Uncommon Dissent
Frank J
go to mirsrepresent his critics:
http://www.talkreason.org/articles/compass4.cfm
What mainly caught my eye, though, was the title of Dembski's upcoming
book - a play on words that suggests denial of common descent. Unless
Dembski has changed his mind and is now prepared to refute his
colleague Michael Behe, one must assume that the book will not
challenge common descent in the least. But note that Behe used a
similar tactic: The cover of the paperback version of "Darwin's Black
Box" features a human and ape. What the heck does this have to do with
his own alternative hypothesis, which doesn't deny common ancestry at
all, let alone among species of such biochemical similarity? Plenty. A
quick glance at Amazon.com reviews of "Darwin's Black Box" and other
pseudoscientific anti-evolution books suggests that most readers who
find them convincing never get much past the cover before inferring
independent origins -and often YEC to boot! The fact that the authors
have no apparent problem with this speaks volumes.
Ron Okimoto
Frank J wrote:
Dembski probably knows that he is going to go down with the likes of Gish
and Morris. The next generation of creationists will be trying very hard
to put as much distance between this generation as these guys are trying
to claim separates them from the "scientific creationist" of the 70's and
80's. What is really stupid is that the only thing that they have to
teach is from Wells and he is just a throwback to the old scientific
creationists. Just more of the same old obfuscationist blather. They
can't come up with anything from this new generation to teach. He didn't
even try to defend his views at the skeptics conference. His
presentation there boiled down to if you can sell books to the rubes that
makes everything OK.
They've already failed and the next generation of creationists will not
want to associate with failures. They have come to the point where they
have to put up or shut up and they have opted to shut up. People want to
teach ID in the schools, but the ID supporters can't come up with
anything that they can teach. Even Dembski is admonishing the ID crowd
that they shouldn't overstate their case. These guys know for a fact
that they don't have anything worth teaching, but it doesn't stop them.
I don't know what the next generation of "intellectual" creationists will
be like, but you can bet on one thing, they will sell books or some other
medium, and they won't be doing any real science to back up their
creationist views.
Ron Okimoto
Steven Carr
wrote:
<skip>
> But note that Behe used a
>similar tactic: The cover of the paperback version of "Darwin's Black
>Box" features a human and ape. What the heck does this have to do with
>his own alternative hypothesis, which doesn't deny common ancestry at
>all, let alone among species of such biochemical similarity?
To be fair, not all authors have complete control over what goes on
covers and blurbs etc, so Behe may not be to blame for any possible
misrepresentation.
<skip>
Steven Carr
ste...@bowness.demon.co.uk
http://www.bowness.demon.co.uk/
Alan Wright
"Frank J" <fn...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:38c5d0dd.03080...@posting.google.com...
I noted the following quote from Dembski:
"...describes a computer simulation and thus contains no actual biology. ...
The validity of this study therefore depends on whether the simulation maps
faithfully onto biological reality.
Unfortunately, it does not, and the study therefore doesn't prove a thing
about
real-life biological evolution."
It appears to me that increasingly Dembski is trying to use arguments which
have been validly employed to refute his claims in counterarguments against
those refutations. Of course, his invocation of the same arguments is not
sound. For example, the above argument is essentially the problem with his
use of the NFL theorems, as they truly do say nothing about biology, and
the burden is on Dembski to show that they have some relevance. The
simulation referenced above does, in fact, relate to biology because it
models (as opposed to "maps faithfully" to) aspects of biological processes.
In addition, the point is only to show that there are plausible pathways
to IC systems in evolutionary mechanisms. Dembskis claim is that there
are *no possible* such mechanisms.
He obviously can reason at a higher level than is required to see this, so
it appears he is just becoming ever more mischievously, childishly,
and vindictively dishonest. Letting his emotions run amok like this should
fortunately hasten his departure from the scene.
It is also common in the greater body of creationist literature to try to
use the scientific refutations (or logic thereof) in reverse. Of course,
the reverse arguments are usually transparently and clumsily invalid,
but apparently appeal to the intended audience.
Alan
Mike Goodrich
Irony/Hypocrisy meter pegs ...
That's really laughable since the citation *begins* with the egregious
distortion/mischaracterization 'ID creationism' ...
-mg
Bobby D. Bryant
> Irony/Hypocrisy meter pegs ...
You're holding it upside down, silly.
> That's really laughable since the citation *begins* with the egregious
> distortion/mischaracterization 'ID creationism' ...
ID is vacuous if it isn't a from of creationism. Just ask whether the
designer arose by natural causes or not.
--
Bobby Bryant
Austin, Texas
Adam Marczyk
news:d92ac81f.03080...@posting.google.com...
Well, if the IDers would just stop all the shuffling and dodging and tell
us what they really think happened, maybe they'd stop being called
creationists. They could tell us how old they think the Earth is, who they
think the designer is, to what extent they accept evolution and common
descent - things like that.
--
"We have loved the stars too fondly | a.a. #2001
to be fearful of the night." | http://www.ebonmusings.org
--Tombstone epitaph of | e-mail: ebonmuse!hotmail.com
two amateur astronomers, | ICQ: 8777843
quoted in Carl Sagan's _Cosmos_ | PGP Key ID: 0x5C66F737
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Steven J.
anyone who believes that God has intervened directly in nature in order to
create (whether or not in six literal days), it's not clear that confusing
ID arguments with specifically creationist arguments is an *egregious*
mischaracterization. For that matter, if indeed the ID proponents
deliberately court (e.g. by Dembski's choice of title, or Behe's choice --
if it is indeed his choice -- of cover illustrations) the belief that their
arguments somehow contradict common descent, or an old Earth, then it's
barely a mischaracterization at all. How is it "ironic" or "hypocritical"
to conflate ID with creationism, and then to defend that conflation by
pointing out that ID proponents, in practice, encourage it?
>
> -mg
>
Steven J.
Bobby D. Bryant
> "Mike Goodrich" <goodr...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:d92ac81f.03080...@posting.google.com...
>> That's really laughable since the citation *begins* with the egregious
>> distortion/mischaracterization 'ID creationism' ...
>>
> Given that Phillip Johnson has stated explicitly that "creationist"
> includes anyone who believes that God has intervened directly in nature
> in order to create (whether or not in six literal days), it's not clear
> that confusing ID arguments with specifically creationist arguments is
> an *egregious* mischaracterization. For that matter, if indeed the ID
> proponents deliberately court (e.g. by Dembski's choice of title, or
> Behe's choice -- if it is indeed his choice -- of cover illustrations)
> the belief that their arguments somehow contradict common descent, or an
> old Earth, then it's barely a mischaracterization at all. How is it
> "ironic" or "hypocritical" to conflate ID with creationism, and then to
> defend that conflation by pointing out that ID proponents, in practice,
> encourage it?
You'd think Mike would be quickest to know a tree by its fruit, rather
than slowest.
Frank J
> On Fri, 8 Aug 2003 14:42:51 +0000 (UTC), fn...@comcast.net (Frank J)
> wrote:
>
> <skip>
>
> > But note that Behe used a
> >similar tactic: The cover of the paperback version of "Darwin's Black
> >Box" features a human and ape. What the heck does this have to do with
> >his own alternative hypothesis, which doesn't deny common ancestry at
> >all, let alone among species of such biochemical similarity?
>
> To be fair, not all authors have complete control over what goes on
> covers and blurbs etc, so Behe may not be to blame for any possible
> misrepresentation.
>
You may be right, but I haven't heard him complain about it.
Sarah Berel-Harrop
"Steven J." <sjt...@nts.link.net> wrote in message
news:vj8iuds...@corp.supernews.com...
>
> Given that Phillip Johnson has stated explicitly that "creationist"
includes
> anyone who believes that God has intervened directly in nature in order to
> create (whether or not in six literal days), it's not clear that confusing
> ID arguments with specifically creationist arguments is an *egregious*
> mischaracterization.
see also, http://tmatt.gospelcom.net/column/2002/04/17/
Anyone who has any doubts about Johnson's ideas
regarding ID & Creationism should read in particular
_Reason in the Balance_. Terry Gray has written
some great reviews of Johnson's books, from a
Christian point of view. He particularly complains
about Johnson's equivocation on the meanings of
words. Johnson starts out as you say with a broad
meaning of the word creationist. Then on any point
that matters he ends up excluding broad-creationists
who accept evolution (ie, evolutionary creationists);
thus basically implying that since they do not accept
his doctrine of creation, they are accomodationists,
etc.
See in particular
http://tallship.chm.colostate.edu/gray/opening_minds.html
homepage is here
http://franklin.chm.colostate.edu/~grayt/
Pennock's _Tower of Babel_ also has a fairly detailed
review of each of Johnson's books, including _Reason
in the Balance_ which gives you a basic flavor of the
content of the books. To get a very clear picture of the
degree of misreprentation that Johnson engages in, you
need to read the books. I disclaim any opinion on
whether the misreprentations are the purposeful result
of intelligent design, I simply acknowledge their
existence.
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.505 / Virus Database: 302 - Release Date: 07/30/2003
Bobby D. Bryant
> I disclaim any opinion on whether the misreprentations are the
> purposeful result of intelligent design, I simply acknowledge their
> existence.
IMO it suffices to point out that an ongoing misrepresentation (as opposed
to a nonce faux pas) is evidence of either mendacity or incompetence, and
it doesn't really matter which to an evaluation of the argument or the
reliability of its source.
BTW, those links might find a useful place on talkorigins.org.
Sarah Berel-Harrop
"Bobby D. Bryant" <bdbr...@mail.utexas.edu> wrote in message
news:pan.2003.08.09....@mail.utexas.edu...
> On Sat, 09 Aug 2003 13:32:15 +0000, Sarah Berel-Harrop wrote:
>
> > I disclaim any opinion on whether the misreprentations are the
> > purposeful result of intelligent design, I simply acknowledge their
> > existence.
>
> IMO it suffices to point out that an ongoing misrepresentation (as opposed
> to a nonce faux pas) is evidence of either mendacity or incompetence, and
> it doesn't really matter which to an evaluation of the argument or the
> reliability of its source.
Well it certainly *is* an indication that the source is
unreliable. However it is best not to get into a
sideshow over intent. The misrepresentations and
errors stand on their own. The most egregious and
ongoing one is the strawman characterization of
"evolutionary biology" as "what Johnson says
Dawkins says it is in his popular books".
Peppered in with some pretty outrageous quote
mining. This is hard to check out if you are not
already familiar with the literature because of
Johnson's peculiar endnote style, which consists
mainly of side remarks.
Here is an example I found pretty funny (Cut from
my sermon a few Sundays ago):
"Johnson casts the argument in terms of educational
elites against people they percieve to be religious
fanatics. For example, he states, "As the historian
Ronald Numbers put it in his book The Creationists,
the attitude of the educational elites toward creationism
can be summed up as "we've got to stop these bastards!"
. The elite attitude examined by Numbers is a clear sign
that modernist culture finds creationism . genuinely
threatening" (Reason, p 44).
What Numbers really said: "But even academics who
would have no trouble emphathetically studying studying
fifteenth-century astrology, seventeenth century alchemy,
or nineteenth century phrenology seem to lose their nerve
when they approach twentieth-century creationism and its
fundamentalist proponents. The prevailing attitude
colorfully expressed at one professional meeting I
attended, is that "we've got to stop these bastards." In
other words, although many scholars have no trouble
respecting the unconventional beliefs and behaviors of
peoples chronologically or geographically removed from
us, they substitute condemnation for comprehension when
scrutinizing their own neighbors. I think it is profitable to
get acquainted with the neighbors, especially so if we find
them threatening.". If Johnson bothered to read the
book, (this was in the preface), he would have found
that Numbers does not examine "the elite attitude"
against creationism at all."
> BTW, those links might find a useful place on
talkorigins.org.
>
> --
> Bobby Bryant
> Austin, Texas
>
A Pagano
wrote:
>This link discusses the various lengths to which William Dembski will
>go to mirsrepresent his critics:
>
>http://www.talkreason.org/articles/compass4.cfm
>
>What mainly caught my eye, though, was the title of Dembski's upcoming
>book - a play on words that suggests denial of common descent.
Pagano replies:
Is Frank J jumping to conclusions?
> Unless
>Dembski has changed his mind and is now prepared to refute his
>colleague Michael Behe, one must assume that the book will not
>challenge common descent in the least.
Pagano replies:
Dembski has made very clear that the theory of common descent is not
incompatible with Intelligent Design. He also made clear in "No Free
Lunch" (2002, Rowland and Littlefield Publishers) that Intelligent
Design is NOT willing to accept common descent as a consequence of the
Darwinian mechanism. He wrote:
"The Darwinian mechanism claims the power to transform a
single organism (known as the the last common ancestor) into the full
diversity of life that we see both around us and in the fossil record.
If intelligent design is correct, then the Darwinian mechanism of
natural selection and random variation lacks that power (see Chapter
4). What's more, in that case the justification for common descent
cannot be that it follows as a logical deduction from Darwinism.
Darwinism is not identical with evolution understood merely as common
descent. Darwinism comprises a historical claim (common descent) and
a naturalistic mechanism (natural selection operating on random
variations), with the latter being used to justify the former.
According to intelligent design, the Darwinian mechanism cannot bear
the weight of common descent. Intelligent design therefore throws
common descent into question but at the same time leaves open as a
very live possibility that common descent is the case, albeit for
reasons other than the Darwinian mechanism."
> But note that Behe used a
>similar tactic: The cover of the paperback version of "Darwin's Black
>Box" features a human and ape. What the heck does this have to do with
>his own alternative hypothesis, which doesn't deny common ancestry at
>all, let alone among species of such biochemical similarity? Plenty. A
>quick glance at Amazon.com reviews of "Darwin's Black Box" and other
>pseudoscientific anti-evolution books suggests that most readers who
>find them convincing never get much past the cover before inferring
>independent origins -and often YEC to boot! The fact that the authors
>have no apparent problem with this speaks volumes.
Pagano replies:
Behe's "irreducible complexity" is a special case of Dembski's theory
of intelligent design. Like Dembski his criticism does not address,
or contradict common descent it criticizes the neoDarwinian mechanism.
Regards,
T Pagano
Boikat
"A Pagano" <anthony...@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:qvlajvkd0lh6jpdb4...@4ax.com...
> On Fri, 8 Aug 2003 14:42:51 +0000 (UTC), fn...@comcast.net (Frank J)
> wrote:
>
> >This link discusses the various lengths to which William Dembski will
> >go to mirsrepresent his critics:
> >
> >http://www.talkreason.org/articles/compass4.cfm
> >
> >What mainly caught my eye, though, was the title of Dembski's upcoming
> >book - a play on words that suggests denial of common descent.
>
> Pagano replies:
> Is Frank J jumping to conclusions?
You mean like the way you've jumped to the conclusion that abiogenesis is
falsified because nobody's created life in the lab yet?
Pagano, thy name is hypocrite.
Boikat
Frank J
> fn...@comcast.net (Frank J) wrote in message news:<38c5d0dd.03080...@posting.google.com>...
> > This link discusses the various lengths to which William Dembski will
> > go to mirsrepresent his critics:
> >
> > http://www.talkreason.org/articles/compass4.cfm
> >
> > What mainly caught my eye, though, was the title of Dembski's upcoming
> > book - a play on words that suggests denial of common descent. Unless
> > Dembski has changed his mind and is now prepared to refute his
> > colleague Michael Behe, one must assume that the book will not
> > challenge common descent in the least. But note that Behe used a
> > similar tactic: The cover of the paperback version of "Darwin's Black
> > Box" features a human and ape. What the heck does this have to do with
> > his own alternative hypothesis, which doesn't deny common ancestry at
> > all, let alone among species of such biochemical similarity? Plenty. A
> > quick glance at Amazon.com reviews of "Darwin's Black Box" and other
> > pseudoscientific anti-evolution books suggests that most readers who
> > independent origins -and often YEC to boot! The fact that the authors
> > have no apparent problem with this speaks volumes.
>
>
> Irony/Hypocrisy meter pegs ...
>
> That's really laughable since the citation *begins* with the egregious
> distortion/mischaracterization 'ID creationism' ...
>
> -mg
As Steven J. told you, Phillip Johnson defines "creationism" as
broadly as possible to include not just ID advocates, but many of
their "evolutionist" critics. Interestingly, Johnson's colleague,
Michael Behe, defines it as narrowly as possible - IIRC YEC only. Now,
I don't see PJ and MB having heated debates on their conflicting
definitions - not to mention on their fundamental difference regarding
common descent.
I try not to use the words "creationism" and "creationist" much, and
only if defined by context. If I were writing something formal, I'd be
even more careful. There is, however, an implied "default" definition
of "creationist," which includes YECs, OECs, ID advovates, but not
theistic evolutionists. For this I would rather use "pseudoscientific
evolution misrepresenter." But for simplicity I often say simply
"anti-evolutionist". But, unlike many "evolutionists," I don't mean
the "anti" to imply that they personally reject evolution. I'm
convinced that many of them, especially the ID advocates, privately
accept evolution, or at the very least common descent. The "anti"
means that they "don't like it," and prefer that the "masses," reject
it because "they can't handle the truth."
Frank J
As you know, one (Michael Behe) already has. The verdict, unopposed
directly to my knowledge by any major ID player since it's
introduction in 1996 (Darwin's Black Box), is old earth (4.5 billion
years) and common descent. All the vague allusions to the contrary,
such as in "Icons of Evolution" are now moot. Of course this is still
a well-kept secret from the general public, who hear all the
misleading sound-bites, but would never think to question why Behe has
not developed an intense research program to investigate his "complex
abiogenesis" hypothesis.
As to "who the designer is," that too is rather moot, since some of
the chief pro-evolution critics of ID have openly admitted who they
think the designer is. Unlike the ID pseudoscientists, however, they
think that this designer is too smart to be caught in an "irreducibly
complex mousetrap."
Bobby D. Bryant
> I try not to use the words "creationism" and "creationist" much, and
> only if defined by context. If I were writing something formal, I'd be
> even more careful. There is, however, an implied "default" definition of
> "creationist," which includes YECs, OECs, ID advovates, but not theistic
> evolutionists. For this I would rather use "pseudoscientific evolution
> misrepresenter." But for simplicity I often say simply
> "anti-evolutionist". But, unlike many "evolutionists," I don't mean the
> "anti" to imply that they personally reject evolution. I'm convinced
> that many of them, especially the ID advocates, privately accept
> evolution, or at the very least common descent. The "anti" means that
> they "don't like it," and prefer that the "masses," reject it because
> "they can't handle the truth."
Is it because they don't think the masses can handle the truth, or because
they don't think the truth would work as an opiate?
Louann Miller
Possibly a distinction without a difference. I suspect that if you
dig, their definition of the appropriate mental state for the masses
is quiet, heads down, and doing as they're told -- not questioning
what authority e.g. their churches tells them. Ergo "not under opiate"
works out in practice to "not handling it."
Louann
--
If God wanted us to believe we were related to chimpanzees,
he'd have given us DNA 95% identical to theirs.
John Stockwell
>
> Pagano replies:
>Dembski has made very clear that the theory of common descent is not
>incompatible with Intelligent Design. He also made clear in "No Free
>Lunch" (2002, Rowland and Littlefield Publishers) that Intelligent
>Design is NOT willing to accept common descent as a consequence of the
>Darwinian mechanism. He wrote:
This is "big tent" creationism. What you have stated there is that
ID as evolution theory. If you are ascribing to Dembski-Behe ID theory,
then you are required to accept common descent, which means that we
are only arguing about the *mechanism* of evolution not the *fact*
of evolution.
>
> "The Darwinian mechanism claims the power to transform a
>single organism (known as the the last common ancestor) into the full
>diversity of life that we see both around us and in the fossil record.
>If intelligent design is correct, then the Darwinian mechanism of
>natural selection and random variation lacks that power (see Chapter
>4).
The NFL theorems are not applicable to the problem of variation and
selection in the context of natural selection, owing to the fact that
values can be revisited in Darwinian models, but the NFL theorems assume
that values are not revisited. The creators of the NFL theorems state this
in their paper. Furthermore, there is no claim or requirement that natural
selection be intrinsically more efficient than another algorithm. Indeed,
the authors of the NFL theorems also state that the issue of the massive
parallelism of biological systems is not addressed in applications of NFL
to biology. In short, Dembski's NFL book is a nonsequiter.
> What's more, in that case the justification for common descent
>cannot be that it follows as a logical deduction from Darwinism.
>Darwinism is not identical with evolution understood merely as common
>descent.
Common descent is evolution as "fact" or evolution as a "phenomenon."
>Darwinism comprises a historical claim (common descent) and
>a naturalistic mechanism (natural selection operating on random
>variations), with the latter being used to justify the former.
>According to intelligent design, the Darwinian mechanism cannot bear
>the weight of common descent. Intelligent design therefore throws
>common descent into question but at the same time leaves open as a
>very live possibility that common descent is the case, albeit for
>reasons other than the Darwinian mechanism."
So far there is no scientific theory of ID, only the assertion.
>> But note that Behe used a
>>similar tactic: The cover of the paperback version of "Darwin's Black
>>Box" features a human and ape. What the heck does this have to do with
>>his own alternative hypothesis, which doesn't deny common ancestry at
>>all, let alone among species of such biochemical similarity? Plenty. A
>>quick glance at Amazon.com reviews of "Darwin's Black Box" and other
>>pseudoscientific anti-evolution books suggests that most readers who
>>find them convincing never get much past the cover before inferring
>>independent origins -and often YEC to boot! The fact that the authors
>>have no apparent problem with this speaks volumes.
>
> Pagano replies:
>Behe's "irreducible complexity" is a special case of Dembski's theory
>of intelligent design. Like Dembski his criticism does not address,
>or contradict common descent it criticizes the neoDarwinian mechanism.
'Fraid not. Dembski's "theory" is a statement (an incorrect one, I might
add) about how we identify design, it is not a theory of how design happens,
or how species originate. Behe's assertion is that certain structures are
such small targets on the fitness landscape that natural selection cannot
find them. Unfortunately, he does not supply mathematics to back up either
the assertion that the targets themselves are "small", or that selection
cannot find a "small" target. He only makes the statement about "irreduceable
complexity", with the tacit assumption that the only possible paths to
a given complex structures is assembly rather than substitution.
>
>Regards,
>T Pagano
>
>
--
John Stockwell | jo...@dix.Mines.EDU
Center for Wave Phenomena (The Home of Seismic Un*x)
Colorado School of Mines
Golden, CO 80401 | http://www.cwp.mines.edu/cwpcodes
voice: (303) 273-3049
Our book:
Norman Bleistein, Jack K. Cohen, John W. Stockwell Jr., [2001],
Mathematics of multidimensional seismic imaging, migration, and inversion,
(Interdisciplinary Applied Mathematics, V. 13.), Springer-Verlag, New York.
A Pagano
<jo...@dix.Mines.EDU> wrote:
Pagano notes:
Stockwell's attempt in his subject line to liken me to a Nazi murderer
is both libelous and reprehensible regardless of his motives. This is
not unlike a previous libel concerning a source document which
Stockwell didn't even possess. Such a tactic indicates that even
academics who are purportedly "authoritative" experts in their field
hit intellectual bankruptcy with the same regularity as the rest of
the evolutionist amateurs.
>>Pagano wrote in part:
>>
>> Pagano replies:
>>Dembski has made very clear that the theory of common descent is not
>>incompatible with Intelligent Design. He also made clear in "No Free
>>Lunch" (2002, Rowland and Littlefield Publishers) that Intelligent
>>Design is NOT willing to accept common descent as a consequence of the
>>Darwinian mechanism. He wrote:
>
>This is "big tent" creationism. What you have stated there is that
>ID as evolution theory. If you are ascribing to Dembski-Behe ID theory,
>then you are required to accept common descent,...
Pagano replies:
Evolutionary theory is a solution to the problem of how biological
diversity arose assuming that life began from prebiotic molecules and
assuming common descent. NeoDarwinian theory comprises a historical
claim (common descent) and a purely naturalistic mechanism (natural
selection operating on random mutations).
ID theory offers neither a mechanism nor any historical explanations
of events nor anything even analogous to those components. ID theory
solves the problem of how we may rationally and rigorously decide
between three logical possible kinds of causation when examining a
natural object, system or event-----that is, between chance, necessity
and intelligent design. Stockwell apparently has a fundamental
misunderstanding of ID theory.
ID theory can be consistent with, but does NOT logically entail
"common descent." As a result ID theory hardly requires its
adherents to accept common descent. ID theory allows for BOTH the
possibility that similarities were the result of the historical claim
of "common descent" or the result of a designer employing similar
design.
>...which means that we
>are only arguing about the *mechanism* of evolution not the *fact*
>of evolution.
Pagano replies:
I doubt this is the case.
1. The "fact of evolution" is fact, if and only if, biological
relationship (that is, similarities) is equivalent to a purely
materialistic evolutionary relationship. Unfortunately this
equivalence is very much in dispute and is the cornerstone of the
origins dispute.
2. This equivalence is posited by evolutionists "a priori" given a
commitment to methodological naturalism not the basis of empirical
testing. Furthermore this a priori acceptance is justified by an
inappropriate extrapolation of the neoDarwinian mechanism well beyond
its empirical basis.
3. The historical claim of "common descent" is consistent with but is
NOT logically entailed or required by the neoDarwinian mechanism.
4. Neither Darwin nor the neoDarwinian synthesizers invented or
deduced common descent from the consequences entailed by the
neoDarwinian mechanism. Both Darwin and his neoDarwinian rescuers
attempted to provide an explanation in purely materialistic terms of
how the categories of Linnaeus came about.
THEREFORE, the "fact of evolution" is not a scientific fact and IS
very much in dispute. Darwin and his neoDarwinian rescuers posited a
priori that the "connections" between the categories in Linnaeus's
taxonomy were not arbitrary sorting systems but real evolutionary
relationships. Maybe this is so, but this is positing an axiom by
fiat not the result of empirical science.
FINALLY, the neoDarwinian mechanism doesn't entail or require common
descent, the neoDarwinian mechanism doesn't predict the emergence of
novelty, the purported transformational power of neoDarwinian
mechanism has never been observed, and ID theory indicates that the
neoDarwinian mechanism lacks the power to generate specified
complexity.
<snip>
Regards,
T Pagano
A Pagano
<jo...@dix.Mines.EDU> wrote:
Pagano replies:
Is Stockwell trying to argue that the neoDarwinian mechanism cannot be
interpreted as an evolutionary algorithm? Perhaps Stockwell could
produce the quotes from the relevent paper so that we all can be clear
about the author's position.
Otherwise, the fundamental claim of these theorems is that when
averaged across fitness functions, evolutionary algorithms cannot
outperform a blind search. The NFL theorems provide a best case
senario; that is, the neoDarwian mechanism can be no better than a
blind search. "Revisiting" the same possibilities (if that's what
Stockwell means by "revisiting") within the space of possible
solutions for a complex specified target could make the situation
worse for the neoDarwinian mechanism not better.
>Furthermore, there is no claim or requirement that natural
>selection be intrinsically more efficient than another algorithm.
Pagano replies:
Actually Dawkins clearly implied----with his computer model of a
evolutionary algorithm (the "Weasel" algorithm)----that the
neoDarwinian mechanism "is" intrinsically more efficient. The NFL
theorems prove that the neoDarwinian mechanism can be no better than a
blind search.
The NFL theorems dashed Dawkins's position. A position which he and
other evolutionists attempted to carve out because they were well
aware of the magnitude of the possibilities the evolutionary algorithm
had to search and the finite time available to conduct the search.
Compounding the problem of the magnitude of the search is that nature
does not allow infinite free play but places constraints on the search
of the possibilities. For example: Mutations are not equally
probable for all loci. And the error correction mechanism is highly
effective in attenuating the possibilities (that is, the mutations)
that can occur to even be acted upon by natural selection.
> Indeed,
>the authors of the NFL theorems also state that the issue of the massive
>parallelism of biological systems is not addressed in applications of NFL
>to biology. In short, Dembski's NFL book is a nonsequiter.
Pagano replies:
Without a quote from the author's work it's difficult to determine
what the authors intended compared to Stockwell's conclusion.
Nonetheless Stockwell would have to make a considerable argument to
justify the claim that the neoDarwinian mechanism conducts a "massive
parallel search." In what way is it "massive" and "parallel" and does
this make the search for complex specified targets significantly more
manageable? Stockwell never says.
>
>> What's more, in that case the justification for common descent
>>cannot be that it follows as a logical deduction from Darwinism.
>>Darwinism is not identical with evolution understood merely as common
>>descent.
>
>Common descent is evolution as "fact" or evolution as a "phenomenon."
Pagano replies:
As "fact" it is nothing more than an axiom established by fiat not a
scientificlly testable claim which has been tested. The "phenomenon"
is little more than an inappropriate extrapolation too distant from
its empirical basis.
>
>>Darwinism comprises a historical claim (common descent) and
>>a naturalistic mechanism (natural selection operating on random
>>variations), with the latter being used to justify the former.
>>According to intelligent design, the Darwinian mechanism cannot bear
>>the weight of common descent. Intelligent design therefore throws
>>common descent into question but at the same time leaves open as a
>>very live possibility that common descent is the case, albeit for
>>reasons other than the Darwinian mechanism."
>
>So far there is no scientific theory of ID, only the assertion.
Paganor replies:
Perhaps, but its hard to take this seriously since Stockwell is under
the mistaken belief that ID is an evolutionary theory. It is nothing
of the sort. ID theory does not explain historical events. Its
purpose is to explain how one can choose between three possible modes
of causation for a given natural object, system or event. The
explanatory filter has been tested on known objects and events. It
has not failed to correctly chose the correct mode of causation. That
means it has garnered corroborations making it more than a hypothesis.
On the other hand Common descent is a historical assertion not a
theory. It is untestable apart from a mechanism to explain how
diversity emerges from some common descendent. It has no
corroborations.
>
>>> But note that Behe used a
>>>similar tactic: The cover of the paperback version of "Darwin's Black
>>>Box" features a human and ape. What the heck does this have to do with
>>>his own alternative hypothesis, which doesn't deny common ancestry at
>>>all, let alone among species of such biochemical similarity? Plenty. A
>>>quick glance at Amazon.com reviews of "Darwin's Black Box" and other
>>>pseudoscientific anti-evolution books suggests that most readers who
>>>find them convincing never get much past the cover before inferring
>>>independent origins -and often YEC to boot! The fact that the authors
>>>have no apparent problem with this speaks volumes.
>>
>> Pagano replies:
>>Behe's "irreducible complexity" is a special case of Dembski's theory
>>of intelligent design. Like Dembski his criticism does not address,
>>or contradict common descent it criticizes the neoDarwinian mechanism.
>
>'Fraid not. Dembski's "theory" is a statement (an incorrect one, I might
>add) about how we identify design, it is not a theory of how design happens,
>or how species originate.
Pagano replies:
Stockwell may use the words "theory" and "statement" how ever he
chooses, but in this case the word play amounts to verbalism.
Dembski set out to solve the problem of how to determine from the
examination of a natural object, system or event the actual mode of
causation: necessity, chance or intelligent design. He dispensed
with the restriction imposed by methodological naturalism which is not
a first order claim of science. He systematically organized knowledge
in Probability and Information Theory applicable to the class of
problems he wished to solve. He devised a set of rules to analyze
natural objects including direct observation to allow the investigator
to determine the mode of causation. If this doesn't meet the
requirements of a theory then I don't know what does. His theory is
capable of sorting between three modes of causation.
Dembski never claimed that his theory was a theory of crreation or
evolution. It was Stockwell at the start his post who claimed that it
was and that is the claim of most evolutionists in this forum.
>Behe's assertion is that certain structures are
>such small targets on the fitness landscape that natural selection cannot
>find them.
Pagano replies:
This doesn't contradict my claim that IC is a special case of ID.
>Unfortunately, he does not supply mathematics to back up either
>the assertion that the targets themselves are "small", or that selection
>cannot find a "small" target. He only makes the statement about "irreduceable
>complexity", with the tacit assumption that the only possible paths to
>a given complex structures is assembly rather than substitution.
Pagano replies:
Indeed he doesn't but as a special case of ID, Dembski has done the
math. IC systems meet the requirements of specified complexity and
Dembski has also done the math with the "substitution" objection.
Since math is apparently Stockwell's forte perhaps he could show in
detail where Dembski has gone wrong. So far he is indulging in
generalities which are misguided and demonstrate a misunderstanding of
ID.
Regards,
T Pagano
>
>>
>>Regards,
>>T Pagano
>>
>>
Steven J.
>
> >>Pagano wrote in part:
> >>
> >> Pagano replies:
> >>Dembski has made very clear that the theory of common descent is not
> >>incompatible with Intelligent Design. He also made clear in "No Free
> >>Lunch" (2002, Rowland and Littlefield Publishers) that Intelligent
> >>Design is NOT willing to accept common descent as a consequence of the
> >>Darwinian mechanism. He wrote:
> >
> >This is "big tent" creationism. What you have stated there is that
> >ID as evolution theory. If you are ascribing to Dembski-Behe ID theory,
> >then you are required to accept common descent,...
>
> Pagano replies:
> Evolutionary theory is a solution to the problem of how biological
> diversity arose assuming that life began from prebiotic molecules and
> assuming common descent. NeoDarwinian theory comprises a historical
> claim (common descent) and a purely naturalistic mechanism (natural
> selection operating on random mutations).
>
you prefer) regardless of how we assume that life originated. If the
prokaryote last common ancestor was miraculously *poofed* into existence,
that would be irrelevant to the reconstruction of its subsequent branching
descent with modification, or of the mechanisms for same.
>
> ID theory offers neither a mechanism nor any historical explanations
> of events nor anything even analogous to those components. ID theory
> solves the problem of how we may rationally and rigorously decide
> between three logical possible kinds of causation when examining a
> natural object, system or event-----that is, between chance, necessity
> and intelligent design. Stockwell apparently has a fundamental
> misunderstanding of ID theory.
>
race, politics, and religion are *not* part Darwinian of the theory of
evolution, so quite arguably Dembski's and Behe's views on life's history
are not part of ID, any more than Johnson's apparently more traditional
special creationist views.
>
> ID theory can be consistent with, but does NOT logically entail
> "common descent." As a result ID theory hardly requires its
> adherents to accept common descent. ID theory allows for BOTH the
> possibility that similarities were the result of the historical claim
> of "common descent" or the result of a designer employing similar
> design.
>
of anything.
>
> >...which means that we
> >are only arguing about the *mechanism* of evolution not the *fact*
> >of evolution.
>
> Pagano replies:
> I doubt this is the case.
>
> 1. The "fact of evolution" is fact, if and only if, biological
> relationship (that is, similarities) is equivalent to a purely
> materialistic evolutionary relationship. Unfortunately this
> equivalence is very much in dispute and is the cornerstone of the
> origins dispute.
>
similarities not required by functional similarities) are inherited from
common ancestors, rather than simply copied (with modifications) in
separately created kinds. Note, however, that virtually all creationists
accept some degree of evolution within created kinds. Whether they limit it
to, say, two very similar species of _Drosophilia_, or to cheetahs and
lynxes within a single "cat kind," creationists routinely accept that in
some cases homologies are best explained by common ancestry. Note, by the
way, that "shared inheritance" is "purely materialistic" whether we're
talking about your similarities to your cousins, or your similarities to
howler monkeys. The mechanisms by which inherited traits are modified in
the course of descent is a separate issue from the mechanisms by which they
are inherited.
>
> 2. This equivalence is posited by evolutionists "a priori" given a
> commitment to methodological naturalism not the basis of empirical
> testing. Furthermore this a priori acceptance is justified by an
> inappropriate extrapolation of the neoDarwinian mechanism well beyond
> its empirical basis.
>
assumed to act according to their discoverable and consistent nature.
There is no way to test the hypothesis that the Creator might have inserted
identically disabled pseudogenes in humans and several other primate
species, so that they *look* like a mutation inherited from a single common
ancestor. There is no way to falsify the idea that the consistent nested
hierarchy of life was simply the Creator's idea of a cool way to create
life. What you call positing an equivalence (between homology and common
ancestry) a priori, we call the assumption that evidence means something,
and that the Creator is not capriciously weaving deceits into the fabric of
life.
>
> 3. The historical claim of "common descent" is consistent with but is
> NOT logically entailed or required by the neoDarwinian mechanism.
>
encounter more or less different environments, and establish isolated
populations. Different random mutations will occur in these different
populations, and different mutations will be selected by different
environments. Unless a very simple environment prevails without variation
worldwide, the neoDarwinian mechanism *must* entail common descent.
It occurs to me that you might mean that mutation and natural selection
don't entail *universal* common descent -- a single ancestor for all current
living species. This is true; evolutionists long considered the possibility
that at the phylum level or higher, different groups might have separate
ancestry. This view has been rejected because of the extensive genetic and
biochemical homologies even among bacteria and eukaryotes, as well as the
tendency of these homologies to conform to the nested hierarchy. But this
merely shows that common ancestry *is* tested (on the "naturalistic"
assumption that evidence means something), and not assumed a priori.
>
> 4. Neither Darwin nor the neoDarwinian synthesizers invented or
> deduced common descent from the consequences entailed by the
> neoDarwinian mechanism. Both Darwin and his neoDarwinian rescuers
> attempted to provide an explanation in purely materialistic terms of
> how the categories of Linnaeus came about.
>
It is true that no evolutionist started with natural selection, and figured
out that it would cause common descent, and then looked to see if there was
any evidence that could be explained in terms of common descent. Charles
Darwin clearly explained the biogeographical pattern of mockingbird species
in the Galapagoes, as well as the diversity of finches, in terms of common
descent *before* he worked out a theory to explain how that common descent
had happened. He noted at the same time that this same theory could explain
the nested hierarchy of life on which the Linnaean taxonomy was based. The
validity of gradual common descent as an explanation cof the nested
hierarchy, dissimilar structures for similar purposes and similar structures
for dissimilar purposes, biogeography, etc. does not depend on the
mechanisms used as explanations for common descent.
>
> THEREFORE, the "fact of evolution" is not a scientific fact and IS
> very much in dispute. Darwin and his neoDarwinian rescuers posited a
> priori that the "connections" between the categories in Linnaeus's
> taxonomy were not arbitrary sorting systems but real evolutionary
> relationships. Maybe this is so, but this is positing an axiom by
> fiat not the result of empirical science.
>
Your conclusion, here, does not follow in any discernable manner from your
premises. That common descent was inferred from the evidence before natural
selection was proposed as a mechanism for common descent (and by the way,
common descent was suggested as an explanation for the nested hierarchy
before Darwin suggested it) does not make it either an untestable axiom, or
a fiat, or dogmatic. Common descent is quite testable -- by looking for
exceptions to the nested hierarchy of life, for example -- assuming, again,
that evidence is allowed to mean anything.
>
> FINALLY, the neoDarwinian mechanism doesn't entail or require common
> descent, the neoDarwinian mechanism doesn't predict the emergence of
> novelty, the purported transformational power of neoDarwinian
> mechanism has never been observed, and ID theory indicates that the
> neoDarwinian mechanism lacks the power to generate specified
> complexity.
>
The "neoDarwinian mechanism" does entail common descent, assuming it
operates in anything like the observed world. You've never offered a
coherent definition of "novelty." I'd personally say that the emergence, in
monoclonal bacterial cultures, variously, of the ability to digest nylon (or
antibiotics!), or to incorporate into proteins amino acids not found in
nature, or to re-evolve IC enzyme systems, is fairly impressive evidence of
observation of transformational power. So is the emergence of
multicelluarity in unicellular eukaryotes (induced by predation acting to
select mutations for cells forming colonies). As I've noted in a previous
post, specificied complexity is a measure of improbability. Natural
selection makes the spread and accumulation of certain mutations probable
(so it does not produce highly improbable results), while mutations are not
specified in advance. Pretty much by definition, the neoDarwinian mechanism
cannot produce specified complexity -- but Dembski's filter can't tell
whether the world contains specified complexity (in his sense) without
virtual omniscience on the part of whoever is applying the filter.
>
>
> <snip>
>
>
> Regards,
> T Pagano
>
-- Steven J.
H,R.Gruemm
This is simply wrong. The requirements for a function class for which
NFL holds (i.e. all algorithms perform equally when averaged over the
class) are not satisfied for the fitness functions of biology.
Now that Mr. Pagano has been informed of this fact, I expect that he
will not repeat his false claims.
<snip>
Regards,
HRG.
Steven J.
>
> >The NFL theorems are not applicable to the problem of variation and
> >selection in the context of natural selection, owing to the fact that
> >values can be revisited in Darwinian models, but the NFL theorems assume
> >that values are not revisited. The creators of the NFL theorems state
this
> >in their paper
>
> Pagano replies:
> Is Stockwell trying to argue that the neoDarwinian mechanism cannot be
> interpreted as an evolutionary algorithm? Perhaps Stockwell could
> produce the quotes from the relevent paper so that we all can be clear
> about the author's position.
>
possible evolutionary algorithms -- including those those that comprise the
actual "neoDarwinian mechanism."
>
> Otherwise, the fundamental claim of these theorems is that when
> averaged across fitness functions, evolutionary algorithms cannot
> outperform a blind search. The NFL theorems provide a best case
> senario; that is, the neoDarwian mechanism can be no better than a
> blind search. "Revisiting" the same possibilities (if that's what
> Stockwell means by "revisiting") within the space of possible
> solutions for a complex specified target could make the situation
> worse for the neoDarwinian mechanism not better.
>
outperform a blind search, *on average*, for a prespecified target. But
then, part of the claim of "neoDarwinism" is that natural selection doesn't
have goals; it isn't looking for a specified target. Any search algorithm
can outperform a blind search at finding some solutions. Natural selection,
to be the correct explanation for adaption, only needs to be able to explain
the adaptions actually found in nature, not all the possible adaptions that
might exist and which some other search algorithm might have found more
easily, but which don't actually exist in nature.
Daniel C. Dennett offers a point to consider: you find a species of tropical
butterfly that is perfectly camoflaged to hide against the forest floor.
The naive Darwinist might assume that if the forest floor looked different,
a very similar species of butterfly would still be there, with a different
camoflage pattern to match the different forest floor. The more
sophisticated Darwinist does not assume this; perhaps that camoflage pattern
was the only one that natural selection could "find" given the starting
point of the butterfly's ancestors. We see the solutions that natural
selection *could* come up with; we don't see the hosts of extinct species
for whom natural selection and mutation failed to find any solution that
kept the species fitted to a changing environment.
Note that revisiting the same possibilities might be very useful, if the
environment varies in a cyclical fashion. Consider the Grants' observations
of average finch beak size growing and then shrinking as droughts came and
went on the Galapagoes. Creationists often cite this as evidence that
natural selection is confined to a narrow range of variations within a
single "kind," but it serves better to illustrate the usefulness, on
occasion, of revisiting past solutions to problems.
>
> >Furthermore, there is no claim or requirement that natural
> >selection be intrinsically more efficient than another algorithm.
>
> Pagano replies:
> Actually Dawkins clearly implied----with his computer model of a
> evolutionary algorithm (the "Weasel" algorithm)----that the
> neoDarwinian mechanism "is" intrinsically more efficient. The NFL
> theorems prove that the neoDarwinian mechanism can be no better than a
> blind search.
>
Dawkins was illustrating the advantages of cumulative selection (not,
strictly speaking, natural selection -- all natural selection is cumulative
selection, but not all cumulative selection is natural selection) over a
blind search. Again, the point is that cumulative selection (and by
extension, natural selection) is intrinsically more efficient *at some
tasks*. It need not be better than a blind search at finding all possible
solutions to all possible problems. Indeed, a frequent argument for
evolution (and the "neoDarwinian mechanism") is the jury-rigged and bizarre
nature of some adaptions; implicitly such evidence implies a mechanism that
is not a universally optimum search algorithm.
>
> The NFL theorems dashed Dawkins's position. A position which he and
> other evolutionists attempted to carve out because they were well
> aware of the magnitude of the possibilities the evolutionary algorithm
> had to search and the finite time available to conduct the search.
>
Yet again, you don't seem to understand Dawkin's position. If he, or any
other evolutionist, had argued that mutation and natural selection could
find the optimum solution (or indeed any solution) to any problem at all,
the NFL theorems would perhaps have dashed that position. But that position
was an absurd strawman, never advocated by any evolutionist.
>
> Compounding the problem of the magnitude of the search is that nature
> does not allow infinite free play but places constraints on the search
> of the possibilities. For example: Mutations are not equally
> probable for all loci. And the error correction mechanism is highly
> effective in attenuating the possibilities (that is, the mutations)
> that can occur to even be acted upon by natural selection.
>
One more time: the mechanism does not need to be infinitely powerful,
because there is no evidence either that adaptions in general are perfect,
or that species in general are fully adapted to their environments. Note
that the error correcting mechanism does not prevent the average human being
from being born with numerous mutations, mostly in noncoding DNA, mostly
neutral or silent -- but numerous.
>
> > Indeed,
> >the authors of the NFL theorems also state that the issue of the massive
> >parallelism of biological systems is not addressed in applications of NFL
> >to biology. In short, Dembski's NFL book is a nonsequiter.
>
> Pagano replies:
> Without a quote from the author's work it's difficult to determine
> what the authors intended compared to Stockwell's conclusion.
> Nonetheless Stockwell would have to make a considerable argument to
> justify the claim that the neoDarwinian mechanism conducts a "massive
> parallel search." In what way is it "massive" and "parallel" and does
> this make the search for complex specified targets significantly more
> manageable? Stockwell never says.
>
It is massive and parallel because evolving populations normally contain
many individuals. There are many mothers producing many offspring (all with
their own distinctive mutations). Many mutations recur over and over,
happening more than once in a generation and in more than one generation.
It is a serious mistake to imagine (as many creationists seem to) a single
copy of the genome having to survive mutations in each generation; there
exist hosts of variant copies of the species genome, most of which will be
"thrown away" (by not producing offspring), so that thousands of
"experiments" with new alleles can typically be run in each generation.
Nothing prevents, e.g. two favorable mutations from arising in different
offspring (or several different offspring) in a single generation, and
spreading out until the heirs of those lucky mutants mate and some of their
offspring accumulate both new favorable alleles.
>
> >> What's more, in that case the justification for common descent
> >>cannot be that it follows as a logical deduction from Darwinism.
> >>Darwinism is not identical with evolution understood merely as common
> >>descent.
> >
> >Common descent is evolution as "fact" or evolution as a "phenomenon."
>
> Pagano replies:
> As "fact" it is nothing more than an axiom established by fiat not a
> scientificlly testable claim which has been tested. The "phenomenon"
> is little more than an inappropriate extrapolation too distant from
> its empirical basis.
>
This is simply untrue. If common descent were simply established by fiat,
then, e.g. there would be no attempts to confirm or falsify hypotheses about
phylogeny. We would not have seen, within the last few years, the overturn
of the "whales are evolved mesonychids" paradigm and its replacement (based
on genetic and fossil evidence) of the "whales are derived artiodactyls"
model. There would be no point or possibility to the "bones vs. molecules"
dispute in taxomony. Again, the existence of facts from shared pseudogenes
between humans and other anthropoids, to the existence of fossil skulls that
straddle any line one might wish to draw between human and ape "kinds" are
an empirical basis for claims of common descent.
>
> >>Darwinism comprises a historical claim (common descent) and
> >>a naturalistic mechanism (natural selection operating on random
> >>variations), with the latter being used to justify the former.
> >>According to intelligent design, the Darwinian mechanism cannot bear
> >>the weight of common descent. Intelligent design therefore throws
> >>common descent into question but at the same time leaves open as a
> >>very live possibility that common descent is the case, albeit for
> >>reasons other than the Darwinian mechanism."
> >
> >So far there is no scientific theory of ID, only the assertion.
>
> Paganor replies:
> Perhaps, but its hard to take this seriously since Stockwell is under
> the mistaken belief that ID is an evolutionary theory. It is nothing
> of the sort. ID theory does not explain historical events. Its
> purpose is to explain how one can choose between three possible modes
> of causation for a given natural object, system or event. The
> explanatory filter has been tested on known objects and events. It
> has not failed to correctly chose the correct mode of causation. That
> means it has garnered corroborations making it more than a hypothesis.
>
It has been tested on a few simple cases, and yielded results consistent
with common sense. It identified "design" in cases where design was already
known to exist, or strongly suspected of existing. It's not clear whether
this confirms the filter's reliability, or merely shows that Dembski can use
it to reach some preordained result. Dembski has never attempted to
construct a complete set of "neoDarwinian" (much less other naturalistic)
explanations for the origin of the bacterial flagellum. He would need
knowledge neither he nor anyone else currently has (or is ever likely to
have) to rule out all naturalistic explanations for any phenomenon.
>
> On the other hand Common descent is a historical assertion not a
> theory. It is untestable apart from a mechanism to explain how
> diversity emerges from some common descendent. It has no
> corroborations.
>
This, again, is simply false. Darwin deduced common descent (starting with
genera of birds on the Galapagoes, and extending it to classes and kingdoms
of living things) before he had any mechanism to explain common descent.
The mere fact that birds and crocodilians were identified, in the 19th
century and before the discovery of genes, as derived archosaurs, and later
shown to be more genetically and biochemically similar to each other than
either was to, e.g. lizards, is a corroboration of common descent.
Conversely, the discovery of shared endogenous retroviruses between
cetaceans and artiodactyls (especially hippos), and the subsequent discovery
of fossils combining artiodactyl and cetacean features, was a corroboration
of common descent. Did we not go over all of this in arguments over Douglas
Theobald's evidences for macroevolution (gradual common descent)? The
consistency of the nested hierarchy is the foremost test of common descent,
and it provides numerous possibilities for confirmations and falsification.
>
-- [snip]
>
> >> Pagano replies:
> >>Behe's "irreducible complexity" is a special case of Dembski's theory
> >>of intelligent design. Like Dembski his criticism does not address,
> >>or contradict common descent it criticizes the neoDarwinian mechanism.
> >
> >'Fraid not. Dembski's "theory" is a statement (an incorrect one, I might
> >add) about how we identify design, it is not a theory of how design
happens,
> >or how species originate.
>
> Pagano replies:
> Stockwell may use the words "theory" and "statement" how ever he
> chooses, but in this case the word play amounts to verbalism.
>
A theory is an explanation of how something happens. Common descent is an
explanation of the nested hierarchy of life. Mutation, natural selection,
and drift are an explanation for common descent. The mere ascription of
design to some phenomenon, with no even conjectural details about the
designer or his methods or purpose, explains nothing about a phenomenon; at
most it asserts that the phenomenon has one more property requiring an
explanation than was previously noted.
>
> Dembski set out to solve the problem of how to determine from the
> examination of a natural object, system or event the actual mode of
> causation: necessity, chance or intelligent design. He dispensed
> with the restriction imposed by methodological naturalism which is not
> a first order claim of science. He systematically organized knowledge
> in Probability and Information Theory applicable to the class of
> problems he wished to solve. He devised a set of rules to analyze
> natural objects including direct observation to allow the investigator
> to determine the mode of causation. If this doesn't meet the
> requirements of a theory then I don't know what does. His theory is
> capable of sorting between three modes of causation.
>
That you don't know what does and does not qualify as a theory surprises,
I'm sure, very few people here.
It's not clear to me that Dembski does dispense with the restriction of
naturalism. The assumption that "law" and "chance" produce, consistently,
certain sorts of results and not others, while intelligence (a observed and
scientifically studiable phenomenon) consistently produces others, seems
quite naturalistic to me. He may well be *wrong* about the nature of
causes, or sloppy in his reasoning about that nature -- but he assumes that
causes act according to their nature. However, his set of rules requires
the investigator to know all the possible simple regularities of nature (and
know that he knows them), as well as all the possible combinations of these
simple regularities with each other and stochastic events, in order to rule
out false positives (by neglecting unintelligent natural causes adequate to
explain a phenomenon). It requires the investigator to exhaustively
calculate the odds of uncountable (literally -- how can you count causes
when you don't even know that some of them exist?) combinations of causes,
in order to rule all of them out, before concluding that design is present.
It's much easier simply to argue from ignorance that if no naturalistic
solution has been proposed, none exists; this is what Dembski ends up doing,
but it's not a proper application of his filter.
I've run across, in a creationist book of no particular merit, an example
that seems relevant to me. Recall the scene in the movie _2001_ where lunar
explorers uncover the black monolith. It is clearly designed. *Why* do we
conclude that it is clearly designed, though? Known natural processes can
produce shiny black objects (obsidian), objects with 90 degree angles
(halite crystals), and large monolith-like objects (numerous standing
boulders). That we don't know, offhand, of any natural process that is
likely to produce an object with all three traits seems the purest and least
plausible sort of argument from ignorance; surely we would have no trouble
assuming some slight variant of known natural processes could produce the
monolith. We infer design, not because the monolith passes Dembski's
filter, but because it resembles *known* artifacts of intelligent design
even more than it resembles known results of mindless natural processes.
The monolith is clearly the result of intelligent causation -- but not for
any reason that Dembski's filter can disclose to us. As Stockwell noted,
Dembski is wrong about how we recognize design; his filter can't be properly
applied except in carefully preselected cases, in which it isn't needed, and
is prone to both false positives and false negatives.
>
> Dembski never claimed that his theory was a theory of crreation or
> evolution. It was Stockwell at the start his post who claimed that it
> was and that is the claim of most evolutionists in this forum.
>
I believe that Stockwell's point is that Dembski's filter offers no
explanation for the diversity of life, so some other explanation is
needed -- and Dembski offers no grounds for rejecting common descent, or
even (for many features of life) the neoDarwinian mechanism as explanations
for that diversity.
>
> >Behe's assertion is that certain structures are
> >such small targets on the fitness landscape that natural selection cannot
> >find them.
>
> Pagano replies:
> This doesn't contradict my claim that IC is a special case of ID.
>
>
> >Unfortunately, he does not supply mathematics to back up either
> >the assertion that the targets themselves are "small", or that selection
> >cannot find a "small" target. He only makes the statement about
"irreduceable
> >complexity", with the tacit assumption that the only possible paths to
> >a given complex structures is assembly rather than substitution.
>
> Pagano replies:
> Indeed he doesn't but as a special case of ID, Dembski has done the
> math. IC systems meet the requirements of specified complexity and
> Dembski has also done the math with the "substitution" objection.
> Since math is apparently Stockwell's forte perhaps he could show in
> detail where Dembski has gone wrong. So far he is indulging in
> generalities which are misguided and demonstrate a misunderstanding of
> ID.
>
Perhaps you could provide the details regarding where Dembski did the math
relevant to ruling out indirect pathways to IC systems.
Bobby D. Bryant
> Otherwise, the fundamental claim of these theorems is that when averaged
> across fitness functions, evolutionary algorithms cannot outperform a
> blind search. The NFL theorems provide a best case senario; that is,
> the neoDarwian mechanism can be no better than a blind search.
> "Revisiting" the same possibilities (if that's what Stockwell means by
> "revisiting") within the space of possible solutions for a complex
> specified target could make the situation worse for the neoDarwinian
> mechanism not better.
<snip>
> Actually Dawkins clearly implied----with his computer model of a
> evolutionary algorithm (the "Weasel" algorithm)----that the neoDarwinian
> mechanism "is" intrinsically more efficient. The NFL theorems prove
> that the neoDarwinian mechanism can be no better than a blind search.
>
> The NFL theorems dashed Dawkins's position. A position which he and
> other evolutionists attempted to carve out because they were well aware
> of the magnitude of the possibilities the evolutionary algorithm had to
> search and the finite time available to conduct the search.
>
> Compounding the problem of the magnitude of the search is that nature
> does not allow infinite free play but places constraints on the search
> of the possibilities. For example: Mutations are not equally probable
> for all loci. And the error correction mechanism is highly effective in
> attenuating the possibilities (that is, the mutations) that can occur to
> even be acted upon by natural selection.
<snip>
The No Free Lunch Theorem (NFLT) is based on a peculiar definition of
"problem" and an even more peculiar definition of "performs well", which
makes it of dubious interest to computer scientists, let alone to
biologists.
Very importantly, your "cannot outperform a blind search" is a crude
misrepresentation of the actual theorem, which actually states that the
_expected value_ of a randomly selected algorithm on a randomly selected
problem is equal to the _expected value_ for a blind search. The theorem
does *not* say -- and if you had read the papers you'd know that Wolpert
and McReady take the trouble to point this out explicitly -- does *not*
say that _no_ algorithm can perform better than a blind search on _any_
problem. Not only does the theorem neither say nor imply any such thing,
but simple experiments can demonstrate the falsity of that kind of claim
as well. See e.g.
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/bdbryant/talk-origins/ga-on-tsp/index.html
for a simple counterexample.
Dembski's invocation of the NFLT is like calculating that the expected
value of a roll of a fair die is 3.5 and then crying "goddidit" when you
roll a 3 instead of the "expected" 3.5.
And remember, _that_ misrepresentation is layered on top of the more
complex problem of mapping biology onto the definitions of "problem" and
"performs well" that the theorem is built on to begin with. Tell us,
please, what _is_ the nature of the fitness function of the "problem"
represented by biological evolution, and how "well" has biological
evolution actually performed on that problem historically?
Hint: I don't feel like writing a technical essay tonight, but the
performance measure of the NFLT is a histogram of all attempted solutions
so far -- *attempted* solutions, catastrophic failures included. So once
you figure out what fitness function you're trying to score biological
evolution on, you have to count in not only the wonderful successes, but
also all the fertilizations that didn't take, all the spontaneous
abortions, all the stillborns, all the species that have gone extinct,
etc., to get the histogram of "goodness" of performance so far. And even
if you take the trouble to do all that and discover that evolution really
has beat the odds, all you've done is the equivalent of showing that you
rolled a 4 instead of the "expected" 3.5 on a die. The NFLT doesn't
disallow the equivalent of rolling fours, ones, sixes, or any other
possible value.
There simply isn't any evolution denial argument to be made by invoking
the NFLT except another tired old fine tuning argument, and even if that's
all you're hoping for you're going to disappointed to find out how much
more work it's going to take than the traditional fine tuning arguments,
and how undazzling the argument is going to be even if you do go through
the trouble of making it.
John Stockwell
>>On Tue, 12 Aug 2003 17:30:56 +0000 (UTC), John Stockwell
><jo...@dix.Mines.EDU> wrote:
>
> Pagano notes:
>Stockwell's attempt in his subject line to liken me to a Nazi murderer
>is both libelous and reprehensible regardless of his motives.
Really? I only suggested that you change your name to something
more Germanic.
> This is
>not unlike a previous libel concerning a source document which
>Stockwell didn't even possess.
When I did get a copy of the document of Hamblin and Christiansen,
I showed beyond any reasonable doubt that you misrepresented the
document. That's not libel. That's unmasking chicanery. You should
apologize to the group and retract any statements you have made
regarding the matter.
>>>Pagano wrote in part:
>>>
>>> Pagano replies:
>>>Dembski has made very clear that the theory of common descent is not
>>>incompatible with Intelligent Design. He also made clear in "No Free
>>>Lunch" (2002, Rowland and Littlefield Publishers) that Intelligent
>>>Design is NOT willing to accept common descent as a consequence of the
>>>Darwinian mechanism. He wrote:
>>
>>This is "big tent" creationism. What you have stated there is that
>>ID as evolution theory. If you are ascribing to Dembski-Behe ID theory,
>>then you are required to accept common descent,...
>
> Pagano replies:
>Evolutionary theory is a solution to the problem of how biological
>diversity arose assuming that life began from prebiotic molecules and
>assuming common descent. NeoDarwinian theory comprises a historical
>claim (common descent) and a purely naturalistic mechanism (natural
>selection operating on random mutations).
Actually, no. There is nothing about "prebiotic molecules" in the
theory of evolution. Evolution is purely about origin of species.
The basic mechanism of evolution is reproduction.
>
>ID theory offers neither a mechanism nor any historical explanations
>of events nor anything even analogous to those components.
Indeed, ID doesn't offer a damned thing, which is why it is not scientific.
> ID theory
>solves the problem of how we may rationally and rigorously decide
>between three logical possible kinds of causation when examining a
>natural object, system or event-----that is, between chance, necessity
>and intelligent design. Stockwell apparently has a fundamental
>misunderstanding of ID theory.
What crap. Dembski's "explanatory filter" is a *model* of how humans
identify design. In fact, there is not a single example of Dembski's
method in use. Not one. In fact, every claimed example of the use
of Dembski's method is a fabrication---by Dembski's own definition of
the term "fabrication".
In fact, humans definitely do not identify design by anything akin to
Dembski's proposed method.
>
>ID theory can be consistent with, but does NOT logically entail
>"common descent." As a result ID theory hardly requires its
>adherents to accept common descent. ID theory allows for BOTH the
>possibility that similarities were the result of the historical claim
>of "common descent" or the result of a designer employing similar
>design.
ID doesn't entail much of anything. If, however, it is to be applied
to biology, it must be synthesized with common descent to be a theory
of origins of species, because common descent regardless of the
mechanism of new traits being added, describes the nested heirarchical
structure of species.
>
>
>>...which means that we
>>are only arguing about the *mechanism* of evolution not the *fact*
>>of evolution.
>
> Pagano replies:
>I doubt this is the case.
You don't want it to be the case, but that's the way it is. Deal
with it. Indeed, Behe knows this which is why he is an evolutionist
as well as an ID'er. Dembski doesn't really deal with scientific issues
in his expositions, so he hasn't had to address this.
Now, of course, Phil Johnson and the other big tent creationists don't
want anybody to come out and admit the basic fact that---any new theory
of the origins of species will be an evolutionary theory---because
they would lose the support of their young-earth global-flood
supporters.
>
>1. The "fact of evolution" is fact, if and only if, biological
>relationship (that is, similarities) is equivalent to a purely
>materialistic evolutionary relationship. Unfortunately this
>equivalence is very much in dispute and is the cornerstone of the
>origins dispute.
Basically common descent describes what is observed. It is a fact
as long as there is no evidence for "separate" descent. It is a
more powerfully described fact now that comparative DNA studies
have become realizable. Biology is a common descent world. (You
can't get away from being related to an ape.)
As to Pagano's colorful claim that this is somehow "very much in dispute"
this would come as a big surprise to the people who actually
are in the biological sciences. It may be controversial to non-scientists
and anti-scientists, but it is not controversial in mainstream science.
>
>2. This equivalence is posited by evolutionists "a priori" given a
>commitment to methodological naturalism not the basis of empirical
>testing. Furthermore this a priori acceptance is justified by an
>inappropriate extrapolation of the neoDarwinian mechanism well beyond
>its empirical basis.
"Methodological naturalism" is nothing but the scientific method.
Yes "evolutionists" (i.e. mainstream science) do employ the scientific
method. And yes again, you are correct in the implication that the
only way currently to introduce ID creationism into mainstream
science is by abandoning the scientific method.
>
>3. The historical claim of "common descent" is consistent with but is
>NOT logically entailed or required by the neoDarwinian mechanism.
>
>4. Neither Darwin nor the neoDarwinian synthesizers invented or
>deduced common descent from the consequences entailed by the
>neoDarwinian mechanism. Both Darwin and his neoDarwinian rescuers
>attempted to provide an explanation in purely materialistic terms of
>how the categories of Linnaeus came about.
Common descent was already known before the neoDarwinian mechanism
was proposed. The latter evidence from comparative DNA has pretty
much sealed the deal. If you want to create a new mechanism for
the origin of species, then you will have to create something new
and better to slip in in place of neoDarwinian-type mechanism.
What is lacking is a body of data of the form of "observations
of non-Darwinian aspects of speciation". Gather up a pile of nonDarwinian
aspects, and you would have a chance for a new mechanism to be
created to explain those "nonDarwinian observations".
>
>THEREFORE, the "fact of evolution" is not a scientific fact and IS
>very much in dispute. Darwin and his neoDarwinian rescuers posited a
>priori that the "connections" between the categories in Linnaeus's
>taxonomy were not arbitrary sorting systems but real evolutionary
>relationships. Maybe this is so, but this is positing an axiom by
>fiat not the result of empirical science.
It's called data reduction and stating a scientific law. The facts
are that similarities exist between living species that indicate
common origin through common descent. That is all that is meant by
the statement that "evolution is a fact". More precisely we should
say that evolution is a phenomenon.
>
>FINALLY, the neoDarwinian mechanism doesn't entail or require common
>descent, the neoDarwinian mechanism doesn't predict the emergence of
>novelty, the purported transformational power of neoDarwinian
>mechanism has never been observed, and ID theory indicates that the
>neoDarwinian mechanism lacks the power to generate specified
>complexity.
Inovation comes from changes in an organisms DNA. That is obvious.
There are numerous mechanisms for changing the DNA of an organism.
In the light of today's knowledge that is also obvious. What isn't
obvious is how these changes translate into adaptation and the
origin of species. This is an indication that more study is needed.
No doubt that what we call "neoDarwinian" will mean something different
in 20 years than it does today, just as it meant something different still
20 years ago.
Basically, any new mechanism that is supposed to unseat
the neoDarwinian mechnism, must be able to be slipped in where
neoDarwinian-type mechanism sit, and do more and tell us more about
biology.
Unfortunately for ID'ers, ID doesn't propose any mechanisms, so it
*can't* slip in to replace neoDarwinian-type mechanism, nor can
it slip in as a selection mechanism, because ID *isn't a mechanism*.
A Pagano
<jo...@dix.Mines.EDU> wrote:
Pagano replies:
Stockwell is so hell bent on contradicting me that he is making easily
avoidable mistakes. Stockwell is forgetting that abiogenesis is a
required and necessary INITIAL CONDITION of neoDarwian evolution. I
didn't write that prebiotic molecules were "in the theory of
evolution," I said they were assumed [as one of the initial
conditions]. Finally I doubt this point has any relevence to
Stockwell's position with regard to the NFL theorems.
I'm starting to become convinced that Stockwell has neither a grasp of
science, evolutionary theory nor ID theory. And Stockwell is the
academic authority and I'm just a rank amateur.
<snip; maybe get to the rest later; for those interested in the rest
see Stockwell's post up the thread.>
Regards,
T Pagano
John Wilkins
during which he said:
> Basically, any new mechanism that is supposed to unseat
> the neoDarwinian mechnism, must be able to be slipped in where
> neoDarwinian-type mechanism sit, and do more and tell us more about
> biology.
You are giving way too much away here. Paggers refuses to define what he
*means* by "neoDarwinism", and so he can claim pretty well anything as
not a nD mechanism. Hint for the reader: natural selection is only one
of many nD mechanisms, and in fact it is not even restricted to
"NeoDarwinism".
--
John Wilkins - wilkins.id.au
[I]magine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, "...interesting
hole I find myself in - fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? ...
must have been made to have me in it." Douglas Adams, Salmon of Doubt
David Sienkiewicz
< snip >
> I'm starting to become convinced that Stockwell has neither a grasp of
> science, evolutionary theory nor ID theory. And Stockwell is the
> academic authority and I'm just a rank amateur.
Well, Tony, we've known for some time that you have a rather inflated
view of yourself, so what YOU presume or what convinces YOU can hardly
be considered definitive or even reasonably accurate. It is only on
rare occasions that you accurately read or represent the arguments of
others, and you generally don't answer them.
No reasonable person will conclude, as you have, that Stockwell
possesses knowledge or intuition inferior to yours. On the other
hand, it is perfectly within character for you to post a lot of
substanceless pap, as you have, and presume this kind of victory.
You're almost as deluded as Ed Conrad, Tony; and almost as bad a liar.
That's your cue, by the way.
Steven J.
>
> >> Pagano replies:
> >>Evolutionary theory is a solution to the problem of how biological
> >>diversity arose assuming that life began from prebiotic molecules and
> >>assuming common descent. NeoDarwinian theory comprises a historical
> >>claim (common descent) and a purely naturalistic mechanism (natural
> >>selection operating on random mutations).
> >
> >Actually, no. There is nothing about "prebiotic molecules" in the
> >theory of evolution. Evolution is purely about origin of species.
> >The basic mechanism of evolution is reproduction.
>
> Pagano replies:
> Stockwell is so hell bent on contradicting me that he is making easily
> avoidable mistakes. Stockwell is forgetting that abiogenesis is a
> required and necessary INITIAL CONDITION of neoDarwian evolution. I
> didn't write that prebiotic molecules were "in the theory of
> evolution," I said they were assumed [as one of the initial
> conditions]. Finally I doubt this point has any relevence to
> Stockwell's position with regard to the NFL theorems.
>
always resort to pleonasm when you're losing an argument?) initial condition
for evolution. We can study the evolution of species in the lab today,
without any requirement that those species come into existence (by any means
whatsoever) right before the experiments. The theory of evolution works
equally well whether the last common ancestor was the descendant of life
that had always existed, infinitely into the past, or life that had been
miraculously created, or life that had originated by purely naturalistic
means. Now, given what is known about the actual history of the Earth and
the universe, it's concluded that life had to have some beginning -- but
that beginning is not part of the theory of evolution _strictu sensu_. The
theory itself assumes *nothing* about prebiotic molecules. Note, by the
way, that special creation from the dust of the earth is also a form of
abiogenesis.
>
> I'm starting to become convinced that Stockwell has neither a grasp of
> science, evolutionary theory nor ID theory. And Stockwell is the
> academic authority and I'm just a rank amateur.
>
what he's talking about, should you not show a bit more humility and doubt
about about your own convictions? You are wrong that evolution presupposes
any particular model of abiogenesis, or indeed that it presupposes
abiogenesis at all. You are wrong to suppose that Dembski's filter is a
theory, or that it has been or can be rigorously applied, or that it has
anything to do with how humans actually identify design. I've seen no sign
that Stockwell has been wrong about any aspect of science or evolutionary
theory in his exchanges with you. If he fails to grasp some aspects of ID
"theory" ... well, you've yet to grasp that it isn't any sort of theory, so
if he's in that boat, you're in it with him.
>
> <snip; maybe get to the rest later; for those interested in the rest
> see Stockwell's post up the thread.>
>
> Regards,
> T Pagano
>
Bobby D. Bryant
> "A Pagano" <anthony...@verizon.net> wrote in message
> news:r1mljv4rubji3paoq...@4ax.com...
>> I'm starting to become convinced that Stockwell has neither a grasp of
>> science, evolutionary theory nor ID theory. And Stockwell is the
>> academic authority and I'm just a rank amateur.
>>
> Given that you're just a rank amateur debating someone who actually
> knows what he's talking about, should you not show a bit more humility
> and doubt about about your own convictions?
If he did that, how could he still be a creationist?
I suppose we could invoke an argument akin to the anthropic principle to
"explain" why he "must" be the way he is.
John Stockwell
>
>>On Tue, 12 Aug 2003 17:30:56 +0000 (UTC), John Stockwell
>><jo...@dix.Mines.EDU> wrote:
>
>>>Pagano wrote in part:
>>
>>selection in the context of natural selection, owing to the fact that
>>values can be revisited in Darwinian models, but the NFL theorems assume
>>that values are not revisited. The creators of the NFL theorems state this
>>in their paper
>
> Pagano replies:
>Is Stockwell trying to argue that the neoDarwinian mechanism cannot be
>interpreted as an evolutionary algorithm? Perhaps Stockwell could
>produce the quotes from the relevent paper so that we all can be clear
>about the author's position.
>
>Otherwise, the fundamental claim of these theorems is that when
>averaged across fitness functions, evolutionary algorithms cannot
>outperform a blind search.
"When averaged over all possible objective functions", the expectation
from a genetic algorithm, or any other algorithm, used as a search
is no better than random search, so the NFL theorems say. The upstart
of this is that if an algorithm (such as a genetic algorithm) works *well*
for a particular class or set of classes of objective functions, it must
work poorly for all other classes. That's it. (Genetic algorithms work
extremely well on certain classes of problems.)
Please direct me to the place in Dembski's book where he derives the
fitness functions used in biology and shows that Darwinian evolution,
expressed as a genetic algorithm, does not work well on those algorithms?
(Hint: he can't, because this knowledge is not possessed by humanity at
this time. So, his claims are merely an assertion unfounded in any science.)
Again, evolution in biology is _not_ a search in the same way that the
typical problems that g.a's are used for, so there is no claim
from biology that biological evolution has anything at all to do
with "searching for specific solutions". Biology is expressed as *inhabiting*
fitness landscapes. It cannot be interpreted as being engaged in a
search in the same way that the typical problems that optimization
theorists work on.
Furthermore, as Wolpert himself says at:
http://www.talkreason.org/articles/jello.cfm
(referring to the deficiences of Dembski's book)
...
Indeed, throughout there is a marked elision of the formal details
of the biological processes under consideration. Perhaps the most
glaring example of this is that neo-Darwinian evolution of ecosystems
does not involve a set of genomes all searching the same, fixed fitness
function, the situation considered by the NFL theorems. Rather it is a
co-evolutionary process. Roughly speaking, as each genome changes from
one generation to the next, it modifies the surfaces that the other
genomes are searching. And recent results indicate that NFL results
do not hold in co-evolution.
...
>The NFL theorems provide a best case
>senario; that is, the neoDarwian mechanism can be no better than a
>blind search.
'Fraid not. All it says is that if genetic algorithms work well, such
as in problems where some critical aspect of the solution is exposed in
the selection process, and the objective function has lots of local minima,
then it can be expected to work poorly in some other classes of problem.
>"Revisiting" the same possibilities (if that's what
>Stockwell means by "revisiting") within the space of possible
>solutions for a complex specified target could make the situation
>worse for the neoDarwinian mechanism not better.
Not really. Biological populations are not really searching, and there
is no constraint that they have to move out of a particular area
of the fitness landscape. The further problem is that the fitness
landscape is changing owing to the interaction between species.
It is critical that points be revisitable so that the changes in
the fitness landscape can be taken into account.
In the case of genetic algorithms for computation, solutions are
not supposed to get trapped in local minima, so random input is thrown
in to force the populations to move out of local minima to further
the search for some global minimum that is the minimum of a given
fitness function. In biology, organisms may be perfectly capable of
reproducing and be viable at many locations, including local minima.
There may not be a specific global minimum that organisms need to find
to survive. The whole computation analogy simply does not hold up.
>
>>Furthermore, there is no claim or requirement that natural
>>selection be intrinsically more efficient than another algorithm.
>
> Pagano replies:
>Actually Dawkins clearly implied----with his computer model of a
>evolutionary algorithm (the "Weasel" algorithm)----that the
>neoDarwinian mechanism "is" intrinsically more efficient. The NFL
>theorems prove that the neoDarwinian mechanism can be no better than a
>blind search.
>
>The NFL theorems dashed Dawkins's position. A position which he and
>other evolutionists attempted to carve out because they were well
>aware of the magnitude of the possibilities the evolutionary algorithm
>had to search and the finite time available to conduct the search.
The basic fact is that there are problems, such as Dawkins' weasel
problem, in which genetic algorithms do perform vastly more efficiently
than a blind search. This is why people use genetic algorithms for
certain tasks. The real question is whether or not something like a
genetic algorithm is compatible with the issues of neoDarwinism.
Dembski has not addressed that issue. He is simply demolishing high
tech strawmen.
So, no. The only thing that was dashed was the hopes of the optimization
community in finding a algorithmic "silver bullet" that would solve
all optimization problems with equal high efficience. This has nothing
to do with biology or evolution.
>
>Compounding the problem of the magnitude of the search is that nature
>does not allow infinite free play but places constraints on the search
>of the possibilities. For example: Mutations are not equally
>probable for all loci. And the error correction mechanism is highly
>effective in attenuating the possibilities (that is, the mutations)
>that can occur to even be acted upon by natural selection.
Dawkins is not a mathematician. Genetic algorithms illustrate that
for specific problems, random modification of a population with
selection can be an extremely efficient solution to specific problems.
Indeed, the real problem is vastly more difficult than toy genetic
algorithms. It may be that most of biological structure represents
emergent phenomena rather than a phenomenon of natural selection.
Nobody knows the answer to these questions at this time. However, we
can probably safely say that whatever emerges, it will still have selection
in it somewhere, and will still be called "Darwinian evolution".
>
>> Indeed,
>>the authors of the NFL theorems also state that the issue of the massive
>>parallelism of biological systems is not addressed in applications of NFL
>>to biology. In short, Dembski's NFL book is a nonsequiter.
>
> Pagano replies:
>Without a quote from the author's work it's difficult to determine
>what the authors intended compared to Stockwell's conclusion.
>Nonetheless Stockwell would have to make a considerable argument to
>justify the claim that the neoDarwinian mechanism conducts a "massive
>parallel search." In what way is it "massive" and "parallel" and does
>this make the search for complex specified targets significantly more
>manageable? Stockwell never says.
That biology is massively parallelized is obvious. I never said that it
was a "parallel search".
>
>>
>>> What's more, in that case the justification for common descent
>>>cannot be that it follows as a logical deduction from Darwinism.
>>>Darwinism is not identical with evolution understood merely as common
>>>descent.
>>
>>Common descent is evolution as "fact" or evolution as a "phenomenon."
>
> Pagano replies:
>As "fact" it is nothing more than an axiom established by fiat not a
>scientificlly testable claim which has been tested. The "phenomenon"
>is little more than an inappropriate extrapolation too distant from
>its empirical basis.
Get real. Common descent is the parsimonious explanation for the
nested heirarchical relatedness of all species. The task of dissenters
to *that* fact is obvious---you must show either that the nested heirarchy
breaks down (so far that seems to be impossible) or you have to provide an
alternate mechanism for producing the nested heirarchy via separate descent
that looks like the heirarchical structure expected from common descent.
So far, nobody has done that either.
>>>Darwinism comprises a historical claim (common descent) and
>>>a naturalistic mechanism (natural selection operating on random
>>>variations), with the latter being used to justify the former.
>>>According to intelligent design, the Darwinian mechanism cannot bear
>>>the weight of common descent. Intelligent design therefore throws
>>>common descent into question but at the same time leaves open as a
>>>very live possibility that common descent is the case, albeit for
>>>reasons other than the Darwinian mechanism."
>>
>>So far there is no scientific theory of ID, only the assertion.
>
> Paganor replies:
>Perhaps, but its hard to take this seriously since Stockwell is under
>the mistaken belief that ID is an evolutionary theory. It is nothing
>of the sort. ID theory does not explain historical events. Its
>purpose is to explain how one can choose between three possible modes
>of causation for a given natural object, system or event. The
>explanatory filter has been tested on known objects and events. It
>has not failed to correctly chose the correct mode of causation. That
>means it has garnered corroborations making it more than a hypothesis.
To be relevant to biology ID must be synthesized with observations of
biology.
Even if it were shown that no Darwinian mechanism could possibly deliver
the phenomena of biology, common descent still stands, as there is no
body of contrary data to refute it.
>On the other hand Common descent is a historical assertion not a
>theory. It is untestable apart from a mechanism to explain how
>diversity emerges from some common descendent. It has no
>corroborations.
Common descent is the parsimonious description of the overwhelming
observation that all life appears to be related in a nested heirarchical
structure. That is the overwhelming fact of evolution. To deny this
fact is to turn one's back on most of biology.
>>
>>>> But note that Behe used a
>>>>similar tactic: The cover of the paperback version of "Darwin's Black
>>>>Box" features a human and ape. What the heck does this have to do with
>>>>his own alternative hypothesis, which doesn't deny common ancestry at
>>>>all, let alone among species of such biochemical similarity? Plenty. A
>>>>quick glance at Amazon.com reviews of "Darwin's Black Box" and other
>>>>pseudoscientific anti-evolution books suggests that most readers who
>>>>find them convincing never get much past the cover before inferring
>>>>independent origins -and often YEC to boot! The fact that the authors
>>>>have no apparent problem with this speaks volumes.
>>>
>>> Pagano replies:
>>>Behe's "irreducible complexity" is a special case of Dembski's theory
>>>of intelligent design. Like Dembski his criticism does not address,
>>>or contradict common descent it criticizes the neoDarwinian mechanism.
>>
>>'Fraid not. Dembski's "theory" is a statement (an incorrect one, I might
>>add) about how we identify design, it is not a theory of how design happens,
>>or how species originate.
>
> Pagano replies:
>Stockwell may use the words "theory" and "statement" how ever he
>chooses, but in this case the word play amounts to verbalism.
I should have said "model" here.
>
>Dembski set out to solve the problem of how to determine from the
>examination of a natural object, system or event the actual mode of
>causation: necessity, chance or intelligent design. He dispensed
>with the restriction imposed by methodological naturalism which is not
>a first order claim of science. He systematically organized knowledge
>in Probability and Information Theory applicable to the class of
>problems he wished to solve. He devised a set of rules to analyze
>natural objects including direct observation to allow the investigator
>to determine the mode of causation. If this doesn't meet the
>requirements of a theory then I don't know what does. His theory is
>capable of sorting between three modes of causation.
At best, Dembski has created one possible mechanism that mimmics how
humans may detect design. Humans get it wrong sometimes, just as
Dembski's filter does, because of incomplete information. Indeed, the
way we really indentify design is by building a model composed of
representative cases of design, combined with our knowledge of the natural
world. We recognize patterns as being designed by comparing observations
with that canonical set of observations.
>Dembski never claimed that his theory was a theory of crreation or
>evolution. It was Stockwell at the start his post who claimed that it
>was and that is the claim of most evolutionists in this forum.
>
>>Behe's assertion is that certain structures are
>>such small targets on the fitness landscape that natural selection cannot
>>find them.
>
> Pagano replies:
>This doesn't contradict my claim that IC is a special case of ID.
The fact that that there is no mechanism for ID says that scientifically
it does not exist as a viable explanation of anything.
>
>>Unfortunately, he does not supply mathematics to back up either
>>the assertion that the targets themselves are "small", or that selection
>>cannot find a "small" target. He only makes the statement about "irreduceable
>>complexity", with the tacit assumption that the only possible paths to
>>a given complex structures is assembly rather than substitution.
>
> Pagano replies:
>Indeed he doesn't but as a special case of ID, Dembski has done the
>math. IC systems meet the requirements of specified complexity and
>Dembski has also done the math with the "substitution" objection.
>Since math is apparently Stockwell's forte perhaps he could show in
>detail where Dembski has gone wrong. So far he is indulging in
>generalities which are misguided and demonstrate a misunderstanding of
>ID.
It is not possible to say which "math" Pagano is referring to here.
Every computation I have seen from Dembski consists of new variations
of the old crap that creationists have been throwing at us for decades.
This review concurs with that assessment:
http://www.math.ksu.edu/~jasonr/dembski.htm
...(referring to Dembski's NFL book)
The subsequent ten pages represent a valiant attempt to assign
values to the terms of this product. The text soon becomes a
dazzling congeries of binomial coefficients, perturbation
probabilities, and sundry mathematical notation, all in the
service of a computation that may as well have been written in
Klingon for all the connection it has to reality. Modeling the
formation of complex structures via a three part process of
atomization, convergence and assembly is terribly unrealistic.
Further, IC machines cannot be treated as discrete combinatorial
objects. Since the publication of Behe's book, numerous biologists
have undertaken the thankless task of stating the obvious:
irreducible complexity in the present tells us nothing about
functional precursors in the past. This has been demonstrated
in two ways: (1) By describing general schemata whereby an IC
machine could arise gradually (Thornhill and Ussery, 2000). (2)
By outlining hypothetical scenarios to explain specific biochemical
machines. Structures so explained include the blood clotting
cascade (Miller, 1999) and the flagellum (Rizzotti, 2000), among
many others. The theoretical plausibility of such scenarios renders
IC useless as a device for carrying out computations, and Dembski's
argument is no improvement over the creationists.
....
>T Pagano
John Stockwell
>>On Wed, 13 Aug 2003 18:11:27 +0000 (UTC), John Stockwell
>><jo...@dix.Mines.EDU> wrote:
>
>>>Pagano wrote:
>>
>>> Pagano replies:
>>>Evolutionary theory is a solution to the problem of how biological
>>>diversity arose assuming that life began from prebiotic molecules and
>>>assuming common descent. NeoDarwinian theory comprises a historical
>>>claim (common descent) and a purely naturalistic mechanism (natural
>>>selection operating on random mutations).
>>
>>Actually, no. There is nothing about "prebiotic molecules" in the
>>theory of evolution. Evolution is purely about origin of species.
>>The basic mechanism of evolution is reproduction.
>
> Pagano replies:
>Stockwell is so hell bent on contradicting me that he is making easily
>avoidable mistakes. Stockwell is forgetting that abiogenesis is a
>required and necessary INITIAL CONDITION of neoDarwian evolution. I
>didn't write that prebiotic molecules were "in the theory of
>evolution," I said they were assumed [as one of the initial
>conditions]. Finally I doubt this point has any relevence to
>Stockwell's position with regard to the NFL theorems.
Nope. The only initial condition is that there is common ancestry, implying
a common ancestor. Pagano has been steeped in his propaganda so long
that he just doesn't get it. Indeed, there is no assumption regarding
even the existence of molecules in neoDarwinian evolution, let alone
the existence of "prebiotic molecules".
>
>I'm starting to become convinced that Stockwell has neither a grasp of
>science, evolutionary theory nor ID theory. And Stockwell is the
>academic authority and I'm just a rank amateur.
I think that likely you are a "crank" amateur.
>
><snip; maybe get to the rest later; for those interested in the rest
>see Stockwell's post up the thread.>
>
>Regards,
>T Pagano
>
>
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