(1) positive, i.e. doesn't define it as what it is *not*.
(2) isn't a truism, i.e. merely using synonyms of "natural".
(3) isn't circular, i.e. defining "natural" as "pertaining to nature",
leaving "nature" undefined.
Do you understand the definition of the scientific method?
"a more deliberate kind of realism in novels, stories, and plays,
usually involving a view of human beings as passive victims of
external physical forces and social environment.A typical example is
�mile Zola,and his studies of impoverished characters miserably
subjected to hunger, sexual obsession, and hereditary defects in
Th�r�se Raquin " Literary Dictionary
<or with other words, which specific type of naturalism do you mean?>
Even if 2 is allowed, there is no hard definition of the term
"natural". Indeed, anybody
who seeks to attack scientists, science, or any other aspect of
modernity as being
influenced or controlled by "naturalism" is demolishing a strawman.
-John
It's the assumption that the universe behaves in a consistent and
coherent manner.
If we work under that assumption science would be impossible.
The system seems to work.
RF
Since I see (2) and (3) as problems of lexical ambiguity (i.e., some
words imperfectly capture and express some concepts), I'll just
address (1) by asking if you're suggesting that defining naturalism by
what it is not is not good, or useful, and why that should be.
Perhaps "naturalism" exists as a result of of antithetical necessity
rather than linguistic utility. Consider "morality." Though we can
identify and list things we consider moral, they're really just
expressions of reactions to acts we find unfair or hurtful. Morality
is in effect defined by that which it is not. If there was no
deliberately wrong behavior, there would be no need to clarify that
which is right behavior.
Would we even need "naturalism" as a concept if nobody was ever
tempted to infer the "supernatural?"
RLC
To echo RC a bit, the concept is only meaningful in the context of
claims that something other than natural could exist. I see
_everything_ that actually exists as natural. To suggest that a thing
could actually be, and yet be "unnatural", seems meaningless to me.
Natural is simply what is. Your question makes no sense.
KP
Sanity.
How about "The study of the observable universe"?
--
Bob C.
"Evidence confirming an observation is
evidence that the observation is wrong."
- McNameless
True naturalism is naked sub-bathing and well you know it.
I can find dictionary definitions that relate to art, literature, theatre,
not wearing clothes and two (or maybe three) connected with philosophy.
Which do mean?
I am guessing it is to do with philosophy. If so how about giving us a few
definitions that you think are at least intended to convey the concept of
interest and then comment on them.
I am also interested in your exclusions. All three approaches are used in
dictionary definitions, why do you want to exclude them? If these three
rules were widely used a great many words would be very hard to define.
What's the reason for it?
David
I tried bathing in a sub but the crew insisted I get dressed.
--
John S. Wilkins, Philosophy, Bond University
http://evolvingthoughts.net
But al be that he was a philosophre,
Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
Start by reading this:
http://www.lancs.ac.uk/users/philosophy/texts/mill_on.htm
The read this:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/
Then search
http://plato.stanford.edu/search/searcher.py?query=supernaturalism
That violates (1). You're only saying what naturalism isn't (i.e. it isn't
an inflencer or controller of "modernity", and it isn't a "real" man but a
strawman).
I didn't ask for a "hard" definition, only for a "basic" one. But I'll go
ahead and add "naturalism" to the (very long) list of things of which "there
is no such thing" according to the denizens of t.o.
That violates (2), "the universe" is merely a synonym for "nature". and (3)
"the universe" or "nature" is left undefined.
I think that there is more than one "nature". That's what I'm getting at.
What is the "nature" which is the subject of "naturalism"?
In the western tradition, which is where phusis became physics, nature
is what happens when the innate properties of things are what causes
them to act as they do. That is the best "positive" definition I can
think of that covers all cases.
There is no consistent demarcation into things that are caused by their
phusis to have the properties they do and things that have something
else make them what they are (such as the actions of the gods).
A distinction between the artificial and the natural is one that has
more to do with privileging human actions than a consistent metaphysical
distinction. Artificial selection, for example, is a subset of natural
selection.
I gave links to various sources. You really should read them before you
continue, even if only to know what others in the western philosophical
tradition have come to before you attempted it.
I disagree with Robert's reduction of morality. This is a view known as
emotivism; I am much less inclined to reduce moral talk that way: what
he has mentioned may be the reason why we have the moral talk we do, but
moral talk is normative, and one cannot noncircularly derive the moral
import from a factual claim about history or psychology.
Distinguishing natural from supernatural is nigh on impossible. If it
happens in a way we can investigate, then it falls into the natural
camp, because even God must have a nature. If God is unconstrained by
his nature (some thodicies have it that way), then he is uninvestigable,
but then explanation in terms of arbitrary events becomes
indistinguishable from ordinary chance.
We typically talk about the supernatural as events that, if they happen,
do so in ways that some idea physics excludes as physically (i.e.,
naturally) possible, like ESP or precognition or telekinesis. It is
unclear to me that miracles, in the theistic tradition of the west, need
be supernatural in this sense.
It isn't actually a synonym. The universe is everything, nature does
not include artificial things.
But even given your objection, so what? He isn't defining naturalism
as the universe, he is defining it as the assumption that everything
Now Kalk is going to take over Backspaces schtick. You can't define
away reality, Kalk. It is stupid to even try. What you need is a
viable alternative.
Ron Okimoto
That which people can reliably describe, observe, measure, or model.
No, no. Add "naturalism" to the (very long) list of things about which you are
abyssaly and willfully ignorant.
I insist.
And my argument was, I suppose, a contention that there cannot be more
than one nature. If "nature" can be (for the epistemological context
of this discussion) reasonably defined as,
"Everything we see"
( - Where "everything" is not defined a priori but is conditional upon
"we" and "see,"
- where "we" means a consensus of opinion based upon reason, and
- where "see" means perceive by human senses or human-engineered
capacity.)
...then it seems to me that there is simply nothing that falls outside
of that definition (e.g., the insistence that something exists which
is not testable, either practically or in principle) that is not
justifiably viewed with serious skepticism.
Now that you've explained a little further, it seems clear to me that
my earlier analogy was apt*, at least in that it forces recognition of
the fact that "natural" and "supernatural" are not actual subsets of
some broader reality. They are semantic conventions necessitated by
the ability of the human mind to embrace the conviction of things
unseen.
There is only one nature. And the only reason I need to say such a
thing is that there is enough Faith (I do not mean this derogatorily)
out there such that a word like "supernatural" has become a useful
convenience.
RLC
[*Though I'm happy to defer to John, who has likely forgotten more
about emotivism than I'll learn in any future investigations, on
matters of philosophy, the perspective that moral statements are less
factual and meaningful than they are emotional is not one I intended
to express. My analogy was not meant to diminish the reality of
inflicted violation of any sort, nor was it my intent to "reduce"
morality to anything simplistic. The point was that morality, as an
intellectual and linguistic concept, exists because there is
demonstrable, specific immorality in the world (without which it would
be superflous).]
I knew he was operating in the dark, but I had no idea he was under
such pressure.
(Sorry, sometimes my base half gets the better of me.)
RLC
So he can include supernaturalism as an explaintory possibility with
equal standing with naturalistic (scientific) explainations.
Boikat
At least this time I didn't get likened to Hitler for asking for
clarification.
David
A truism is an obvious or self-evident truth, not a circular
definition. If you need to know what "the universe" or "nature" means,
get out your dictionary.
"Means something" to whom?
To the people who understand the means of examining the evidence.
Which "evidence"?
A less vernacular way of stating it is that methodological naturalism
consists of working under the provisional assumption that the universe
behaves, at least statistically, in a regular manner.
--
alias Ernest Major
Which universe?
Anything you can observe, measure, or model.
Which "all"?
For naturalism, there's only one, the one that can be observed, measured, and
modeled.
Do you have a point you're trying (and failing) to make? Perhaps something
about the Democratic Party? 'Cause you're not doing too much better than
Utterly Clueless.
Which "you"?
Sorry, but you don't get to conclude that. "Undefined" is left undefined.
"Universe" is clear enough for me to understand.
--
Mark Isaak eciton (at) earthlink (dot) net
"It is certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural
honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most
pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems." - D. Hume
Anybody.
>
>"richardal...@googlemail.com" <richardal...@gmail.com> wrote in
>message
>news:01b7dd77-c2e1-4408...@k3g2000vbp.googlegroups.com...
>> On Nov 11, 5:58 pm, "Kalkidas" <e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>>> I wonder if a basic definition of "naturalism" can be made which
>>>
>>> (1) positive, i.e. doesn't define it as what it is *not*.
>>> (2) isn't a truism, i.e. merely using synonyms of "natural".
>>> (3) isn't circular, i.e. defining "natural" as "pertaining to nature",
>>> leaving "nature" undefined.
>>
>> It's the assumption that the universe behaves in a consistent and
>> coherent manner.
>> If we work under that assumption science would be impossible.
>> The system seems to work.
>
>That violates (2), "the universe" is merely a synonym for "nature". and (3)
>"the universe" or "nature" is left undefined.
Several responses have provided answers, but from the above
it seems you're determined to show that there can be no
definition, since any definition would violate at least one
of your arbitrary "rules", rules which seem to have no
purpose beyond precluding any definition.
So what's your agenda?
--
Bob C.
"Evidence confirming an observation is
evidence that the observation is wrong."
- McNameless
>
>"Robert Camp" <rober...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:d5a6a3cc-b25f-44a7...@i32g2000pri.googlegroups.com...
>> On Nov 11, 9:58 am, "Kalkidas" <e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>>> I wonder if a basic definition of "naturalism" can be made which
>>>
>>> (1) positive, i.e. doesn't define it as what it is *not*.
>>> (2) isn't a truism, i.e. merely using synonyms of "natural".
>>> (3) isn't circular, i.e. defining "natural" as "pertaining to nature",
>>> leaving "nature" undefined.
>>
>> Since I see (2) and (3) as problems of lexical ambiguity (i.e., some
>> words imperfectly capture and express some concepts), I'll just
>> address (1) by asking if you're suggesting that defining naturalism by
>> what it is not is not good, or useful, and why that should be.
>>
>> Perhaps "naturalism" exists as a result of of antithetical necessity
>> rather than linguistic utility. Consider "morality." Though we can
>> identify and list things we consider moral, they're really just
>> expressions of reactions to acts we find unfair or hurtful. Morality
>> is in effect defined by that which it is not. If there was no
>> deliberately wrong behavior, there would be no need to clarify that
>> which is right behavior.
>>
>> Would we even need "naturalism" as a concept if nobody was ever
>> tempted to infer the "supernatural?"
>
>I think that there is more than one "nature". That's what I'm getting at.
Your privilege, just don't expect anyone to accept your
belief as valid until you demonstrate the existence of these
other "natures".
>What is the "nature" which is the subject of "naturalism"?
Everything which is observed to exist. Problems with that?
The tenor of your thoughts is obvious.
To the objective and unbiased observer, who can demonstrate
it to another objective and unbiased observer.
I'm just trying to determine which evidence means something to which people.
In other words, is the "nature" in "methodological naturalism" something
that everyone who practices "methodological naturalism" agrees on, or are
there different "natures" depending on who you ask?
If it's something all the practitioners agree on, then it ought to have
positive properties that distinguish it from all that is "not nature".
But if it's not something all practitioners agree on, then who gets to
decide whether something is "natural" or not?
Who is that?
Might that be your deeper half?
The abyss I speak of is metaphorical and not filled with a heavy liquid.
<snip/>
Are there such people? I'd say rather observers acting in good faith.
No pun intended.
You want names? Do you not know someone who can report an observation or
take a measurement? If so, him.
Or her.
Evidence often means something different to different people. But
methodological naturalists will agree on whether it's evidence. Because they
can reproduce the experiment, retake the measurement, or recalculate the model
from which the evidence came.
>
> If it's something all the practitioners agree on, then it ought to have
> positive properties that distinguish it from all that is "not nature".
>
> But if it's not something all practitioners agree on, then who gets to
> decide whether something is "natural" or not?
Not all practitioners will agree on whether the the temperature is 90 deg C or
something slightly more or less, but they will all agree that the temperature is
evidence. Because they can follow the procedures that produced the reading.
This doesn't happen with reports from seances, which notoriously stop producing
their alleged evidence in the presence of skeptics.
Backspace is that you nymshifted?
David
Adding all those loaded terms isn't going to help.
What rules?
Do you think that you can simply make up a set of rules and impose
them on reality?
Why not try to learn about the nature of science rather than trying to
impose a set of rules which serve no purpose other than to give you
the illusion that you can define science out of existence?
RF
No, it's Kalitus attempting to appear "clever".
It isn't working, is it?
Boikat
To "whom" do you think? Sea monkeys?
Really, how lame can you get?
Boikat
Which one do you think?
Boikat
No. There is only one "nature".
>
> If it's something all the practitioners agree on, then it ought to have
> positive properties that distinguish it from all that is "not nature".
It's called "reality". You might drop in for a visit some time.
>
> But if it's not something all practitioners agree on, then who gets to
> decide whether something is "natural" or not?
The sane ones.
Boikat
It is not difficult to define nature. It is the empirical reality of
phenomena in the universe.
You are, of course, hoping your god(s) has/have a nature. They do
not. They are created by humans for humans and as such they think and
behave like humans who create and believe in them. Thus beliefs
about various gods effects, can and does affect the believers
behavior; but it does not validate the empirical reality of the gods.
It only documents the empirical reality of people acting on their
beliefs about gods. Thus W. I. Thomas's famous definition of the
situation dictum: "If men define things as real, they are real in
their consequences;" this means in short that if people believe in
god(s) it has consequences for their behavior.
He said with acid tongue.
--
Love consists of overestimating
the differences between one woman
and another. --George Bernard Shaw
<snip>
> >> I knew he was operating in the dark, but I had no idea he was under
> >> such pressure.
>
> >> (Sorry, sometimes my base half gets the better of me.)
>
> > The tenor of your thoughts is obvious.
>
> He said with acid tongue.
It didn't strike me as being that caustic.
Boikat
What do you envision are our choices?
Eric Root
Just looking for specifics, so that I'll know when "methodological
naturalism" is being practiced, or something else. After all, it is federal
law according to Judge Jones, that to be called "science" a body of
knowledge must be arrived at by "methodological naturalism".
Judge Jones understands the law, science and religion better than you
do.
Really? Because you've been given specifics, yet you keep asking.
> so that I'll know when "methodological
> naturalism" is being practiced, or something else.
Really? You can't tell when the scientific method is being employed? What,
exactly, has you confused?
> After all, it is federal
> law according to Judge Jones, that to be called "science" a body of
> knowledge must be arrived at by "methodological naturalism".
No, that's not true. In his opinion, the judge quotes William Dembski to
that effect. Remember that one IDiot defense at Dover is that IDiocy is
really science, but the judge catches Dembski out in saying that science is
governed by methodological naturalism, which must change to accommodate
IDiocy.
So why not write Dembski and ask him what naturalism is? He apparently had
to no problem figuring out what it is, that science is based upon it, and
that IDiocy isn't.
Actually, a stronger statement obtains. Judge Jones understands that science
is a safe harbor for subjects that may be funded by taxpayers and that the ID
scammers themselves recognize that the ID scam isn't science.
Dembski simply made an observation about a dominant paradigm. But you, along
with Judge Jones, choose to pretend that it was a value judgment, as if
Dembski said that it "should be" rather than "is" the dominant paradigm.
It is as if politician X made the remark that "congress is controlled by
democrats" and the headlines read "politician X supports democrat control of
congress".
You are the one who is "caught" in a deception, not Dembski.
Moreover, the slow-witted Judge actually said that "methodological
naturalism" *is* the scientific method. No doubt the glaring contradiction
in this escapes you.
And the headlines read "democrat control of congress *is* the american
political system".
Now, Judge Jones may perhaps be excused for his fearful self-deception,
since he was at the mercy of those on the anti-ID side who, although they
are tenth-rate scientists, are experts at threating dissenters with public
ridicule.
What's your excuse?
What gives you that idea? It is not for the judiciary to decide what
science "should" be,
though they are sometimes asked to decide what it is.
Dembski didn't mean that "science = methodological naturalism". He clearly
meant that "methodological naturalism dominates the thinking of the
scientific establishment".
The judge pretended that Dembski meant the former. So what can one conclude?
Either the judge is really stupid, or he is deceiving himself, or he is
deliberately lying.
And the Judge did, in fact, decide what science "should" be. His entire
opinion is nothing but a list of what criteria must be met for a body of
knowledge to be called "science" and hence be taught in science classes in
public schools.
You got that upside down. The question of Kitzmiller v Dover was; is
teaching of ID favouring certain religious views, in violation of the
1. Amendment? Having answered this in the affirmative, the question
becomes: is there a secular justification for doing it despite the
prima facie violation of the 1.? The justification offered by the
defendant is: yes, because it is (secular) science. This raises the
question what science _is_. Since witness for the defendant submits
that science is indeed based on methodological naturalism, his side
has to show that ID is based on methodological naturalism too. They
fail to do this (Fuller actually doing more damage to his side than
even Dembski) and so they lose.
Behe is reported to have conceded that a definition of science which
encompassed ID would also encompass astrology.
--
alias Ernest Major
sorry, my bad, I thought something was wrong but did not wait to
think it through. Behe of course, not Dembski, was quoted by Jones,
together with Fuller
Of course the defense screwed up. And one way in which they screwed up was
to capitulate to the false equation of science with methodological
naturalism put forward by the plaintiffs and seconded by the Judge.
But Dembski had nothing to do with it. His words were misinterpreted, most
likely deliberately.
As a matter of idle curiosity, perhaps you could describe how one
would undertake a scientific investigation *without* the assumption of
methodological naturalism?
Can't see it myself, but evidently you think it possible.
Enlighten us.
RF
>
>"deadrat" <a...@b.com> wrote in message
>news:09229B73-5389-4C25-BD2C-C90009D289AB%a...@b.com...
>> "Kalkidas" <e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> "Ernest Major" <{$to$}@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>>> news:0vUJwcjq...@meden.invalid...
>>>> In message <ibharu$n0q$1...@news.eternal-september.org>, Kalkidas
>>>> <e...@joes.pub> writes
>>>>>I wonder if a basic definition of "naturalism" can be made which
>>>>>
>>>>>(1) positive, i.e. doesn't define it as what it is *not*.
>>>>>(2) isn't a truism, i.e. merely using synonyms of "natural".
>>>>>(3) isn't circular, i.e. defining "natural" as "pertaining to nature",
>>>>>leaving "nature" undefined.
>>>>>
>>>> Methodological naturalism consists of working under the provisional
>>>> assumption that evidence means something.
>>>
>>> "Means something" to whom?
>>
>> To the people who understand the means of examining the evidence.
>
>Which "evidence"?
Short attention span? Look two posts above your own,
Grasshopper.
You're welcome.
--
Bob C.
"Evidence confirming an observation is
evidence that the observation is wrong."
- McNameless
>Bob Casanova <nos...@buzz.off> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 12 Nov 2010 08:28:59 -0700, the following appeared
>> in talk.origins, posted by "Kalkidas" <e...@joes.pub>:
>>
>>>
>>>"Ernest Major" <{$to$}@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>>>news:0vUJwcjq...@meden.invalid...
>>>> In message <ibharu$n0q$1...@news.eternal-september.org>, Kalkidas
>>>> <e...@joes.pub> writes
>>>>>I wonder if a basic definition of "naturalism" can be made which
>>>>>
>>>>>(1) positive, i.e. doesn't define it as what it is *not*.
>>>>>(2) isn't a truism, i.e. merely using synonyms of "natural".
>>>>>(3) isn't circular, i.e. defining "natural" as "pertaining to nature",
>>>>>leaving "nature" undefined.
>>>>>
>>>> Methodological naturalism consists of working under the provisional
>>>> assumption that evidence means something.
>>>
>>>"Means something" to whom?
>>
>> To the objective and unbiased observer, who can demonstrate
>> it to another objective and unbiased observer.
>
>Are there such people?
Probably only ideally, but the point is still valid and
serves to describe the process.
> I'd say rather observers acting in good faith.
That, too, but unfortunately good faith, while necessary, is
insufficient. Most religious fundies, for example, act in
good faith; "good faith" only means the person is not
consciously dishonest.
>No pun intended.
Unintended, but unavoidable. ;-)
This is untrue as well. The judge doesn't need to make a "value judgment." He
needs to evaluate the claims of the defendants. It's their claim that IDiocy is
science. According to the rules that science uses. Right now and right here.
The reason they made this claim is easy to understand from the point of view of
the law: if they can convince the judge that IDiocy is science, then they have
sailed into a legal safe harbor.
But they didn't make it. To continue the nautical metaphor ad nauseam, a squall
of reason, evidence, and logic sank their little venture.
> You are the one who is "caught" in a deception, not Dembski.
What do you see as a "deception"? What sunk Dembski was his honesty -- he is
forthright about the fact IDiocy doesn't meet the current criteria by which
science operates. Now, maybe science should adopt new rules to accommodate new
fields, like IDiocy and alchemy, as testimony in support of the defendants at
Dover claimed. But that won't achieve the legal safe harbor.
> Moreover, the slow-witted Judge actually said that "methodological
> naturalism" *is* the scientific method. No doubt the glaring contradiction
> in this escapes you.
There is no contradiction, glaring or otherwise. The terms are equivalent. And
the judge didn't reach this conclusion on his own. Irony of ironies, he's
quoting Dembksi. It's the IDiots themselves who have declared that science
operates by methodological naturalism. For the purposes of Dover, this is
called an admission against interest.
> And the headlines read "democrat control of congress *is* the american
> political system".
This reasoning is confused beyond understanding. The defendants claim at Dover
was that IDiocy was science under the current rules of science. Let's pick a
better analogy. If your tax return is postmarked by the due date (usually April
15), then you may claim timely filing. This is a safe harbor against an IRS
charge of late filing. If your return is postmarked the day after, you're free
to argue that the deadline should be different or that you have some other valid
reason why your return isn't late. But the postmark rule won't shield you.
A similar thing happened at Dover. The IDiots failed to make the case that
IDiocy is science by the rules science uses. That was their goal; that was
their claim. And the judge noted that the claim was wrong.
> Now, Judge Jones may perhaps be excused for hifearful self-deception,
> since he was at the mercy of those on the anti-ID side who, although they
> are tenth-rate scientists, are experts at threating dissenters with public
> ridicule.
This reminds me of the Monty Python sketch in which a man tells an interviewer
why everyone was terrified of the gangster Doug Dinsdale: "He used sarcasm. He
knew all the tricks -- dramatic irony, metaphor, bathos, puns, parody, litotes
and satire."
Are you kidding me? Federal judges are kings in their courtrooms and sit for
life. They don't care about "public ridicule." This is more creationist
projection. It's the IDiots who fear public ridicule and for good reason.
> What's your excuse?
For what? I've read the judge's opinion; I've read much of the testimony at
trial; I understand the law.
Try to follow along: the IDiots didn't have to show that IDiocy was science.
All they really had to show was that IDiocy wasn't religion. After all, the
federal government doesn't require that a public school teach science in science
class. The school can teach Icelandic sagas instead. That might get them into
trouble with the PTA, the school board, or accrediting agencies, but it wouldn't
be a federal issue. But the school can't teach religion as dogma in science
class (or anywhere else). When dragged into court in a First Amendment case, a
surefire way for the school to win is to demonstrate that what they teach in
science class is science. Perforce it can't be religion.
And a surefire way to demonstrate that what they teach is science is show that
scientists agree that what they're teaching is science. *That's* what the
IDiots at Dover tried and failed to do.
I'll note in passing, that the plaintiffs in Dover also showed that IDiocy is
religion.
>
>"Bob Casanova" <nos...@buzz.off> wrote in message
>news:5r7rd650gv7i79mk7...@4ax.com...
>> On Fri, 12 Nov 2010 08:28:59 -0700, the following appeared
>> in talk.origins, posted by "Kalkidas" <e...@joes.pub>:
>>
>>>
>>>"Ernest Major" <{$to$}@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>>>news:0vUJwcjq...@meden.invalid...
>>>> In message <ibharu$n0q$1...@news.eternal-september.org>, Kalkidas
>>>> <e...@joes.pub> writes
>>>>>I wonder if a basic definition of "naturalism" can be made which
>>>>>
>>>>>(1) positive, i.e. doesn't define it as what it is *not*.
>>>>>(2) isn't a truism, i.e. merely using synonyms of "natural".
>>>>>(3) isn't circular, i.e. defining "natural" as "pertaining to nature",
>>>>>leaving "nature" undefined.
>>>>>
>>>> Methodological naturalism consists of working under the provisional
>>>> assumption that evidence means something.
>>>
>>>"Means something" to whom?
>>
>> To the objective and unbiased observer, who can demonstrate
>> it to another objective and unbiased observer.
>
>Adding all those loaded terms isn't going to help.
IOW, you couldn't see a way to twist this into something you
could attack on its merits and decided to shotgun a charge
of some sort of conspiracy. OK, I'm used to that sort of
behavior from some who post here; Ray is a good example.
But I'm curious; just how are "objective" and "unbiased"
loaded terms? Is "demonstrate" included in that accusation?
We're in the process of discovering that now with his
multiple "backspaceisms". So far we haven't found any
limits.
>
>"Burkhard" <b.sc...@ed.ac.uk> wrote in message
>news:84e7b537-5d4b-4b61...@i41g2000vbn.googlegroups.com...
>> On Nov 13, 6:45 pm, "Kalkidas" <e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>>> "Burkhard" <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote in message
>>>
>>> news:00709c4c-8ac2-44f8...@s9g2000vby.googlegroups.com...
...
The defense did not screw up, except to the extent that they conned a
school district into breaking the law. Science is methodological
naturalism. Your objection to that is meaningless and dishonest. No one
here is going to be misled by the lies you spew.
>But Dembski had nothing to do with it. His words were misinterpreted, most
>likely deliberately.
>
Dembski had a lot to do with the case, he just knew when it was time to
run. He ran away from the case because he knew without question that
his presentation was dishonest and that he was going to be nailed. He
does not get to plead ignorance, so it will be clear to all who try to
think that his presentations about ID were completely dishonest.
You still misunderstand the ruling and its logic. If they had,
hypothetically, proposed a different definition of
science that permits religious ideas, science would not be any longer
the "secular justification"
that you need for a 1. Amendment exception .
The decision is not about: what is science?
The decision is about if is there a secular justification for a
prima facie religious doctrine .- which could be science, but science
as practised.
You demonstrate a complete misunderstanding of how the law works.
The judge must evaluate the relevant claims put forth by both sides in a suit.
He's not asked and doesn't decide what "should be." He relies on the evidence
provided by both sides, including the testimony of expert witnesses, to decide
what actually obtains.
The defendants in Kitzmiller v Dover chose to make the claim that IDiocy was
science as commonly understood. If that legal strategy had prevailed, then
IDiocy would have been proof (at least in that district in western Pennsylvania)
against the charge that it was (disallowed) religion.
Another legal strategy would have been to show that IDiocy was science under an
expanded definition of science, a definition that still excluded religion. The
defendants didn't choose to make that argument. Which, by the way, would have
failed, as the plaintiffs were able to show that IDiocy was nothing more than
slightly dressed-up creationism, which the courts have already decided is
religion.
I don't follow the first part of your description. The "justification" of the
defendants would defeat the claim of a prima facie violation of the First
Amendment. But the rest of your description is sound: in response to the
plaintiff's case that IDiocy is religion, the defendants claimed they could show
the contrary, that IDiocy was science (that being what scientists actually do
when they're working). They couldn't do that by a preponderance of the
evidence, so their argument failed and the plaintiffs' thereby succeeded.
An alternate legal strategy would have been to posit an expanded definition of
science could encompass IDiocy without also encompassing religion. But that
wouldn't have been sufficient. They would also have had to defeat the
plaintiff's strong case that IDiocy was really gussied up creationism, already
adjudicated to be religion.
Judging by Dembski's subsequent writings about Judge Jones it would be
more accurate to replaced the "anti" with a "pro". (And change the first
phrase to "praised for his courageous stand".)
--
alias Ernest Major
Yes. Thanks for noting that. I believe that Dembski ended up hurting the Dover
defendants in absentia through the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert witness,
Barbara Forrest.
> Behe is reported to have conceded that a definition of science which
> encompassed ID would also encompass astrology.
Oops! I said "alchemy" in my previous post. Astrology was the pseudoscience
that the Dover defendants ended up endorsing as science.
Here's the exchange, courtesy of the talk.origins faqs:
<quote>
Q And using your definition, intelligent design is a scientific theory, correct?
A Yes.
Q Under that same definition astrology is a scientific theory under your
definition, correct?
A Under my definition, a scientific theory is a proposed explanation which
focuses or points to physical, observable data and logical inferences. There are
many things throughout the history of science which we now think to be incorrect
which nonetheless would fit that -- which would fit that definition. Yes,
astrology is in fact one, and so is the ether theory of the propagation of
light, and many other -- many other theories as well.
</quote>
Behe tried to dodge the issue by claiming that under his definition astrology
used to be a scientific theory but isn't now, leading to the following amusing
exchange
<quote>
Q I did not take your deposition in the 1500s, correct?
A It seems like that.
Q Okay. It seem like that since we started yesterday. But could you turn to
page 132 of your deposition?
</quote>
Whereupon it turns out that Behe had testified that astrology is (present tense)
a scientific theory under his definition.
Dembski's reported words on the subject were "... my aim was to render
Judge Jones and his decision ridiculous in the eyes of many young
people, who from here on will never take Darwinian evolution or him
seriously"
--
alias Ernest Major
By "good faith" I mean not lying about what's observed. Most fundies may
deny the obvious conclusions in good faith, but they can make perfectly fine
"observers" if they don't salt the coal seams with 21st century artifacts.
<snip/>
I'm still waiting for someone to tell me what the "nature" in "naturalism"
refers to. That was, after all, the topic of this thread. No answers so far.
So as soon as I get clarification, I'll be happy to discuss with you.....
I don't misunderstand the decision. In the course of giving his decision,
Judge Jones declared that the scientific method is the same thing as
methodological naturalism. That is simply false, regardless of the
"decision".
Not sure where you see a first part? To the extend there is one, it
is simply stating that
a prima facie violation took place. The science issue falls under the
header of "secular justification" as an exception of the general rule.
I suppose one could reconstruct the decision also as a claim that ID
is just science, with no religious implications at all, but that seems
to me not what was argued.
>The "justification" of the
> defendants would defeat the claim of a prima facie violation of the First
> Amendment. But the rest of your description is sound: in response to the
> plaintiff's case that IDiocy is religion, the defendants claimed they could show
> the contrary, that IDiocy was science (that being what scientists actually do
> when they're working). They couldn't do that by a preponderance of the
> evidence, so their argument failed and the plaintiffs' thereby succeeded.
>
> An alternate legal strategy would have been to posit an expanded definition of
> science could encompass IDiocy without also encompassing religion. But that
> wouldn't have been sufficient. They would also have had to defeat the
> plaintiff's strong case that IDiocy was really gussied up creationism, already
> adjudicated to be religion.
If I had been in charge of the defence (;o)) I would have pushed an
obviously secular form of ID like directed panspermia, and nailed my
flag to the entirely natural super intelligent alien
But my clients might have objected against that strategy...
Well ridicule is the number one weapon in the Darwinists' arsenal. Why
complain if it's used by the other side?
Yes, you have. Easy to do, since it's fairly obvious you haven't read it.
> In the course of giving his decision,
> Judge Jones declared that the scientific method is the same thing as
> methodological naturalism.
In the course of giving any decision as the trier of fact, a judge makes his
decision based on the evidence presented. Judge Jones isn't declaring that in
his independent belief, the scientific method is the same as methodological
naturalism. He's noting that's what the evidence says. If you'd read the
decision, you'd know that the judge actually mentions the source for this
evidence. And one of the sources is Dembski. All the evidence at trial is that
methodological naturalism is pretty much what science is all about.
> That is simply false, regardless of the "decision".
Please make a case that this is actually false. So far you've just claimed it.
I'm only asking for the amusement value here, because for the purposes of
Kitzmiller v Dover, the claim was easily supported by a preponderance of the
evidence, and that's the way the truth is determined in civil court. If the
IDiots in Dover wanted to show daylight between science and methodological
naturalism, then they should have presented some convincing evidence,
dontchathink?
They didn't, and their decision was a deliberate part of their (failed) legal
strategy. Your argument really isn't with the judge, who had no choice but to
rule on the evidence. Your argument is with the IDiot defendants.
>>> But Dembski had nothing to do with it. His words were misinterpreted,
>>> most likely deliberately.
Could you elaborate on this misinterpretation?
> "Ernest Major" <{$to$}@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
> news:orXOBALn...@meden.invalid...
>> In message <09229B73-5389-4C25-BD2C-C90009D289AB%a...@b.com>, deadrat
>> <a...@b.com> writes
>>>"Kalkidas" <e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>>>
>>>> "Ernest Major" <{$to$}@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>>>> news:0vUJwcjq...@meden.invalid...
>>>>> In message <ibharu$n0q$1...@news.eternal-september.org>, Kalkidas
>>>>> <e...@joes.pub> writes
>>>>>>I wonder if a basic definition of "naturalism" can be made which
>>>>>>
>>>>>>(1) positive, i.e. doesn't define it as what it is *not*. (2) isn't a
>>>>>>truism, i.e. merely using synonyms of "natural". (3) isn't circular,
>>>>>>i.e. defining "natural" as "pertaining to nature", leaving "nature"
>>>>>>undefined.
>>>>>>
>>>>> Methodological naturalism consists of working under the provisional
>>>>> assumption that evidence means something.
>>>>
>>>> "Means something" to whom?
>>>
>>>To the people who understand the means of examining the evidence.
>>>
>> I meant something more abstract. Asking "whom?" misses the point.
>>
>> A less vernacular way of stating it is that methodological naturalism
>> consists of working under the provisional assumption that the universe
>> behaves, at least statistically, in a regular manner.
>
> Which universe?
Yes, that one.
--
Mark Isaak eciton (at) earthlink (dot) net
"It is certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural
honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most
pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems." - D. Hume
In your court, Brave Sir Robin.
Our chief weapon is ridicule. Evidence and ridicule; ridicule and evidence.
Our two weapons are ridicule and evidence and logic. Our *three* weapons are
ridicule, evidence, and logic, and an almost fanatical devotion to testing.
Our *four* .... No. Amongst our weapons.... Amongst our weaponry are such
elements as ridicule, evidence, ....
I'll come in again.
> Why complain if it's used by the other side?
No one's complaining. Just noting the irony that the only real threat of
ridicule against the judge came from Dembski, and not, as you claimed, from
people who support and understand science.
I wonder how Judge Jones is holding up under the assault.
As I've asked you that question several times and never received an
answer, I'll look forward to your discussion.
RLC
If I didn't know your past history I would suspect that you were trying
to lead into an argument that religion is useless as a tool for
understanding.
--
alias Ernest Major
Well, Judge Jones cited: " Methodological naturalism is a "ground rule" of
science today which requires scientists to seek explanations in the world
around us based
upon what we can observe, test, replicate, and verify. (1:59-64, 2:41-43
(Miller);"
Of course, it isn't clear what "the world around us" really means, or how an
explanation could be found "in" it.
I have no problem understanding what "the world around us" means.
What part do you not understand?
> or how an
> explanation could be found "in" it.
How are you going to find any answers *outside* of it?
Boikat
It seems pretty clear to me, regardless of whether it's exactly
definable or comprehensively describable. It's certainly clear enough
to the overwhelming majority of living beings that the pursuit of a
life lived in it ("the world around us") rewards apt observations and
punishes poor ones fairly predictably.
I really don't understand your perspective. Can you give me an
explanation of why you think as you do (one that doesn't require
reference to scripture or articles of faith)?
RLC