
of my 63 years. This old dog does take a little time to unlearn his tricks.
>
> > If the internal logic of a philosophical thesis is consistent, can't the
> > philosopher simply deny the existence of contradictory data. Isn't that
what
> > W is doing?
>
> Strange. Philosophers don't argue about "data." in your sense of the
> word. We are not trying to prove hypotheses in philosophy; here I use
> philosophy in the traditional, non-Wittgensteinian sense. WE argue
> about propositions, not hypotheses.
Of course. See last cringing, breast-beating, hair-tearing response. Oh ..
then what is 'sense-data'.
>I wonder if you've ever read any philosophy?
>
I will admit the the only dialectic I learned about was in PoliSci ..
thesis, antithesis, synthesis.
I'm certain that it is not obvious. But some - yes. Mostly the ancients.
The opposite positions of Parmenides and Heraclitus (I floundered in his
fragments), Zeno's paradoxes, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Mind you I
said I read, not studied. And that was long ago, in a different place - and
anyway, they are dead.
Of the more recent .. not really ,,, only if you consider C.S. Lewis,
Bertrand Russell (a few essays), and Aynn Rand (of whom I could make little
sense) as philosophers. Rand's objectivism seemed slightly strained. And
very recently, some of W.
It's never too late to start (although sometimes it is too late to finish);
perhaps you could suggest an appropriate beginning for a narrowly educated
but literate person? The stoics, perhaps?
<snip>
> > Alan Walkington
> > An engineer, and proud of it.
>
> I'm not sure why you'd be proud to be an engineer>
Now Mr. Greer, please. It's engineers which make all this
philosophising(sp?) possible. The books, the internet, the stove upon which
you prepare your porridge, the tea you drink, the electric fire in the
winter. Without engineers, you would be spending your time growing your
veggies, milking your goats, tanning your leather, mending your socks,
cobbling your sandles and shoving peat over the hearth. To say nothing of
dying before forty, if you were lucky enough to live past six.
Its sort of like the labour-ites and the conservatives. Without the
conservatives to make money, the labour-ites would have none to give away.
(grin)
>When engineers do philosophy they often make mistakes. Sometimes, for civil
engineers, the bridges start to come down.
Engineers learn from their mistakes or they quit and become professors.
Besides, mistakes in philosophy are neither as costly nor as embarrassing as
mistakes in engineering. Err . When civil engineers make mistakes in
philosophy, exactly which bridges fail?
Again, thank you for your patience, and for giving me the benefit of the
doubt.
Alan Walkington
An engineer, and still proud of it
Michael Greer
(snip)
> Indeed I have been properly disciplined. But I've been an engineer for 35
> of my 63 years. This old dog does take a little time to unlearn his tricks.
There's plenty of time for philosophy, whatever your age. Remember
philosophy grows out of leisure, nothing less. It bakes no bread and
opens no bank accounts. It is completely "useless" and, therefore,
invaluable to you and all.
(snip)
> Of course. See last cringing, breast-beating, hair-tearing response. Oh ..
> then what is 'sense-data'.
This open kind of question might be a trap. You have to understand the
long history in modern philosophy to see why talk about "sense data"
is so problematic. It began with Locke stripping away the secondary
properties from objects in experience. This turn in philosophy led to
a preoccupation with how the human mind comes to know anything. I
could understand this question if it were properly contextualized:
"what does G.E. Moore mean by sense-data?", for example, would be a
very interesting discussion, but it would be historical and not
philosophical. Or, perhaps, you'd be interested in this question, one
which I am prepared to develop with you as far as you'd like: "how
does the concept of sense-data operate in the philosophy of science?"
I feel that you would need to understand "theory-laden observation" to
understand this point.
> I will admit the the only dialectic I learned about was in PoliSci ..
> thesis, antithesis, synthesis.
Okay, this reveals a bad education. First of all, you're referring to
Hegel's dialectic, a dialectic which is the most idiosyncratic in the
history of philosophy. Second, PoliSci course, and I've taken several
myself, are generally inadequate for philosophers. Professors of
Political Science are usually people of limited capacities, would-be
lawyers in some instances. I would hope that you'd avoid Poli Sci in
the future.Third, dialectic as a form of investigation goes back to
Plato and should be appreciated in a less schematic way than you've
proposed with your Hegel reference.
> I'm certain that it is not obvious. But some - yes. Mostly the ancients.
> The opposite positions of Parmenides and Heraclitus (I floundered in his
> fragments), Zeno's paradoxes, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Mind you I
> said I read, not studied. And that was long ago, in a different place - and
> anyway, they are dead.
And like the character of Huck Finn, in Mark Twain's novel, you might
wish to say, finding out that Moses was dead: "I don't take no stock
in dead people."
LOL.
> Of the more recent .. not really ,,, only if you consider C.S. Lewis,
> Bertrand Russell (a few essays), and Aynn Rand (of whom I could make little
> sense) as philosophers. Rand's objectivism seemed slightly strained. And
> very recently, some of W.
Okay, then you have a lot of catching up to do. As of this moment,
you're behind. You need to get serious about improving your mind.
There is a statement about misspent youth that I would bring forth,
but out of respect for you, I'll defer that.
> It's never too late to start (although sometimes it is too late to finish);
> perhaps you could suggest an appropriate beginning for a narrowly educated
> but literate person? The stoics, perhaps?
Actually, this shows you are quite bright. The reason I've posted
recently on the Stoic school is that they are by far the most
accessible for anyone who approaches philosophy with a general lack of
cultivation, as you have. More cultivated intellects will soon tire of
Stoic positions, but as an instructor here, I find that the Stoic play
well with introductory students. First of all, their language is
accessible. Secondly, they detest public conventions for the most
part, even if they abide by them. And lastly, they were highly
critical of religion.
(snip)
> Now Mr. Greer, please. It's engineers which make all this
> philosophising(sp?) possible. The books, the internet, the stove upon which
> you prepare your porridge, the tea you drink, the electric fire in the
> winter. Without engineers, you would be spending your time growing your
> veggies, milking your goats, tanning your leather, mending your socks,
> cobbling your sandles and shoving peat over the hearth. To say nothing of
> dying before forty, if you were lucky enough to live past six.
Rubbish. Philosophy doesn't depend on any level of technological
development. What you say would be true just on the human level. I'll
grant that. Engineering makes life better in many respects. That is
true. And we do appreciate that. However, philosophy owes nothing to
anyone. Philosophy lives its own life, regardless of culture,
technical development, level of income, what have you. It is an
"independent variable." In fact, personally, I'd prefer a less
developed society and a more philosophically alert one. You'll notice
a correlation between high technical development and low entertainment
values.
(snip)
> Engineers learn from their mistakes or they quit and become professors.
> Besides, mistakes in philosophy are neither as costly nor as embarrassing as
> mistakes in engineering. Err . When civil engineers make mistakes in
> philosophy, exactly which bridges fail?
This is a grave error. Mistakes in philosophy ruin human lives.
Mistakes in engineering might cost a life or two, even many, but they
don't ruin lives. You have to understand something here Mr.
Walkington. Philosophy is all about the way human beings live their
lives; what else could it be about? Engineering is completely
ancillary: roads, bridges, viaducts, acquaducts, whatever. But no man
ever lost his soul over a bridge, though many have jumped from a
bridge in a moment of philosophical lucidity.
This has all been quite a pleasure.
Michael Greer
ursus major
> development. What you say would be true just on the human level. I'll
> grant that. Engineering makes life better in many respects. That is
> true. And we do appreciate that. However, philosophy owes nothing to
> anyone. Philosophy lives its own life, regardless of culture,
> technical development, level of income, what have you. It is an
> "independent variable." In fact, personally, I'd prefer a less
> developed society and a more philosophically alert one. You'll notice
> a correlation between high technical development and low entertainment
> values.
I did not make my point sufficiently clear, although you made it for me
previously in your post.
> Remember philosophy grows out of leisure, nothing less.
A leisure class is available only when society has produced a surplus of the
physical necessities of life. Nobility, government officials,
parlamentarians, priests, lawers, artists, poets, philosophers, hippies,
druggies, liberal democrats, and other non-producers of basic goods can
exist if, and only if <grin> there is a sufficient surplus of produce for
the producing population to support them. They are, in a few cases
important, luxuries.
The same is true for what might be called the 'working' thinkers, part-time
artisans. Individual leisure is not possible when you rise at dawn,
struggle in the fields until dark, retire hungry, cold, and exhausted to a
pile of flea-ridden dirty firs on a moldy straw pallet; and face the same
miserable routine each and every day for the rest of your short and unhappy
life.
Only when you can produce enough for yourself and your family, in either
goods or the means to acqure goods, in less than all your waking hours, will
you have the leisure to be reflective rather than reflexive.
Alan Walkington
An engineer, and proud of it
"Michael Greer" <gilwo...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:fb14c691.02040...@posting.google.com...
Michael Greer
(snip)
> A leisure class is available only when society has produced a surplus of the
> physical necessities of life. Nobility, government officials,
> parlamentarians, priests, lawers, artists, poets, philosophers, hippies,
> druggies, liberal democrats, and other non-producers of basic goods can
> exist if, and only if <grin> there is a sufficient surplus of produce for
> the producing population to support them. They are, in a few cases
> important, luxuries.
Okay. But don't confuse this condition with what is sufficient to do
philosophy. Leisure is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient
condition.
Furthermore, your claim was that engineering did all these things. But
obviously agriculture, hunting, transportation are only indirectly
related to engineering. I still think you're wrong to suggest that
philosophy "owes" something to the productive arts. Philosophy may
require certain conditions for its exercise, but how does that amount
to "owing" something?
> The same is true for what might be called the 'working' thinkers, part-time
> artisans. Individual leisure is not possible when you rise at dawn,
> struggle in the fields until dark, retire hungry, cold, and exhausted to a
> pile of flea-ridden dirty firs on a moldy straw pallet; and face the same
> miserable routine each and every day for the rest of your short and unhappy
> life.
An interesting picture of a life that almost no one in history has
ever lived. Consider the narrative provided by Frederick Douglass of
his life as a slave. As horrible as being a slave is, whether a slave
to man or a slave to the elements that we require for survival, there
are always other things going on: music, conversation, storytelling,
even friendship. I think you've got a poetic conceit that almost
certainly is merely literary.
> Only when you can produce enough for yourself and your family, in either
> goods or the means to acqure goods, in less than all your waking hours, will
> you have the leisure to be reflective rather than reflexive.
Okay. Suppose I grant this premise. Then what? Suppose I say, "you
can't have philosophy until you have a certain division of labor that
provides the free time for the exercise of philosophical reason." What
are the consequences of believing this?
Michael Greer
ursus major
news:<Me7s8.202505$BX5.2...@news.easynews.com>...
>
> (snip)
>
> > A leisure class is available only when society has produced a surplus of
the
> > physical necessities of life.
>
> philosophy. Leisure is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient
> condition.
There is no confusion. I was iterating your statement. I agree that
"philosophy implies leisure" is true, and that "leisure implies philosophy"
is false. Other conditions are indeed necessary for philosophy to flourish.
> Furthermore, your claim was that engineering did all these things. But
> obviously agriculture, hunting, transportation are only indirectly
> related to engineering.
Engineering is a component of productive arts, but certainly not the only
one nor even the dominant one. I should not have implied (if I did) that
engineering alone was responsible for the improvements in productive arts.
>I still think you're wrong to suggest that
> philosophy "owes" something to the productive arts. Philosophy may
> require certain conditions for its exercise, but how does that amount
> to "owing" something?
>
Given that the productive arts are necessary to produce 'leisure', then
leisure implies productive arts
philosophy implies leisure
therefore, philosophy implies productive arts
Perhaps the idea attached to the sign 'owe' is not the same in my mind as in
yours <grin>. To 'owe' is not necessarily to be obligated to repay a debt.
It can also used in the following manner:
to be indebted for <owed his wealth to his father> <owes much to good
luck>
or
to be attributable <an idea that owes to Greek philosophy>
I stand by my suggestion that philosophy 'owes much' to the productive arts.
>
> > The same is true for what might be called the 'working' thinkers,
part-time
> > artisans. Individual leisure is not possible when you rise at dawn,
> > struggle in the fields until dark, retire hungry, cold, and exhausted to
a
> > pile of flea-ridden dirty firs on a moldy straw pallet; and face the
same
> > miserable routine each and every day for the rest of your short and
unhappy
> > life.
>
> An interesting picture of a life that almost no one in history has
> ever lived. Consider the narrative provided by Frederick Douglass of
> his life as a slave. As horrible as being a slave is, whether a slave
> to man or a slave to the elements that we require for survival, there
> are always other things going on: music, conversation, storytelling,
> even friendship. I think you've got a poetic conceit that almost
> certainly is merely literary.
Well, I will admit to some hyperbole there. Although, it is not far from
the life lead by the textile factory workers and the coal miners in the
early days of the industrial revolution. But is not hyperbole, along with
irony, an acceptable rhetorical device? (Anyway, it looked so good on the
screen that I couldn't bear to delete it!) .
>
>
> > Only when you can produce enough for yourself and your family, in either
> > goods or the means to acquire goods, in less than all your waking hours,
will
> > you have the leisure to be reflective rather than reflexive.
>
> Okay. Suppose I grant this premise. Then what? Suppose I say, "you
> can't have philosophy until you have a certain division of labor that
> provides the free time for the exercise of philosophical reason." What
> are the consequences of believing this?
>
Aye, there is the rub. To rest, perchance to think? You challenge me to
face the slings and arrows of outrageous discourse, of rhetoric; nay ... of
dialectic! ( Damn, there's that literary conceit again.)
I accept your challenge, although I will first rest, and think.
Alan Walkington
An engineer, and proud of it.
Davin C. Enigl
wrote:
>Dear Reader:
>
>It has come to my attention lately that we have some vigorous
>discussion at this site which is basically headed in the wrong
>direction for lack of training and due preparation.
I agree.
> I will now rememdy
>this confusion . . .
Of course you are kidding, you are merely giving us a good history
lesson on the Logical Positivivist point of view that was refuted by
1) Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery as early as 1934, and 2)
was also rejected by Wittgenstein himself, in his Philosophical
Investigations (which repudiated his earlier Tractatus).
>By reconstruction I mean that all
>philosophical puzzles can be expressed in ordinary language. . .
That is not strickly true, e.g.,
1) Tarski metalanguage correspondence truth theory is not in ordinary
language,
2) Ronald Geire's picture/graphics (a picture is worth a thousand
words) is not in ordinary language, also,
3) Compare your linear (sequential) thinking as in ordinary language
discourse analysis (discursive thinking) to: the a non-sequential
(such as parallel processing) network not of ordinary language.
>Philosophy is in error whenever the common
>sense core of philosophy is not appreciated.
I agree.
>In order to retake the
>common sense core of philosophy we will need to develop an appropriate
>ontology: an account of what is and of what it means to speak of what
>is real.
No, because that gets into infinite regress of definitional meaning,
rather than undefined understanding. The important thing is
understanding, not meaning. That is where the Logical Positivists got
themselves boxed into a corner they could not get out of.
>Anyone who considers the task at hand will first have to acknowledge
>our esteemed predecessors: the Cambridge School of Analysis and the
>Vienna Circle.
Yes, esteemed, but also refuted predecessors.
>Anyone who proceeds to do philosophy today must encounter
>(a.) Hume's >account of causality and induction;
I agree that Hume was right about induction, but I disagree in that he
was probably wrong about causality (I think this because according to
some of the newer Topos Logic quantum physical theories).
>(b.) insist on the tautological nature of logical truths;
Such as Tarski's Correspondence theory? OK, I'll go along with that.
>(c.) see philosophy itself as a form of logical analysis;
No, because logical analysis, even deduction presupposes unsupported
first principles. Logical deduction can be both 1) valid and 2)
empirically wrong.
>(d.) and reject "metaphysics" as "unintelligible" at least in the traditional forms of
>realism, idealism, and phenomenalism.
No, it is wrong to totally reject metaphysics. Please read the
(counter-)argument in favor of metaphysics in Popper's (1956/1983)
Realism and the Aim of Science, p. 194, Metaphysics: Sense or
Nonsense?.
This rejection of metaphysics is a self-important notion of the
Logical Positivists who started by invalidity arguing backwards from
the presupposition to validate the presupposition (logical fallacy of
circular argument, "Because we see things that look meaningful and
real, therefore only things we see can be meaningful and real."). They
presupposed metaphysics was invalid, then tried to construct their
philosophy to support their presupposition. They failed to do this,
however, many interesting arguments can out of the excursive
discourse.
>Much of this wisdom grows out of
>the work of Wittgenstein in the early work, the Tractatus.
Yes, however, even he rejected it later in life, in his Philosophical
Investigations.
>Call it the "linguistic turn."
I call it an "infinitely regressive" turn.
>The importance of Moore can be seen in his resistance to the effort to prove
>"metaphysical" theses. We don't do metaphysics. Metaphysics is usually
>bad philosophy, caused by a misunderstanding of language.
Which turned out to be a fallacy caused by his flawed logic and *lack*
of commonsense. For instance, read what Eddington wrote about this on
the first few pages of his book The Nature of the Physical World, way
back in 1928. Eddington has a much more sophisticated view of what
commonsense is and is not.
>Now, how can we do "reconstruction" in philosophy? We must first
>define the form of our language. I hold that to do philosophy properly
>we need an ideal language, a purely logical language.
Many have tried and failed (e.g., Whitehead and Russell (1925)
Principia Mathematics.). Some have given logical arguments why this
adventure *must* fail (e.g, Gödel, (1930) On Formally Undecidable
Propositions of Principia Mathematics and Related Systems).
>This should be obvious.
Obvious, but apparently wrong.
>I am not now doing linguistics, though I am writing in language about language.
Are you about to re-invent Tarski?
>I am an empiricist. I hold that all thinking must begin with what we first are
>aware of: that which comes through the senses.
That has been refuted many times. The most recent interesting
refutation I have come across is the one by Alan Chalmer's in his
(1999 edition) _What is This Thing Called Science?_ esp. on page 8.
Basically, the *good* part about empiricism is almost totally based on
the psychological confidence we get from performing experiments that
are *not* depending on large-scale theoretical frameworks
(theory-dependent interpretations) in order to be valid, but rather
are based on local-scale theories. Unfortunately, the problem of
large scale theory-laden justification, is a jump that most empiricist
fail to prevent. And, this is overcome, not by a logical language,
but by physical experimentation.
>There is a handy grammatical model for this kind of empiricism: it's called the
>principle of acquaintance.
This is Bertrand Russell's (1912) idea. Again, this is no longer
thought to be sufficient.
>But how do we know that we know? Because we have direct sensory
>experience of them.
And, yet, we still only know these based on subjective-relative
training used to judge what is "seen," perceived. Knowledge is first
formed *before* observation -- probably by genetic a posteriori, and
not after observation -- as if it were a priori. Rather,
interpretation of the perception is formed after observation. This
goes counter to most empiricist arguments, including the one made here
by Michael Greer.
But, the problem of empiricism even goes deeper than that. A person's
theories are not just causing interpretations of what is being
perceived, rather even the before that high level, we get a twist on
the input signals e.g., the images on (say) our retinas are not
uniquely determining our perceptual experience, that takes the camera
analogy too far (as Alan Chalmers said). Rather, we filter-out many
things we "see," (such as in "eye-witness testimony") in such a way
that we never get to apply a theory and form an interpretation. And,
even worse: Look at Chalmers' page 6 the tribe that was studied, did
not see the lines on that page, as a representation of a
three-dimensional image.
>We have the schema and the empiricist temper in place. What do we do?
>We salvage from traditional philosophy what can be salvaged and we
>dump the rest.
So, then why not dump the proposed schema and the proposed empiricism
too? In my opinion, a more sufficient answer is Ackermann's and
Mayo's new experimentalism with error correction and local-theory
empirical epistemology (which is still not totally sufficient). This
is similar to Alan Chalmers' Unrepresentative Realism and John
Worrall's (1989b) Structural Realism. This also seems compatible with
Popper's reconstruction of Kant's Transcendental Realism and
Eddington's Super-Realism.
>Now the rule in the ideal language is that an existential clause
>joined to a constant makes grammatical nonsense is plainly evident.
That is true. Existential statements cannot be used in science,
mainly because they are not deductively falsifiable as in testing a
theory empirically. Constructivist reformulation of existential
statements are however, used in science with no problem.
>This way we avoid "metaphysical realism" a nonsense position.
>Michael Greer
Well, here are my thoughts on that:
OK, I am a scientist and I am biased toward empirical science too.
Let me explore some distinctions first, then I'll go into how various
epistemologies (in science) differs in solving problems.
1.) First order "Philosophy" is "thinking about thinking" in
particular kinds of thinking: reflection, critical thinking, etc.
This expands into second order philosophy.
2.) Second order philosophy is basically three aspects of the first
order philosophy.
2.1) Thinking about the nature of the universe/world: cosmology and
cosmogony theories (called Metaphysics). [I contend Logical
Positivism and Linguistic Analysis goes too far with this and throws
the baby out with the bath water.]
2.2) Thinking about knowledge: theories of knowledge (called
Epistemology).
2.3) Thinking about conducting one's life: ethical theories (called
Ethics) -- I will not cover these here.
3.) Metaphysics comes before epistemology because a certain
metaphysics will then presuppose a particular group epistemological
theories. [I contend Logical Positivism did this backwards, for
felonious reasons and that even they have committed to metaphysical
Realism, despite their protests.]
4.) Metaphysically, I tend to agree with Realism (and Superrealism,
and Transcendental Realism) as opposed to Descriptivism,
Instrumentalism, Idealism, Antirealism. I am still close to
Pragmatism (upper case P) in many ways. And, as far as theories of
truth, I side with Tarski's correspondence theory as opposed to the
pragmatist (lower case p) or coherence or consensus theories (see
5.1).
5) Three categories of theories:
5.1) Mathematical and Logical theories are testable and are both
provable *and* disprovable in principle (even via Gödel's
Incompleteness Proof, but outside of mathematics and Classical Logic
in some cases).
5.2) Empirical scientific theories are testable but are only
disprovable, *not* provable. This is similar to the Socratic method
-- learn from mistakes with error correction evolving over time.
Deductive reasoning is used, but (due mostly to Hume) no induction can
be used (6.3 used, 6.5 cannot be used). Empirical theories can clash
with reality and this is used as a regulative mechanism for "proof "
of untruthfulness, but *not* as a proof of truthfulness.
5.3) Metaphysical theories are not testable and are *neither*
provable *nor* disprovable. But these may be rationally (or
irrationally) held depending on if you hold the results from the 5.1
(e.g., the Classical logic of Tarski's Correspondence Theory of Truth,
truth via pragmatism, or the coherence or consensus truth theories)
and by 5.2 empirical explanatory theories.
6) Types of philosophy of science tests of an explanatory theory:
6.1) Baconian experiments are the "observe then just-do-the same
thing" tests. These are very limited to lucky observations that
happen to be "seen" without needing further corrections (e.g., mirages
count against this way of testing, see Berkeley's objections). This
is the basic (unfortunately, refuted) argument for empirical science.
6.2) Aristotelian experiments prove the preconceived (often wrong)
theoretical guess. These may also be "self-fulfilling prophesy" tests
and therefore can be very weak and uncritical tests of theories --
almost everything passes (e.g., ESP, "remote viewing," mind reading,
mysticism). Applicable to 5.3, but this can be disproved if wrong
Classical deduction in 5.2.
"Aristotle maintained that women have fewer teeth than men; although
he was twice married, it never occurred to him to verify this
statement by examining his wives' mouths." -- Bertrand Russell, The
Impact of Science on Society.
6.3) Galilean experiments uses the trial and error elimination
method. This can be very strong and culling out bad theories -- and
learning from mistakes. Most of science now uses some form of this
plus the 6.4 method. Errors are eliminated via deductive reasoning.
Applicable to 5.1 (disproof part only) and 5.2.
6.4) Thought experiments (e.g., Kant, Newton, Galileo, Einstein) are
very useful for generating ideas that can be tested by Galilean
experiments in 6.3 (e.g., Einstein vs. Newton). Thought experiments
are not usually seen as much of a test of a theory until surviving,
(or not), in Galilean type experiments. Theoretical physics use this
method before observations can be even be made. Applicable to 5.1,
5.2, and 5.3.
[Note: Galileo made some brilliant though experiments to find
alternate solutions to his problems with planetary orbital mechanics.]
6.5) Logical Positivist test: Are the statements in the theory
meaningful? If not, the theory is meaningless metaphysics. If they
are meaningful, proof is based on repeated observation. This
"positive" method is not used anymore because a logical error was
discovered, in that, trying to "prove" a 5.2 theory inductively is
not possible. This is why many non-philosophers and scientists think
that philosophy does not "do" anything relevant and is therefore a
joke, i.e., pseudo-problems just for fun. Are you really solving
anything by playing word games about everything is in dream-land?
Fortunately this is an declining tendency.
Yet, Metaphysics (5.3) is not science (5.2) either. Yes, science,
math, and logic expects and gives answers (as explanations) to
problems. Most of the answers clash with reality and we have to
cull-out the contradictions and then build better explanatory
theories. Clashing with reality (yet remember, "Realism" is a
metaphysical theory) demarcates science vs. pseudoscience. We expect
more from philosophy than fun word games and pseudo-problems.
-- Davin C. Enigl
-------------------------------
Michael Greer
(snip)
> Given that the productive arts are necessary to produce 'leisure', then
>
> leisure implies productive arts
> philosophy implies leisure
> therefore, philosophy implies productive arts
Now consider this argument: leisure implies oxygen/philosophy implies
leisure/ therefore, philosophy implies oxygen. Now where are we?
> Perhaps the idea attached to the sign 'owe' is not the same in my mind as in
> yours <grin>. To 'owe' is not necessarily to be obligated to repay a debt.
> It can also used in the following manner:
>
> to be indebted for <owed his wealth to his father> <owes much to good
> luck>
> or
> to be attributable <an idea that owes to Greek philosophy>
>
> I stand by my suggestion that philosophy 'owes much' to the productive arts.
I think your first statement is suggestive. I agree that words have
many senses. Fine. It is good that you can clarify what you mean. That
shows some mastery of skill, evidence which, heretofore, has been
lacking. Well, nothing about philosophy connects it to the productive
arts in any of these senses. Philosophy does not gain by being
connected to the productive arts. Philosophy is not lucky to be
associated with the productive arts. And philosophy is not
attributable to the productive arts. So, what have we got here?
Nothing.
> Well, I will admit to some hyperbole there. Although, it is not far from
> the life lead by the textile factory workers and the coal miners in the
> early days of the industrial revolution. But is not hyperbole, along with
> irony, an acceptable rhetorical device? (Anyway, it looked so good on the
> screen that I couldn't bear to delete it!) .
I understand your temptations. Certainly the relationship between
rhetoric, which you have employed here to make a point, and
philosophical argument requires an extended discussion. We are only
now, two thousand years into the history of philosophy, beginning to
understand their relationship to one another. I can't really say the
Greeks got it right, but they were the first to understand the
problematic of rhetoric, as well as the problematic posed by the
productive arts. You might even argue that Plato became a philosopher
as an attempt to understand the rule of techne in Greek life. For me,
technology, the child of engineering, is the greatest philosophical
issue before us today, in the domain of social life, that is. There
are independent considerations: metaphysics, ethics, ontology, logic,
which are not so related to the problem of technology.
(snip)
> Aye, there is the rub. To rest, perchance to think? You challenge me to
> face the slings and arrows of outrageous discourse, of rhetoric; nay ... of
> dialectic! ( Damn, there's that literary conceit again.)
>
> I accept your challenge, although I will first rest, and think.
It is good to see a humble man going about his tasks. One needs the
long view, the time to rest, to allow the mind to make new
connections. I honor you sir in the humility you have demonstrated
here. You do need to consider these things: What are the productive
arts? How do they connect to human life, for good and ill? What role
does rhetoric play in the positioning of an argument?
Michael Greer
ursus major
>Now consider this argument: leisure implies oxygen/philosophy implies
>leisure/ therefore, philosophy implies oxygen. Now where are we?
Start timer. Hold nose and clamp mouth. Begin philosophising.
Let me know what the timer says when you stop. I think somewhere around 3
1/2 minutes is a western record.
Of course all bets are off if you are talking Zen
(I know, I know, that's inductive. Next time you try you might keep on
forever.)
See 'ya upstream.
Alan Walkington
A breathing engineer, and proud of it
Michael Greer
> Ah, Mr. Greer:
>
> >Now consider this argument: leisure implies oxygen/philosophy implies
> >leisure/ therefore, philosophy implies oxygen. Now where are we?
>
> Start timer. Hold nose and clamp mouth. Begin philosophising.
> Let me know what the timer says when you stop. I think somewhere around 3
> 1/2 minutes is a western record.
>
> Of course all bets are off if you are talking Zen
>
> (I know, I know, that's inductive. Next time you try you might keep on
> forever.)
> See 'ya upstream.
We should all breathe so well!
Michael Greer
Michael Greer
(snip)
> Of course you are kidding, you are merely giving us a good history
> lesson on the Logical Positivivist point of view that was refuted by
> 1) Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery as early as 1934, and 2)
> was also rejected by Wittgenstein himself, in his Philosophical
> Investigations (which repudiated his earlier Tractatus).
Yes, I am :-) That's true that Popper and W. both flirted with L.P.
and that both came to reject it.
> 1) Tarski metalanguage correspondence truth theory is not in ordinary
> language,
May we call this a formalism? If so, I'll have something to say about
that.
> 2) Ronald Geire's picture/graphics (a picture is worth a thousand
> words) is not in ordinary language, also,
It's not clear that anything philosophical is being claimed in this
language.
> 3) Compare your linear (sequential) thinking as in ordinary language
> discourse analysis (discursive thinking) to: the a non-sequential
> (such as parallel processing) network not of ordinary language.
Don't know if "parallel processing" has any philosophical
significance. I have read David Gerenter (noted computer guy without a
left hand because of teh Unabomber) on this one, but not very
illuminating.
(snip)
> No, because that gets into infinite regress of definitional meaning,
> rather than undefined understanding. The important thing is
> understanding, not meaning. That is where the Logical Positivists got
> themselves boxed into a corner they could not get out of.
Are you arguing for a type of "foundationalism"?
> I agree that Hume was right about induction, but I disagree in that he
> was probably wrong about causality (I think this because according to
> some of the newer Topos Logic quantum physical theories).
And this is because you hold a "realist" position on causality?
> No, because logical analysis, even deduction presupposes unsupported
> first principles. Logical deduction can be both 1) valid and 2)
> empirically wrong.
Okay, another type of formalism?
> No, it is wrong to totally reject metaphysics. Please read the
> (counter-)argument in favor of metaphysics in Popper's (1956/1983)
> Realism and the Aim of Science, p. 194, Metaphysics: Sense or
> Nonsense?.
I'll need to read these works, and I will. By metaphysics I mean the
articulation of first principles, principles which you rightly claim
are not themselves "proved." Is that also Popper's view? I do recall
something about World One, World Two, and World Three. But what I must
remember of him, since I heard him lecture when he was already very
old, that he used Science as a way to do philosophy.
(snip)
> >Call it the "linguistic turn."
>
> I call it an "infinitely regressive" turn.
It seems to me that something like this objection may be motivating
the work of Richard Rorty. I'm not secure in making that claim, but I
do think he also started out thinking that the "linguistic turn" would
be fruitful, only to conclude that it ends, spiralling out of control,
in nonsense.
> Which turned out to be a fallacy caused by his flawed logic and *lack*
> of commonsense. For instance, read what Eddington wrote about this on
> the first few pages of his book The Nature of the Physical World, way
> back in 1928. Eddington has a much more sophisticated view of what
> commonsense is and is not.
A good book indeed.
> >Now, how can we do "reconstruction" in philosophy? We must first
> >define the form of our language. I hold that to do philosophy properly
> >we need an ideal language, a purely logical language.
>
> Many have tried and failed (e.g., Whitehead and Russell (1925)
> Principia Mathematics.). Some have given logical arguments why this
> adventure *must* fail (e.g, Gödel, (1930) On Formally Undecidable
> Propositions of Principia Mathematics and Related Systems).
Because they were formalists?
> That has been refuted many times. The most recent interesting
> refutation I have come across is the one by Alan Chalmer's in his
> (1999 edition) _What is This Thing Called Science?_ esp. on page 8.
> Basically, the *good* part about empiricism is almost totally based on
> the psychological confidence we get from performing experiments that
> are *not* depending on large-scale theoretical frameworks
> (theory-dependent interpretations) in order to be valid, but rather
> are based on local-scale theories. Unfortunately, the problem of
> large scale theory-laden justification, is a jump that most empiricist
> fail to prevent. And, this is overcome, not by a logical language,
> but by physical experimentation.
That makes sense. I'll need to take a look at it.
> This is Bertrand Russell's (1912) idea. Again, this is no longer
> thought to be sufficient.
No one really refutes such a priniciple? It just fails to do
somethings we'd like to do?
> And, yet, we still only know these based on subjective-relative
> training used to judge what is "seen," perceived. Knowledge is first
> formed *before* observation -- probably by genetic a posteriori, and
> not after observation -- as if it were a priori. Rather,
> interpretation of the perception is formed after observation. This
> goes counter to most empiricist arguments, including the one made here
> by Michael Greer.
Knowledge is formed before observation? Before here means logically
prior?
So we have formed concepted without observation. How do we have access
to that?
I can see the point that interpretation comes after observation, but
I'm not clear about this "hard-wired" knowledge.
> But, the problem of empiricism even goes deeper than that. A person's
> theories are not just causing interpretations of what is being
> perceived, rather even the before that high level, we get a twist on
> the input signals e.g., the images on (say) our retinas are not
> uniquely determining our perceptual experience, that takes the camera
> analogy too far (as Alan Chalmers said). Rather, we filter-out many
> things we "see," (such as in "eye-witness testimony") in such a way
> that we never get to apply a theory and form an interpretation. And,
> even worse: Look at Chalmers' page 6 the tribe that was studied, did
> not see the lines on that page, as a representation of a
> three-dimensional image.
Because they lacked the knowledge to make that connection? They had
never had any emipirical input with pages and lines? They had no
conception of what an illustration in language is?
> So, then why not dump the proposed schema and the proposed empiricism
> too? In my opinion, a more sufficient answer is Ackermann's and
> Mayo's new experimentalism with error correction and local-theory
> empirical epistemology (which is still not totally sufficient). This
> is similar to Alan Chalmers' Unrepresentative Realism and John
> Worrall's (1989b) Structural Realism. This also seems compatible with
> Popper's reconstruction of Kant's Transcendental Realism and
> Eddington's Super-Realism.
Kant's Transcendental Idealism. The antinomies. The illusions of pure
reason.
> That is true. Existential statements cannot be used in science,
> mainly because they are not deductively falsifiable as in testing a
> theory empirically. Constructivist reformulation of existential
> statements are however, used in science with no problem.
Okay, Popper proposed the Principle of Falsifiability. This means that
any thesis put forth must be tested to show that it is false. The
obverse of the princple of verifiability.
Indeed. I couldn't agree more with that. I want to propose another
solution, but I haven't got time today. Next time. Thanks for your
remarks.
Michael Greer
Davin C. Enigl
wrote:
>That's true that Popper and W. both flirted with L.P.
>and that both came to reject it.
Popper never flirted with Logical Positivism. He was opposed to it in
1919, even before Logical Positivism was formulated in 1921 when
Wittgenstein published Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (the starting
point for Logical Positivism via the Vienna Circle). Popper had heard
of the Vienna Circle in 1926 or 1927 (while reading Neurath) and had
read the Tractatus (and Carnap) some years earlier while getting his
Ph.D. He thought they had found the wrong demarcation namely between
science and metaphysics, rather than science and pseudoscience. He
disliked their inductive reasoning having see how inductive reasoning
failed in psychology (e.g., Freud and Alfred Adler, 1919).
>> 1) Tarski metalanguage correspondence truth theory is not in ordinary
>> language,
>
>May we call this a formalism? If so, I'll have something to say about
>that.
No, this is not a formalism, in that it is not convertible into a
metamathematical meaningless system of logical rules, where the "rules
rule" (e.g, not "game formalism," not "Instrumentalism", it is also
not a Hilbert "Consistency" proof). This is because, the
correspondence truth theory is not proved by consistency established
within it's own system (say, like set theory is, or even like Haskell
Curry's Constructivism), it is, rather, an "informal" system, I think.
It is *about* a formal language system and not within that same formal
language system. This is Tarski truth semantics. The truth is in the
real world (Realism) not in the language. Semantics is a ascent
(satisfying the second incompleteness proof of Gödel) because the
properties of L cannot be expressed in L. [Talking about axioms of
Peano math cannot be expressed in Peano math without semantic ascent].
Right now, Tarski's Truth Correspondence is the most common truth
theory of Realists.
>> 2) Ronald Geire's picture/graphics (a picture is worth a thousand
>> words) is not in ordinary language, also,
>
>It's not clear that anything philosophical is being claimed in this
>language.
This is another example of non-discursive thinking, call it a
communications method, rather than a language. It is a thinking
method that may be more fundamental than ordinary language and might
be a method of communicating with extraterrestrials as depicted in the
movie Contact (actually, it was a 3-D pictorial communication method
and partly discursive too).
As far a philosophical claims. The main claim by Giere (I see I
spelled the poor guy's name wrong) is that it is that crucial
judgements are based on visual models esp. where diagrams are
compared, without ordinary language, the changes are immediately seen
(somewhat "holistically") and definitely not discursively or
sequentially -- the "logical argument" is made without using any
ordinary language, symbols or intellectual intuition, but rather by an
all-at-once non-intellectual intuition similar to parallel processing
in distributed systems using parallel processors (say) like the
Connection Machine or a multi-layered neural network. [An interesting
side issue is that there are fewer connections in a child's brain than
in a adult's brain. Learning is subtractive, and comes by
dis-connection!]
It is a non-axiomatic system which comes from Babylonian philosophy of
mathematics, rather than the axiomatic systems developed in Greek
philosophy. Logical Positivism is dominated by this Greek originated
axiomatic system who's primary method is (ordinary) language dominated
and leaves no room for non-discursive philosophical thinking. I
believe we must break away from this limitation and think more like
the Babylonians in order to make further scientific progress towards a
Theory of Everything. I am not alone in thinking this, so did Richard
Feynman in his (1965/1994) book The Character of Physical Law,
p.40-44.
This works in science because science is essentially a descriptive
system that "shows" (just as much as "tells") the explanations of how
things work. This dates back very far, just look at Euclid's books on
geometry -- essentially visual and discursive writing is secondary or
even non-existent. There are other examples, Newton's Principia is
full of visuals. See Giere's book (1999) Science Without Laws, p.
118-146 "Visual Models and Scientific Judgements," visual images in
thinking about the philosophy of science with a naturalistic account
of decisions. It is definitely a move away from propositional
thinking.
>> 3) Compare your linear (sequential) thinking as in ordinary language
>> discourse analysis (discursive thinking) to: the a non-sequential
>> (such as parallel processing) network not of ordinary language.
>
>Don't know if "parallel processing" has any philosophical
>significance. I have read David Gerenter (noted computer guy without a
>left hand because of teh Unabomber) on this one, but not very
>illuminating.
My comments refer to Intuitionism (i.e., Brouwer, which is still a
first order complete and consistent intuitionistic (still predicate)
logic with axioms) vs. discursive (sequential) thinking via ordinary
language. Discursive thinking is what all ordinary language is based
on. And, this "intuitionism" is commonly rejected by Realists,
(Dummett used this to defend anti-realism?) and formalists.
Basically, I do not reject intuitionistic logic because of the work by
Isham (and Butterfield) into how Topos Logic (an offshoot of
intuitionistic logic) can be used in Canonical Quantum Gravity
theoretical physics, which can be linked to supersymmetric string
theory's M-theory (and possibly culminating in a Theory of Everything
that will not even be mathematical at all, but instead may be depicted
as a multi-dimensional visual intuitionistic logic-like diagram and
seen (if we can even call it seeing) "holistically" (in the mild sense
of that term) that is, understood all-at-once).
>(snip)
>> No, because that gets into infinite regress of definitional meaning,
>> rather than undefined understanding. The important thing is
>> understanding, not meaning. That is where the Logical Positivists got
>> themselves boxed into a corner they could not get out of.
>
>Are you arguing for a type of "foundationalism"?
No, it is the opposite. It is closer to (see exception below)
Sellars's attack on foundationalism (or is it foundationism?) via his
"myth of the given" (e.g., rather, Functionalism, Identity theory
materialism, David Armstrong and Hilary Putnam, and Turing machines)
and Neurath's (and Quine (in 1969) then changed to a naturalized
epistemology) "boat" simile. Except, I have my own "Four-World
Pluralism" (FWP) which I posted few times already, and here again
below.
>> I agree that Hume was right about induction, but I disagree in that he
>> was probably wrong about causality (I think this because according to
>> some of the newer Topos Logic quantum physical theories).
>
>And this is because you hold a "realist" position on causality?
First, I think I mess up here, but you still figured out what I meant
to say. Thank you.
Anyway, more likely I disagree with many of Hume's ideas on causality,
because I have an unconventional twist on Realism that does not limit
logic to only Classical Logic, more esp. classical deductive logic.
The Law of the Excluded middle is no longer rock-solid for me. Hume,
I think was right about the non-existence of fully Causal Necessity,
because that requires determinism and I am an indeterminist.
However, Hume tries to reconcile that "we can have our determinism and
free-will at the same time" (have our cake and eat it too). The
(1819) Laplacean causal philosophy is, to me much more compatible with
recent developments in theoretical physics such as the "Consistent
Histories" approach (Griffiths' 1984, Omnes's 1988, Gell-Mann and
Hartle's 1990, and their gr-qc/9404013, Hartle's gr-qc/9808070 both at
http://xxx.lanl.gov. Isham and Butterfield then reformulated this
causality theory in Topos Theory in their gr-qc/9910005. But there
are several other people how have done just as well, Crane, Baez,
Markopoulou, Rovelli, Smolin -- e.g., gr-qc/950806. This also ties in
nicely to Popper's Propensity Interpretation of probability theory.
>> No, because logical analysis, even deduction presupposes unsupported
>> first principles. Logical deduction can be both 1) valid and 2)
>> empirically wrong.
>
>Okay, another type of formalism?
No, because this is not an Instrumentalism approach. There is no
disagreement that this *is* an instrument. The disagreement lies in
that the rules of the instrument create a "Formalism" that is tied to
the erroneous (non-naturalized) Foundationalist epistemological
doctrine of certainty, verificationalism (say, Ayer's) , confirmation
and even the erroneous doctrine of a single universal epistemological
method (e.g., Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn, Carnap, Neurath, Wittgenstein,
Ayer).
>> No, it is wrong to totally reject metaphysics. Please read the
>> (counter-)argument in favor of metaphysics in Popper's (1956/1983)
>> Realism and the Aim of Science, p. 194, Metaphysics: Sense or
>> Nonsense?.
>
>I'll need to read these works, and I will. By metaphysics I mean the
>articulation of first principles, principles which you rightly claim
>are not themselves "proved." Is that also Popper's view?
Yes. But Popper would then also claim first principles of Realism,
Anti-Realism (and the non-metaphysical, epistemology of Empiricism,
Rationalism and Logical Positivism is also based on unprovable and
un-disprovable metaphysics). Plus, he would say, L.P.'s epistemology
using inductive reasoning does not exist and never has existed because
it always has been logically invalid. So, unlike metaphysics
epistemology *can* actually be proven wrong.
>I do recall
>something about World One, World Two, and World Three.
I have reconstructed Popper's Transcendental Realism (which is already
a reconstruction of Kant by Popper), to tie into Eddington's
Super-Realism. I call this my "Four-World Pluralism." This is my
current theory of Mind.
Four-World Pluralism (FWP) (Yes, it is a visual 2-D "Flatland"
diagram):
Objective Subjective
_____| W 4 ^ v . . |_______|W4|_______
| Popper World 3a || Popper World 2a | W
Non-Physical | Theories of Math, Art || Understanding | o
| Science, Metaphysics || Decode |R
|____ ^ . . . v _____ || ^ v . . . ________|L
| Popper World 1 . Popper World 2b | D
Physical | Physical world > Perception | 4
| Popper World 3b . Encoding |
| Human Artifacts, Art < Action signals |
|__ . . . ________._______________|
| < v ^ > |
World 4
**********************************************************************
>> >Call it the "linguistic turn."
>>
>> I call it an "infinitely regressive" turn.
>
>It seems to me that something like this objection may be motivating
>the work of Richard Rorty.
You are about the fifth person to tell me I should read more Rorty.
So much to read, so little time.
>> Many have tried and failed (e.g., Whitehead and Russell (1925)
>> Principia Mathematics.). Some have given logical arguments why this
>> adventure *must* fail (e.g, Gödel, (1930) On Formally Undecidable
>> Propositions of Principia Mathematics and Related Systems).
>
>Because they were formalists?
Maybe, because they look at epistemology from the erroneous "universal
method" view. But, even I would not go as far a Feyerabend did in his
book, Against Method.
>> This is Bertrand Russell's (1912) idea. Again, this is no longer
>> thought to be sufficient.
>
>No one really refutes such a principle? It just fails to do
>somethings we'd like to do?
No one refutes it, but it goes astray almost immediately, because it
does not take into account the flaws in inductive interpretation of
repeated human perceptions. This principle can also lead to faulty
information processing, in that chains of "evidence" are broken by the
inductive inference flaws. Because of this, it is inadequate, and
therefore, we need a more reliable principle. But, compared to the
"esse" is "percepti" Idealism, that Berkeley spewed out, Russell's
Acquaintance Principle is almost a priori self-evident commonsense.
>> And, yet, we still only know these based on subjective-relative
>> training used to judge what is "seen," perceived. Knowledge is first
>> formed *before* observation -- probably by genetic a posteriori, and
>> not after observation -- as if it were a priori. Rather,
>> interpretation of the perception is formed after observation. This
>> goes counter to most empiricist arguments, including the one made here
>> by Michael Greer.
>
>Knowledge is formed before observation?
Yes, knowledge has to start before observation. Knowledge starts
perception, . . . perception can not start knowledge. Theory, the
guess, comes first: "OK, *now* I see what you mean. I never saw that
before. I should say, I "saw" it, but I never understood it."
One of the problems, was how unreliable human perceptions are. Hume
discovered problems with Empiricism's logical inference from
perceptions. The Empiricists went wrong when they stopped at
perception and made perception their "starting point" and then when up
from there and did not go any deeper down. They made perceptions the
ultimate source of knowledge (which even they admitted was
impossible), even knowing full-well how unreliable human perceptions
are and how the exact same perceptions will have logically
inconsistent "form" and inconsistent "substance" interpretations,
e.g., a mirage is a false perception that we cannot form knowledge
about by starting from the perception, (unless we want to be wrong
logically -- the wrong logical transmissibility direction and the
wrong substance -- water). And, why do we know about unobservables?
I say, because we don't start theories with observations, we "end"
theories with observations ("end" that is: to test the theory by
observing the real world and see if the theory is wrong, but not to
formulate the theory by starting with observations).
> Before here means logically
>prior?
That is right, in logical form and in substance, before observations.
As I said, this a posteriori explanation nowadays gives rise to
theories involving genetics, and thus inheritance and (punctuated)
evolutionary theory. The idea is that our bodies incorporate
knowledge derived from prior animals (not Lamarckian knowledge, but
innate knowledge nevertheless). This goes back at least to Kant's
realization, that we have limits to what we can know, no matter what
we do, because of our limited perceptions. It is considered by some,
(e.g., Bryan Magee) to be one of the greatest achievements to
epistemology ever made. My Border Collie, having never seen sheep or
been on a farm before (she is a city dog) -- apparently, innately --
knew how to herd, e.g., she "knew" what to do, without any training --
she knew not to bite the sheep, or to scare them too much, but to get
them into a group and then move them all together around the field.
Apparently, buried down deep in the genes someplace is the mechanism
for a propensity biased toward herding behavior. We biologists call
this "emergent" behavior. But that really does not explain anything.
So, we get into Complexity theory (Per Bak's (1996) How Nature Works),
and the like (my FWP).
>So we have formed conceptions without observation. How do we have access
>to that?
I would not say "conceptions," because that presupposes a particular
dogmatic theory interpretation based only on the "right" and maybe
erroneous linguistic concepts. Conceptions and linguistics are merely
human inventions, they have no causal power, they do not "do"
anything, i.e., they are instruments -- tools, and not universal nor
fundamental to epistemological theory formation, nor fundamental, in
my view, to a theory of mind. My World 2a and 2b has no concepts
(only neurobiological encoding), only my World 3 (invented) has
concepts. I don't know how it happens, but it happens. Just ask my
Border Collie, it works. My Border Collie does not know what a
herding concept is (that is only what we humans call it), yet she
herds.
>I can see the point that interpretation comes after observation, but
>I'm not clear about this "hard-wired" knowledge.
It is hard-wired but also, plastic and re-wireable with training and
learning and the propensity is apparently partly heritable (and looks
much like overt Lamarckian evolutionary theory claimed).
>>Look at Chalmers' page 6 the tribe that was studied, did
>> not see the lines on that page, as a representation of a
>> three-dimensional image.
>
>Because they lacked the knowledge to make that connection? They had
>never had any emipirical input with pages and lines? They had no
>conception of what an illustration in language is?
They drew pictures with lines just fine, they saw in 3-D just fine, it
is just that they were unable to identify a 3-D drawing depicted on a
2-D surface. The images on their retinas do not determine "what they
see." The process of perception is not determined by the sense organ.
Again, the Russell "sense-data" (observation) was not determining the
knowledge. Looking at the same object, people "see" it differently
and hence knowledge is not formulated by the observation.
>> So, then why not dump the proposed schema and the proposed empiricism
>> too? In my opinion, a more sufficient answer is Ackermann's and
>> Mayo's new experimentalism with error correction and local-theory
>> empirical epistemology (which is still not totally sufficient). This
>> is similar to Alan Chalmers' Unrepresentative Realism and John
>> Worrall's (1989b) Structural Realism. This also seems compatible with
>> Popper's reconstruction of Kant's Transcendental Realism and
>> Eddington's Super-Realism.
>
>Kant's Transcendental Idealism. The antinomies. The illusions of pure
>reason.
Kant was a Transcendental Realist metaphysician, and *not* a
"Transcendental Idealist." He explained his wording error in his
essay "Refutation of Idealism" in the second edition of his The
Critique of Pure Reason. This misunderstanding of Kant should be
cleared up now, but the misunderstanding was made by Kant himself when
he talked about time and space not "existing" except as a
transcendental idea or Ideal hence "Idealism." Yet, he was Realism's
Realist, (not an anti-realist or Idealist).
>> That is true. Existential statements cannot be used in science,
>> mainly because they are not deductively falsifiable as in testing a
>> theory empirically. Constructivist reformulation of existential
>> statements are however, used in science with no problem.
>
>Okay, Popper proposed the Principle of Falsifiability. This means that
>any thesis put forth must be tested to show that it is false.
Actually, only to show if it is false, when if is in fact false.
>The
>obverse of the principle of verifiability.
Which Popper rejected as illogical, so did Hume (problem of
induction). So, verifiability is NOT the obverse. Verifiability has
the opposite (IOW, wrong) direction of logical transmissibility and it
is illogical -- verifiability is the *invalid* counterpart of the
valid falsifiability.
>> Yet, Metaphysics (5.3) is not science (5.2) either. Yes, science,
>> math, and logic expects and gives answers (as explanations) to
>> problems. Most of the answers clash with reality and we have to
>> cull-out the contradictions and then build better explanatory
>> theories. Clashing with reality (yet remember, "Realism" is a
>> metaphysical theory) demarcates science vs. pseudoscience. We expect
>> more from philosophy than fun word games and pseudo-problems.
>
>Indeed. I couldn't agree more with that. I want to propose another
>solution, but I haven't got time today. Next time. Thanks for your
>remarks.
>
>Michael Greer
Thank you, Michael. I like reading your articles.
-- Davin
Michael Greer
Davin, it will take me some time to work through this reasoning, but
I'll get there soon enough. Let me remark here that I've been working
over the writings of Gustav Bergmann, and I hope to post some matters
relative to these issues and in his terms. His book *Realism, a
Critique of Brentano and Meinong* you might find interesting.
Michael Greer
Davin C. Enigl
wrote:
>Davin, it will take me some time to work through this reasoning, but
>I'll get there soon enough. Let me remark here that I've been working
>over the writings of Gustav Bergmann,
Excellent.
>and I hope to post some matters
>relative to these issues and in his terms. His book *Realism, a
>Critique of Brentano and Meinong* you might find interesting.
I've got a nice book on Brentano by Barry Smith (1994) Austrian
Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano.
>Michael Greer
