On Nov 30, 3:53 am, Ray Martinez <
pyramid...@yahoo.com> wrote:
<snip>
>
> > You really should try to read "The Natural History
> > of Religion" or "An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals." You
> > won't agree with them, but they're written very clearly.
.
>
> The spelling, vocabulary, sentence structure and style (of Hume) is a
> far cry from the spelling, vocabulary, sentence structure and style of
> modern commentators. This point is true whether you admit or not.
Well, here's the introduction from Hume's "Natural History of
Religion."
"As every enquiry, which regards religion, is of the utmost
importance, there are two questions in particular, which challenge
our attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and
that concerning its origin in human nature. Happily, the first
question, which is the most important, admits of the most obvious,
at least, the clearest solution. The whole frame of nature bespeaks
an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious
reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary
principles of genuine Theism and Religion. But the other question,
concerning the origin of religion in human nature, is exposed to
some more difficulty. The belief of invisible, intelligent power has
been very generally diffused over the human race, in all places and
in all ages; but it has neither perhaps been so universal as to
admit of no exception, nor has it been, in any degree, uniform in
the ideas, which it has suggested. Some nations have been
discovered, who entertained no sentiments of Religion, if travellers
and historians may be credited; and no two nations, and scarce any
two men, have ever agreed precisely in the same sentiments. It would
appear, therefore, that this preconception springs not from an
original instinct or primary impression of nature, such as gives
rise to self-love, affection between the sexes, love of progeny,
gratitude, resentment; since every instinct of this kind has been
found absolutely universal in all nations and ages, and has always a
precise determinate object, which it inflexibly pursues. The first
religious principles must be secondary; such as may easily be
perverted by various accidents and causes, and whose operation too,
in some cases, may, by an extraordinary concurrence of
circumstances, be altogether prevented. What those principles are,
which give rise to the original belief, and what those accidents and
causes are, which direct its operation, is the subject of our
present enquiry."
It doesn't read like something you'd see on MTV, but it's not terribly
hard to understand, is it?
Now, here is a section from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
containing modern commentary on Hume:
"Now as concerns the argument, its conclusion is that in induction
(causal inference) experience does not produce the idea of an effect
from an impression of its cause by means of the understanding or
reason, but by the imagination, by “a certain association and relation
of perceptions.” The center of the argument is a dilemma: If inductive
conclusions were produced by the understanding, inductive reasoning
would be based upon the premise that nature is uniform; “that
instances of which we have had no experience, must resemble those of
which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues
always uniformly the same.” (Hume THN, 89) And were this premise to be
established by reasoning, that reasoning would be either deductive or
probabilistic (i.e. causal). The principle can't be proved
deductively, for whatever can be proved deductively is a necessary
truth, and the principle is not necessary; its antecedent is
consistent with the denial of its consequent. Nor can the principle be
proved by causal reasoning, for it is presupposed by all such
reasoning and any such proof would be a petitio principii.
The normative component of Hume's project is striking here: That the
principle of uniformity of nature cannot be proved deductively or
inductively shows that it is not the principle that drives our causal
reasoning only if our causal reasoning is sound and leads to true
conclusions as a “natural effect” of belief in true premises. This is
what licenses the capsule description of the argument as showing that
induction cannot be justified or licensed either deductively or
inductively; not deductively because (non-trivial) inductions do not
express logically necessary connections, not inductively because that
would be circular. If, however, causal reasoning were fallacious, the
principle of the uniformity of nature might well be among its
principles."
I don't think it's much of a stretch to claim that the text Hume wrote
himself is somewhat clearer than the commentary. Hume is certainly no
harder to read than the modern commentary.
.
>
> > >And I still
> > > can't figure out why Tony has you over a barrel concerning induction?
>
> > Tony has me over a barrel concerning induction in the same we he has
> > you over a barrel concerning geocentrism. In other words, not in the
> > least.
>
> That's the first time I ever heard you defend yourself. Could you tell
> me as to why Tony thinks otherwise, what exactly is he on about?
I went many rounds with Tony over induction. He misunderstands Hume.
You can find his arguments and mine through Google Groups, if you
like. Your time would be better spent reading Hume.