Google Groups no longer supports new Usenet posts or subscriptions. Historical content remains viewable.
Dismiss
May Griffiths and Wilkins’ thesis that evolution s
153 views
Skip to first unread message
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 4:14:42 AM8/14/12
to
In their paper �When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
belief?� PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn�t a kind of
Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
belief?� PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn�t a kind of
Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
Burkhard
Aug 14, 2012, 4:43:55 AM8/14/12
to
Nor can I see why truth tracking implies any teleology. It really is
much simpler than that - if I belief that sabre tooth tigers are just
"cute little pussycats that want some cuddling", my chances to
reproduce will fall dramatically. Similarly for the belief that I can
jump form the top of Big Ben safely to Westminster Palace, or that
eating lots of death cap mushrooms is really good for me.
Sometimes, holding false beliefs has an advantage - which explains why
we systematically make certain errors is reasoning, but the claim is
simply that as a matter of fact, wrong theories about the world tend
to have negative consequences. Just ask the Maji Maji if Bokero's war
water made them really bullet proof.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 5:05:41 AM8/14/12
to
On Aug 14, 10:43�am, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>
> > In their paper When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > belief? PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
about this topic: "My thinking is that evolution has specifically
(dare I say "deliberately"?) moved the control of behavior from the
genome into the culture as being far more flexible and adaptive to
environmental changes" and you know his friendly links with John.
> Nor can I see why truth tracking implies any teleology. It really is
> much simpler than that - if I belief that sabre tooth tigers are just
> "cute little pussycats that want some cuddling", my chances to
> reproduce will fall dramatically. Similarly for the belief that I can
> jump form the top of Big Ben safely to Westminster Palace, or that
> eating lots of death cap mushrooms is really good for me.
>
> Sometimes, holding false beliefs has an advantage - which explains why
> we systematically make certain errors is reasoning, but the claim is
> simply that as a matter of fact, wrong theories about the world tend
> to have negative consequences. Just ask the Maji Maji if Bokero's war
> water made them really bullet proof.
However, as Hemidactylus, I think that "truth is over-rated as a
fitness measure�. As he added "The factuality of evolution was not
relevant to fitness before Darwinism arrived and I don't think
Darwinism as belief system helps anyone procreate in most cultures
even now". I think that all that matters is survival and reproduction
for natural selection.
> On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>
> > In their paper When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > belief? PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
> > evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
> > would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn t a kind of
> > Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
>
> Where does the "deliberately" come from, I can find it in the text?
You are right I added the term, actually because Richard Norman wrote
>
> Where does the "deliberately" come from, I can find it in the text?
about this topic: "My thinking is that evolution has specifically
(dare I say "deliberately"?) moved the control of behavior from the
genome into the culture as being far more flexible and adaptive to
environmental changes" and you know his friendly links with John.
> Nor can I see why truth tracking implies any teleology. It really is
> much simpler than that - if I belief that sabre tooth tigers are just
> "cute little pussycats that want some cuddling", my chances to
> reproduce will fall dramatically. Similarly for the belief that I can
> jump form the top of Big Ben safely to Westminster Palace, or that
> eating lots of death cap mushrooms is really good for me.
>
> Sometimes, holding false beliefs has an advantage - which explains why
> we systematically make certain errors is reasoning, but the claim is
> simply that as a matter of fact, wrong theories about the world tend
> to have negative consequences. Just ask the Maji Maji if Bokero's war
> water made them really bullet proof.
fitness measure�. As he added "The factuality of evolution was not
relevant to fitness before Darwinism arrived and I don't think
Darwinism as belief system helps anyone procreate in most cultures
even now". I think that all that matters is survival and reproduction
for natural selection.
Burkhard
Aug 14, 2012, 5:22:05 AM8/14/12
to
On Aug 14, 9:14�am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
"As we stated in Section two, we do not believe that a Milvian bridge
is available for religious beliefs, because none of the leading
contemporary accounts of the evolution of religious belief makes any
reference to the truth or falsity of those beliefs when explaining
their effects on reproductive fitness"
That seems to be a mixture of argument from ignorance and argument
from authority - just because leading thinkers cold not come up with a
"truth tracking" theory of evolution of religion does not mean that
such a thing is not possible, or not true.
I could easily imagine two possible worlds where religious beliefs are
truth tracking and fitness increasing.
In the first, the gods punish (or better, select against, as a breeder
does) non-believers with impotence, halitosis, early death or early
death of their children,depending on their degree of malevolence. This
one makes testable predictions - we should expect atheists to have
fewer children than theists. Now the return of the prawnster - to some
extend this is what we actually do observe. Now, Wilkins would
probably argue that this correlation is due to third factors such as
increased affluence in Western Europe that coincided with
secularisation, or China's one child policy and its enforcement. But
that of course may be due to the respective prior probabilities he
assigns to the two explanations - and also leaves open the possibility
that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is simple
the proxy the gods chose to implement their breeding programme.
In the other model, testable predictions are more difficult to come
by. Here, the gods allow reincarnation only (or preferably) to
believers - and the reincarnated self keeps the "god instinct" of the
prior self.
That no religion currently advocates either belief system is of course
not an argument that it is not true.
Burkhard
Aug 14, 2012, 5:28:59 AM8/14/12
to
On Aug 14, 10:05�am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> fitness measure . As he added "The factuality of evolution was not
more bridges than common sense knowledge. That also means that not all
scientific theories are necessarily helping us to increase our
reproductive success. However, they are derived utilising the very
same inference mechanisms, senses, and cognitive schemata that our
truth tracking common sense beliefs about the word utilise - so in
that way , they "inherit" the selection for truthful beliefs.
> I think that all that matters is survival and reproduction
> for natural selection.
That assumes a false dichotomy, which is explicitly addressed in the
paper. True beliefs (in a certain domain) are simply the truthful
ones. your argument is like saying that evolution did not select for
the eye because it allows us to identify predators and food sources,
but because it increases survival and reproduction. Obviously, both
can be true, just on different levels of explanation.
> relevant to fitness before Darwinism arrived and I don't think
> Darwinism as belief system helps anyone procreate in most cultures
> even now".
The first part is addressed by the paper. Scientific theories require
> Darwinism as belief system helps anyone procreate in most cultures
> even now".
more bridges than common sense knowledge. That also means that not all
scientific theories are necessarily helping us to increase our
reproductive success. However, they are derived utilising the very
same inference mechanisms, senses, and cognitive schemata that our
truth tracking common sense beliefs about the word utilise - so in
that way , they "inherit" the selection for truthful beliefs.
> I think that all that matters is survival and reproduction
> for natural selection.
paper. True beliefs (in a certain domain) are simply the truthful
ones. your argument is like saying that evolution did not select for
the eye because it allows us to identify predators and food sources,
but because it increases survival and reproduction. Obviously, both
can be true, just on different levels of explanation.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 5:31:45 AM8/14/12
to
On Aug 14, 10:43�am, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>
> > In their paper When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > belief? PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
> > evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
> > would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn t a kind of
> > Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
>
> Where does the "deliberately" come from, I can find it in the text?
> Nor can I see why truth tracking implies any teleology.
When it is written that "Evolution selects for something" I think that
>
> Where does the "deliberately" come from, I can find it in the text?
> Nor can I see why truth tracking implies any teleology.
a finality is meant in the process. "Evolution selected this or that"
is factual and much less ambiguous.
Message has been deleted
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 5:54:40 AM8/14/12
to
On Aug 14, 11:22�am, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>
> > In their paper When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > belief? PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
As I 'm definitely an atheist I can't follow you on this metaphysical
track.
> On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>
> > In their paper When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > belief? PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
> > evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
> > would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn t a kind of
track.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 5:48:24 AM8/14/12
to
>
> - Show quoted text -
This is the general problem with a posteriori explanations. With the
notion of fitness you can always find a good explanation why a given
organism or group of organisms was finally selected. What is purely
factual is that natural selection by definition selects only what
survives. See the massive extinctions: it is nearly impossible to
explain why such or such groups of organisms finally survived.
Burkhard
Aug 14, 2012, 6:04:13 AM8/14/12
to
said has testable predictions, even if it assumes a deity of sorts?
Apart form that, nothing of what I said above requires commitment to a
specific god, it is a simple question of consistency - are there
_possible_ models where religious beliefs track for truth that are not
inconsistent with any observation?
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 8:25:54 AM8/14/12
to
>
> - Show quoted text -
"Are there possible models where religious beliefs track for truth
> - Show quoted text -
that are not inconsistent with any observation?"
This is a difficult sentence, before being a difficult question. I try
to analyse it:
1. "where religious beliefs track for truth": as an atheist I can't
see how 'religious beliefs' can track the truth;
2. "Are there possible models ...": by models I suppose you mean
worlds like the "two possible worlds where religious beliefs are truth
tracking and fitness increasing". Still I can't believe in such
worlds;
3. "that are not inconsistent with any observation?": as the double
negation makes the understanding of the sentence more difficult I
prefer to change it into "that are consistent with some observations".
You already mentioned that a prediction is: "we should expect atheists
to have fewer children than theists" and you considerered that "to
some extend this is what we actually do observe". I really don't know
if it is the case but I guess it is as, particularly in France, very
religious families often have a lot of children and those families who
are not so religious, have only about two children in average. However
there are confounded causes (ie, other than the punishment of the
gods) like the fact, for example, that most religions incite
childbearing.
On the whole I think impossible to test your hypothesis and thus to
falsify it.
Richard Norman
Aug 14, 2012, 9:25:19 AM8/14/12
to
On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 02:05:41 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>fitness measure�. As he added "The factuality of evolution was not
is called "teleological shorthand." For disucssion in a group that is
familiar with evolution and it mechanisms, it really means that
organisms that reduce the influence of instinctive behavior and
instead substitute socially and culturally controlled behavior, of
course living in social groups that can pass accumulated experience
across generations by cultural means rather than genetic, have a
selective advantage.
wrote:
>relevant to fitness before Darwinism arrived and I don't think
>Darwinism as belief system helps anyone procreate in most cultures
>even now". I think that all that matters is survival and reproduction
>for natural selection.
>
I used the terms "specifically" and "deliberately" in a sense of what
>Darwinism as belief system helps anyone procreate in most cultures
>even now". I think that all that matters is survival and reproduction
>for natural selection.
>
is called "teleological shorthand." For disucssion in a group that is
familiar with evolution and it mechanisms, it really means that
organisms that reduce the influence of instinctive behavior and
instead substitute socially and culturally controlled behavior, of
course living in social groups that can pass accumulated experience
across generations by cultural means rather than genetic, have a
selective advantage.
*Hemidactylus*
Aug 14, 2012, 9:44:19 AM8/14/12
to
kernel of truth, or at least hit the nail on the head for the wrong
reasons. They would represent a best try before the more formal and
sober methods of scientific inquiry came along. And as I've said, truth
can be applied within an ideological system wrt coherence and not real
world congruity.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 10:03:07 AM8/14/12
to
On Aug 14, 3:25�pm, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 02:05:41 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >fitness measure�. As he added "The factuality of evolution was not
"evolution has specifically (dare I say "deliberately"?) moved etc."
could clearly imply that, according to you, evolution was a
teleological process (even more, because of the term "deliberately"
you dared use!).
Nevertheless, what do mean exactly by "teleological shorthand"? Is
there no teleology at all in such an expression?
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 02:05:41 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >relevant to fitness before Darwinism arrived and I don't think
> >Darwinism as belief system helps anyone procreate in most cultures
> >even now". I think that all that matters is survival and reproduction
> >for natural selection.
>
> I used the terms "specifically" and "deliberately" in a sense of what
> is called "teleological shorthand." �For disucssion in a group that is
> >Darwinism as belief system helps anyone procreate in most cultures
> >even now". I think that all that matters is survival and reproduction
> >for natural selection.
>
> I used the terms "specifically" and "deliberately" in a sense of what
> familiar with evolution and it mechanisms, it really means that
> organisms that reduce the influence of instinctive behavior �and
> instead substitute socially and culturally controlled behavior, of
> course living in social groups that can pass accumulated experience
> across generations by cultural means rather than genetic, have a
> selective advantage.- Hide quoted text -
> course living in social groups that can pass accumulated experience
> across generations by cultural means rather than genetic, have a
>
> - Show quoted text -
Ok, but you would agree that for unwary people your sentence
> - Show quoted text -
"evolution has specifically (dare I say "deliberately"?) moved etc."
could clearly imply that, according to you, evolution was a
teleological process (even more, because of the term "deliberately"
you dared use!).
Nevertheless, what do mean exactly by "teleological shorthand"? Is
there no teleology at all in such an expression?
Richard Norman
Aug 14, 2012, 10:05:50 AM8/14/12
to
as us, I prefer to think of myths as having the same esthetic
qualities then as we find in them now: powerful and often beautifully
expressed stories illustrating strengths and weaknesses of human
character. Whether people thought they were true explanations or
fanciful imaginations is much less important.
Richard Norman
Aug 14, 2012, 10:14:58 AM8/14/12
to
On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 07:03:07 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>> >fitness measure�. As he added "The factuality of evolution was not
on using "deliberately". The word "specifically" has far less
telological implication: some directions have a selective advantage,
other directions don't and evolution is selective in which are
preserved. We get people here arguing that natural "selection" is
necessarily teleological because some intelligent agent is necessary
to select.
Teleological shorthand means simply using teleological expressions in
place of more long-winded real explanations that don't involve
teleology. For example, Wikipedia says:
"Various commentators view the teleological phrases used in modern
evolutionary biology as a type of shorthand. For example, S. H. P.
Madrell writes that "the proper but cumbersome way of describing
change by evolutionary adaptation [may be] substituted by shorter
overtly teleological statements" for the sake of saving space, but
that this "should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by
anything other than from mutations arising by chance, with those that
impart an advantage being retained by natural selection."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes -- the final two paragraphs,
especially the final sentence: "Nevertheless, biologists still
frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even
if that is not the intention."
wrote:
>> >relevant to fitness before Darwinism arrived and I don't think
>> >Darwinism as belief system helps anyone procreate in most cultures
>> >even now". I think that all that matters is survival and reproduction
>> >for natural selection.
>>
>> I used the terms "specifically" and "deliberately" in a sense of what
>> is called "teleological shorthand." �For disucssion in a group that is
>> >Darwinism as belief system helps anyone procreate in most cultures
>> >even now". I think that all that matters is survival and reproduction
>> >for natural selection.
>>
>> I used the terms "specifically" and "deliberately" in a sense of what
>> familiar with evolution and it mechanisms, it really means that
>> organisms that reduce the influence of instinctive behavior �and
>> instead substitute socially and culturally controlled behavior, of
>> course living in social groups that can pass accumulated experience
>> across generations by cultural means rather than genetic, have a
>> selective advantage.- Hide quoted text -
>>
>> - Show quoted text -
>
>Ok, but you would agree that for unwary people your sentence
>"evolution has specifically (dare I say "deliberately"?) moved etc."
>could clearly imply that, according to you, evolution was a
>teleological process (even more, because of the term "deliberately"
>you dared use!).
>Nevertheless, what do mean exactly by "teleological shorthand"? Is
>there no teleology at all in such an expression?
I was aware of the dangers in my choice of words. That is why I hedge
>> course living in social groups that can pass accumulated experience
>> across generations by cultural means rather than genetic, have a
>> selective advantage.- Hide quoted text -
>>
>> - Show quoted text -
>
>Ok, but you would agree that for unwary people your sentence
>"evolution has specifically (dare I say "deliberately"?) moved etc."
>could clearly imply that, according to you, evolution was a
>teleological process (even more, because of the term "deliberately"
>you dared use!).
>Nevertheless, what do mean exactly by "teleological shorthand"? Is
>there no teleology at all in such an expression?
on using "deliberately". The word "specifically" has far less
telological implication: some directions have a selective advantage,
other directions don't and evolution is selective in which are
preserved. We get people here arguing that natural "selection" is
necessarily teleological because some intelligent agent is necessary
to select.
Teleological shorthand means simply using teleological expressions in
place of more long-winded real explanations that don't involve
teleology. For example, Wikipedia says:
"Various commentators view the teleological phrases used in modern
evolutionary biology as a type of shorthand. For example, S. H. P.
Madrell writes that "the proper but cumbersome way of describing
change by evolutionary adaptation [may be] substituted by shorter
overtly teleological statements" for the sake of saving space, but
that this "should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by
anything other than from mutations arising by chance, with those that
impart an advantage being retained by natural selection."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes -- the final two paragraphs,
especially the final sentence: "Nevertheless, biologists still
frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even
if that is not the intention."
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 10:26:39 AM8/14/12
to
On Aug 14, 4:14�pm, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 07:03:07 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes-- the final two paragraphs,
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 07:03:07 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> especially the final sentence: "Nevertheless, biologists still
> frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even
> if that is not the intention."- Hide quoted text -
> frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even
>
> - Show quoted text -
Thank you for the clarification, I am reassured.
> - Show quoted text -
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 10:16:55 AM8/14/12
to
On Aug 14, 3:44�pm, *Hemidactylus* <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
I agree that myths "represent a best try before the more formal and
sober methods of scientific inquiry came along". But the reference is
the real physical world and not a metaphysical different world.
> And as I've said, truth
> can be applied within an ideological system wrt coherence and not real
> world congruity.
Here you envisage that the reference would be "an ideological system",
I would say "a metaphysical world" different from our real physical
world: is it what you are saying?
sober methods of scientific inquiry came along". But the reference is
the real physical world and not a metaphysical different world.
> And as I've said, truth
> can be applied within an ideological system wrt coherence and not real
> world congruity.
I would say "a metaphysical world" different from our real physical
world: is it what you are saying?
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 10:35:29 AM8/14/12
to
On Aug 14, 4:14�pm, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 07:03:07 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes-- the final two paragraphs,
something" instead of "Evolution selected this or that"?
Would you agree that writing in that way "can be read as implying
teleology even if that is not the intention" of the authors?
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 07:03:07 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> especially the final sentence: "Nevertheless, biologists still
> frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even
> if that is not the intention."- Hide quoted text -
> frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even
>
> - Show quoted text -
What do you think of sentences such as "Evolution selects for
> - Show quoted text -
something" instead of "Evolution selected this or that"?
Would you agree that writing in that way "can be read as implying
teleology even if that is not the intention" of the authors?
Richard Norman
Aug 14, 2012, 10:53:45 AM8/14/12
to
On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 07:35:29 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
In the context of evolution, the word "selection" can never imply
teleology except by really untutored (or very obstinate) readers. Your
two examples differ only in the use of present or past tense for the
verb. I do not see how that would make any difference.
The "proper" expression would be "Natural selection acts so that this
is retained because it produces greater fitness than that". It is so
much easier to say "This was selected by evolution." Once you get
past the first thirty seconds of the lecture or the first paragraph in
the introductory biology textbook, everybody should understand exactly
what is meant.
wrote:
teleology except by really untutored (or very obstinate) readers. Your
two examples differ only in the use of present or past tense for the
verb. I do not see how that would make any difference.
The "proper" expression would be "Natural selection acts so that this
is retained because it produces greater fitness than that". It is so
much easier to say "This was selected by evolution." Once you get
past the first thirty seconds of the lecture or the first paragraph in
the introductory biology textbook, everybody should understand exactly
what is meant.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 11:08:03 AM8/14/12
to
On Aug 14, 4:53�pm, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 07:35:29 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes--the final two paragraphs,
for" (as if there was a finality) and "selected" (which I see as just
factual).
In addition the past means that a posteriori you just observe what
happened while the present means that a priori you know what will be
selected (as if there was a finality).
> The "proper" expression would be "Natural selection acts so that this
> is retained because it produces greater fitness than that". �It is so
> much easier to say "This was selected by evolution." �Once you get
> past the first thirty seconds of the lecture or the first paragraph in
> the introductory biology textbook, everybody should understand exactly
> what is meant.- Hide quoted text -
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 07:35:29 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> especially the final sentence: "Nevertheless, biologists still
> >> frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even
> >> if that is not the intention."- Hide quoted text -
>
> >> - Show quoted text -
>
> >What do you think of sentences such as "Evolution selects for
> >something" instead of "Evolution selected this or that"?
> >Would you agree that writing in that way "can be read as implying
> >teleology even if that is not the intention" of the authors?
>
> In the context of evolution, the word "selection" can never imply
> teleology except by really untutored (or very obstinate) readers. Your
> two examples differ only in the use of present or past tense for the
> verb. �I do not see how that would make any difference.
As I am not an English-speaker I make a difference between "selected
> >> frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even
> >> if that is not the intention."- Hide quoted text -
>
> >> - Show quoted text -
>
> >What do you think of sentences such as "Evolution selects for
> >something" instead of "Evolution selected this or that"?
> >Would you agree that writing in that way "can be read as implying
> >teleology even if that is not the intention" of the authors?
>
> In the context of evolution, the word "selection" can never imply
> teleology except by really untutored (or very obstinate) readers. Your
> two examples differ only in the use of present or past tense for the
> verb. �I do not see how that would make any difference.
for" (as if there was a finality) and "selected" (which I see as just
factual).
In addition the past means that a posteriori you just observe what
happened while the present means that a priori you know what will be
selected (as if there was a finality).
> The "proper" expression would be "Natural selection acts so that this
> is retained because it produces greater fitness than that". �It is so
> much easier to say "This was selected by evolution." �Once you get
> past the first thirty seconds of the lecture or the first paragraph in
> the introductory biology textbook, everybody should understand exactly
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 11:10:35 AM8/14/12
to
On Aug 14, 4:05�pm, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 09:44:19 -0400, *Hemidactylus*
>
>
>
>
>
> <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 09:44:19 -0400, *Hemidactylus*
>
>
>
>
>
>
> - Show quoted text -
You are a poet and I like that.
> - Show quoted text -
Richard Norman
Aug 14, 2012, 11:17:14 AM8/14/12
to
On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 08:08:03 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>> verb. 锟絀 do not see how that would make any difference.
>> much easier to say "This was selected by evolution." 锟絆nce you get
it matters that much whether you say "select for" rather than
"select". The selection always implies that one alternative is
different from another and is, in fact "favored" (to use another
loaded word).
As to the tense, I would use present tense to explain how evolution
works in general. "This characteristic is selected (for)". I would
use past tense to explain the evolution of a particular feature we
observe in the world. "This characteristic was selected because ..."
It is also traditional to use "selection" as an "actor" that does
something: "selection produced the long neck of giraffes (although
some argue that sexual selection in male combat rather than natural
selection for feeding high in trees was the major factor)". Of
course that produces confusion for those not accustomed to the usage
and consternation among those who refuse to accept 'godless atheistic
random materialism" as resulting in anything. (I add that because
there are some on this news group who argue that way.)
wrote:
>
>As I am not an English-speaker I make a difference between "selected
>for" (as if there was a finality) and "selected" (which I see as just
>factual).
>In addition the past means that a posteriori you just observe what
>happened while the present means that a priori you know what will be
>selected (as if there was a finality).
>
>> The "proper" expression would be "Natural selection acts so that this
>> is retained because it produces greater fitness than that". 锟絀t is so
>As I am not an English-speaker I make a difference between "selected
>for" (as if there was a finality) and "selected" (which I see as just
>factual).
>In addition the past means that a posteriori you just observe what
>happened while the present means that a priori you know what will be
>selected (as if there was a finality).
>
>> The "proper" expression would be "Natural selection acts so that this
>> much easier to say "This was selected by evolution." 锟絆nce you get
>> past the first thirty seconds of the lecture or the first paragraph in
>> the introductory biology textbook, everybody should understand exactly
>> what is meant.- Hide quoted text -
>>
>> - Show quoted text -
I apologize, I missed the word "for" in your examples. I don't think
>> the introductory biology textbook, everybody should understand exactly
>> what is meant.- Hide quoted text -
>>
>> - Show quoted text -
it matters that much whether you say "select for" rather than
"select". The selection always implies that one alternative is
different from another and is, in fact "favored" (to use another
loaded word).
As to the tense, I would use present tense to explain how evolution
works in general. "This characteristic is selected (for)". I would
use past tense to explain the evolution of a particular feature we
observe in the world. "This characteristic was selected because ..."
It is also traditional to use "selection" as an "actor" that does
something: "selection produced the long neck of giraffes (although
some argue that sexual selection in male combat rather than natural
selection for feeding high in trees was the major factor)". Of
course that produces confusion for those not accustomed to the usage
and consternation among those who refuse to accept 'godless atheistic
random materialism" as resulting in anything. (I add that because
there are some on this news group who argue that way.)
Richard Norman
Aug 14, 2012, 11:28:19 AM8/14/12
to
On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 08:10:35 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
Thank you. It just seems to me that people now read fantasy and
science fiction and vampire/werewolf fiction and really enjoy the
tales knowing them not to be realistic representations of how the
world works. My eight year old grandson, having read the Harry Potter
series (with some assistance) and watched the movies and who is now
going through The Hobbit knows full well that it is all fiction. Why
do we not accept that the ancients had the same awareness of fiction
vs. non-fiction and the nature and role of myth as literature? No
doubt some of the masses might have believed in the literal reality of
the tales but my impression is that those who held power and used the
tales partly to control those masses and retain and consolidate their
power knew otherwise.
I particularly apply that awareness to the editors and compilers of
what we now call the Bible. Those who selected the tales and oral
lore must surely have known the influence of words and myths and
especially how to use them to consolidate the power of the church (or
temple).
wrote:
science fiction and vampire/werewolf fiction and really enjoy the
tales knowing them not to be realistic representations of how the
world works. My eight year old grandson, having read the Harry Potter
series (with some assistance) and watched the movies and who is now
going through The Hobbit knows full well that it is all fiction. Why
do we not accept that the ancients had the same awareness of fiction
vs. non-fiction and the nature and role of myth as literature? No
doubt some of the masses might have believed in the literal reality of
the tales but my impression is that those who held power and used the
tales partly to control those masses and retain and consolidate their
power knew otherwise.
I particularly apply that awareness to the editors and compilers of
what we now call the Bible. Those who selected the tales and oral
lore must surely have known the influence of words and myths and
especially how to use them to consolidate the power of the church (or
temple).
John Stockwell
Aug 14, 2012, 11:35:51 AM8/14/12
to
areas of science from a similar mistake. Most notably the Fermat principle
of minimum time in the propagation of the path of a light ray. Hamilton's
principle of least action also says that mechanical systems follow
the "path of least action".
In each case the path is a mathematical solution to a minimization problem.
"But how does the light/particle know the path?", ask the philosophers.
The answer, of course is that "it doesn't". In the case of light, the
notion of a "ray" is a high-frequency asymptotic assumption. The raypath
is the result of a constructive interference condition. All ray paths
are mathematically possible, but the only one that "survives" by constructive
interference is the
path of least time.
In the case of Hamilton's principle, the question is
asked wrong. The process of the propagation from initial to final state
passes incrementally through a collection of initial and final states, which incrementally, are "selected locally". For example a particle propagating
in a potential field experiences the field not just at its initial and final
position, but at every position along its path.
So it is with the case of evolution. In hindsight we could say that "evolution selected for a particular trait" but in reality selection is incremental
and the result after some elapsed time is governed by incremental selection
influenced by local conditions.
-John
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 11:39:01 AM8/14/12
to
On Aug 14, 5:17�pm, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 08:08:03 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes--thefinal two paragraphs,
> >> much easier to say "This was selected by evolution." �Once you get
"Discussion subject"?
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 08:08:03 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >> especially the final sentence: "Nevertheless, biologists still
> >> >> frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even
> >> >> if that is not the intention."- Hide quoted text -
>
> >> >> - Show quoted text -
>
> >> >What do you think of sentences such as "Evolution selects for
> >> >something" instead of "Evolution selected this or that"?
> >> >Would you agree that writing in that way "can be read as implying
> >> >teleology even if that is not the intention" of the authors?
>
> >> In the context of evolution, the word "selection" can never imply
> >> teleology except by really untutored (or very obstinate) readers. Your
> >> two examples differ only in the use of present or past tense for the
> >> verb. �I do not see how that would make any difference.
> >> >> frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even
> >> >> if that is not the intention."- Hide quoted text -
>
> >> >> - Show quoted text -
>
> >> >What do you think of sentences such as "Evolution selects for
> >> >something" instead of "Evolution selected this or that"?
> >> >Would you agree that writing in that way "can be read as implying
> >> >teleology even if that is not the intention" of the authors?
>
> >> In the context of evolution, the word "selection" can never imply
> >> teleology except by really untutored (or very obstinate) readers. Your
> >> two examples differ only in the use of present or past tense for the
>
> >As I am not an English-speaker I make a difference between "selected
> >for" (as if there was a finality) and "selected" (which I see as just
> >factual).
> >In addition the past means that a posteriori you just observe what
> >happened while the present means that a priori you know what will be
> >selected (as if there was a finality).
>
> >> The "proper" expression would be "Natural selection acts so that this
> >> is retained because it produces greater fitness than that". �It is so
> >As I am not an English-speaker I make a difference between "selected
> >for" (as if there was a finality) and "selected" (which I see as just
> >factual).
> >In addition the past means that a posteriori you just observe what
> >happened while the present means that a priori you know what will be
> >selected (as if there was a finality).
>
> >> The "proper" expression would be "Natural selection acts so that this
> >> much easier to say "This was selected by evolution." �Once you get
> >> past the first thirty seconds of the lecture or the first paragraph in
> >> the introductory biology textbook, everybody should understand exactly
> >> what is meant.- Hide quoted text -
>
> >> - Show quoted text -
>
> I apologize, I missed the word "for" in your examples. �I don't think
> it matters that much whether you say "select for" rather than
> "select". �The selection always implies that one alternative is
> different from another and is, in fact "favored" (to use another
> loaded word).
>
> As to the tense, I would use present tense to explain how evolution
> works in general. �"This characteristic is selected (for)". �I would
> use past tense to explain the evolution of a particular feature we
> observe in the world. �"This characteristic was selected because ..."
>
> It is also traditional to use "selection" as an "actor" that does
> something: �"selection produced the long neck of giraffes (although
> some argue that sexual selection in male combat rather than natural
> selection for feeding high in trees was the major factor)". � Of
> course that produces confusion for those not accustomed to the usage
> and consternation among those who refuse to accept 'godless atheistic
> random materialism" as resulting in anything. �(I add that because
> there are some on this news group who argue that way.)- Hide quoted text -
> >> the introductory biology textbook, everybody should understand exactly
> >> what is meant.- Hide quoted text -
>
> >> - Show quoted text -
>
> I apologize, I missed the word "for" in your examples. �I don't think
> it matters that much whether you say "select for" rather than
> "select". �The selection always implies that one alternative is
> different from another and is, in fact "favored" (to use another
> loaded word).
>
> As to the tense, I would use present tense to explain how evolution
> works in general. �"This characteristic is selected (for)". �I would
> use past tense to explain the evolution of a particular feature we
> observe in the world. �"This characteristic was selected because ..."
>
> It is also traditional to use "selection" as an "actor" that does
> something: �"selection produced the long neck of giraffes (although
> some argue that sexual selection in male combat rather than natural
> selection for feeding high in trees was the major factor)". � Of
> course that produces confusion for those not accustomed to the usage
> and consternation among those who refuse to accept 'godless atheistic
> random materialism" as resulting in anything. �(I add that because
>
> - Show quoted text -
I have a technical question about T-O: how do you change the
> - Show quoted text -
"Discussion subject"?
Richard Norman
Aug 14, 2012, 1:50:33 PM8/14/12
to
On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 08:39:01 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>I have a technical question about T-O: how do you change the
>"Discussion subject"?
In many news readers, you just edit the header line called "subject".
I don't know what you do in Google groups.
There are two problems doing that. First, it really is more proper if
the subject changes drastically (as here when the subject changed from
Giffiths-Wilkins to the meaning of teleological wording in biology to
how to change the subject header) to start a new thread with the new
title. You can then post a brief note in the old thread to alert
people of the new thread.
Second, threads are threaded, meaning that they form a tree structure
that results from each response referring to a specific precursor.
That is, each response has a "parent" and one post that generates
several responses "spawns a number of offspring" producing a branching
of the tree. Changing the subject line does nothing to change that
and many news readers simply show the tree of a thread without regard
to the words in the subject line. In fact, my news reader is set so
that only new and unread posts are displayed. The tree shows the
subject line from the first new post in each thread and then only the
author of each subsequent post. So I don't even see the subject line
unless I make a special effort. When people do change the subject, as
I just did here in this post, I would never notice it.
wrote:
>I have a technical question about T-O: how do you change the
>"Discussion subject"?
I don't know what you do in Google groups.
There are two problems doing that. First, it really is more proper if
the subject changes drastically (as here when the subject changed from
Giffiths-Wilkins to the meaning of teleological wording in biology to
how to change the subject header) to start a new thread with the new
title. You can then post a brief note in the old thread to alert
people of the new thread.
Second, threads are threaded, meaning that they form a tree structure
that results from each response referring to a specific precursor.
That is, each response has a "parent" and one post that generates
several responses "spawns a number of offspring" producing a branching
of the tree. Changing the subject line does nothing to change that
and many news readers simply show the tree of a thread without regard
to the words in the subject line. In fact, my news reader is set so
that only new and unread posts are displayed. The tree shows the
subject line from the first new post in each thread and then only the
author of each subsequent post. So I don't even see the subject line
unless I make a special effort. When people do change the subject, as
I just did here in this post, I would never notice it.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 14, 2012, 2:11:48 PM8/14/12
to
On 14 ao�t, 19:50, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 08:39:01 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
Thank you very much
> On Tue, 14 Aug 2012 08:39:01 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
*Hemidactylus*
Aug 14, 2012, 9:03:53 PM8/14/12
to
kinda what gets Trekkies and Harry Potter fans all worked up into a fit.
I'm not saying I believe they are right, but that they do.
When a friend of mine's son was young I told him Pokemon was around when
his dad and I were kids. Then I started making stuff up off the top off
my head about Pikachu and he quickly realized what was going on and said
something like: "You don't know much about Pokemon do you?" What I said
about Pikachu wasn't consistent with the Pokemon world.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 6:08:53 AM8/15/12
to
On 15 ao�t, 03:03, *Hemidactylus* <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
Precisely, the major difference I see between these worlds for
children and the metaphysical worlds is that the kids most often know
that their worlds are not real while many adults really believe in
their metaphysical worlds.
children and the metaphysical worlds is that the kids most often know
that their worlds are not real while many adults really believe in
their metaphysical worlds.
John S. Wilkins
Aug 15, 2012, 6:32:28 AM8/15/12
to
Burkhard <b.sc...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > In their paper "When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > belief?" PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
> > evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
> > would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn't a kind of
> > Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?
> > http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
>
> I have a bit more problems with this part of their analysis:
>
> "As we stated in Section two, we do not believe that a Milvian bridge
> is available for religious beliefs, because none of the leading
> contemporary accounts of the evolution of religious belief makes any
> reference to the truth or falsity of those beliefs when explaining
> their effects on reproductive fitness"
>
> That seems to be a mixture of argument from ignorance and argument
> from authority - just because leading thinkers cold not come up with a
> "truth tracking" theory of evolution of religion does not mean that
> such a thing is not possible, or not true.
Bearing in mind we are dealing with Plantinga's silly argument against
> On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > In their paper "When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > belief?" PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
> > evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
> > would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn't a kind of
> > Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?
> > http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
>
> I have a bit more problems with this part of their analysis:
>
> "As we stated in Section two, we do not believe that a Milvian bridge
> is available for religious beliefs, because none of the leading
> contemporary accounts of the evolution of religious belief makes any
> reference to the truth or falsity of those beliefs when explaining
> their effects on reproductive fitness"
>
> That seems to be a mixture of argument from ignorance and argument
> from authority - just because leading thinkers cold not come up with a
> "truth tracking" theory of evolution of religion does not mean that
> such a thing is not possible, or not true.
naturalism, we are entitled to some assumptions. If a decent account of
religion tracking truth *naturalistically* can be made out, then our
argument has been blocked. We never deny that revelation or some
non-naturalistic knowledge might be available (although, how would you
know?).
>
> I could easily imagine two possible worlds where religious beliefs are
> truth tracking and fitness increasing.
>
> In the first, the gods punish (or better, select against, as a breeder
> does) non-believers with impotence, halitosis, early death or early
> death of their children,depending on their degree of malevolence. This
> one makes testable predictions - we should expect atheists to have
> fewer children than theists. Now the return of the prawnster - to some
> extend this is what we actually do observe. Now, Wilkins would
> probably argue that this correlation is due to third factors such as
> increased affluence in Western Europe that coincided with
> secularisation, or China's one child policy and its enforcement. But
> that of course may be due to the respective prior probabilities he
> assigns to the two explanations - and also leaves open the possibility
> that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is simple
> the proxy the gods chose to implement their breeding programme.
The issue is not whether we can conceive of a situation in which
> I could easily imagine two possible worlds where religious beliefs are
> truth tracking and fitness increasing.
>
> In the first, the gods punish (or better, select against, as a breeder
> does) non-believers with impotence, halitosis, early death or early
> death of their children,depending on their degree of malevolence. This
> one makes testable predictions - we should expect atheists to have
> fewer children than theists. Now the return of the prawnster - to some
> extend this is what we actually do observe. Now, Wilkins would
> probably argue that this correlation is due to third factors such as
> increased affluence in Western Europe that coincided with
> secularisation, or China's one child policy and its enforcement. But
> that of course may be due to the respective prior probabilities he
> assigns to the two explanations - and also leaves open the possibility
> that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is simple
> the proxy the gods chose to implement their breeding programme.
something might select against non-truth tracking religious beliefs (a
suitably grumpy deity being the obvious case). This is an argument that
*natural selection* will not track truth on religious matters.
Plantinga argues that natural selection *never* tracks truth so if we
evolved our cognitive capacities by natural selection we should not have
confidence that we know anything, especially evolution by natural
selection and any other naturalistic account of knowledge. We are
defeating this by arguing that natural selection *can* track truth under
certain conditions.
>
> In the other model, testable predictions are more difficult to come
> by. Here, the gods allow reincarnation only (or preferably) to
> believers - and the reincarnated self keeps the "god instinct" of the
> prior self.
>
> That no religion currently advocates either belief system is of course
> not an argument that it is not true.
Again, not a response to Plantinga or the attack on naturalism.
> In the other model, testable predictions are more difficult to come
> by. Here, the gods allow reincarnation only (or preferably) to
> believers - and the reincarnated self keeps the "god instinct" of the
> prior self.
>
> That no religion currently advocates either belief system is of course
> not an argument that it is not true.
--
John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydney
http://evolvingthoughts.net
But al be that he was a philosophre,
Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 7:14:45 AM8/15/12
to
On 15 ao�t, 12:32, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
you think it is worthwhile to take it into account?
> John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydneyhttp://evolvingthoughts.net
> Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> > On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > > In their paper "When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > > belief?" PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
> > > evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
> > > would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn't a kind of
> > > Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?
> > >http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
>
> > I have a bit more problems with this part of their analysis:
>
> > "As we stated in Section two, we do not believe that a Milvian bridge
> > is available for religious beliefs, because none of the leading
> > contemporary accounts of the evolution of religious belief makes any
> > reference to the truth or falsity of those beliefs when explaining
> > their effects on reproductive fitness"
>
> > That seems to be a mixture of argument from ignorance and argument
> > from authority - just because leading thinkers cold not come up with a
> > "truth tracking" theory of evolution of religion does not mean that
> > such a thing is not possible, or not true.
>
> Bearing in mind we are dealing with Plantinga's silly argument against
> naturalism, we are entitled to some assumptions.
If Plantinga's argument against natural selection is so silly why do
> > On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > > In their paper "When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > > belief?" PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
> > > evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
> > > would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn't a kind of
> > > Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?
> > >http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
>
> > I have a bit more problems with this part of their analysis:
>
> > "As we stated in Section two, we do not believe that a Milvian bridge
> > is available for religious beliefs, because none of the leading
> > contemporary accounts of the evolution of religious belief makes any
> > reference to the truth or falsity of those beliefs when explaining
> > their effects on reproductive fitness"
>
> > That seems to be a mixture of argument from ignorance and argument
> > from authority - just because leading thinkers cold not come up with a
> > "truth tracking" theory of evolution of religion does not mean that
> > such a thing is not possible, or not true.
>
> Bearing in mind we are dealing with Plantinga's silly argument against
> naturalism, we are entitled to some assumptions.
you think it is worthwhile to take it into account?
Burkhard
Aug 15, 2012, 7:37:27 AM8/15/12
to
On Aug 15, 11:32�am, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
"Nitpickin:" I fully get it that this is mainly a very good rebuttal
of Plantinga, I just felt that paragraph overstated your case.
>
>
>
>
>
> > I could easily imagine two possible worlds where religious beliefs are
> > truth tracking and fitness increasing.
>
> > In the first, the gods punish (or better, select against, as a breeder
> > does) non-believers with impotence, halitosis, early death or early
> > death of their children,depending on their degree of malevolence. This
> > one makes testable predictions - we should expect atheists to have
> > fewer children than theists. Now the return of the prawnster - to some
> > extend this is what we actually do observe. Now, Wilkins would
> > probably argue �that this correlation is due to third factors such as
> > increased affluence in Western Europe that coincided with
> > secularisation, or China's one child policy and its enforcement. But
> > that of course may be due to the respective prior probabilities he
> > assigns to the two explanations - and also leaves open the possibility
> > that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is simple
> > the proxy the gods chose to implement their breeding programme.
>
> The issue is not whether we can conceive of a situation in which
> something might select against non-truth tracking religious beliefs (a
> suitably grumpy deity being the obvious case). This is an argument that
> *natural selection* will not track truth on religious matters.
Mhh, I'm not totally sure. I don't think - and think you agree -
either that there is a real difference between artificial selection
by breeders and "natural" selection. While some breeders I know have
some rather unnatural predilections, I would consider them simply part
of the environment of a species. Replace "breeder" by "deity" and you
get my argument, which is oen of natural selection (just by a
supernatural agency). In that scenario, the (ex hypothesis false )
belief "there is no god" would be selected against by the part of the
environment that is that god.
>
> Plantinga argues that natural selection *never* tracks truth so if we
> evolved our cognitive capacities by natural selection we should not have
> confidence that we know anything, especially evolution by natural
> selection and any other naturalistic account of knowledge. We are
> defeating this by arguing that natural selection *can* track truth under
> certain conditions.
Yes, and I totally agree with that part of the analysis. As I said,
the only one is whether religious beliefs "can't" be truth tracking
too. They aren't in the type of "evolution of religion" accounts that
you cite (where religious beliefs may be selected because they
facilitate cooperation, or as cognitive overshoots of an otherwise
truth tracking facility) That is at least how I understood the "we do
not used so far.
>
>
>
> > In the other model, testable predictions are more difficult to come
> > by. Here, the gods allow reincarnation only (or preferably) to
> > believers - and the reincarnated self keeps the "god instinct" of the
> > prior self.
>
> > That no religion currently advocates either belief system is of course
> > not an argument that it is not true.
>
> Again, not a response to Plantinga or the attack on naturalism.
> --
> John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydneyhttp://evolvingthoughts.net
> Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> > On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > > In their paper "When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > > belief?" PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
> > > evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
> > > would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn't a kind of
> > > Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?
> > >http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
>
> > I have a bit more problems with this part of their analysis:
>
> > "As we stated in Section two, we do not believe that a Milvian bridge
> > is available for religious beliefs, because none of the leading
> > contemporary accounts of the evolution of religious belief makes any
> > reference to the truth or falsity of those beliefs when explaining
> > their effects on reproductive fitness"
>
> > That seems to be a mixture of argument from ignorance and argument
> > from authority - just because leading thinkers cold not come up with a
> > "truth tracking" theory of evolution of religion does not mean that
> > such a thing is not possible, or not true.
>
> Bearing in mind we are dealing with Plantinga's silly argument against
> naturalism, we are entitled to some assumptions. If a decent account of
> religion tracking truth *naturalistically* can be made out, then our
> argument has been blocked. We never deny that revelation or some
> non-naturalistic knowledge might be available (although, how would you
> know?).
Fair enough, I probably should have prefaced my comment with
> > On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > > In their paper "When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > > belief?" PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
> > > evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
> > > would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn't a kind of
> > > Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?
> > >http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
>
> > I have a bit more problems with this part of their analysis:
>
> > "As we stated in Section two, we do not believe that a Milvian bridge
> > is available for religious beliefs, because none of the leading
> > contemporary accounts of the evolution of religious belief makes any
> > reference to the truth or falsity of those beliefs when explaining
> > their effects on reproductive fitness"
>
> > That seems to be a mixture of argument from ignorance and argument
> > from authority - just because leading thinkers cold not come up with a
> > "truth tracking" theory of evolution of religion does not mean that
> > such a thing is not possible, or not true.
>
> Bearing in mind we are dealing with Plantinga's silly argument against
> naturalism, we are entitled to some assumptions. If a decent account of
> religion tracking truth *naturalistically* can be made out, then our
> argument has been blocked. We never deny that revelation or some
> non-naturalistic knowledge might be available (although, how would you
> know?).
"Nitpickin:" I fully get it that this is mainly a very good rebuttal
of Plantinga, I just felt that paragraph overstated your case.
>
>
>
>
>
> > I could easily imagine two possible worlds where religious beliefs are
> > truth tracking and fitness increasing.
>
> > In the first, the gods punish (or better, select against, as a breeder
> > does) non-believers with impotence, halitosis, early death or early
> > death of their children,depending on their degree of malevolence. This
> > one makes testable predictions - we should expect atheists to have
> > fewer children than theists. Now the return of the prawnster - to some
> > extend this is what we actually do observe. Now, Wilkins would
> > probably argue �that this correlation is due to third factors such as
> > increased affluence in Western Europe that coincided with
> > secularisation, or China's one child policy and its enforcement. But
> > that of course may be due to the respective prior probabilities he
> > assigns to the two explanations - and also leaves open the possibility
> > that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is simple
> > the proxy the gods chose to implement their breeding programme.
>
> The issue is not whether we can conceive of a situation in which
> something might select against non-truth tracking religious beliefs (a
> suitably grumpy deity being the obvious case). This is an argument that
> *natural selection* will not track truth on religious matters.
either that there is a real difference between artificial selection
by breeders and "natural" selection. While some breeders I know have
some rather unnatural predilections, I would consider them simply part
of the environment of a species. Replace "breeder" by "deity" and you
get my argument, which is oen of natural selection (just by a
supernatural agency). In that scenario, the (ex hypothesis false )
belief "there is no god" would be selected against by the part of the
environment that is that god.
>
> Plantinga argues that natural selection *never* tracks truth so if we
> evolved our cognitive capacities by natural selection we should not have
> confidence that we know anything, especially evolution by natural
> selection and any other naturalistic account of knowledge. We are
> defeating this by arguing that natural selection *can* track truth under
> certain conditions.
the only one is whether religious beliefs "can't" be truth tracking
too. They aren't in the type of "evolution of religion" accounts that
you cite (where religious beliefs may be selected because they
facilitate cooperation, or as cognitive overshoots of an otherwise
truth tracking facility) That is at least how I understood the "we do
not believe that a Milvian bridge
is available for religious beliefs" - I argue they are available, just
not used so far.
>
>
>
> > In the other model, testable predictions are more difficult to come
> > by. Here, the gods allow reincarnation only (or preferably) to
> > believers - and the reincarnated self keeps the "god instinct" of the
> > prior self.
>
> > That no religion currently advocates either belief system is of course
> > not an argument that it is not true.
>
> Again, not a response to Plantinga or the attack on naturalism.
> --
Burkhard
Aug 15, 2012, 7:39:29 AM8/15/12
to
On Aug 15, 12:14�pm, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> On 15 ao t, 12:32, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
>
>
>
> > Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> > > On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > > > In their paper "When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > > > belief?" PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
> > > > evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
> > > > would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn't a kind of
> > > > Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?
> > > >http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
>
> > > I have a bit more problems with this part of their analysis:
>
> > > "As we stated in Section two, we do not believe that a Milvian bridge
> > > is available for religious beliefs, because none of the leading
> > > contemporary accounts of the evolution of religious belief makes any
> > > reference to the truth or falsity of those beliefs when explaining
> > > their effects on reproductive fitness"
>
> > > That seems to be a mixture of argument from ignorance and argument
> > > from authority - just because leading thinkers cold not come up with a
> > > "truth tracking" theory of evolution of religion does not mean that
> > > such a thing is not possible, or not true.
>
> > Bearing in mind we are dealing with Plantinga's silly argument against
> > naturalism, we are entitled to some assumptions.
>
> If Plantinga's argument against natural selection is so silly why do
> you think it is worthwhile to take it into account?
>
You think only plausible arguments need rebutting? When Linus Pauling
> On 15 ao t, 12:32, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
>
>
>
> > Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> > > On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > > > In their paper "When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > > > belief?" PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
> > > > evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
> > > > would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn't a kind of
> > > > Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?
> > > >http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
>
> > > I have a bit more problems with this part of their analysis:
>
> > > "As we stated in Section two, we do not believe that a Milvian bridge
> > > is available for religious beliefs, because none of the leading
> > > contemporary accounts of the evolution of religious belief makes any
> > > reference to the truth or falsity of those beliefs when explaining
> > > their effects on reproductive fitness"
>
> > > That seems to be a mixture of argument from ignorance and argument
> > > from authority - just because leading thinkers cold not come up with a
> > > "truth tracking" theory of evolution of religion does not mean that
> > > such a thing is not possible, or not true.
>
> > Bearing in mind we are dealing with Plantinga's silly argument against
> > naturalism, we are entitled to some assumptions.
>
> If Plantinga's argument against natural selection is so silly why do
> you think it is worthwhile to take it into account?
>
developed his strange idea about Vitamin C, should scientists have
ignored it and not even bothered publishing rebuttals because it was
"obviously wrong"? Plantinga is influential, the argument has a
superficial appeal, and therefore people will pick it up. Enough
reason to show in detail why it fails.
John S. Wilkins
Aug 15, 2012, 8:11:02 AM8/15/12
to
<marc.t...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
> On 15 ao�t, 12:32, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
> > Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> > > On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > > > In their paper "When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > > > belief?" PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
> > > > evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
> > > > would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn't a kind of
> > > > Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?
> > > >http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
> >
> > > I have a bit more problems with this part of their analysis:
> >
> > > "As we stated in Section two, we do not believe that a Milvian bridge
> > > is available for religious beliefs, because none of the leading
> > > contemporary accounts of the evolution of religious belief makes any
> > > reference to the truth or falsity of those beliefs when explaining
> > > their effects on reproductive fitness"
> >
> > > That seems to be a mixture of argument from ignorance and argument
> > > from authority - just because leading thinkers cold not come up with a
> > > "truth tracking" theory of evolution of religion does not mean that
> > > such a thing is not possible, or not true.
> >
> > Bearing in mind we are dealing with Plantinga's silly argument against
> > naturalism, we are entitled to some assumptions.
>
> If Plantinga's argument against natural selection is so silly why do
> you think it is worthwhile to take it into account?
Because it's published and others are taking it seriously. And because
> On 15 ao�t, 12:32, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
> > Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> > > On Aug 14, 9:14 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > > > In their paper "When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk
> > > > belief?" PE. Griffiths and J. Wilkins develop the thesis that
> > > > evolution specifically (deliberately?) selects for truth-tracking. It
> > > > would mean that evolution is a teleological process. Isn't a kind of
> > > > Intelligence Design ideology that dares not speak its name?
> > > >http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/
> >
> > > I have a bit more problems with this part of their analysis:
> >
> > > "As we stated in Section two, we do not believe that a Milvian bridge
> > > is available for religious beliefs, because none of the leading
> > > contemporary accounts of the evolution of religious belief makes any
> > > reference to the truth or falsity of those beliefs when explaining
> > > their effects on reproductive fitness"
> >
> > > That seems to be a mixture of argument from ignorance and argument
> > > from authority - just because leading thinkers cold not come up with a
> > > "truth tracking" theory of evolution of religion does not mean that
> > > such a thing is not possible, or not true.
> >
> > Bearing in mind we are dealing with Plantinga's silly argument against
> > naturalism, we are entitled to some assumptions.
>
> If Plantinga's argument against natural selection is so silly why do
> you think it is worthwhile to take it into account?
it offered an interesting issue to discuss more widely.
Marc, I'm not interested in engaging you any more. You don't read the
essay carefully, offer objections we deal with in the essay, argue
against superficial isues like referencing, and object to philosophy
using technical terms because they aren't "ordinary English". So see if
you can discuss this with others; I'm done. I have other things to do.
John S. Wilkins
Aug 15, 2012, 8:17:48 AM8/15/12
to
selection". If God can choose for any reason, then his selection is
unpredictable and can in no way be treated as an analogue of natural
selection. Unless you have some idea of what God's selection targets
are.
>
>
> >
> > Plantinga argues that natural selection *never* tracks truth so if we
> > evolved our cognitive capacities by natural selection we should not have
> > confidence that we know anything, especially evolution by natural
> > selection and any other naturalistic account of knowledge. We are
> > defeating this by arguing that natural selection *can* track truth under
> > certain conditions.
>
> Yes, and I totally agree with that part of the analysis. As I said,
> the only one is whether religious beliefs "can't" be truth tracking
> too. They aren't in the type of "evolution of religion" accounts that
> you cite (where religious beliefs may be selected because they
> facilitate cooperation, or as cognitive overshoots of an otherwise
> truth tracking facility) That is at least how I understood the "we do
> not believe that a Milvian bridge
> is available for religious beliefs" - I argue they are available, just
> not used so far.
We do not say that they *can't*; we say that there's no reason to think
>
> >
> > Plantinga argues that natural selection *never* tracks truth so if we
> > evolved our cognitive capacities by natural selection we should not have
> > confidence that we know anything, especially evolution by natural
> > selection and any other naturalistic account of knowledge. We are
> > defeating this by arguing that natural selection *can* track truth under
> > certain conditions.
>
> Yes, and I totally agree with that part of the analysis. As I said,
> the only one is whether religious beliefs "can't" be truth tracking
> too. They aren't in the type of "evolution of religion" accounts that
> you cite (where religious beliefs may be selected because they
> facilitate cooperation, or as cognitive overshoots of an otherwise
> truth tracking facility) That is at least how I understood the "we do
> not believe that a Milvian bridge
> is available for religious beliefs" - I argue they are available, just
> not used so far.
they *do*.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 8:34:36 AM8/15/12
to
for truth-tracking in order to dispute Plantinga's ones that natural
selection *never* tracks truth leads to the opposite result, ie, to be
grist to the mill of the intelligent design movement Plantiga
supports.
1. Griffiths and Wilkins' thesis suggests that "Truth" exists in
absolute with a great "T";
2. Then if natural selection exists for tracking "Truth" it means that
this is its finality.
These two arguments support the view that natural selection is a
teleological process and thus that there is indeed a kind of
intelligent design!
Richard Norman
Aug 15, 2012, 9:23:05 AM8/15/12
to
On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 05:34:36 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
It seems you fail to grasp either the nature of selection or of
teleology. Do you deny that selection acts in a direction to optimize
various processes -- extraction of energy from food, efficiency of
locomotion, visual acuity? Of course I mean optimization subject to a
variety of constraints. Still even constrained optimization is a
teleological process which "strives" to obtain an absolute Best (with
a great 'B') result.
The fact is that selection is a process that can function without an
intelligent agent but that still is capable of producing results we
describe in teleological terms because we humans, to achieve similar
results, must use intelligence directed to a desired end.
teleology. Do you deny that selection acts in a direction to optimize
various processes -- extraction of energy from food, efficiency of
locomotion, visual acuity? Of course I mean optimization subject to a
variety of constraints. Still even constrained optimization is a
teleological process which "strives" to obtain an absolute Best (with
a great 'B') result.
The fact is that selection is a process that can function without an
intelligent agent but that still is capable of producing results we
describe in teleological terms because we humans, to achieve similar
results, must use intelligence directed to a desired end.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 9:26:48 AM8/15/12
to
On 15 ao�t, 14:11, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
I understand, you prefer dispute silly arguments such as Plantiga's
one.
> > > �If a decent account of
> John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydneyhttp://evolvingthoughts.net
one.
> > > �If a decent account of
Burkhard
Aug 15, 2012, 9:29:49 AM8/15/12
to
around it a bit
Scenario 1:
A and B are hunter- gatherers. One has a cognitive anomaly that makes
him perceive lions as cuddly kittens, the other not.
Lion eats A, B escapes. B's true belief: "Lions are dangerous" (or
rather the cognitive mechanism that makes him come to that conclusion)
is selected. Clear example of truth tracking natural selection, having
the true belief is causally responsible for the survival of A (or his
genes)
Scenario 2 (requires a lot of ex hypothesis assumptions)
Again our A and B. A has the "God instinct", which gives him a certain
type of experience that leads him to believe: "There is a God", B
doesn't. God (existing ex hypothesis) ensures A procreates and B does
not - _because_ he likes what A beliefs. A's (ex hypothesis) true
belief "There is a God" is selected. Again, having the true belief is
causally responsible for the survival of A (or his genes) .
Now, you are saying the two scenarios are essentially different. The
difference seems to be an element of arbitrary choice in scenario 2,
counterfactually, a shy god who prefers to stay in hiding could have
chosen B over A.
But it is not just that the outcome could have been the other way
round - that is also the case in scenario 1 Sometimes at least, false
beliefs can be selected for (A's optical illusion makes him attack
lions rather than trying to run away from them, which happens to be
the more efficient strategy). There may be some leverage in trying to
distinguish "selecting true beliefs" and "selecting beliefs because
they are true", but I didn't get anywhere far with it, or at least
resulted in this time really dangerously anthropomorphic descriptions
of natural selection.
So the exercise of arbitrary will on the side of the deity has to do
quite some work, or so it seems to me. And one consequence of this
seems to be that perfectly non-supernatural, but artificial selection
by breeders has then to be treated as something different from
"natural selection" too. Seems in a way plausible - we could, as a
cruel joke, decide to breed say a dog species for having messed up
brains that make them see things that aren't there, not see things
that are there, get sizes, colours etc systematically wrong. The
beliefs of this species about the world would then not be truth
tracking. And our belief is truth tracking only insofar no alien.
deity etc played such tricks with us (which I guess is just a
variation of the brain in a vat argument)
So far so good, but it does create quite a gap between artificial
selection and natural selection, gives humans a very special status in
the theory of evolution and takes them partly out of the concept of
environment. At one point, I thought it might even require some pretty
strong theory of free will (so that the strange preferences of my
hypothetical breeder above are not themselves caused by the
environment) but on reflection, that is probably not true.
<snip>
Burkhard
Aug 15, 2012, 9:33:33 AM8/15/12
to
they imply a teleological process is moot. You are reading stuff into
the text that are so far away from what it says that it is difficult
to even see where precisely you get it wrong (or where you get your
reading from in the first place)
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 9:40:38 AM8/15/12
to
On 15 ao�t, 15:23, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 05:34:36 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
I think your comment is very interesting because you approach a
crucial point.
So, you consider that "selection acts in a direction to optimize
various processes" and thus, like Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, that
there is a direction in evolution?
In case of massive extinctions how do you interpret the selection?
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 05:34:36 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
crucial point.
So, you consider that "selection acts in a direction to optimize
various processes" and thus, like Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, that
there is a direction in evolution?
In case of massive extinctions how do you interpret the selection?
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 9:54:28 AM8/15/12
to
be defined in the absolute?
Richard Norman
Aug 15, 2012, 10:05:08 AM8/15/12
to
On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:26:48 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Since John has indicated he doesn't care to continue, let me introduce
my two cents worth, not because John is a special friend of mine -- he
isn't -- but because I agree with what John wrote (to a certain
extent) and why he wrote it.
Reading the actual paper shows that in the first paragraph Griffiths
and Wilkins say: "In contemporary philosophy, however, the most widely
discussed form of evolutionary scepticism is probably that of Alvin
Plantinga." The significance of Plantinga can be shown by the volume
"Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument
Against Naturalism" of critical essays with Plantinga's replies, that
is well referenced by Griffiths and Wilkins:
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23138-naturalism-defeated-essays-on-plantinga-s-evolutionary-argument-against-naturalism/
Also if you read the paper it uses Plantinga as a launching pad to
propose a way of viewing evolutionary scepticism and build a "Milvian
bridge" that can explain truth-tracking in some domains but
specifically not in others. You may not care for philosophy,
something you indicated in previous posts implying that it stood
diametrically opposed to "science" but philosophy is what this is all
about. This paper was written by philosophers for philosophers and is
in the style and vocabulary common to that profession.
my two cents worth, not because John is a special friend of mine -- he
isn't -- but because I agree with what John wrote (to a certain
extent) and why he wrote it.
Reading the actual paper shows that in the first paragraph Griffiths
and Wilkins say: "In contemporary philosophy, however, the most widely
discussed form of evolutionary scepticism is probably that of Alvin
Plantinga." The significance of Plantinga can be shown by the volume
"Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument
Against Naturalism" of critical essays with Plantinga's replies, that
is well referenced by Griffiths and Wilkins:
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23138-naturalism-defeated-essays-on-plantinga-s-evolutionary-argument-against-naturalism/
Also if you read the paper it uses Plantinga as a launching pad to
propose a way of viewing evolutionary scepticism and build a "Milvian
bridge" that can explain truth-tracking in some domains but
specifically not in others. You may not care for philosophy,
something you indicated in previous posts implying that it stood
diametrically opposed to "science" but philosophy is what this is all
about. This paper was written by philosophers for philosophers and is
in the style and vocabulary common to that profession.
Richard Norman
Aug 15, 2012, 10:10:49 AM8/15/12
to
On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:40:38 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Do you think that evolution produced those massive extinctions or do
you think geological and astronomical events imposed conditions
outside the evolutionary process?
Do you think that "evolution" as a whole necessarily has a direction
just because there are instances of evolutionary processes that do
tend in one direction? Do you doubt that "directional selection" is
directional? If not, do you conclude that directional selection must
be teleological?
you think geological and astronomical events imposed conditions
outside the evolutionary process?
Do you think that "evolution" as a whole necessarily has a direction
just because there are instances of evolutionary processes that do
tend in one direction? Do you doubt that "directional selection" is
directional? If not, do you conclude that directional selection must
be teleological?
Richard Norman
Aug 15, 2012, 10:11:55 AM8/15/12
to
On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Once again you fall back on the problem of definitions. Read the
paper to see what "track truth" refers to.
paper to see what "track truth" refers to.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 10:49:21 AM8/15/12
to
On 15 août, 16:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:40:38 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
Of course massive extinctions were not produced by evolution. However
massive extinctions had a major impact on evolution. In such events it
is likely impossible to explain why some groups of organisms survived
while most extincted.
That means that random is also at work in the process of selection.
> Do you think that "evolution" as a whole necessarily has a direction
> just because there are instances of evolutionary processes that do
> tend in one direction?
Indeed, as Jay Gould, I don't think that evolution has an a priori
direction. A posteriori specific outcomes are observed (eg, 'species'
or organs such the mammalian eye). Then scientists try to find the
mechanisms, events, constraints etc. which can explain how such
outcomes were obtained.
> Do you doubt that "directional selection" is
> directional? If not, do you conclude that directional selection must
> be teleological?
Could you give some examples of directional selections?
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:40:38 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 15 août, 15:23, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 05:34:36 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 15 août, 15:23, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 05:34:36 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
massive extinctions had a major impact on evolution. In such events it
is likely impossible to explain why some groups of organisms survived
while most extincted.
That means that random is also at work in the process of selection.
> Do you think that "evolution" as a whole necessarily has a direction
> just because there are instances of evolutionary processes that do
> tend in one direction?
direction. A posteriori specific outcomes are observed (eg, 'species'
or organs such the mammalian eye). Then scientists try to find the
mechanisms, events, constraints etc. which can explain how such
outcomes were obtained.
> Do you doubt that "directional selection" is
> directional? If not, do you conclude that directional selection must
> be teleological?
Richard Norman
Aug 15, 2012, 11:13:04 AM8/15/12
to
On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 07:49:21 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>On 15 ao�t, 16:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:40:38 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> >On 15 ao�t, 15:23, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 05:34:36 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> wrote:
>>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directional_selection
wrote:
>On 15 ao�t, 16:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:40:38 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> >On 15 ao�t, 15:23, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 05:34:36 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> wrote:
>>
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 11:14:57 AM8/15/12
to
On 15 ao�t, 16:11, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
I am sorry to confirm that indeed I set to work reading this chore.
The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
(but I know you disagree with this approach).
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
(but I know you disagree with this approach).
Richard Norman
Aug 15, 2012, 11:20:51 AM8/15/12
to
On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 07:49:21 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>On 15 ao�t, 16:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:40:38 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> >On 15 ao�t, 15:23, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 05:34:36 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> wrote:
>>
tends to be absolute: all or none. If Wilkins writes that evolution
can be truth-tracking you seem to infer that evolution always produces
"Truth" (when the paper specifically disavows that notion). When I
say that evolution optimizes some property you seem to infer that it
must always do so. Evolution can be selective, evolution can be
random, evolution can in one case do one thing but in another case do
something different. "Evolution" refers to an enormity of different
things. The most important thing about evolutionary processes is that
they are highly dependent on particular local conditions and the
particular history of past events. Biological evolution is, in a
sense, akin to human history which shows many overall patterns but in
each particular instance is contingent on particulars.
Burkhard
Aug 15, 2012, 11:08:07 AM8/15/12
to
On Aug 15, 2:54�pm, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
No, why? "Truth tracking" simple means that beliefs that have a closer
correspondence (not, total correspondence) to reality have a greater
chance to be beneficial than those that aren't. We can in this model
still have a whole class of mutually inconsistent beliefs about
gravity which are nonetheless "tracked" in that sense - that is they
are selected over e.g. the false belief that gravity dos not apply
on Mondays.
correspondence (not, total correspondence) to reality have a greater
chance to be beneficial than those that aren't. We can in this model
still have a whole class of mutually inconsistent beliefs about
gravity which are nonetheless "tracked" in that sense - that is they
are selected over e.g. the false belief that gravity dos not apply
on Mondays.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 11:36:19 AM8/15/12
to
On 15 ao�t, 17:13, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 07:49:21 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
Thank you. Actually I was just thinking of the example of the
evolution of the peppered moth over the last two hundred years. In the
wikipedia link you forward me there is also the example of the size of
the black bears in Europe which decreased during interglacial periods
of the ice ages, This is typically microevolution. Such an evolution
is reversible.
However the evolution which is more relevant is macroevolution which
is irreversible: "Macroevolution means evolution on the grand scale,
and it is mainly studied in the fossil record. It is contrasted with
microevolution, the study of evolution over short time periods., such
as that of a human lifetime or less. Microevolution therefore refers
to changes in gene frequency within a population ....
Macroevolutionary events are more likely to take millions, probably
tens of millions of years. Macroevolution refers to things like the
trends in horse evolution described by Simpson, and occurring over
tens of millions of years, or the origin of major groups, or mass
extinctions, or the Cambrian explosion described by Conway Morris.
Speciation is the traditional dividing line between micro- and
macroevolution" (LA Moran "Macroevolution" 2006). (http://
bioinfo.med.utoronto.ca/Evolution_by_Accident/Macroevolution.html).
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 07:49:21 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
evolution of the peppered moth over the last two hundred years. In the
wikipedia link you forward me there is also the example of the size of
the black bears in Europe which decreased during interglacial periods
of the ice ages, This is typically microevolution. Such an evolution
is reversible.
However the evolution which is more relevant is macroevolution which
is irreversible: "Macroevolution means evolution on the grand scale,
and it is mainly studied in the fossil record. It is contrasted with
microevolution, the study of evolution over short time periods., such
as that of a human lifetime or less. Microevolution therefore refers
to changes in gene frequency within a population ....
Macroevolutionary events are more likely to take millions, probably
tens of millions of years. Macroevolution refers to things like the
trends in horse evolution described by Simpson, and occurring over
tens of millions of years, or the origin of major groups, or mass
extinctions, or the Cambrian explosion described by Conway Morris.
Speciation is the traditional dividing line between micro- and
macroevolution" (LA Moran "Macroevolution" 2006). (http://
bioinfo.med.utoronto.ca/Evolution_by_Accident/Macroevolution.html).
Richard Norman
Aug 15, 2012, 12:09:41 PM8/15/12
to
On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:36:19 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
You seem to forget that I am a biologist and quite familiar with
microevolution and macroevolution, topics that you seem to have only a
nodding acquaintance with. You toy with ideas like the relative
reversibility of evolution which really is unrelated to micro- vs
macro; many aspects of microevolution are irreversible. You also are
not aware of the enormous differences between Larrry Moran and John
Wilkins on the problem of whether macroevolution is simply
"microevolution piled higher and deeper". You should know that in
this case I agree with Moran, not Wilkins.
Also I do not understand how your introduction of the distinction
between micro- and macroevolution relates to seeming teleological
processes in evolution and how to explain them in purely mechanistic
terms.
microevolution and macroevolution, topics that you seem to have only a
nodding acquaintance with. You toy with ideas like the relative
reversibility of evolution which really is unrelated to micro- vs
macro; many aspects of microevolution are irreversible. You also are
not aware of the enormous differences between Larrry Moran and John
Wilkins on the problem of whether macroevolution is simply
"microevolution piled higher and deeper". You should know that in
this case I agree with Moran, not Wilkins.
Also I do not understand how your introduction of the distinction
between micro- and macroevolution relates to seeming teleological
processes in evolution and how to explain them in purely mechanistic
terms.
Richard Norman
Aug 15, 2012, 12:10:20 PM8/15/12
to
On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
My impression (but I am not certain of this) is that the "truth" under
discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
corresponds to the way things actually are�to the facts."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/
Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
beliefs, but not to moral and religious beliefs." Of course you do
understand that the whole argument is about the truth of beliefs.
discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
corresponds to the way things actually are�to the facts."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/
Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
beliefs, but not to moral and religious beliefs." Of course you do
understand that the whole argument is about the truth of beliefs.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 12:28:04 PM8/15/12
to
On 15 ao�t, 17:20, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 07:49:21 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
Actually a very good example of directional evolution is the one
produced by the artificial selection by breeders. In that case there
is a god: the breeder.
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 07:49:21 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
produced by the artificial selection by breeders. In that case there
is a god: the breeder.
Richard Norman
Aug 15, 2012, 12:39:28 PM8/15/12
to
On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 09:28:04 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Once again you miss the important point. The directional form of
natural selection results in apparent teleology through a purely
mechanistic process without the intervention of an intelligent agent.
This is exactly the greatness of the "Darwinian revolution", the
exquisite adaptiveness of organisms to their physical and biological
environments can result from purely naturalistic processes, contrary
to what was previously supposed.
natural selection results in apparent teleology through a purely
mechanistic process without the intervention of an intelligent agent.
This is exactly the greatness of the "Darwinian revolution", the
exquisite adaptiveness of organisms to their physical and biological
environments can result from purely naturalistic processes, contrary
to what was previously supposed.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 12:50:18 PM8/15/12
to
On 15 ao�t, 18:09, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:36:19 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
Actually, now I remember the story about Moran and Wilkins you
recounted. It was not in favor of John.
> Also I do not understand how your introduction of the distinction
> between micro- and macroevolution relates to seeming teleological
> processes in evolution and how to explain them in purely mechanistic
> terms.
Well, in some cases of microevolution (eg, the evolution of the
peppered moth over the last two hundred years) it is relatively easy
to make a relationship between the evolution and the constraints of
the environment and then to speak of a directional evolution.
When considering macroevolution it is impossible a priori to guess the
directions. So when you assert that selection acts in a direction to
optimize various processes you seem to suggest that the direction is
predictable and thus that there is a kind of finality in the selection
process.
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:36:19 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
recounted. It was not in favor of John.
> Also I do not understand how your introduction of the distinction
> between micro- and macroevolution relates to seeming teleological
> processes in evolution and how to explain them in purely mechanistic
> terms.
peppered moth over the last two hundred years) it is relatively easy
to make a relationship between the evolution and the constraints of
the environment and then to speak of a directional evolution.
When considering macroevolution it is impossible a priori to guess the
directions. So when you assert that selection acts in a direction to
optimize various processes you seem to suggest that the direction is
predictable and thus that there is a kind of finality in the selection
process.
Richard Norman
Aug 15, 2012, 1:00:39 PM8/15/12
to
On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 09:50:18 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
I never suggested that direction is predictable, only that
directionality is possible. Sometimes peppered moths get darker.
Other times they get lighter. The classical notion of directional
evolution is to things like like climate. There are directional
adaptions to cold and directional adaptations the other way to heat.
There is finality: animals subjected to cold environments eventually
become adapted evolutionarily to cold. If the environment changes,
that is a different story. But placed in a cold environment,
selection is directional with a specific direction.
directionality is possible. Sometimes peppered moths get darker.
Other times they get lighter. The classical notion of directional
evolution is to things like like climate. There are directional
adaptions to cold and directional adaptations the other way to heat.
There is finality: animals subjected to cold environments eventually
become adapted evolutionarily to cold. If the environment changes,
that is a different story. But placed in a cold environment,
selection is directional with a specific direction.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 1:09:30 PM8/15/12
to
On 15 ao�t, 18:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
> >> Once again you fall back on the problem of definitions. �Read the
> �http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/
a problem with John's notion of beliefs. I remind you that John
replied to my comment "you didn't specify what exactly you meant by
beliefs while it is the main subject of your paper": "We took some
usage as unanalysed because our argument does not greatly depend on
what those terms specifically mean" (!).
For me a belief is irrational but not necessarily false. Then there
cannot be any 'scientific beliefs' as the scientific approach is
rational. In addition, as I am definitively atheist, for me all the
religious/metaphysical beliefs are false (or at least unfalsifiable).
Of course you can say that my conception of 'beliefs' is wrong or at
least different from John's one. Anyway you would agree with me that
the argument does depend on what those terms specifically mean.
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 15 ao�t, 16:11, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 15 ao�t, 16:11, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
> >> paper to see what "track truth" refers to.
>
> >I am sorry to confirm that indeed I set to work reading this chore.
> >The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
> >(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
> >natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
> >reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
> >Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
> >notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
> >absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
> >an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
> >it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
> >given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
> >(but I know you disagree with this approach).
>
> My impression (but I am not certain of this) is that the "truth" under
> discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
> correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
> corresponds to the way things actually are�to the facts."
>
> >I am sorry to confirm that indeed I set to work reading this chore.
> >The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
> >(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
> >natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
> >reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
> >Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
> >notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
> >absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
> >an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
> >it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
> >given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
> >(but I know you disagree with this approach).
>
> My impression (but I am not certain of this) is that the "truth" under
> discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
> correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
> �http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/
>
> Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
> be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
> beliefs, but not to moral and religious beliefs." �Of course you do
> Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
> be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
> understand that the whole argument is about the truth of beliefs.
As you know (from my posts to John in the thread "Speciation") I have
a problem with John's notion of beliefs. I remind you that John
replied to my comment "you didn't specify what exactly you meant by
beliefs while it is the main subject of your paper": "We took some
usage as unanalysed because our argument does not greatly depend on
what those terms specifically mean" (!).
For me a belief is irrational but not necessarily false. Then there
cannot be any 'scientific beliefs' as the scientific approach is
rational. In addition, as I am definitively atheist, for me all the
religious/metaphysical beliefs are false (or at least unfalsifiable).
Of course you can say that my conception of 'beliefs' is wrong or at
least different from John's one. Anyway you would agree with me that
the argument does depend on what those terms specifically mean.
Message has been deleted
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 1:34:07 PM8/15/12
to
On 15 ao�t, 19:00, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> I never suggested that direction is predictable, only that
> directionality is possible. �Sometimes peppered moths get darker.
> Other times they get lighter. �The classical notion of directional
> evolution is to things like like climate. �There are directional
> adaptions to cold and directional adaptations the other way to heat.
> There is finality: �animals subjected to cold environments eventually
> become adapted evolutionarily to cold. �If the environment changes,
> that is a different story. �But placed in a cold environment,
> selection is directional with a specific direction.
I would say there was a strong local constraint for a certain period
> I never suggested that direction is predictable, only that
> directionality is possible. �Sometimes peppered moths get darker.
> Other times they get lighter. �The classical notion of directional
> evolution is to things like like climate. �There are directional
> adaptions to cold and directional adaptations the other way to heat.
> There is finality: �animals subjected to cold environments eventually
> become adapted evolutionarily to cold. �If the environment changes,
> that is a different story. �But placed in a cold environment,
> selection is directional with a specific direction.
of time then the evolution of the given species we observed a
posteriori is likely partly explained by such a constraint. I
wouldn't
say that there was a finality in the observed selection, only a
constraint. Moreover the impact of the constraint was probabilistic:
that means there was only a certain probability that the constraint
had this impact.
Richard Norman
Aug 15, 2012, 1:33:07 PM8/15/12
to
On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 10:09:30 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>On 15 ao�t, 18:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>>
>> >> Once again you fall back on the problem of definitions. �Read the
>> �http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/
exasperation with you is that in a technical discussion about
philosophy you don't interject your own private definition of
"belief". That you happen to think that a belief must be irrational
must be a source of constant confusion as you read philosophy because
that view is not shared. Modern philosophers may dispute the fine
points of "belief" and "truth" but have a good understanding of the
subject matter under discussion. Your interpretation of these terms
is totally different. That does not mean they have to define
everything they say. It does mean that you have to learn some
philosophy before reading papers in it.
wrote:
>On 15 ao�t, 18:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>>
>> >On 15 ao�t, 16:11, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> wrote:
>>
>> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> wrote:
>>
>> >> paper to see what "track truth" refers to.
>>
>> >I am sorry to confirm that indeed I set to work reading this chore.
>> >The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
>> >(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
>> >natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
>> >reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
>> >Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
>> >notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
>> >absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
>> >an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
>> >it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
>> >given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
>> >(but I know you disagree with this approach).
>>
>> My impression (but I am not certain of this) is that the "truth" under
>> discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
>> correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
>> corresponds to the way things actually are�to the facts."
>>
>> >I am sorry to confirm that indeed I set to work reading this chore.
>> >The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
>> >(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
>> >natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
>> >reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
>> >Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
>> >notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
>> >absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
>> >an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
>> >it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
>> >given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
>> >(but I know you disagree with this approach).
>>
>> My impression (but I am not certain of this) is that the "truth" under
>> discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
>> correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
>> �http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/
>>
>> Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
>> be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
>> beliefs, but not to moral and religious beliefs." �Of course you do
>> Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
>> be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
>> understand that the whole argument is about the truth of beliefs.
>
>As you know (from my posts to John in the thread "Speciation") I have
>a problem with John's notion of beliefs. I remind you that John
>replied to my comment "you didn't specify what exactly you meant by
>beliefs while it is the main subject of your paper": "We took some
>usage as unanalysed because our argument does not greatly depend on
>what those terms specifically mean" (!).
>For me a belief is irrational but not necessarily false. Then there
>cannot be any 'scientific beliefs' as the scientific approach is
>rational. In addition, as I am definitively atheist, for me all the
>religious/metaphysical beliefs are false (or at least unfalsifiable).
>Of course you can say that my conception of 'beliefs' is wrong or at
>least different from John's one. Anyway you would agree with me that
>the argument does depend on what those terms specifically mean.
The major point and, in my opinion, the major source of John's
>
>As you know (from my posts to John in the thread "Speciation") I have
>a problem with John's notion of beliefs. I remind you that John
>replied to my comment "you didn't specify what exactly you meant by
>beliefs while it is the main subject of your paper": "We took some
>usage as unanalysed because our argument does not greatly depend on
>what those terms specifically mean" (!).
>For me a belief is irrational but not necessarily false. Then there
>cannot be any 'scientific beliefs' as the scientific approach is
>rational. In addition, as I am definitively atheist, for me all the
>religious/metaphysical beliefs are false (or at least unfalsifiable).
>Of course you can say that my conception of 'beliefs' is wrong or at
>least different from John's one. Anyway you would agree with me that
>the argument does depend on what those terms specifically mean.
exasperation with you is that in a technical discussion about
philosophy you don't interject your own private definition of
"belief". That you happen to think that a belief must be irrational
must be a source of constant confusion as you read philosophy because
that view is not shared. Modern philosophers may dispute the fine
points of "belief" and "truth" but have a good understanding of the
subject matter under discussion. Your interpretation of these terms
is totally different. That does not mean they have to define
everything they say. It does mean that you have to learn some
philosophy before reading papers in it.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 1:51:59 PM8/15/12
to
On 15 ao�t, 19:33, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 10:09:30 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
> >> >> Once again you fall back on the problem of definitions. �Read the
> is totally different. �That does not mean they have to define
> everything they say. �It does mean that you have to learn some
forum I think a specialist shouldn't jabber in his jargon when giving
his arguments or at least should explicit his professional terms if it
is impossible for him to avoid these.
Moreover, as Anglo-Saxons, you don't realize that some of us are not
English speakers. Then it is much easier for us when you use English
words that we can find in the dictionary!
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 10:09:30 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 15 ao�t, 18:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 15 ao�t, 18:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
> >> >On 15 ao�t, 16:11, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >> wrote:
>
> >> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >> wrote:
>
> >> >> paper to see what "track truth" refers to.
>
> >> >I am sorry to confirm that indeed I set to work reading this chore.
> >> >The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
> >> >(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
> >> >natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
> >> >reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
> >> >Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
> >> >notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
> >> >absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
> >> >an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
> >> >it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
> >> >given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
> >> >(but I know you disagree with this approach).
>
> >> My impression (but I am not certain of this) is that the "truth" under
> >> discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
> >> correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
>
> >> >I am sorry to confirm that indeed I set to work reading this chore.
> >> >The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
> >> >(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
> >> >natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
> >> >reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
> >> >Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
> >> >notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
> >> >absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
> >> >an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
> >> >it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
> >> >given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
> >> >(but I know you disagree with this approach).
>
> >> My impression (but I am not certain of this) is that the "truth" under
> >> discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
> >> correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
> >> corresponds to the way things actually are�to the facts."
> >> �http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/
>
> >> Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
> >> be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
> >> beliefs, but not to moral and religious beliefs." �Of course you do
> >> Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
> >> be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
> >> understand that the whole argument is about the truth of beliefs.
>
> >As you know (from my posts to John in the thread "Speciation") I have
> >a problem with John's notion of beliefs. I remind you that John
> >replied to my comment "you didn't specify what exactly you meant by
> >beliefs while it is the main subject of your paper": "We took some
> >usage as unanalysed because our argument does not greatly depend on
> >what those terms specifically mean" (!).
> >For me a belief is irrational but not necessarily false. Then there
> >cannot be any 'scientific beliefs' as the scientific approach is
> >rational. In addition, as I am definitively atheist, for me all the
> >religious/metaphysical beliefs are false (or at least unfalsifiable).
> >Of course you can say that my conception of 'beliefs' is wrong or at
> >least different from John's one. Anyway you would agree with me that
> >the argument does depend on what those terms specifically mean.
>
> The major point and, in my opinion, the major source of John's
> exasperation with you is that in a technical discussion about
> philosophy you don't interject your own private definition of
> "belief". �That you happen to think that a belief must be irrational
>
> >As you know (from my posts to John in the thread "Speciation") I have
> >a problem with John's notion of beliefs. I remind you that John
> >replied to my comment "you didn't specify what exactly you meant by
> >beliefs while it is the main subject of your paper": "We took some
> >usage as unanalysed because our argument does not greatly depend on
> >what those terms specifically mean" (!).
> >For me a belief is irrational but not necessarily false. Then there
> >cannot be any 'scientific beliefs' as the scientific approach is
> >rational. In addition, as I am definitively atheist, for me all the
> >religious/metaphysical beliefs are false (or at least unfalsifiable).
> >Of course you can say that my conception of 'beliefs' is wrong or at
> >least different from John's one. Anyway you would agree with me that
> >the argument does depend on what those terms specifically mean.
>
> The major point and, in my opinion, the major source of John's
> exasperation with you is that in a technical discussion about
> philosophy you don't interject your own private definition of
> must be a source of constant confusion as you read philosophy because
> that view is not shared. �Modern philosophers may dispute the fine
> points of "belief" and "truth" but have a good understanding of the
> subject matter under discussion. �Your interpretation of these terms
> is totally different. �That does not mean they have to define
> everything they say. �It does mean that you have to learn some
> philosophy before reading papers in it.
You would be right if this forum was a philosophical one. In this
forum I think a specialist shouldn't jabber in his jargon when giving
his arguments or at least should explicit his professional terms if it
is impossible for him to avoid these.
Moreover, as Anglo-Saxons, you don't realize that some of us are not
English speakers. Then it is much easier for us when you use English
words that we can find in the dictionary!
Message has been deleted
Burkhard
Aug 15, 2012, 4:19:37 PM8/15/12
to
On Aug 15, 6:51 pm, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > >> >> Once again you fall back on the problem of definitions. Read the
> > is totally different. That does not mean they have to define
> > everything they say. It does mean that you have to learn some
be·lieve
/bɪˈliv/ Show Spelled [bih-leev] Show IPA verb, be·lieved,
be·liev·ing.
verb (used without object)
1.
to have confidence in the truth, the existence, or the reliability of
something, although without absolute proof that one is right in doing
so: Only if one believes in something can one act purposefully.
verb (used with object)
2.
to have confidence or faith in the truth of (a positive assertion,
story, etc.); give credence to.
3.
to have confidence in the assertions of (a person).
4.
to have a conviction that (a person or thing) is, has been, or will be
engaged in a given action or involved in a given situation: The
fugitive is believed to be headed for the Mexican border.
5.
to suppose or assume; understand (usually followed by a noun clause):
I believe that he has left town.
Verb phrase
6.
believe in,
a.
to be persuaded of the truth or existence of: to believe in
Zoroastrianism; to believe in ghosts.
b.
to have faith in the reliability, honesty, benevolence, etc., of: I
can help only if you believe in me.
Idiom
7.
make believe. make ( def. 46 ) .
Origin:
1150–1200; Middle English bileven, equivalent to bi- be- + leven,
Old English (Anglian) gelēfan (cognate with Dutch gelooven, German
glauben, Gothic galaubjan )
Example Sentences
* Some crime experts believe all the country's major kidnap gangs
rely in part on the participation of the police.
* Libertarians believe the poor guy doesn't have a right to the
water.
* The moment you have to believe in global warming to make it real
to you is the moment you create the religion of global warming
So far form specialist jargon, the way philosophers use "belief",
without any implication that it is irrational, is fully covered by the
everyday usage - see: "crime experts believe that..." as an example
sentence.
When a judge tells the jury: "If you believe the police officer, you
must convict", he does not invite them to be irrational or to base
their decision on irrational considerations. In the sentence "The
fugitive is believed to be headed for the Mexican border.", the
implication is not: the police used a medium to form their opinion.
With other words, while in some contexts, belief may carry the
connotation of "without evidence" or "irrationally", in the majority
it doesn't. Philosophical usage follows this.
> On 15 ao t, 19:33, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 10:09:30 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > wrote:
>
>
>
>
> > On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 10:09:30 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > wrote:
>
> > >On 15 ao t, 18:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> > >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > >> wrote:
>
> > >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > >> wrote:
>
> > >> >On 15 ao t, 16:11, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> > >> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > >> >> wrote:
>
> > >> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > >> >> wrote:
>
> > >> >> paper to see what "track truth" refers to.
>
> > >> >I am sorry to confirm that indeed I set to work reading this chore.
> > >> >The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
> > >> >(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
> > >> >natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
> > >> >reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
> > >> >Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
> > >> >notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
> > >> >absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
> > >> >an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
> > >> >it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
> > >> >given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
> > >> >(but I know you disagree with this approach).
>
> > >> My impression (but I am not certain of this) is that the "truth" under
> > >> discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
> > >> correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
> > >> corresponds to the way things actually are to the facts."
>
> > >> >I am sorry to confirm that indeed I set to work reading this chore.
> > >> >The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
> > >> >(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
> > >> >natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
> > >> >reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
> > >> >Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
> > >> >notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
> > >> >absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
> > >> >an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
> > >> >it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
> > >> >given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
> > >> >(but I know you disagree with this approach).
>
> > >> My impression (but I am not certain of this) is that the "truth" under
> > >> discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
> > >> correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
> > >>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/
>
> > >> Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
> > >> be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
> > >> beliefs, but not to moral and religious beliefs." Of course you do
>
> > >> Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
> > >> be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
> > >> understand that the whole argument is about the truth of beliefs.
>
> > >As you know (from my posts to John in the thread "Speciation") I have
> > >a problem with John's notion of beliefs. I remind you that John
> > >replied to my comment "you didn't specify what exactly you meant by
> > >beliefs while it is the main subject of your paper": "We took some
> > >usage as unanalysed because our argument does not greatly depend on
> > >what those terms specifically mean" (!).
> > >For me a belief is irrational but not necessarily false. Then there
> > >cannot be any 'scientific beliefs' as the scientific approach is
> > >rational. In addition, as I am definitively atheist, for me all the
> > >religious/metaphysical beliefs are false (or at least unfalsifiable).
> > >Of course you can say that my conception of 'beliefs' is wrong or at
> > >least different from John's one. Anyway you would agree with me that
> > >the argument does depend on what those terms specifically mean.
>
> > The major point and, in my opinion, the major source of John's
> > exasperation with you is that in a technical discussion about
> > philosophy you don't interject your own private definition of
> > "belief". That you happen to think that a belief must be irrational
>
> > >As you know (from my posts to John in the thread "Speciation") I have
> > >a problem with John's notion of beliefs. I remind you that John
> > >replied to my comment "you didn't specify what exactly you meant by
> > >beliefs while it is the main subject of your paper": "We took some
> > >usage as unanalysed because our argument does not greatly depend on
> > >what those terms specifically mean" (!).
> > >For me a belief is irrational but not necessarily false. Then there
> > >cannot be any 'scientific beliefs' as the scientific approach is
> > >rational. In addition, as I am definitively atheist, for me all the
> > >religious/metaphysical beliefs are false (or at least unfalsifiable).
> > >Of course you can say that my conception of 'beliefs' is wrong or at
> > >least different from John's one. Anyway you would agree with me that
> > >the argument does depend on what those terms specifically mean.
>
> > The major point and, in my opinion, the major source of John's
> > exasperation with you is that in a technical discussion about
> > philosophy you don't interject your own private definition of
> > must be a source of constant confusion as you read philosophy because
> > that view is not shared. Modern philosophers may dispute the fine
> > points of "belief" and "truth" but have a good understanding of the
> > subject matter under discussion. Your interpretation of these terms
> > is totally different. That does not mean they have to define
> > everything they say. It does mean that you have to learn some
> > philosophy before reading papers in it.
>
> You would be right if this forum was a philosophical one. In this
> forum I think a specialist shouldn't jabber in his jargon when giving
> his arguments or at least should explicit his professional terms if it
> is impossible for him to avoid these.
> Moreover, as Anglo-Saxons, you don't realize that some of us are not
> English speakers. Then it is much easier for us when you use English
> words that we can find in the dictionary!
You mean one like this?:
>
> You would be right if this forum was a philosophical one. In this
> forum I think a specialist shouldn't jabber in his jargon when giving
> his arguments or at least should explicit his professional terms if it
> is impossible for him to avoid these.
> Moreover, as Anglo-Saxons, you don't realize that some of us are not
> English speakers. Then it is much easier for us when you use English
> words that we can find in the dictionary!
be·lieve
/bɪˈliv/ Show Spelled [bih-leev] Show IPA verb, be·lieved,
be·liev·ing.
verb (used without object)
1.
to have confidence in the truth, the existence, or the reliability of
something, although without absolute proof that one is right in doing
so: Only if one believes in something can one act purposefully.
verb (used with object)
2.
to have confidence or faith in the truth of (a positive assertion,
story, etc.); give credence to.
3.
to have confidence in the assertions of (a person).
4.
to have a conviction that (a person or thing) is, has been, or will be
engaged in a given action or involved in a given situation: The
fugitive is believed to be headed for the Mexican border.
5.
to suppose or assume; understand (usually followed by a noun clause):
I believe that he has left town.
Verb phrase
6.
believe in,
a.
to be persuaded of the truth or existence of: to believe in
Zoroastrianism; to believe in ghosts.
b.
to have faith in the reliability, honesty, benevolence, etc., of: I
can help only if you believe in me.
Idiom
7.
make believe. make ( def. 46 ) .
Origin:
1150–1200; Middle English bileven, equivalent to bi- be- + leven,
Old English (Anglian) gelēfan (cognate with Dutch gelooven, German
glauben, Gothic galaubjan )
Example Sentences
* Some crime experts believe all the country's major kidnap gangs
rely in part on the participation of the police.
* Libertarians believe the poor guy doesn't have a right to the
water.
* The moment you have to believe in global warming to make it real
to you is the moment you create the religion of global warming
So far form specialist jargon, the way philosophers use "belief",
without any implication that it is irrational, is fully covered by the
everyday usage - see: "crime experts believe that..." as an example
sentence.
When a judge tells the jury: "If you believe the police officer, you
must convict", he does not invite them to be irrational or to base
their decision on irrational considerations. In the sentence "The
fugitive is believed to be headed for the Mexican border.", the
implication is not: the police used a medium to form their opinion.
With other words, while in some contexts, belief may carry the
connotation of "without evidence" or "irrationally", in the majority
it doesn't. Philosophical usage follows this.
Message has been deleted
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 4:37:53 PM8/15/12
to
>
> plus de détails »
The first definition is sufficient:
be·lieve
/bɪˈliv/ Show Spelled [bih-leev] Show IPA verb, be·lieved,
be·liev·ing.
verb (used without object)
1.
to have confidence in the truth, the existence, or the reliability of
something, although without absolute proof that one is right in doing
so.
/bɪˈliv/ Show Spelled [bih-leev] Show IPA verb, be·lieved,
be·liev·ing.
verb (used without object)
1.
to have confidence in the truth, the existence, or the reliability of
something, although without absolute proof that one is right in doing
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 4:45:09 PM8/15/12
to
On 15 ao�t, 19:33, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 10:09:30 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
> >> >> Once again you fall back on the problem of definitions. �Read the
> is totally different. �That does not mean they have to define
> everything they say. �It does mean that you have to learn some
1. "Belief is the psychological state in which an individual holds a
proposition or premise to be true".
I fully agree with this definition.
2. "The terms belief and knowledge are used differently in
philosophy".
I agree with that too.
3. "The relationship between belief and knowledge is that a belief is
knowledge if the belief is true, and if the believer has a
justification (reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/
evidence/guidance) for believing it is true".
Again I agree. I would just add that, in such a case, the belief
should be called no more a belief but knowledge.
Moreover there is at least one philosopher who has the same approach
as mine: Donald Davidson defends the claim that "nothing can count as
a reason for holding a belief except another belief" (Davidson,
Donald. 1986. A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In Truth and
Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson,
ed.
E. LePore. Oxford: Blackwell).
What is your conception of what would be a belief?
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 10:09:30 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 15 ao�t, 18:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 15 ao�t, 18:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
> >> >On 15 ao�t, 16:11, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >> wrote:
>
> >> >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >> wrote:
>
> >> >> paper to see what "track truth" refers to.
>
> >> >I am sorry to confirm that indeed I set to work reading this chore.
> >> >The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
> >> >(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
> >> >natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
> >> >reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
> >> >Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
> >> >notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
> >> >absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
> >> >an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
> >> >it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
> >> >given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
> >> >(but I know you disagree with this approach).
>
> >> My impression (but I am not certain of this) is that the "truth" under
> >> discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
> >> correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
>
> >> >I am sorry to confirm that indeed I set to work reading this chore.
> >> >The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
> >> >(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
> >> >natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
> >> >reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
> >> >Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
> >> >notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
> >> >absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
> >> >an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
> >> >it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
> >> >given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
> >> >(but I know you disagree with this approach).
>
> >> My impression (but I am not certain of this) is that the "truth" under
> >> discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
> >> correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
> >> corresponds to the way things actually are�to the facts."
> >> �http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/
>
> >> Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
> >> be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
> >> beliefs, but not to moral and religious beliefs." �Of course you do
> >> Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
> >> be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
> >> understand that the whole argument is about the truth of beliefs.
>
> >As you know (from my posts to John in the thread "Speciation") I have
> >a problem with John's notion of beliefs. I remind you that John
> >replied to my comment "you didn't specify what exactly you meant by
> >beliefs while it is the main subject of your paper": "We took some
> >usage as unanalysed because our argument does not greatly depend on
> >what those terms specifically mean" (!).
> >For me a belief is irrational but not necessarily false. Then there
> >cannot be any 'scientific beliefs' as the scientific approach is
> >rational. In addition, as I am definitively atheist, for me all the
> >religious/metaphysical beliefs are false (or at least unfalsifiable).
> >Of course you can say that my conception of 'beliefs' is wrong or at
> >least different from John's one. Anyway you would agree with me that
> >the argument does depend on what those terms specifically mean.
>
> The major point and, in my opinion, the major source of John's
> exasperation with you is that in a technical discussion about
> philosophy you don't interject your own private definition of
> "belief". �That you happen to think that a belief must be irrational
>
> >As you know (from my posts to John in the thread "Speciation") I have
> >a problem with John's notion of beliefs. I remind you that John
> >replied to my comment "you didn't specify what exactly you meant by
> >beliefs while it is the main subject of your paper": "We took some
> >usage as unanalysed because our argument does not greatly depend on
> >what those terms specifically mean" (!).
> >For me a belief is irrational but not necessarily false. Then there
> >cannot be any 'scientific beliefs' as the scientific approach is
> >rational. In addition, as I am definitively atheist, for me all the
> >religious/metaphysical beliefs are false (or at least unfalsifiable).
> >Of course you can say that my conception of 'beliefs' is wrong or at
> >least different from John's one. Anyway you would agree with me that
> >the argument does depend on what those terms specifically mean.
>
> The major point and, in my opinion, the major source of John's
> exasperation with you is that in a technical discussion about
> philosophy you don't interject your own private definition of
> must be a source of constant confusion as you read philosophy because
> that view is not shared. �Modern philosophers may dispute the fine
> points of "belief" and "truth" but have a good understanding of the
> subject matter under discussion. �Your interpretation of these terms
> is totally different. �That does not mean they have to define
> everything they say. �It does mean that you have to learn some
> philosophy before reading papers in it.
According to Wikipedia:
1. "Belief is the psychological state in which an individual holds a
proposition or premise to be true".
I fully agree with this definition.
2. "The terms belief and knowledge are used differently in
philosophy".
I agree with that too.
3. "The relationship between belief and knowledge is that a belief is
knowledge if the belief is true, and if the believer has a
justification (reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/
evidence/guidance) for believing it is true".
Again I agree. I would just add that, in such a case, the belief
should be called no more a belief but knowledge.
Moreover there is at least one philosopher who has the same approach
as mine: Donald Davidson defends the claim that "nothing can count as
a reason for holding a belief except another belief" (Davidson,
Donald. 1986. A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In Truth and
Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson,
ed.
E. LePore. Oxford: Blackwell).
What is your conception of what would be a belief?
Burkhard
Aug 15, 2012, 4:47:33 PM8/15/12
to
Message has been deleted
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 5:01:48 PM8/15/12
to
In addition, according to Wikipedia:
1. "Belief is the psychological state in which an individual holds a
proposition or premise to be true".
proposition or premise to be true".
2. "The terms belief and knowledge are used differently in
philosophy".
philosophy".
3. "The relationship between belief and knowledge is that a belief is
knowledge if the belief is true, and if the believer has a
justification (reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/
evidence/guidance) for believing it is true".
I agree but just add that, in such a case, the belief should be
knowledge if the belief is true, and if the believer has a
justification (reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/
evidence/guidance) for believing it is true".
called
knowledge and no more a belief.
What is your conception of what would be a belief?
Richard Norman
Aug 15, 2012, 5:05:42 PM8/15/12
to
On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 13:00:34 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>On 15 ao�t, 19:33, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 10:09:30 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>According to Wikipedia:
>and necessarily plausible assertions/evidence/guidance), then it
>becomes a rational knowledge and, according to 2 ("belief and
>knowledge are used differently in philosophy") it should be called no
>more a belief but a knowledge.
belief is irrelevant to a philosophical argument. You write,
correctly, that a belief is knowledge if it is true and justified.
Then you say you disagree. OK. But you must accept the philosophical
usage when doing philosophy.
I had a long argument with my philosopher son-in-law about belief and
knowledge because he insisted that knowledge must be true and my own
personal definition didn't require that. Most dictionaries include
definitions that I interpret as not requiring truth -- you can be
mistaken in what you learn and acquire through experience. As it
turns out, he was right in his field. Apparently no philosopher would
accept false information and experience as "knowledge".
Philosophy is noted for its exceptions and deviations. That you find
one or more philosophers who disagrees with the rest is the rule.
Someone who agrees with, for example, Donaldson would then make
reference to "the Donaldson version of belief" or some such locution.
The simple fact is that the way John used "truth" and "belief" would
be well understood by philosophers and, when John refers a technical
philosophy paper to this group, it is understood that we have to have
the background to understand it. If you tried to read a technical
paper in, for example, the down-regulation of AMPA receptors in a
particular neuron, you would have an enormous amount of background
information to acquire before you could understand anything. If he
gets cranky about teaching you intro philosophy it is no different
from the crankiness I felt when you admitted you didn't know what
directional selection was -- very much Biology 101 material.
.
wrote:
>On 15 ao�t, 19:33, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 10:09:30 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>1. "Belief is the psychological state in which an individual holds a
>proposition or premise to be true".
>I fully agrre with this definition.
>proposition or premise to be true".
>2. "The terms belief and knowledge are used differently in
>philosophy".
>philosophy".
>I agree with that too.
>3. "The relationship between belief and knowledge is that a belief is
>knowledge if the belief is true, and if the believer has a
>justification (reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/
>evidence/guidance) for believing it is true".
>Here I disagree because, if a belief has a justification (reasonable
>knowledge if the belief is true, and if the believer has a
>justification (reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/
>evidence/guidance) for believing it is true".
>and necessarily plausible assertions/evidence/guidance), then it
>becomes a rational knowledge and, according to 2 ("belief and
>knowledge are used differently in philosophy") it should be called no
>more a belief but a knowledge.
>Moreover there is at least one philosopher who has the same approach
>as mine: Donald Davidson defends the claim that "nothing can count as
>a reason for holding a belief except another belief" (Davidson,
>Donald. 1986. A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In Truth and
>Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed.
>E. LePore. Oxford: Blackwell).
>as mine: Donald Davidson defends the claim that "nothing can count as
>a reason for holding a belief except another belief" (Davidson,
>Donald. 1986. A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In Truth and
>Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed.
>E. LePore. Oxford: Blackwell).
>What is your conception of what would be a belief?
>
The whole point of this discussion is that my personal conception of
>
belief is irrelevant to a philosophical argument. You write,
correctly, that a belief is knowledge if it is true and justified.
Then you say you disagree. OK. But you must accept the philosophical
usage when doing philosophy.
I had a long argument with my philosopher son-in-law about belief and
knowledge because he insisted that knowledge must be true and my own
personal definition didn't require that. Most dictionaries include
definitions that I interpret as not requiring truth -- you can be
mistaken in what you learn and acquire through experience. As it
turns out, he was right in his field. Apparently no philosopher would
accept false information and experience as "knowledge".
Philosophy is noted for its exceptions and deviations. That you find
one or more philosophers who disagrees with the rest is the rule.
Someone who agrees with, for example, Donaldson would then make
reference to "the Donaldson version of belief" or some such locution.
The simple fact is that the way John used "truth" and "belief" would
be well understood by philosophers and, when John refers a technical
philosophy paper to this group, it is understood that we have to have
the background to understand it. If you tried to read a technical
paper in, for example, the down-regulation of AMPA receptors in a
particular neuron, you would have an enormous amount of background
information to acquire before you could understand anything. If he
gets cranky about teaching you intro philosophy it is no different
from the crankiness I felt when you admitted you didn't know what
directional selection was -- very much Biology 101 material.
.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 15, 2012, 5:41:11 PM8/15/12
to
On 15 ao�t, 23:05, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> The whole point of this discussion is that my personal conception of
> belief is irrelevant to a philosophical argument. �You write,
> correctly, that a belief is knowledge if it is true and justified.
> Then you say you disagree.
I modified my post when I realized my mistake (see the new version):
> The whole point of this discussion is that my personal conception of
> belief is irrelevant to a philosophical argument. �You write,
> correctly, that a belief is knowledge if it is true and justified.
> Then you say you disagree.
now I say I agree but just add that, in such a case, the belief should
be called knowledge and no more a belief.
> OK. �But you must accept the philosophical
> usage when doing philosophy.
I was not doing philosophy, I commented the paper by Griffiths &
> usage when doing philosophy.
Wilkins that John recommended me to read following my hypothesis on
religious beliefs.
When I comment a paper I try to be rational and critical. If an
assertion is illogical or unclear I think anybody can notice it. But
of course it is confortable to hide behind his professional jargon (as
were doing the physicians of Moli�re).
> I had a long argument with my philosopher son-in-law about belief and
> knowledge because he insisted that knowledge must be true and my own
> personal definition didn't require that. Most dictionaries include
> definitions that I interpret as not requiring truth -- you can be
> mistaken in what you learn and acquire through experience. �As it
> turns out, he was right in his field. �Apparently no philosopher would
> accept false information and experience as "knowledge".
>
> Philosophy is noted for its exceptions and deviations. �That you find
> one or more philosophers who disagrees with the rest is the rule.
>
> plus de d�tails �
Burkhard
Aug 15, 2012, 6:28:09 PM8/15/12
to
"without absolute proof". In hat sense, I believe in the theory of
gravity, but I know that 2+2 =4
> In addition, according to Wikipedia:
> 1. "Belief is the psychological state in which an individual holds a
> proposition or premise to be true".
> 2. "The terms belief and knowledge are used differently in
> philosophy".
belief - there are some problems with it (the so called Gettier
problem) but for most practical purposes it works
> 3. "The relationship between belief and knowledge is that a belief is
> knowledge if the belief is true, and if the believer has a
> justification (reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/
> evidence/guidance) for believing it is true".
> I agree but just add that, in such a case, the belief should be
> called
> knowledge and no more a belief.
>
> What is your conception of what would be a belief?
that the proposition is true or probably true.
> What would be a rational belief?
accept to be true (aka the evidence), the proposition is more likely
to be true than false.
*Hemidactylus*
Aug 15, 2012, 7:33:23 PM8/15/12
to
On 08/15/2012 05:05 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 13:00:34 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 13:00:34 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
>
cause mutual misunderstanding and confusion. I admit having some
difficulty with G&W's paper, but have tried addressing it on my own
terms and it has inspired me to ramble and ruminate about various
things. I managed to add an anecdote about a child's coherence version
of truth relative to Pokemon characters in a follow-up to Marc. That
sort of tangent doesn't happen everyday :-)
I'm still stuck at the hurdle where we go from humans with well
developed noggins and being exapted to develop a concept of truth and
evolution tracking truth. I think truth is confined to the cultural
sphere as a human construct in how ideas correspond to nature or to a
coherent ideological system, but John might see this as magical pixie
dust on my part. I'm not a philosopher and I think the paper is
interesting and worthy of reflection and discussion. I guess,
channelling Piaget, I am assimilating G&W through biased lenses and not
accommodating them.
I still wonder how ideational or belief drift (vs. truth tracking) comes
into play in founder populations or populations that either lose eminent
knowledge leaders or have their works of knowledge burned by zealots,
lost in a flood, or major computer storage mishap. There have been
incidents where people try to find personal (or personnel) records only
to find they were lost in a fire.
http://www.archives.gov/st-louis/military-personnel/fire-1973.html
And I have solved the greatest riddles of the world on numerous
occasions only to forget before I could write them down or type them
into a newsreader.
Syamsu
Aug 15, 2012, 7:30:47 PM8/15/12
to
On Aug 15, 7:09 pm, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > >> Once again you fall back on the problem of definitions. Read the
talk.origins by sidelining subjectivity. There is nothing wrong with
reaching a conclusion about what exists through chosing it is there,
if the conclusion is relevant to what choses. We are allowed to
express emotion, eventhough that is not rational. Please depart from
the point of view that both subjectivity and objectivity are valid for
any human being, subjectivity relevant to what choses, and objectivity
relevant to what has been chosen, the spiritual domain, and the
material domain.
> On 15 août, 18:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > wrote:
>
> > >On 15 août, 16:11, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> > >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > >> wrote:
>
> > >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > >> wrote:
>
> > >> paper to see what "track truth" refers to.
>
> > >I am sorry to confirm that indeed I set to work reading this chore.
> > >The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
> > >(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
> > >natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
> > >reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
> > >Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
> > >notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
> > >absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
> > >an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
> > >it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
> > >given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
> > >(but I know you disagree with this approach).
>
> > My impression (but I am not certain of this) is that the "truth" under
> > discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
> > correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
> > corresponds to the way things actually are—to the facts."
>
> > >I am sorry to confirm that indeed I set to work reading this chore.
> > >The paper is mainly a reply to Plantiga's argument. This theist
> > >(christian) philosopher "argues that if the mind has evolved by
> > >natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no
> > >reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true".
> > >Precisely, scientifically speaking, there is a major problem with the
> > >notion of 'truth'. What is 'truth'? 'Truth' doesn't exist in the
> > >absolute as it is impossible to demonstrate (by an observation and/or
> > >an experiment), that something is true. You can only demonstrate that
> > >it is not false (or, on the contrary, false) in the conditions of the
> > >given observation and/or experiment), ie, the notion of falsification
> > >(but I know you disagree with this approach).
>
> > My impression (but I am not certain of this) is that the "truth" under
> > discussion is a form of correspondence theory: "The basic idea of the
> > correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it
> > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/
>
> > Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
> > be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
> > beliefs, but not to moral and religious beliefs." Of course you do
>
> > Hence Griffiths and Wilkins write "We argue that a Milvian bridge can
> > be constructed for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific
> > understand that the whole argument is about the truth of beliefs.
>
> As you know (from my posts to John in the thread "Speciation") I have
> a problem with John's notion of beliefs. I remind you that John
> replied to my comment "you didn't specify what exactly you meant by
> beliefs while it is the main subject of your paper": "We took some
> usage as unanalysed because our argument does not greatly depend on
> what those terms specifically mean" (!).
> For me a belief is irrational but not necessarily false. Then there
> cannot be any 'scientific beliefs' as the scientific approach is
> rational. In addition, as I am definitively atheist, for me all the
> religious/metaphysical beliefs are false (or at least unfalsifiable).
> Of course you can say that my conception of 'beliefs' is wrong or at
> least different from John's one. Anyway you would agree with me that
> the argument does depend on what those terms specifically mean.
Marc you are giving a bit of a downer to the atmosphere on
>
> As you know (from my posts to John in the thread "Speciation") I have
> a problem with John's notion of beliefs. I remind you that John
> replied to my comment "you didn't specify what exactly you meant by
> beliefs while it is the main subject of your paper": "We took some
> usage as unanalysed because our argument does not greatly depend on
> what those terms specifically mean" (!).
> For me a belief is irrational but not necessarily false. Then there
> cannot be any 'scientific beliefs' as the scientific approach is
> rational. In addition, as I am definitively atheist, for me all the
> religious/metaphysical beliefs are false (or at least unfalsifiable).
> Of course you can say that my conception of 'beliefs' is wrong or at
> least different from John's one. Anyway you would agree with me that
> the argument does depend on what those terms specifically mean.
talk.origins by sidelining subjectivity. There is nothing wrong with
reaching a conclusion about what exists through chosing it is there,
if the conclusion is relevant to what choses. We are allowed to
express emotion, eventhough that is not rational. Please depart from
the point of view that both subjectivity and objectivity are valid for
any human being, subjectivity relevant to what choses, and objectivity
relevant to what has been chosen, the spiritual domain, and the
material domain.
*Hemidactylus*
Aug 15, 2012, 7:43:51 PM8/15/12
to
On 08/15/2012 05:41 PM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
Wilkins can be terse, technical, or grumpy at times, but you may have
poured it on a bit too much from the onset, which didn't help. You are
both really smart and well versed guys (perhaps coming from different
backgrounds), so somewhere down the road maybe you two will see eye to
eye. Just be glad he didn't hit you upside the head with one of his
extended bibliographical reading lists. Those hurt :-)
> On 15 août, 23:05, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> The whole point of this discussion is that my personal conception of
>> belief is irrelevant to a philosophical argument. You write,
>> correctly, that a belief is knowledge if it is true and justified.
>> Then you say you disagree.
>
> I modified my post when I realized my mistake (see the new version):
> now I say I agree but just add that, in such a case, the belief should
> be called knowledge and no more a belief.
>
>> OK. But you must accept the philosophical
>> usage when doing philosophy.
>
> I was not doing philosophy, I commented the paper by Griffiths &
> Wilkins that John recommended me to read following my hypothesis on
> religious beliefs.
> When I comment a paper I try to be rational and critical. If an
> assertion is illogical or unclear I think anybody can notice it. But
> of course it is confortable to hide behind his professional jargon (as
> were doing the physicians of Molière).
>> The whole point of this discussion is that my personal conception of
>> belief is irrelevant to a philosophical argument. You write,
>> correctly, that a belief is knowledge if it is true and justified.
>> Then you say you disagree.
>
> I modified my post when I realized my mistake (see the new version):
> now I say I agree but just add that, in such a case, the belief should
> be called knowledge and no more a belief.
>
>> OK. But you must accept the philosophical
>> usage when doing philosophy.
>
> I was not doing philosophy, I commented the paper by Griffiths &
> Wilkins that John recommended me to read following my hypothesis on
> religious beliefs.
> When I comment a paper I try to be rational and critical. If an
> assertion is illogical or unclear I think anybody can notice it. But
> of course it is confortable to hide behind his professional jargon (as
Wilkins can be terse, technical, or grumpy at times, but you may have
poured it on a bit too much from the onset, which didn't help. You are
both really smart and well versed guys (perhaps coming from different
backgrounds), so somewhere down the road maybe you two will see eye to
eye. Just be glad he didn't hit you upside the head with one of his
extended bibliographical reading lists. Those hurt :-)
Richard Norman
Aug 15, 2012, 7:54:56 PM8/15/12
to
On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 19:33:23 -0400, *Hemidactylus*
<ecph...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>On 08/15/2012 05:05 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
>> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 13:00:34 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>>
<ecph...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>On 08/15/2012 05:05 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
>> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 13:00:34 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>>
deleted the text before I had a chance to save it. World peace failed
to be achieved because I had a hard disk crash without backup.
I was intrigued by the Pokemon anecdote. I am sure that, just as
surely the children insisted the additions to the story were
"incorrect" (or false), they no doubt also would surely agree that it
is all fiction. I recall an essay of Umberto Eco about whether
fiction could ever be false. Apparently Dumas, in The Three
Musketeers, had a gross error in describing an encounter at a
particular street intersection in Paris. Everything else about the
physical description exists in reality including the building
described but those two streets never did intersect. So was Dumas
wrong? How can you make a factual error if you are making up the
whole story?
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 16, 2012, 3:52:55 AM8/16/12
to
On 16 août, 01:30, Syamsu <nando_rontel...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Aug 15, 7:09 pm, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 15 ao t, 18:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
> > > On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > > wrote:
>
> On Aug 15, 7:09 pm, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 15 ao t, 18:10, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
> > > On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 08:14:57 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > > wrote:
>
> > > >On 15 ao t, 16:11, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> > > >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > > >> wrote:
>
> > > >> On Wed, 15 Aug 2012 06:54:28 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > > >> wrote:
>
in the sense that they stem from previous emotional experiences (even
if we are not usually aware of these). As I like to say, our nervous
system (NS) is not a computer. It has been shaped by evolution from
the body and for its benefit (and not the contrary, ie, the body would
exist for the benefit of our mind).
In this evolutionary perspective the emotional NS was (and is) crucial
for the survival of the multicellular organisms with a NS because it
allows to avoid hostile environments or, on the contrary, to be
attracted by favorable ones, in particular when our conscious brain is
puzzling in front of complex situations (eg, I am wondering whether
this thing is dangerous or not and the only knowledge I have is my
feeling about it, based on previous similar emotional experiences).
> Please depart from
> the point of view that both subjectivity and objectivity are valid for
> any human being, subjectivity relevant to what choses, and objectivity
> relevant to what has been chosen, the spiritual domain, and the
>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 16, 2012, 3:13:43 AM8/16/12
to
On 16 août, 00:28, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> Good then that the dictionary does not say: "without proof" but
> "without absolute proof". In hat sense, I believe in the theory of
> gravity, but I know that 2+2 =4
>
> > In addition, according to Wikipedia:
> > 1. "Belief is the psychological state in which an individual holds a
> > proposition or premise to be true".
>
> So nowhere does it say "irrationally" or "without evidence"
>
> > 2. "The terms belief and knowledge are used differently in
> > philosophy".
>
> True. One popular way to phrase it is : Knowledge is justified true
> belief - there are some problems with it (the so called Gettier
> problem) but for most practical purposes it works
>
> > 3. "The relationship between belief and knowledge is that a belief is
> > knowledge if the belief is true, and if the believer has a
> > justification (reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/
> > evidence/guidance) for believing it is true".
> > I agree but just add that, in such a case, the belief should be
> > called
> > knowledge and no more a belief.
>
> That is what the entry actually says, so what is it you add?
According to 2. "The terms belief and knowledge are used differently
> Good then that the dictionary does not say: "without proof" but
> "without absolute proof". In hat sense, I believe in the theory of
> gravity, but I know that 2+2 =4
>
> > In addition, according to Wikipedia:
> > 1. "Belief is the psychological state in which an individual holds a
> > proposition or premise to be true".
>
> So nowhere does it say "irrationally" or "without evidence"
>
> > 2. "The terms belief and knowledge are used differently in
> > philosophy".
>
> True. One popular way to phrase it is : Knowledge is justified true
> belief - there are some problems with it (the so called Gettier
> problem) but for most practical purposes it works
>
> > 3. "The relationship between belief and knowledge is that a belief is
> > knowledge if the belief is true, and if the believer has a
> > justification (reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/
> > evidence/guidance) for believing it is true".
> > I agree but just add that, in such a case, the belief should be
> > called
> > knowledge and no more a belief.
>
> That is what the entry actually says, so what is it you add?
in philosophy", then, if a belief become knowledge because it is
jusitfied (reasonable and necessarily plausible assertions/evidence/
guidance), logically it is better to call it 'knowledge' instead of
'belief' in order to maintain the difference between 'belief' and
knowledge'. Otherwise everything is everything and there is a lot of
confusion.
> > What is your conception of what would be a belief?
>
> A belief is a relation between me and a proposition so that I believe
> that the proposition is true or probably true.
>
> > What would be a rational belief?
>
> That subset of these relations so that relative to the facts that I
> accept to be true (aka the evidence), the proposition is more likely
> to be true than false.
"knowledge"?
-Masquer le texte des messages précédents -
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 16, 2012, 4:04:10 AM8/16/12
to
On 16 août, 01:43, *Hemidactylus* <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> On 08/15/2012 05:41 PM, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
(but it is probably too late).
> You are
> both really smart and well versed guys (perhaps coming from different
> backgrounds), so somewhere down the road maybe you two will see eye to
> eye. Just be glad he didn't hit you upside the head with one of his
> extended bibliographical reading lists. Those hurt :-)
Yes, I know, I have already had such an opportunity.
- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -
> On 08/15/2012 05:41 PM, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 15 ao t, 23:05, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> The whole point of this discussion is that my personal conception of
> >> belief is irrelevant to a philosophical argument. You write,
> >> correctly, that a belief is knowledge if it is true and justified.
> >> Then you say you disagree.
>
> > I modified my post when I realized my mistake (see the new version):
> > now I say I agree but just add that, in such a case, the belief should
> > be called knowledge and no more a belief.
>
> >> OK. But you must accept the philosophical
> >> usage when doing philosophy.
>
> > I was not doing philosophy, I commented the paper by Griffiths &
> > Wilkins that John recommended me to read following my hypothesis on
> > religious beliefs.
> > When I comment a paper I try to be rational and critical. If an
> > assertion is illogical or unclear I think anybody can notice it. But
> > of course it is confortable to hide behind his professional jargon (as
> > were doing the physicians of Moli re).
>
>
>
>
> > On 15 ao t, 23:05, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> The whole point of this discussion is that my personal conception of
> >> belief is irrelevant to a philosophical argument. You write,
> >> correctly, that a belief is knowledge if it is true and justified.
> >> Then you say you disagree.
>
> > I modified my post when I realized my mistake (see the new version):
> > now I say I agree but just add that, in such a case, the belief should
> > be called knowledge and no more a belief.
>
> >> OK. But you must accept the philosophical
> >> usage when doing philosophy.
>
> > I was not doing philosophy, I commented the paper by Griffiths &
> > Wilkins that John recommended me to read following my hypothesis on
> > religious beliefs.
> > When I comment a paper I try to be rational and critical. If an
> > assertion is illogical or unclear I think anybody can notice it. But
> > of course it is confortable to hide behind his professional jargon (as
>
> Wilkins can be terse, technical, or grumpy at times, but you may have
> poured it on a bit too much from the onset, which didn't help.
You are right I was too tough and would like to ask him to apologize
> Wilkins can be terse, technical, or grumpy at times, but you may have
> poured it on a bit too much from the onset, which didn't help.
(but it is probably too late).
> You are
> both really smart and well versed guys (perhaps coming from different
> backgrounds), so somewhere down the road maybe you two will see eye to
> eye. Just be glad he didn't hit you upside the head with one of his
> extended bibliographical reading lists. Those hurt :-)
- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -
Vend
Aug 16, 2012, 4:52:44 AM8/16/12
to
On 14 Ago, 10:14, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
<snip>
From the abstract: "We argue that a Milvian bridge can be constructed
scepticism, which has been used defend moral beliefs, is to argue that
their truth does not depend on their tracking some external state of
affairs."
Truth of moral beliefs? Is Wilkins a moral realist?
<snip>
From the abstract: "We argue that a Milvian bridge can be constructed
for commonsense beliefs, and extended to scientific beliefs, but not
to moral and religious beliefs. An alternative reply to evolutionary
scepticism, which has been used defend moral beliefs, is to argue that
their truth does not depend on their tracking some external state of
affairs."
Truth of moral beliefs? Is Wilkins a moral realist?
Syamsu
Aug 16, 2012, 4:55:27 AM8/16/12
to
relevant with free will. You are explaining away the freedom, where
instead you should focus on it. You are dissing people by pretending
it is an issue of fact what emotions people have. You are not going to
make any trouble about this are you? Simply chose in identifying what
emotions people have and don't pretend to be able to measure or
calculate it. Express yourself, and let others express themselves.
Burkhard
Aug 16, 2012, 5:46:06 AM8/16/12
to
On Aug 16, 8:13�am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
The only confusion is yours, and it is caused, again, by extremely
careless reading.Now, I know you are not a native speaker - neither am
I_, but that simply means you need to take ore time and stop adding/
omitting words from the text.
In this case, you omitted from the text the word "truth". a belief
becomes knowledge under 2 conditions, not just one: it has to be
justified, and it has also to be true.
So yes, there are two terms, in philosophy (and also everyday
language), and yes, it is good to keep them apart, bit what keeps them
apart is that one is stipulated to be true, whereas the other might or
might not be true.
>
> > > What is your conception of what would be a belief?
>
> > A belief is a relation between me and a proposition so that I believe
> > that the proposition is true or probably true.
>
> > > What would be a rational belief?
>
> > That subset of these relations so that relative to the facts that I
> > accept to be true (aka the evidence), �the proposition is more likely
> > to be true than false.
>
> Do you mean it is a "justified true belief"? In other words is it
> "knowledge"?
again, try at least to read carefully. Where in my sentence does the
word "true" appear? It is within the scope of the "belief" predicate,
so I BELIEF the proposition to be true - but that does not mean it is
actually true. So no, my definition of rational belief is not the
same as the definition of knowledge as justified true belief.
Maybe examples are easier for you:
1) Peter gets to town He wants to know what time it is. He thinks that
the number of crows on the church tower tells him the time. He sees 3
crows He now believes: it is three o'clock: irrational belief (which
may or may not be true - it might actually be three by chance)
2.) Peter gets to town He wants to know what time it is. He looks at
the big clock on the church tower which always worked accurately in
the past. it shows three o'clock, Peter now believes it is thee
o'clock: Rational belief. He has a ratio, a reason for the belief that
is normally truth tracking (reliable)
2a) It is actually 4 o'clock, unknown to Peter, someone fiddled with
the clock. His belief that it is three is still rational, but it is
not knowledge - he does not "know" it is 3 simply because it is in
fact 4 - regardless how good his evidence is, if the proposition is
false, he does not have knowledge.
2b) it is actually 3. In this case, we can say that Peter knows it is
three o'clock. He has the belief it is three, he has reasons for the
belief (it is justified) and it is also true.
All this is pretty straightforward, and roughly in line with at least
one normal dictionary definition of belief.
There are some consequences though: at any given time, we will know
lots of things - but we don;t know which ones we know, and which ones
we only rationally belief. The condition in the definition that the
belief is also true comes from the outsider perspective (there are a
few possible exceptions, mathematical truth and certain introspective
truth)
The examples above are unproblematic. There is one problematic
variation, described by Gettier:
3) Peter gets to town He wants to know what time it is. He looks at
the big clock on the church tower which always worked accurately in
the past. it shows three o'clock, Peter now believes it is thee
o'clock. It is also actually three. However, unbeknown to Peter, the
clock stopped working at three the previous day - he was just lucky to
look at the right time.
In this case he has a belief that happens to be true, and also a good
justification (which just happens to be invalid) Would we say peter
"knows" it is three? Entire libraries have been written on this.
>
> -Masquer le texte des messages pr�c�dents -
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > - Afficher le texte des messages pr�c�dents -
careless reading.Now, I know you are not a native speaker - neither am
I_, but that simply means you need to take ore time and stop adding/
omitting words from the text.
In this case, you omitted from the text the word "truth". a belief
becomes knowledge under 2 conditions, not just one: it has to be
justified, and it has also to be true.
So yes, there are two terms, in philosophy (and also everyday
language), and yes, it is good to keep them apart, bit what keeps them
apart is that one is stipulated to be true, whereas the other might or
might not be true.
>
> > > What is your conception of what would be a belief?
>
> > A belief is a relation between me and a proposition so that I believe
> > that the proposition is true or probably true.
>
> > > What would be a rational belief?
>
> > That subset of these relations so that relative to the facts that I
> > accept to be true (aka the evidence), �the proposition is more likely
> > to be true than false.
>
> Do you mean it is a "justified true belief"? In other words is it
> "knowledge"?
word "true" appear? It is within the scope of the "belief" predicate,
so I BELIEF the proposition to be true - but that does not mean it is
actually true. So no, my definition of rational belief is not the
same as the definition of knowledge as justified true belief.
Maybe examples are easier for you:
1) Peter gets to town He wants to know what time it is. He thinks that
the number of crows on the church tower tells him the time. He sees 3
crows He now believes: it is three o'clock: irrational belief (which
may or may not be true - it might actually be three by chance)
2.) Peter gets to town He wants to know what time it is. He looks at
the big clock on the church tower which always worked accurately in
the past. it shows three o'clock, Peter now believes it is thee
o'clock: Rational belief. He has a ratio, a reason for the belief that
is normally truth tracking (reliable)
2a) It is actually 4 o'clock, unknown to Peter, someone fiddled with
the clock. His belief that it is three is still rational, but it is
not knowledge - he does not "know" it is 3 simply because it is in
fact 4 - regardless how good his evidence is, if the proposition is
false, he does not have knowledge.
2b) it is actually 3. In this case, we can say that Peter knows it is
three o'clock. He has the belief it is three, he has reasons for the
belief (it is justified) and it is also true.
All this is pretty straightforward, and roughly in line with at least
one normal dictionary definition of belief.
There are some consequences though: at any given time, we will know
lots of things - but we don;t know which ones we know, and which ones
we only rationally belief. The condition in the definition that the
belief is also true comes from the outsider perspective (there are a
few possible exceptions, mathematical truth and certain introspective
truth)
The examples above are unproblematic. There is one problematic
variation, described by Gettier:
3) Peter gets to town He wants to know what time it is. He looks at
the big clock on the church tower which always worked accurately in
the past. it shows three o'clock, Peter now believes it is thee
o'clock. It is also actually three. However, unbeknown to Peter, the
clock stopped working at three the previous day - he was just lucky to
look at the right time.
In this case he has a belief that happens to be true, and also a good
justification (which just happens to be invalid) Would we say peter
"knows" it is three? Entire libraries have been written on this.
>
> -Masquer le texte des messages pr�c�dents -
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > - Afficher le texte des messages pr�c�dents -
Burkhard
Aug 16, 2012, 5:49:49 AM8/16/12
to
On Aug 15, 1:17�pm, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
<snip>
>
> > Yes, and I totally agree with that part of the analysis. As I �said,
> > the only one is whether religious beliefs "can't" be truth tracking
> > too. They aren't in the type of "evolution of religion" accounts that
> > you cite (where religious beliefs may be selected because they
> > facilitate cooperation, or as cognitive overshoots of an otherwise
> > truth tracking facility) That is at least how I understood the "we do
> > not used so far.
>
> We do not say that they *can't*; we say that there's no reason to think
> they *do*.
>
<snip>
Having re-read the paper to clear my head, and with due respect yes
you do say they "can't" : here the cite, my emphasis:
"We argue that a Milvian bridge CAN be constructed for commonsense
beliefs, and extended to scientific beliefs, BUT NOT to moral and
religious beliefs."
<snip>
>
> > Yes, and I totally agree with that part of the analysis. As I �said,
> > the only one is whether religious beliefs "can't" be truth tracking
> > too. They aren't in the type of "evolution of religion" accounts that
> > you cite (where religious beliefs may be selected because they
> > facilitate cooperation, or as cognitive overshoots of an otherwise
> > truth tracking facility) That is at least how I understood the "we do
> > not believe that a Milvian bridge
> > is available for religious beliefs" - I argue they are available, just
> > not used so far.
>
> We do not say that they *can't*; we say that there's no reason to think
> they *do*.
>
<snip>
Having re-read the paper to clear my head, and with due respect yes
you do say they "can't" : here the cite, my emphasis:
"We argue that a Milvian bridge CAN be constructed for commonsense
beliefs, and extended to scientific beliefs, BUT NOT to moral and
religious beliefs."
John S. Wilkins
Aug 16, 2012, 6:09:09 AM8/16/12
to
--
John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydney
http://evolvingthoughts.net
But al be that he was a philosophre,
Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
jillery
Aug 16, 2012, 6:12:14 AM8/16/12
to
On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:04:10 -0700 (PDT), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>On 16 août, 01:43, *Hemidactylus* <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On 08/15/2012 05:41 PM, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > On 15 ao t, 23:05, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> The whole point of this discussion is that my personal conception of
>> >> belief is irrelevant to a philosophical argument. You write,
>> >> correctly, that a belief is knowledge if it is true and justified.
>> >> Then you say you disagree.
>>
>> > I modified my post when I realized my mistake (see the new version):
>> > now I say I agree but just add that, in such a case, the belief should
>> > be called knowledge and no more a belief.
>>
>> >> OK. But you must accept the philosophical
>> >> usage when doing philosophy.
>>
>> > I was not doing philosophy, I commented the paper by Griffiths &
>> > Wilkins that John recommended me to read following my hypothesis on
>> > religious beliefs.
>> > When I comment a paper I try to be rational and critical. If an
>> > assertion is illogical or unclear I think anybody can notice it. But
>> > of course it is confortable to hide behind his professional jargon (as
>> > were doing the physicians of Moli re).
>>
>> Wilkins can be terse, technical, or grumpy at times, but you may have
>> poured it on a bit too much from the onset, which didn't help.
>
>You are right I was too tough and would like to ask him to apologize
>(but it is probably too late).
The above might be a simple due to your use of English as a second
language. If not, it is bold sarcasm.
wrote:
>On 16 août, 01:43, *Hemidactylus* <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On 08/15/2012 05:41 PM, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > On 15 ao t, 23:05, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> The whole point of this discussion is that my personal conception of
>> >> belief is irrelevant to a philosophical argument. You write,
>> >> correctly, that a belief is knowledge if it is true and justified.
>> >> Then you say you disagree.
>>
>> > I modified my post when I realized my mistake (see the new version):
>> > now I say I agree but just add that, in such a case, the belief should
>> > be called knowledge and no more a belief.
>>
>> >> OK. But you must accept the philosophical
>> >> usage when doing philosophy.
>>
>> > I was not doing philosophy, I commented the paper by Griffiths &
>> > Wilkins that John recommended me to read following my hypothesis on
>> > religious beliefs.
>> > When I comment a paper I try to be rational and critical. If an
>> > assertion is illogical or unclear I think anybody can notice it. But
>> > of course it is confortable to hide behind his professional jargon (as
>> > were doing the physicians of Moli re).
>>
>> Wilkins can be terse, technical, or grumpy at times, but you may have
>> poured it on a bit too much from the onset, which didn't help.
>
>You are right I was too tough and would like to ask him to apologize
>(but it is probably too late).
language. If not, it is bold sarcasm.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 16, 2012, 5:10:39 AM8/16/12
to
> > > Please depart from
> > > the point of view that both subjectivity and objectivity are valid for
> > > any human being, subjectivity relevant to what choses, and objectivity
> > > relevant to what has been chosen, the spiritual domain, and the
> > > material domain.- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -
>
>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -
>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -
Burkhard
Aug 16, 2012, 6:36:44 AM8/16/12
to
On Aug 16, 11:12 am, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:04:10 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
I think in this case we can give him the benefit of the doubt :o) .in
French, it would be "M'excuse", with the personal pronoun "me"
disambiguating the sentence, so what he means is more like "to pardon
ME"
> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:04:10 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
French, it would be "M'excuse", with the personal pronoun "me"
disambiguating the sentence, so what he means is more like "to pardon
ME"
*Hemidactylus*
Aug 16, 2012, 7:01:04 AM8/16/12
to
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 16, 2012, 8:16:04 AM8/16/12
to
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 16, 2012, 8:15:05 AM8/16/12
to
On 16 août, 12:12, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:04:10 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
I am indeed quite sincere.
> >> You are
> >> both really smart and well versed guys (perhaps coming from different
> >> backgrounds), so somewhere down the road maybe you two will see eye to
> >> eye. Just be glad he didn't hit you upside the head with one of his
> >> extended bibliographical reading lists. Those hurt :-)
>
> >Yes, I know, I have already had such an opportunity.
>
> >- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -
>
> >> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -
>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -
> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:04:10 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> You are
> >> both really smart and well versed guys (perhaps coming from different
> >> backgrounds), so somewhere down the road maybe you two will see eye to
> >> eye. Just be glad he didn't hit you upside the head with one of his
> >> extended bibliographical reading lists. Those hurt :-)
>
> >Yes, I know, I have already had such an opportunity.
>
> >- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -
>
>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -
John S. Wilkins
Aug 16, 2012, 8:22:47 AM8/16/12
to
<marc.t...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
> On 16 août, 12:12, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:04:10 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > wrote:
...
> On 16 août, 12:12, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:04:10 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > wrote:
> >
> > >You are right I was too tough and would like to ask him to apologize
> > >(but it is probably too late).
> >
> > The above might be a simple due to your use of English as a second
> > language. If not, it is bold sarcasm.
>
> I am indeed quite sincere.
Very well, if that wasn't a mistake of translation, here is my apology:
> > >You are right I was too tough and would like to ask him to apologize
> > >(but it is probably too late).
> >
> > The above might be a simple due to your use of English as a second
> > language. If not, it is bold sarcasm.
>
> I am indeed quite sincere.
fuck off.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 16, 2012, 8:13:02 AM8/16/12
to
better to say: "Je vous prie de bien vouloir m'excuser" ce que j'ai
traduit par "I would like to ask him to apologize" (as I didn't speak
to John directly, unfortunately).
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 16, 2012, 9:02:46 AM8/16/12
to
The problem I see is related to the notion of truth. In your examples
there is no possible doubt about what is true.
This is not the case for knowledge about our physical world: nobody
can be certain that ones present knowledge is fully true. In the
future it is always possible that it will be falsified, at least
partly (ie, within specific conditions of observation and/or
experiment) like in the example of the Newton's laws.
Then our knowledge about our physical world can only be approximate.
The truth doesn't exist per se.
In 2a) and 3) Peter had a justification (reasonable and necessarily
plausible assertions/evidence/guidance) for believing it was true but
an important information was missing (in 2a): "someone fiddled with
the clock"; in 3) "the clock stopped working at three the previous
day"). Then I would say that Peter had a true and rational
justification to say that it was three o'clock. However Peter had an
incomplete information which made his knowlege falsifiable and
actually falsified. Then it was not a belief it was imperfect
knowledge, which is always the case in our physical world.
> > -Masquer le texte des messages pr c dents -
>
>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -
>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -
Syamsu
Aug 16, 2012, 9:12:28 AM8/16/12
to
subjectivity.
Message has been deleted
Message has been deleted
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 16, 2012, 9:46:40 AM8/16/12
to
On 16 aoūt, 15:12, Syamsu <nando_rontel...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > This is ofcourse an incorrect way of looking at it, emotions are only
> > > relevant with free will. You are explaining away the freedom, where
> > > instead you should focus on it. You are dissing people by pretending
> > > it is an issue of fact what emotions people have. You are not going to
> > > make any trouble about this are you? Simply chose in identifying what
> > > emotions people have and don't pretend to be able to measure or
> > > calculate it. Express yourself, and let others express themselves.
>
> > Did you feel unable to express yourself in this forum?
>
> Yes. Due to that there are many such as yourself, who sideline
> subjectivity.
Where do you see I sideline subjectivity?
> > > This is ofcourse an incorrect way of looking at it, emotions are only
> > > relevant with free will. You are explaining away the freedom, where
> > > instead you should focus on it. You are dissing people by pretending
> > > it is an issue of fact what emotions people have. You are not going to
> > > make any trouble about this are you? Simply chose in identifying what
> > > emotions people have and don't pretend to be able to measure or
> > > calculate it. Express yourself, and let others express themselves.
>
> > Did you feel unable to express yourself in this forum?
>
> Yes. Due to that there are many such as yourself, who sideline
> subjectivity.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Aug 16, 2012, 9:43:04 AM8/16/12
to
On 16 août, 14:22, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
that my translation "I would like to ask him to apologize" is fully
mistaken: I wanted to say "I present my apologies".
Sorry again!
> <marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
> > On 16 août, 12:12, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:04:10 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > > wrote:
> ...
>
> > > >You are right I was too tough and would like to ask him to apologize
> > > >(but it is probably too late).
>
> > > The above might be a simple due to your use of English as a second
> > > language. If not, it is bold sarcasm.
>
> > I am indeed quite sincere.
>
> Very well, if that wasn't a mistake of translation, here is my apology:
> fuck off.
>
> --
> John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydneyhttp://evolvingthoughts.net
> > On 16 août, 12:12, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:04:10 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > > wrote:
> ...
>
> > > >You are right I was too tough and would like to ask him to apologize
> > > >(but it is probably too late).
>
> > > The above might be a simple due to your use of English as a second
> > > language. If not, it is bold sarcasm.
>
> > I am indeed quite sincere.
>
> Very well, if that wasn't a mistake of translation, here is my apology:
> fuck off.
>
> --
> But al be that he was a philosophre,
> Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
I am very sorry but there is a huge misunderstanding! I just realize
> Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
that my translation "I would like to ask him to apologize" is fully
mistaken: I wanted to say "I present my apologies".
Sorry again!
It is loading more messages.
0 new messages