pomo science?
Philip Nikolayev
> Out of curiosity, are there any pomo scientists?
>
> Also, what would science done in a pomo way look like? How
> do pomos want science to be done?
Come to think of it, I'd like to know that too.
PN
Paul Strong
: bhat...@skynet.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
: PN
Kuhn? I suspect it would be done the same way it always is, with a little
more irony. ;)
Paul
Tom Coates
>Kuhn? I suspect it would be done the same way it always is, with a little
>more irony. ;)
Grrrr. True postmodernity is NOT about Irony. IMHO.
Tom Coates
Ken MacIver
>Philip Nikolayev (nik...@login1.fas.harvard.edu) wrote:
>: bhat...@skynet.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
>
>: > Out of curiosity, are there any pomo scientists?
>: >
>: > Also, what would science done in a pomo way look like? How
>: > do pomos want science to be done?
>
>: Come to think of it, I'd like to know that too.
>
Einstein would be the first pomo.
Ken
John McCarthy
Oh! In that case, I didn't need to read Derrida. Still, I don't see
the parallel.
--
John McCarthy, Computer Science Department, Stanford, CA 94305
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/progress/
He who refuses to do arithmetic is doomed to talk nonsense.
Steve & Jean Williams
of one!).... Look out for Kenneth Gergen and Rom Harre....
Steve
Philip Nikolayev wrote in message ...
>bhat...@skynet.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
>
>> Out of curiosity, are there any pomo scientists?
>>
>> Also, what would science done in a pomo way look like? How
>> do pomos want science to be done?
>
>Come to think of it, I'd like to know that too.
>
>PN
MT
not much of one!).... Look out for Kenneth Gergen and Rom Harre....>>
Not a science.
.....
Steve & Jean Williams
recognised as one....
Steve
MT wrote in message <360FED...@sprintmail.com>...
Philip Nikolayev
postmodernists think science should be done. Anyone?
PN
Colin Rosenthal
>There's still no response to the interesting question of how
>postmodernists think science should be done. Anyone?
I used to ask this question a lot around my pomo historyandsociologyofscience
friends in Cambridge. The straightest answer I ever got basically came out
as "just keep on doing science assuming you're really finding out the truth
about how the universe really actually is and we'll keep doing what we do
assuming you're not".
--
Colin Rosenthal
High Altitude Observatory
Boulder, Colorado
rose...@hao.ucar.edu
Ron Hardin
>
> There's still no response to the interesting question of how
> postmodernists think science should be done. Anyone?
>
Unpretentiously.
--
Ron Hardin
rhha...@mindspring.com
On the internet, nobody knows you're a jerk.
Ken MacIver
wrote:
>nan...@tiac.net (Ken MacIver) writes:
>
>> On 28 Sep 1998 05:31:52 GMT, pst...@uoguelph.ca (Paul Strong) wrote:
>>
>> >Philip Nikolayev (nik...@login1.fas.harvard.edu) wrote:
>> >: bhat...@skynet.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
>> >
>> >: > Out of curiosity, are there any pomo scientists?
>> >: >
>> >: > Also, what would science done in a pomo way look like? How
>> >: > do pomos want science to be done?
>> >
>> >: Come to think of it, I'd like to know that too.
>> >
>> Einstein would be the first pomo.
>
>Oh! In that case, I didn't need to read Derrida. Still, I don't see
>the parallel.
By way of [brief] explanation, I am of the view that pomo is modernism
renamed by a generation of scholars looking for something to
differentiate their studies [and efforts towards tenure] from the
recent past. In science, Einstein [and others, of course] broke from
the accepted notion of continuity and certainty [Maxwell's objective
observer].
Ken
ObRef: Everdell, The First Moderns
Steve & Jean Williams
research methodology.... The tendency being to use qualitative, rather than
quantitative methods; such as discourse analysis, ethnographic method and so
on.....
Now whether this is how postmodern science 'should be done' or not is
another matter.... Perhaps it shouldn't be done at all?
Steve
Philip Nikolayev wrote in message ...
youngkyj
much
>of one!).... Look out for Kenneth Gergen and Rom Harre....
I think 'science' does not need any adjective.
Dave Fried
>
> On 28 Sep 1998 18:21:42 -0400,
> Philip Nikolayev <nik...@login5.fas.harvard.edu> wrote:
> >postmodernists think science should be done. Anyone?
>
> friends in Cambridge. The straightest answer I ever got basically came out
> as "just keep on doing science assuming you're really finding out the truth
> about how the universe really actually is and we'll keep doing what we do
> assuming you're not".
Because they realize that the insistence that there is no absolute
underlying physical reality ends up telling us nothing useful about the
world. Whereas assuming there is (whether or not it's true) provides
two benefits: (1) technology progresses, bettering the situation of
mankind, and (2) pomos still have something to bitch about.
I dunno. I think pomo was invented because philosophers ran out of new
stuff to say. And maybe to get back at the scientists, whom they envy
because science actually *does* something.
So I think the above question is irrelevant. Science will always be
around. The question is what happens when pomo goes out of style? What
will post-post-structuralism be like?
--Dave
Tom Coates
that the world does not conform to strict determinist dogma - in this sense,
quantum theory etc, with its interaction of observer and observed is quite
often seem in this sense.
Philip Nikolayev wrote in message ...
>bhat...@skynet.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
>
>> Out of curiosity, are there any pomo scientists?
>>
>> Also, what would science done in a pomo way look like? How
>> do pomos want science to be done?
>
>Come to think of it, I'd like to know that too.
>
>PN
Tom Coates
>the parallel.
The point is not that scientists are approaching the same conclusions, but
that a similar distrust of grand uniform narratives, determinism, ideas of
total knowledge and comprehension is evolving in some of the scientists -
look at Heisenbergs Uncertainty Principle, for example - that is a very un
modernist concept.
Tom Coates
>By way of [brief] explanation, I am of the view that pomo is modernism
>renamed by a generation of scholars looking for something to
>differentiate their studies [and efforts towards tenure] from the
>recent past. In science, Einstein [and others, of course] broke from
>the accepted notion of continuity and certainty [Maxwell's objective
>observer].
That is one of the two main approaches to postmodernity - that it is a form
of uber-modernity rather than a break. I don't have a problem with that at
all, but I think it has distinguishing in that many of the assumptions of
modernity have been self-deconstructing.
Tom Coates
>underlying physical reality ends up telling us nothing useful about the
>world. Whereas assuming there is (whether or not it's true) provides
>two benefits: (1) technology progresses, bettering the situation of
>mankind, and (2) pomos still have something to bitch about.
This is irritating - and again proves that people should stop cross-posting
between alt.postmodern and other groups unless there is a bloody good
reason - it would be considered bad form if someone here cross posted "Books
are obselete" messages to rec.arts.books, however true it might be. I don't
want to enter dialogue at this stage with people who will assert things like
"common sense".
Most decent scientists do not assume that their theories reflect a true
underlying world, because they believe (like Popper) that no theoriy can be
proven, only falsified - in this sense, although they believe that rules and
laws of the universe will be consistent, they don't necessarily believe that
this reflects the way things are. I think you would be hard pushed to find a
postmodernist who said that whatever science is that it doesn't "work" in
some sense, but I think they would say that science is considerably more
problematic an artefact, and process than is generally assumed....
>I dunno. I think pomo was invented because philosophers ran out of new
>stuff to say. And maybe to get back at the scientists, whom they envy
>because science actually *does* something.
Really? Not because they pushed what they could say to the limits and found
that if pushed enough it always collapsed upon itself? In many ways
postmodernity is the natural limit of philosophy, the point on the margins
where philosophy, science, art etc. collapses upon itself. For that reason
it has more of a structural use (in terms of its relations to other ideas)
than a practical one of its own. IMHO.
>So I think the above question is irrelevant. Science will always be
>around. The question is what happens when pomo goes out of style? What
>will post-post-structuralism be like?
But to what extent has science always been around? The ideas have changed,
the methologies used to determine truth have shifted, the sense of what it
is there to do has changed as well. And postmodernity may very well go out
of style, but philosophy has existed just as long as science, indeed
fractionally longer if anything. Philosophy too has transformed over the
years. Once they could not be told apart, and now again they seem to be
moving togther again.
Tom Coates
>not much of one!).... Look out for Kenneth Gergen and Rom Harre....>>
>
Well that is one of those really interesting arguments isn't it. Seeing as
postmodernity problematises ideas of science and their division from what is
considered not science, it is a little clumsy to use Popperian ideas of what
constitutes a science to tell whether something can be considered postmodern
science. Using your typology of science and non-science, based on strict
determinist (modernist) notions of proof, then nothing that is postmodern
CAN be science. I tend to think the edges are woolier than that....
Tom Coates
youngkyj wrote in message ...
>I think 'science' does not need any adjective.
Then you will not be open to postmodern ideas of what science is.
Ron Hardin
>
> >There are pomo psychologists, and psychology is a science (although not
> much
> >of one!).... Look out for Kenneth Gergen and Rom Harre....
>
Small-breasted science
Dave Fried
>
> This is irritating - and again proves that people should stop cross-posting
> between alt.postmodern
Apologies for cross-posts. In the future, replies will be limited to
alt.philosophy.misc.
> Most decent scientists do not assume that their theories reflect a true
> underlying world, because they believe (like Popper) that no theoriy can be
> proven, only falsified
This is an incorrect conclusion; you are assuming a majority of
scientists think like you, which is incorrect. From personal experience
(as a scientist who has studied at two highly regarded institutions of
higher learning) scientists generally take one of two views:
1) That the theories which they come up with reflect the exact physical
nature of the Universe (or would, if they were refined properly enough).
2) That the theories describe the underlying mathematics behind things
like physics, chemistry, etc., though the actual physical phenomena are
just manifestations of the math.
The main difference between the two attitudes is more what is real, the
observations or the theory (or the *ideal* theory, I should say). There
are very few scientists who believe that their discoveries are just the
product of some specific "need" of Western Culture and don't actually
represent absolute physical concepts.
> in this sense, although they believe that rules and
> laws of the universe will be consistent, they don't necessarily believe that
> this reflects the way things are.
I don't understand this statement. You seem to be saying either that
scientists believe that the rules can never be known, but that they are
still there and consistent, or that there are rules that can be
discerned through science but that those rules do not necessarily
reflect reality? Most scientists would assert that at least a subset of
physical laws can be known, and that they do reflect reality (even if
this is just pragmatic--you can't say anything useful about reality
unless you believe in it).
> I think you would be hard pushed to find a
> postmodernist who said that whatever science is that it doesn't "work" in
> some sense, but I think they would say that science is considerably more
> problematic an artefact, and process than is generally assumed....
Problematic artifact, process? Problematic in the way any human
endeavor is problematic... An artifact of what? Western culture? I
hardly think so. The scientific method in some form has existed in
every culture. Human culture? What other culture do we know of?
Science, despite the fact that it has been carried out by imperfect
human beings, is the *only* thing which has consistently led to a
greater understanding of the universe and of ourselves.
The only thing postmodernity has established is that philosophy
collapses if you think too hard.
> Really? Not because they pushed what they could say to the limits and found
> that if pushed enough it always collapsed upon itself? In many ways
> postmodernity is the natural limit of philosophy, the point on the margins
> where philosophy, science, art etc. collapses upon itself. For that reason
> it has more of a structural use (in terms of its relations to other ideas)
> than a practical one of its own. IMHO.
Like I said... But can you apply pomo to science? Science deals with
physical reality, to which there appears to be some concrete substance.
Philosophy and art deal with the human experience, which (I would agree
with you in saying) has no absolutes. That the first (physical reality)
is a subset of the second (human reality) and therefore also lacking in
absolutes is a very strong claim, especially given the progress made by
science in discovering what we consider to be physical absolutes and
laws. But you would discard that argument as empiricism, wouldn't you
8^>
> >So I think the above question is irrelevant. Science will always be
> >around. The question is what happens when pomo goes out of style? What
> >will post-post-structuralism be like?
>
> But to what extent has science always been around? The ideas have changed,
> the methologies used to determine truth have shifted, the sense of what it
> is there to do has changed as well. And postmodernity may very well go out
> of style, but philosophy has existed just as long as science, indeed
> fractionally longer if anything. Philosophy too has transformed over the
> years. Once they could not be told apart, and now again they seem to be
> moving togther again.
Philosophy deals with what can be discerned directly though thought
about the human experience. Science deals with what can be determined
empirically about the physical world. Again, to claim that philosophy
(of any kind) can or should affect the way science is done doesn't seem
to make sense.
Just because you can think so hard that your brain falls out is not a
justification for deciding that everyone else's brain has fallen out
too, and that they just don't know it yet.
--Dave
MT
<<I think you would be hard pushed to find a postmodernist who said that
whatever science is that it doesn't "work" in some sense, but I think
they would say that science is considerably more problematic an
artefact, and process than is generally assumed....>>
Scientists are well aware of this. After all, the "artifact" is their
bread and butter...
.....
Dave Fried
A common fallacy for those who don't understand the math behind quantum
mechanics is to conclude that the H.U.P. says something profound about
what we can and cannot know. In reality, it is a definite statement of
fact relating two variables in the wave function of a QM particle. The
function can be known exactly, but the momentum and position follow some
sort of probability distribution, and the product of their standard
deviations is always a positive integer.
No, of course it *is* significant to say that we can't know exactly
where an electron is and how fast it's moving at the same time. But
that's just as shocking as saying that you can't look inside a black
hole, or solve the halting problem. These phenomena, however
frustrating, are all still based on *known* mathematical and physical
laws.
--Dave
j...@ncgr.org
> There's still no response to the interesting question of how
> postmodernists think science should be done. Anyone?
I'm not an expert, but I'll take a guess at it. One might look
at the process and the objects of science as reflections of
ourselves. In the eyepiece of the telescope: the ghostly
reflection of a blinking curious eyeball.
But in order to learn from the reflection one has also to conduct
what might be thought of as the more "naive" kind of science.
One has to have "scientific" enterprises in order to be able to
study the unconscious principles within those enterprises. So,
I doubt if there'd be much value in radically transforming science,
en toto. The goals of the "postmodernist" (assuming I have correctly
intuited something about that creature) are different than the
goals of the "scientist", and criteria by which a set of goals
is preferred and valued are aesthetic ones.
This need for two opposed, or at least conflicted principles also
implies that the process of having the void look into oneself will
always seem at least irrelevant (and often repulsive) to folks who
are more interested in just looking into the void. (And vice versa.)
Hence, I suspect this debate will not be resolved. It seems possible,
though, that both sides could become more sophisticated and interesting,
as a result of contact with the other.
-----== Posted via Deja News, The Leader in Internet Discussion ==-----
http://www.dejanews.com/rg_mkgrp.xp Create Your Own Free Member Forum
Joan Marie Shields
bhat...@skynet.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
>>> Also, what would science done in a pomo way look like? How
>>> do pomos want science to be done?
Tom Coates <Tom.C...@CHEEZbtinternet.com> wrote:
>People tend to refer to postmodern scientists as scientists who have found
>that the world does not conform to strict determinist dogma - in this sense,
>quantum theory etc, with its interaction of observer and observed is quite
>often seem in this sense.
The curious thing about the above is that there have always been scientists
who were/are not satisfied with conforming to dogma AND that there have been
regular cycles of science dogma shatterings throughout history. What makes
today and this round of it so special that it needs be called postmodern?
ObPhiol: While I haven't read Derrida I have read some of Decartes
yours in wet fishes and critical thinking,
joan
--
Joan Shields jshi...@uci.edu http://www.ags.uci.edu/~jshields
University of California - Irvine School of Social Ecology
Department of Environmental Analysis and Design
I do not purchase services or products from unsolicited e-mail advertisements.
MT
<<This need for two opposed, or at least conflicted principles also
implies that the process of having the void look into oneself will
always seem at least irrelevant (and often repulsive) to folks who
are more interested in just looking into the void. (And vice versa.)
Hence, I suspect this debate will not be resolved. It seems possible,
though, that both sides could become more sophisticated and interesting,
as a result of contact with the other.>>
Having the void will look into oneself? I was looking for a boulangerie.
ObPoem: "No" by Oliverio Girondo
Tom Coates
cross-posting
>> between alt.postmodern
>
>Apologies for cross-posts. In the future, replies will be limited to
>alt.philosophy.misc.
I only want it removed from rec.arts.books, as responses from there are
often ill-informed.
>> Most decent scientists do not assume that their theories reflect a true
>> underlying world, because they believe (like Popper) that no theoriy can
be
>> proven, only falsified
>
>This is an incorrect conclusion; you are assuming a majority of
>scientists think like you, which is incorrect. From personal experience
>(as a scientist who has studied at two highly regarded institutions of
>higher learning) scientists generally take one of two views:
Well, you are of course correct in that most scientists do indeed believe in
one of the following ideas, however it is part of the training of the
"scientific method" that you operate about hypotheses and attempting to
disprove them. Since it is generally considered impossible to PROVE
something (except in mathematics), the theory cannot be held to COMPLETELY
accurately model the "real" world, nor can it EVER be said to COMPLETELY
accurately model the "real" world - since even though there has been to date
no disproof, that does not mean that such a disproof might occur. For the
sake of convenience these theories are held to be correct if there is no
apparent disproof, but this is not a proof in and of itself. This is basic
modernist stuff, as I am sure you know - described by one of the most
stringent modernists, Karl Popper.
>1) That the theories which they come up with reflect the exact physical
>nature of the Universe (or would, if they were refined properly enough).
Indeed - but even assuming they did, they are still metaphors - the phrase
"reflect" is interesting in itself here - it "isn't", but it accurately
appears the same.
>2) That the theories describe the underlying mathematics behind things
>like physics, chemistry, etc., though the actual physical phenomena are
>just manifestations of the math.
More interesting - but if you extend things down to the most basic parts,
(Biology being large scale Chemistry being large scale physics, composed at
one level of quantum physics), at THIS level, the math is expressed in terms
of probability and in relation to observers etc. Since this is at one of the
most fundamental levels, and this cannot be accurately predicted except
through probability, there is at least one level of mathematical determinism
which should be considered problematic.
>The main difference between the two attitudes is more what is real, the
>observations or the theory (or the *ideal* theory, I should say). There
>are very few scientists who believe that their discoveries are just the
>product of some specific "need" of Western Culture and don't actually
>represent absolute physical concepts.
I certainly don't believe that either! People completely bastardise
Postmodern insights into Science. Having said that though, I think there is
a third position which is comfortable with the idea that these things are
not MERELY reflecting some kind of external reality and that there are onion
skins of interpretation, metaphor, ideology etc, that cannot ever be
entirely removed or divorced from science while also thinking that such
reflections must necessarily limit the full expression of "truth".
Most scientists would assert that at least a subset of
>physical laws can be known, and that they do reflect reality (even if
>this is just pragmatic--you can't say anything useful about reality
>unless you believe in it).
This is an interesting statement. I don't know what I think about this
particularly, except that an assertion that you cannot say anything useful
suggests that the theories are to some extent already based upon an
assertion of faith - faith that there is something at all. I know this seems
really sophmoric, but Derrida's idea of the metaphysics of presence seems
relevant here.
>> I think you would be hard pushed to find a
>> postmodernist who said that whatever science is that it doesn't "work" in
>> some sense, but I think they would say that science is considerably more
>> problematic an artefact, and process than is generally assumed....
>
>Problematic artifact, process? Problematic in the way any human
>endeavor is problematic...
Yes, exactly. That is exactly right. Science is a human endeavor, and
therefore problematic and worthy of investigation, inevitably flawed, useful
and functional, but a product of human minds, with their associations,
links, interpretative mechanisms blah blah blah. That's all that I am really
asserting here - and although it is a bastardisation of a postmodern
position, it makes a point reasonably well - I don't know of a single
postmodernist who wants to get rid of science, much as I wouldn't want to
suggest that we get rid of gravity - but that doesn't mean that the analysis
of the concept and functioning of science in its mechanisms, gaps,
fundamental assumptions, etc should not be undertaken!
>An artifact of what? Western culture? I
>hardly think so. The scientific method in some form has existed in
>every culture.
Really? That's an interesting assertion.
> Human culture? What other culture do we know of?
Since much of postmodernity has evolved from quite a lot of work on language
and meaning through post-structuralism, etc - with the analysis of the
indeterminacy of meaning etc. I think it reasonably certain that generally
we are talking about creatures with language here - ie. humans.
>Science, despite the fact that it has been carried out by imperfect
>human beings, is the *only* thing which has consistently led to a
>greater understanding of the universe and of ourselves.
But has it led to a greater understanding of itself? Is it not a worthy
object of study - and what if what is found undermines some of its
pretentions. Sure this is a good thing? To get a sense of where it
collapses.
>The only thing postmodernity has established is that philosophy
>collapses if you think too hard.
No - I think that it has established that rationality itself collapses if
you push it too hard - that if you go to the edges you find that the
assumptions that you base everything else on are fundamentally
unsupportable - not that they are wrong, but that there is no way to tell if
they are right or wrong. In fact that ideas like right and wrong themselves
are more heavily laden with other ideas.
>Just because you can think so hard that your brain falls out is not a
>justification for deciding that everyone else's brain has fallen out
>too, and that they just don't know it yet.
I think this has got a little trivial now. The fact, for example, that
"meaning" and "truth" are problematic concepts, does not mean that something
called "meaning" and "truth" don't operate as effective concepts in a large
process or economy of analysis. And surely analysis of the nature of the
standards we assess all thought and argument by is fundamental to the whole
project that you believe in?
Tom Coates
>>People tend to refer to postmodern scientists as scientists who have found
>>that the world does not conform to strict determinist dogma - in this
sense,
>>quantum theory etc, with its interaction of observer and observed is quite
>>often seem in this sense.
>
>The curious thing about the above is that there have always been scientists
>who were/are not satisfied with conforming to dogma AND that there have
been
>regular cycles of science dogma shatterings throughout history. What makes
>today and this round of it so special that it needs be called postmodern?
It's not dogma that is the problem as such, since scientists have always
shifted and moved through a variety of paradigms. But what is the subject of
postmodernity is the Enlightenment modernist project of trying to
understand, uncover and fully comprehend everything - hence if you notice I
talk about DETERMINIST dogma. Postmodernity seems to me to take issue with
the force and potency of notions like meaning and truth in order that they
should not be taken for granted and that they should be understood to be
constructions in and of themselves, and hence inevitably at some level
problematic.
M.C.Harrison
>
> There's still no response to the interesting question of how
> postmodernists think science should be done. Anyone?
Probably the way they do other forms of logic, i.e. "wrongly".
Oops, I just remembered they don't perceive things as right or wrong,
only as sharing or unsharing.
Basically, could post-modernists get a man onto the moon? Obviously not,
even with the hot air.
Iván Ordóñez
<Tom.C...@CHEEZbtinternet.com> wrote:
>People tend to refer to postmodern scientists as scientists who have found
>that the world does not conform to strict determinist dogma - in this sense,
>quantum theory etc, with its interaction of observer and observed is quite
>often seem in this sense.
So as soon as someone finds out that quantum theory involves probabilities
then presto! one has become a postmodernist?
I don't really have a clue what "determinist dogma" is nowadays. Before
this century, people didn't have the means to look at things close enough
to realize that Newtonian mechanics breaks down at certain places. Every
observation was consistent with Newton's laws. Hardly a dogma, since a
dogma is an unjustified belief. What people like Heisenberg did was not to
shatter a dogma, but to provide a more encompassing theory, consistent
with recent observations in ways that previous theories were not.
So your observation reduces to: "postmodern scientist are just scientists
that live in the 20th century", because unless they have been buried in a
time capsule, no scientists believes anymore that Newtonian mechanics are
accurate. Does it turn out that to be a postmodernist one only needs a
decent education? How come I think that "distrust of grand metanarratives"
is an inherently contradictory statement (it *is* a grand metanarrative,
after all)?
--
Iván Ordóñez
iord...@columbus.rr.com
http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/~iordonez
email is iordonez at columbus dot rr dot com
Dave Fried
> I only want it removed from rec.arts.books, as responses from there are
> often ill-informed.
We'll see how it goes, then.
> >This is an incorrect conclusion; you are assuming a majority of
> >scientists think like you, which is incorrect. From personal experience
> >(as a scientist who has studied at two highly regarded institutions of
> >higher learning) scientists generally take one of two views:
>
[SNIP - appears later]
>
> >1) That the theories which they come up with reflect the exact physical
> >nature of the Universe (or would, if they were refined properly enough).
>
> Indeed - but even assuming they did, they are still metaphors - the phrase
> "reflect" is interesting in itself here - it "isn't", but it accurately
> appears the same.
Well, as you'd probably agree, theories (especially ones with
qualitiative aspects) can only be stated using human languages, which
are fundamentally incapable of conveying exactly what you want them to.
I think this is a major problem in modern philosophy, too, as most of
what I've read becomes unnecessarily wordy in an attempt to nail down
the point being made 8^) Therefore, written theories and scientific
explanations can only "reflect" the true underlying physical nature of
the universe*, though I would also argue that mathematics, since it *is*
exact, self-consistent, and *can* prove useful things, when used in
scientific theories *may* perfectly describe a phenomenon.
* I only use the idea of an extant underlying physical nature because
our experience has been that the world behaves in predictable ways.
But, as I said before, I tend to give empiricism plenty of credit.
> >2) That the theories describe the underlying mathematics behind things
> >like physics, chemistry, etc., though the actual physical phenomena are
> >just manifestations of the math.
>
> More interesting - but if you extend things down to the most basic parts,
> (Biology being large scale Chemistry being large scale physics, composed at
> one level of quantum physics), at THIS level, the math is expressed in terms
> of probability and in relation to observers etc. Since this is at one of the
> most fundamental levels, and this cannot be accurately predicted except
> through probability, there is at least one level of mathematical determinism
> which should be considered problematic.
Who ever said that scientific thought/empiricism == strict mathematical
determinism? I mean, scientists in some fields, up until the
introduction of quantum mechanics might have equated the two, but most
(including biologists, chemists, statisticians, economists, etc.) have
always had to deal with probability. The more interesting question is
whether the underlying probability models are true (perhaps call this a
bias toward "probabilistic determinism," for lack of remembering whose
philosophical camp this describes--the opposite of the Bayesians?).
> >The main difference between the two attitudes is more what is real, the
> >observations or the theory (or the *ideal* theory, I should say). There
> >are very few scientists who believe that their discoveries are just the
> >product of some specific "need" of Western Culture and don't actually
> >represent absolute physical concepts.
>
> I certainly don't believe that either! People completely bastardise
> Postmodern insights into Science. Having said that though, I think there is
> a third position which is comfortable with the idea that these things are
> not MERELY reflecting some kind of external reality and that there are onion
> skins of interpretation, metaphor, ideology etc, that cannot ever be
> entirely removed or divorced from science while also thinking that such
> reflections must necessarily limit the full expression of "truth".
Well, postmodernism is sometimes used as a tool to attack established
scientific principles, like genetic theory, when the predictions or
findings of said theory conflict with the pomos' philosophical or
political agenda. I don't support pseudoscience like the "Bell Curve,"
but in some places even suggesting that things like intelligence and
creativity have genetic basis** will start people with that "DNA is just
a tool of Eurocentric patriarchal science used to oppress women and
minorities" bullcrap. This particular frustration was vented by a
columnist in Discover Magaizine not very long ago, but you see this sort
of thing a lot.
Now I'm not saying that this is a proper use or interperetation of the
pomo philosophy, just that, taken to the extreme, you get people
claiming that since the West Australian aborigines believe the world is
flat, it's not fair for science to claim absolutely that it's round.
** Since there is greater genetic diversity between individuals of the
same race than between races, I don't believe this can be applied in the
same way the "Bell Curve" scientists did. So please don't start calling
me a Nazi 8^>
> Most scientists would assert that at least a subset of
> >physical laws can be known, and that they do reflect reality (even if
> >this is just pragmatic--you can't say anything useful about reality
> >unless you believe in it).
[from before]
> Well, you are of course correct in that most scientists do indeed believe in
> one of the following ideas, however it is part of the training of the
> "scientific method" that you operate about hypotheses and attempting to
> disprove them. Since it is generally considered impossible to PROVE
> something (except in mathematics), the theory cannot be held to COMPLETELY
> accurately model the "real" world, nor can it EVER be said to COMPLETELY
> accurately model the "real" world - since even though there has been to date
> no disproof, that does not mean that such a disproof might occur. For the
> sake of convenience these theories are held to be correct if there is no
> apparent disproof, but this is not a proof in and of itself. This is basic
> modernist stuff, as I am sure you know - described by one of the most
> stringent modernists, Karl Popper.
[end excerpt]
> This is an interesting statement. I don't know what I think about this
> particularly, except that an assertion that you cannot say anything useful
> suggests that the theories are to some extent already based upon an
> assertion of faith - faith that there is something at all. I know this seems
> really sophmoric, but Derrida's idea of the metaphysics of presence seems
> relevant here.
Of course there is the possibility that there is nothing, and that
everything we experience is some sort of silly hallucination. But that
sort of thinking is problematic because (a) you can't say anything
useful about anything and (b) it's usually easier and more practical to
assume, until given reason not to, that things are more or less as they
appear.
The truth <g> is that you have to make some assumptions; make some kind
of a leap of faith to do anything. The issue becomes, after you've made
that leap, does the world still make sense; is it self-consistent? If
our leap is that reality exists and that we can at least partially
observe it (a rather minimal claim), then science is the natural
product, and tends to work very well.
Can you get anything useful without making both or either of those
assumptions? If so, do tell! If not, then you're not in a position to
criticize others for making the assumptions, other than to occasionally
point out that they did make the assumptions, and that we might all
really be figments of the imagination of the Invisible Pink Unicorn.
> >[science is a] Problematic artifact, process? Problematic in the way any human
> >endeavor is problematic...
>
> Yes, exactly. That is exactly right. Science is a human endeavor, and
> therefore problematic and worthy of investigation, inevitably flawed, useful
> and functional, but a product of human minds, with their associations,
> links, interpretative mechanisms blah blah blah. That's all that I am really
> asserting here - and although it is a bastardisation of a postmodern
> position, it makes a point reasonably well - I don't know of a single
> postmodernist who wants to get rid of science, much as I wouldn't want to
> suggest that we get rid of gravity - but that doesn't mean that the analysis
> of the concept and functioning of science in its mechanisms, gaps,
> fundamental assumptions, etc should not be undertaken!
OK, here is where we differ. You want to examine science the same way
you examine philosophy, sociology, theory of government, etc. You want
to pick it apart and show that everyone is biased and bringing their own
issues to the table, and saying stuff that suits them or their culture.
Maybe that's valid, but I think there are some things which set science
apart and make it difficult to compare with philosophy, religion, and
other fields.
I wonder (and this question may stem more from me not being well-read
enough) what other processes you would combine science with to make it
more palatable, or what other processes could be used in place of
science to answer scientific questions (and where they would be
applicable). If there are no substitutes for science in answering
questions about the world, then you kind of have to accept the results,
even if you don't like how they were attained.
> >An artifact of what? Western culture? I
> >hardly think so. The scientific method in some form has existed in
> >every culture.
>
> Really? That's an interesting assertion.
In that the scientific method says, "create a hypothesis to explain a
phenomenon; test the hypothesis; if it fails start over." We wouldn't
have gotten much past stone tools if we didn't do this on a regular
basis. It's part of the way the human mind works. The
institutionalization of science as it is found in academia in the modern
world is not science, though it does science. This is an important
distinction!
Eastern religion/philosophy sometimes discards empiricism, but
technological advance in the East was just as dependent on that sort of
scientific thinking.
Then again, if you think that it is indeed an artifact of Western
culture, demonstrate why.
> >Science, despite the fact that it has been carried out by imperfect
> >human beings, is the *only* thing which has consistently led to a
> >greater understanding of the universe and of ourselves.
>
> But has it led to a greater understanding of itself? Is it not a worthy
> object of study - and what if what is found undermines some of its
> pretentions. Sure this is a good thing? To get a sense of where it
> collapses.
What undermines science's pretentions? Where does it collapse? If only
at the boundary of accepting reality at all, then it's as solid (if not
moreso) than any other method of thought.
> >The only thing postmodernity has established is that philosophy
> >collapses if you think too hard.
>
> No - I think that it has established that rationality itself collapses if
> you push it too hard - that if you go to the edges you find that the
> assumptions that you base everything else on are fundamentally
> unsupportable - not that they are wrong, but that there is no way to tell if
> they are right or wrong. In fact that ideas like right and wrong themselves
> are more heavily laden with other ideas.
But what conclusion do you draw from this? Even if the underlying truth
is that there is no truth, there are existing systems (however flawed)
that produce useful information. Science may be flawed, but it is still
the best and most useful system we have for exploring the world around
us.
--Dave
Richard Crew
: bhat...@skynet.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
:
: > Out of curiosity, are there any pomo scientists?
: > Also, what would science done in a pomo way look like? How
: Come to think of it, I'd like to know that too.
If you want to know what one pomo thinks it might be, check out Lyotard's
'Postmodern Condition', in particular the chapter on 'Postmodern science as
the search for instabilities.'
Mind you, this is just Lyotard's fantasy. He claims to be discussing the
practice of current science, his understanding of it seems so helplessly
incoherent that it's hard to take it seriously even as a possibility.
--Rich
--
Better to toss a stone at random, then a word.
-Porphyry
Richard Crew
:
: By way of [brief] explanation, I am of the view that pomo is modernism
: renamed by a generation of scholars looking for something to
: differentiate their studies [and efforts towards tenure] from the
: recent past. In science, Einstein [and others, of course] broke from
: the accepted notion of continuity and certainty [Maxwell's objective
: observer].
: Ken
:
: ObRef: Everdell, The First Moderns
Einstein breaks with accepted notions of continuity and certainty? What
can this mean? I didn't think that Relativity was any less "certain" than
classical mechanics. And in what sense does it break with "continuity"?
Re Everdell: I found his account of the relation of modernism &
postmodernism quite on the mark, too. And I found the book quite enjoyable,
although for me it was marred by some real bloopers on the subject of
mathematics. It does not inspire confidence when an author who seems
generally reliable loses it when he starts discussing precisely the subject
one knows best...
Richard Crew
:
: >People tend to refer to postmodern scientists as scientists who have found
: >that the world does not conform to strict determinist dogma - in this sense,
: >quantum theory etc, with its interaction of observer and observed is quite
: >often seem in this sense.
: The curious thing about the above is that there have always been scientists
: who were/are not satisfied with conforming to dogma AND that there have been
: regular cycles of science dogma shatterings throughout history. What makes
: today and this round of it so special that it needs be called postmodern?
:
It has always amused me some of the scientists most frequently help up as
heralding the postmodern era -- Einstein and Godel -- held views basically
at odds with the "standard" postmodern ones: in Einstein's case, determinism,
and in Godel's, Platonic realism.
Michael Kagalenko
]The point is not that scientists are approaching the same conclusions, but
]that a similar distrust of grand uniform narratives, determinism, ideas of
]total knowledge and comprehension is evolving in some of the scientists -
]look at Heisenbergs Uncertainty Principle, for example - that is a very un
]modernist concept.
Some facts about "uncertainty principle":
- It is not a principle. It is consequence of the postulates of
Quantum mechanics (that physical variables are represented by non-commuting
operators acting on the wave functions)
- It does not say what you think it does. Specifically, it has nothing to do
with "grand uniform narratives, determinism, ideas of total knowledge and
comprehension." Rather, it gets grossly misapplied by ignorant pseudo-
scholars, a lot like Goedel's theorem, actually.
- Pomos who talk about it unfailingly produce hugely amusing (to those
who understand QM) texts, full of most precious howlers.
Tom Coates
Silke-Maria Weineck wrote in message <5U9Q1.5274>: I only want it removed
from rec.arts.books, as responses from there are
>: often ill-informed.
>
>ap/rab crosspost is a genre in itself. Who or what appointed you Miss
>Manners of ap anyway? Be a good boy and look up the meaning of DAU.
Why don't you fuck yourself. I have spent considerable time justifying
postmodernity in this group to considerable numbers of people who fight
against it simply because it is counter-intuitive. If it is a seperate genre
of people, then you have to expect it to not be about postmodernity. I came
here to discuss postmodernity with people, not justify my interest in it,
and I think that if you cross-posted to any other group while including
slamming comments about the subject of the group you would get people
complaining about it. When I said ill-informed I only meant ABOUT
postmodernity. rec.arts.books is CLEARLY a more general group than
alt.postmodern, and if being subject to the ill-informed whims of people who
have no interest in postmodernity is part of posting to alt.postmodern then
I will indeed leave.
Christ. i can't spend my life in this group fucking justifying postmodernity
to people. I want to investigate it not explain it to people over and over
again.
Joseph Askew
>There are pomo psychologists, and psychology is a science (although not much
>of one!).... Look out for Kenneth Gergen and Rom Harre....
I've now attended three different Universities. I've visited far
more. I can't think of one that places psychology in the Faculty of
Science (or whatever its local equivalent is). Here the rumour is
that Psych wanted to be in with Medicine. But they wouldn't have
them. So they tried for Science, but they wouldn't have them either.
So they ended up in Arts of which they are the largest slice of
EFTSUs I believe. Psychology, if it is indeed a science, is the
only science I can think of which accepts students for higher
degrees if they have failed every single mandatory statistics
course during their entire under-grad life.
Joseph
--
Reason Why I'm Never Going to Get an Academic Job Number Three:
"[Monsanto] said that they had carried out 'extensive safety
assessments of new biotech crops' including tests using rats
that have results published in journals" (http://news.bbc.co.uk)
MT
<<I think fundamentally that is correct - but then when I talked of
postmodernity in the sciences I wasn't talking about postmodernity
elsewhere. Generally, postmodern science is viewed.....>>
There is no postmodern science.
Dave Fried
too much work to respond to 8^)
Tom Coates wrote:
>
> I am simply not interested in whether science is useful or not. I *know*
> that it works, generally, but that is not to say that there are times when
> it is self-undermining, where its basic premises, or purported long term
> goals collapse under themselves - areas worthy of study surely?
That is precisely what I'm interested in. I understand that you have
probably had this conversation many times on this newsgroup before (we
fight the same fight in the atheism and humanism newsgroups) but I'd
really like to know exactly what about science is self-undermining?
What exactly do you feel the goals of science are, other than to learn
more about the observable universe? And are those goals contradictory;
do they collapse under any circumstances other than the disbelief of the
observable universe itself? I hope I'm not creating a strawman here,
I'd just really like an explanation/justification for this.
Thanks,
Dave
John McCarthy
Think of math as art. Most everything in painting, for
example, whatever form it took, was at some level
representational in nature. First Cezanne, then Picasso,
pointed the way towards hidden doors. IMO, Braque's
painting of the houses at L'estraque (sp) represents the
absolute break from the past, the moment when houses have
neither doors nor windows nor do they resemble houses, as we
thought of them until that time. Einstein and relativity
broke from the past in a similar manner.
The special theory of relativity is not a break with past
methodology. It changes the notions of the way distance and time
interval depend on the co-ordinate system used to measure these
differences. Specifically, the special theory of relativity
asserts that if (x1,y1,z1,t1) and (x2,y2,z2,t2) are two
*events*, i.e. space-time points, then
(x1 - x2)^2 + (y1 - y2)^2 + (z1 - z2)^2 - c^2(t1 - t2)^2
does not depend on the inertial co-ordinate system used to
represent (x1,y1,z1,t1) and (x2,y2,z2,t2). Pre-relativistic
physics would have asserted that
(x1 - x2)^2 + (y1 - y2)^2 + (z1 - z2)^2
and
(t1 - t2)^2
are separately independent of the co-ordinate system. Special
relativity does not allow the separate invariance of time and
space intervals.
This is a clear and precise statement of physics, and it was well
accepted by most phyicists rather shortly after Einstein asserted
it in 1905.
There is no mysticism in it. The analogy with the painters is
false. The painters proposed a new way of looking at the world,
whereas Einstein asserted what he believed to be a previously
undiscovered fact about the world. Einstein turned out to be
right.
The general theory of relativity (1916) is more complicated, but
it is also an assertion of fact about the world. Unfortunately,
while a few of the mathematical consequences of general
relativity were calculated relativity and more have been
calculated from time to time, the mathematical consequences of
the theory have proved very difficult. Not even the full theory
of two bodies has been computed.
There are plenty of mysteries but no mystcism in relativity.
--
John McCarthy, Computer Science Department, Stanford, CA 94305
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/progress/
He who refuses to do arithmetic is doomed to talk nonsense.
Lewis Mammel
> There are plenty of mysteries but no mystcism in relativity.
... but there's a lot of mysticism AROUND it. I forget the question -
I think it was "Does metaphysics have anything to say to science?" - but
I remember Einstein's answer: "Science is metaphysics."
Lew Mammel, Jr.
Tom Coates
Dave Fried wrote in message <36115732...@students.uiuc.edu>...
>Of course there is the possibility that there is nothing, and that
>everything we experience is some sort of silly hallucination. But that
>sort of thinking is problematic because (a) you can't say anything
>useful about anything and (b) it's usually easier and more practical to
>assume, until given reason not to, that things are more or less as they
>appear.
I am simply not interested in whether science is useful or not. I *know*
that it works, generally, but that is not to say that there are times when
it is self-undermining, where its basic premises, or purported long term
goals collapse under themselves - areas worthy of study surely?
>Can you get anything useful without making both or either of those
>assumptions? If so, do tell! If not, then you're not in a position to
>criticize others for making the assumptions, other than to occasionally
>point out that they did make the assumptions, and that we might all
>really be figments of the imagination of the Invisible Pink Unicorn.
Nope. Disagree! I think that it is very much worthwhile examining the very
assumptions of a science based on rationality and ideas of progress,
fullness of knowledge etc. and to determine whether assumptions of this
nature are flawed. That does not mean that you dismiss all the work that has
occurred, merely that you look at science itself as a product of humanity, a
huge and evolving branch of human thought, and then decide whether or not
problems with human thought - like the nature and problematics of meaning,
grand-narratives etc. effect this product....
>I wonder (and this question may stem more from me not being well-read
>enough) what other processes you would combine science with to make it
>more palatable, or what other processes could be used in place of
>science to answer scientific questions (and where they would be
>applicable). If there are no substitutes for science in answering
>questions about the world, then you kind of have to accept the results,
>even if you don't like how they were attained.
I don' t think it is a question of alternatives - just because there are not
necessarily any alternatives does not make something unworthy of
investigation or further (interminable) analysis.
>But what conclusion do you draw from this? Even if the underlying truth
>is that there is no truth, there are existing systems (however flawed)
>that produce useful information. Science may be flawed, but it is still
>the best and most useful system we have for exploring the world around
>us.
I don't deny this. But that doesn't mean it is without its problems,
tensions and flaws which are still worth examining.
Tom Coates
Iván Ordóñez wrote in message ...
>So your observation reduces to: "postmodern scientist are just scientists
>that live in the 20th century", because unless they have been buried in a
>time capsule, no scientists believes anymore that Newtonian mechanics are
>accurate. Does it turn out that to be a postmodernist one only needs a
>decent education?
I think fundamentally that is correct - but then when I talked of
postmodernity in the sciences I wasn't talking about postmodernity
elsewhere. Generally, postmodern science is viewed in much the same way as
postmodern architecture - as an approach away from monolithic uniform clean
and pure concepts of wholeness and entirety. This is the aesthetic angle
rather than the philosophical angle, and while it is not postmodernity in
the philosophical sense in is postmodern in the sense of a chronological
period which shares certain aesthetic, general ideological beliefs.
Basically, I don't think that postmodernity in the sciences is the same as
postmodernity in philosophy.
Joseph Askew
>There's still no response to the interesting question of how
>postmodernists think science should be done. Anyone?
If you think that is a toughie, the Centre for Women's Studies
near me (now part of the Centre for Social Inquiry I believe,
meaning they've been merged with the Centre for Labour Studies,
aka Trade Unionism I, II and III) has recently put out a few
helpful suggestions which claim that science is patriarchal etc
etc etc. Which it probably is mind you. But they go on to suggest
that gyno-centric science could be a big break-through. So how
should feminist science be done? I gather they think peer-review
is confrontational and sexist.
Ken MacIver
Crew) wrote:
>Ken MacIver <nan...@tiac.net> wrote:
> :
> : By way of [brief] explanation, I am of the view that pomo is modernism
> : renamed by a generation of scholars looking for something to
> : differentiate their studies [and efforts towards tenure] from the
> : recent past. In science, Einstein [and others, of course] broke from
> : the accepted notion of continuity and certainty [Maxwell's objective
> : observer].
> :
> : Ken
> :
> : ObRef: Everdell, The First Moderns
>
> Einstein breaks with accepted notions of continuity and certainty? What
> can this mean?
Surely, as a self-described mathematician, you have some idea of what
continuity means in that discipline. I am not a math buff and do not
intend to argue technical points with you, if that is what you are
leading towards. What I meant is the deep held 19th century beliefs
in science that suggested everything had its place on a scale, a
continuity if you will. Certainty implied the existence of an
objective "truth" concerning the physical world.
I didn't think that Relativity was any less "certain" than
> classical mechanics. And in what sense does it break with "continuity"?
Relativity, as I understand its implications, shattered 19th century
concepts of time & space. Everything depended on context, not place.
Nothing was continuous any more. Speed and time might depend on the
observer, a radical departure from the past.
Think of math as art. Most everything in painting, for example,
whatever form it took, was at some level representational in nature.
First Cezanne, then Picasso, pointed the way towards hidden doors.
IMO, Braque's painting of the houses at L'estraque (sp) represents the
absolute break from the past, the moment when houses have neither
doors nor windows nor do they resemble houses, as we thought of them
until that time. Einstein and relativity broke from the past in a
similar manner.
Ken
Tom Coates
Michael Kagalenko wrote in message <6uroln$m...@lynx01.dac.neu.edu>...
> - It does not say what you think it does. Specifically, it has nothing to
do
> with "grand uniform narratives, determinism, ideas of total knowledge
and
> comprehension." Rather, it gets grossly misapplied by ignorant pseudo-
> scholars, a lot like Goedel's theorem, actually.
>
> - Pomos who talk about it unfailingly produce hugely amusing (to those
> who understand QM) texts, full of most precious howlers.
I am also gay, by the way, if you feel that you would like to involve
yourself in some more name calling. I am not a fucking "pomo", and the
uncertainty principle, in as it sets a frontier to the possibilities of
knowledge (denies complete knowledge as a possibility), does indeed seem to
me to be profoundly un-modernist notion.
I am indeed not a scholar of long standing in quantum physics, and I
apologise if my text contains howlers, although I am reasonably certain that
whatever the level of my bastardisation it is reasonably accurate in this
circumstance. At the same time, I am sure you will appreciate that I suffer
a similar reaction to the misinterpretations that I experience from a
variety of other groups etc. Nor have I asked this to be posted to
sci.physics, which I notice it has been.
Iván Ordóñez
wrote:
[...] What I meant is the deep held 19th century beliefs
>in science that suggested everything had its place on a scale, a
>continuity if you will. Certainty implied the existence of an
>objective "truth" concerning the physical world.
How does relativity imply that things don't have a place anymore? How does
it reject the existence of objective truth?
[...]
>Relativity, as I understand its implications, shattered 19th century
>concepts of time & space. Everything depended on context, not place.
>Nothing was continuous any more. Speed and time might depend on the
>observer, a radical departure from the past.
You seem to believe that relativity equals anarchic relativism. All
relativity did was to replace some invariants with others. The existence
of an objective reality, and its independence of the observer, was never
questioned. And yes, space and time are preceived differently by different
observers, but causality is never violated. Furthermore, the observations
made from one system of reference can be translated what would be seen
from of another, in a very reliable, very objective way. The world is not
any less real just because we have to do a little math to compare our
observations.
In fact, special relativity introduced a very hard absolute: the speed of
light is the same for all observers, independently of their velocities.
John McCarthy
Einstein occasionally contributed mystification, especially when
talking to journalists. Maybe he got bored.
Tom Coates
>: against it simply because it is counter-intuitive.
>
>Your assumption that "postmodernity" is there to be "justified" is
>extremely touching, and actually quite 'counter-intuitive' itself. Some of
>us like controversial discussions.
Apparently, your idea of controversial is to insult someone. Hey look. I can
do that too!
> I can tell you're a bit excited.
Indeed - as I should be when defending myself from vengeful and obnoxious
people.
>Well, no. Quite often, people in rec.arts.books talk about books in quite
>naughty ways.
Really? So they say that books should be burned? Or that the whole project
of reading is unfounded or ridiciulous? INteresting company you keep.
Tom Coates
MT wrote in message <36117D...@sprintmail.com>...
>Coates:
>
><<I think fundamentally that is correct - but then when I talked of
>postmodernity in the sciences I wasn't talking about postmodernity
Gerry Quinn
>
>Christ. i can't spend my life in this group fucking justifying postmodernity
>to people.
>
Then don't.
> I want to investigate it not explain it to people over and over
>again.
>
Then do.
- Gerry
----------------------------------------------------------
ger...@indigo.ie (Gerry Quinn)
----------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Wood
>
> Some facts about "uncertainty principle":
>
> - It is not a principle. It is consequence of the postulates of
> Quantum mechanics (that physical variables are represented by non-commuting
> operators acting on the wave functions)
No, that's wrong. Although is a consequence of the postulates of QM, I
think you have your terminology muddled. Physical variables are
represented by Hermitian operators. They have the property that they
yield real eigen values.
HUP arises when two operators dont commute, so an eigen function
obtained by applying one of the operators on the wavefunction is not an
eigen function of the other operator, and a statistically distributed
expectation value is obtained from a measurement associated with the
second operator.
Remember HUP only applies to parameters which have operators which don't
commute.
>
> - It does not say what you think it does. Specifically, it has nothing to do
> with "grand uniform narratives, determinism, ideas of total knowledge and
> comprehension." Rather, it gets grossly misapplied by ignorant pseudo-
> scholars, a lot like Goedel's theorem, actually.
>
> - Pomos who talk about it unfailingly produce hugely amusing (to those
> who understand QM) texts, full of most precious howlers.
I'd only half agree here. HUP does determine how much is measurable and
hence knowable about a system.
Remember QM is really a measurement theory. It tells you what the state
of a system will be after you've extracted information from it, and what
information you can subsequently extract.
What's a pomo ?
--
...Andrew...
Opinions expressed here are my own, not those of my employer.
G*rd*n
| It has always amused me some of the scientists most frequently help up as
| heralding the postmodern era -- Einstein and Godel -- held views basically
| at odds with the "standard" postmodern ones: in Einstein's case, determinism,
| and in Godel's, Platonic realism.
But these were religious views, not scientific views. And
that's one of the very curious things about science and
"postmodernism." You probably can't find anything more
"postmodernistic" than Niels Bohr's "The question is not
what the world _is_, but what we can say about it," (or
something like that), and science in general seems to
proceed on skepticism, sometimes about very profound issues
like its own methods or proper subject matter.
But many scientists seem to require an emotional commitment
to an underlying order below or beyond the phenomena and
their innumerable possible interpretations which they think
they already know something about, certainly Einstein and
Goedel among them. There's an article in the October 8,
1998 issue of _The_New_York_Review_Of_Books_, "The Non-
Revolution of T.S. Kuhn", by Steven Weinberg which contains
this contradiction. For instance, his last sentence reads
"And when we have discovered this theory [ a unified theory
of physics ] it will be part of a true description of
reality." Yet in the paragraphs immediately preceding it,
he handwaves the philosophical issues, assigning the work
to Charles Peirce -- "I am not equipped by taste or
education to judge conflicts among philosophers," he says,
that is, he has nothing to say in defense of the
philosophical or religious position he is about to take.
Weinberg does give what I think is a good indication of
the _emotional_ issues involved. Having just described
Kuhn's "radical" (elsewhere "corrosive") skepticism about
science, he remarks, "All this is wormwood to scientists
like myself, who think the task of science is to bring us
closer and closer to objective truth." Given that he
declines philosophical inquiry, however, he should probably
have said "believe" rather than "think."
A _scientific_, rather than philsophical, investigation of
this problem might ask whether science in general needs
scientists who are believers in objective reality, gods,
etc. regardless of whether science itself needs them
(apparently not). Newton and Einstein were both profoundly
religious, the later famously to the point of having
convictions about God's character ("The Lord is subtle, but
he is not malicious") so I think the answer to such a study
might be affirmative. One could go on from there, I
suppose, and try to determine _which_ religion was most
inspiring to scientists, possibly with an eye towards
promoting it to those of the young who were found to
have an aptitude for it.
--
}"{ G*rd*n }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
{ http://www.etaoin.com | latest new material 9/10 } <-adv't
Ken MacIver
wrote:
>This is a clear and precise statement of physics, and it was well
>accepted by most phyicists rather shortly after Einstein asserted
>it in 1905.
Artists also accepted the break from representational art after
Cezanne asserted it.
>
>There is no mysticism in it. The analogy with the painters is
>false. The painters proposed a new way of looking at the world,
>whereas Einstein asserted what he believed to be a previously
>undiscovered fact about the world. Einstein turned out to be
>right.
We will have to agree to disagree. Einstein also proposed a new way
of looking at the world. In the broadest sense, everything new is an
"undiscovered fact about the world."
Ken
Ken MacIver
>nan...@tiac.net (Ken MacIver) wrote:
>
>>On 29 Sep 1998 22:16:34 GMT, ri...@hinthial.allison-house.org (Richard
>>Crew) wrote:
>
>>>Ken MacIver <nan...@tiac.net> wrote:
>>> :
>>> : By way of [brief] explanation, I am of the view that pomo is modernism
>>> : renamed by a generation of scholars looking for something to
>>> : differentiate their studies [and efforts towards tenure] from the
>>> : recent past. In science, Einstein [and others, of course] broke from
>>> : the accepted notion of continuity and certainty [Maxwell's objective
>>> : observer].
>>> :
>>> : Ken
>>> :
>>> : ObRef: Everdell, The First Moderns
>>>
>>> Einstein breaks with accepted notions of continuity and certainty? What
>>> can this mean?
>
>>Surely, as a self-described mathematician, you have some idea of what
>>continuity means in that discipline. I am not a math buff and do not
>>intend to argue technical points with you, if that is what you are
>>leading towards. What I meant is the deep held 19th century beliefs
>>in science that suggested everything had its place on a scale, a
>>continuity if you will. Certainty implied the existence of an
>>objective "truth" concerning the physical world.
>
>
>>I didn't think that Relativity was any less "certain" than
>>> classical mechanics. And in what sense does it break with "continuity"?
>
>>Relativity, as I understand its implications, shattered 19th century
>>concepts of time & space. Everything depended on context, not place.
>>Nothing was continuous any more. Speed and time might depend on the
>>observer, a radical departure from the past.
>
>>Think of math as art. Most everything in painting, for example,
>>whatever form it took, was at some level representational in nature.
>>First Cezanne, then Picasso, pointed the way towards hidden doors.
>>IMO, Braque's painting of the houses at L'estraque (sp) represents the
>>absolute break from the past, the moment when houses have neither
>>doors nor windows nor do they resemble houses, as we thought of them
>>until that time. Einstein and relativity broke from the past in a
>>similar manner.
>
>
>This posting might well do as example for Sokal's _Intellectual
>Imposters_ wherein he examines authors who use the terminology of
>science and mathematics and, not understanding the language they are
>using, rely on their confusions to establish misconceived points via
>loose and ill founded analogies.
>
Piffle.
K.
Ken MacIver
Ordóñez) wrote:
>In article <3611a2d8...@news.tiac.net>, nan...@tiac.net (Ken MacIver)
>wrote:
>
>[...] What I meant is the deep held 19th century beliefs
>>in science that suggested everything had its place on a scale, a
>>continuity if you will. Certainty implied the existence of an
>>objective "truth" concerning the physical world.
>
>How does relativity imply that things don't have a place anymore?
By changing previous conceptions of time and space.
How does
>it reject the existence of objective truth?
By offering multiple truths.
K
Iván Ordóñez
[...] There's an article in the October 8,
>1998 issue of _The_New_York_Review_Of_Books_, "The Non-
>Revolution of T.S. Kuhn", by Steven Weinberg which contains
>this contradiction. For instance, his last sentence reads
>"And when we have discovered this theory [ a unified theory
>of physics ] it will be part of a true description of
>reality."
Indeed it will when it is discovered. But he's not saying it necessarily
*will* be discovered.
> Yet in the paragraphs immediately preceding it,
>he handwaves the philosophical issues, assigning the work
>to Charles Peirce -- "I am not equipped by taste or
>education to judge conflicts among philosophers," he says,
>that is, he has nothing to say in defense of the
>philosophical or religious position he is about to take.
It's one think to wash one's hands from what is perceived as bickering
among charlatans, and another to be unwilling to commit oneself to a
philoso[hical position. Philosophy is hardly the exclusive domain of
philosophers.
[...] Given that he
>declines philosophical inquiry, however, he should probably
>have said "believe" rather than "think."
He doesn't really decline such inquiry, even if he says he does. In any
case, I'd like to know, given a descriptive predicate P, what is the
difference between saying "I think P" and "I believe P."
[...] Newton and Einstein were both profoundly
>religious, the later famously to the point of having
>convictions about God's character ("The Lord is subtle, but
>he is not malicious") so I think the answer to such a study
>might be affirmative.
That is taken out of context. Einstein used such statements as metaphors.
He was very far from being "profoundly religious."
Iván Ordóñez
MacIver) wrote:
>>How does relativity imply that things don't have a place anymore?
>
>By changing previous conceptions of time and space.
Such changes don't imply that.
>> How does
>>it reject the existence of objective truth?
>
>By offering multiple truths.
It doesn't.
Tom Coates
other people without actually being totally correct themselves.
Pomo is a basically abusive term used by people to refer to people who are
interested in postmodernity. Comments generally seem to take the form of
"Isn't it typical how all these pomos don't know anything about science" or
"God these pomos talk rubbish".
Tom Coates
>> yourself in some more name calling. I am not a fucking "pomo", and
>
>rather remarkable that the staunch defenders of pomo in this thread
>have declined to be classified as pomo? Why is that? And will the
>real pomos stand up and be counted?
Because although I am interested in postmodernity, I resent being given a
diminutive nickname, which serves for insult purposes. Seems perfectly
pleasant to me.
>> I am indeed not a scholar of long standing in quantum physics, and I
>> apologise if my text contains howlers, although I am reasonably certain
that
>> whatever the level of my bastardisation it is reasonably accurate in this
>> circumstance. At the same time, I am sure you will appreciate that I
suffer
>> a similar reaction to the misinterpretations that I experience from a
>> variety of other groups etc. Nor have I asked this to be posted to
>> sci.physics, which I notice it has been.
>
>If you talk about QM, the sci.physics is a relevant newsgroup.
It may be relevant, but there are over 35,000 newsgroups, many of which are
relevant to almost every discussion. I would not cross-post every alt.fan
post to alt.celebrity, nor every alt.tv.er one to a general television
group - nor would I post every alt.tv.er posting to something concerned with
real ER supervision or on how the television works.
MT
are interested in postmodernity. Comments generally seem to take the
form of "Isn't it typical how all these pomos don't know anything about
science" or "God these pomos talk rubbish".>>
The received expression is "that pomo bullshit".
......
Gerry Quinn
> Newton and Einstein were both profoundly
>religious, the later famously to the point of having
>convictions about God's character ("The Lord is subtle, but
>he is not malicious") so I think the answer to such a study
>might be affirmative.
The above can perhaps be read in context as "I believe the laws of
Nature are accessible to thought and observation."
Gerry Quinn
>>
>>How does relativity imply that things don't have a place anymore?
>
>By changing previous conceptions of time and space.
>
> How does
>>it reject the existence of objective truth?
>
>By offering multiple truths.
Name two!
Richard Harter
>On Wed, 30 Sep 1998 04:38:03 GMT, c...@tiac.net (Richard Harter) wrote:
>>nan...@tiac.net (Ken MacIver) wrote:
>>
>>>On 29 Sep 1998 22:16:34 GMT, ri...@hinthial.allison-house.org (Richard
>>>Crew) wrote:
>>
>>>>Ken MacIver <nan...@tiac.net> wrote:
>>>> :
>>>> : By way of [brief] explanation, I am of the view that pomo is modernism
>>>> : renamed by a generation of scholars looking for something to
>>>> : differentiate their studies [and efforts towards tenure] from the
>>>> : recent past. In science, Einstein [and others, of course] broke from
>>>> : the accepted notion of continuity and certainty [Maxwell's objective
>>>> : observer].
>>>> :
>>>> : Ken
>>>> :
>>>> : ObRef: Everdell, The First Moderns
>>>>
>>>> Einstein breaks with accepted notions of continuity and certainty? What
>>>> can this mean?
>>
>>>Surely, as a self-described mathematician, you have some idea of what
>>>continuity means in that discipline. I am not a math buff and do not
>>>intend to argue technical points with you, if that is what you are
>>>leading towards. What I meant is the deep held 19th century beliefs
>>>in science that suggested everything had its place on a scale, a
>>>continuity if you will. Certainty implied the existence of an
>>>objective "truth" concerning the physical world.
>>
>>
>>>I didn't think that Relativity was any less "certain" than
>>>> classical mechanics. And in what sense does it break with "continuity"?
>>
>>>Relativity, as I understand its implications, shattered 19th century
>>>concepts of time & space. Everything depended on context, not place.
>>>Nothing was continuous any more. Speed and time might depend on the
>>>observer, a radical departure from the past.
>>
>>>Think of math as art. Most everything in painting, for example,
>>>whatever form it took, was at some level representational in nature.
>>>First Cezanne, then Picasso, pointed the way towards hidden doors.
>>>IMO, Braque's painting of the houses at L'estraque (sp) represents the
>>>absolute break from the past, the moment when houses have neither
>>>doors nor windows nor do they resemble houses, as we thought of them
>>>until that time. Einstein and relativity broke from the past in a
>>>similar manner.
>>
>>
>>This posting might well do as example for Sokal's _Intellectual
>>Imposters_ wherein he examines authors who use the terminology of
>>science and mathematics and, not understanding the language they are
>>using, rely on their confusions to establish misconceived points via
>>loose and ill founded analogies.
>>
>Piffle.
Well, no, it's not; it's a fairly accurate summary. You may justly
complain that I have not enumerated the confusions, misconceptions, and
ill founded analogies for I have not. What would you have? Others are
happily undertaking that task.
Richard Harter, c...@tiac.net, The Concord Research Institute
URL = http://www.tiac.net/users/cri, phone = 1-978-369-3911
The enemy of my enemy is my friend.
With friends like these who needs enemies.
Richard Crew
>
> On Wed, 30 Sep 1998 04:38:03 GMT, c...@tiac.net (Richard Harter) wrote:
>
> >nan...@tiac.net (Ken MacIver) wrote:
> >
> >>Think of math as art. Most everything in painting, for example,
> >>whatever form it took, was at some level representational in nature.
> >>First Cezanne, then Picasso, pointed the way towards hidden doors.
> >>IMO, Braque's painting of the houses at L'estraque (sp) represents the
> >>absolute break from the past, the moment when houses have neither
> >>doors nor windows nor do they resemble houses, as we thought of them
> >>until that time. Einstein and relativity broke from the past in a
> >>similar manner.
> >
> >
> >This posting might well do as example for Sokal's _Intellectual
> >Imposters_ wherein he examines authors who use the terminology of
> >science and mathematics and, not understanding the language they are
> >using, rely on their confusions to establish misconceived points via
> >loose and ill founded analogies.
> >
> Piffle.
Calm down, kids. It's just usenet.
--Rich
Richard Harter
>cr...@math.ufl.edu:
>| It has always amused me some of the scientists most frequently help up as
>| heralding the postmodern era -- Einstein and Godel -- held views basically
>| at odds with the "standard" postmodern ones: in Einstein's case, determinism,
>| and in Godel's, Platonic realism.
>But these were religious views, not scientific views. And
>that's one of the very curious things about science and
>"postmodernism." You probably can't find anything more
>"postmodernistic" than Niels Bohr's "The question is not
>what the world _is_, but what we can say about it," (or
>something like that), and science in general seems to
>proceed on skepticism, sometimes about very profound issues
>like its own methods or proper subject matter.
I would disagree - if one relies on the analogies with "postmodernism"
in the arts and philosophy and politics it is "modern" both in timing
and in context. Modernism challenged the simplicities of the Victorians
and the Enlightenment generally - Joyce, Bohr, Reti, and the
totalitarians are all different faces of the same impulse and are of the
same historic era. Postmodernism does not own skepticism.
[snip rest of Gordon party line]
Steve Hagelman
> I don't know if this has been previously noted or not, but isn't it
> rather remarkable that the staunch defenders of pomo in this thread
> have declined to be classified as pomo? Why is that? And will the
> real pomos stand up and be counted?
most of the existentialists didn't want to be called existentialists. they
were crazy about themselves as individuals and didn't want to become merely
a member of a group, and likewise with postmodernism=name someone and
he/she is reduced to the signifier, and what could anyone want in this
kooky world except to be signified?
Steve & Jean Williams
although it is in life & health sciences at mine ;)
Steve
Joseph Askew wrote in message <36108...@hakea.services.adelaide.edu.au>...
>In article <360fd...@news.netdirect.net.uk> "Steve & Jean Williams"
<ste...@ndirect.co.uk> writes:
>
>>There are pomo psychologists, and psychology is a science (although not
much
>>of one!).... Look out for Kenneth Gergen and Rom Harre....
>
>I've now attended three different Universities. I've visited far
>more. I can't think of one that places psychology in the Faculty of
>Science (or whatever its local equivalent is). Here the rumour is
>that Psych wanted to be in with Medicine. But they wouldn't have
>them. So they tried for Science, but they wouldn't have them either.
>So they ended up in Arts of which they are the largest slice of
>EFTSUs I believe. Psychology, if it is indeed a science, is the
>only science I can think of which accepts students for higher
>degrees if they have failed every single mandatory statistics
>course during their entire under-grad life.
Ken MacIver
Ordóñez) wrote:
>In article <361234de...@news.tiac.net>, nan...@tiac.net (Ken
>MacIver) wrote:
>
>>>How does relativity imply that things don't have a place anymore?
>>
>>By changing previous conceptions of time and space.
>
>Such changes don't imply that.
Yes, they do.
>
>>> How does
>>>it reject the existence of objective truth?
>>
>>By offering multiple truths.
>
>It doesn't.
Yes, it does.
Steve Hagelman
pretty easy dismissal there.
err..I'm a sociologist, and the social *sciences* use the scientific
method to death, and since science is a proposed method of finding 'truth',
what the method is used to study and how flimsy the results are
irrelevant, social sciences are sciences.
Ken MacIver
>nan...@tiac.net (Ken MacIver) wrote:
[snip]
>>>
>>>>Relativity, as I understand its implications, shattered 19th century
>>>>concepts of time & space. Everything depended on context, not place.
>>>>Nothing was continuous any more. Speed and time might depend on the
>>>>observer, a radical departure from the past.
>>>
>>>>Think of math as art. Most everything in painting, for example,
>>>>whatever form it took, was at some level representational in nature.
>>>>First Cezanne, then Picasso, pointed the way towards hidden doors.
>>>>IMO, Braque's painting of the houses at L'estraque (sp) represents the
>>>>absolute break from the past, the moment when houses have neither
>>>>doors nor windows nor do they resemble houses, as we thought of them
>>>>until that time. Einstein and relativity broke from the past in a
>>>>similar manner.
Harter:
>>>This posting might well do as example for Sokal's _Intellectual
>>>Imposters_ wherein he examines authors who use the terminology of
>>>science and mathematics and, not understanding the language they are
>>>using, rely on their confusions to establish misconceived points via
>>>loose and ill founded analogies.
MacIver:
>>Piffle.
Harter:
>Well, no, it's not; it's a fairly accurate summary. You may justly
>complain that I have not enumerated the confusions, misconceptions, and
>ill founded analogies for I have not. What would you have? Others are
>happily undertaking that task.
Ah, so you're one of those a rock was always a rock only we just
didn't know it yet kind of guys. For once, think big, Mr. Harter,
think of large ideas and the sea change of human perceptions around
the fin de seicle. Reflect on the permanent fracture of western
"values" caused by WWI.
Ken
Ken MacIver
<Tom.C...@CHEEZbtinternet.com> wrote:
although I am interested in postmodernity, I resent being given a
>diminutive nickname, which serves for insult purposes. Seems perfectly
>pleasant to me.
Watch out for that Nash Rambler.
ObSong: Beep Beep
k
Robert Parson
>>Think of math as art. Most everything in painting, for example,
>>whatever form it took, was at some level representational in nature.
>>First Cezanne, then Picasso, pointed the way towards hidden doors.
>>IMO, Braque's painting of the houses at L'estraque (sp) represents the
>>absolute break from the past, the moment when houses have neither
>>doors nor windows nor do they resemble houses, as we thought of them
>>until that time. Einstein and relativity broke from the past in a
>>similar manner.
>
>
>This posting might well do as example for Sokal's _Intellectual
>Imposters_ wherein he examines authors who use the terminology of
>science and mathematics and, not understanding the language they are
>using, rely on their confusions to establish misconceived points via
>loose and ill founded analogies.
One might offer the following quotation as another example:
" The thesis 'light consists of particles' and the antithesis 'light
consists of waves' fought with one another until they were united in
the synthesis of quantum mechanics... Only why not apply it to the
thesis Liberalism (or Capitalism), the antithesis Communism, and
expect a synthesis, instead of a complete and permanent victory for
the antithesis? There seems to be some inconsistency. But the idea
of complementarity goes deeper. In fact, this thesis and antithesis
represent two psychological motives and economic forces, both justified
in themselves, but, in their extremes, mutually exclusive...There must
exist a relation between the latitudes of freedom \delta f and of
regulation \delta r, of the type \delta f \delta r = p... But what
is the 'political constant' p? I must leave this to a future quantum
theory of human affairs."
One might, except that those words were written by Max Born, one of
the founders of Quantum Mechanics. Which shows that those who do
understand the language of science are not immune to arguments
based upon loose and ill-founded analogies.
The above quote is taken from an article by Mary Beller in the
September 1998 issue of _Physics Today_, entitled "The Sokal Hoax:
At Whom Are We Laughing?" Beller argues that "The philosophical
pronouncements of Bohr, Born, Heisenberg and Pauli deserve some of
the blame for the excesses of the postmodernist critique of science."
ObBook: J. S. Bell, _Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics_,
Cambridge 1987.
------
Robert
Tom Coates
MT wrote in message <361269...@sprintmail.com>...
MT
Heisenberg and Pauli deserve some of the blame for the excesses of the
postmodernist critique of science.">>
This is correct. However, Heisenberg et al never confused their
philosophical lucubrations (that is, their esoteric or speculative
interpretations of mathematical results) with rigorous results.
There is a difference between an eminent physicist giving a talk or
writing an essay that goes beyond what is rigorously known and an
ignorant outsider trying to transpose scientific results he doesn't
understand into another field of inquiry - such as literary criticism.
Regards,
mrt
Iván Ordóñez
MacIver) wrote:
>>Such changes don't imply that.
>
>Yes, they do.
>>>By offering multiple truths.
>>
>>It doesn't.
>
>Yes, it does.
I must conclude you don't understand relativity at all.
Steve Hagelman
I forgot to say, the identity (of not being a postmodernist) would have to
manifest itself in various circumstances, from a casual discussion, like
this, to a general theoretical approach.
It is kind of an issue of accuracy rather than making yourself so easily
categorizable by others.
Steve Hagelman
> I note that scientists and engineers have no such inhibitions.
Though there are some philosophical assumptions inherent in science,
saying that you're a scientist or an engineer is saying
more about your job than your beliefs. Even if you're a philosopher by
career, at a university, you might say "I'm a philosopher" but it is less
likely that you'd say "I'm a post-modernist philosopher" even if everything
you ever read or write is postmodernist or directly related to
postmodernism. I think the difference is you are attaching yourself to a
certain perspective rather than a certain discipline, and the perspective
is probably not a completely accurate label in most cases.
> The
> question isn't so much as to why pomos don't declare their pomo
> allegiance in all contexts but why are they so reluctant to identify
> themselves as such even in the *limited* context of this discussion?
> One might even think that this betrays a secret shame, no? ;-)
> --
> Rajappa Iyer <r...@lucent.com> #include <std_disclaimer.h>
> We're too busy mopping the floor to turn off the faucet.
>
For me at least, who likes postmodernism but wouldn't call myself a
postmodernist, I really hope it is not a secret shame. There are some
flaky theorists and the academic community, as a whole, turns their nose at
it, as they do with most continental philosophy, but that is not why I
don't commit to the postmodernist label. First, I don't know enough
about it. Second, there are different postmodernisms (like there are
different schizophrenias :-), that aren't always so complimentary, calling
yourself a postmodernist, would put you into semiotics,
post-structuralism, deconstructionism, leftist cultural theory, etc. So
it goes way beyond a generic, odd-word-using, historicism/relativism, and
you would be basically saying I agree with all of these people on all of
these different issues. Third, if I said yes, I'm going to be a
postmodernist and do all of my work thinking as a postmodernist, I would
probably flunk out of school!!! And finally, like a lot of philosophies,
strictly adhering to them to their logical ends would result in blowing
your brains out! Someone said about their work, I think it was Hume or
Kuhn (short name) something like "geez...I don't actually live my life
like this!"
-steve h.
Michael Abalovich
>
> Tom Coates (Tom.C...@CHEEZbtinternet.com) wrote:
> ]The point is not that scientists are approaching the same conclusions, but
> ]that a similar distrust of grand uniform narratives, determinism, ideas of
> ]total knowledge and comprehension is evolving in some of the scientists -
> ]look at Heisenbergs Uncertainty Principle, for example - that is a very un
> ]modernist concept.
>
> Some facts about "uncertainty principle":
>
> - It is not a principle. It is consequence of the postulates of
> Quantum mechanics (that physical variables are represented by
> non-commuting operators acting on the wave functions)
>
> those who understand QM) texts, full of most precious howlers.
That is a poor explanation; not so much wrong -- it's not very clear
whether it's right or wrong -- as poor: it doesn't explain very much
at all. If you're talking to those who you think don't understand QM,
how do you expect them to begin to understand what you said? What are
those mysterious 'postulates'? And, if you chose some other postulates,
would you watch all uncertainty go away?
To give a first notion, one could say that "the uncertainty principle"
-- the technical expression of which is indeed the non-commutativity of
certain 'operators' -- is a consequence of the fascinating fact that
things are internally interrellated in a rather nontrivial way. (If
that is a 'pomo' thing to say, then Anaxagoras and Leibniz must be
among those in the ranks, and I gladly with them.) The thing to do is
establish a certain relation -- an equivalence relation, the math term
is -- and treat it as such: as a relation, not as de facto equivalence:
to see the affinity without turning it into identity. In other words,
not to forget about all differences but rather build upon them: much as
one should treat their spouse, amen. This delightful description must
appeal to many on both sides of the aisle (as they say on TV [1]) and
apply to many an affair on every agenda.
(The relevant technical statement is that the so-called 'convolution
algebra' built on a pre-equivalence relation is non-commutative, alas.
In fact, that is precisely what Heisenberg did; what helped him a lot
was the fact that he fortuitously played hooky the day they covered
matrices in highschool, so that he had to re-invent the wheel -- and
that gave him a possibility to see something that he'd've never seen
otherwise.)
MA
____________________________________________________________________
[1] The best bit that I've seen on r.a.b. lately is Ron Hardin's
incredibly apt remark that "news divisions are populated with mental
patients". Well put, maestro.
g...@my-dejanews.com
> [...] Newton and Einstein were both profoundly
> >religious, the later famously to the point of having
> >convictions about God's character ("The Lord is subtle, but
> >he is not malicious") so I think the answer to such a study
> >might be affirmative.
iord...@a.fake.address.com (Iván Ordóñez):
> That is taken out of context. Einstein used such statements as metaphors.
> He was very far from being "profoundly religious."
Here's Uncle Albert speaking -- probably after huffing that
he didn't believe God played dice with the universe:
"The most beautiful emotion we can experience is the mystical.
It is the sower of all true art and science. He to whom this
emotion is a stranger...is as good as dead. To know that
what is impenetrable to us really exists, manifesting itself
to us as the highest wisdom and the most radiant beauty,
which our dull faculties can comprehend only in their most
primitive forms this knowledge, this feeling, is at the centre
of all true religiousness. In this sense, and in this sense
only, I belong to the ranks of devoutly religious men."
I got this off a web site which is probably too New-Agey for
many involved in this discussion -- they'd have to make fun
of it and boyishly bristle about -- but I've seen it quoted
elsewhere, so I believe it's really the _ipsissima_verba_.
-----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
g...@my-dejanews.com
cr...@math.ufl.edu:
>|It has always amused me some of the scientists most frequently help up as
>|heralding the postmodern era -- Einstein and Godel -- held views basically
>|at odds with the "standard" postmodern ones: in Einstein's case, determinism,
>|and in Godel's, Platonic realism.
g...@panix.com (G*rd*n) wrote:
> >But these were religious views, not scientific views. And
> >that's one of the very curious things about science and
> >"postmodernism." You probably can't find anything more
> >"postmodernistic" than Niels Bohr's "The question is not
> >what the world _is_, but what we can say about it," (or
> >something like that), and science in general seems to
> >proceed on skepticism, sometimes about very profound issues
> >like its own methods or proper subject matter.
c...@tiac.net (Richard Harter) wrote:
> I would disagree - if one relies on the analogies with "postmodernism"
> in the arts and philosophy and politics it is "modern" both in timing
> and in context. Modernism challenged the simplicities of the Victorians
> and the Enlightenment generally - Joyce, Bohr, Reti, and the
> totalitarians are all different faces of the same impulse and are of the
> same historic era. Postmodernism does not own skepticism.
Richard, as you know, I have no idea what "postmodernism" really,
really means. "Postmodern" in the arts is something quite different.
I'd just been told about "corrosive skepticism", which seems to be
an anti-pomo slogan, so of course I thought it would be okay to use
skepticism in connection with the evil of Pomo. I've gone wrong
again, eh? It's the _Modernists_ who were the skeptics. Corrosive?
> [snip rest of Gordon party line]
What party line? I thought my idea of scientifically investigating
the role of religion in motivating scientists, and taking action
based on the results, was a rather original solution to the danger
of "corrosive skepticism." So the Pomoburo has already ordered this
to the faithful? Why wasn't I informed via my code ring?
G*rd*n
Bryan W. Reed
Tom Coates <Tom.C...@CHEEZbtinternet.com> wrote:
>Thank you very much for this posting - it should stop some people insulting
>other people without actually being totally correct themselves.
>
>>>
>>> - It is not a principle. It is consequence of the postulates of
>>> Quantum mechanics (that physical variables are represented by
>non-commuting
>>> operators acting on the wave functions)
>>
It's not wrong, it's simply not very verbose. It's a reasonably brief way
of saying exactly what you say below. Granted, it's more ambiguous than
what you said--but it's hard to be technically precise and brief at the same
time. The statement could easily be misinterpreted to produce a falsehood.
But I see nothing there that's actually wrong.
>> Although is a consequence of the postulates of QM, I
>>think you have your terminology muddled. Physical variables are
>>represented by Hermitian operators. They have the property that they
>>yield real eigen values.
>>HUP arises when two operators dont commute, so an eigen function
>>obtained by applying one of the operators on the wavefunction is not an
>>eigen function of the other operator, and a statistically distributed
>>expectation value is obtained from a measurement associated with the
>>second operator.
>>Remember HUP only applies to parameters which have operators which don't
>>commute.
>>
>>>
>>> - It does not say what you think it does. Specifically, it has nothing
>to do
>>> with "grand uniform narratives, determinism, ideas of total knowledge
>and
>>> comprehension." Rather, it gets grossly misapplied by ignorant pseudo-
>>> scholars, a lot like Goedel's theorem, actually.
>>>
There's way too many non-scientist amateur philosophers who read about
Schrodinger's cat and decide that they Grok the True Meaning of Quantum
in Fullness. Depending on their tone, it can either be amusing or very,
very annoying to us scientists. They sometimes seem to forget that it's
a physical theory, not a mystical essence to be discovered in all aspects
of life.
>>> - Pomos who talk about it unfailingly produce hugely amusing (to those
>>> who understand QM) texts, full of most precious howlers.
>>
>>I'd only half agree here. HUP does determine how much is measurable and
>>hence knowable about a system.
>>Remember QM is really a measurement theory. It tells you what the state
>>of a system will be after you've extracted information from it, and what
>>information you can subsequently extract.
>
This is actually a debatable interpretation on several technical points.
But I'm not feeling particularly picky today, and I think I know what you're
saying, so I'll lay off.
Have fun,
breed
PS--the only reason I even read this thread was 'cause I had no idea what the
word "pomo" meant. I'm coming from sci.physics. I think it's fair to say
that a lot of this thread is off-topic, by the way.
Michael Abalovich
> Ken MacIver wrote:
>>Relativity, as I understand its implications, shattered 19th century
>>concepts of time & space. Everything depended on context, not place.
>>Nothing was continuous any more. Speed and time might depend on the
>>observer, a radical departure from the past.
>
> relativity did was to replace some invariants with others.
[...]
> In fact, special relativity introduced a very hard absolute:
> the speed of light is the same for all observers, independently
> of their velocities.
A well-appointed point, pointing as it does to the pointlessness
of the SR title. "Special Relativity" is bad enough a misnomer;
but "General Relativity" is very ill-named indeed.
If anything QM (Heisenberg's version) has more of a claim to be
called a relativistic -- or better yet, relational -- theory,
insomuch as it builds upon a certain relation among things.
(Precisely, on a gruppoid-like relation that obtains among
'spectral lines'.)
MA
Steve & Jean Williams
social science ;)
Steve
Steve Hagelman wrote in message <01bdec9d$9569c740$2dd8c186@Steve>...
John McCarthy
The above quote is taken from an article by Mary Beller in
the September 1998 issue of _Physics Today_, entitled "The
Sokal Hoax: At Whom Are We Laughing?" Beller argues that
"The philosophical pronouncements of Bohr, Born, Heisenberg
and Pauli deserve some of the blame for the excesses of the
postmodernist critique of science."
Good for Mary Beller.
--
John McCarthy, Computer Science Department, Stanford, CA 94305
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/progress/
He who refuses to do arithmetic is doomed to talk nonsense.
Michael Abalovich
>
> Michael Abalovich wrote:
>: Michael Kagalenko wrote:
>:> Some facts about "uncertainty principle":
>:>
>:> - It is not a principle. It is consequence of the postulates of
>:> Quantum mechanics (that physical variables are represented by
>:> non-commuting operators acting on the wave functions)
>:> - Pomos who talk about it unfailingly produce hugely amusing (to
>:> those who understand QM) texts, full of most precious howlers.
>
>
> You mean, he's not even wrong? I love it how these threads circle back
> onto themselves.
>
No he's not. The "not so much wrong" preamble was meant to introduce
my suggestion that his formulation was not very illuminating.
Nor do I see anything in my post that turns things back, in this
thread or elsewhere; except perhaps that the interconnexion of things
(that engenders QM's 'non-commutativity') is not exactly a novel thesis
to uphold.
> cheers, silke
MA
V-man
On Wed, 30 Sep 1998, Silke-Maria Weineck wrote:
> Michael Abalovich (aba...@erols.com) wrote:
> : Michael Kagalenko wrote:
> : >
> : > Tom Coates (Tom.C...@CHEEZbtinternet.com) wrote:
> : > ]The point is not that scientists are approaching the same conclusions, but
> : > ]that a similar distrust of grand uniform narratives, determinism, ideas of
> : > ]total knowledge and comprehension is evolving in some of the scientists -
> : > ]look at Heisenbergs Uncertainty Principle, for example - that is a very un
> : > ]modernist concept.
> : >
> : > Some facts about "uncertainty principle":
> : >
> : > - It is not a principle. It is consequence of the postulates of
> : > Quantum mechanics (that physical variables are represented by
> : > non-commuting operators acting on the wave functions)
> : >
> : > - Pomos who talk about it unfailingly produce hugely amusing (to
> : > those who understand QM) texts, full of most precious howlers.
>
>
> : That is a poor explanation; not so much wrong -
>
> You mean, he's not even wrong? I love it how these threads circle back
> onto themselves.
>
> cheers, silke
>
What? you don't know either?
Michael Kagalenko
]Michael Kagalenko wrote:
]>
]> Some facts about "uncertainty principle":
]>
]> - It is not a principle. It is consequence of the postulates of
]> Quantum mechanics (that physical variables are represented by non-commuting
]> operators acting on the wave functions)
]No, that's wrong.
To the contrary, it is right.
] Although is a consequence of the postulates of QM, I
]think you have your terminology muddled.
You are incorrect.
] Physical variables are
]represented by Hermitian operators. They have the property that they
]yield real eigen values.
]HUP arises when two operators dont commute, so an eigen function
]obtained by applying one of the operators on the wavefunction is not an
]eigen function of the other operator, and a statistically distributed
]expectation value is obtained from a measurement associated with the
]second operator.
That is elaboration on what I have said.
]Remember HUP only applies to parameters which have operators which don't
]commute.
]
]>
]> - It does not say what you think it does. Specifically, it has nothing to do
]> with "grand uniform narratives, determinism, ideas of total knowledge and
]> comprehension." Rather, it gets grossly misapplied by ignorant pseudo-
]> scholars, a lot like Goedel's theorem, actually.
]>
]> - Pomos who talk about it unfailingly produce hugely amusing (to those
]> who understand QM) texts, full of most precious howlers.
]
]I'd only half agree here. HUP does determine how much is measurable and
]hence knowable about a system.
No, it doesn't. Nothing prevents you from measuring two quantities
which correspond to non-commuting operators. For instance, momentum
and coordinate. "Uncertainty" refers to the statistical distribution of the
results of such measurements, not possibility of performing them.
]Remember QM is really a measurement theory.
No, it isn't. QM is also a theory of unitary evolution of unobservable
variables.
] It tells you what the state
]of a system will be after you've extracted information from it,
That's, in general, false.
] and what
]information you can subsequently extract.
]
]What's a pomo ?
Michael Kagalenko
]>
]> Tom Coates (Tom.C...@CHEEZbtinternet.com) wrote:
]> ]The point is not that scientists are approaching the same conclusions, but
]> ]total knowledge and comprehension is evolving in some of the scientists -
]> ]look at Heisenbergs Uncertainty Principle, for example - that is a very un
]> ]modernist concept.
]> Some facts about "uncertainty principle":
]>
]> - It is not a principle. It is consequence of the postulates of
]> Quantum mechanics (that physical variables are represented by
]> non-commuting operators acting on the wave functions)
]>
]> those who understand QM) texts, full of most precious howlers.
]
]
]whether it's right or wrong -- as poor: it doesn't explain very much
]at all. If you're talking to those who you think don't understand QM,
]how do you expect them to begin to understand what you said?
My explanation was not intended to illuminate the whole structure of the
quantum theory. My goal was to point out the fallacy in calling
uncertainty relation "the principle." I think it is unfortunate
that this is accepted usage; it creates wrong impression.
] What are
]those mysterious 'postulates'? And, if you chose some other postulates,
]would you watch all uncertainty go away?
I am pointing out that uncertainty principle is the consequence of mathematical
structure of QM. I believe that this structure have been put on rigorous
axiomatic basis, but John Baez is better qualified to confirm this, if
he is around.
]To give a first notion, one could say that "the uncertainty principle"
]-- the technical expression of which is indeed the non-commutativity of
]certain 'operators'
Non-commutativity is not a first principle, however. It arises
naturally from correspndence to classical mechanics' Lie bracket.
]-- is a consequence of the fascinating fact that
]things are internally interrellated in a rather nontrivial way. (If
]that is a 'pomo' thing to say, then Anaxagoras and Leibniz must be
]among those in the ranks, and I gladly with them.)
I m afraid that this understanding of what I have said is at odds
with the text of my post.
] The thing to do is
]establish a certain relation -- an equivalence relation, the math term
]is -- and treat it as such: as a relation, not as de facto equivalence:
]to see the affinity without turning it into identity. In other words,
]not to forget about all differences but rather build upon them: much as
]one should treat their spouse, amen. This delightful description must
]appeal to many on both sides of the aisle (as they say on TV [1]) and
]apply to many an affair on every agenda.
Well, speaking solely for myself, it doesn't. It strikes me as vague
and very easy to misinterpret and pervert.
](The relevant technical statement is that the so-called 'convolution
Michael Kagalenko
]In article <norww6n...@login5.fas.harvard.edu> Philip Nikolayev <nik...@login5.fas.harvard.edu> writes:
]
]>There's still no response to the interesting question of how
]>postmodernists think science should be done. Anyone?
]
]If you think that is a toughie, the Centre for Women's Studies
]near me (now part of the Centre for Social Inquiry I believe,
]meaning they've been merged with the Centre for Labour Studies,
]aka Trade Unionism I, II and III) has recently put out a few
]helpful suggestions which claim that science is patriarchal etc
]etc etc. Which it probably is mind you. But they go on to suggest
]that gyno-centric science could be a big break-through. So how
]should feminist science be done? I gather they think peer-review
]is confrontational and sexist.
Things should be done by consensus. Atomic bomb would have never been built
if Manhattan project was run that way, so you have progressive consequence.
ObBook: Anything by Judith Butler.
Michael Kagalenko
]nan...@tiac.net (Ken MacIver) wrote:
]
]>On 29 Sep 1998 22:16:34 GMT, ri...@hinthial.allison-house.org (Richard
]>Crew) wrote:
]
]>>Ken MacIver <nan...@tiac.net> wrote:
]>> :
]>> : By way of [brief] explanation, I am of the view that pomo is modernism
]>> : renamed by a generation of scholars looking for something to
]>> : differentiate their studies [and efforts towards tenure] from the
]>> : recent past. In science, Einstein [and others, of course] broke from
]>> : the accepted notion of continuity and certainty [Maxwell's objective
]>> : observer].
]>> :
]>> : Ken
]>> :
]>> : ObRef: Everdell, The First Moderns
]>>
]>> Einstein breaks with accepted notions of continuity and certainty? What
]>> can this mean?
]
]>Surely, as a self-described mathematician, you have some idea of what
]>continuity means in that discipline. I am not a math buff and do not
]>intend to argue technical points with you, if that is what you are
]>leading towards. What I meant is the deep held 19th century beliefs
]>in science that suggested everything had its place on a scale, a
]>continuity if you will. Certainty implied the existence of an
]>objective "truth" concerning the physical world.
]
]
]>I didn't think that Relativity was any less "certain" than
]>> classical mechanics. And in what sense does it break with "continuity"?
]
]>Relativity, as I understand its implications, shattered 19th century
]>concepts of time & space. Everything depended on context, not place.
]>Nothing was continuous any more. Speed and time might depend on the
]>observer, a radical departure from the past.
]>Think of math as art. Most everything in painting, for example,
]>whatever form it took, was at some level representational in nature.
]>First Cezanne, then Picasso, pointed the way towards hidden doors.
]>IMO, Braque's painting of the houses at L'estraque (sp) represents the
]>absolute break from the past, the moment when houses have neither
]>doors nor windows nor do they resemble houses, as we thought of them
]>until that time. Einstein and relativity broke from the past in a
]>similar manner.
]
]
]This posting might well do as example for Sokal's _Intellectual
]Imposters_ wherein he examines authors who use the terminology of
]science and mathematics and, not understanding the language they are
]using, rely on their confusions to establish misconceived points via
]loose and ill founded analogies.
Very well put.
Ron Hardin
> This posting might well do as example for Sokal's _Intellectual
> Imposters_ wherein he examines authors who use the terminology of
> science and mathematics and, not understanding the language they are
> using, rely on their confusions to establish misconceived points via
> loose and ill founded analogies.
Analogies are like a meadow.
--
Ron Hardin
rhha...@mindspring.com
On the internet, nobody knows you're a jerk.
Michael Kagalenko
Ken MacIver produces howlers at assembly-line speed:
]I didn't think that Relativity was any less "certain" than
]> classical mechanics. And in what sense does it break with "continuity"?
]
]Relativity, as I understand its implications, shattered 19th century
]concepts of time & space.
Nope. Relativity replaced Galileo's relativity pronciple with
Einstein's.
] Everything depended on context, not place.
Not at all. A notion of a point in space and time is well-defined
and is not relative in the SR. It is the definition of distance
in space or time that becomes relative, that is, the corrdinates
of fixed points.
]Nothing was continuous any more.
Absolute baloney. SR has nothing to do with mathematical notion of continuity.
] Speed and time might depend on the
]observer, a radical departure from the past.
Again wrong. Have you checked Galileo's relativity principle ?
]Think of math as art.
That would be poor analogy indeed.
] Most everything in painting, for example,
]whatever form it took, was at some level representational in nature.
Yeah, like for instance strictly formalized Bysantium and Russian iconic art
with its inverse perspective and other nice tricks. I see that you know
about art as much as you know about Physics.
]First Cezanne, then Picasso, pointed the way towards hidden doors.
]IMO, Braque's painting of the houses at L'estraque (sp) represents the
]absolute break from the past, the moment when houses have neither
]doors nor windows nor do they resemble houses, as we thought of them
]until that time. Einstein and relativity broke from the past in a
]similar manner.
Einstein didn't break with the past. Quite the oppposite, SR is the
elegant physical explanation of the symmetries of Maxwell's equations
that were discovered before Einstein, by Lorentz and Poincare, and
represnted putting the existing physics on firmer basis; providing
well-defined and very simple postulates and showing that Lorentz-Poincare
transformations are the consequence. And, the routine exercise in any SR course
is showing that Newtonian equations are the limit of Einstein's
when the speed of light becomes infinitely large.
Michael Kagalenko
]
]Michael Kagalenko wrote in message <6uroln$m...@lynx01.dac.neu.edu>...
]
]> - It does not say what you think it does. Specifically, it has nothing to
]do
]> with "grand uniform narratives, determinism, ideas of total knowledge
]and
]> comprehension." Rather, it gets grossly misapplied by ignorant pseudo-
]> scholars, a lot like Goedel's theorem, actually.
]>
]> who understand QM) texts, full of most precious howlers.
]
]
]yourself in some more name calling.
I am afraid I do not see the relevance of little sordid factoids about
your personal conduct. So feel free to omit any description of boogers you
plucked out of your nose lately, as well.
] I am not a fucking "pomo", and the
]uncertainty principle, in as it sets a frontier to the possibilities of
]knowledge (denies complete knowledge as a possibility), does indeed seem to
]me to be profoundly un-modernist notion.
I have to reiterate my point; stick to talking about things you have
some clue about.
]I am indeed not a scholar of long standing in quantum physics,
(to put it mildly)
] and I
]apologise if my text contains howlers, although I am reasonably certain that
]whatever the level of my bastardisation it is reasonably accurate in this
]circumstance.
Alas, it isn't.
] At the same time, I am sure you will appreciate that I suffer
]a similar reaction to the misinterpretations that I experience from a
]variety of other groups etc. Nor have I asked this to be posted to
]sci.physics, which I notice it has been.
It appears that your understanding of Usenet is on par with your
knowledge of physics.
G*rd*n
| ...
| All very true, but where the battle lines are drawn between scientists
| on the one end and pomos on the other, I don't know if your objection
| is quite as applicable...
There's no coherent body of belief called _postmodernism_.
It's mostly a sort of bogie-man which is being gradually
stuffed with a variety of materials. Maybe eventually it
will stand up and affright its stuffers, but I don't think
that's happened yet. Hence people are unwilling to be
identified with it.
I don't see any battle lines between scientists at one end
and "pomos" at the other. There are famous scientists who
can be classed as "pomos" and even as I write this, there
are articles in these same newsgroups calling for them to
be chided and possibly cast out of the temple for heresy:
<<Beller argues that "The philosophical pronouncements of Bohr, Born,
Heisenberg and Pauli deserve some of the blame for the excesses of the
postmodernist critique of science.">>
It's sort of like the Counterreformation -- always so many
wrongthinkers, never enough orthodoxy.
--
}"{ G*rd*n }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
{ http://www.etaoin.com | latest new material 9/10 } <-adv't
David E Latane
On Wed, 30 Sep 1998 g...@my-dejanews.com wrote:
> I got this off a web site which is probably too New-Agey for
> many involved in this discussion -- they'd have to make fun
> of it and boyishly bristle about -- but I've seen it quoted
> elsewhere, so I believe it's really the _ipsissima_verba_.
>
I once tried to pin down a Mark Twain quotation which I found with a
misspelled word--I was curious to see if twain had mispelled it, or if it
was a typo. What I discovered was the passage on the web quoted over and
over again, but nobody every actually citing a Twain work. I finally,
after consulting MT specialists, etc., decide the whole quotation was
bogus, and various people "publishing" on the web were just plaigerizing
each other. The same thing happens in print, as S.J. Gould's example of
the the dawn-horse "about the size of a fix-terrier" amply demonstrated.
So to see it "quoted elsewhere" proves absolute zilch.
D. Latane
Michael Abalovich
> Michael Abalovich wrote:
>] Michael Kagalenko wrote:
>
> the quantum theory. My goal was to point out the fallacy in calling
> uncertainty relation "the principle." I think it is unfortunate
> that this is accepted usage; it creates wrong impression.
Fine. I don't quite see what, in principle, is wrong with "principle",
though.
>] What are those mysterious 'postulates'? And, if you chose some
>] other postulates, would you watch all uncertainty go away?
>
> I am pointing out that uncertainty principle is the consequence of
> mathematical structure of QM.
True, but unilluminating. In case you again didn't intend to illuminate,
let me further suggest that it is also irrelevant; a non-answer.
> I believe that this structure have been put on rigorous axiomatic basis,
> but John Baez is better qualified to confirm this, if he is around.
In the absense of John I hereby do solemnly confirm that to be so.
>] To give a first notion, one could say that "the uncertainty principle"
>] -- the technical expression of which is indeed the non-commutativity
>] of certain 'operators'
>
> Non-commutativity is not a first principle, however.
Nor did I say it was. "First notion", as in, "you know, that thing
under the hood."
> It arises
> naturally from correspndence to classical mechanics' Lie bracket.
No it doesn't. It does correspond to the classical Poisson bracket
(which introduces Lie structure), but it does not "arise" from it.
Just think of what you're saying: how can non-commutativity arise,
let alone "naturally", from commutativity? That would be pretty damn
unnatural. What it does "arise" from is the interrelatedness of
certain entities, which has no counterpart in the classical situation.
>] -- is a consequence of the fascinating fact that
>] things are internally interrellated in a rather nontrivial way. (If
>] that is a 'pomo' thing to say, then Anaxagoras and Leibniz must be
>] among those in the ranks, and I gladly with them.)
>
> I'm afraid that this understanding of what I have said is at odds
> with the text of my post.
It wasn't an "understanding" of what you had said; rather, it offered
an "understanding", in primitive yet tasteful terms, of what the UP is
all about. If your post were at odds with mine, then so much the worse
for your post -- but luckily, it isn't, so fear not.
>] .... This delightful description must appeal to many ....
>
> Well, speaking solely for myself, it doesn't.
Too bad, really. We aim to please, as Zeleny used to say.
> It strikes me as vague and very easy to misinterpret and pervert.
That it strikes you as vague conveys the degree of your understanding
of the subject; in fact, it is almost impossible to go more precise.
Everything that's 'effable' can be misinterpreted.
MA