Re: We Robot
someone2
> On Oct 6, 5:57 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
>
>
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> > On 6 Oct, 06:25, SortingItOut <eri...@home.com> wrote:
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> > > On Oct 5, 2:12 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
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> > > > On 4 Oct, 07:47, SortingItOut <eri...@home.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > On Oct 3, 12:35 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
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> > > > > > On 3 Oct, 17:56, SortingItOut <eri...@home.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > On Oct 2, 10:11 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
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> > > > > > > > On 3 Oct, 03:15, Ymir <inva...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > > In article
> > > > > > > > > <77441867-2b71-40c8-9fe0-55bd8508f...@l76g2000hse.googlegroups.com>,
>
> > > > > > > > > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > On 2 Oct, 11:29, Ymir <inva...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > In article
> > > > > > > > > > > <a7529b55-2ac2-44ba-b1f2-65f6bd8dd...@m74g2000hsh.googlegroups.com>,
>
> > > > > > > > > > > someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > > On 1 Oct, 09:02, Ymir <inva...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > > > In article
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <03d7bc0a-63bf-4c20-87cc-00f2ecab9...@d45g2000hsc.googlegroups.com>,
>
> > > > > <snip>
>
> > > > > > > > Are you ok with that? If you are we can continue, and see why the
> > > > > > > > different theories which assume that something that consciously
> > > > > > > > experienced can have its behaviour described by the same laws of
> > > > > > > > physics as something that wasn't, can not be scientifically
> > > > > > > > distinguished.
>
> > > > > > > Why is that? If all of the theories involve only the physical, and
> > > > > > > the robot involves only the physical, then the robot can be studied
> > > > > > > and understood completely, and all theories that don't match reality
> > > > > > > can be eliminated.
>
> > > > > > > Whether or not we are capable of this investigation today is
> > > > > > > irrelevant. Maybe we need some new technology. Maybe we need some
> > > > > > > new insight. I don't know. But in principle, or by definition it
> > > > > > > seems, this can be done within the bounds of physicalism. I don't see
> > > > > > > any barrier to making this performing this investigation and making
> > > > > > > this determination. If you can be more specific as to why you think
> > > > > > > this can't be done, that would help a lot.
>
> > > > > > > > So to demand acceptance of one such theory and forbid
> > > > > > > > others would be nothing more than dogma with no scientific backing.
> > > > > > > > Once you aren't blinkered by dogma, and can consider other theories,
> > > > > > > > you'll notice the that all theories in this group have the same
> > > > > > > > expected behaviour,
>
> > > > > > > But they will have different *causes* of their behavior, and that's
> > > > > > > what can be investigated.> regardless of whether the build is being theorised
> > > > > > > > to be consciously experiencing or not. Nor do any of them have a
> > > > > > > > different expected behaviour with regards to the null hypothesis to
> > > > > > > > their theory regarding whether something is consciously experiencing.
>
> > > > > > > > Also try to understand what we are investigating here are the
> > > > > > > > implications of an assumption that something that consciously
> > > > > > > > experienced can have its behaviour described by the same laws of
> > > > > > > > physics as something that wasn't. I reject that assumption and its
> > > > > > > > implications as implausible precisely because it's obvious what we
> > > > > > > > consciously experience influences our behaviour. Why would we be
> > > > > > > > considering whether a robot consciously experiences if not for being
> > > > > > > > influenced by the reality of our own conscious experiences.
>
> > > > > > The theories are only differing in regards as to what it is about
> > > > > > certain physical activity that causes some to be consciously
> > > > > > experienced but not others. How are you suggesting that it could be
> > > > > > established which theory was correct if they all expect something that
> > > > > > consciously experiences to follow the same laws of physics as
> > > > > > something that doesn't. Think about it, for a robot, one theory might
> > > > > > claim that since what they theorise to be the required physical
> > > > > > activity for something to consciously experience isn't happening, that
> > > > > > the robot isn't consciously experiencing. Supporters of another theory
> > > > > > can claim that as what they theorise to be the required physical
> > > > > > activity for something to consciously experience is happening, that
> > > > > > the robot is consciously experiencing. There is no difference in
> > > > > > expected behaviour for the robot though, both theories simply expect
> > > > > > it to follow the laws of physics.
>
> > > > > Remember, this is physicalism. There's nothing magical or mysterious
> > > > > about consciousness. With physicalism, there's no barrier to a
> > > > > complete understanding of consciousness. If both theories you mention
> > > > > above are both referring to the exact same robot, the issue is
> > > > > resolved by investigating the mechanism and determining exactly what
> > > > > is causing the behavior. Either A) consciousness is an integral part
> > > > > of the mechanism where sensory input or internal triggers result in
> > > > > behavior (and the mechanism follows the laws of physics), or B)
> > > > > consciousness is *not* part of the mechanism (and the mechanism
> > > > > follows the laws of physics). I don't see why you think this
> > > > > determination is not possible.
>
> > > > I don't think you are undestanding the issue. Consider that there may
> > > > be different theories about what is responsible for some physical
> > > > activity consciously experiencing and not others. One theory might
> > > > suggest that organic chemistry is responsible for example, and
> > > > therefore theorise that the robot isn't consciously experiencing for
> > > > example. Another theory may suggest that the chemical composition is
> > > > irrelevant it is the function of the physical activity that is
> > > > important. Now, there is one robot, it behaves like a human, but is
> > > > not made of organic chemicals, the different theories have different
> > > > opinions about whether it is consciously experiencing or not, how can
> > > > they determine which theory is correct, when neither suggests that the
> > > > build would do anything other than follow the laws of physics.
>
> > > How, you ask? By investigating the mechanism. In a physicalist
> > > world, a conscious robot will follow the same laws of physics that a
> > > non-conscious robot will. Consciousness is as integral a part of the
> > > mechanism between inputs and outputs as the transmission in a car.
> > > Consciousness has outputs that can be detected and measured (someday,
> > > in this physicalist world). There will be parts of the mechanism that
> > > are only driven by consciousness.
>
> > > You seem to think this investigation is not possible, today or
> > > ever...not even in principle. For you to think that, you must be
> > > making a certain assumption about consciousness, one that may not be
> > > valid for physicalism. Can you clarify this assumption for us?
>
> > The paper investigates the assumption that something that is
> > consciously experiencing can have it's behaviour described in the same
> > terms of physics as something which isn't conscously experiencing.
>
> Okay.
>
>
>
> > I don't think you are undestanding the issue. Consider that there may
> > be different suggestions about what is responsible for some physical
> > activity consciously experiencing and not others. One suggestion might
> > be that organic chemistry is responsible for example. Another
> > suggestion may be that the chemical composition is irrelevant it is
> > the function of the physical activity that is important. Now, there is
> > one robot, it behaves like a human, but is not made of organic
> > chemicals. The first suggestion would be that it isn't consciously
> > experiencing, whereas the second might be that it is. How can they
> > determine which theory is correct, when neither suggests that the
> > build would do anything other than follow the laws of physics?
>
> You stated in your paper (in your original post):
> "It should be highlighted that the theories put
> forward here aren't individually important."
>
> I agree. The specifics of the speculations don't matter. But we
> don't have to live with speculations forever, anyway. With
> physicalism, consciousness can be studied and completely understood.
> Once that happens, any mechanism can be studied to determine whether
> or not it is conscious. Both conscious and non-conscious mechanisms
> follow the laws of physics.
>
> I've answered your question: Investigate the mechanism.
>
> Now please tell me why you think this is not possible within the
> constraints of physicalism. What is it about consciousness that puts
> it beyond investigation?
>
So they investigate the mechanism. How can they determine which theory
is correct (between the two I gave mentioned in my last response),
when neither suggests that the build would do anything other than
follow the laws of physics?
Kermit
*You have to tell us what they are looking for; it's your thought
experiment. Note that if they have two different thwopries, then there
must be different observable consequences. Tell us what they are
looking for, and then tell us what they find (e.g., one thinks the
build is sufficient for a robot that can pass the Turing test; the
other thinks the build will not lead to that behavior.)
Physicalists know that everything follows the laws of physics. What do
you know of that does not? Asserting over and over that these builds
"merely" follow the laws of physics does not contribute anything
except obscurity. Is that your goal?
How can goats and sports car be significantly different, since they
both follow the laws of physics?
Kermit
someone2
> On Oct 7, 2:04 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
> > On 7 Oct, 06:25, SortingItOut <eri...@home.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Oct 6, 5:57 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
You suggest that I should tell you where they should be looking to
distinguish between their speculations, yet I have repeatedly pointed
out that if it was assumed that something that consciously experienced
followed the same laws of physics as something something that didn't
there would be no scientific means of distinguishing between the
speculations. If the assumption was correct, the difference in
behaviour between a goat and a sports car would be explainable by the
differences in build. Regarding the robot, *given the build*, any
speculation that it was consciously experiencing would be expecting
the same behaviour as speculations that it wasn't consciously
experiencing. People seem to be contesting this, so I am asking,
where, given the build, would the difference in expected behaviour be?
This clearly isn't suggesting that the build could in reality be
either consciously experiencing or not, clearly it would be on or the
other. It is clearly a question about distinguishing between the
different speculations about whether in reality it is consciously
experiencing or not.
Inez
Why not? Everything follows the same laws of physics, and we can
distinguish between them. Why don't you explain what you mean by
"following the laws of physics?"
> If the assumption was correct, the difference in
> behaviour between a goat and a sports car would be explainable by the
> differences in build.
But you just now got done saying that if they follow the same laws of
physics they are indistinguishable. Now all of a sudden build is
important.
> Regarding the robot, *given the build*, any
> speculation that it was consciously experiencing would be expecting
> the same behaviour as speculations that it wasn't consciously
> experiencing. People seem to be contesting this, so I am asking,
> where, given the build, would the difference in expected behaviour be?
There can't be a difference, because in order for there to be a
difference there has to be two things that are compared. There is
only one prediction, and it's not based on consciousness, it's based
on build. There is no link between consciousness and behavior. There
are no expectations for any value of consciousness. The expectations
are only of the build.
For that matter, as far as I can see there aren't any predictions at
all. All anyone is doing is explaining what the robot is doing, no
one is predicting the future.
> This clearly isn't suggesting that the build could in reality be
> either consciously experiencing or not, clearly it would be on or the
> other. It is clearly a question about distinguishing between the
> different speculations about whether in reality it is consciously
> experiencing or not.
But these speculations don't generate any predictions or
expectations. They basically just come down to "I don't know how
consciousness affects behavior." And in the end, when the actual
status of the robot is revealed, it turns out that only one of the
speculations is correct, and the other can now be seen to predict
different behavior, since it must be attached to a different robot.
SortingItOut
In the same manner that a goat and a sports car have different builds,
a conscious robot and a non-conscious robot will have different
builds. Once consciousness is understood, the build can be
investigated to see which type of build it is, and therefore determine
which speculation is correct.
> Regarding the robot, *given the build*, any
> speculation that it was consciously experiencing would be expecting
> the same behaviour as speculations that it wasn't consciously
> experiencing. People seem to be contesting this, so I am asking,
> where, given the build, would the difference in expected behaviour be?
Internally.
Two different cars may externally behave in a similar manner but have
different kinds of engines. You determine which type it is by looking
under the hood. Same with the robot.
> This clearly isn't suggesting that the build could in reality be
> either consciously experiencing or not, clearly it would be on or the
> other. It is clearly a question about distinguishing between the
> different speculations about whether in reality it is consciously
> experiencing or not.
Look at the internal mechanism to determine whether it is consciously
experiencing.
someone2
How can they determine by looking at the mechanism whether it is
consciously experiencing or not, when some might suggest that
conscious experiences are linked to organic chemistry, whereas others
might speculate that the chemical composition is irrelevant it is the
function of the physical activity that is important. Unless there is a
way of distinguishing which speculation was correct, then there can be
no evidence for either speculation, and no way of determining whether
the robot is consciously experiencing or not by looking at the
mechanism.
Inez
Some might suggest that a car cannot drive unless it is made of
organic chemicals, but they would be buffoons. Presumably if you
understand the mechanism you knwo what it is doing.
> Unless there is a
> way of distinguishing which speculation was correct, then there can be
> no evidence for either speculation, and no way of determining whether
> the robot is consciously experiencing or not by looking at the
> mechanism.
Do your hypothetical people understand the mechanism or don't they?
Kermit
They are not different scientific theories if they do not predict
different observable behavior.
> If the assumption was correct, the difference in
> behaviour between a goat and a sports car would be explainable by the
> differences in build.
Correct.
> Regarding the robot, *given the build*, any
> speculation that it was consciously experiencing would be expecting
> the same behaviour as speculations that it wasn't consciously
> experiencing.
No, when the build is complex we don't know what the behavior will be
ahead of time.
*That is what they are disagreeing with - not whether or not it is
conscious, but how it will behave. They may believe that consciousness
will determine its behavior, but if the question of the robot's
consciousness is not yet decided (because they haven't turned it on
yet), then they do *not know it's behavior.
An example of not knowing the behavior of a build with a *high degree
of confidence:
The Wright Brothers first few attempts at airplanes. Whether it flies
or not was not something they were sure of ahead of time. But whether
it flies or not is *the* determining factor in its behavior.
A possibly conscious robot would be even more complicated, and we
would not know whether or not it would be conscious until we turn it
on. Of course whether it is conscious or not depends on its build, but
we cannot be sure that we get it right until we try it.
> People seem to be contesting this, so I am asking,
> where, given the build, would the difference in expected behaviour be?
You may as well ask Orville and Wilbur before they fly their first
aircraft "What will the behavior of this build be? And how could you
possibly know whether or not it is flying?"
> This clearly isn't suggesting that the build could in reality be
> either consciously experiencing or not, clearly it would be on or the
> other. It is clearly a question about distinguishing between the
> different speculations about whether in reality it is consciously
> experiencing or not.
Since those of us who are paying attention know that consciousness
determines our behavior within the constraints of the body, we have to
turn on the robot to see if theory A or theory B is correct (or
possibly neither). This assumes that both theorists agree on a
definition of consciousness - don't conflate disagreement about
predicted behavior with a semantic disagreement.
Kermit
Kermit
they are not different theories. Given the build, and two different
predictions of observable behavior, only one at most can be correct.
We will never know whether the robot brain perceives the world in a
way we call conscious. I'm not sure that's a meaningful question. If
a robot can pass the Turing test, can tell bad puns at the right time,
gets cranky, and appreciates sunsets, I will treat it as though it's
conscious.
Same goes for aliens that fly in to visit in their spaceships.
Humans I assume have a consciousness essentially the same as mine
because it arises in a similar brain. Of course, you don't believe
that, so I don't know why you assume other humans are conscious.
Kermit
SortingItOut
Speculations are irrelevant.
I don't think you're really looking at this from a physicalist
perspective. Once consciousness is understood, then we will be armed
with all the information necessary to determine whether any given
mechanism is operating in a conscious manner.
Given a specific power plant, some may speculate that it's a nuclear
power plant and some may speculate that it's not. But we have the
information necessary to determine whether or not it is.
Given a specific computer, some may speculate that it's capable of
10^20 operations per second, and some may say no. But we have the
knowledge to determine which is the case.
It's no different with consciousness. It *seems* to you that
consciousness is a special case, but that's only because we can't
explain consciousness yet. Your argument depends on that big hole in
our knowledge. But, under physicalism, there's no reason to think
that consciousness cannot be understood to the same level as any other
physical process.
Now, physicalism *may* prove to be the incorrect model. Maybe
consciousness actually has a spritual component, or whatever. But
that's beside the point. The issue is whether physicalism is
plausible. Your repeated questions require that we know how
consciousness works in order to give you the kind of answer you're
looking for. We don't understand consciousness to that level. But
that's beside the point too.
To support your claim, you need to provide the reason that, under
physicalism, consciousness cannot be fully understood. What is the
barrier to that knowledge?
someone2
Well how could they distinguish between the speculations. If they
can't how can they make any further progress.
someone2
So you are relying on the complexity of the build in practise
preventing prediction of behaviour. So let us just talk in principle,
for example in the sense that the robot could be modelled on a
computer in some future time, and the computer could be used to
predict the behaviour of the robot, given it's build.
Now back to the suggested differences, they aren't semantic
disagreements, one group is suggesting that it won't be consciously
experiencing, as conscious experiences are linked to organic
chemistry, and the other group is suggesting that the conscious
experiences are linked to function rather than chemical composition.
The both agree what they mean by consciously experiencing. They mean
that it would be like something to be the robot. The functionalists
might even offer suggestions of what they think it would be like.
Those considering conscious experiences to be linked to organic
chemistry are suggesting that it wouldn't be like anything to be the
robot, there wouldn't be any sensations at all. They are disputing a
difference in reality. They both rely on the assumption that something
that consciously experiences follows the laws of physics can have its
behaviour described in the same terms of physics as something that
doesn't. Do you agree that given that assumption there would be no way
to distinguish between the two speculations.
Inez
But they both agree on exactly what the robot is doing, they just
don't agree on whether or not it should be called "consciousness."
> The both agree what they mean by consciously experiencing.
Then if they know what the robot is doing, they shouldn't have a
disagreement on whether the robot is conscious nor not.
>They mean
> that it would be like something to be the robot.
That is a not a useful definition, as has been pointed out to you over
and over.
Inez
> > To support your claim, you need to provide the reason that, under
> > physicalism, consciousness cannot be fully understood. What is the
> > barrier to that knowledge?
>
> Well how could they distinguish between the speculations. If they
> can't how can they make any further progress.
If consciousness can be fully understood and is physical, then they
*can* distinguish between speculations by examining the mechanism.
Kermit
I'm hardly relying on it - this is an observation of past situations
analogous to this.
> So let us just talk in principle,
> for example in the sense that the robot could be modelled on a
> computer in some future time, and the computer could be used to
> predict the behaviour of the robot, given it's build.
So... you're saying that we can come to conclusions with a high degree
of confidence, based on the blueprints?
OK.
>
> Now back to the suggested differences, they aren't semantic
> disagreements, one group is suggesting that it won't be consciously
> experiencing, as conscious experiences are linked to organic
> chemistry, and the other group is suggesting that the conscious
> experiences are linked to function rather than chemical composition.
This *is a semantic difference. Both can agree on its behavior, but
they are disagreeing on whether that behavior *means consciousness.
> The both agree what they mean by consciously experiencing. They mean
> that it would be like something to be the robot.
I haven't the foggiest idea what that means, and I have seen no
indication that you do, either.
> The functionalists
> might even offer suggestions of what they think it would be like.
But they both agree on how the machine is functioning. I don't see any
disagreement between them except in the meaning of "consciousness".
> Those considering conscious experiences to be linked to organic
> chemistry are suggesting that it wouldn't be like anything to be the
> robot, there wouldn't be any sensations at all. They are disputing a
> difference in reality. They both rely on the assumption that something
> that consciously experiences follows the laws of physics can have its
> behaviour described in the same terms of physics as something that
> doesn't.
1. All things follow the laws of physics. Now, if that's wrong, feel
free to offer evidence to the contrary. But that's the physicalist
view, and it's mine until I see persuasive contrary data. It's also
the view of your hypothetical theorists, remember?
2. Neither f them assumes that the behavior of something that is
conscious behaves like something that is not. Even a person who is
completely paralyzed (including eyeballs) has different observable
brain activity, depending on his state of consciousness.
> Do you agree that given that assumption there would be no way
> to distinguish between the two speculations.
No, for the reasons stated above.
Kermit
someone2
No they aren't both defining consciousness as a behaviour and
therefore having a semantic dispute. They both are in agreement on
what they mean by consciousness. By saying that something consciously
experiences they are saying that it would be like something to be that
thing. Now you are saying you don't know what that means. So we need
to address this first.
Have you ever heard of the philosophical zombie argument? If so, did
you understand what was being suggested?
Inez
> > > chemistry are suggesting that it wouldn't be like anything to be the
> > > robot, there wouldn't be any sensations at all. They are disputing a
> > > difference in reality. They both rely on the assumption that something
> > > that consciously experiences follows the laws of physics can have its
> > > behaviour described in the same terms of physics as something that
> > > doesn't.
>
> > 1. All things follow the laws of physics. Now, if that's wrong, feel
> > free to offer evidence to the contrary. But that's the physicalist
> > view, and it's mine until I see persuasive contrary data. It's also
> > the view of your hypothetical theorists, remember?
>
> > 2. Neither f them assumes that the behavior of something that is
> > conscious behaves like something that is not. Even a person who is
> > completely paralyzed (including eyeballs) has different observable
> > brain activity, depending on his state of consciousness.
>
> > > Do you agree that given that assumption there would be no way
> > > to distinguish between the two speculations.
>
> > No, for the reasons stated above.
>
> No they aren't both defining consciousness as a behaviour and
> therefore having a semantic dispute. They both are in agreement on
> what they mean by consciousness.
And curiously, they agree that it is a non-physical thing, despite the
fact that they are purportedly physicalists. Were they actual
physicalists they would agree that certain observable attributes of
the robot were consciousness. But since they are only faux-
physicalists, the argument continues.
Kermit
You have never answered my question: "what is the difference between
"conscious" and "consciously experiencing"?
See, I have the unshakable suspicion that you obscure your ideas by
throwing syllables at them. Can you help disabuse me of this notion?
>
> Have you ever heard of the philosophical zombie argument? If so, did
> you understand what was being suggested?
Yes, and I find it silly - like saying two airplanes are behaving
identically, but one of them isn't flying. I believe most physicalists
would find it untenable, or even incomprehensible. You can't use the
zombie argument to convince anyone who believes it to be impossible,
that they are wrong. It's an empty claim, and inconsistent with known
facts about the brain.
I can *imagine it. I can imagine that we are programs in a vast
computer simulation, and perhaps some of the people around us are
avatars for the "real" players. But I have no reason to think so, and
you cannot bring up such a scenario in a thought experiment (of sorts)
and convince me it's true.
Kermit
SortingItOut
What she said...
SortingItOut
I've answered your question. You can stop asking it now.
John Wilkins
It won't matter. No matter how many times you repeat this, our friend
(who I no longer see for this reason) will manage to ignore this point
and assert that, after all, there is something that makes a difference
that is not physical (which is question begging of course).
--
John S. Wilkins, Philosophy, University of Queensland
scienceblogs.com/evolvingthoughts
But al be that he was a philosophre,
Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
Inez
> SortingItOut <eri...@home.com> wrote:
> > On Oct 10, 8:45 am, Inez <savagemouse...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > To support your claim, you need to provide the reason that, under
> > > > > physicalism, consciousness cannot be fully understood. What is the
> > > > > barrier to that knowledge?
>
> > > > Well how could they distinguish between the speculations. If they
> > > > can't how can they make any further progress.
>
> > > If consciousness can be fully understood and is physical, then they
> > > *can* distinguish between speculations by examining the mechanism.
>
> > What she said...
Sadly, someone2 had decided to ignore me. I suppose he feels less
unmanned by being refuted by men. Of course, he still reads my posts,
since he refers to things I've written in posts to other people.
> It won't matter. No matter how many times you repeat this, our friend
> (who I no longer see for this reason) will manage to ignore this point
> and assert that, after all, there is something that makes a difference
> that is not physical (which is question begging of course).
> --
One is continually tempted to think that he is a robot that may or may
not be conscious. This item does seem to be engraved in his ROM and
cannot be overwritten.
Kermit
> On Oct 10, 10:07 pm, j.wilki...@uq.edu.au (John Wilkins) wrote:
>
> > SortingItOut <eri...@home.com> wrote:
> > > On Oct 10, 8:45 am, Inez <savagemouse...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > > To support your claim, you need to provide the reason that, under
> > > > > > physicalism, consciousness cannot be fully understood. What is the
> > > > > > barrier to that knowledge?
>
> > > > > Well how could they distinguish between the speculations. If they
> > > > > can't how can they make any further progress.
>
> > > > If consciousness can be fully understood and is physical, then they
> > > > *can* distinguish between speculations by examining the mechanism.
>
> > > What she said...
>
> Sadly, someone2 had decided to ignore me. I suppose he feels less
> unmanned by being refuted by men. Of course, he still reads my posts,
> since he refers to things I've written in posts to other people.
Of course even if he were to reply to you, he would still ignore you.
He would wonder why you didn't understand him, then patiently and
politely repeat himself.
>
> > It won't matter. No matter how many times you repeat this, our friend
> > (who I no longer see for this reason) will manage to ignore this point
> > and assert that, after all, there is something that makes a difference
> > that is not physical (which is question begging of course).
> > --
>
> One is continually tempted to think that he is a robot that may or may
> not be conscious. This item does seem to be engraved in his ROM and
> cannot be overwritten.
I have often considered the possibility. But while passing a good
Turing test is indicative of consciousness (I think), I am not sure
that failing one indicates a lack of consciousness. It certainly
brings the it to mind, however.
Kermit
someone2
You didn't answer it. You gave an example about how people could
distinguish about something being a nuclear power plant or not, or how
people could distinguish between speculations of how many cycles a
computer would do a second, then claimed consciousness was analogous.
If it is as you claim then point out how they could distinguish
between the two speculations. If you can see a way they could
distinguish, then say it, if you can't then say so, don't pretend you
can, when you can't.
someone2
For the purposes of this discussion you could consider that if
something is conscious that it means the same as saying that something
is consciously experiencing.
With a philosophical zombie you are being asked to imagine something
physically identical to a human yet without any conscious experiences.
It doesn't matter that you regard it an impossibility that there could
be something physically identical to a human, and yet not consciously
experiencing, because you believe that which identified by conscious
experiences is an identity of the neural state. If you are capable of
imagining it, then you know what is being referred to by conscious
experiences. As long as you recognise what is being identified, that
is all that is required for the converstation, and we can continue.
SortingItOut
Yes I did. Check the mechanism. Once consciousness is understood,
the mechanism gives all the information necessary to determine whether
or not the mechanism is conscious.
It is not my job to give a specific procedure. It is your job (based
on your initial claim) to show that what I've explained is not
plausible. If you have evidence that consciousness cannot be
understood to this level, please present it.
> You gave an example about how people could
> distinguish about something being a nuclear power plant or not, or how
> people could distinguish between speculations of how many cycles a
> computer would do a second, then claimed consciousness was analogous.
> If it is as you claim then point out how they could distinguish
> between the two speculations. If you can see a way they could
> distinguish, then say it,
I already did. Check the mechanism.
Kermit
Oh, good. I have been, but it's good to hear that you didn't mean
anything radically different from it.
>
> With a philosophical zombie you are being asked to imagine something
> physically identical to a human yet without any conscious experiences.
> It doesn't matter that you regard it an impossibility that there could
> be something physically identical to a human, and yet not consciously
> experiencing, because you believe that which identified by conscious
> experiences is an identity of the neural state. If you are capable of
> imagining it, then you know what is being referred to by conscious
> experiences. As long as you recognise what is being identified, that
> is all that is required for the converstation, and we can continue.
But I think zombies are impossible, as do (I believe) typical
physicalists. So you cannot imagine two physicalist theorists who
believe that a conscious and an non-conscious robots would have
identical behavior. One might expect the robot to be conscious when
turned on, and the other not conscious. But when turned on, at least
one of them would admit being wrong. If their disagreement is merely
semantical, then they do not have different theories. If their
definitions of conscious are essentially the same, then they would
expect different observable behavior, or they do not have different
theories.
I can imagine a Matrix-like VR illusion, too. But if it would not
produce any observable evidence, then there is no reason to believe we
are a virtual reality, and there cannot be any scientific theory about
it. So too for your "soul" - a consciousness that produces no
observable effects. This is quite heretical, BTW. Most theists believe
that cosnciousness controls the body, even if they also think it can
survive on its own in some ill-defined way.
Do *you feel like you inhabit your body, but you are not in charge of
its behavior?
Kermit
Inez
Someone2 actually believes that consciousness controls the body, but
that it must be in the form of a non-material soul in order to do so.
Why? Because of his zombie/robot argument.
Kermit
This doesn't make any sense, so that's a strong argument that you are
correct.
I thought I remembered him saying that he believed that consciousness
inhabited the bodies of humans, but our souls were entirely passive,
and our actions those of our base physical bodies. Perhaps I
misremember, and am confusing him with somebody else. It would help if
he answered our questions, and clarified his stance on various
issues.
Nonetheless, I apologize to you, someone, for any confusion I've
caused. Everything else stills stands, of course. The mind is a an
emergent characteristic of the body, and imagining people who think
otherwise doesn't establish anything.
Kermit
Inez
Well lord knows he might have changed since his last time here, but
that used to be his line.
> I thought I remembered him saying that he believed that consciousness
> inhabited the bodies of humans, but our souls were entirely passive,
> and our actions those of our base physical bodies. Perhaps I
> misremember, and am confusing him with somebody else. It would help if
> he answered our questions, and clarified his stance on various
> issues.
>
The problem is that it's hard to get to the point where he springs his
conclusion on you because the arguments to get there are such nonsense
that few people ever get past them. He requires that you
unequivically accept all his premises before he will pounce. Because
he cannot listen or respond to criticism his threads usually last
2,000 highly conserved posts before everyone gets tired and quits.
someone2
Well I'm asking you how you could distinguish between the
speculations. Your answer is once consciousness is understood, they
can check the mechanism. But as I said, how can their knowledge about
consciousness progress, without being able to distinguish between the
speculations. Which is why I am asking you how can they progress their
understanding of consciousness, without being able to distinguish
between the speculations?
someone2
As I said it doesn't matter that you think zombies are impossible. Do
you understand what the suggested difference is? (I presume you do,
otherwise why would you think that the suggested difference was
impossible)
Kermit
someone2 wrote:
> On 13 Oct, 18:15, Kermit <unrestrained_h...@hotmail.com> wrote:
<snip>
>
> As I said it doesn't matter that you think zombies are impossible. Do
> you understand what the suggested difference is? (I presume you do,
> otherwise why would you think that the suggested difference was
> impossible)
Do you think you can have two physically identical airplanes, one that
flies and one that can't?
If there are two engineers who look over blueprints for an airplane,
and one thinks it will fly, and the other thinks it can't, do you
think they will have any trouble determining who is correct, after it
is built? How do you suppose they will be able to figure it out?
Kermit
SortingItOut
> On 13 Oct, 08:08, SortingItOut <eri...@home.com> wrote:
>
> > On Oct 12, 6:26 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
> > > On 11 Oct, 06:01, SortingItOut <eri...@home.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Oct 10, 5:06 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
I don't accept your implication that we can't learn about and
understand consciousness by research and analysis. We don't have to
look only at speculations. If we completely understand the
biochemistry of the brain and the wiring of the neurons, what's to
keep us from having a complete understanding of the sensation of "what
it's like to be something"? You're writing us off as permanently
ignorant in this area, but hundreds or thousands of years of research
will give us insight that's hard to even imagine now.
Take for instance the apparent behavior that we react to what we see
consciously. If we trace the physical reaction back to its source,
what do you think we'll find? Why can't consciousness itself be the
source? Even if a spiritual component is ultimately the seat of
consciousness, it still drives our nervous system. Why can't this
"interface" to our nervous system be studied and understood, and then
consciousness itself beyond that? Why do you think this is all beyond
our understanding? Please be very specific about the barrier that you
think there is that prevents this kind of understanding.
Speculations are irrelevant.
someone2
The barrier is that if the assumption that the behaviour of something
that consciously experiences could be described in the same terms of
physics as something that doesn't, then speculations that differ
regarding somethings conscious status, given the build, still expect
the same behaviour. I have given you an example, of the two
speculations for the robot, and pointed out why they aren't
scientifically distinguishable in principle. As given a particular
build, they don't have any differences in expected behaviour, and
therefore cannot be scientifcally distinguished. That is the barrier,
that I pointed out in the paper, and have been pointing out to you
again and again and again and again. I am rather suprised you are
suggesting that I haven't been specific enough in my repeating that
the speculations don't have a difference in expected behaviour given a
build, and therefore cannot be scientifically distinguished between.
If you think I haven't been specific enough about the barrier, perhaps
try, as I have been asking you to, to suggest how they could
distinguish between the speculations of whether the robot is conscious
or not, and then maybe you'll come across the barrier as you consider
the problem (both speculations expect the same behaviour and therefore
aren't scientifically distinguishable). If you avoid trying, then
perhaps you will answer why you continue to avoid doing this, sure it
means you can avoid facing the fact, but is there anything else?
Kermit
Why would anyone assume this?
Specifically: you have never clarified what you mean by "explained in
terms of the laws of physics".
If you mean merely that it is subject to the laws of physics, then
this is a trivial observation, which physicalists believe applies to
everything. May just as well say "it exists".
If you mean that these hypothetical scientist/engineers know enough of
physics, consciousness, and the robot's design that they can describe
how they think its build will result in consciousness, then it
certainly does *not make sense to say that they will expect it to
behave as a non-conscious robot would.
> then speculations that differ
> regarding somethings conscious status, given the build, still expect
> the same behaviour.
Negatory, nope, uh-uh, for reasons just stated.
Please answer: do these theorists of yours think that the robot will
only be subject to the laws of physics, which tells us nothing, or do
they know enough to understand why it is significantly different from
other (non-conscious) things?
> I have given you an example, of the two
> speculations for the robot, and pointed out why they aren't
> scientifically distinguishable in principle.
No, you haven't. Two different theories predict different observable
results, by definition.
> As given a particular
> build, they don't have any differences in expected behaviour, and
> therefore cannot be scientifcally distinguished.
They must, or they are not different theories.
Which is it:
do they have different expectations, or are they indistinguishable?
>That is the barrier,
> that I pointed out in the paper, and have been pointing out to you
> again and again and again and again.
No, you have simply asserted it again and again.
> I am rather suprised you are
> suggesting that I haven't been specific enough in my repeating
Repetition is not clarification, nor is it responsive.
> that
> the speculations don't have a difference in expected behaviour given a
> build, and therefore cannot be scientifically distinguished between.
Of course they do.
And you have never explained why you think physics is especially
applicable here. There are very few physicists studying brain science.
And most of them are developing new tools.
Why your obsession with physics, and not biochemistry, or evolutionary
biology, or evo-devo?
>
> If you think I haven't been specific enough about the barrier, perhaps
> try, as I have been asking you to, to suggest how they could
> distinguish between the speculations of whether the robot is conscious
> or not, and then maybe you'll come across the barrier as you consider
> the problem (both speculations expect the same behaviour and therefore
> aren't scientifically distinguishable). If you avoid trying, then
> perhaps you will answer why you continue to avoid doing this, sure it
> means you can avoid facing the fact, but is there anything else?
Why do you continually avoid answering questions?
Repeating yourself is not a response; it is an evasion.
Different theories predict different responses.
Different theories predict different responses.
Different theories predict different responses.
Different theories predict different responses.
Different theories predict different responses.
Different theories predict different responses.
Different theories predict different responses.
Different theories predict different responses.
Different theories predict different responses.
Kermit
someone2
So say, given the speculations and the robot, where the differences in
expected behaviour would be. Which speculation isn't going to expect
the build to simply follow the laws of physics? Presumably you have
been following the converstation you jumped in on.
Inez
> > Different theories predict different responses.
> > Different theories predict different responses.
> > Different theories predict different responses.
> > Different theories predict different responses.
> > Different theories predict different responses.
> > Different theories predict different responses.
> > Different theories predict different responses.
> > Different theories predict different responses.
> > Different theories predict different responses.
>
> So say, given the speculations and the robot, where the differences in
> expected behaviour would be.
Neither speculation generates expectations of behavior. The
expectations of behavior were generated according to the build. The
speculations are a side bet that do not link to behavior in any way.
> Which speculation isn't going to expect
> the build to simply follow the laws of physics?
Neither of them generate expectations of any kind.
Jim Lovejoy
8d60-4ba...@y29g2000hsf.googlegroups.com:
But according to both engineers speculations the airplane just follows the
laws of physics whether it can fly or it can't. That proves that it's
implausible that the physicalist perspective is correct.
SortingItOut
You've missed my point. When it comes to understanding how
consciousness works, we don't have to limit our study to complex
robots. We can study humans, which we know are conscious. Then, once
we know how consciousness works, we can apply that knowledge to the
analysis of other objects, such as dogs, mice, spiders, plants,
bacteria, robots, and whatever else, and determine the degree to which
they are conscious (at least as far as consciousness as we know it
then). I'm not asking about a barrier related to the robot problem.
I'm asking what the barrier is to finding out how consciousness works
in known conscious beings.
>
> If you think I haven't been specific enough about the barrier, perhaps
> try, as I have been asking you to, to suggest how they could
> distinguish between the speculations of whether the robot is conscious
> or not, and then maybe you'll come across the barrier as you consider
> the problem (both speculations expect the same behaviour and therefore
> aren't scientifically distinguishable). If you avoid trying, then
> perhaps you will answer why you continue to avoid doing this, sure it
> means you can avoid facing the fact, but is there anything else?
Yes. Your inability to understand my answer. You can start slinging
accusations if you want to, but it's only going to alienate yet
another person trying to communicate with you despite all the
difficulties that that entails. I've answered your question more than
once.
someone2
Ok, let us for discussions sake assume that we are analogous to a
robot in function, even though this is implausible. You seem to be
admitting that with purely study of the robot there would be a
barrier. Your argument then seems to be that there wouldn't be a
barrier though when examining humans. Presumably because you know the
human is consciously experiencing. You also however know that the
human neurons are organic. Now how do could you determine whether the
conscious experiences were due to the corresponding neural states
being activity of organic chemistry, or more that more generally just
the was important. Before, silly ideas like replacing certain neurons
with artificial neurons and then asking them are suggested, and it
seeming like a solution to you, consider that when experiments are
being performed, there might even be some manipulations of the neural
state which would cause some to speculate that the neural state no
longer had an associated experience, and others that it did. How could
you tell, when both speculations expect the same behaviour and
therefore aren't scientifically distinguishable. Ah, there we go, back
to the same barrier problem as the robot. Which it seems you have
admitted is a barrier in the robot if you only had the robot to study.
Ymir
<1402bf4b-c768-4315...@i18g2000prf.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
You keep bringing up this organic vs. inorganic argument, but it makes
very little sense. If you seem to think that this is a valid argument,
try transferring it to some other domain.
Let's say that two people are investigating the behaviour of wires. One
claims that they conduct because of the particular way in which
electrons are organized in the wires, whereas another claims they
conduct because they are made of metal and that conduction is a special
property associated with metals.
If we were to replace all the metal with something non-metallic, but
with the same sort of electron configuration which the first person
claimed was relevant to conduction (salt water, for example), and it
then exhibited all of the behaviours associated with conduction, would
it be reasonable for the second person to maintain that it behaved as
predicted according to the laws of physics, but that what we were
witnessing wasn't actually conduction since only metals can conduct?
André
someone2
> In article
> <1402bf4b-c768-4315-84e0-8aedd92a4...@i18g2000prf.googlegroups.com>,
While you know of some machine in some amusement park that waves its
hands at the spectators, and is driven electricity passing through
wires. There is another system which uses hard plastic cogs, which
don't conduct electricity. A computer could simulate systems of 1, 2,
or 3 cogs up to the complexity of a configuration that drives a
machine to wave its hands at spectators. There is no need to suggest
any difference in conductivity between any configuration of cogs, the
difference in behaviour between the systems can be explained purely in
terms of the number of cogs, and configuration.
With the robot, you could have a simulator that was built to simulate
systems of various node configuations, and give an expected behaviour.
It could simulate systems of 1, 2, or 3 nodes up to the complexity of
the robot. There is no need to suggest any difference in conscious
status between any configurations, the difference in behaviour between
the systems can be explained purely in terms of the number of nodes,
and configuration, and inputs.
Your analogy with wires was poor, as how could certain behaviour be
explained without the assumption that electricty was being passed.
There is no problem explaining the behaviour of the robot without the
assumption that it was consciously experiencing. I can't think of
anyone other than an atheist even suggesting such a thing. They add it
in because they need to for their belief. Certainly it has nothing to
do with an explanation of the robot's behaviour though. It offers no
more of an explanation of behaviour than the suggestion that when
special node configurations occur, intangible fairies influence the
way the robot behaves in such a way as to be behaving exactly as
people that assumed it wasn't influenced by intangible fairies
expected it to behave. Both the intangible fairies and the atheist
story that the robot would be consciously experiencing aren't required
to explain the behaviour, and would be removed on applying Occam's
Razor.
Inez
So...the parts may or may not conduct electricity, we can have
different speculations and they predict the same behavior. By your
logic, this example shows that according to physicalists electricity
cannot affect behavior.
> With the robot, you could have a simulator that was built to simulate
> systems of various node configuations, and give an expected behaviour.
> It could simulate systems of 1, 2, or 3 nodes up to the complexity of
> the robot. There is no need to suggest any difference in conscious
> status between any configurations, the difference in behaviour between
> the systems can be explained purely in terms of the number of nodes,
> and configuration, and inputs.
There may not be a "need" to do so, but you can look at the parts and
see whether they are simulating consciousness or actually being
conscious
Ymir
<c6d8ee47-b26b-43db...@x41g2000hsb.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
By this logic, though, there is also no need to suggest that the
amusement park machine waves, since its behaviour can be explained
purely in terms of the behaviour of the cogs, and none of the cogs
requires us to claim that it is waving.
> Your analogy with wires was poor, as how could certain behaviour be
> explained without the assumption that electricty was being passed.
That's because the behaviour is consistent with what we call
'conduction' and is not consistent with other explanations.
> There is no problem explaining the behaviour of the robot without the
> assumption that it was consciously experiencing.
Why? If its behaviour is consistent with what we call 'consciousness',
why should are explanation call it anything other than consciousness?
Why is this any different from the conduction example? How would we
explain its behaviour without making reference to its mental states
(directly or indirectly)?
> I can't think of
> anyone other than an atheist even suggesting such a thing. They add it
> in because they need to for their belief. Certainly it has nothing to
> do with an explanation of the robot's behaviour though.
Are you suggesting that atheists also must claim that human beings
aren't conscious? Human behaviour is perfectly consistent with the laws
of physics; There is nothing magical about human behaviour which
suggests that it does not follow from physical law, and yet the majority
of physicalists would certainly not claim that humans aren't conscious.
André
SortingItOut
Please re-write the last part of the above sentence. It doesn't
parse.
> Before, silly ideas like replacing certain neurons
> with artificial neurons and then asking them are suggested, and it
> seeming like a solution to you, consider that when experiments are
> being performed, there might even be some manipulations of the neural
> state which would cause some to speculate that the neural state no
> longer had an associated experience, and others that it did. How could
> you tell, when both speculations expect the same behaviour and
> therefore aren't scientifically distinguishable.
The above sentence is really difficult to follow. Are you saying that
there is a barrier to investigating human consciousness in humans, or
in applying that knowledge to non-humans?
someone2
Regarding the sentance that was poorly written:
Now how do could you determine whether the conscious experiences were
due to the corresponding neural states being activity of organic
chemistry, or whether the more general function was what was
importantant.
Regarding your second question, I was saying how you could tell
whether the human was consciously experiencing giving the neuron
replacement suggestion offered. This assumes of course (even though it
is implausible) that the human is analogous to a robot and you were to
find out that the brain behaviour was explainable in terms of the same
laws of physics as something that wasn't consciously experiencing.
someone2
> In article
The machine is waving, it's an observable behaviour, and it didn't
follow from the reasoning that there would be no need to assume it was
waving.
Though later you seem to think we are defining consciousness as a
behaviour. We haven't. We have defined something as conscious if it is
consciously experiencing, and it to be consciously experiencing if it
is like something to be that thing.
So maybe re-read my last response with this in mind, and you'll be
able to follow the point.
Ymir
<3f2a5c4a-efef-4e12...@l62g2000hse.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
As far as I'm concerned, consciously experiencing *is* a behaviour.
If you want to view it as something other than a behaviour (which leads
me to believe that you are using a much narrower definition of
'behaviour' than I am -- perhaps you would clarify), you still need to
operationalize it in some manner, which is something which you haven't
done yet.
Let's go back to the example of conduction.
When metal conducts, is that a 'behaviour' by your definition? In your
comments in an earlier post you seemed to suggest that it is, though you
were not explicit.
Conduction isn't something we can actually see. It's something which we
infer from other observations. Why do you think that this inference is
appropriate in the case of conduction, but not in the case of
consciousness?
André
Kermit
They would have to agree ahead of time what verifiable data would
indicate consciousness. For example, passing an extended Turing test.
>Which speculation isn't going to expect
> the build to simply follow the laws of physics?
They both would expect the robots, as they expect everything, to
follow the laws of physics.
> Presumably you have
> been following the converstation you jumped in on.
Yes. Have you? If you cannot answer the most basic questions, I must
continue to entertain doubts that *you understand what you are saying.
By "Following the laws of physics", do you mean:
A. All interactions of matter and energy behave as they do for
everything.
or
B. The theorists understand the design of the robot so thoroughly that
they believe they know whether it will be conscious or not, when it's
built and turned on?
or
C. Something else.
If A, why is the phrase inserted into every mention of your thought
experiment, since it contributes no information.
If B, why do you keep insisting that one of them thinks it will not do
what he or she thinks it will do, based on its design?
If C, please note that simply repeating yourself is not explaining.
Why, for example, would it not apply to humans?
Kermit
Kermit
You seem to be offering a dichotomy:
A. consciousness = [some} organic chemistry
B. consciousness = general function
I would say that
walking, consciousness, remembering, hearing, and waving
are all examples of general functions. I see o reason to claim that
only organic chemistry can bring them about.
Nor do I see how it coudlb e considered informative to say that any
particular one of these follows the laws of physics. They all do. Or
do you have evidence to suggest otherwise?
>
> Regarding your second question, I was saying how you could tell
> whether the human was consciously experiencing giving the neuron
> replacement suggestion offered.
The behavior (or the function, if you prefer) doesn't change.
> This assumes of course (even though it
> is implausible) that the human is analogous to a robot and you were to
> find out that the brain behaviour was explainable in terms of the same
> laws of physics as something that wasn't consciously experiencing.
You still have not explained what you mean by "explainable in terms of
the laws of physics".
Icebergs and volcanoes are equally explainable in terms of the laws of
physics. That does not mean they are indistinguishable.
Perhaps you could give us some hints.
Sounds like?
Number of syllables?
Kermit
Kermit
<snip>
> Presumably you have
> been following the converstation you jumped in on.
It hardly matters. The conversation is the same day after day.
Somebody asks a question or points out a logical fallacy.
You ignore this, and ask them what they don't understand.
You then politely offer to help, and either refer them to your paper,
or repeat yourself.
Kermit
Inez
> In article
Let me also point out that we cannot see actual electricity passing
through a wire. As long as we are willing to accept magic as an
explanation of things (which is what someone2 wants to do with
consciousness) then you don't *have* to assume conduction. It is not
the only way to explain the results, although it is the only sane way
to explain the results.
This is why science discards supernatural hypotheses, they can never
be proven or disproven and they don't actually explain anything.
someone2
> In article
Yes metal conducting would be a behaviour.
Well if you are only referring to behaviour when you are talking about
conscious experiences, then you aren't talking about whether it would
be like something to be that thing, whether there would be any
sensations etc. Whether there are sensations of sight, sound, taste
etc.
If you were to claim that you are talking about those very same
sensations, but that as a functionalist maybe the behaviour/the
function of the thing are those sensations, then that they are
behaviour is an explanation of the sensations. There is the reality
that we experience the sensations. What I am referring to is that
reality of sensations which functionalism is trying to explain.
Functionalists tend to look at it that there is the reality of that
which we identify as sensations etc, but that they are only an
identity of the functioning that is occuring. There is though the
question of whether functionalism was a correct explanation of what we
identify as our sensations. You seem so indoctrinated that you don't
even consider that there could be other explanations. This seems
incomprehensible to you. How did you end up so indoctrinated? Can you
remember a time when you weren't? If so, I was wondering what
convinced you so much that you forbid yourself to even consider that
the explanation might not be correct. Even just enough to allow
yourself to see, that it isn't necessary to even believe that the
identity functionalism was trying to explain exists for the robot.
That people could explain the way the robot behaves with the
assumption that it doesn't experience any sensations.
You can presumably understand that the behaviour of a 1, 2, or 3 node
network with the assumption that it doesn't experience any sensations.
Why would you be suggesting that the 10, the 100, the 1000, the
billion node network, up to the complexity of the robot not be
explained in the same fashion. Why would there be the *need* to think
that there existed a reality where certain system configurations
experienced sensations, but not others, when the whole range of
different behaviours were explainable in terms of different
configurations of the nodes.
Perhaps you could contrast any reasoning you give as an answer
contrasts with a person claiming that there existed the reality of
intangible invisible fairies that were attracted to certain
configurations of the nodes, and influenced the behaviour of the
system, and that the system behaviour couldn't be explained without
the reality of the intangible invisible fairies. For it seems to me
that the behaviour of the system configurations that supposedly
attracted invisible, intangible faires, can be explained without the
assumption that the influential fairies existed. The same as the
behaviour of the systems which were supposedly experiencing
sensations, can be explained without the assumption that the
sensations existed.
Kermit
Of *course this is behavior. We can even see it in living brains with
scanning instruments of various sorts. It used to be that people
formerly in comas would sometimes answer "yes" when we asked them
whether or not they were conscious when they were comatose.(In the
1970s I was taught as a military clinical specialist to be careful
what I said around them, for they might be listening.) Now we can tell
with a high degree of confidence if they are in real time, by scanning
their brains. Nothing has changed abouts the nature of brains in the
last few decades; only our improved ability to see what is going on
inside them.
Brains being conscious or not certainly *is behavior of the brain,
just as conducting electricity or not is behavior of a wire.
>
> If you were to claim that you are talking about those very same
> sensations, but that as a functionalist maybe the behaviour/the
> function of the thing are those sensations, then that they are
> behaviour is an explanation of the sensations. There is the reality
> that we experience the sensations.
Yes. Of course we each can only infer it in others, but since people
have brains similar to mine I assume that they have similar sensations
and emotions as I.
> What I am referring to is that
> reality of sensations which functionalism is trying to explain.
> Functionalists tend to look at it that there is the reality of that
> which we identify as sensations etc, but that they are only an
> identity of the functioning that is occuring. There is though the
> question of whether functionalism was a correct explanation of what we
> identify as our sensations. You seem so indoctrinated that you don't
> even consider that there could be other explanations.
Speaking for myself, I have no trouble considering other explanations.
I just have no reason to believe them, and object to your
misrepresenting physicalism in order to refute it.
I can imagine that we are all subroutines in a virtual reality, but I
would not use such a scenario to pretend to refute methodological
materialism. Simply because a model is conceivable is no reason to
give it equal consideration.
> This seems
> incomprehensible to you. How did you end up so indoctrinated? Can you
> remember a time when you weren't? If so, I was wondering what
> convinced you so much that you forbid yourself to even consider that
>the explanation might not be correct. Even just enough to allow
>yourself to see, that it isn't necessary to even believe that the
>identity functionalism was trying to explain exists for the robot.
>That people could explain the way the robot behaves with the
>assumption that it doesn't experience any sensations.
You have some very confused ideas. You keep presenting consciousness
as necessarily free from restrictions of the physical. You seem to
think that if robots are subject to the laws of physics - as
everything is - then consciousness would be inexplicable and
simultaneously undetectable. Or something. I'm not sure I've seen you
answer *any request for clarification.
Of course we can explain the robot in terms of its structure,
function, and programming. Have you not noticed that we are describing
more and more of human behavior that way? That does not mean that we
humans do not have sensations, only that our behavior has
*explanations, and we are beginning to get a handle on them.
>
>You can presumably understand that the behaviour of a 1, 2, or 3 node
>network with the assumption that it doesn't experience any sensations.
>Why would you be suggesting that the 10, the 100, the 1000, the
>billion node network, up to the complexity of the robot not be
>explained in the same fashion. Why would there be the *need* to think
>that there existed a reality where certain system configurations
>experienced sensations, but not others, when the whole range of
>different behaviours were explainable in terms of different
>configurations of the nodes.
My brain is conscious; an equal mass of algae is not. Not all
biological structures are equal in consciousness. We do not think so,
there is no reason to think so, there are no theories that suggest it
that I know of. Why would we expect all neural nets to have the same
behavior? My daughter's laptop and my toaster are both machines,
roughly equal in mass, but they do not behave the same way. They wouod
need a certain design, and a certain level of complexity to begin to
manifest consciousness. And, as with animals, I suppose it would be a
matter of degree.
We do not know of any reason why computers cannot simulate human minds
successfully. Individual neurons do not think; it is only the
interaction of all the cells in a functioning brain that thinking
occurs. We can safely assume that if neural nets could be intelligent
and conscious some day, that the same will apply to them.
>
>Perhaps you could contrast any reasoning you give as an answer
>contrasts with a person claiming that there existed the reality of
>intangible invisible fairies that were attracted to certain
>configurations of the nodes, and influenced the behaviour of the
>system, and that the system behaviour couldn't be explained without
>the reality of the intangible invisible fairies.
One difference is that we know functioning brains produce minds of
varying degrees of complexity. That you would suggest fairies as
analogous to consciousness says more about how you think of the mind
than any failing of physicalism.
> For it seems to me
>that the behaviour of the system configurations that supposedly
>attracted invisible, intangible faires, can be explained without the
>assumption that the influential fairies existed. The same as the
>behaviour of the systems which were supposedly experiencing
>sensations, can be explained without the assumption that the
>sensations existed.
Can you also explain a working airplane moving thru the air without
referencing flying?
Will robots have sensations the same way I do? How would I be able to
tell? But if they perceive the world around them, and learn, and can
communicate flexibly and with purpose, and remember what they
perceive, then I see no reason to claim they are not conscious.
You may note that this has not actually happened yet. What questions
do you have about consciousness that cannot be investigated by
studying human and other minds? Is it because you are afraid they
might actually provide some answers, and you prefer the fantasies of
your strawmen in an alternate universe?
Kermit
Ymir
<022f2df7-5a27-48c7...@q35g2000hsg.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
As I pointed out before, I suspect you are using the term 'behaviour' in
a very narrow sense -- can you please clarify how exactly you are
defining this term?
Why do we explain the behaviour of one, two, or three muscle cells
without talking about a heart, but when we reach a certain number of
muscle cells arranged in a certain way, we suddenly start talking about
a heart? Obviously, because a small number of muscle cells don't
constitute a heart.
Similarly, a group of one, two, or three neurons is insufficient to
generate conscious experiences.
No one is claiming that the individual neurons suddenly start to exhibit
different properties once you get enough of them, or start behaving in a
different fashion. Consciousness isn't a property of neurons. It's a
property of an overall system.
> Perhaps you could contrast any reasoning you give as an answer
> contrasts with a person claiming that there existed the reality of
> intangible invisible fairies that were attracted to certain
> configurations of the nodes, and influenced the behaviour of the
> system, and that the system behaviour couldn't be explained without
> the reality of the intangible invisible fairies. For it seems to me
> that the behaviour of the system configurations that supposedly
> attracted invisible, intangible faires, can be explained without the
> assumption that the influential fairies existed. The same as the
> behaviour of the systems which were supposedly experiencing
> sensations, can be explained without the assumption that the
> sensations existed.
The invisible fairies of your example bear no resemblance to any of the
positions being offered here other than your own, because those who
would describe larger systems as conscious do so under the assumption
that conscious systems behave *differently* from non-conscious ones
(unlike systems with or without fairies). Moreover, conscious
experiences themselves are part of the explananda which theories of mind
are trying to account for, unlike the fairies which you mention which
are simply tacked on for no apparent purpose.
Do you believe that you would continue to behave in exactly the same way
that you do now if you were to suddenly lose the ability to experience
anything? If not, then you must see that the explanation for your
behaviour must include an explanation for your conscious experience or
it will be incomplete and will therefore fail to account for your
behaviour.
Similarly, with the robot, if it *is* conscious, then any explanation of
its behaviour must include the fact that it has conscious experiences if
it is to fully explain its behaviour. If it *isn't* conscious, then any
explanation which attributes consciousness to it will fail to predict
the correct behaviour since conscious and non-conscious entities *do*
*not* *behave* *the* *same* *way*.
Your insistence that consciousness can be removed from an explanation
represents a failure to acknowledge this last point. You want to claim
consciousness is inconsequential (or, more likely, you want to attribute
this view to physicalism, despite the fact that it is emphatically not a
position which physicalists take).
André
someone2
> In article
Yes theories of the mind, like functionalism for example are trying to
account for us consciously experiencing. So consciously experiencing
is only equivalent to behaviour in certain theories. Though even when
the theory has them the behaviour/funtion and that which was
identified as consciously experiencing as equivalent, they can still
be identified seperately.
What I am asking you to do is be consistent with your reasoning with
regards to the neural network being influenced by consciously
experiencing story, and your reasoning with regards to the neural
network being influenced by intangible, invisible fairies story. It
would seem strange if you thought one line of reasoning was reasonable
if you happened to believe in a story, but then no longer think the
same line of reasoning was reasonable if you didn't.
So, if you don't mind, could we just try this to see whether it helps
either of us understand the others position more clearly.
If a person suggested that neural networks which when communicated
with with claimed to be being influenced by intangible, invisible
fairies, actually were being influenced by intangible, invisible
fairies, do you feel it would be necessary to believe them, if the
behaviour of the system could be explained simply in terms of the node
configurations, and their interactions?
SortingItOut
I'm not sure exactly what you mean by general function. And what is
the point of this question? Are you suggesting that brain
researchers, after hundreds of years of research, might not be able to
answer something as basic as what I think you're asking?
Or are you in agreement that human consciousness can be completely
understood by studying humans?
>
> Regarding your second question, I was saying how you could tell
> whether the human was consciously experiencing giving the neuron
> replacement suggestion offered.
I'm not sure why we're replacing neurons. Is this *after* we
completely understand human consciousness, as an avenue to figuring
out whether the robot is conscious?
Also, to answer the question, why not just ask the human if it is
still conscious? It's beyond far-fetched to think that it could
answer yes but not actually be conscious.
Besides, once we understand consciousness in humans, we'll know the
impact of replacing a particular neuron with something else.
someone2
When I said:
-----------
Now how do could you determine whether the conscious experiences were
due to the corresponding neural states being activity of organic
chemistry, or whether the more general function was what was
importantant.
-----------
By the more general function, I meant functionalism, which suggests
that the conscious experiences are realisable through not just the
activity of the organic neurons but though anything that performs the
functions that the organic neurons are performing.
The neuron replacement would have been an example of an idea to
distinguish between the which was important for conscious experienes,
the organic chemistry, or the general function. I used it to
illustrate how the idea wouldn't help because of the barrier.
So if we assume (even though it is implausible) that the human is
analogous to a robot and you were to find out that the brain behaviour
was explainable in terms of the same laws of physics as something that
wasn't consciously experiencing, then I am saying that you could not
understand consciousness by studying humans, because of the barrier,
which I have mentioned.
If you like you could put forward some suggestions of how you think
they could study such a human to gain the knowledge about
consciousness, for example distinguishing between whether it is
organic chemistry or functionalism, and I'll show you why the
suggestion doesn't work.
Kermit
You're still not clarifying what *you mean by behavior. do you include
all of the electrochemical activity of the brain - all of the changing
brain states?
> Though even when
> the theory has them the behaviour/funtion and that which was
> identified as consciously experiencing as equivalent, they can still
> be identified seperately.
>
Depends on how you mean this. If you are driving a car, you have a
different experience of it than I do when I watch you drive it. But I
can explain what you are doing as I see it, and you can explain what
you are doing from your viewpoint. If I say that you slow down at such
and such a rate, and step on the clutch, downshift, put the turn
signal on, turn the wheel, etc, you can also describe the same from
your viewpoint. We can each of us do it in greater or lesser detail.
One of us may see something going on that the other doesn't catch. But
we are *describing *the *same *thing.
> What I am asking you to do is be consistent with your reasoning with
> regards to the neural network being influenced by consciously
> experiencing story,
The brain (robot or human) is not influenced by our story. Theories do
not affect the way a process happens.
> and your reasoning with regards to the neural
> network being influenced by intangible, invisible fairies story.
Is there any reason to postulate fairies, or investigate them? What
would we be looking for?
This is very much like your idea of a consciousness that is not
derived from physical activity, has no detectable characteristics
independent of the physical, and has no reason for its existence.
> It
> would seem strange if you thought one line of reasoning was reasonable
> if you happened to believe in a story, but then no longer think the
> same line of reasoning was reasonable if you didn't.
External behavior is largely a product of consciousness. This is the
reason consciousness exists. This is a scientific model, and one that
can be investigated.
Undetectable fairies are not.
>
> So, if you don't mind, could we just try this to see whether it helps
> either of us understand the others position more clearly.
But a fairies model which predicts no discernable evidence is not a
theory or hypothesis. It is a Disney cartoon device.
>
> If a person suggested that neural networks which when communicated
> with with claimed to be being influenced by intangible, invisible
> fairies, actually were being influenced by intangible, invisible
> fairies, do you feel it would be necessary to believe them, if the
> behaviour of the system could be explained simply in terms of the node
> configurations, and their interactions?
No, of course not. By the same token, do you think that reference to
nodes only is useful if a brain - silicon or organic - shows signs of
consciousness? Do you think that poring over an airplane's blueprint
is as useful for determining if it will fly, as looking at one that is
built and operating?
If airplane engineers can tell you ahead of time with a high degree of
confidence whether a particular design for an airplane will work or
not, it is because they have over a century of accumulated empirical
observations to judge it by.
What evidence do you have that minds are in any way independent of a
functioning brain?
Kermit
Kermit
OK.
>
> The neuron replacement would have been an example of an idea to
> distinguish between the which was important for conscious experienes,
> the organic chemistry, or the general function. I used it to
> illustrate how the idea wouldn't help because of the barrier.
Oh, good grief. You said:
"The barrier is that if the assumption that the behaviour of something
that consciously experiences could be described in the same terms of
physics as something that doesn't, then speculations that differ
regarding somethings conscious status, given the build, still expect
the same behaviour."
*Everything is subject to physics. If by "described in the same terms
of physics" you mean that we can give a physical explanation for its
behavior, then we expect a certain behavior from it, conscious if we
expect it to be conscious, and non-conscious if we don't expect it to
be conscious. Like the Wright brothers, we will know whether we are
right of not if we build it.
Substitute "airplane" and "flying" for "neural net" and
"consciousness". It is silly beyond words to say that because we can
describe working airplanes and working toasters in the "same terms of
physics", that we don't know whether the airplane is flying or not.
>
> So if we assume (even though it is implausible)
It's not implausible for a functionalist, is it? That what their
theory is all about.
> that the human is
> analogous to a robot and you were to find out that the brain behaviour
> was explainable in terms of the same laws of physics as something that
> wasn't consciously experiencing, then I am saying that you could not
> understand consciousness by studying humans, because of the barrier,
> which I have mentioned.
So you assert that because airplanes are explainable in terms of
physics, we can't tell whether they fly or not?
>
> If you like you could put forward some suggestions of how you think
> they could study such a human to gain the knowledge about
> consciousness, for example distinguishing between whether it is
> organic chemistry or functionalism, and I'll show you why the
> suggestion doesn't work.
Ask it. Ask it thoroughly, if you like, with an extended Turing test.
Kermit
Ymir
<3ed68c85-e4a9-43f5...@y21g2000hsf.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
First off, I notice that you didn't respond to my request to have you
clarify what you mean by 'behaviour' since you seem to be excluding
certain things which I (and it would appear others) would view as
behaviours from your definition.
You also failed to respond to my question regarding whether you believe
that you would continue to act the same way were you to suddenly lose
your ability to consciously experience the world.
> Yes theories of the mind, like functionalism for example are trying to
> account for us consciously experiencing. So consciously experiencing
> is only equivalent to behaviour in certain theories. Though even when
> the theory has them the behaviour/funtion and that which was
> identified as consciously experiencing as equivalent, they can still
> be identified seperately.
I think that you misunderstand what I mean when I refer to conscious
experience as a behaviour. I am not claiming that it is equivalent to
some other behaviour (i.e. waving your hand in response to a stimulus).
I am saying that it is a behaviour in its own right, one which *every*
theory of consciousness attempts to explain.
While consciousness itself is not a behaviour per se, consciously
experiencing is, in much the same way that being red is not a behaviour,
but that reflecting photons of particular wavelengths is. Behaviours are
what something does as opposed to a more general capacity/propensity to
do something in particular.
> What I am asking you to do is be consistent with your reasoning with
> regards to the neural network being influenced by consciously
> experiencing story, and your reasoning with regards to the neural
> network being influenced by intangible, invisible fairies story. It
> would seem strange if you thought one line of reasoning was reasonable
> if you happened to believe in a story, but then no longer think the
> same line of reasoning was reasonable if you didn't.
Since I don't see the parallelism between these cases, I'm not sure how
I am being inconsistent here. In the case of fairies, no claim is being
made about how they influence a particular system. They don't actually
*do* anything in this explanation. What I, and others, are claiming is
that our conscious experiences *do* in fact influence our other
behaviours.
> So, if you don't mind, could we just try this to see whether it helps
> either of us understand the others position more clearly.
>
> If a person suggested that neural networks which when communicated
> with with claimed to be being influenced by intangible, invisible
> fairies, actually were being influenced by intangible, invisible
> fairies, do you feel it would be necessary to believe them, if the
> behaviour of the system could be explained simply in terms of the node
> configurations, and their interactions?
No, because, as I point out above, the fairies don't actually perform
anything in the above scenario.
I think you are under the impression that we are discussing some
situation in which you have some physical configuration of neurons, and
that consciousness somehow impinges on that system in the same
ill-defined way that your fairies do above, but that isn't the case.
The physicalist position is that a given configuration of neurons (or,
possibly, of other elements) -- call it configuration X, will behave in
a particular way, whereas a different configuration -- call it
configuration Y, will behave in a different way. In both cases, the
behaviour of the overall system will follow entirely from the laws of
physics, but the systems will act differently because of differences in
the configurations involved.
Some configurations (let's assume Y is one of them in the above example)
will result in behaviours which includes creating a representation of
the external world, consciously experiencing aspects of that
representation, and making use of that representation in responding to
environmental stimuli. We refer to such systems as 'conscious' unlike
systems such as X which do not result in such behaviours. The laws of
physics are the same, though, in both cases. Consciousness is not being
tacked on to the explanation as some unnecessary add-on, but rather is
an integral part of the explanation.
System X and Y are not expected to respond to the world in the same way,
despite the fact that, at the most basic level, they follow exactly the
same set of physical laws. Because of this, we expect the observable
behaviours of a system (a robot if you like -- we can restrict it to
being one constructed entirely of organic neurons which have the exact
same chemical makeup of human neurons if you like, though I don't
particularly feel that this is necessary) which instantiates system Y to
have behaviour which is readily distinguishable from one which instead
instantiates system X.
That is why everyone is having a difficult time comprehending your
hypothetical cases since it would appear that you want us to consider
invoking a physical explanation appropriate for system X in order to
explain the behaviour (either in the broad sense, or in your more narrow
sense which you have yet to clarify) of system Y and to assume that
explanation X will actually somehow succeed at this task -- from my
vantage that is very much like asking someone to explain a mobile phone
using the same explanation that one would give for a can-opener, i.e. it
simply makes no sense despite the fact that the appropriate explanation
for either would be cast in terms of the same set of physical laws.
At other points in this discussion, you are asking us to do something
analagous to assuming more appropriate explanations for both a mobile
phone and a can-opener, yet to assume that the two are somehow
indistinguishable in terms of how they act.
Hopefully the above clarifies my position. Now perhaps you wouldn't mind
responding to some of the requests for clarification which I asked in my
previous post.
André
Ymir
<fe3506a5-803a-4041...@d31g2000hsg.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
I think you may be misunderstanding the functionalist position.
The functionalist position is not necessarily an account of
consciousness which contradicts your (hypothetical) theory that only
organic things/neurons/whatever can be conscious.
Functionalism is essentially a methodological position which claims that
in order to understand the mind, it is better to concentrate on the
functional relationship between mental states and the world rather than
on the actually physical realisation of those states. Multiple
realisability is a possibility which is invoked as an argument in favour
of this approach, but it doesn't assume that *every* physical system
will be able to instantiate the relevant relationships. It may turn out
that only organic systems composed of neurons are physically capable of
instantiating those relations (though I don't see any compelling reason
to believe this), but if this did turn out to be the case it wouldn't
invalidate functionalist accounts. The views you contrast above differ
necessarily only in terms of the *level* of explanation which the deem
to be most appropriate.
André
someone2
> In article
By behaviour I mean any physical motion.
Regarding whether I believe that the human I experience being would
behave the same with or without me having any conscious experiences is
irrelevant. We aren't talking about my beliefs, we are talking about
physicalist beliefs, and the implications of their stories. If the
implication of the story doesn't seem to fit what needs to be
explained, then that might indicate a problem in the story, which is
why we are looking at the implications of the stories.
Do you see that there is a difference between saying:
------A-------
Some configurations (let's assume Y is one of them in the above
example) will result in behaviours which includes creating a
representation of the external world, and making use of that
representation in responding to environmental stimuli.
--------------
and:
------B-------
Some configurations (let's assume Y is one of them in the above
example) will result in behaviours which includes creating a
representation of the external world, consciously experiencing aspects
of that representation, and making use of that representation in
responding to environmental stimuli.
-------------
You said B, and then you go onto claim that you didn't just tack on
that it consciously experiences aspects of that representation. Could
you explain how that isn't tacked on, but intangible invisible fairies
would be, and could you also explain how consciously experiencing
aspects of the representation would influence the way it behaves, but
the intangible invisible fairies wouldn't be.
Ymir
<8bbf376a-3381-446b...@g61g2000hsf.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
That's a somewhat odd definition, but OK. I'd personally consider many
things which don't involve motion to be 'behaviours' (e.g. the fact that
a wire generates a magnetic field when conducting electricity is, to me,
a behaviour, though I take it you'd disagree).
> Regarding whether I believe that the human I experience being would
> behave the same with or without me having any conscious experiences is
> irrelevant.
It's very much relevant -- please see my comments below.
> We aren't talking about my beliefs, we are talking about
> physicalist beliefs,
In which case you should probably take my views (qua physicalist) on
what a physicalist's beliefs are as being more authoratative than your
own. I am disputing some of your claims precisely on the grounds that
they *do not* correspond to what physicalists actually believe.
> and the implications of their stories. If the
> implication of the story doesn't seem to fit what needs to be
> explained, then that might indicate a problem in the story, which is
> why we are looking at the implications of the stories.
>
>
> Do you see that there is a difference between saying:
> ------A-------
> Some configurations (let's assume Y is one of them in the above
> example) will result in behaviours which includes creating a
> representation of the external world, and making use of that
> representation in responding to environmental stimuli.
> --------------
>
> and:
>
> ------B-------
> Some configurations (let's assume Y is one of them in the above
> example) will result in behaviours which includes creating a
> representation of the external world, consciously experiencing aspects
> of that representation, and making use of that representation in
> responding to environmental stimuli.
> -------------
Of course there is a difference -- in my example I specified what you
have quoted in B and not what you have misquoted in A. Had I also
included discussion of that situation I would have assigned yet a third
letter to it (call it W), and systems instantiating W would be expected
to behave differently from those instantiating either X or Y. The same
points I raised about X and Y would apply to W and Y or W and X.
That's three different neural configurations with three different sets
of behaviours, each of which would require a different explanation,
though the explanations would all be grounded in the same physical laws.
> You said B, and then you go onto claim that you didn't just tack on
> that it consciously experiences aspects of that representation. Could
> you explain how that isn't tacked on,
It's not tacked on because it plays a causal role in determining how we
respond to environmental stimuli -- this takes us back to the point
which you claim is irrelevant above; namely, would we behave differently
if we didn't consciously experience the world.
I'd argue that we would behave *very differently*, and, AFAIK, so would
any other physicalist. I also suspect that you would, which is why I
asked the question earlier. If you believe, as I do, that conscious
experience does play a causal role in our decision making, then the
physical configuration which produces conscious experience is going to
behave entirely differently than one which does not, which means that
the configuration described in (A) is going to be different from the one
described in (B) since the difference in behaviour must follow from the
same set of physical laws which wouldn't happen if the configurations
were the same.
> but intangible invisible fairies
> would be, and could you also explain how consciously experiencing
> aspects of the representation would influence the way it behaves, but
> the intangible invisible fairies wouldn't be.
Positing differences in consciousness follows directly from observed
differences in behaviour and in physical makeup between different types
of systems, and plays a role in accounting for the behaviour of those
systems. Your fairies, on the other hand, are not tied to any
observation, nor do they play any explanatory role as far as I can tell.
The two situations are not even vaguely analogous.
André
Kermit
You realize that this ignores most activity of the conscious brain;
even confining consideration to the parts that would be considered
consciousness. When brain scientists study behavior, they don't simply
look at gross physical behavior; they examine which parts of the brain
are activated. Parts which don't show as observable motor behavior are
often the most important parts of consciousness.
It also means that you have misunderstood much of what you've read.
>
> Regarding whether I believe that the human I experience being would
> behave the same with or without me having any conscious experiences is
> irrelevant. We aren't talking about my beliefs, we are talking about
> physicalist beliefs, and the implications of their stories.
In that case you should know that it is almost universal among
physicalists that consciousness is brain activity, or a subset of it;
that moving appropriately thru the environment is the *reason
consciousness evolved; that non-conscious entities cannot behave the
same as conscious entities (especially in light of the fact that most
conscious activity does not result in obvious motor behavior).
> If the
> implication of the story doesn't seem to fit what needs to be
> explained, then that might indicate a problem in the story, which is
> why we are looking at the implications of the stories.
If by story you mean a testable model, then they have to be tested
against actual data, and not strawmen. But certainly some preliminary
thought experiments might save some time.
>
> Do you see that there is a difference between saying:
> ------A-------
> Some configurations (let's assume Y is one of them in the above
> example) will result in behaviours which includes creating a
> representation of the external world, and making use of that
> representation in responding to environmental stimuli.
> --------------
>
> and:
>
> ------B-------
> Some configurations (let's assume Y is one of them in the above
> example) will result in behaviours which includes creating a
> representation of the external world, consciously experiencing aspects
> of that representation, and making use of that representation in
> responding to environmental stimuli.
> -------------
>
> You said B, and then you go onto claim that you didn't just tack on
> that it consciously experiences aspects of that representation. Could
> you explain how that isn't tacked on, but intangible invisible fairies
> would be, and could you also explain how consciously experiencing
> aspects of the representation would influence the way it behaves, but
> the intangible invisible fairies wouldn't be.
If you ask a non-conscious robot to wave its hand, it might -
depending on how it's programmed. If you ask me to wave my hand, I
might, or might not, depending on how I feel, on how many times I've
been asked this before, on whether or not I was asked politely, on how
hungry I am - on a number of factors which help determine my internal
state, which determines my subsequent behavior. This is my experience,
and it is the experience of everyone I've talked to about the subject,
altho I suppose it may not be universal. Are you saying that you don't
think your internal view and experiences of the world influence your
behavior?
As used by nearly every physicalist, especially actual researchers in
the field, consciousness *is (a subset of) brain activity. You don't
have to be doing jumping jacks in order to be conscious, and assuming
physicalists are right and consciousness is brain activity, then
ignoring consciousness-generating brain activity which doesn't result
in immediate gross motor activity is missing the boat, and frankly
sounds rather contrived. At the very least, it predisposes us to talk
at cross purposes. If you prefer to confine the use of "behavior" to
large-scale physical movement of the body only, we need another term
to refer to everything we are interested in here - perhaps "brain
activity"?
As for invisible fairies, they're your ephemera, in your thought
experiment. Perhaps you could tell us how they affect anything.
Kermit
SortingItOut
The question of functionalism is irrelevant to the initial study and
understanding of consciousness in humans. There's no reason to know
up front whether it applies. The question of functionalism will get
answered during the study.
>
> So if we assume (even though it is implausible) that the human is
> analogous to a robot and you were to find out that the brain behaviour
> was explainable in terms of the same laws of physics as something that
> wasn't consciously experiencing, then I am saying that you could not
> understand consciousness by studying humans, because of the barrier,
> which I have mentioned.
But something that has a brain that is *not* consciously experiencing
will have its neurons behaving in a different way than a brain that
*is* consciously experiencing (according to physicalism), so where's
the problem? Anyway, there's plenty of consciously experiencing
humans to study. The question of whether or not the test subject is
consciously experiencing is eliminated. We have consciousness right
in front of us. Study it and see how it works.
Even if you have a human (consciously experiencing) and a zombie (not
consciously experiencing) in front of you moving the same muscles and
saying the same words, their brains would *not* be behaving the same
(according to physicalism). This difference is detectable. So
where's the problem?
>
> If you like you could put forward some suggestions of how you think
> they could study such a human to gain the knowledge about
> consciousness, for example distinguishing between whether it is
> organic chemistry or functionalism, and I'll show you why the
> suggestion doesn't work.
I think we're all in agreement that conscious experiences drive
outward behavior in humans (e.g. movement of muscles, etc.). Finding
out what is activating the neurons, and the chain of events in the
brain that leads to it, will point to consciousness which can then be
studied. We can wait for those results to know the degree to which
organic chemistry is required.
someone2
> In article
Regarding behaviour, I have no objection to you including generation
of magnetic fields as a behaviour, even though the definition I
supplied didn't cover it, and would have needed to regard the field as
a observable property, observable by the otherwise unaccounted for
behaviour of things whose behaviour is affected upon contact with the
field.
Well the people that believe certain configurations are influenced by
intangible invisible fairies have that believe about possibly
different configurations from those that believe certain
configurations are being influenced by the IIF (intangible invisble
fairies) consciously experiences. The configurations would be said to
be influenced by IIF are systems which when in the robot would cause
the robot to respond when asked that it was indeed influenced by
invisible intangible fairies. They might suggest that positing the
existance of IIF comes from observed differences in behaviour and in
physical makeup between different types of systems, and plays a role
in accounting for the behaviour of those systems. They believe that
the IIF play a causal role in the decision making of the system, and
that the physical configuration which attracts IIF is going to behave
entirely differently than one which does not, which means that
a configuration that doesn't attract them is going to be different
from the one that doesn't attract them since the difference in
behaviour must follow from the same set of physical laws which
wouldn't happen if the configurations were the same (they aren't
suggesting that systems influenced by the reality of IIF aren't going
to follow the laws of physics).
Certainly you could point out to them that the expected behaviour of
the configurations in question would be produced for that
configuration in a simulation which gave expected results for 1, 2, or
3 node systems, all the way up to the complexity of the configuration
in question. You could point out that the system in question could be
explained in the same fashion as the earlier ones, with no need to
assert the reality of IIF influencing it. Now do you think it would be
reasonable to suggest to the IIF supporters that if it can be assumed
that the 1 and 2 node simulated systems weren't influenced by IIF that
it wasn't necessary to change that assumption of reality for the
simulated system no matter what the configuration, and that as such
what the simulation is giving is an expected behaviour for the
configuration if reality was that it wasn't being influenced by IFF.
someone2
I'm not sure I understood your last paragraph, you seem to be
suggesting they will be looking for what is driving, what you believe
we're all in agreement is driving, the outward behaviour in humans.
So if we assume, even though it is implausible, that the human is
analogous to a robot, and that they work out how the robot works, how
do you suggest that they will distinguish whether it is organic
chemistry or functionalism which is responsible for the conscious
experiences?
Ymir
<47c81b4e-6921-492f...@b1g2000hsg.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
So now that I've explained the relevance, will you please *answer* the
question.
Do you think that your behaviour is influenced by your conscious
experiences? Would you behave the same way if you ceased to have such
experiences?
While you're at it, maybe you'd like to address the other question you
keep avoiding:
Would you mind providing any evidence that people (as an example of
conscious entities) violate the laws of physics? Which laws do they
break?
So why then do you have a problem with defining conscious experience as
a behaviour? It also affects our other behaviours in ways in which would
otherwise be unaccounted for, or do you intend your answer to my earlier
question to be 'no, my behaviour would be unaffected if I lost the
ability to consciously experience the world'?
> Well the people that believe certain configurations are influenced by
> intangible invisible fairies have that believe about possibly
> different configurations from those that believe certain
> configurations are being influenced by the IIF (intangible invisble
> fairies) consciously experiences. The configurations would be said to
> be influenced by IIF are systems which when in the robot would cause
> the robot to respond when asked that it was indeed influenced by
> invisible intangible fairies. They might suggest that positing the
> existance of IIF comes from observed differences in behaviour and in
> physical makeup between different types of systems, and plays a role
> in accounting for the behaviour of those systems. They believe that
> the IIF play a causal role in the decision making of the system, and
> that the physical configuration which attracts IIF is going to behave
> entirely differently than one which does not, which means that
> a configuration that doesn't attract them is going to be different
> from the one that doesn't attract them since the difference in
> behaviour must follow from the same set of physical laws which
> wouldn't happen if the configurations were the same (they aren't
> suggesting that systems influenced by the reality of IIF aren't going
> to follow the laws of physics).
In your example, you're positing faeries which are AFAICT entirely
outside the system, *defined* as being unobservable, and presumably
independent of the laws of physics. There is no analogy here with my
position on consciousness.
André
Kermit
Yes. Our common experience is that consciousness drives much, perhaps
most outward behavior. Certainly the parts most of us are interested
in, most of the time. We have been studying for some time the brain at
work in consicous humans. This investigation has taken off in recent
decades with new tools that allow real time mintoring of th ebrain
while the test subjects do various tasks.
The paragraph seemed pretty straightforward to me.
>
> So if we assume, even though it is implausible, that the human is
> analogous to a robot, and that they work out how the robot works, how
> do you suggest that they will distinguish whether it is organic
> chemistry or functionalism which is responsible for the conscious
> experiences?
Wow. Quite a series of non sequitors. Let's look at them one by one:
"So if we assume, that the human is analogous to a robot"
Well, the brain is a machine of sorts - it takes sensory input,
processes it via various learned and instinctive processes, and
produces ideas and action. So there is some similarity. However, there
aren't actually any self-aware robots yet. It may turn out to be
impossible, but we don't know yet. Surely it makes more sense to call
robots analogous to humans?
"even though it is implausible"
We know of no reason why self-aware and human-intelligent robots are
impossible *in *principle. We can't actually make them yet, which is
why your thought experiment has limited use.
"and that they work out how the robot works"
Well we will know its design, because we built it. However,
intelligent entities, such a s hypothetical Robot As Seen in Movies®,
will behave in unexpected ways, and we will probably want to study it
in order to learn even more. On the other hand, if it is not
conscious, and was never expected to be, there is probably not nearly
as much to learn from it.
"how do you suggest that they will distinguish whether it is organic
chemistry or functionalism which is responsible for the conscious
experiences".
As has been explained to you before, these are not mutually exclusive
conditions. Either, both, or neither may turn out to be true.
Moreover, none of these four possibilities depend on whether or not
the robot works as expected, nor whether or not the mechanism
explaining consciousness can be found by investigation.
So this last sentence was a series of unconnected innuendos,
unsupported assertions, and a false dichotomy. What were you trying to
ask, or if it were intended to be rhetorical, what point were you
trying to make?
Kermit
Jim Lovejoy
news:f48e80c3-d8a5-4e62...@w39g2000prb.googlegroups.com:
> On Oct 19, 2:16 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>snip<
From my perspective, it looks like he's just getting ready to declare
victory before running, er I mean leaving to spread his word to other
newsgroups, yeah that's it.
>
> Kermit
>
>
SortingItOut
Yes, at least for most outward behaviors (excluding reflexes or any
other involuntary behavior). I only said "all in agreement" because I
thought I read a post from you where you stated that you agreed that
consciousness *does* affect behavior in humans.
I don't know the best way to research consciousness. I would think
there are any number of approaches. An expert in the field would have
much better suggestions than me. I only suggested the above as a
possible conceptual approach.
>
> So if we assume, even though it is implausible, that the human is
> analogous to a robot, and that they work out how the robot works, how
> do you suggest that they will distinguish whether it is organic
> chemistry or functionalism which is responsible for the conscious
> experiences?
If you remember, my suggestion is to find out how consciousness works
in humans first, and then apply that knowledge to the robot. So I'm
not sure why you say above "and they work out how the robot works".
Fur humans, I would think that once consciousness is understood, the
questions of organic chemistry vs. functionalism will be answerable.
I don't see why that question needs to be answered first.
Scooter the Mighty
It is nonsense to imply that there are things that are general
functions that are only possible of machines built with carbon
compounds. The idea that only organic chemistry can produce
consciousness is without logical merit.
It is also absurd to propose that a conscious entity can have entirely
predictable behavior based on its parts unless you have knowledge of
every chemical reaction in its brain, which is not an achievable level
of knowledge. If you had such knowledge, the question of whether or
not the robot was conscious would be answered.
Because you cannot be the robot you wouldn't be able to tell if its
conscious experiences were just like yours, but you could certainly
tell it was processing sensory input and making decisions about them
in a way similar to humans, and which affected its behavior. Whether
or not that's "conscious experience" would mostly be an argument about
definitions rather than about what the robot is doing.
someone2
> In article
Yes I believe my behaviour is affected by my conscious experiences, in
the sense that they influence what I will. Though I'm not a
physicalist.
I had said regarding my definition of behaviour as physical motion,
and you questioning whether magnetic fields were a behaviour:
-----------
Regarding behaviour, I have no objection to you including generation
of magnetic fields as a behaviour, even though the definition I
supplied didn't cover it, and would have needed to regard the field as
a observable property, observable by the otherwise unaccounted for
behaviour of things whose behaviour is affected upon contact with the
field.
-----------
To which you asked:
"So why then do you have a problem with defining conscious experience
as a behaviour? It also affects our other behaviours in ways in which
would otherwise be unaccounted for..."
To relate it to magnetic fields; if it were the case that in systems
of high node density that a strong magnetic field emerged that
influenced the way the nodes behaved, and thus the system behaviour,
then the node behaviour could not be explained without the suggestion
of the strong magnetic field. If a strong magnetic field did emerge,
then simulation working simply on inputs, node states and
configurations, wouldn't give the correct expected behaviour, since it
doesn't take into account that emergence. If on the other hand the
system behaviour didn't take any such emergence into account, and
simply worked on inputs, node states and configurations and yet gave
the correct expected behaviour, there would be no need to suggest the
emergence of a strong magnetic field which influenced the behaviour of
the system.
Regarding the suggestion that the robot would be consciously
experiencing; what physical motion does the robot show that requires
the suggestion that in reality it was consciously experiencing.
Similarly what physical motion does a node configuration in a robot
that claimed it was being influenced by invisible intangible fairies
show that requires the suggestion that in reality invisible intangible
fairies were in fact influencing it. In both scenarios the systems can
be simulated on a simulator that can model 1, 2, 3 node systems, up to
the complexity of the systems required, and explained simply in terms
of the inputs, nodes states, and configuration. In otherwords only the
inputs, node states and configurations were needed to be able to
account for all the physical motion in the systems.
someone2
> someone2 wrote:
> > On 17 Oct, 20:26, Eric Rowley <n...@no.nix> wrote:
> >> someone2 wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>> Are you saying that people that don't believe the intangible invisible
> >>> fairy story can't have an expected behaviour for the system not being
> >>> influenced by intangible invisible fairies?
> >> Certainly not, why would I say that?
>
> >> All they have to do is borrow the results of the simulation from Team A
> >> or Team B.
>
> >>> It seems slightly strange if you are.
> >>> Yet you seem to claim that people that don't believe the
> >>> consciously experiencing story can't have an expected behaviour for
> >>> the system not being influenced by conscious experiences.
> >> Certainly!
> >> Since they don't know if the simulation is a simulation of a conscious
> >> robot or of a non conscious robot they can't know whether the prediction
> >> is the way the robot would behave if it were conscious or the way it
> >> would behave if it weren't conscious.
>
> >> All they know is that that is how the robot should behave if it has the
> >> state of consciousness (conscious or non conscious) that it had when the
> >> neural state the simulation was based on was recorded.
> >> (if it isn't influenced by fairies.)
>
> >>> Have I misunderstood,
> >> Probably.
>
> >>> and that you are consistent in your reasoning,
> >> I think so.
>
> >>> and that you accept that the people that don't believe in the stories can still
> >>> have an expected behaviour for the system?
> >> Sure they can.
> >> But the simulation only tells them how the robot will behave if it isn't
> >> influenced by fairies, not how it will behave if it isn't influenced by
> >> consciousness.
>
> >> And that, I believe, is your cue, time for another round of
> >> misunderstanding and accusing me of being inconsistent again. ;-)
>
> > Well the people that believe certain configurations are influenced by
> > intangible invisible fairies have that believe about possibly
> > different configurations from those that believe certain
>
> Yes?
>
> And what are we supposed to infer from that?
>
> > The configurations would be said to be influenced by invisible
> > intangible fairies are systems which when in the robot would cause the
> > robot to respond when asked that it was indeed influenced by invisible
> > intangible fairies.
>
> by fairies?
>
> Certainly the robot _could_ have been designed to pretend to be infested
> by fairies. But suppose we knew that it hadn't, that in fact the robot
> had never been told about fairies, never read about fairies, never heard
> about them on the radio or TV? If so, claiming to be influenced by
> fairies would be pretty good evidence that that was actually the case!
>
> > Certainly you could point out to them that the expected behaviour of
> > the configurations in question would be produced for that
> > configuration in a simulation which gave expected results for 1, 2, or
> > in question.
>
> Not if the behavior really _was_ influenced by fairies!
>
> > You could point out that the system in question could be
> > explained in the same fashion as the earlier ones,
>
>
> > with no need to
> > assert the reality of invisible, intangible fairies influencing it.
>
> If the robot didn't behave as predicted by the simulation, and no fault
> could be found in the simulation then that would be evidence for
> _something_ influencing it.
>
> > Now are you saying that it would be fair to point out to them that the
> > simulation is giving an expected behaviour for if the reality was that
> > there weren't invisible, intangible fairies influencing the system?
>
> Yes.
> Didn't I say that in the post you were replying to?
>
Ah so if it were the invisible intangible fairies were a reality and
that the behaviour of the system were influenced by that reality you
suggest that the simulation which gave expected results for 1, 2, or 3
node systems wouldn't be able to give the correct expected results for
a system so influenced.
That if the simulation were to give the expected behaviour that it
would be fair to point out that the system was giving the expected
behaviour for if the system were not influenced by a reality of
invisible intangible fairies.
While this seems perfectly reasonable to me, would you be consistent
in your reasoning such that you would also be saying:
If it were the conscious experiences were a reality and that the
behaviour of the system were influenced by that reality you suggest
that the simulation which gave expected results for 1, 2, or 3 node
systems wouldn't be able to give the correct expected results for a
system so influenced.
That if the simulation were to give the expected behaviour that it
would be fair to point out that the system was giving the expected
behaviour for if the system were not influenced by a reality of
conscious experiences.
someone2
If we assume, even though it is implausible, that the human is
analogous to a robot, to work out how consciousness works, presumably
it'd need to be established whether it was organic chemistry or
functionalism which is responsible for the conscious experiences.
Otherwise you don't know how it works because you don't know whether
it is caused by organic activity, or functionalism. I am pointing out
that there is a barrier there, and that you couldn't do it. You seem
to not have understood the problem, and aren't claiming to have any
ideas in how you could distinguish between the speculations, but seem
to be just begging the question that it could be done.
Anyway, back to the robot we were talking about earlier, do you accept
that if people were only given that to study, that they couldn't
determine whether it was consciously experiencing or not?
Inez
And if the robot were conscious, you couldn't explain its behavior as
if it weren't conscious. The consciousness would be present like a
magnetic field, and affect the robot's behavior, and you could detect
it.
Ymir
<988f18b1-f725-40a8...@c2g2000pra.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
> Yes I believe my behaviour is affected by my conscious experiences,
And this is the entire crux of the matter.
If you believe that your behaviour is affected by consciousness, then
you recognise that a conscious entity and a non-conscious one will
behave differently.
A physical explanation of the behaviour of a robot (or a person, or a
collection of nodes, or of anything else for that matter) will produce
expectations regarding its behaviour. What we need to ask is whether
that behaviour is the type of behaviour that we associate with
consciousness or not.
If two researchers expect the same behaviour from a given entity, but
one claims that the entity is conscious and the other claims that it is
not, then that indicates that they have different views on what
behaviours are associated with consciousness.
We need to reach some sort of agreement on what constitutes conscious
behaviour *before* we look at the sorts of behaviours that given
theories predict about different entities if we want to establish which
theory provides a better explanation of how consciousness works.
Your hypothetical only-organic-things-can-be-conscious person will need
to outline which behaviours they assume are sufficient to demonstrate
consciousness and then show that the laws of physics provide a way for
organic entities to produce those behaviours, but do not provide any way
for inorganic ones to produce said behaviours.
You, on the other hand, are taking an entirely backwards approach where
you say they assert that only organic entities can be conscious, and
therefore deny that a robot could be conscious regardless of how it
acts. By doing so they are setting up their position in such a way as to
render it entirely non-testable and useless. That's not how legitimate
scientific inquiry works.
If our researchers *can't* agree on behavioural tests for consciousness,
then that indicates that they are having a dispute over definitions, not
a dispute over how reality actually works.
>in
> the sense that they influence what I will. Though I'm not a
> physicalist.
Whether you're a physicalist or not is irrelevant to establishing
criteria for identifying consciousness -- investigating which position
on how to account for consciousness is most adequate is something which
comes later.
All of this confuses different levels of explanation.
The behaviour of my computer can be described in terms of its current
memory state, its inputs and outputs, and the way in which the Intel
instruction set is interpreted without making any reference to Mac OS X.
Does that mean that there is no need to suggest that I am actually
running Mac OS X?
>
> Regarding the suggestion that the robot would be consciously
> experiencing; what physical motion does the robot show that requires
> the suggestion that in reality it was consciously experiencing.
You have already acknowledged that conscious entities will behave
differently from non-conscious ones, so the above question is really
quite silly. Why don't you start by identifying which criteria you use
to identify consciousness in others and then simply apply them to this
situation? That is, after all, how empirical inquiry works.
André
SortingItOut
This makes no sense. You need to explain why the question of
functionalism has to be answered before consciousness can be
understood. If we're investigating how a kidney works, do we have to
know something about functionalism before we know how a kidney works?
Explain your answer.
> Otherwise you don't know how it works because you don't know whether
> it is caused by organic activity, or functionalism. I am pointing out
> that there is a barrier there,
You have failed to point out a barrier to understanding human
consciousness.
> and that you couldn't do it. You seem
> to not have understood the problem,
I see no problem.
> and aren't claiming to have any
> ideas in how you could distinguish between the speculations,
Which of your many hypothetical speculations are you referring to?
I've explained that all speculations about the robot are answered when
human consciousness is understood.
someone2
> In article
It doesn't follow for me that my conscious experiences (A) implies a
certain external behaviour (B) means that a certain external behaviour
(B) implies conscious experiences (A). That is the fallacy of
affirming the consequent.
Furthermore though you seem to fail to grasp it, the issue is that if
it were assumed that consciously experienced could have its behaviour
explained in the same terms of physics as something that didn't
consciously experience, then something that consciously experiences
would be behaving as expected if it wasn't. Though you haven't managed
to follow why that would be the case. Which is why you don't seem to
grasp that if your behaviour is being influenced by your conscious
experiences (as it blantantly is), then the assumption was wrong.
I had said:
--------------
To relate it to magnetic fields; if it were the case that in systems
of high node density that a strong magnetic field emerged that
influenced the way the nodes behaved, and thus the system behaviour,
then the node behaviour could not be explained without the suggestion
of the strong magnetic field. If a strong magnetic field did emerge,
then simulation working simply on inputs, node states and
configurations, wouldn't give the correct expected behaviour, since it
doesn't take into account that emergence. If on the other hand the
system behaviour didn't take any such emergence into account, and
simply worked on inputs, node states and configurations and yet gave
the correct expected behaviour, there would be no need to suggest the
emergence of a strong magnetic field which influenced the behaviour of
the system.
--------------
Did you manage to understand when there would be evidence for the
emergence of a strong magnetic field and when there would be none?
Regarding your inappropriate example of a computer running Mac OS X,
the "Mac OS X" is a label for some essence of memory state. Whether
you chose to use the label or not is irrelevant. Whether a strong
magnetic field were present or not is not an issue of whether a
certain label were used, it would mean a difference in physical motion
in the example given, and thus there would be evidence for whether it
were present or not.
someone2
You seem to be suggesting that you could "understand" consciousness
and yet not understand whether the cause for the conscious experiences
was the function of the physical activity, or whether it was
particularly the organic physical activity of the brain.
If not then you need to point out how you would distinguish between
whether it was the function of the physical activity (functionalism)
or the particular organic neural activity.
If you are, then without understanding whether the cause of conscious
experiences was the the function of the physical activity, or whether
it was particularly the organic physical activity of the brain, then
how could they know whether the robot was consciously experiencing, as
the answer would be affected by that very point.
When you tire of begging the question, perhaps you comment on whether
Ymir
<a721ff81-2902-4219...@y79g2000hsa.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
Except that isn't what I said. I said we need to establish criteria for
identifying consciousness, which entails identifying observable
behaviours which are *only* associated with conscious behaviour. There
is no affirmation of the consequent involved.
Operational definitions are required in any domain of inquiry. You seem
determined, though, to evade any questions about how to operationalise
consciousness, because it becomes clear that your entire argument (using
the term rather loosely) falls apart as soon as you are forced to
abandon the definitional vagueness which you employ.
> Furthermore though you seem to fail to grasp it, the issue is that if
> it were assumed that consciously experienced could have its behaviour
> explained in the same terms of physics as something that didn't
> consciously experience, then something that consciously experiences
> would be behaving as expected if it wasn't.
You've said this numerous times, and it is just as wrong this time as it
has been the last bazillion times.
I can explain the behaviour of a rising helium balloon using the exact
same physicals laws as I can explain the behaviour of a falling anvil.
That doesn't mean that either of them is behaving in a way other than
expected, nor does it entail that anvils don't fall or that helium
balloons don't rise.
> Though you haven't managed
> to follow why that would be the case. Which is why you don't seem to
> grasp that if your behaviour is being influenced by your conscious
> experiences (as it blantantly is), then the assumption was wrong.
You're making no sense here.
> I had said:
> --------------
> To relate it to magnetic fields; if it were the case that in systems
> of high node density that a strong magnetic field emerged that
> influenced the way the nodes behaved, and thus the system behaviour,
> then the node behaviour could not be explained without the suggestion
> of the strong magnetic field. If a strong magnetic field did emerge,
> then simulation working simply on inputs, node states and
> configurations, wouldn't give the correct expected behaviour, since it
> doesn't take into account that emergence. If on the other hand the
> system behaviour didn't take any such emergence into account, and
> simply worked on inputs, node states and configurations and yet gave
> the correct expected behaviour, there would be no need to suggest the
> emergence of a strong magnetic field which influenced the behaviour of
> the system.
> --------------
>
> Did you manage to understand when there would be evidence for the
> emergence of a strong magnetic field and when there would be none?
Just as behaviour provides evidence for consciousness -- you said
yourself that conscious things behave differently from non-conscious
ones.
> Regarding your inappropriate example of a computer running Mac OS X,
> the "Mac OS X" is a label for some essence of memory state.
It's a label for a set of instructions and associated data, not for
'some essence of memory state.'
Simililarly, 'consciousness' is a label for the activity produced by a
set of neurons or comparable entities which are configured in a
particularly way.
Similarly 'deuterium' is a label for a group of fermions arranged in a
particular way which differs from the way in which a group of fermions
which we label as 'iron' are arranged. Iron and deuterium behave
differently despite the fact that they follow the same exact same laws
of physics and are composed of the exact same types of particles.
I'm not sure why labels pose a problem for you.
> Whether
> you chose to use the label or not is irrelevant. Whether a strong
> magnetic field were present or not is not an issue of whether a
> certain label were used, it would mean a difference in physical motion
> in the example given, and thus there would be evidence for whether it
> were present or not.
And consciousness is different from this because...?
André
someone2
> In article
I never said conscious things behave differently from non conscious
things. I said my behaviour is influenced by me consciously
experiencing. I never said anything about infering from the external
behaviour of something whether it is consciously experiencing or not.
To do so would seem to be making the fallacy of confirming the
consequent that I pointed out.
As for you asking why consciousness would be different from a magnetic
field as I had said regarding the magnetic field:
--------------
To relate it to magnetic fields; if it were the case that in systems
of high node density that a strong magnetic field emerged that
influenced the way the nodes behaved, and thus the system behaviour,
then the node behaviour could not be explained without the suggestion
of the strong magnetic field. If a strong magnetic field did emerge,
then simulation working simply on inputs, node states and
configurations, wouldn't give the correct expected behaviour, since it
doesn't take into account that emergence. If on the other hand the
system behaviour didn't take any such emergence into account, and
simply worked on inputs, node states and configurations and yet gave
the correct expected behaviour, there would be no need to suggest the
emergence of a strong magnetic field which influenced the behaviour of
the system.
--------------
You presumably admit, that the simulation would not give the correct
expected behaviour for if a strong magnetic field had emerged, only
for if it hadn't. Yet you claim that the simulation working simply on
the inputs, node states and configurations could give the correct
expected behaviour for whether conscious experiences had emerged or
not. Perhaps you'll explain why it would be different for the
emergence of the magnetic field.
Ymir
<d8a48c9b-d35c-4fd0...@k16g2000hsf.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
That is a contradiction. Are you trying to claim that your conscious
experiences influence your behaviour, but that if your conscious
experiences were removed you'd behave exactly the same way? In that case
you have a rather nonstandard definition of 'influence' in mind.
> I never said anything about infering from the external
> behaviour of something whether it is consciously experiencing or not.
> To do so would seem to be making the fallacy of confirming the
> consequent that I pointed out.
No. It would be employing inductive reasoning, which is what science
does.
Since you want to maintain that we can't infer consciousness from
behaviour, perhaps you will tell us which criterion you would use to
decide whether something is conscious (this is about the thousandth time
you've been asked this question btw).
> As for you asking why consciousness would be different from a magnetic
> field as I had said regarding the magnetic field:
> --------------
> To relate it to magnetic fields; if it were the case that in systems
> of high node density that a strong magnetic field emerged that
> influenced the way the nodes behaved, and thus the system behaviour,
> then the node behaviour could not be explained without the suggestion
> of the strong magnetic field. If a strong magnetic field did emerge,
> then simulation working simply on inputs, node states and
> configurations, wouldn't give the correct expected behaviour, since it
> doesn't take into account that emergence.
Why do you say this? If I'm trying to explain how something behaves, I
would have to consider all relevant aspects of the system. Otherwise,
I'm not successfully explaining it. Surely you're not suggesting that we
wouldn't be capable of determining whether or not something generates a
magnetic field?
> If on the other hand the
> system behaviour didn't take any such emergence into account, and
> simply worked on inputs, node states and configurations and yet gave
> the correct expected behaviour, there would be no need to suggest the
> emergence of a strong magnetic field which influenced the behaviour of
> the system.
> --------------
>
> You presumably admit, that the simulation would not give the correct
> expected behaviour for if a strong magnetic field had emerged, only
> for if it hadn't.
Why would I want to consider what an incomplete model of something does
or doesn't do? If I were trying to model something and magnetism played
a role, I'd model that as well.
> Yet you claim that the simulation working simply on
> the inputs, node states and configurations could give the correct
> expected behaviour for whether conscious experiences had emerged or
> not.
If the nodes were arranged such that they produced consciousness, they
would behave in one way; were they arranged in some other way, then they
would behave in another way. In neither case do we need to talk about
the nodes 'simulating' something. They either form a conscious system or
they do not.
I'm not sure exactly what you mean by 'inputs' and 'node states', but
I'm starting to think you are using it to mean something which is far
less inclusive than anything I have been suggesting. I've said that the
behaviour of the system is the result of its physical configuration; not
of some limited subset of that configuration.
André
Inez
> In article
conscious robots can behave in the same way as conscious robots, so
that zombie pseudo-consciousness can give the same behavior.
> > I never said anything about infering from the external
> > behaviour of something whether it is consciously experiencing or not.
> > To do so would seem to be making the fallacy of confirming the
> > consequent that I pointed out.
>
> No. It would be employing inductive reasoning, which is what science
> does.
>
> Since you want to maintain that we can't infer consciousness from
> behaviour, perhaps you will tell us which criterion you would use to
> decide whether something is conscious (this is about the thousandth time
> you've been asked this question btw).
It is vital to his argument that consciousness be non-detectable.
Ymir
<4cb15d00-b13b-45dd...@k36g2000pri.googlegroups.com>,
Inez <savagem...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> It is vital to his argument that consciousness be non-detectable.
>
Yes, but it would be nice if he would come out and explicitly admit that
his view of consciousness is one in which it is entirely irrelevant to
anything. Then maybe he'd stop obsessing about it so much.
André
Inez
> In article
>
> Inez <savagemouse...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > It is vital to his argument that consciousness be non-detectable.
>
> Yes, but it would be nice if he would come out and explicitly admit that
> his view of consciousness is one in which it is entirely irrelevant to
> anything. Then maybe he'd stop obsessing about it so much.
>
> André
Well...I think he believes it's the bit of you that goes to heaven or
the bad place when you die, so it is relevant to him.
I'm fairly sure that at this point he sees where his logic breaks
down, which is why he hates to answer questions and never does so in a
thoughtful way.
someone2
> In article
If you reason that your conscious experiences (A) imply certain
behaviour (B) and that therefore certain behaviour (B) implies
conscious experiences (A) then you are committing the fallacy of
affirming the consequent.
How I would infer consciousness is irrelevant, this isn't a
conversation about my beliefs.
I said:
-----------------
To relate it to magnetic fields; if it were the case that in systems
of high node density that a strong magnetic field emerged that
influenced the way the nodes behaved, and thus the system behaviour,
then the node behaviour could not be explained without the suggestion
of the strong magnetic field. If a strong magnetic field did emerge,
then simulation working simply on inputs, node states and
configurations, wouldn't give the correct expected behaviour, since it
doesn't take into account that emergence.
-----------------
And you seemed not to understand why the simultation wouldn't get the
correct expected behaviour. The reason is that it isn't taking into
account any strong magnetic field emerging. It is simply working on
the inputs the node states and configurations, same as it does for 1
or 2 or 3 node systems, up to the complexity of the system in
question. Do you understand now, it hasn't been taken into account
that any strong magnetic field would emerge.
Ymir
<0222300c-98ef-412c...@y79g2000hsa.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
Except that my reasoning wasn't the above. It was that if certain
behaviours arise only if consciousness is present, then we can use those
behaviours to infer consciousness.
> How I would infer consciousness is irrelevant, this isn't a
> conversation about my beliefs.
It's relevant because if you want to meaningfully discuss consciousness,
you need some way of identifying it before you start theorising about
its causes. So let's try that again. Which criteria would you use to
distinguish conscious from non-conscious entities. If you can't provide
one, then you are essentially claiming that consciousness is a
meaningless entity.
> I said:
> -----------------
> To relate it to magnetic fields; if it were the case that in systems
> of high node density that a strong magnetic field emerged that
> influenced the way the nodes behaved, and thus the system behaviour,
> then the node behaviour could not be explained without the suggestion
> of the strong magnetic field. If a strong magnetic field did emerge,
> then simulation working simply on inputs, node states and
> configurations, wouldn't give the correct expected behaviour, since it
> doesn't take into account that emergence.
> -----------------
>
> And you seemed not to understand why the simultation wouldn't get the
> correct expected behaviour. The reason is that it isn't taking into
> account any strong magnetic field emerging. It is simply working on
> the inputs the node states and configurations, same as it does for 1
> or 2 or 3 node systems, up to the complexity of the system in
> question. Do you understand now, it hasn't been taken into account
> that any strong magnetic field would emerge.
Why would my simulation be required to restrict itself in such a way
that it wouldn't consider those aspects of node interaction which
resulted in this magnetic field? This seems to be a rather artificial
limitation that you are trying to impose.
André
someone2
> In article
Let's just suppose that the simulation program was written to simulate
systems which had 1-100,000,000 nodes, but that it could simulate
more. It just wasn't built to account for strong magnetic fields that
would occur in 50gb node sytems (a node being a byte).
Ymir
<d6bae8da-434d-47aa...@b38g2000prf.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
So you're saying that a simulation which is only designed to handle
certain cases might break down in instances which fall outside of those
parameters. Fine, but I don't actually see what point you are making
here.
Now, let's try again: What criteria do you use to distinguish conscious
entities from non-conscious entities? If you see, for example, an
electric motor and a cat, what leads you to believe that the former is
non-conscious whereas the latter is (assuming you believe motors to be
non-conscious and cats to be conscious)?
André
SortingItOut
> On 21 Oct, 06:42, SortingItOut <eri...@home.com> wrote:
>
> > On Oct 20, 4:30 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
> > > On 20 Oct, 07:05, SortingItOut <eri...@home.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Oct 19, 4:16 pm, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > On 18 Oct, 06:43, SortingItOut <eri...@home.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > On Oct 17, 8:41 am, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > O
No, I'm saying that the question of functionalism comes with the
understanding.
>
> If not then you need to point out how you would distinguish between
> whether it was the function of the physical activity (functionalism)
> or the particular organic neural activity.
No I don't. You're requiring knowledge of consciousness that we don't
have, or at least I don't think we have.
>
> If you are, then without understanding whether the cause of conscious
> experiences was the the function of the physical activity, or whether
> it was particularly the organic physical activity of the brain, then
> how could they know whether the robot was consciously experiencing, as
> the answer would be affected by that very point.
Why is this relevant, anyway? If functionalism doesn't apply, and
neurons are required for consciousness, then we know the robot is not
conscious. If functionalism applies, then we're armed with the
knowledge necessary to investigate the robot. We'll know whether
functionalism applies when we understand human consciousness. So who
cares whether we know that now?
>
> When you tire of begging the question, perhaps you comment on whether
> you accept that if people were only given that to study, that they
> couldn't determine whether it was consciously experiencing or not?
So:
1) You agree that there's no barrier to understanding human
consciousness?
2) You're arbitrarily rejecting my solution to the problem?
3) You think the robot question has significance even *after* we
understand human consciousness?
I need to re-read your original paper to remember exactly what we know
and don't know about the robot. It's now in another thread
somewhere. I'll get to this tomorrow.
someone2
> In article
What difference what criteria I would use to distinguish conscious
entities from non-conscious entities, the answer is that I don't
expect a difference in external behaviour, but would expect a
difference in the internal behaviour in the sense that that which is
consciously experiencing couldn't have its behaviour described in the
same terms of physics as something that doesn't consciously
experience. So I wouldn't expect the robot to be consciously
experiencing. It is behaving as I would expect it to if it wasn't. As
for a cat, I don't know whether it is consciously experiencing or not,
I would treat it as though it is though, as I don't know. The electric
motor could be shown not to be consciously experiencing.
As for where I would expect the differences, I would expect them to be
in the neural state, though I am not sure where they would be found,
possibilities such as differences in quantum effects operating on
alpha and beta microtubules have been put forward by Professors
Penrose and Hameroff, though theirs is a physicalist account,
http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/penrose-hameroff/consciousevents.html,
alternatively there could be spontaneous neural activity. Activity
like this would also be expected from physicalist perspectives such as
property dualism as reported by Professor Chalmers in
http://consc.net/papers/nature.html. This isn't to say that I expect
evidence to be found of these, there may well be practical obstacles
preventing this.
This doesn't mean that there could be no scientific experiment to
falsify the suggestion. For example recent research by John-Dylan
Haynes from the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain
Sciences suggests that the technology is now available to allow for an
experiment on this issue. From the press release:
“They let subjects freely and covertly choose between two possible
tasks - to either add or subtract two numbers. They were then asked to
hold in mind their intention for a while until the relevant numbers
were presented on a screen. The researchers were able to recognize the
subjects intentions with 70% accuracy based alone on their brain”
it can be seen that the technology allows for decisions to be
recognized from their "multivariate pattern recognition" method. This
allows for the perspective that there is purely the spiritual to make
an experimental prediction, and thus be put forward as a scientific
theory. The prediction would be that given a button being placed
infront of a subject, they would be unable to predict a when the
subject was going to push the button, above 50% accuracy, more than
one and a half seconds before the behaviour to do so is implemented,
to be safe with regards to not simply detecting the physical
implementation of a spiritual decision. Admittedly the inability to do
so isn't strictly a positive result for the spiritual perspective, as
there could be technical difficulties, though it is difficult to see
the conceptual objections from a physicalist perspective of there
being patterns of activity prior to the behavioural implementation
indicating a proximity in time of the behaviour being implemented.
Though my perspective is not the issue here. I have just answered so
you don't start claiming that I am avoiding your questions. Perhaps
you would be kind enough to explain the relevance of my perspective to
the implications of the assumption of some physicalists that something
that consciously experiences can have its behaviour described in the
same terms of physics as something that doesn't.
The simulation can give an expected behaviour for very complex cases.
The problem is that expected behaviour is always based upon the inputs
the node states and configurations. So if something emerges that
influences the behaviour of the nodes such as a strong magnetic field,
then it wouldn't give the correct expected behaviour. You seem to
understand why, not all node outputs would be as expected given the
inputs as they would in a one node system. Though you aren't saying
that the emergence of conscious experiences that influence the
behaviour would cause the simulation to no longer give the correct
expected behaviour. So here you can clearly see that there is a
difference between the emergence of a strong magnetic field, and your
claimed emergence of conscious experiences. There is a clear
difference in the expected behaviour with regards to whether strong
magnetic field emerged in a system or not, there is no difference in
expected behaviour with regards whether conscious experiences emerged
or not.
someone2
Obviously I don't agree to 1, I've been telling you there would a
barrier the whole time.
I'm not arbitrarily rejecting your solution, you don't have one. You
don't have any suggestion that of how it could be distinguished
whether it was the function of the physical activity, or whether it
was particularly the organic physical activity of the brain. You just
beg the question that you could distinguish.
Ymir
<ad1decf6-7a64-4d43...@75g2000hso.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
Would it be too much to ask for you to start responding to posts inline
rather than putting all of your responses at the end of the post. It
makes it difficult to determine which parts of the post you are
responding to. It's much easier to follow a post when you place your
text immediately below the portion of the post you are responding to.
> What difference what criteria I would use to distinguish conscious
> entities from non-conscious entities, the answer is that I don't
> expect a difference in external behaviour, but would expect a
> difference in the internal behaviour in the sense that that which is
> consciously experiencing couldn't have its behaviour described in the
> same terms of physics as something that doesn't consciously
> experience.
What actual evidence do you have to back this up? There's nothing to
suggest that people (who are conscious) do not obey the same laws of
physics as anything else. And how exactly does this constitute a
criterion for identifying something as conscious? How exactly do you
propose that we investigate its 'internal behaviour' to determine
whether it is conscious.
This whole business of conscious things following different laws from
non-conscious ones is purely a baseless supposition on your part which
renders your entire argument circular, since it seems to revolve around
the notion that if we can explain a robot in terms of the laws of
physics, it must not be conscious. Unless you can back up this
supposition of yours, then your entire argument begs the question.
> So I wouldn't expect the robot to be consciously
> experiencing. It is behaving as I would expect it to if it wasn't. As
> for a cat, I don't know whether it is consciously experiencing or not,
> I would treat it as though it is though, as I don't know. The electric
> motor could be shown not to be consciously experiencing.
How can an electric motor be shown to not be conscious? Why can't the
same approach be used to determine whether the cat is conscious?
> As for where I would expect the differences, I would expect them to be
> in the neural state, though I am not sure where they would be found,
> possibilities such as differences in quantum effects operating on
> alpha and beta microtubules have been put forward by Professors
> Penrose and Hameroff
Evidence for this? What exactly constitutes a 'difference in quantum
effects'?
> , though theirs is a physicalist account,
> http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/penrose-hameroff/consciousevents.html,
> alternatively there could be spontaneous neural activity. Activity
> like this would also be expected from physicalist perspectives such as
> property dualism as reported by Professor Chalmers in
> http://consc.net/papers/nature.html. This isn't to say that I expect
> evidence to be found of these, there may well be practical obstacles
> preventing this.
>
> This doesn't mean that there could be no scientific experiment to
> falsify the suggestion. For example recent research by John-Dylan
> Haynes from the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain
> Sciences suggests that the technology is now available to allow for an
> experiment on this issue. From the press release:
>
> ³They let subjects freely and covertly choose between two possible
> tasks - to either add or subtract two numbers. They were then asked to
> hold in mind their intention for a while until the relevant numbers
> were presented on a screen. The researchers were able to recognize the
> subjects intentions with 70% accuracy based alone on their brain²
>
> it can be seen that the technology allows for decisions to be
> recognized from their "multivariate pattern recognition" method. This
> allows for the perspective that there is purely the spiritual to make
> an experimental prediction, and thus be put forward as a scientific
> theory.
That's got to be the strangest interpretation of this result that I've
ever encountered. All this experiment shows is that it is possible to
determine which decision a subject is making by looking at their brain
states, which would seem to suggest that it is the brain, and not some
'spiritual' entity which is responsible for the decisions.
> The prediction would be that given a button being placed
> infront of a subject, they would be unable to predict a when the
> subject was going to push the button, above 50% accuracy, more than
> one and a half seconds before the behaviour to do so is implemented,
> to be safe with regards to not simply detecting the physical
> implementation of a spiritual decision.
?? This is entirely incoherent.
> Admittedly the inability to do
> so isn't strictly a positive result for the spiritual perspective, as
> there could be technical difficulties, though it is difficult to see
> the conceptual objections from a physicalist perspective of there
> being patterns of activity prior to the behavioural implementation
> indicating a proximity in time of the behaviour being implemented.
>
> Though my perspective is not the issue here. I have just answered so
> you don't start claiming that I am avoiding your questions. Perhaps
> you would be kind enough to explain the relevance of my perspective to
> the implications of the assumption of some physicalists that something
> that consciously experiences can have its behaviour described in the
> same terms of physics as something that doesn't.
Your assumption has no actual evidence to back it up. You haven't
actually answered the question, though, since you haven't actually
provided any *test* for consciousness. The relevance of this is that if
you want to assert that things are or aren't conscious, or that things
with/without certain properties can/cannot be conscious, you need to
actually have some criterion for *independently* recognising
consciousness. You seem to think there is a test with respect to the
motor above, but you don't actually state it.
> The simulation can give an expected behaviour for very complex cases.
> The problem is that expected behaviour is always based upon the inputs
> the node states and configurations.
Why do you assert this? Why must a simulation be restricted to looking
only at these things? If something is going on which requires us to look
at additional factors, any competent researcher is going to include
these in their model.
> So if something emerges that
> influences the behaviour of the nodes such as a strong magnetic field,
> then it wouldn't give the correct expected behaviour.
If a bunch of nodes put together cause a magnetic field, then any
adequate model of node behaviour is going to have to account for this
fact. All your doing is asserting that an inadequate model isn't going
to be adequate, which is a truism. The whole point of developing models
is to refine those models to the point where they actually account for
all of the facts which you are trying to explain.
> You seem to
> understand why, not all node outputs would be as expected given the
> inputs as they would in a one node system. Though you aren't saying
> that the emergence of conscious experiences that influence the
> behaviour would cause the simulation to no longer give the correct
> expected behaviour. So here you can clearly see that there is a
> difference between the emergence of a strong magnetic field, and your
> claimed emergence of conscious experiences. There is a clear
> difference in the expected behaviour with regards to whether strong
> magnetic field emerged in a system or not, there is no difference in
> expected behaviour with regards whether conscious experiences emerged
> or not.
You seem to constantly be assuming that consciousness is some sort of
primitive which exists independently of the system. It is not.
Consciousness refers to a pattern of activity which can only be created
in systems with the appropriate physical characteristics. The nodes
might behave the same in a one, two, or 10^10 node system, but that
doesn't mean the *systems* will behave the same way.
André
someone2
> In article
I won't answer inline, but will repaste the parts that I am responding
to, to help avoid confusion. Personally I'd prefer if you answered at
the bottom each time, but I doubt you will.
You said:
------------
You seem to constantly be assuming that consciousness is some sort of
primitive which exists independently of the system.
------------
I don't assume that consciousness is some fort of primitive which
exists independently of the system while discussing physicalism.
I had said:
----------
The simulation can give an expected behaviour for very complex cases.
The problem is that expected behaviour is always based upon the inputs
the node states and configurations.
----------
To which you replied:
----------
Why do you assert this? Why must a simulation be restricted to looking
only at these things? If something is going on which requires us to
look at additional factors, any competent researcher is going to
include these in their model.
----------
As I had posted earlier but which is now snipped:
----------
Let's just suppose that the simulation program was written to simulate
systems which had 1-100,000,000 nodes, but that it could simulate
more. It just wasn't built to account for strong magnetic fields that
would occur in 50gb node sytems (a node being a byte).
----------
Furthermore, it helps illustrate the point that there is a difference
between the emergence of a strong magnetic field, and your claimed
emergence of conscious experiences.
The difference being that if something emerges that influences the
behaviour of the nodes such as a strong magnetic field, then the
simulations wouldn't give the correct expected behaviour. Though the
emergence of conscious experiences wouldn't cause the simulation to no
longer give the correct expected behaviour. Which is different to the
emergence of a stong magnetic field. Have you managed to understand
this point, it has been going on for a few posts now, and you haven't
acknowledged that you understand the difference yet.
Ymir
<870c0628-224f-429f...@v72g2000hsv.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
Responding at the bottom makes it less obvious when you skip questions.
In particular, you failed to answer my question regarding how it would
be possible to determine that a motor wasn't conscious but not possible
to determine whether a cat was conscious. If your criterion is to be
useful, it needs to work both ways.
You also failed to address my question regarding evidence pertaining to
your claim that conscious entities can't follow the same laws of physics
as nonconscious ones. What evidence do you have to support the view that
humans don't follow the laws of physics?
> You said:
> ------------
> You seem to constantly be assuming that consciousness is some sort of
> primitive which exists independently of the system.
> ------------
>
> I don't assume that consciousness is some fort of primitive which
> exists independently of the system while discussing physicalism.
Are you saying that you do assume this when not discussing physicalism?
Unfortunately, it seems to sneak into your discussions of physicalism
even if you don't realise it.
> I had said:
> ----------
> The simulation can give an expected behaviour for very complex cases.
> The problem is that expected behaviour is always based upon the inputs
> the node states and configurations.
> ----------
>
> To which you replied:
> ----------
> Why do you assert this? Why must a simulation be restricted to looking
> only at these things? If something is going on which requires us to
> look at additional factors, any competent researcher is going to
> include these in their model.
> ----------
>
> As I had posted earlier but which is now snipped:
> ----------
> Let's just suppose that the simulation program was written to simulate
> systems which had 1-100,000,000 nodes, but that it could simulate
> more. It just wasn't built to account for strong magnetic fields that
> would occur in 50gb node sytems (a node being a byte).
> --------
If it was written to simulate smaller systems, one wouldn't rely on it
to model larger ones without verifying that it actually worked for such
cases as well.
> Furthermore, it helps illustrate the point that there is a difference
> between the emergence of a strong magnetic field, and your claimed
> emergence of conscious experiences.
>
> The difference being that if something emerges that influences the
> behaviour of the nodes such as a strong magnetic field, then the
> simulations wouldn't give the correct expected behaviour. Though the
> emergence of conscious experiences wouldn't cause the simulation to no
> longer give the correct expected behaviour.
If the simulation was incapable of modelling consciousness and you were
trying to use it to predict the behaviour of a conscious system then of
course it wouldn't give the correct behaviour.
I don't think you understand what 'emergence' means. It doesn't mean
'magically appears in ways which don't follow from lower level
components'. If a magnetic field were to emerge, it would be something
that could be predicted from the make-up and arrangement of the
individual nodes. In your example, if the simulation fails to predict it
it is only because it isn't a very good model.
Consciousness is the combined behaviour of a group of nodes. It isn't
something which exists independently of those nodes and which somehow
alters their individual behaviours. If a simulation fails to predict
this combined behaviour it means the model isn't taking into account all
of the relevant properties of the individual nodes.
> Which is different to the
> emergence of a stong magnetic field. Have you managed to understand
> this point, it has been going on for a few posts now, and you haven't
> acknowledged that you understand the difference yet.
I understand your point, but think it only demonstrates a fundamental
failure on your part to grasp what the physicalist position which you
claim to be arguing against actually is. You are implicitly assuming
that consciousness is something which exists independently of the node
interactions rather than the overall activity performed by the set of
nodes themselves.
André
someone2
> In article
You said:
---------------
Responding at the bottom makes it less obvious when you skip
questions. In particular, you failed to answer my question regarding
how it would be possible to determine that a motor wasn't conscious
but not possible to determine whether a cat was conscious. If your
criterion is to be useful, it needs to work both ways.
You also failed to address my question regarding evidence pertaining
to your claim that conscious entities can't follow the same laws of
physics as nonconscious ones. What evidence do you have to support the
view that humans don't follow the laws of physics?
---------------
Regarding your question about the cat, I never said it wasn't possible
to determine whether the cat was consciously experiencing. I said I
didn't know the answer. If it were ever shown that a cat could have
its behaviour described in the same terms of physics as something that
doesn't consciously experience then it wouldn't be consciously
experiencing. As for your question about any evidence, why do I need
evidence, the conversation isn't about my perspective. Though it is
evident through reasoning that the suggestion that we could have our
behaviour explained in the same terms of physics as something that
isn't consciously experiencing as outlined in the paper. You are
having trouble understanding that though, so I suggest we get back to
it.
So back to the simulation, I had said:
----------
Let's just suppose that the simulation program was written to simulate
systems which had 1-100,000,000 nodes, but that it could simulate
more. It just wasn't built to account for strong magnetic fields that
would occur in 50gb node sytems (a node being a byte).
----------
To which you replied:
----------
If it was written to simulate smaller systems, one wouldn't rely on it
to model larger ones without verifying that it actually worked for
such cases as well.
----------
Well we can assume it gives the right result as long as the nodes in
the system give the same outputs given the inputs as they would
individually in a lab. Which is why it wouldn't work if a strong
magnetic field emerged that influenced the node behaviour, but would
work with the emergence of consciousness that you suggest. Presumably
you agree that the emergence of a strong magnetic field or anything
else that affects node activity, would be different from the emergence
of consciousness, which you aren't claiming has any affect on the node
activity.
You said:
----------
You are implicitly assuming that consciousness is something which
exists independently of the node
interactions rather than the overall activity performed by the set of
nodes themselves.
----------
No, I don't. All I am saying is that there is a difference in the
suggested reality if it is suggested that a system is consciously
experiencing or not, and that the difference isn't about what the the
overall node activity was. Reality would be different for the robot if
reality was that our conscious experiences were due to organic
activity, or whether they were due to the function of the activity. Do
you have trouble in understanding that there could be different
theories about whether the robot was consciously experiencing or not,
and that they would be suggesting a difference in reality.
Ymir
<34e2fa54-ec24-4ede...@d70g2000hsc.googlegroups.com>,
someone2 <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote:
<snip>
> You said:
> ---------------
> Responding at the bottom makes it less obvious when you skip
> questions. In particular, you failed to answer my question regarding
> how it would be possible to determine that a motor wasn't conscious
> but not possible to determine whether a cat was conscious. If your
> criterion is to be useful, it needs to work both ways.
>
> You also failed to address my question regarding evidence pertaining
> to your claim that conscious entities can't follow the same laws of
> physics as nonconscious ones. What evidence do you have to support the
> view that humans don't follow the laws of physics?
> ---------------
>
> Regarding your question about the cat, I never said it wasn't possible
> to determine whether the cat was consciously experiencing. I said I
> didn't know the answer.
But you also didn't answer my question with respect to the electric
motor. You said that the motor *could* be shown to be non-conscious, but
you never identified which test allowed you to make this determination.
So how do you determine that the motor isn't conscious? If I were to
assert that it was in fact conscious which observations would you rely
on to counter this claim? Why couldn't the same sorts of observations be
used to make a determination regarding the cat?
> If it were ever shown that a cat could have
> its behaviour described in the same terms of physics as something that
> doesn't consciously experience then it wouldn't be consciously
> experiencing.
So you're saying that, since human behaviour is entirely consistent with
the laws of physics, humans don't consciously experience?
Again, I'd asked you in the past to point to *any* aspect of human
behaviour for which you have actual evidence that it doesn't follow from
the laws of physics. You've consistently failed to address this question.
> As for your question about any evidence, why do I need
> evidence, the conversation isn't about my perspective.
So you're basically absolving yourself of any responsibility for
defending your argument. Then why should anyone bother taking your
argument seriously?
And of course the argument is about your perspective. You have built
into your arguments the assumption that conscious behaviour isn't
explicable in terms of physical laws, yet you provide no evidence to
back up this assumption -- an assumption clearly rejected by the
majority of your interlocutors.
> Though it is
> evident through reasoning that the suggestion that we could have our
> behaviour explained in the same terms of physics as something that
> isn't consciously experiencing as outlined in the paper. You are
> having trouble understanding that though, so I suggest we get back to
> it.
I do understand your argument. The problem is that it begs the question
since it assumes (without evidence or argumentation) as part of its
arguments that consciousness *doesn't* follow the laws of physics, and
then draws as its conclusion this very assumption.
If you start providing us with the criteria by which you identify
consciousness, I can easily show you why this breaks down. The problem
is that because you keep your assumptions in this regard vague and
unstated you have somehow managed to convince yourself that the above
actually makes sense. It does not. Whether consciousness is restricted
to organic entities or not is an *empirical* issue. One can't simply
take the position that only organic things are conscious without somehow
providing an explanation for why this is predicted to be the case, and
then showing that the predictions made by this explanation actually
match with reality. Which, of course, requires developing operational
criteria for identifying consciousness.
André