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What is our physical world?
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marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 21, 2012, 1:41:22 PM12/21/12
to marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
There are 3 hypotheses for our physical world (Robertson 2000):
1. According to positivists (e.g., Albert Michelson, Lord Kelvin,
Henri Poincare etc.) there is an absolute truth and the methods that
are needed to discover that absolute truth (“scientific methods”) can
be contained within or expressed with a finite quantity of
information;
2. According to postmodernists (e.g., Paul Feyerabend) our physical
world is perfectly chaotic: it contains no absolute truth: there are
no underlying axioms of physics or at least none that are independent
of social context;
3. According to other scientists (e.g., Freeman Dyson, Stuart
Kauffman, Douglas Robertson etc.) the axioms of physics exist but they
cannot be contained within any finite quantity of information, and
neither can the methods needed to develop successive approximations to
that absolute truth.
Actually “Goedel, Turing, and Chaitin have established the
impossibility of a positivist position in mathematics in the mid-to-
late twentieth century”. There is evidence that this result may be
extrapolate to our physical world because of “the unreasonable
effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences” according to
Eugene Wigner (1960). “If we simply assume that this unreasonable
effectiveness will continue through the indefinite future and that
mathematicians will continue indefinitely to discover new areas of
mathematics that have important applications, then the infinite
complexity that we know exists in mathematics would carry over
immediately into physics and the rest of science”.
The postmodernist position is untenable as “the evidence is simply the
observed fact of the incredible effectiveness of conventional
scientific and mathematical methods”. Although this uncontested
effectiveness of conventional scientific techniques does not offer
absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore. At the same
time there is no particular positive evidence for the existence of
such a perfectly chaotic physical world, and the only mildly effective
argument the postmodernists were able to offer for it centers on the
false dichotomy between the positivist position and theirs.
Finally, close to Stuart Kauffman’s concept of “edge of chaos” (i.e.,
Kauffman postulated that this edge of chaos was the only region where
life was possible), our physical world is likely between the Charybdis
of the postmodernist position and the Scylla of the positivist one,
given that “the Odysseus understood that Scylla was far less dangerous
than Charybdis”!
References:
Robertson DS. Goedel's theorem, the theory of everything, and the
future of science and mathematics. Complexity 2000;5(52):22-27.
http://cires.colorado.edu/~doug/philosophy/info5.pdf
1. According to positivists (e.g., Albert Michelson, Lord Kelvin,
Henri Poincare etc.) there is an absolute truth and the methods that
are needed to discover that absolute truth (“scientific methods”) can
be contained within or expressed with a finite quantity of
information;
2. According to postmodernists (e.g., Paul Feyerabend) our physical
world is perfectly chaotic: it contains no absolute truth: there are
no underlying axioms of physics or at least none that are independent
of social context;
3. According to other scientists (e.g., Freeman Dyson, Stuart
Kauffman, Douglas Robertson etc.) the axioms of physics exist but they
cannot be contained within any finite quantity of information, and
neither can the methods needed to develop successive approximations to
that absolute truth.
Actually “Goedel, Turing, and Chaitin have established the
impossibility of a positivist position in mathematics in the mid-to-
late twentieth century”. There is evidence that this result may be
extrapolate to our physical world because of “the unreasonable
effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences” according to
Eugene Wigner (1960). “If we simply assume that this unreasonable
effectiveness will continue through the indefinite future and that
mathematicians will continue indefinitely to discover new areas of
mathematics that have important applications, then the infinite
complexity that we know exists in mathematics would carry over
immediately into physics and the rest of science”.
The postmodernist position is untenable as “the evidence is simply the
observed fact of the incredible effectiveness of conventional
scientific and mathematical methods”. Although this uncontested
effectiveness of conventional scientific techniques does not offer
absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore. At the same
time there is no particular positive evidence for the existence of
such a perfectly chaotic physical world, and the only mildly effective
argument the postmodernists were able to offer for it centers on the
false dichotomy between the positivist position and theirs.
Finally, close to Stuart Kauffman’s concept of “edge of chaos” (i.e.,
Kauffman postulated that this edge of chaos was the only region where
life was possible), our physical world is likely between the Charybdis
of the postmodernist position and the Scylla of the positivist one,
given that “the Odysseus understood that Scylla was far less dangerous
than Charybdis”!
References:
Robertson DS. Goedel's theorem, the theory of everything, and the
future of science and mathematics. Complexity 2000;5(52):22-27.
http://cires.colorado.edu/~doug/philosophy/info5.pdf
eridanus
Dec 21, 2012, 3:49:03 PM12/21/12
to
A shallow knowledge about the history of science is enough to realize
that do not exist such an animal as absolute truth or absolute
understanding.
This obsession with the absolute truth has been inherited from the
philosophers that had showed mostly an excessive confidence in human
intelligence. There is a lot of petulance involved in this "faith".
Eridanus
Maria Rogers
Dec 21, 2012, 4:06:39 PM12/21/12
to
on natural selection. Why would you believe him on this? You are
wasting your time.
Richard Norman
Dec 21, 2012, 7:57:19 PM12/21/12
to
On Fri, 21 Dec 2012 10:41:22 -0800 (PST), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
There are several points that must be considered about that paper.
First, it is philosophy, not science. Wilkins can comment on whether
it even agrees with what is ordinarily considered good philosophy of
science. In any event, nothing discussed there has any effect on the
way that scientists go about their daily lives (except, of course,
that far too many physicists go off on philosophical sprees when they
are not doing real science).
Second, what is called "truth" there has a very specialized and
unusual (in my thinking, anyway) meaning. It means "accurately
describes physical reality". "Absolute truth" means "really
accurately describes everything about physical reality". That a single
man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife may be a
truth universally acknowledged but definitely not by Robertson.
Third, what is called "chaos" there has a very unspecialized and
wishy-washy meaning that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with
the mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos. Robertson
refers to a universe in chaos as obeying no laws. A mathematical
system in chaos close adheres exactly to a particular law, the
mathematical equaltion whose solution is said to exhibit chaos albeit
completely deterministic. Thus Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is totally
irrelevant to the analysis.
Fourth, the fact that we know that mathematics does not have a finite
set of axioms from which all "truth" can be derived has nothing
whatsoever to do with whether physics does or does not. That all
kinds of branches of mathematics, no matter how seeming esoteric, have
been shown to have some application to physics is irrelevant. The
incompleteness in mathematics is closely related to self-referential
or recursive statements dealing with uncountably infinite sets. If
the physical universe is finite then no such argument applies. It may
well be that neither space nor time are infinitely divisible nor
infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller particles made
of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a halt. It is NOT
turtles all the way down. It is just that there is nothing under the
bottom turtle for it to fall into.
wrote:
First, it is philosophy, not science. Wilkins can comment on whether
it even agrees with what is ordinarily considered good philosophy of
science. In any event, nothing discussed there has any effect on the
way that scientists go about their daily lives (except, of course,
that far too many physicists go off on philosophical sprees when they
are not doing real science).
Second, what is called "truth" there has a very specialized and
unusual (in my thinking, anyway) meaning. It means "accurately
describes physical reality". "Absolute truth" means "really
accurately describes everything about physical reality". That a single
man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife may be a
truth universally acknowledged but definitely not by Robertson.
Third, what is called "chaos" there has a very unspecialized and
wishy-washy meaning that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with
the mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos. Robertson
refers to a universe in chaos as obeying no laws. A mathematical
system in chaos close adheres exactly to a particular law, the
mathematical equaltion whose solution is said to exhibit chaos albeit
completely deterministic. Thus Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is totally
irrelevant to the analysis.
Fourth, the fact that we know that mathematics does not have a finite
set of axioms from which all "truth" can be derived has nothing
whatsoever to do with whether physics does or does not. That all
kinds of branches of mathematics, no matter how seeming esoteric, have
been shown to have some application to physics is irrelevant. The
incompleteness in mathematics is closely related to self-referential
or recursive statements dealing with uncountably infinite sets. If
the physical universe is finite then no such argument applies. It may
well be that neither space nor time are infinitely divisible nor
infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller particles made
of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a halt. It is NOT
turtles all the way down. It is just that there is nothing under the
bottom turtle for it to fall into.
John S. Wilkins
Dec 22, 2012, 4:18:28 AM12/22/12
to
thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
uninteresting.
The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydney
Honorary Fellow, University of Melbourne
- http://evolvingthoughts.net
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 6:47:16 AM12/22/12
to
On 21 d�c, 13:06, Maria Rogers <ma.zinha...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > extrapolate to our physical world because of �the unreasonable
> > effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences� according to
> > Eugene Wigner (1960). �If we simply assume that this unreasonable
> > The postmodernist position is untenable as �the evidence is simply the
> > than Charybdis�!
in Darwinian Evolution" I require more than just an opinion, even if
it is yours.
Moreover I don't believe in Robertson's beliefs I just consider that
his reasoning is correct: I would appreciate if you could give
arguments demonstrating that there are logic errors in the text of
this thread.
> On Dec 22, 1:41�am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > There are 3 hypotheses for our physical world (Robertson 2000):
> > 1. � � �According to positivists (e.g., Albert Michelson, Lord Kelvin,
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > There are 3 hypotheses for our physical world (Robertson 2000):
> > Henri Poincare etc.) there is an absolute truth and the methods that
> > are needed to discover that absolute truth (�scientific methods�) can
> > be contained within or expressed with a finite quantity of
> > information;
> > 2. � � �According to postmodernists (e.g., Paul Feyerabend) our physical
> > information;
> > world is perfectly chaotic: it contains no absolute truth: there are
> > no underlying axioms of physics or at least none that are independent
> > of social context;
> > 3. � � �According to other scientists (e.g., Freeman Dyson, Stuart
> > no underlying axioms of physics or at least none that are independent
> > of social context;
> > Kauffman, Douglas Robertson etc.) the axioms of physics exist but they
> > cannot be contained within any finite quantity of information, and
> > neither can the methods needed to develop successive approximations to
> > that absolute truth.
> > Actually �Goedel, Turing, and Chaitin have established the
> > cannot be contained within any finite quantity of information, and
> > neither can the methods needed to develop successive approximations to
> > that absolute truth.
> > impossibility of a positivist position in mathematics in the mid-to-
> > late twentieth century�. There is evidence that this result may be
> > extrapolate to our physical world because of �the unreasonable
> > effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences� according to
> > Eugene Wigner (1960). �If we simply assume that this unreasonable
> > effectiveness will continue through the indefinite future and that
> > mathematicians will continue indefinitely to discover new areas of
> > mathematics that have important applications, then the infinite
> > complexity that we know exists in mathematics would carry over
> > immediately into physics and the rest of science�.
> > mathematicians will continue indefinitely to discover new areas of
> > mathematics that have important applications, then the infinite
> > complexity that we know exists in mathematics would carry over
> > The postmodernist position is untenable as �the evidence is simply the
> > observed fact of the incredible effectiveness of conventional
> > scientific and mathematical methods�. Although this uncontested
> > effectiveness of conventional scientific techniques does not offer
> > absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
> > chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore. At the same
> > time there is no particular positive evidence for the existence of
> > such a perfectly chaotic physical world, and the only mildly effective
> > argument the postmodernists were able to offer for it centers on the
> > false dichotomy between the positivist position and theirs.
> > Finally, close to Stuart Kauffman�s concept of �edge of chaos� (i.e.,
> > absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
> > chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore. At the same
> > time there is no particular positive evidence for the existence of
> > such a perfectly chaotic physical world, and the only mildly effective
> > argument the postmodernists were able to offer for it centers on the
> > false dichotomy between the positivist position and theirs.
> > Kauffman postulated that this edge of chaos was the only region where
> > life was possible), our physical world is likely between the Charybdis
> > of the postmodernist position and the Scylla of the positivist one,
> > given that �the Odysseus understood that Scylla was far less dangerous
> > life was possible), our physical world is likely between the Charybdis
> > of the postmodernist position and the Scylla of the positivist one,
> > than Charybdis�!
>
> > References:
> > Robertson DS. Goedel's theorem, the theory of everything, and the
> > future of science and mathematics. Complexity 2000;5(52):22-27.http://cires.colorado.edu/~doug/philosophy/info5.pdf
>
> Robertson clearly didn't know what he was talking about in the papers
> on natural selection. Why would you believe him on this? You are
> wasting your time.
As mentioned in my response to you in the thread "Feedback and Chaos
> > References:
> > Robertson DS. Goedel's theorem, the theory of everything, and the
> > future of science and mathematics. Complexity 2000;5(52):22-27.http://cires.colorado.edu/~doug/philosophy/info5.pdf
>
> Robertson clearly didn't know what he was talking about in the papers
> on natural selection. Why would you believe him on this? You are
> wasting your time.
in Darwinian Evolution" I require more than just an opinion, even if
it is yours.
Moreover I don't believe in Robertson's beliefs I just consider that
his reasoning is correct: I would appreciate if you could give
arguments demonstrating that there are logic errors in the text of
this thread.
Bill
Dec 22, 2012, 7:40:16 AM12/22/12
to
So did Arkalen and Harshman and perhaps others. Life is too short.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 7:50:43 AM12/22/12
to
On 21 d�c, 16:57, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
<snip for focus>
> There are several points that must be considered about that paper.
> First, it is philosophy, not science. �Wilkins can comment on whether
scientifically speaking, even if, as Robertson recognizes it with
reserves such as "Although this uncontested effectiveness of
even what is "good philosophy"? (however I am sure Pr. Wilkins can:
see his comments).
> Second, what is called "truth" there has a very specialized and
> unusual (in my thinking, anyway) meaning. �It means "accurately
> describes physical reality". �"Absolute truth" means "really
With your example (ISTM a value judgment) I don't understand your
meaning of "Absolute truth": could you explicit it?
> Third, what is called "chaos" there has a very unspecialized and
> wishy-washy meaning that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with
> the mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos. �Robertson
> refers to a universe in chaos as obeying no laws. �A mathematical
> completely deterministic. �Thus Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is totally
> irrelevant to the analysis.
I am surprised that a top scientist like you can make such a mistake
about the meaning of the term "chaos".
"Chaos" in Robertson's paper context means "Randomness" or "a lack of
intelligible pattern or combination".
"The mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos" you refer to
is related to the notion of "deterministic chaos" which is, as you
well know, an oxymoron to describe specific deterministic dynamical
systems that are highly sensitive to initial conditions and thus not
foreseeable after some time.
The reference to Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is just a metaphor meaning
that our physical world, even it is not as positivists see it, is
however partly understandable as Eistein said "The most
incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible".
> Fourth, the fact that we know that mathematics does not have a finite
> set of axioms from which all "truth" can be derived has nothing
> whatsoever to do with whether physics does or does not. �That all
> the physical universe is finite then no such argument applies. �It may
> turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is nothing under the
evidence that the incompleteness in mathematics may be extrapolate to
our physical world because of �the unreasonable effectiveness of
mathematics in the natural sciences� as Eugene Wigner already stated
in 1960.
<snip for focus>
> There are several points that must be considered about that paper.
> it even agrees with what is ordinarily considered good philosophy of
> science. �In any event, nothing discussed there has any effect on the
> way that scientists go about their daily lives (except, of course,
> that far too many physicists go off on philosophical sprees when they
> are not doing real science).
I don't fully agree with you. I think the asked question is relevant
> that far too many physicists go off on philosophical sprees when they
> are not doing real science).
scientifically speaking, even if, as Robertson recognizes it with
reserves such as "Although this uncontested effectiveness of
conventional scientific techniques does not offer
absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore".
Do you think anybody can claim what is "good philosophy of science" or
absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore".
even what is "good philosophy"? (however I am sure Pr. Wilkins can:
see his comments).
> Second, what is called "truth" there has a very specialized and
> describes physical reality". �"Absolute truth" means "really
> accurately describes everything about physical reality". That a single
> man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife may be a
> truth universally acknowledged but definitely not by Robertson.
Personally Robertson's meaning of truth suits me very well.
> man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife may be a
> truth universally acknowledged but definitely not by Robertson.
With your example (ISTM a value judgment) I don't understand your
meaning of "Absolute truth": could you explicit it?
> Third, what is called "chaos" there has a very unspecialized and
> wishy-washy meaning that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with
> refers to a universe in chaos as obeying no laws. �A mathematical
> system in chaos close adheres exactly to a particular law, the
> mathematical equation whose solution is said to exhibit chaos albeit
> completely deterministic. �Thus Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is totally
> irrelevant to the analysis.
I am surprised that a top scientist like you can make such a mistake
about the meaning of the term "chaos".
"Chaos" in Robertson's paper context means "Randomness" or "a lack of
intelligible pattern or combination".
"The mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos" you refer to
is related to the notion of "deterministic chaos" which is, as you
well know, an oxymoron to describe specific deterministic dynamical
systems that are highly sensitive to initial conditions and thus not
foreseeable after some time.
The reference to Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is just a metaphor meaning
that our physical world, even it is not as positivists see it, is
however partly understandable as Eistein said "The most
incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible".
> Fourth, the fact that we know that mathematics does not have a finite
> set of axioms from which all "truth" can be derived has nothing
> kinds of branches of mathematics, no matter how seeming esoteric, have
> been shown to have some application to physics is irrelevant. The
> incompleteness in mathematics is closely related to self-referential
> or recursive statements dealing with uncountably infinite sets. �If
> been shown to have some application to physics is irrelevant. The
> incompleteness in mathematics is closely related to self-referential
> the physical universe is finite then no such argument applies. �It may
> well be that neither space nor time are infinitely divisible nor
> infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller particles made
> of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a halt. �It is NOT
> infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller particles made
> turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is nothing under the
> bottom turtle for it to fall into.
Of course I don't agree with you. As Robertson asserted there is
evidence that the incompleteness in mathematics may be extrapolate to
our physical world because of �the unreasonable effectiveness of
mathematics in the natural sciences� as Eugene Wigner already stated
in 1960.
Ernest Major
Dec 22, 2012, 8:17:57 AM12/22/12
to
In message
<b5cbf812-9803-493f...@r14g2000vbe.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
>On 21 déc, 13:06, Maria Rogers <ma.zinha...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> > extrapolate to our physical world because of “the unreasonable
>> > effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences” according to
>> > Eugene Wigner (1960). “If we simply assume that this unreasonable
>> > The postmodernist position is untenable as “the evidence is simply the
>> > than Charybdis”!
ontology and epistemology.
Furthermore, I rather suspect it is not an accurate description of
postmodernism. It seems to approach the collective solipsism of pop
postmodernism - "reality is socially constructed" taken literally,
rather than the weaker claim that our understanding of reality is a
social construct. (Postmodernism in cultural anthropology was once
explained to me as if we want to understand why people behave as they do
we need to understand not how reality is, but how they think reality
is.)
I am skeptical of the claim that Feyerabend is a postmodernist.
I also don't understand why you brought up the topic in the first place.
--
alias Ernest Major
<b5cbf812-9803-493f...@r14g2000vbe.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
>On 21 déc, 13:06, Maria Rogers <ma.zinha...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Dec 22, 1:41 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > There are 3 hypotheses for our physical world (Robertson 2000):
>> > 1. According to positivists (e.g., Albert Michelson, Lord Kelvin,
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > There are 3 hypotheses for our physical world (Robertson 2000):
>> > Henri Poincare etc.) there is an absolute truth and the methods that
>> > are needed to discover that absolute truth (“scientific methods”) can
>> > be contained within or expressed with a finite quantity of
>> > information;
>> > 2. According to postmodernists (e.g., Paul Feyerabend) our physical
>> > information;
>> > world is perfectly chaotic: it contains no absolute truth: there are
>> > no underlying axioms of physics or at least none that are independent
>> > of social context;
>> > 3. According to other scientists (e.g., Freeman Dyson, Stuart
>> > no underlying axioms of physics or at least none that are independent
>> > of social context;
>> > Kauffman, Douglas Robertson etc.) the axioms of physics exist but they
>> > cannot be contained within any finite quantity of information, and
>> > neither can the methods needed to develop successive approximations to
>> > that absolute truth.
>> > Actually “Goedel, Turing, and Chaitin have established the
>> > cannot be contained within any finite quantity of information, and
>> > neither can the methods needed to develop successive approximations to
>> > that absolute truth.
>> > impossibility of a positivist position in mathematics in the mid-to-
>> > late twentieth century”. There is evidence that this result may be
>> > extrapolate to our physical world because of “the unreasonable
>> > effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences” according to
>> > Eugene Wigner (1960). “If we simply assume that this unreasonable
>> > effectiveness will continue through the indefinite future and that
>> > mathematicians will continue indefinitely to discover new areas of
>> > mathematics that have important applications, then the infinite
>> > complexity that we know exists in mathematics would carry over
>> > immediately into physics and the rest of science”.
>> > mathematicians will continue indefinitely to discover new areas of
>> > mathematics that have important applications, then the infinite
>> > complexity that we know exists in mathematics would carry over
>> > The postmodernist position is untenable as “the evidence is simply the
>> > observed fact of the incredible effectiveness of conventional
>> > scientific and mathematical methods”. Although this uncontested
>> > effectiveness of conventional scientific techniques does not offer
>> > absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
>> > chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore. At the same
>> > time there is no particular positive evidence for the existence of
>> > such a perfectly chaotic physical world, and the only mildly effective
>> > argument the postmodernists were able to offer for it centers on the
>> > false dichotomy between the positivist position and theirs.
>> > Finally, close to Stuart Kauffman’s concept of “edge of chaos” (i.e.,
>> > absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
>> > chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore. At the same
>> > time there is no particular positive evidence for the existence of
>> > such a perfectly chaotic physical world, and the only mildly effective
>> > argument the postmodernists were able to offer for it centers on the
>> > false dichotomy between the positivist position and theirs.
>> > Kauffman postulated that this edge of chaos was the only region where
>> > life was possible), our physical world is likely between the Charybdis
>> > of the postmodernist position and the Scylla of the positivist one,
>> > given that “the Odysseus understood that Scylla was far less dangerous
>> > life was possible), our physical world is likely between the Charybdis
>> > of the postmodernist position and the Scylla of the positivist one,
>> > than Charybdis”!
>>
>> > References:
>> > Robertson DS. Goedel's theorem, the theory of everything, and the
>> > future of science and mathematics. Complexity
>> >2000;5(52):22-27.http://cires.colorado.edu/~doug/philosophy/info5.pdf
>>
>> Robertson clearly didn't know what he was talking about in the papers
>> on natural selection. Why would you believe him on this? You are
>> wasting your time.
>
>As mentioned in my response to you in the thread "Feedback and Chaos
>in Darwinian Evolution" I require more than just an opinion, even if
>it is yours.
>Moreover I don't believe in Robertson's beliefs I just consider that
>his reasoning is correct: I would appreciate if you could give
>arguments demonstrating that there are logic errors in the text of
>this thread.
>
For a start it's likely to be a false trichotomy. Then it confuses
>> > References:
>> > Robertson DS. Goedel's theorem, the theory of everything, and the
>> > future of science and mathematics. Complexity
>> >2000;5(52):22-27.http://cires.colorado.edu/~doug/philosophy/info5.pdf
>>
>> Robertson clearly didn't know what he was talking about in the papers
>> on natural selection. Why would you believe him on this? You are
>> wasting your time.
>
>As mentioned in my response to you in the thread "Feedback and Chaos
>in Darwinian Evolution" I require more than just an opinion, even if
>it is yours.
>Moreover I don't believe in Robertson's beliefs I just consider that
>his reasoning is correct: I would appreciate if you could give
>arguments demonstrating that there are logic errors in the text of
>this thread.
>
ontology and epistemology.
Furthermore, I rather suspect it is not an accurate description of
postmodernism. It seems to approach the collective solipsism of pop
postmodernism - "reality is socially constructed" taken literally,
rather than the weaker claim that our understanding of reality is a
social construct. (Postmodernism in cultural anthropology was once
explained to me as if we want to understand why people behave as they do
we need to understand not how reality is, but how they think reality
is.)
I am skeptical of the claim that Feyerabend is a postmodernist.
I also don't understand why you brought up the topic in the first place.
--
alias Ernest Major
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 8:20:11 AM12/22/12
to
On 22 d�c, 01:18, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
<snip for focus>
> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
> uninteresting.
> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
<snip for focus>
Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
<snip for focus>
> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
> uninteresting.
> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 8:50:15 AM12/22/12
to
Chaos in Darwinian Evolution" perhaps we could go on discussing the
matter.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 8:54:24 AM12/22/12
to
On 22 d�c, 05:17, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
<snip for focus>
> For a start it's likely to be a false trichotomy. Then it confuses
> ontology and epistemology.
So what are the possibilities to your opinion?
<snip for focus>
<snip for focus>
> For a start it's likely to be a false trichotomy. Then it confuses
> ontology and epistemology.
<snip for focus>
Dale
Dec 22, 2012, 9:24:16 AM12/22/12
to
On 12/21/2012 01:41 PM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> There are 3 hypotheses for our physical world (Robertson 2000):
> 1. According to positivists (e.g., Albert Michelson, Lord Kelvin,
> Henri Poincare etc.) there is an absolute truth and the methods that
> are needed to discover that absolute truth (�scientific methods�) can
> There are 3 hypotheses for our physical world (Robertson 2000):
> 1. According to positivists (e.g., Albert Michelson, Lord Kelvin,
> Henri Poincare etc.) there is an absolute truth and the methods that
> be contained within or expressed with a finite quantity of
> information;
> 2. According to postmodernists (e.g., Paul Feyerabend) our physical
> world is perfectly chaotic: it contains no absolute truth: there are
> no underlying axioms of physics or at least none that are independent
> of social context;
> 3. According to other scientists (e.g., Freeman Dyson, Stuart
> Kauffman, Douglas Robertson etc.) the axioms of physics exist but they
> cannot be contained within any finite quantity of information, and
> neither can the methods needed to develop successive approximations to
> that absolute truth.
> Actually �Goedel, Turing, and Chaitin have established the
> information;
> 2. According to postmodernists (e.g., Paul Feyerabend) our physical
> world is perfectly chaotic: it contains no absolute truth: there are
> no underlying axioms of physics or at least none that are independent
> of social context;
> 3. According to other scientists (e.g., Freeman Dyson, Stuart
> Kauffman, Douglas Robertson etc.) the axioms of physics exist but they
> cannot be contained within any finite quantity of information, and
> neither can the methods needed to develop successive approximations to
> that absolute truth.
> impossibility of a positivist position in mathematics in the mid-to-
> late twentieth century�. There is evidence that this result may be
> extrapolate to our physical world because of �the unreasonable
> effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences� according to
> Eugene Wigner (1960). �If we simply assume that this unreasonable
> effectiveness will continue through the indefinite future and that
> mathematicians will continue indefinitely to discover new areas of
> mathematics that have important applications, then the infinite
> complexity that we know exists in mathematics would carry over
> immediately into physics and the rest of science�.
> mathematicians will continue indefinitely to discover new areas of
> mathematics that have important applications, then the infinite
> complexity that we know exists in mathematics would carry over
> The postmodernist position is untenable as �the evidence is simply the
> observed fact of the incredible effectiveness of conventional
> scientific and mathematical methods�. Although this uncontested
> effectiveness of conventional scientific techniques does not offer
> absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
> chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore. At the same
> time there is no particular positive evidence for the existence of
> such a perfectly chaotic physical world, and the only mildly effective
> argument the postmodernists were able to offer for it centers on the
> false dichotomy between the positivist position and theirs.
> Finally, close to Stuart Kauffman�s concept of �edge of chaos� (i.e.,
> absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
> chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore. At the same
> time there is no particular positive evidence for the existence of
> such a perfectly chaotic physical world, and the only mildly effective
> argument the postmodernists were able to offer for it centers on the
> false dichotomy between the positivist position and theirs.
> Kauffman postulated that this edge of chaos was the only region where
> life was possible), our physical world is likely between the Charybdis
> of the postmodernist position and the Scylla of the positivist one,
> given that �the Odysseus understood that Scylla was far less dangerous
> life was possible), our physical world is likely between the Charybdis
> of the postmodernist position and the Scylla of the positivist one,
> than Charybdis�!
>
> References:
> Robertson DS. Goedel's theorem, the theory of everything, and the
> future of science and mathematics. Complexity 2000;5(52):22-27.
> http://cires.colorado.edu/~doug/philosophy/info5.pdf
>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maya_%28illusion%29
> References:
> Robertson DS. Goedel's theorem, the theory of everything, and the
> future of science and mathematics. Complexity 2000;5(52):22-27.
> http://cires.colorado.edu/~doug/philosophy/info5.pdf
>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biocentrism_%28theory_of_everything%29
--
Dale
Ernest Major
Dec 22, 2012, 9:42:18 AM12/22/12
to
In message
<cc0d31f2-2c9f-4e43...@b11g2000yqh.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
You'd do better to ask a philosopher. Philosophers have spent centuries
thinking about the alternatives - I haven't. But I did already point out
that postmodernism as a movement adopts positions other than that
offered.
Apart from philosophical realism, off the top of my head there are
alternatives such as omphalism, occasionalism, simulationism, solipsism
and collective solipsism.
--
alias Ernest Major
<cc0d31f2-2c9f-4e43...@b11g2000yqh.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
thinking about the alternatives - I haven't. But I did already point out
that postmodernism as a movement adopts positions other than that
offered.
Apart from philosophical realism, off the top of my head there are
alternatives such as omphalism, occasionalism, simulationism, solipsism
and collective solipsism.
--
alias Ernest Major
Richard Norman
Dec 22, 2012, 11:41:58 AM12/22/12
to
On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
argumentation.
wrote:
response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
argumentation.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 11:48:09 AM12/22/12
to
On 22 d�c, 06:42, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> In message
> <cc0d31f2-2c9f-4e43-b38e-7d80e2dea...@b11g2000yqh.googlegroups.com>,
I see you point but, to me, all these "ism" are not alternatives as
these belong to pure metaphysics.
Unlike Richard's opinion I think Robertson asks questions that are
relevant scientifically speaking and not only pure philosophical
questions.
> In message
> <cc0d31f2-2c9f-4e43-b38e-7d80e2dea...@b11g2000yqh.googlegroups.com>,
these belong to pure metaphysics.
Unlike Richard's opinion I think Robertson asks questions that are
relevant scientifically speaking and not only pure philosophical
questions.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 11:55:44 AM12/22/12
to
On 22 d�c, 08:41, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
scientists.
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
scientists.
Richard Norman
Dec 22, 2012, 12:08:04 PM12/22/12
to
On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 08:55:44 -0800 (PST), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
debates and, more commonly, collaborates with those rare scientists
who are not petty-minded.
wrote:
>On 22 d�c, 08:41, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>>
>> >On 22 d�c, 01:18, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
>>
>> ><snip for focus>
>>
>> >> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
>> >> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
>> >> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
>> >> uninteresting.
>> >> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
>>
>> ><snip for focus>
>>
>> >Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
>> >paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
>>
>> I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
>> response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
>> argumentation.
>
>Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
>debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
>scientists.
The great philosopher Prof. Wilkins has real work to do. He often
>On 22 d�c, 08:41, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>>
>> >On 22 d�c, 01:18, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
>>
>> ><snip for focus>
>>
>> >> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
>> >> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
>> >> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
>> >> uninteresting.
>> >> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
>>
>> ><snip for focus>
>>
>> >Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
>> >paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
>>
>> I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
>> response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
>> argumentation.
>
>Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
>debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
>scientists.
debates and, more commonly, collaborates with those rare scientists
who are not petty-minded.
Richard Norman
Dec 22, 2012, 12:05:41 PM12/22/12
to
On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 04:50:43 -0800 (PST), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>On 21 d�c, 16:57, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
><snip for focus>
>
>> There are several points that must be considered about that paper.
>> First, it is philosophy, not science. �Wilkins can comment on whether
>> describes physical reality". �"Absolute truth" means "really
>> refers to a universe in chaos as obeying no laws. �A mathematical
>> the physical universe is finite then no such argument applies. �It may
>> turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is nothing under the
>mathematics in the natural sciences� as Eugene Wigner already stated
>in 1960.
(I prefer to keep all my comments here at the bottom rather than
interspersed through the text.)
First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
sense. Otherwise there would be no value in pursuing science. As to
whether a finite set of laws would encompass everything -- we are far
removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
physics to explain even what we see now. So science proceeds
independent of this question. And this question applies only to
fundamental physics. Chemistry and geology and biology proceed with
an enormity of problems to investigate quite apart from whether
physics explains "everything" to its satisfaction. The "everything"
of physics really fails to include it all. The universe may be
reducible to fundamental physics but understanding the physics does
not really explain biology. In particular, evolution is not
explicable in terms of fundamental particles interacting even though
nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
particles interacting.
Second, you may appreciate Robertson's notion of "truth". I was
simply warning bystanders not to misinterpret your summary because
they misunderstand what is meant by that term. And my example was
taken from classic English literature so my ethnocentric bias made me
forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
with it. It is, in case you didn't realize, the first sentence in
Jane Austen's "Pride and Prejudice" about "at truth universally
recognized". I, myself, have no definition of "absolute truth" nor do
I wish to pursue one.
Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
must clarify exactly what is meant. Quantum mechanics argues that
the universe is, in some important sense, is "random" and
"unpredictable" but still obeys quite specific laws. As to the "edge
of Chaos", it may be used metaphorically by some but still refers to
the mathematical phase transition to chaotic behavior. Further there
are demurrals to Kauffman's (and others') work. See Mitchell's paper
"Dynamics, Computation, and the Edge of Chaos": A Re-Examination"
http://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~mm/dyn-comp-edge.pdf
Fourth, on the "incompleteness of mathematics". It is true that
physics has strong connections to mathematics but that does not
necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
important physical correlation. I gave specific reasons why this may
not hold which you did not comment on.
wrote:
>On 21 d�c, 16:57, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
><snip for focus>
>
>> There are several points that must be considered about that paper.
>> it even agrees with what is ordinarily considered good philosophy of
>> science. �In any event, nothing discussed there has any effect on the
>> way that scientists go about their daily lives (except, of course,
>> that far too many physicists go off on philosophical sprees when they
>> are not doing real science).
>
>I don't fully agree with you. I think the asked question is relevant
>scientifically speaking, even if, as Robertson recognizes it with
>reserves such as "Although this uncontested effectiveness of
>conventional scientific techniques does not offer
>absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
>chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore".
>Do you think anybody can claim what is "good philosophy of science" or
>even what is "good philosophy"? (however I am sure Pr. Wilkins can:
>see his comments).
>
>> Second, what is called "truth" there has a very specialized and
>> unusual (in my thinking, anyway) meaning. �It means "accurately
>> that far too many physicists go off on philosophical sprees when they
>> are not doing real science).
>
>I don't fully agree with you. I think the asked question is relevant
>scientifically speaking, even if, as Robertson recognizes it with
>reserves such as "Although this uncontested effectiveness of
>conventional scientific techniques does not offer
>absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
>chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore".
>Do you think anybody can claim what is "good philosophy of science" or
>even what is "good philosophy"? (however I am sure Pr. Wilkins can:
>see his comments).
>
>> Second, what is called "truth" there has a very specialized and
>> describes physical reality". �"Absolute truth" means "really
>> accurately describes everything about physical reality". That a single
>> man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife may be a
>> truth universally acknowledged but definitely not by Robertson.
>
>Personally Robertson's meaning of truth suits me very well.
>With your example (ISTM a value judgment) I don't understand your
>meaning of "Absolute truth": could you explicit it?
>
>> Third, what is called "chaos" there has a very unspecialized and
>> wishy-washy meaning that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with
>> the mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos. �Robertson
>> man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife may be a
>> truth universally acknowledged but definitely not by Robertson.
>
>Personally Robertson's meaning of truth suits me very well.
>With your example (ISTM a value judgment) I don't understand your
>meaning of "Absolute truth": could you explicit it?
>
>> Third, what is called "chaos" there has a very unspecialized and
>> wishy-washy meaning that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with
>> refers to a universe in chaos as obeying no laws. �A mathematical
>> system in chaos close adheres exactly to a particular law, the
>> mathematical equation whose solution is said to exhibit chaos albeit
>> completely deterministic. �Thus Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is totally
>> mathematical equation whose solution is said to exhibit chaos albeit
>> irrelevant to the analysis.
>
>I am surprised that a top scientist like you can make such a mistake
>about the meaning of the term "chaos".
>"Chaos" in Robertson's paper context means "Randomness" or "a lack of
>intelligible pattern or combination".
>"The mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos" you refer to
>is related to the notion of "deterministic chaos" which is, as you
>well know, an oxymoron to describe specific deterministic dynamical
>systems that are highly sensitive to initial conditions and thus not
>foreseeable after some time.
>The reference to Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is just a metaphor meaning
>that our physical world, even it is not as positivists see it, is
>however partly understandable as Eistein said "The most
>incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible".
>
>> Fourth, the fact that we know that mathematics does not have a finite
>> set of axioms from which all "truth" can be derived has nothing
>> whatsoever to do with whether physics does or does not. �That all
>
>I am surprised that a top scientist like you can make such a mistake
>about the meaning of the term "chaos".
>"Chaos" in Robertson's paper context means "Randomness" or "a lack of
>intelligible pattern or combination".
>"The mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos" you refer to
>is related to the notion of "deterministic chaos" which is, as you
>well know, an oxymoron to describe specific deterministic dynamical
>systems that are highly sensitive to initial conditions and thus not
>foreseeable after some time.
>The reference to Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is just a metaphor meaning
>that our physical world, even it is not as positivists see it, is
>however partly understandable as Eistein said "The most
>incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible".
>
>> Fourth, the fact that we know that mathematics does not have a finite
>> set of axioms from which all "truth" can be derived has nothing
>> kinds of branches of mathematics, no matter how seeming esoteric, have
>> been shown to have some application to physics is irrelevant. The
>> incompleteness in mathematics is closely related to self-referential
>> or recursive statements dealing with uncountably infinite sets. �If
>> been shown to have some application to physics is irrelevant. The
>> incompleteness in mathematics is closely related to self-referential
>> the physical universe is finite then no such argument applies. �It may
>> well be that neither space nor time are infinitely divisible nor
>> infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller particles made
>> of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a halt. �It is NOT
>> infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller particles made
>> turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is nothing under the
>> bottom turtle for it to fall into.
>
>Of course I don't agree with you. As Robertson asserted there is
>evidence that the incompleteness in mathematics may be extrapolate to
>our physical world because of �the unreasonable effectiveness of
>
>Of course I don't agree with you. As Robertson asserted there is
>evidence that the incompleteness in mathematics may be extrapolate to
>mathematics in the natural sciences� as Eugene Wigner already stated
>in 1960.
(I prefer to keep all my comments here at the bottom rather than
interspersed through the text.)
First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
sense. Otherwise there would be no value in pursuing science. As to
whether a finite set of laws would encompass everything -- we are far
removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
physics to explain even what we see now. So science proceeds
independent of this question. And this question applies only to
fundamental physics. Chemistry and geology and biology proceed with
an enormity of problems to investigate quite apart from whether
physics explains "everything" to its satisfaction. The "everything"
of physics really fails to include it all. The universe may be
reducible to fundamental physics but understanding the physics does
not really explain biology. In particular, evolution is not
explicable in terms of fundamental particles interacting even though
nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
particles interacting.
Second, you may appreciate Robertson's notion of "truth". I was
simply warning bystanders not to misinterpret your summary because
they misunderstand what is meant by that term. And my example was
taken from classic English literature so my ethnocentric bias made me
forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
with it. It is, in case you didn't realize, the first sentence in
Jane Austen's "Pride and Prejudice" about "at truth universally
recognized". I, myself, have no definition of "absolute truth" nor do
I wish to pursue one.
Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
must clarify exactly what is meant. Quantum mechanics argues that
the universe is, in some important sense, is "random" and
"unpredictable" but still obeys quite specific laws. As to the "edge
of Chaos", it may be used metaphorically by some but still refers to
the mathematical phase transition to chaotic behavior. Further there
are demurrals to Kauffman's (and others') work. See Mitchell's paper
"Dynamics, Computation, and the Edge of Chaos": A Re-Examination"
http://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~mm/dyn-comp-edge.pdf
Fourth, on the "incompleteness of mathematics". It is true that
physics has strong connections to mathematics but that does not
necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
important physical correlation. I gave specific reasons why this may
not hold which you did not comment on.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 1:49:13 PM12/22/12
to
On 22 d�c, 09:08, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 08:55:44 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
scientists are not petty-minded.
Personally I consider that people who accept fairly to debate with
anybody who propose sensible, rational and logical arguments to defend
one's opinion are never petty-minded. Until recently you were among
these.
By contrast I wouldn't say the same for other people.
But, of course, it's only my opinion.
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 08:55:44 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 22 d�c, 08:41, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
> >> >On 22 d�c, 01:18, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
>
> >> ><snip for focus>
>
> >> >> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
> >> >> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
> >> >> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
> >> >> uninteresting.
> >> >> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
>
> >> ><snip for focus>
>
> >> >Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
> >> >paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
>
> >> I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
> >> response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
> >> argumentation.
>
> >Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
> >debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
> >scientists.
>
> The great philosopher Prof. Wilkins has real work to do. �He often
> debates and, more commonly, collaborates with those rare scientists
> who are not petty-minded.
So you consider that except yourself and only a few of other
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 22 d�c, 08:41, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
> >> >On 22 d�c, 01:18, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
>
> >> ><snip for focus>
>
> >> >> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
> >> >> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
> >> >> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
> >> >> uninteresting.
> >> >> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
>
> >> ><snip for focus>
>
> >> >Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
> >> >paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
>
> >> I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
> >> response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
> >> argumentation.
>
> >Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
> >debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
> >scientists.
>
> The great philosopher Prof. Wilkins has real work to do. �He often
> debates and, more commonly, collaborates with those rare scientists
> who are not petty-minded.
scientists are not petty-minded.
Personally I consider that people who accept fairly to debate with
anybody who propose sensible, rational and logical arguments to defend
one's opinion are never petty-minded. Until recently you were among
these.
By contrast I wouldn't say the same for other people.
But, of course, it's only my opinion.
Ernest Major
Dec 22, 2012, 2:16:06 PM12/22/12
to
In message
<1df052de-9ce9-49d2...@ci3g2000vbb.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
There are several different questions.
Is the universe real?
Is the universe lawful?
Is the universe knowable?
If the universe is knowable can we tell when we know it?
Is the universe predictable?
And probably several others in the same general ball park.
You need to be clear what questions you are asking and answering.
To offer an equally unsophisticated refutation of your conclusion, in
mathematics there are not actual infinities, only potential infinities.
Therefore the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural
sciences" implies that there can't be an infinite quantity of
information describing the universe.
--
alias Ernest Major
<1df052de-9ce9-49d2...@ci3g2000vbb.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
Is the universe real?
Is the universe lawful?
Is the universe knowable?
If the universe is knowable can we tell when we know it?
Is the universe predictable?
And probably several others in the same general ball park.
You need to be clear what questions you are asking and answering.
To offer an equally unsophisticated refutation of your conclusion, in
mathematics there are not actual infinities, only potential infinities.
Therefore the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural
sciences" implies that there can't be an infinite quantity of
information describing the universe.
--
alias Ernest Major
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 2:37:02 PM12/22/12
to
On 22 d�c, 09:05, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 04:50:43 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
> >> describes physical reality". �"Absolute truth" means "really
> >> refers to a universe in chaos as obeying no laws. �A mathematical
> >> the physical universe is finite then no such argument applies. �It may
> >> turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is nothing under the
> >mathematics in the natural sciences� as Eugene Wigner already stated
> independent of this question. �And this question applies only to
> fundamental physics. �Chemistry and geology and biology proceed with
> of physics really fails to include it all. �The universe may be
>�In particular, evolution is not
can assert that physics is only the study of interactions between
fundamental particles (!).
Do you consider for example that far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics
is not part of Physics?
> Second, you may appreciate Robertson's notion of "truth". �I was
personal viewpoint is the same as Karl Popper's one: "theories cannot
be proved correct, only falsified", as quoted by Robertson.
> Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
> scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
> must clarify exactly what is meant. � Quantum mechanics argues that
> are demurrals to Kauffman's (and others') work. �See Mitchell's paper
I recommend you also to read "Order within Chaos" by Pierre Berge,
Yves Pomeau and Christian Vidal (1987).
It is the best book on deterministic chaos systems I have ever read.
> Fourth, on the "incompleteness of mathematics". �It is true that
applies.�It may well be that neither space nor time are infinitely
1. The question is not only related to the finitude of our universe,
even if actually I am convinced that the existence of multiverse is
required for atheism not to be wrong: thus, as a pure atheist, I must
believe in multiverse.
For instance why do you think of the following Robertson's argument:
"if we assume that the physical universe is a type 1 universe, we
would then be in the rather odd position of assuming that at some
point research in physics is going to
end while research in mathematics is still ongoing. In other words, we
would be assuming that although progress in mathematics will never
end, the development of applications of that mathematics will come to
an end, somehow. This seems to me to be a very strange assumption" ?
2. I don't understand you metaphor with "turtles" and your sentence
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 04:50:43 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
> >On 21 d�c, 16:57, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> There are several points that must be considered about that paper.
> >> First, it is philosophy, not science. �Wilkins can comment on whether
> >> There are several points that must be considered about that paper.
> >> it even agrees with what is ordinarily considered good philosophy of
> >> science. �In any event, nothing discussed there has any effect on the
> >> way that scientists go about their daily lives (except, of course,
> >> that far too many physicists go off on philosophical sprees when they
> >> are not doing real science).
> >I don't fully agree with you. I think the asked question is relevant
> >scientifically speaking, even if, as Robertson recognizes it with
> >reserves such as "Although this uncontested effectiveness of
> >conventional scientific techniques does not offer
> >absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
> >chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore".
> >Do you think anybody can claim what is "good philosophy of science" or
> >even what is "good philosophy"? (however I am sure Pr. Wilkins can:
> >see his comments).
> >> Second, what is called "truth" there has a very specialized and
> >> unusual (in my thinking, anyway) meaning. �It means "accurately
> >> that far too many physicists go off on philosophical sprees when they
> >> are not doing real science).
> >I don't fully agree with you. I think the asked question is relevant
> >scientifically speaking, even if, as Robertson recognizes it with
> >reserves such as "Although this uncontested effectiveness of
> >conventional scientific techniques does not offer
> >absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
> >chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore".
> >Do you think anybody can claim what is "good philosophy of science" or
> >even what is "good philosophy"? (however I am sure Pr. Wilkins can:
> >see his comments).
> >> Second, what is called "truth" there has a very specialized and
> >> describes physical reality". �"Absolute truth" means "really
> >> accurately describes everything about physical reality". That a single
> >> man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife may be a
> >> truth universally acknowledged but definitely not by Robertson.
> >Personally Robertson's meaning of truth suits me very well.
> >With your example (ISTM a value judgment) I don't understand your
> >meaning of �"Absolute truth": could you explicit it?
> >> man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife may be a
> >> truth universally acknowledged but definitely not by Robertson.
> >Personally Robertson's meaning of truth suits me very well.
> >With your example (ISTM a value judgment) I don't understand your
> >> Third, what is called "chaos" there has a very unspecialized and
> >> wishy-washy meaning that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with
> >> the mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos. �Robertson
> >> wishy-washy meaning that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with
> >> refers to a universe in chaos as obeying no laws. �A mathematical
> >> system in chaos close adheres exactly to a particular law, the
> >> mathematical equation whose solution is said to exhibit chaos albeit
> >> completely deterministic. �Thus Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is totally
> >> mathematical equation whose solution is said to exhibit chaos albeit
> >> irrelevant to the analysis.
> >I am surprised that a top scientist like you can make such a mistake
> >about the meaning of the term "chaos".
> >"Chaos" in Robertson's paper context means "Randomness" or "a lack of
> >intelligible pattern or combination".
> >"The mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos" you refer to
> >is related to the notion of "deterministic chaos" which is, as you
> >well know, an oxymoron to describe specific deterministic dynamical
> >systems that are highly sensitive to initial conditions and thus not
> >foreseeable after some time.
> >The reference to Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is just a metaphor meaning
> >that our physical world, even it is not as positivists see it, is
> >however partly understandable as Einstein said "The most
> >I am surprised that a top scientist like you can make such a mistake
> >about the meaning of the term "chaos".
> >"Chaos" in Robertson's paper context means "Randomness" or "a lack of
> >intelligible pattern or combination".
> >"The mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos" you refer to
> >is related to the notion of "deterministic chaos" which is, as you
> >well know, an oxymoron to describe specific deterministic dynamical
> >systems that are highly sensitive to initial conditions and thus not
> >foreseeable after some time.
> >The reference to Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is just a metaphor meaning
> >that our physical world, even it is not as positivists see it, is
> >incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible".
> >> Fourth, the fact that we know that mathematics does not have a finite
> >> set of axioms from which all "truth" can be derived has nothing
> >> whatsoever to do with whether physics does or does not. �That all
> >> Fourth, the fact that we know that mathematics does not have a finite
> >> set of axioms from which all "truth" can be derived has nothing
> >> kinds of branches of mathematics, no matter how seeming esoteric, have
> >> been shown to have some application to physics is irrelevant. The
> >> incompleteness in mathematics is closely related to self-referential
> >> or recursive statements dealing with uncountably infinite sets. �If
> >> been shown to have some application to physics is irrelevant. The
> >> incompleteness in mathematics is closely related to self-referential
> >> the physical universe is finite then no such argument applies. �It may
> >> well be that neither space nor time are infinitely divisible nor
> >> infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller particles made
> >> of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a halt. �It is NOT
> >> infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller particles made
> >> turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is nothing under the
> >> bottom turtle for it to fall into.
> >Of course I don't agree with you. As Robertson asserted there is
> >evidence that the incompleteness in mathematics may be extrapolate to
> >our physical world because of �the unreasonable effectiveness of
> >Of course I don't agree with you. As Robertson asserted there is
> >evidence that the incompleteness in mathematics may be extrapolate to
> >mathematics in the natural sciences� as Eugene Wigner already stated
> >in 1960.
> (I prefer to keep all my comments here at the bottom rather than
> interspersed through the text.)
> First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
> No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
> sense. Otherwise there would be no value in pursuing science. �As to
> (I prefer to keep all my comments here at the bottom rather than
> interspersed through the text.)
> First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
> No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
> whether a finite set of laws would encompass everything -- we are far
> removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
> physics to explain even what we see now. �So science proceeds
> removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
> independent of this question. �And this question applies only to
> fundamental physics. �Chemistry and geology and biology proceed with
> an enormity of problems to investigate quite apart from whether
> physics explains "everything" to its satisfaction. �The "everything"
> of physics really fails to include it all. �The universe may be
> reducible to fundamental physics but understanding the physics does
> not really explain biology.
Of course I fully disagree with you on that.
> not really explain biology.
>�In particular, evolution is not
> explicable in terms of fundamental particles interacting even though
> nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
> particles interacting.
I am sorry but I am surprised that, again, a top scientist like you
> nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
> particles interacting.
can assert that physics is only the study of interactions between
fundamental particles (!).
Do you consider for example that far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics
is not part of Physics?
> Second, you may appreciate Robertson's notion of "truth". �I was
> simply warning bystanders not to misinterpret your summary because
> they misunderstand what is meant by that term. �And my example was
> taken from classic English literature so my ethnocentric bias made me
> forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
> with it. �It is, in case you didn't realize, the first sentence in
> forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
> Jane Austen's "Pride and Prejudice" about "at truth universally
> recognized". �I, myself, have no definition of "absolute truth" nor do
> I wish to pursue one.
We agree: Absolute truth cannot be defined. As you are aware my
personal viewpoint is the same as Karl Popper's one: "theories cannot
be proved correct, only falsified", as quoted by Robertson.
> Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
> scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
> the universe is, in some important sense, is "random" and
> "unpredictable" but still obeys quite specific laws. �As to the "edge
> of Chaos", it may be used metaphorically by some but still refers to
> the mathematical phase transition to chaotic behavior. �Further there
> are demurrals to Kauffman's (and others') work. �See Mitchell's paper
> "Dynamics, Computation, and the Edge of Chaos": A Re-Examination"
> �http://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~mm/dyn-comp-edge.pdf
I recommend you also to read "Order within Chaos" by Pierre Berge,
Yves Pomeau and Christian Vidal (1987).
It is the best book on deterministic chaos systems I have ever read.
> Fourth, on the "incompleteness of mathematics". �It is true that
> physics has strong connections to mathematics but that does not
> necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
> important physical correlation. �I gave specific reasons why this may
> necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
> not hold which you did not comment on.
You wrote: " If the physical universe is finite then no such argument
applies.�It may well be that neither space nor time are infinitely
divisible nor infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller
particles made of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a
halt. �It is NOT turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is
particles made of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a
nothing under the bottom turtle for it to fall into".
I have two main comments:
1. The question is not only related to the finitude of our universe,
even if actually I am convinced that the existence of multiverse is
required for atheism not to be wrong: thus, as a pure atheist, I must
believe in multiverse.
For instance why do you think of the following Robertson's argument:
"if we assume that the physical universe is a type 1 universe, we
would then be in the rather odd position of assuming that at some
point research in physics is going to
end while research in mathematics is still ongoing. In other words, we
would be assuming that although progress in mathematics will never
end, the development of applications of that mathematics will come to
an end, somehow. This seems to me to be a very strange assumption" ?
2. I don't understand you metaphor with "turtles" and your sentence
"It is just that there is nothing under the bottom turtle for it to
fall into": can you explicit it?
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 3:01:26 PM12/22/12
to
> There are several different questions.
> Is the universe real?
> Is the universe lawful?
> Is the universe knowable?
> If the universe is knowable can we tell when we know it?
> Is the universe predictable?
> And probably several others in the same general ball park.
> You need to be clear what questions you are asking and answering.
You are right and here are my comments on your list of questions
> Is the universe real?
> Is the universe lawful?
> Is the universe knowable?
> If the universe is knowable can we tell when we know it?
> Is the universe predictable?
> And probably several others in the same general ball park.
> You need to be clear what questions you are asking and answering.
(given that I would like to stay within a scientific approach only.
Then, as you know, a scientific approach cannot answer all kinds of
questions):
- "Is the universe real?" seems a pure philosophical question to me;
- "Is the universe lawful?" and "Is the universe knowable?" are
clearly related to the questioning by Robertson;
- "If the universe is knowable can we tell when we know it?" is a
philosophical question;
- "Is the universe predictable?" The response depends on the details
you require.
> To offer an equally unsophisticated refutation of your conclusion, in
> mathematics there are not actual infinities, only potential infinities.
> Therefore the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural
> sciences" implies that there can't be an infinite quantity of
> information describing the universe.
How can you assert that "in mathematics there are not actual
infinities, only potential infinities"?
What does that mean actually?
By the way do you agree that "Turing�s halting theorem establishes
that there can be no finite method for determining the truth of an
arbitrary statement in mathematics, and therefore no finite
'scientific method' in mathematics either"?
*Hemidactylus*
Dec 22, 2012, 3:30:03 PM12/22/12
to
emergent Norman I used to know. Has Wilkins taken over your account?
Richard Norman
Dec 22, 2012, 3:46:34 PM12/22/12
to
Wilkins, it must be me.
In fact, the most serious problem with Robertson's question about
"absolute truth" is that it deals with physics explaining the world
whereas biology deals entirely with emergent properties.
Ernest Major
Dec 22, 2012, 3:47:31 PM12/22/12
to
In message
<00ff3539-b1b5-43b3...@d4g2000vbw.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Actual_infinity (not the best of
WikiPedia articles)
To be accurate, that there are no actual infinities, only potential
infinities, was a position held by some mathematicians and philosophers,
and is now a minority position, if held at all.
>
>By the way do you agree that "Turing’s halting theorem establishes
alias Ernest Major
<00ff3539-b1b5-43b3...@d4g2000vbw.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
WikiPedia articles)
To be accurate, that there are no actual infinities, only potential
infinities, was a position held by some mathematicians and philosophers,
and is now a minority position, if held at all.
>
>By the way do you agree that "Turing’s halting theorem establishes
>that there can be no finite method for determining the truth of an
>arbitrary statement in mathematics, and therefore no finite
>'scientific method' in mathematics either"?
>
--
>arbitrary statement in mathematics, and therefore no finite
>'scientific method' in mathematics either"?
>
alias Ernest Major
Richard Norman
Dec 22, 2012, 4:34:55 PM12/22/12
to
On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 11:37:02 -0800 (PST), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>On 22 d�c, 09:05, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 04:50:43 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>> >> describes physical reality". �"Absolute truth" means "really
>> >> refers to a universe in chaos as obeying no laws. �A mathematical
>> >> the physical universe is finite then no such argument applies. �It may
>> >> turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is nothing under the
>> >mathematics in the natural sciences� as Eugene Wigner already stated
>> independent of this question. �And this question applies only to
>> fundamental physics. �Chemistry and geology and biology proceed with
>> of physics really fails to include it all. �The universe may be
>> are demurrals to Kauffman's (and others') work. �See Mitchell's paper
find a "physics of everything". That really means explaining the
fundamental particles along with their interactions plus space and
time since what we know of the physical universe consists solely of
particles and their interactions in space-time. The reductionist
approach says there is nothing else; everything can be reduced to
that.
You also seem not to understand "progress in mathematics". Only some
logicians or specialists in what is called "foundations" look into
extending known mathematics with new axioms in order to encompass
statements true but not provable with the axioms we ordinarily use.
Hardly any mathematicians butt against the "unprovable because our
axiomatic system is incomplete." Rather they butt against the "as yet
unprovable because nobody has been clever enough to date."
The "end of physics" that I contemplate is the end of reductionistic
physics. That leaves all sorts of properties of complex systems that
are not usefully explained in terms of particle interactions.
Robertson's statement is, as you phrase him, strange. In my view an
awful lot of Robertson's statements are strange. This is no stranger
than the rest.
The "turtles all the way down" is simply a classical metaphor for an
unending series of questions -- basically what is meant by Robertson's
type 2 system. See, for example, Wikipedia at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down
If the universe is type 1 so that a finite set of axioms suffices,
then there must be a bottom set of turtles. The obvious question then
is "what do they stand on." I say they don't have to stand on
anything; they just have to be there because "falling" beneath the
ultimate explanation doesn't make sense.
Incidentally, I find your claim that atheism only makes sense in the
context of a multiverse. I would argue that almost all of science,
and all of science that I am professionally interested in, occurs
within our own universe and that nothing that happens outside it can
have any influence on what happens to the systems I want to study. In
particular, nothing in any alternative universe bears on biological
evolution in general and animal physiology in particular. I am quite
happy denying the existence of any god without having to conjure up
alternate universes.
wrote:
>On 22 d�c, 09:05, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 04:50:43 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>> >On 21 d�c, 16:57, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> There are several points that must be considered about that paper.
>> >> First, it is philosophy, not science. �Wilkins can comment on whether
>> >> There are several points that must be considered about that paper.
>> >> it even agrees with what is ordinarily considered good philosophy of
>> >> science. �In any event, nothing discussed there has any effect on the
>> >> way that scientists go about their daily lives (except, of course,
>> >> that far too many physicists go off on philosophical sprees when they
>> >> are not doing real science).
>> >I don't fully agree with you. I think the asked question is relevant
>> >scientifically speaking, even if, as Robertson recognizes it with
>> >reserves such as "Although this uncontested effectiveness of
>> >conventional scientific techniques does not offer
>> >absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
>> >chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore".
>> >Do you think anybody can claim what is "good philosophy of science" or
>> >even what is "good philosophy"? (however I am sure Pr. Wilkins can:
>> >see his comments).
>> >> Second, what is called "truth" there has a very specialized and
>> >> unusual (in my thinking, anyway) meaning. �It means "accurately
>> >> that far too many physicists go off on philosophical sprees when they
>> >> are not doing real science).
>> >I don't fully agree with you. I think the asked question is relevant
>> >scientifically speaking, even if, as Robertson recognizes it with
>> >reserves such as "Although this uncontested effectiveness of
>> >conventional scientific techniques does not offer
>> >absolute and conclusive proof that our physical world is not perfectly
>> >chaotic, the evidence is far too strong to simply ignore".
>> >Do you think anybody can claim what is "good philosophy of science" or
>> >even what is "good philosophy"? (however I am sure Pr. Wilkins can:
>> >see his comments).
>> >> Second, what is called "truth" there has a very specialized and
>> >> describes physical reality". �"Absolute truth" means "really
>> >> accurately describes everything about physical reality". That a single
>> >> man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife may be a
>> >> truth universally acknowledged but definitely not by Robertson.
>> >Personally Robertson's meaning of truth suits me very well.
>> >With your example (ISTM a value judgment) I don't understand your
>> >meaning of �"Absolute truth": could you explicit it?
>> >> man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife may be a
>> >> truth universally acknowledged but definitely not by Robertson.
>> >Personally Robertson's meaning of truth suits me very well.
>> >With your example (ISTM a value judgment) I don't understand your
>> >> Third, what is called "chaos" there has a very unspecialized and
>> >> wishy-washy meaning that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with
>> >> the mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos. �Robertson
>> >> wishy-washy meaning that has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with
>> >> refers to a universe in chaos as obeying no laws. �A mathematical
>> >> system in chaos close adheres exactly to a particular law, the
>> >> mathematical equation whose solution is said to exhibit chaos albeit
>> >> completely deterministic. �Thus Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is totally
>> >> mathematical equation whose solution is said to exhibit chaos albeit
>> >> irrelevant to the analysis.
>> >I am surprised that a top scientist like you can make such a mistake
>> >about the meaning of the term "chaos".
>> >"Chaos" in Robertson's paper context means "Randomness" or "a lack of
>> >intelligible pattern or combination".
>> >"The mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos" you refer to
>> >is related to the notion of "deterministic chaos" which is, as you
>> >well know, an oxymoron to describe specific deterministic dynamical
>> >systems that are highly sensitive to initial conditions and thus not
>> >foreseeable after some time.
>> >The reference to Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is just a metaphor meaning
>> >that our physical world, even it is not as positivists see it, is
>> >however partly understandable as Einstein said "The most
>> >incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible".
>> >> Fourth, the fact that we know that mathematics does not have a finite
>> >> set of axioms from which all "truth" can be derived has nothing
>> >> whatsoever to do with whether physics does or does not. �That all
>> >I am surprised that a top scientist like you can make such a mistake
>> >about the meaning of the term "chaos".
>> >"Chaos" in Robertson's paper context means "Randomness" or "a lack of
>> >intelligible pattern or combination".
>> >"The mathematics and complexity theory notions of chaos" you refer to
>> >is related to the notion of "deterministic chaos" which is, as you
>> >well know, an oxymoron to describe specific deterministic dynamical
>> >systems that are highly sensitive to initial conditions and thus not
>> >foreseeable after some time.
>> >The reference to Kauffman's "edge of chaos" is just a metaphor meaning
>> >that our physical world, even it is not as positivists see it, is
>> >however partly understandable as Einstein said "The most
>> >incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible".
>> >> Fourth, the fact that we know that mathematics does not have a finite
>> >> set of axioms from which all "truth" can be derived has nothing
>> >> kinds of branches of mathematics, no matter how seeming esoteric, have
>> >> been shown to have some application to physics is irrelevant. The
>> >> incompleteness in mathematics is closely related to self-referential
>> >> or recursive statements dealing with uncountably infinite sets. �If
>> >> been shown to have some application to physics is irrelevant. The
>> >> incompleteness in mathematics is closely related to self-referential
>> >> the physical universe is finite then no such argument applies. �It may
>> >> well be that neither space nor time are infinitely divisible nor
>> >> infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller particles made
>> >> of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a halt. �It is NOT
>> >> infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller particles made
>> >> turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is nothing under the
>> >> bottom turtle for it to fall into.
>> >Of course I don't agree with you. As Robertson asserted there is
>> >evidence that the incompleteness in mathematics may be extrapolate to
>> >our physical world because of �the unreasonable effectiveness of
>> >Of course I don't agree with you. As Robertson asserted there is
>> >evidence that the incompleteness in mathematics may be extrapolate to
>> >mathematics in the natural sciences� as Eugene Wigner already stated
>> >in 1960.
>> (I prefer to keep all my comments here at the bottom rather than
>> interspersed through the text.)
>> First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
>> No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
>> sense. Otherwise there would be no value in pursuing science. �As to
>> (I prefer to keep all my comments here at the bottom rather than
>> interspersed through the text.)
>> First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
>> No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
>> whether a finite set of laws would encompass everything -- we are far
>> removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
>> physics to explain even what we see now. �So science proceeds
>> removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
>> independent of this question. �And this question applies only to
>> fundamental physics. �Chemistry and geology and biology proceed with
>> an enormity of problems to investigate quite apart from whether
>> physics explains "everything" to its satisfaction. �The "everything"
>> of physics really fails to include it all. �The universe may be
>> reducible to fundamental physics but understanding the physics does
>> not really explain biology.
>
>Of course I fully disagree with you on that.
>
>>�In particular, evolution is not
>> not really explain biology.
>
>Of course I fully disagree with you on that.
>
>> explicable in terms of fundamental particles interacting even though
>> nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
>> particles interacting.
>
>I am sorry but I am surprised that, again, a top scientist like you
>can assert that physics is only the study of interactions between
>fundamental particles (!).
>Do you consider for example that far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics
>is not part of Physics?
>
>> Second, you may appreciate Robertson's notion of "truth". �I was
>> nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
>> particles interacting.
>
>I am sorry but I am surprised that, again, a top scientist like you
>can assert that physics is only the study of interactions between
>fundamental particles (!).
>Do you consider for example that far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics
>is not part of Physics?
>
>> simply warning bystanders not to misinterpret your summary because
>> they misunderstand what is meant by that term. �And my example was
>> taken from classic English literature so my ethnocentric bias made me
>> forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
>> with it. �It is, in case you didn't realize, the first sentence in
>> forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
>> Jane Austen's "Pride and Prejudice" about "at truth universally
>> recognized". �I, myself, have no definition of "absolute truth" nor do
>> I wish to pursue one.
>
>We agree: Absolute truth cannot be defined. As you are aware my
>personal viewpoint is the same as Karl Popper's one: "theories cannot
>be proved correct, only falsified", as quoted by Robertson.
>
>> Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
>> scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
>> must clarify exactly what is meant. � Quantum mechanics argues that
>
>We agree: Absolute truth cannot be defined. As you are aware my
>personal viewpoint is the same as Karl Popper's one: "theories cannot
>be proved correct, only falsified", as quoted by Robertson.
>
>> Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
>> scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
>> the universe is, in some important sense, is "random" and
>> "unpredictable" but still obeys quite specific laws. �As to the "edge
>> of Chaos", it may be used metaphorically by some but still refers to
>> the mathematical phase transition to chaotic behavior. �Further there
>> are demurrals to Kauffman's (and others') work. �See Mitchell's paper
>> "Dynamics, Computation, and the Edge of Chaos": A Re-Examination"
>> �http://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~mm/dyn-comp-edge.pdf
>
>I recommend you also to read "Order within Chaos" by Pierre Berge,
>Yves Pomeau and Christian Vidal (1987).
>It is the best book on deterministic chaos systems I have ever read.
>
>> Fourth, on the "incompleteness of mathematics". �It is true that
>I recommend you also to read "Order within Chaos" by Pierre Berge,
>Yves Pomeau and Christian Vidal (1987).
>It is the best book on deterministic chaos systems I have ever read.
>
>> physics has strong connections to mathematics but that does not
>> necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
>> important physical correlation. �I gave specific reasons why this may
>> necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
>> not hold which you did not comment on.
>
>You wrote: " If the physical universe is finite then no such argument
>applies.�It may well be that neither space nor time are infinitely
>
>You wrote: " If the physical universe is finite then no such argument
>divisible nor infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller
>particles made of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a
>halt. �It is NOT turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is
>particles made of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a
>nothing under the bottom turtle for it to fall into".
>I have two main comments:
>1. The question is not only related to the finitude of our universe,
>even if actually I am convinced that the existence of multiverse is
>required for atheism not to be wrong: thus, as a pure atheist, I must
>believe in multiverse.
>For instance why do you think of the following Robertson's argument:
>"if we assume that the physical universe is a type 1 universe, we
>would then be in the rather odd position of assuming that at some
>point research in physics is going to
>end while research in mathematics is still ongoing. In other words, we
>would be assuming that although progress in mathematics will never
>end, the development of applications of that mathematics will come to
>an end, somehow. This seems to me to be a very strange assumption" ?
>2. I don't understand you metaphor with "turtles" and your sentence
>"It is just that there is nothing under the bottom turtle for it to
>fall into": can you explicit it?
The whole idea of Robertson, as I understand it, is whether we can
>I have two main comments:
>1. The question is not only related to the finitude of our universe,
>even if actually I am convinced that the existence of multiverse is
>required for atheism not to be wrong: thus, as a pure atheist, I must
>believe in multiverse.
>For instance why do you think of the following Robertson's argument:
>"if we assume that the physical universe is a type 1 universe, we
>would then be in the rather odd position of assuming that at some
>point research in physics is going to
>end while research in mathematics is still ongoing. In other words, we
>would be assuming that although progress in mathematics will never
>end, the development of applications of that mathematics will come to
>an end, somehow. This seems to me to be a very strange assumption" ?
>2. I don't understand you metaphor with "turtles" and your sentence
>"It is just that there is nothing under the bottom turtle for it to
>fall into": can you explicit it?
find a "physics of everything". That really means explaining the
fundamental particles along with their interactions plus space and
time since what we know of the physical universe consists solely of
particles and their interactions in space-time. The reductionist
approach says there is nothing else; everything can be reduced to
that.
You also seem not to understand "progress in mathematics". Only some
logicians or specialists in what is called "foundations" look into
extending known mathematics with new axioms in order to encompass
statements true but not provable with the axioms we ordinarily use.
Hardly any mathematicians butt against the "unprovable because our
axiomatic system is incomplete." Rather they butt against the "as yet
unprovable because nobody has been clever enough to date."
The "end of physics" that I contemplate is the end of reductionistic
physics. That leaves all sorts of properties of complex systems that
are not usefully explained in terms of particle interactions.
Robertson's statement is, as you phrase him, strange. In my view an
awful lot of Robertson's statements are strange. This is no stranger
than the rest.
The "turtles all the way down" is simply a classical metaphor for an
unending series of questions -- basically what is meant by Robertson's
type 2 system. See, for example, Wikipedia at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down
If the universe is type 1 so that a finite set of axioms suffices,
then there must be a bottom set of turtles. The obvious question then
is "what do they stand on." I say they don't have to stand on
anything; they just have to be there because "falling" beneath the
ultimate explanation doesn't make sense.
Incidentally, I find your claim that atheism only makes sense in the
context of a multiverse. I would argue that almost all of science,
and all of science that I am professionally interested in, occurs
within our own universe and that nothing that happens outside it can
have any influence on what happens to the systems I want to study. In
particular, nothing in any alternative universe bears on biological
evolution in general and animal physiology in particular. I am quite
happy denying the existence of any god without having to conjure up
alternate universes.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 4:45:36 PM12/22/12
to
On 22 d�c, 12:46, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 15:30:03 -0500, *Hemidactylus*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >On 12/22/2012 12:08 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 08:55:44 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 15:30:03 -0500, *Hemidactylus*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >On 12/22/2012 12:08 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
Are these different from the emergent properties in physics as:
- ex. 1: formation of protons and neutrons with specific properties
which cannot be deduced from the properties of their quarks,
- ex. 2: formation of molecules with specific properties which cannot
be deduced from the properties of their atoms (a striking example is
water);
- ex. 3: self-organizing systems with specific properties which cannot
be deduced from the properties of their constituents;
etc.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 5:03:31 PM12/22/12
to
> <00ff3539-b1b5-43b3-8970-b13ed62d8...@d4g2000vbw.googlegroups.com>,
> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
> � �http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Actual_infinity(not the best of
mathematical one.
Where have you ever seen that mathematicians do not use infinity
anymore? This is indeed a fundamental and inescapable notion in
mathematics!
> > By the way do you agree that "Turing�s halting theorem establishes
> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
> WikiPedia articles)
>
> To be accurate, that there are no actual infinities, only potential
> infinities, was a position held by some mathematicians and philosophers,
> and is now a minority position, if held at all.
The link you propose is about a philosophical question not a
>
> To be accurate, that there are no actual infinities, only potential
> infinities, was a position held by some mathematicians and philosophers,
> and is now a minority position, if held at all.
mathematical one.
Where have you ever seen that mathematicians do not use infinity
anymore? This is indeed a fundamental and inescapable notion in
mathematics!
> > By the way do you agree that "Turing�s halting theorem establishes
> > that there can be no finite method for determining the truth of an
> > arbitrary statement in mathematics, and therefore no finite
> > 'scientific method' in mathematics either"?
Why didn't you answer the above question?
> > arbitrary statement in mathematics, and therefore no finite
> > 'scientific method' in mathematics either"?
*Hemidactylus*
Dec 22, 2012, 5:10:40 PM12/22/12
to
unintended consequences rears its head yet again.
*Hemidactylus*
Dec 22, 2012, 5:12:29 PM12/22/12
to
John S. Wilkins
Dec 22, 2012, 5:52:59 PM12/22/12
to
--
John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydney
Honorary Fellow, University of Melbourne
- http://evolvingthoughts.net
John S. Wilkins
Dec 22, 2012, 5:53:00 PM12/22/12
to
the time. But when a scientist tries to do philosophy and does it
poorly, I am unimpressed. If I did science poorly, then a scientist
would have a right to be unimpressed also.
John S. Wilkins
Dec 22, 2012, 5:53:02 PM12/22/12
to
everything it contains."
"Who's Radiohead?"
(long, evil pause) "Penny, I have a working knowledge of the *important*
things in the universe." [The Big Bang Theory "The Work Song
Nanocluster", 2009]
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 6:00:37 PM12/22/12
to
> >> (I prefer to keep all my comments here at the bottom rather than
> >> interspersed through the text.)
> >> First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
> >> No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
> >> sense. Otherwise there would be no value in pursuing science. �As to
> >> interspersed through the text.)
> >> First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
> >> No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
> >> whether a finite set of laws would encompass everything -- we are far
> >> removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
> >> physics to explain even what we see now. �So science proceeds
> >> removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
> >> independent of this question. �And this question applies only to
> >> fundamental physics. �Chemistry and geology and biology proceed with
> >> an enormity of problems to investigate quite apart from whether
> >> physics explains "everything" to its satisfaction. �The "everything"
> >> of physics really fails to include it all. �The universe may be
> >> reducible to fundamental physics but understanding the physics does
> >> not really explain biology.
> >Of course I fully disagree with you on that.
> >>�In particular, evolution is not
> >> not really explain biology.
> >Of course I fully disagree with you on that.
> >> explicable in terms of fundamental particles interacting even though
> >> nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
> >> particles interacting.
> >I am sorry but I am surprised that, again, a top scientist like you
> >can assert that physics is only the study of interactions between
> >fundamental particles (!).
> >Do you consider for example that far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics
> >is not part of Physics?
> >> Second, you may appreciate Robertson's notion of "truth". �I was
> >> nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
> >> particles interacting.
> >I am sorry but I am surprised that, again, a top scientist like you
> >can assert that physics is only the study of interactions between
> >fundamental particles (!).
> >Do you consider for example that far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics
> >is not part of Physics?
> >> simply warning bystanders not to misinterpret your summary because
> >> they misunderstand what is meant by that term. �And my example was
> >> taken from classic English literature so my ethnocentric bias made me
> >> forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
> >> with it. �It is, in case you didn't realize, the first sentence in
> >> forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
> >> Jane Austen's "Pride and Prejudice" about "at truth universally
> >> recognized". �I, myself, have no definition of "absolute truth" nor do
> >> I wish to pursue one.
> >We agree: Absolute truth cannot be defined. As you are aware my
> >personal viewpoint is the same as Karl Popper's one: "theories cannot
> >be proved correct, only falsified", as quoted by Robertson.
> >> Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
> >> scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
> >> must clarify exactly what is meant. � Quantum mechanics argues that
> >We agree: Absolute truth cannot be defined. As you are aware my
> >personal viewpoint is the same as Karl Popper's one: "theories cannot
> >be proved correct, only falsified", as quoted by Robertson.
> >> Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
> >> scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
> >> the universe is, in some important sense, is "random" and
> >> "unpredictable" but still obeys quite specific laws. �As to the "edge
> >> of Chaos", it may be used metaphorically by some but still refers to
> >> the mathematical phase transition to chaotic behavior. �Further there
> >> are demurrals to Kauffman's (and others') work. �See Mitchell's paper
> >> "Dynamics, Computation, and the Edge of Chaos": A Re-Examination"
> >> �http://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~mm/dyn-comp-edge.pdf
> >I recommend you also to read "Order within Chaos" by Pierre Berge,
> >Yves Pomeau and Christian Vidal (1987).
> >It is the best book on deterministic chaos systems I have ever read.
> >> Fourth, on the "incompleteness of mathematics". �It is true that
> >Yves Pomeau and Christian Vidal (1987).
> >It is the best book on deterministic chaos systems I have ever read.
> >> physics has strong connections to mathematics but that does not
> >> necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
> >> important physical correlation. �I gave specific reasons why this may
> >> necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
> >> not hold which you did not comment on.
> >You wrote: " If the physical universe is finite then no such argument
> >applies.�It may well be that neither space nor time are infinitely
> >You wrote: " If the physical universe is finite then no such argument
> >divisible nor infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller
> >particles made of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a
> >halt. �It is NOT turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is
> >particles made of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a
> >nothing under the bottom turtle for it to fall into".
> >I have two main comments:
> >1. The question is not only related to the finitude of our universe,
> >even if actually I am convinced that the existence of multiverse is
> >required for atheism not to be wrong: thus, as a pure atheist, I must
> >believe in multiverse.
> >For instance why do you think of the following Robertson's argument:
> >"if we assume that the physical universe is a type 1 universe, we
> >would then be in the rather odd position of assuming that at some
> >point research in physics is going to
> >end while research in mathematics is still ongoing. In other words, we
> >would be assuming that although progress in mathematics will never
> >end, the development of applications of that mathematics will come to
> >an end, somehow. This seems to me to be a very strange assumption" ?
> >2. I don't understand you metaphor with "turtles" and your sentence
> >"It is just that there is nothing under the bottom turtle for it to
> >fall into": can you explicit it?
> The whole idea of Robertson, as I understand it, is whether we can
> find a "physics of everything".
It is true that I don't like the expression "Theories of
> >I have two main comments:
> >1. The question is not only related to the finitude of our universe,
> >even if actually I am convinced that the existence of multiverse is
> >required for atheism not to be wrong: thus, as a pure atheist, I must
> >believe in multiverse.
> >For instance why do you think of the following Robertson's argument:
> >"if we assume that the physical universe is a type 1 universe, we
> >would then be in the rather odd position of assuming that at some
> >point research in physics is going to
> >end while research in mathematics is still ongoing. In other words, we
> >would be assuming that although progress in mathematics will never
> >end, the development of applications of that mathematics will come to
> >an end, somehow. This seems to me to be a very strange assumption" ?
> >2. I don't understand you metaphor with "turtles" and your sentence
> >"It is just that there is nothing under the bottom turtle for it to
> >fall into": can you explicit it?
> The whole idea of Robertson, as I understand it, is whether we can
> find a "physics of everything".
Everything" (TOE). This was the reason why, in the thread I proposed,
I used the expression "physical world" instead.
> That really means explaining the
> fundamental particles along with their interactions plus space and
> time since what we know of the physical universe consists solely of
> particles and their interactions in space-time.
>�The reductionist
> approach says there is nothing else; everything can be reduced to
> that.
Robertson doesn't specifically speak of reductionist but of the
> that.
positivist position which asserts that there is an absolute truth and
the methods that are needed to discover that absolute truth
(�scientific methods�) can be contained within or expressed with a
finite quantity of information.
(�scientific methods�) can be contained within or expressed with a
> You also seem not to understand "progress in mathematics". �Only some
> logicians or specialists in what is called "foundations" look into
> extending known mathematics with new axioms in order to encompass
> statements true but not provable with the axioms we ordinarily use.
> Hardly any mathematicians butt against the "unprovable because our
> axiomatic system is incomplete." �Rather they butt against the "as yet
> extending known mathematics with new axioms in order to encompass
> statements true but not provable with the axioms we ordinarily use.
> Hardly any mathematicians butt against the "unprovable because our
> unprovable because nobody has been clever enough to date."
Yes, you are right.
> The "end of physics" that I contemplate is the end of reductionistic
> are not usefully explained in terms of particle interactions.
I don't disagree with you about that.
> Robertson's statement is, as you phrase him, strange. �In my view an
> awful lot of Robertson's statements are strange.
Could you specify which ones?
>�This is no stranger
> than the rest.
> The "turtles all the way down" is simply a classical metaphor for an
> unending series of questions -- basically what is meant by Robertson's
> type 2 system. �See, for example, Wikipedia at
> The "turtles all the way down" is simply a classical metaphor for an
> unending series of questions -- basically what is meant by Robertson's
> �http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down
> If the universe is type 1 so that a finite set of axioms suffices,
> then there must be a bottom set of turtles. �The obvious question then
> is "what do they stand on." �I say they don't have to stand on
> anything; they just have to be there because "falling" beneath the
> ultimate explanation doesn't make sense.
> Incidentally, I find your claim that atheism only makes sense in the
> context of a multiverse. �I would argue that almost all of science,
> ultimate explanation doesn't make sense.
> Incidentally, I find your claim that atheism only makes sense in the
> and all of science that I am professionally interested in, occurs
> within our own universe and that nothing that happens outside it can
> have any influence on what happens to the systems I want to study. �In
> within our own universe and that nothing that happens outside it can
> particular, nothing in any alternative universe bears on biological
> evolution in general and animal physiology in particular. �I am quite
> happy denying the existence of any god without having to conjure up
> alternate universes.
How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
> alternate universes.
its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 6:19:06 PM12/22/12
to
> Actually, I didn't see much argument in the paper.
What do you think of Paul Karl Feyerabend's position in the philosophy
of science?
For instance "in his books Against Method and Science in a Free
Society Feyerabend defended the idea that there are no methodological
rules which are always used by scientists. He objected to any single
prescriptive scientific method on the grounds that any such method
would limit the activities of scientists, and hence restrict
scientific progress. In his view, science would benefit most from a
"dose" of theoretical anarchism. He also thought that theoretical
anarchism was desirable because it was more humanitarian than other
systems of organization, by not imposing rigid rules on scientists".
And also:
"Feyerabend's position was originally seen as radical in the
philosophy of science, because it implies that philosophy can neither
succeed in providing a general description of science, nor in devising
a method for differentiating products of science from non-scientific
entities like myths. Feyerabend's position also implies that
philosophical guidelines should be ignored by scientists, if they are
to aim for progress".
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 22, 2012, 6:34:00 PM12/22/12
to
On 22 d�c, 14:53, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
> <marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
> > On 22 d�c, 08:41, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> > > On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > > wrote:
>
> > > >On 22 d�c, 01:18, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
>
> > > ><snip for focus>
>
> > > >> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
> > > >> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
> > > >> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
> > > >> uninteresting.
> > > >> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
>
> > > ><snip for focus>
>
> > > >Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
> > > >paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
>
> > > I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
> > > response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
> > > argumentation.
>
> > Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
> > debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
> > scientists.
>
> Dont be a fool. I work with (am coauthoring a book with) scientists all
> the time. But when a scientist tries to do philosophy and does it
> poorly, I am unimpressed.
As I have already said to Richard I disagree with you when you assert
> <marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
> > On 22 d�c, 08:41, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> > > On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > > wrote:
>
> > > >On 22 d�c, 01:18, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
>
> > > ><snip for focus>
>
> > > >> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
> > > >> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
> > > >> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
> > > >> uninteresting.
> > > >> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
>
> > > ><snip for focus>
>
> > > >Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
> > > >paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
>
> > > I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
> > > response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
> > > argumentation.
>
> > Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
> > debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
> > scientists.
>
> Dont be a fool. I work with (am coauthoring a book with) scientists all
> the time. But when a scientist tries to do philosophy and does it
> poorly, I am unimpressed.
that Robertson is dealing with a philosophical question. I think he is
dealing with a question which is relevant scientifically speaking and
that his responses are quite sensible, rational and logical.
> If I did science poorly, then a scientist
> would have a right to be unimpressed also.
subjective feeling and a value judgement only) it is to be capable or
not to give sensible, rational and logical arguments.
You assert that Robertson gave none but without any example, this is
too easy and unfair.
jonathan
Dec 22, 2012, 6:39:32 PM12/22/12
to
<marc.t...@wanadoo.fr> wrote in message
news:131d2a8c-c418-48d6...@b16g2000vbh.googlegroups.com...
> There are 3 hypotheses for our physical world (Robertson 2000):
> 1. According to positivists (e.g., Albert Michelson, Lord Kelvin,
> Henri Poincare etc.) there is an absolute truth and the methods that
> 1. According to positivists (e.g., Albert Michelson, Lord Kelvin,
> are needed to discover that absolute truth ("scientific methods") can
> be contained within or expressed with a finite quantity of
> information;
> 2. According to postmodernists (e.g., Paul Feyerabend) our physical
> world is perfectly chaotic: it contains no absolute truth: there are
> no underlying axioms of physics or at least none that are independent
> of social context;
> 3. According to other scientists (e.g., Freeman Dyson, Stuart
> Kauffman,
When the two above forms are persistently in balance with each other,
> 2. According to postmodernists (e.g., Paul Feyerabend) our physical
> world is perfectly chaotic: it contains no absolute truth: there are
> no underlying axioms of physics or at least none that are independent
> of social context;
> 3. According to other scientists (e.g., Freeman Dyson, Stuart
> Kauffman,
critically interacting, when one can't tell which dominates system behavior
then the third emergent realm is created, the world of evolution, life
and spirit.
Static > Emergent < Chaotic
>Douglas Robertson etc.) the axioms of physics exist but they
> cannot be contained within any finite quantity of information,
by the output or emergent side, from the properties of life.
Not from the part properties.
Just as the underlying patterns are best seen by the
larger statistical sample, not the smaller one.
From the complex, not the simple.
Darwin, so to speak, shows how the universe goes, not
the other way around.
s
Robert Carnegie: Fnord: cc talk-origins@moderators.isc.org
Dec 22, 2012, 7:07:41 PM12/22/12
to
On Saturday, 22 December 2012 16:48:09 UTC, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>
> Unlike Richard's opinion I think Robertson asks questions that are
> relevant scientifically speaking and not only pure philosophical
> questions.
Not the questions that you posted here.
>
> Unlike Richard's opinion I think Robertson asks questions that are
> relevant scientifically speaking and not only pure philosophical
> questions.
I think it's reasonable to accept that the natural world exists.
But a scientific "theory", a set of evidence-based conclusions, about
its nature, is a separate thing from its actual identity, is something
that we have invented. But I think that is inescapable for science
and scientific thinking by practised beings such as we find ourselves
to be. Therefore it tells us nothing about what the text of
a scientific theory should be. Science itself is independent of
this philosophical question.
Richard Norman
Dec 22, 2012, 9:51:55 PM12/22/12
to
Richard Norman
Dec 22, 2012, 9:56:02 PM12/22/12
to
On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 15:00:37 -0800 (PST), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>On 22 d�c, 13:34, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
><snip for focus>
>
>> >> (I prefer to keep all my comments here at the bottom rather than
>> >> interspersed through the text.)
>> >> First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
>> >> No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
>> >> sense. Otherwise there would be no value in pursuing science. �As to
>> >> independent of this question. �And this question applies only to
>> >> fundamental physics. �Chemistry and geology and biology proceed with
>> >> of physics really fails to include it all. �The universe may be
>> >> are demurrals to Kauffman's (and others') work. �See Mitchell's paper
>>�The reductionist
>finite quantity of information.
>
>> You also seem not to understand "progress in mathematics". �Only some
>> �http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down
>> is "what do they stand on." �I say they don't have to stand on
individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
particular one? That is equally unlikely.
wrote:
>On 22 d�c, 13:34, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
><snip for focus>
>
>> >> (I prefer to keep all my comments here at the bottom rather than
>> >> interspersed through the text.)
>> >> First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
>> >> No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
>> >> whether a finite set of laws would encompass everything -- we are far
>> >> removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
>> >> physics to explain even what we see now. �So science proceeds
>> >> removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
>> >> independent of this question. �And this question applies only to
>> >> fundamental physics. �Chemistry and geology and biology proceed with
>> >> an enormity of problems to investigate quite apart from whether
>> >> physics explains "everything" to its satisfaction. �The "everything"
>> >> of physics really fails to include it all. �The universe may be
>> >> reducible to fundamental physics but understanding the physics does
>> >> not really explain biology.
>> >Of course I fully disagree with you on that.
>> >>�In particular, evolution is not
>> >> not really explain biology.
>> >Of course I fully disagree with you on that.
>> >> explicable in terms of fundamental particles interacting even though
>> >> nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
>> >> particles interacting.
>> >I am sorry but I am surprised that, again, a top scientist like you
>> >can assert that physics is only the study of interactions between
>> >fundamental particles (!).
>> >Do you consider for example that far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics
>> >is not part of Physics?
>> >> Second, you may appreciate Robertson's notion of "truth". �I was
>> >> nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
>> >> particles interacting.
>> >I am sorry but I am surprised that, again, a top scientist like you
>> >can assert that physics is only the study of interactions between
>> >fundamental particles (!).
>> >Do you consider for example that far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics
>> >is not part of Physics?
>> >> simply warning bystanders not to misinterpret your summary because
>> >> they misunderstand what is meant by that term. �And my example was
>> >> taken from classic English literature so my ethnocentric bias made me
>> >> forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
>> >> with it. �It is, in case you didn't realize, the first sentence in
>> >> forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
>> >> Jane Austen's "Pride and Prejudice" about "at truth universally
>> >> recognized". �I, myself, have no definition of "absolute truth" nor do
>> >> I wish to pursue one.
>> >We agree: Absolute truth cannot be defined. As you are aware my
>> >personal viewpoint is the same as Karl Popper's one: "theories cannot
>> >be proved correct, only falsified", as quoted by Robertson.
>> >> Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
>> >> scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
>> >> must clarify exactly what is meant. � Quantum mechanics argues that
>> >We agree: Absolute truth cannot be defined. As you are aware my
>> >personal viewpoint is the same as Karl Popper's one: "theories cannot
>> >be proved correct, only falsified", as quoted by Robertson.
>> >> Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
>> >> scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
>> >> the universe is, in some important sense, is "random" and
>> >> "unpredictable" but still obeys quite specific laws. �As to the "edge
>> >> of Chaos", it may be used metaphorically by some but still refers to
>> >> the mathematical phase transition to chaotic behavior. �Further there
>> >> are demurrals to Kauffman's (and others') work. �See Mitchell's paper
>> >> "Dynamics, Computation, and the Edge of Chaos": A Re-Examination"
>> >> �http://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~mm/dyn-comp-edge.pdf
>> >I recommend you also to read "Order within Chaos" by Pierre Berge,
>> >Yves Pomeau and Christian Vidal (1987).
>> >It is the best book on deterministic chaos systems I have ever read.
>> >> Fourth, on the "incompleteness of mathematics". �It is true that
>> >Yves Pomeau and Christian Vidal (1987).
>> >It is the best book on deterministic chaos systems I have ever read.
>> >> physics has strong connections to mathematics but that does not
>> >> necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
>> >> important physical correlation. �I gave specific reasons why this may
>> >> necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
>> >> not hold which you did not comment on.
>> >You wrote: " If the physical universe is finite then no such argument
>> >applies.�It may well be that neither space nor time are infinitely
>> >You wrote: " If the physical universe is finite then no such argument
>> >divisible nor infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller
>> >particles made of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a
>> >halt. �It is NOT turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is
>> >particles made of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a
>> approach says there is nothing else; everything can be reduced to
>> that.
>
>Robertson doesn't specifically speak of reductionist but of the
>positivist position which asserts that there is an absolute truth and
>the methods that are needed to discover that absolute truth
>(�scientific methods�) can be contained within or expressed with a
>> that.
>
>Robertson doesn't specifically speak of reductionist but of the
>positivist position which asserts that there is an absolute truth and
>the methods that are needed to discover that absolute truth
>finite quantity of information.
>
>> You also seem not to understand "progress in mathematics". �Only some
>> logicians or specialists in what is called "foundations" look into
>> extending known mathematics with new axioms in order to encompass
>> statements true but not provable with the axioms we ordinarily use.
>> Hardly any mathematicians butt against the "unprovable because our
>> axiomatic system is incomplete." �Rather they butt against the "as yet
>> extending known mathematics with new axioms in order to encompass
>> statements true but not provable with the axioms we ordinarily use.
>> Hardly any mathematicians butt against the "unprovable because our
>> unprovable because nobody has been clever enough to date."
>
>Yes, you are right.
>
>> The "end of physics" that I contemplate is the end of reductionistic
>> physics. �That leaves all sorts of properties of complex systems that
>
>Yes, you are right.
>
>> The "end of physics" that I contemplate is the end of reductionistic
>> are not usefully explained in terms of particle interactions.
>
>I don't disagree with you about that.
>
>> Robertson's statement is, as you phrase him, strange. �In my view an
>
>I don't disagree with you about that.
>
>> awful lot of Robertson's statements are strange.
>
>Could you specify which ones?
>
>>�This is no stranger
>
>Could you specify which ones?
>
>> than the rest.
>> The "turtles all the way down" is simply a classical metaphor for an
>> unending series of questions -- basically what is meant by Robertson's
>> type 2 system. �See, for example, Wikipedia at
>> The "turtles all the way down" is simply a classical metaphor for an
>> unending series of questions -- basically what is meant by Robertson's
>> �http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down
>> If the universe is type 1 so that a finite set of axioms suffices,
>> then there must be a bottom set of turtles. �The obvious question then
>> is "what do they stand on." �I say they don't have to stand on
>> anything; they just have to be there because "falling" beneath the
>> ultimate explanation doesn't make sense.
>> Incidentally, I find your claim that atheism only makes sense in the
>> context of a multiverse. �I would argue that almost all of science,
>> ultimate explanation doesn't make sense.
>> Incidentally, I find your claim that atheism only makes sense in the
>> and all of science that I am professionally interested in, occurs
>> within our own universe and that nothing that happens outside it can
>> have any influence on what happens to the systems I want to study. �In
>> within our own universe and that nothing that happens outside it can
>> particular, nothing in any alternative universe bears on biological
>> evolution in general and animal physiology in particular. �I am quite
>> happy denying the existence of any god without having to conjure up
>> alternate universes.
>
>How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
>its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
>> alternate universes.
>
>How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
>its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
particular one? That is equally unlikely.
Richard Norman
Dec 22, 2012, 10:01:02 PM12/22/12
to
On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 13:45:36 -0800 (PST), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Build up another dozen levels of organization of emergence and you
start to get our macroscopic world.
The "absolute truths" that Robertson means is really the statements
that every aspect of all these emergent systems is reducible in
mechanism to the interaction between fundamental particles in space
and time. All the mechanisms of these emergent systems are reducible
to that level. The inverse is the problem: deducing the properties of
these systems (whether self-organizing or not) from the properties of
their constituents. Wilkins argues that it is merely a limitation of
our own human imaginations in failing to specify the proper boundary
conditions (system interconnectivity patterns between the components)
and in failing to compute the resulting fundamental physics. Hence,
emergence does not "really" exist. Wilkins and I differ rather
severely in this viewpoint.
start to get our macroscopic world.
The "absolute truths" that Robertson means is really the statements
that every aspect of all these emergent systems is reducible in
mechanism to the interaction between fundamental particles in space
and time. All the mechanisms of these emergent systems are reducible
to that level. The inverse is the problem: deducing the properties of
these systems (whether self-organizing or not) from the properties of
their constituents. Wilkins argues that it is merely a limitation of
our own human imaginations in failing to specify the proper boundary
conditions (system interconnectivity patterns between the components)
and in failing to compute the resulting fundamental physics. Hence,
emergence does not "really" exist. Wilkins and I differ rather
severely in this viewpoint.
jillery
Dec 22, 2012, 10:57:59 PM12/22/12
to
On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 17:12:29 -0500, *Hemidactylus*
If so, they will have enternity to determine if Hell is exothermic.
*Hemidactylus*
Dec 22, 2012, 11:33:51 PM12/22/12
to
whine about from the "Muppet balcony" or their ivory tower blogs.
Sometimes we howlers have to set him straight, but with less brutality.
And at least Wilkins still hangs with the common folk (Plato's "hoi
polloi") like us and hasn't let blogging (or publishing books) totally
go to his head.
Richard Norman
Dec 23, 2012, 12:31:29 AM12/23/12
to
in general with the important things and what I think of as a little
jab might well be interpreted by some here improperly. Outside of his
views on reductionism/emergence and whether genes contain
"information", he is quite a sensible bloke.
I don't follow either Myers or Moran but from what I remember in the
past, I tend to agree with Larry on at least some issues with John.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 23, 2012, 1:52:31 AM12/23/12
to
On 22 d�c, 15:39, "jonathan" <wr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> <marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr> wrote in message
Our poet is coming back.
> <marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr> wrote in message
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 23, 2012, 2:08:28 AM12/23/12
to
On 22 d�c, 18:56, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 15:00:37 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
> >> >> independent of this question. �And this question applies only to
> >> >> fundamental physics. �Chemistry and geology and biology proceed with
> >> >> of physics really fails to include it all. �The universe may be
> >> >> are demurrals to Kauffman's (and others') work. �See Mitchell's paper
> >>�The reductionist
> >finite quantity of information.
>
> >> You also seem not to understand "progress in mathematics". �Only some
> >> �http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down
> >> is "what do they stand on." �I say they don't have to stand on
Of course not. Once our universe has emerged with its characteristics
so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its probability was
not so high (even with a universe with such characteristics).
How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
universe?
With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the probability
of the emergence of our universe can be explained rationally, even if
infinitely unlikely.
I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 15:00:37 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 22 d�c, 13:34, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
> ><snip for focus>
>
> >> >> (I prefer to keep all my comments here at the bottom rather than
> >> >> interspersed through the text.)
> >> >> First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
> >> >> No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
> >> >> sense. Otherwise there would be no value in pursuing science. �As to
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 22 d�c, 13:34, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
> ><snip for focus>
>
> >> >> (I prefer to keep all my comments here at the bottom rather than
> >> >> interspersed through the text.)
> >> >> First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
> >> >> No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
> >> >> whether a finite set of laws would encompass everything -- we are far
> >> >> removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
> >> >> physics to explain even what we see now. �So science proceeds
> >> >> removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
> >> >> independent of this question. �And this question applies only to
> >> >> fundamental physics. �Chemistry and geology and biology proceed with
> >> >> an enormity of problems to investigate quite apart from whether
> >> >> physics explains "everything" to its satisfaction. �The "everything"
> >> >> of physics really fails to include it all. �The universe may be
> >> >> reducible to fundamental physics but understanding the physics does
> >> >> not really explain biology.
> >> >Of course I fully disagree with you on that.
> >> >>�In particular, evolution is not
> >> >> not really explain biology.
> >> >Of course I fully disagree with you on that.
> >> >> explicable in terms of fundamental particles interacting even though
> >> >> nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
> >> >> particles interacting.
> >> >I am sorry but I am surprised that, again, a top scientist like you
> >> >can assert that physics is only the study of interactions between
> >> >fundamental particles (!).
> >> >Do you consider for example that far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics
> >> >is not part of Physics?
> >> >> Second, you may appreciate Robertson's notion of "truth". �I was
> >> >> nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
> >> >> particles interacting.
> >> >I am sorry but I am surprised that, again, a top scientist like you
> >> >can assert that physics is only the study of interactions between
> >> >fundamental particles (!).
> >> >Do you consider for example that far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics
> >> >is not part of Physics?
> >> >> simply warning bystanders not to misinterpret your summary because
> >> >> they misunderstand what is meant by that term. �And my example was
> >> >> taken from classic English literature so my ethnocentric bias made me
> >> >> forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
> >> >> with it. �It is, in case you didn't realize, the first sentence in
> >> >> forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
> >> >> Jane Austen's "Pride and Prejudice" about "at truth universally
> >> >> recognized". �I, myself, have no definition of "absolute truth" nor do
> >> >> I wish to pursue one.
> >> >We agree: Absolute truth cannot be defined. As you are aware my
> >> >personal viewpoint is the same as Karl Popper's one: "theories cannot
> >> >be proved correct, only falsified", as quoted by Robertson.
> >> >> Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
> >> >> scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
> >> >> must clarify exactly what is meant. � Quantum mechanics argues that
> >> >We agree: Absolute truth cannot be defined. As you are aware my
> >> >personal viewpoint is the same as Karl Popper's one: "theories cannot
> >> >be proved correct, only falsified", as quoted by Robertson.
> >> >> Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
> >> >> scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
> >> >> the universe is, in some important sense, is "random" and
> >> >> "unpredictable" but still obeys quite specific laws. �As to the "edge
> >> >> of Chaos", it may be used metaphorically by some but still refers to
> >> >> the mathematical phase transition to chaotic behavior. �Further there
> >> >> are demurrals to Kauffman's (and others') work. �See Mitchell's paper
> >> >> "Dynamics, Computation, and the Edge of Chaos": A Re-Examination"
> >> >> �http://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~mm/dyn-comp-edge.pdf
> >> >I recommend you also to read "Order within Chaos" by Pierre Berge,
> >> >Yves Pomeau and Christian Vidal (1987).
> >> >It is the best book on deterministic chaos systems I have ever read.
> >> >> Fourth, on the "incompleteness of mathematics". �It is true that
> >> >Yves Pomeau and Christian Vidal (1987).
> >> >It is the best book on deterministic chaos systems I have ever read.
> >> >> physics has strong connections to mathematics but that does not
> >> >> necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
> >> >> important physical correlation. �I gave specific reasons why this may
> >> >> necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
> >> >> not hold which you did not comment on.
> >> >You wrote: " If the physical universe is finite then no such argument
> >> >applies.�It may well be that neither space nor time are infinitely
> >> >You wrote: " If the physical universe is finite then no such argument
> >> >divisible nor infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller
> >> >particles made of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a
> >> >halt. �It is NOT turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is
> >> >particles made of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a
> >> approach says there is nothing else; everything can be reduced to
> >> that.
>
> >Robertson doesn't specifically speak of reductionist but of the
> >positivist position which asserts that there is an absolute truth and
> >the methods that are needed to discover that absolute truth
> >(�scientific methods�) can be contained within or expressed with a
> >> that.
>
> >Robertson doesn't specifically speak of reductionist but of the
> >positivist position which asserts that there is an absolute truth and
> >the methods that are needed to discover that absolute truth
> >finite quantity of information.
>
> >> You also seem not to understand "progress in mathematics". �Only some
> >> logicians or specialists in what is called "foundations" look into
> >> extending known mathematics with new axioms in order to encompass
> >> statements true but not provable with the axioms we ordinarily use.
> >> Hardly any mathematicians butt against the "unprovable because our
> >> axiomatic system is incomplete." �Rather they butt against the "as yet
> >> extending known mathematics with new axioms in order to encompass
> >> statements true but not provable with the axioms we ordinarily use.
> >> Hardly any mathematicians butt against the "unprovable because our
> >> unprovable because nobody has been clever enough to date."
>
> >Yes, you are right.
>
> >> The "end of physics" that I contemplate is the end of reductionistic
> >> physics. �That leaves all sorts of properties of complex systems that
>
> >Yes, you are right.
>
> >> The "end of physics" that I contemplate is the end of reductionistic
> >> are not usefully explained in terms of particle interactions.
>
> >I don't disagree with you about that.
>
> >> Robertson's statement is, as you phrase him, strange. �In my view an
>
> >I don't disagree with you about that.
>
> >> awful lot of Robertson's statements are strange.
>
> >Could you specify which ones?
>
> >>�This is no stranger
>
> >Could you specify which ones?
>
> >> than the rest.
> >> The "turtles all the way down" is simply a classical metaphor for an
> >> unending series of questions -- basically what is meant by Robertson's
> >> type 2 system. �See, for example, Wikipedia at
> >> The "turtles all the way down" is simply a classical metaphor for an
> >> unending series of questions -- basically what is meant by Robertson's
> >> �http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down
> >> If the universe is type 1 so that a finite set of axioms suffices,
> >> then there must be a bottom set of turtles. �The obvious question then
> >> is "what do they stand on." �I say they don't have to stand on
> >> anything; they just have to be there because "falling" beneath the
> >> ultimate explanation doesn't make sense.
> >> Incidentally, I find your claim that atheism only makes sense in the
> >> context of a multiverse. �I would argue that almost all of science,
> >> ultimate explanation doesn't make sense.
> >> Incidentally, I find your claim that atheism only makes sense in the
> >> and all of science that I am professionally interested in, occurs
> >> within our own universe and that nothing that happens outside it can
> >> have any influence on what happens to the systems I want to study. �In
> >> within our own universe and that nothing that happens outside it can
> >> particular, nothing in any alternative universe bears on biological
> >> evolution in general and animal physiology in particular. �I am quite
> >> happy denying the existence of any god without having to conjure up
> >> alternate universes.
>
> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
>
> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
> particular one? �That is equally unlikely.
> >> alternate universes.
>
> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
>
> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
Of course not. Once our universe has emerged with its characteristics
so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its probability was
not so high (even with a universe with such characteristics).
How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
universe?
With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the probability
of the emergence of our universe can be explained rationally, even if
infinitely unlikely.
I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 23, 2012, 2:29:02 AM12/23/12
to
On 22 d�c, 19:01, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 13:45:36 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
I would rather agree with you than with John (and of course it is not
because the other viewpoint is shared by John).
My viewpoint is it is likely impossible to deduce the properties of a
given emergent structure from the properties of its constituents
because the involved physics is related to multiple interactions. Thus
the properties of the emergent structure cannot be foreseeable even if
it they are the result of deterministic laws (by analogy see what
happens in the case of a deterministic chaos system).
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 13:45:36 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
because the other viewpoint is shared by John).
My viewpoint is it is likely impossible to deduce the properties of a
given emergent structure from the properties of its constituents
because the involved physics is related to multiple interactions. Thus
the properties of the emergent structure cannot be foreseeable even if
it they are the result of deterministic laws (by analogy see what
happens in the case of a deterministic chaos system).
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 23, 2012, 2:30:13 AM12/23/12
to
On 22 d�c, 19:57, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 17:12:29 -0500, *Hemidactylus*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >On 12/22/2012 03:46 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 15:30:03 -0500, *Hemidactylus*
> >> <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> >>> On 12/22/2012 12:08 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
> >>>> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 08:55:44 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 17:12:29 -0500, *Hemidactylus*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >On 12/22/2012 03:46 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 15:30:03 -0500, *Hemidactylus*
> >> <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> >>> On 12/22/2012 12:08 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
Ernest Major
Dec 23, 2012, 2:29:41 AM12/23/12
to
In message
<cb79b486-73c0-4797...@n8g2000vbb.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
--
alias Ernest Major
<cb79b486-73c0-4797...@n8g2000vbb.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Actual_infinity(not the best of
>> WikiPedia articles)
>>
>> To be accurate, that there are no actual infinities, only potential
>> infinities, was a position held by some mathematicians and philosophers,
>> and is now a minority position, if held at all.
>
>The link you propose is about a philosophical question not a
>mathematical one.
>Where have you ever seen that mathematicians do not use infinity
>anymore? This is indeed a fundamental and inescapable notion in
>mathematics!
>
>> > By the way do you agree that "Turing’s halting theorem establishes
>> WikiPedia articles)
>>
>> To be accurate, that there are no actual infinities, only potential
>> infinities, was a position held by some mathematicians and philosophers,
>> and is now a minority position, if held at all.
>
>The link you propose is about a philosophical question not a
>mathematical one.
>Where have you ever seen that mathematicians do not use infinity
>anymore? This is indeed a fundamental and inescapable notion in
>mathematics!
>
>> > that there can be no finite method for determining the truth of an
>> > arbitrary statement in mathematics, and therefore no finite
>> > 'scientific method' in mathematics either"?
>
>Why didn't you answer the above question?
>
Because I didn't understand it.
>> > arbitrary statement in mathematics, and therefore no finite
>> > 'scientific method' in mathematics either"?
>
>Why didn't you answer the above question?
>
--
alias Ernest Major
Ernest Major
Dec 23, 2012, 2:35:35 AM12/23/12
to
In message <akscd8ti52rf8vrut...@4ax.com>, Richard Norman
<r_s_n...@comcast.net> writes
The anthropic principle, and the fact that we have to live in some
universe.
universe.
--
alias Ernest Major
<r_s_n...@comcast.net> writes
universe.
>
>How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
>individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
>particular one? That is equally unlikely.
>
The anthropic principle, and the fact that we have to live in some
>How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
>individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
>particular one? That is equally unlikely.
>
universe.
--
alias Ernest Major
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 23, 2012, 2:51:42 AM12/23/12
to
> <cb79b486-73c0-4797-a318-99e936f3a...@n8g2000vbb.googlegroups.com>,
> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
>snip for focus>
> >> > By the way do you agree that "Turing�s halting theorem establishes
According to Wikipedia "Halting problem":
"Given a description of an arbitrary computer program, decide whether
the program finishes running or continues to run forever. This is
equivalent to the problem of deciding, given a program and an input,
whether the program will eventually halt when run with that input, or
will run forever".
And:
"The concepts raised by G�del's incompleteness theorems are very
similar to those raised by the halting problem, and the proofs are
quite similar. In fact, a weaker form of the First Incompleteness
Theorem is an easy consequence of the undecidability of the halting
problem. This weaker form differs from the standard statement of the
incompleteness theorem by asserting that a complete, consistent and
sound axiomatization of all statements about natural numbers is
unachievable. The "sound" part is the weakening: it means that we
require the axiomatic system in question to prove only true statements
about natural numbers (it's very important to observe that the
statement of the standard form of G�del's First Incompleteness Theorem
is completely unconcerned with the question of truth, and only
concerns formal provability)".
Or are the above sentences difficult to understand to you (as actually
to me!)?
> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
>snip for focus>
> >> > By the way do you agree that "Turing�s halting theorem establishes
> >> > that there can be no finite method for determining the truth of an
> >> > arbitrary statement in mathematics, and therefore no finite
> >> > 'scientific method' in mathematics either"?
> >Why didn't you answer the above question?
> Because I didn't understand it.
Is it the way Robertson wrote it?
> >> > arbitrary statement in mathematics, and therefore no finite
> >> > 'scientific method' in mathematics either"?
> >Why didn't you answer the above question?
> Because I didn't understand it.
According to Wikipedia "Halting problem":
"Given a description of an arbitrary computer program, decide whether
the program finishes running or continues to run forever. This is
equivalent to the problem of deciding, given a program and an input,
whether the program will eventually halt when run with that input, or
will run forever".
And:
"The concepts raised by G�del's incompleteness theorems are very
similar to those raised by the halting problem, and the proofs are
quite similar. In fact, a weaker form of the First Incompleteness
Theorem is an easy consequence of the undecidability of the halting
problem. This weaker form differs from the standard statement of the
incompleteness theorem by asserting that a complete, consistent and
sound axiomatization of all statements about natural numbers is
unachievable. The "sound" part is the weakening: it means that we
require the axiomatic system in question to prove only true statements
about natural numbers (it's very important to observe that the
statement of the standard form of G�del's First Incompleteness Theorem
is completely unconcerned with the question of truth, and only
concerns formal provability)".
Or are the above sentences difficult to understand to you (as actually
to me!)?
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 23, 2012, 3:03:14 AM12/23/12
to
On 22 d�c, 23:35, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> In message <akscd8ti52rf8vrutill4j26kanta1r...@4ax.com>, Richard Norman
> <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> writes
> >On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 15:00:37 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >wrote:
<snip for focus>
> >>How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
> >>its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
> The anthropic principle, and the fact that we have to live in some
> universe.
To me, the existence of human beings per se doesn't explain the fact
multiverse is required.
> >How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
> >individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
> >particular one? �That is equally unlikely.
> The anthropic principle, and the fact that we have to live in some
> universe.
The existence of human beings demonstrates that the probability of our
emergence was not nil, once our universe has emerged.
> In message <akscd8ti52rf8vrutill4j26kanta1r...@4ax.com>, Richard Norman
> <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> writes
> >On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 15:00:37 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >wrote:
<snip for focus>
> >>How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
> >>its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
> The anthropic principle, and the fact that we have to live in some
> universe.
that the emergence of our universe, with its characteristics so
specific, was infinitely unlikely. This is why the existence of a
multiverse is required.
> >How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
> >individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
> >particular one? �That is equally unlikely.
> The anthropic principle, and the fact that we have to live in some
> universe.
emergence was not nil, once our universe has emerged.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 23, 2012, 3:29:12 AM12/23/12
to
On 22 d�c, 20:33, *Hemidactylus* <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> On 12/22/2012 09:51 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
> On 12/22/2012 09:51 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
> > On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 09:53:00 +1100, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S.
> > Wilkins) wrote:
> >>>>>> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
> >>>>>> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
> >>>>>> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
> >>>>>> uninteresting.
> >>>>>> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
> > Wilkins) wrote:
> >>>>>> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
> >>>>>> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
> >>>>>> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
> >>>>>> uninteresting.
> >>>>>> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
> >>>>> Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
> >>>>> paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
> >>>> I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
> >>>> response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
> >>>> argumentation.
> >>> Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
> >>> debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
> >>> scientists.
> >> Dont be a fool. I work with (am coauthoring a book with) scientists all
> >> the time. But when a scientist tries to do philosophy and does it
> >> poorly, I am unimpressed. If I did science poorly, then a scientist
> >> would have a right to be unimpressed also.
> > Why do you say "if"?
> Wilkins is one of the good ones regardless of what Myers and Moran might
> whine about from the "Muppet balcony" or their ivory tower blogs.
> Sometimes we howlers have to set him straight, but with less brutality.
> And at least Wilkins still hangs with the common folk (Plato's "hoi
> polloi") like us and hasn't let blogging (or publishing books) totally
> go to his head.
What I don't put up with john's behavior is the self-importance of
> >>>>> paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
> >>>> I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
> >>>> response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
> >>>> argumentation.
> >>> Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
> >>> debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
> >>> scientists.
> >> Dont be a fool. I work with (am coauthoring a book with) scientists all
> >> the time. But when a scientist tries to do philosophy and does it
> >> poorly, I am unimpressed. If I did science poorly, then a scientist
> >> would have a right to be unimpressed also.
> > Why do you say "if"?
> Wilkins is one of the good ones regardless of what Myers and Moran might
> whine about from the "Muppet balcony" or their ivory tower blogs.
> Sometimes we howlers have to set him straight, but with less brutality.
> And at least Wilkins still hangs with the common folk (Plato's "hoi
> polloi") like us and hasn't let blogging (or publishing books) totally
> go to his head.
"Great Philosopher Professor John Wilkins".
jillery
Dec 23, 2012, 7:06:52 AM12/23/12
to
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 23, 2012, 7:11:43 AM12/23/12
to
On 23 d嚙箱, 04:06, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:30:13 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
is exothermic or not?
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:30:13 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 22 d嚙箱, 19:57, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 17:12:29 -0500, *Hemidactylus*
> >> <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >> >On 12/22/2012 03:46 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
> >> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 15:30:03 -0500, *Hemidactylus*
> >> >> <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> >> >>> On 12/22/2012 12:08 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
> >> >>>> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 08:55:44 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >>>> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 22 d嚙箱, 19:57, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 17:12:29 -0500, *Hemidactylus*
> >> <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >> >On 12/22/2012 03:46 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
> >> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 15:30:03 -0500, *Hemidactylus*
> >> >> <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> >> >>> On 12/22/2012 12:08 PM, Richard Norman wrote:
> >> >>>> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 08:55:44 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >>>> wrote:
>
> >> >>>>> On 22 d嚙箱, 08:41, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> >>>>>> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >>>>>> wrote:
>
> >> >>>>>> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >>>>>> wrote:
>
> >> >>>>>>> On 22 d嚙箱, 01:18, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
>
> >> >>>>>>> <snip for focus>
>
> >> >>>>>>>> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
> >> >>>>>>>> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
> >> >>>>>>>> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
> >> >>>>>>>> uninteresting.
> >> >>>>>>>> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
>
> >> >>>>>>> <snip for focus>
>
> >> >>>>>>> Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
> >> >>>>>>> paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
>
> >> >>>>>> I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
> >> >>>>>> response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
> >> >>>>>> argumentation.
>
> >> >>>>> Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
> >> >>>>> debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
> >> >>>>> scientists.
>
> >> >>>> The great philosopher Prof. Wilkins has real work to do. 嚙瘡e often
>
> >> >>>>>>> <snip for focus>
>
> >> >>>>>>>> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
> >> >>>>>>>> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
> >> >>>>>>>> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
> >> >>>>>>>> uninteresting.
> >> >>>>>>>> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
>
> >> >>>>>>> <snip for focus>
>
> >> >>>>>>> Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
> >> >>>>>>> paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
>
> >> >>>>>> I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
> >> >>>>>> response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
> >> >>>>>> argumentation.
>
> >> >>>>> Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
> >> >>>>> debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
> >> >>>>> scientists.
>
> >> >>>> debates and, more commonly, collaborates with those rare scientists
> >> >>>> who are not petty-minded.
>
> >> >>> Beaten you into groveling submission has he? That's not the combatively
> >> >>> emergent Norman I used to know. Has Wilkins taken over your account?
>
> >> >> Au contraire, mon ami! 嚙瘢 just think that if anybody is going to trash
> >> >>>> who are not petty-minded.
>
> >> >>> Beaten you into groveling submission has he? That's not the combatively
> >> >>> emergent Norman I used to know. Has Wilkins taken over your account?
>
> >> >> Wilkins, it must be me.
>
> >> >> In fact, the most serious problem with Robertson's question about
> >> >> "absolute truth" is that it deals with physics explaining the world
> >> >> whereas biology deals entirely with emergent properties.
>
> >> >Damn physicists. They have a special place in hell reserved for them.
>
> >> If so, they will have enternity to determine if Hell is exothermic.
>
> >If you are interested in I have a theory about that!
>
> Of that I have no doubt.
So, you are not interested in my theory on the question whether Hell
>
> >> >> In fact, the most serious problem with Robertson's question about
> >> >> "absolute truth" is that it deals with physics explaining the world
> >> >> whereas biology deals entirely with emergent properties.
>
> >> >Damn physicists. They have a special place in hell reserved for them.
>
> >> If so, they will have enternity to determine if Hell is exothermic.
>
> >If you are interested in I have a theory about that!
>
> Of that I have no doubt.
is exothermic or not?
jonathan
Dec 23, 2012, 9:08:00 AM12/23/12
to
<marc.t...@wanadoo.fr> wrote in message
news:09caad01-144c-493a...@w8g2000yqm.googlegroups.com...
of the universe. And such a wonderful universe deserves
to be appreciated.
But you have to look at the world from a different perspective
to see it's pervasive simplicity and creativity. Through
non-linear eyes, which is an entirely different frame of
reference for observing reality than our long held instinctive
approach.
And this change in perspective is with how we perceive
the concept of complexity. Our intuition would say complexity
is gauged by a simple sliding scale from zero to infinity.
In the instinctive view, complicated and complexity are
analogous.
But with a non-linear frame of reference, that is no longer
the case. One must understand that the static and chaotic
opposites, which interact to form emergent dynamic behavior
are both simple behavior wrt to the emergent realm they
create.
So our long held instinctive view has a complexity view of
simple >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex
zero >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinity
But a non-linear frame of reference would be
simple >>>>>>>>>> complex <<<<<<<<<< simple
zero >>>>>>>>>> infinite <<<<<<<<<< simple
(static) > dynamic (emergent) < (chaotic)
Static and chaotic are considered simple levels of complexity
since both forms take very little ...information to ...describe
their behavior, static changes little, chaotic too fast.
So, from a non-linear perspective, there are ....two minimums
for complexity, and one maximum. And the maximum for
complexity is in-between the two minimums, not at one end
of the scale.
This renders either opposite, classical or quantum, objective
or subjective, as incomplete alone. Only combined can
they become a complete view. And only in the output
or emergent realm of complexity are the two realms
....already entangled.
Only from a complete view, through non-linear eyes, is it
possible to derive the fundamental laws of the universe.
Classical > Emergent (evolving) < Quantum
s
>
jonathan
Dec 23, 2012, 9:28:26 AM12/23/12
to
"jonathan" <wr...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:c8KdnVI3nd3djUrN...@giganews.com...
>
>
> But it's true what I say, life shows us the fundamental laws
> of the universe. And such a wonderful universe deserves
> to be appreciated.
>
> But you have to look at the world from a different perspective
> to see it's pervasive simplicity and creativity. Through
> non-linear eyes, which is an entirely different frame of
> reference for observing reality than our long held instinctive
> approach.
>
> And this change in perspective is with how we perceive
> the concept of complexity. Our intuition would say complexity
> is gauged by a simple sliding scale from zero to infinity.
> In the instinctive view, complicated and complexity are
> analogous.
>
> But with a non-linear frame of reference, that is no longer
> the case. One must understand that the static and chaotic
> opposites, which interact to form emergent dynamic behavior
> are both simple behavior wrt to the emergent realm they
> create.
>
> So our long held instinctive view has a complexity view of
>
> simple >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex
> zero >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinity
>
> But a non-linear frame of reference would be
>
> simple >>>>>>>>>> complex <<<<<<<<<< simple
> zero >>>>>>>>>> infinite <<<<<<<<<< zero
>
> But it's true what I say, life shows us the fundamental laws
> of the universe. And such a wonderful universe deserves
> to be appreciated.
>
> But you have to look at the world from a different perspective
> to see it's pervasive simplicity and creativity. Through
> non-linear eyes, which is an entirely different frame of
> reference for observing reality than our long held instinctive
> approach.
>
> And this change in perspective is with how we perceive
> the concept of complexity. Our intuition would say complexity
> is gauged by a simple sliding scale from zero to infinity.
> In the instinctive view, complicated and complexity are
> analogous.
>
> But with a non-linear frame of reference, that is no longer
> the case. One must understand that the static and chaotic
> opposites, which interact to form emergent dynamic behavior
> are both simple behavior wrt to the emergent realm they
> create.
>
> So our long held instinctive view has a complexity view of
>
> simple >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex
> zero >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinity
>
> But a non-linear frame of reference would be
>
> simple >>>>>>>>>> complex <<<<<<<<<< simple
>
> (static) > dynamic (emergent) < (chaotic)
>
> Static and chaotic are considered simple levels of complexity
> since both forms take very little ...information to ...describe
> their behavior, static changes little, chaotic too fast.
>
> So, from a non-linear perspective, there are ....two minimums
> for complexity, and one maximum. And the maximum for
> complexity is in-between the two minimums, not at one end
> of the scale.
>
> This renders either opposite, classical or quantum, objective
> or subjective, as incomplete alone. Only combined can
> they become a complete view. And only in the output
> or emergent realm of complexity are the two realms
> ....already entangled.
>
> Only from a complete view, through non-linear eyes, is it
> possible to derive the fundamental laws of the universe.
>
>
> Classical > Emergent (evolving) < Quantum
>
And I'd like to add, this is what was being argued by
> (static) > dynamic (emergent) < (chaotic)
>
> Static and chaotic are considered simple levels of complexity
> since both forms take very little ...information to ...describe
> their behavior, static changes little, chaotic too fast.
>
> So, from a non-linear perspective, there are ....two minimums
> for complexity, and one maximum. And the maximum for
> complexity is in-between the two minimums, not at one end
> of the scale.
>
> This renders either opposite, classical or quantum, objective
> or subjective, as incomplete alone. Only combined can
> they become a complete view. And only in the output
> or emergent realm of complexity are the two realms
> ....already entangled.
>
> Only from a complete view, through non-linear eyes, is it
> possible to derive the fundamental laws of the universe.
>
>
> Classical > Emergent (evolving) < Quantum
>
Dickinson as she railed against the modern reductionism
which was sweeping the naturalists of her time away.
The reductionists 'can't see' the fundamental laws since
they derive them from the simplicity, not the complexity
of life.
Their height in heaven comforts not,
Their glory nought to me;
'T was best imperfect, as it was;
I 'm finite, I can't see.
The house of supposition,
The glimmering frontier
That skirts the acres of perhaps,
To me shows insecure.
The wealth I had contented me;
If 't was a meaner size,
Then I had counted it until
It pleased my narrow eyes
Better than larger values,
However true their show;
This timid life of evidence
Keeps pleading, "I don't know."
Just as she pointed out that the theory of
everything flows from the merging of the
two opposites of objective and subjective
into a complete view of reality.
PERCEPTION of an
Object costs
Precise the Object's loss.
Perception in itself a gain
Replying to its price; 5
The Object Absolute is nought,
Perception sets it fair,
And then upbraids a Perfectness
That situates so far.
Complexity Science isn't a new idea, it's a return
to earlier concepts of nature. Where the subjective
takes equal footing to the objective.
>
>
> s
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>
>
>
Robert Carnegie: Fnord: cc talk-origins@moderators.isc.org
Dec 23, 2012, 1:03:39 PM12/23/12
to
On Sunday, 23 December 2012 08:03:14 UTC, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> The existence of human beings demonstrates that the probability of our
> emergence was not nil, once our universe has emerged.
But is that conclusion sound if there are infinitely many planets
> The existence of human beings demonstrates that the probability of our
> emergence was not nil, once our universe has emerged.
in an infinitely large universe? Not that I want you to get excited
about that; it's just a point.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 23, 2012, 2:28:28 PM12/23/12
to
On 23 d�c, 10:03, "Robert Carnegie: Fnord: cc talk-
I am not sure what you want to mean.
Presently the dominant tendency is to consider that our universe is
flat and infinite.
So, if our universe is infinite, I suppose you want to mean that the
probability of human being emergence was 1 once our universe has
emerged?
Is that what you mean?
Presently the dominant tendency is to consider that our universe is
flat and infinite.
So, if our universe is infinite, I suppose you want to mean that the
probability of human being emergence was 1 once our universe has
emerged?
Is that what you mean?
Richard Norman
Dec 23, 2012, 3:19:51 PM12/23/12
to
On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:29:02 -0800 (PST), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
This depends on what you mean by "foreseeable". If you take the
properties of the constituents and add the pattern of interconnections
and properties of the interactions you can deduce the properties. That
is the sense in which many deny that "emergence" exists except as a
consequence of our failing to include all the relevant data
beforehand. As a practical matter we can't foresee all possible
patterns of interconnection and interaction and therefore we can't
foresee the results.
properties of the constituents and add the pattern of interconnections
and properties of the interactions you can deduce the properties. That
is the sense in which many deny that "emergence" exists except as a
consequence of our failing to include all the relevant data
beforehand. As a practical matter we can't foresee all possible
patterns of interconnection and interaction and therefore we can't
foresee the results.
Robert Carnegie: Fnord: cc talk-origins@moderators.isc.org
Dec 23, 2012, 3:21:28 PM12/23/12
to
I mean this: if there are infinitely many planets, and if only one planet
has produced intelligent life, in the passing of history of the universe
up to now, then, what is the correct number for the probability of
a planet producing intelligent life?
Richard Norman
Dec 23, 2012, 3:23:49 PM12/23/12
to
On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:08:28 -0800 (PST), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>On 22 d�c, 18:56, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 15:00:37 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> >On 22 d�c, 13:34, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>
>> ><snip for focus>
>>
>> >> >> (I prefer to keep all my comments here at the bottom rather than
>> >> >> interspersed through the text.)
>> >> >> First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
>> >> >> No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
>> >> >> sense. Otherwise there would be no value in pursuing science. �As to
>> >> >> independent of this question. �And this question applies only to
>> >> >> fundamental physics. �Chemistry and geology and biology proceed with
>> >> >> of physics really fails to include it all. �The universe may be
>> >> >> are demurrals to Kauffman's (and others') work. �See Mitchell's paper
>> >>�The reductionist
>> >finite quantity of information.
>>
>> >> You also seem not to understand "progress in mathematics". �Only some
>> >> �http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down
>> >> is "what do they stand on." �I say they don't have to stand on
that I don't see any connection between multiverses and atheism. Your
condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. Dealing a deck of shuffled
cards produces an "unlikely" event according to people who abuse
probability theory. The fact is that "some" result must necessarily
occur. Similarly when a universe forms it necessarily has "some"
specific set of properties. Why these instead of those? Why this
dealt set of cards instead of that? It is the same thing.
wrote:
>On 22 d�c, 18:56, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 15:00:37 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> >On 22 d�c, 13:34, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>
>> ><snip for focus>
>>
>> >> >> (I prefer to keep all my comments here at the bottom rather than
>> >> >> interspersed through the text.)
>> >> >> First, as to philosophy vs. science -- they are two separate domains.
>> >> >> No scientist believes the universe is "chaotic" in the Robertsonian
>> >> >> whether a finite set of laws would encompass everything -- we are far
>> >> >> removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
>> >> >> physics to explain even what we see now. �So science proceeds
>> >> >> removed from that problem since we know we do not yet have all the
>> >> >> independent of this question. �And this question applies only to
>> >> >> fundamental physics. �Chemistry and geology and biology proceed with
>> >> >> an enormity of problems to investigate quite apart from whether
>> >> >> physics explains "everything" to its satisfaction. �The "everything"
>> >> >> of physics really fails to include it all. �The universe may be
>> >> >> reducible to fundamental physics but understanding the physics does
>> >> >> not really explain biology.
>> >> >Of course I fully disagree with you on that.
>> >> >>�In particular, evolution is not
>> >> >> not really explain biology.
>> >> >Of course I fully disagree with you on that.
>> >> >> explicable in terms of fundamental particles interacting even though
>> >> >> nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
>> >> >> particles interacting.
>> >> >I am sorry but I am surprised that, again, a top scientist like you
>> >> >can assert that physics is only the study of interactions between
>> >> >fundamental particles (!).
>> >> >Do you consider for example that far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics
>> >> >is not part of Physics?
>> >> >> Second, you may appreciate Robertson's notion of "truth". �I was
>> >> >> nothing in the details of how evolution works is beyond fundamental
>> >> >> particles interacting.
>> >> >I am sorry but I am surprised that, again, a top scientist like you
>> >> >can assert that physics is only the study of interactions between
>> >> >fundamental particles (!).
>> >> >Do you consider for example that far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics
>> >> >is not part of Physics?
>> >> >> simply warning bystanders not to misinterpret your summary because
>> >> >> they misunderstand what is meant by that term. �And my example was
>> >> >> taken from classic English literature so my ethnocentric bias made me
>> >> >> forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
>> >> >> with it. �It is, in case you didn't realize, the first sentence in
>> >> >> forget that non-English participants in this forum may not be familiar
>> >> >> Jane Austen's "Pride and Prejudice" about "at truth universally
>> >> >> recognized". �I, myself, have no definition of "absolute truth" nor do
>> >> >> I wish to pursue one.
>> >> >We agree: Absolute truth cannot be defined. As you are aware my
>> >> >personal viewpoint is the same as Karl Popper's one: "theories cannot
>> >> >be proved correct, only falsified", as quoted by Robertson.
>> >> >> Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
>> >> >> scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
>> >> >> must clarify exactly what is meant. � Quantum mechanics argues that
>> >> >We agree: Absolute truth cannot be defined. As you are aware my
>> >> >personal viewpoint is the same as Karl Popper's one: "theories cannot
>> >> >be proved correct, only falsified", as quoted by Robertson.
>> >> >> Third, as to "chaos", that term has a precise mathematical and
>> >> >> scientific meaning and anyone claiming the universe to be "chaotic"
>> >> >> the universe is, in some important sense, is "random" and
>> >> >> "unpredictable" but still obeys quite specific laws. �As to the "edge
>> >> >> of Chaos", it may be used metaphorically by some but still refers to
>> >> >> the mathematical phase transition to chaotic behavior. �Further there
>> >> >> are demurrals to Kauffman's (and others') work. �See Mitchell's paper
>> >> >> "Dynamics, Computation, and the Edge of Chaos": A Re-Examination"
>> >> >> �http://web.cecs.pdx.edu/~mm/dyn-comp-edge.pdf
>> >> >I recommend you also to read "Order within Chaos" by Pierre Berge,
>> >> >Yves Pomeau and Christian Vidal (1987).
>> >> >It is the best book on deterministic chaos systems I have ever read.
>> >> >> Fourth, on the "incompleteness of mathematics". �It is true that
>> >> >Yves Pomeau and Christian Vidal (1987).
>> >> >It is the best book on deterministic chaos systems I have ever read.
>> >> >> physics has strong connections to mathematics but that does not
>> >> >> necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
>> >> >> important physical correlation. �I gave specific reasons why this may
>> >> >> necessarily mean that each and every aspect of mathematics has an
>> >> >> not hold which you did not comment on.
>> >> >You wrote: " If the physical universe is finite then no such argument
>> >> >applies.�It may well be that neither space nor time are infinitely
>> >> >You wrote: " If the physical universe is finite then no such argument
>> >> >divisible nor infinitely extensive and that particles made of smaller
>> >> >particles made of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a
>> >> >halt. �It is NOT turtles all the way down. �It is just that there is
>> >> >particles made of yet smaller particles must necessarily come to a
>> >> approach says there is nothing else; everything can be reduced to
>> >> that.
>>
>> >Robertson doesn't specifically speak of reductionist but of the
>> >positivist position which asserts that there is an absolute truth and
>> >the methods that are needed to discover that absolute truth
>> >(�scientific methods�) can be contained within or expressed with a
>> >> that.
>>
>> >Robertson doesn't specifically speak of reductionist but of the
>> >positivist position which asserts that there is an absolute truth and
>> >the methods that are needed to discover that absolute truth
>> >finite quantity of information.
>>
>> >> You also seem not to understand "progress in mathematics". �Only some
>> >> logicians or specialists in what is called "foundations" look into
>> >> extending known mathematics with new axioms in order to encompass
>> >> statements true but not provable with the axioms we ordinarily use.
>> >> Hardly any mathematicians butt against the "unprovable because our
>> >> axiomatic system is incomplete." �Rather they butt against the "as yet
>> >> extending known mathematics with new axioms in order to encompass
>> >> statements true but not provable with the axioms we ordinarily use.
>> >> Hardly any mathematicians butt against the "unprovable because our
>> >> unprovable because nobody has been clever enough to date."
>>
>> >Yes, you are right.
>>
>> >> The "end of physics" that I contemplate is the end of reductionistic
>> >> physics. �That leaves all sorts of properties of complex systems that
>>
>> >Yes, you are right.
>>
>> >> The "end of physics" that I contemplate is the end of reductionistic
>> >> are not usefully explained in terms of particle interactions.
>>
>> >I don't disagree with you about that.
>>
>> >> Robertson's statement is, as you phrase him, strange. �In my view an
>>
>> >I don't disagree with you about that.
>>
>> >> awful lot of Robertson's statements are strange.
>>
>> >Could you specify which ones?
>>
>> >>�This is no stranger
>>
>> >Could you specify which ones?
>>
>> >> than the rest.
>> >> The "turtles all the way down" is simply a classical metaphor for an
>> >> unending series of questions -- basically what is meant by Robertson's
>> >> type 2 system. �See, for example, Wikipedia at
>> >> The "turtles all the way down" is simply a classical metaphor for an
>> >> unending series of questions -- basically what is meant by Robertson's
>> >> �http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down
>> >> If the universe is type 1 so that a finite set of axioms suffices,
>> >> then there must be a bottom set of turtles. �The obvious question then
>> >> is "what do they stand on." �I say they don't have to stand on
>> >> anything; they just have to be there because "falling" beneath the
>> >> ultimate explanation doesn't make sense.
>> >> Incidentally, I find your claim that atheism only makes sense in the
>> >> context of a multiverse. �I would argue that almost all of science,
>> >> ultimate explanation doesn't make sense.
>> >> Incidentally, I find your claim that atheism only makes sense in the
>> >> and all of science that I am professionally interested in, occurs
>> >> within our own universe and that nothing that happens outside it can
>> >> have any influence on what happens to the systems I want to study. �In
>> >> within our own universe and that nothing that happens outside it can
>> >> particular, nothing in any alternative universe bears on biological
>> >> evolution in general and animal physiology in particular. �I am quite
>> >> happy denying the existence of any god without having to conjure up
>> >> alternate universes.
>>
>> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
>> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
>>
>> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
>> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
>> particular one? �That is equally unlikely.
>> >> alternate universes.
>>
>> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
>> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
>>
>> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
>> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
>
>Of course not. Once our universe has emerged with its characteristics
>so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
>understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its probability was
>not so high (even with a universe with such characteristics).
>How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
>universe?
>With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the probability
>of the emergence of our universe can be explained rationally, even if
>infinitely unlikely.
>I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
I don't understand what point you don't understand. My main point is
>Of course not. Once our universe has emerged with its characteristics
>so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
>understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its probability was
>not so high (even with a universe with such characteristics).
>How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
>universe?
>With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the probability
>of the emergence of our universe can be explained rationally, even if
>infinitely unlikely.
>I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
that I don't see any connection between multiverses and atheism. Your
condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. Dealing a deck of shuffled
cards produces an "unlikely" event according to people who abuse
probability theory. The fact is that "some" result must necessarily
occur. Similarly when a universe forms it necessarily has "some"
specific set of properties. Why these instead of those? Why this
dealt set of cards instead of that? It is the same thing.
John S. Wilkins
Dec 23, 2012, 3:39:31 PM12/23/12
to
<marc.t...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
> On 22 d�c, 14:53, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
> > <marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
> > > On 22 d�c, 08:41, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> that Robertson is dealing with a philosophical question. I think he is
> dealing with a question which is relevant scientifically speaking and
> that his responses are quite sensible, rational and logical.
> subjective feeling and a value judgement only) it is to be capable or
> not to give sensible, rational and logical arguments.
> You assert that Robertson gave none but without any example, this is
> too easy and unfair.
Says the guy whose main rhetorical approach is to ask if people agree
with arcane quotes.
I tried explaining things to you. I stopped out of frustration at your
inability to respond. If you want to know how I view things, enrol in a
course I teach. I'm done with you. Richard asked a question of me (what
I thought of the philosophical merits of that essay) and I answered.
Take it or leave it.
--
John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydney
Honorary Fellow, University of Melbourne
- http://evolvingthoughts.net
> On 22 d�c, 14:53, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
> > <marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
> > > > On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > > > wrote:
> >
> > > > >On 22 d�c, 01:18, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
> >
> > > > ><snip for focus>
> >
> > > > >> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher
> > > > >> who thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so
> > > > >> is writing to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight
> > > > >> and uninteresting.
> > > > >> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
> >
> > > > ><snip for focus>
> >
> > > > >Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
> > > > >paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
> >
> > > > I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
> > > > response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
> > > > argumentation.
> >
> > > Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
> > > debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
> > > scientists.
> >
> > > > wrote:
> >
> > > > >On 22 d�c, 01:18, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
> >
> > > > ><snip for focus>
> >
> > > > >> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher
> > > > >> who thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so
> > > > >> is writing to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight
> > > > >> and uninteresting.
> > > > >> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
> >
> > > > ><snip for focus>
> >
> > > > >Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
> > > > >paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
> >
> > > > I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
> > > > response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
> > > > argumentation.
> >
> > > Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
> > > debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
> > > scientists.
> >
> > Dont be a fool. I work with (am coauthoring a book with) scientists all
> > the time. But when a scientist tries to do philosophy and does it
> > poorly, I am unimpressed.
>
> As I have already said to Richard I disagree with you when you assert
> > the time. But when a scientist tries to do philosophy and does it
> > poorly, I am unimpressed.
>
> that Robertson is dealing with a philosophical question. I think he is
> dealing with a question which is relevant scientifically speaking and
> that his responses are quite sensible, rational and logical.
>
> > If I did science poorly, then a scientist
> > would have a right to be unimpressed also.
>
> The question is not to be impressed or unimpressed (i.e., a fully
> > If I did science poorly, then a scientist
> > would have a right to be unimpressed also.
>
> subjective feeling and a value judgement only) it is to be capable or
> not to give sensible, rational and logical arguments.
> You assert that Robertson gave none but without any example, this is
> too easy and unfair.
Says the guy whose main rhetorical approach is to ask if people agree
with arcane quotes.
I tried explaining things to you. I stopped out of frustration at your
inability to respond. If you want to know how I view things, enrol in a
course I teach. I'm done with you. Richard asked a question of me (what
I thought of the philosophical merits of that essay) and I answered.
Take it or leave it.
--
John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydney
Honorary Fellow, University of Melbourne
- http://evolvingthoughts.net
John S. Wilkins
Dec 23, 2012, 3:39:35 PM12/23/12
to
<marc.t...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
> > Actually, I didn't see much argument in the paper.
>
> What do you think of Paul Karl Feyerabend's position in the philosophy
> of science?
> For instance "in his books Against Method and Science in a Free
> Society Feyerabend defended the idea that there are no methodological
> rules which are always used by scientists. He objected to any single
> prescriptive scientific method on the grounds that any such method
> would limit the activities of scientists, and hence restrict
> scientific progress. In his view, science would benefit most from a
> "dose" of theoretical anarchism. He also thought that theoretical
> anarchism was desirable because it was more humanitarian than other
> systems of organization, by not imposing rigid rules on scientists".
>
> And also:
> "Feyerabend's position was originally seen as radical in the
> philosophy of science, because it implies that philosophy can neither
> succeed in providing a general description of science, nor in devising
> a method for differentiating products of science from non-scientific
> entities like myths. Feyerabend's position also implies that
> philosophical guidelines should be ignored by scientists, if they are
> to aim for progress".
Answered here:
http://scienceblogs.com/evolvingthoughts/2007/10/05/how-not-to-feyeraben
d/
> > Actually, I didn't see much argument in the paper.
>
> What do you think of Paul Karl Feyerabend's position in the philosophy
> of science?
> For instance "in his books Against Method and Science in a Free
> Society Feyerabend defended the idea that there are no methodological
> rules which are always used by scientists. He objected to any single
> prescriptive scientific method on the grounds that any such method
> would limit the activities of scientists, and hence restrict
> scientific progress. In his view, science would benefit most from a
> "dose" of theoretical anarchism. He also thought that theoretical
> anarchism was desirable because it was more humanitarian than other
> systems of organization, by not imposing rigid rules on scientists".
>
> And also:
> "Feyerabend's position was originally seen as radical in the
> philosophy of science, because it implies that philosophy can neither
> succeed in providing a general description of science, nor in devising
> a method for differentiating products of science from non-scientific
> entities like myths. Feyerabend's position also implies that
> philosophical guidelines should be ignored by scientists, if they are
> to aim for progress".
Answered here:
http://scienceblogs.com/evolvingthoughts/2007/10/05/how-not-to-feyeraben
d/
John S. Wilkins
Dec 23, 2012, 3:39:33 PM12/23/12
to
>
> I don't follow either Myers or Moran but from what I remember in the
> past, I tend to agree with Larry on at least some issues with John.
I do to. But Larry is so much fun to poke.
> I don't follow either Myers or Moran but from what I remember in the
> past, I tend to agree with Larry on at least some issues with John.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 23, 2012, 4:00:46 PM12/23/12
to
On 23 d�c, 12:19, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:29:02 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
Yes, I agree with that.
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:29:02 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 23, 2012, 4:30:59 PM12/23/12
to
On 23 d�c, 12:23, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:08:28 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
<snip for focus>
> >> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
> >> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
> >> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
> >> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
> >> particular one? �That is equally unlikely.
> > >Of course not. Once our universe has emerged with its characteristics
> >so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
> >understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its probability was
> >not so high (even with a universe with such characteristics).
> >How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
> >universe?
> >With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the probability
> >of the emergence of our universe can be explained rationally, even if
> >infinitely unlikely.
> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
> > I don't understand what point you don't understand. �My main point is
> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and atheism. �Your
> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. �Dealing a deck of shuffled
> cards produces an "unlikely" event according to people who abuse
> probability theory. �The fact is that "some" result must necessarily
> occur. �Similarly when a universe forms it necessarily has "some"
> specific set of properties. �Why these instead of those? �Why this
> dealt set of cards instead of that? �It is the same thing.
My point is that to have the occurrence of a universe as ours which is
so particular many attempts must have occurred. Thus many universes
would have emerged before the emergence of ours and then a multiverse
would have likely resulted.
Otherwise the probability that the cause of the emergence of our
universe was random would have been too low.
That is why I think atheism requires the existence of a multiverse.
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:08:28 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
<snip for focus>
> >> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
> >> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
> >> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
> >> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
> >> particular one? �That is equally unlikely.
> > >Of course not. Once our universe has emerged with its characteristics
> >so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
> >understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its probability was
> >not so high (even with a universe with such characteristics).
> >How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
> >universe?
> >With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the probability
> >of the emergence of our universe can be explained rationally, even if
> >infinitely unlikely.
> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
> > I don't understand what point you don't understand. �My main point is
> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and atheism. �Your
> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. �Dealing a deck of shuffled
> cards produces an "unlikely" event according to people who abuse
> probability theory. �The fact is that "some" result must necessarily
> occur. �Similarly when a universe forms it necessarily has "some"
> specific set of properties. �Why these instead of those? �Why this
> dealt set of cards instead of that? �It is the same thing.
so particular many attempts must have occurred. Thus many universes
would have emerged before the emergence of ours and then a multiverse
would have likely resulted.
Otherwise the probability that the cause of the emergence of our
universe was random would have been too low.
That is why I think atheism requires the existence of a multiverse.
Ernest Major
Dec 23, 2012, 4:54:16 PM12/23/12
to
In message
<a344d70a-c376-46c4...@r14g2000vbe.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
Invent a new desk of cards, with say 8 suites of 10 cards. Shuffle it.
The probability of getting that sequence is less than 1 in 10^118. So by
your logic many shufflings must as occurred. But no, that sequence
occurred on the first attempt.
--
alias Ernest Major
<a344d70a-c376-46c4...@r14g2000vbe.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
The probability of getting that sequence is less than 1 in 10^118. So by
your logic many shufflings must as occurred. But no, that sequence
occurred on the first attempt.
--
alias Ernest Major
Richard Norman
Dec 23, 2012, 4:58:00 PM12/23/12
to
On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 13:30:59 -0800 (PST), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
You still have not connected your probability argument (which I still
think is terribly flawed) with atheism. You seem to think that the
fact that we live in a universe suitable for life requires a god. I
think that the fact we live in a universe suitable for life simply
reflects that fact that we couldn't live in a universe unsuitable for
life.
wrote:
think is terribly flawed) with atheism. You seem to think that the
fact that we live in a universe suitable for life requires a god. I
think that the fact we live in a universe suitable for life simply
reflects that fact that we couldn't live in a universe unsuitable for
life.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 23, 2012, 5:28:23 PM12/23/12
to
> <a344d70a-c376-46c4-80db-5f5afce14...@r14g2000vbe.googlegroups.com>,
> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
The analogy with a desk of cards is misleading because in this example
you start with a desk of cards and a finite number of possible
combinations. In the case of the emergence of a universe there is a
priori nothing at the beginning and the number of possible
combinations is infinite.
> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
you start with a desk of cards and a finite number of possible
combinations. In the case of the emergence of a universe there is a
priori nothing at the beginning and the number of possible
combinations is infinite.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 23, 2012, 5:39:01 PM12/23/12
to
On Dec 23, 1:58嚙緘m, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 13:30:59 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
> >> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and atheism. 嚙磐our
> >> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. 嚙瘩ealing a deck of shuffled
> >> occur. 嚙磅imilarly when a universe forms it necessarily has "some"
> >> specific set of properties. 嚙磕hy these instead of those? 嚙磕hy this
> >> dealt set of cards instead of that? 嚙瘢t is the same thing.
> fact that we live in a universe suitable for life requires a god. 嚙瘢
for such an occurrence. That is not the question. The question is how
is it possible to explain the emergence of a universe suitable for the
occurrence of Darwinian evolution given that an infinite number of
combinations of physical constants was a priori possible?
> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 13:30:59 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 23 d嚙箱, 12:23, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:08:28 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
> ><snip for focus>
>
> >> >> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
> >> >> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
> >> >> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
> >> >> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
> >> >> particular one? 嚙確hat is equally unlikely.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On 23 d嚙箱, 12:23, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:08:28 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
> ><snip for focus>
>
> >> >> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
> >> >> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
> >> >> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
> >> >> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
> >> > >Of course not. Once our universe has emerged with its characteristics
> >> >so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
> >> >understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its probability was
> >> >not so high (even with a universe with such characteristics).
> >> >How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
> >> >universe?
> >> >With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the probability
> >> >of the emergence of our universe can be explained rationally, even if
> >> >infinitely unlikely.
> >> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
> >> > I don't understand what point you don't understand. 嚙瞎y main point is
> >> >so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
> >> >understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its probability was
> >> >not so high (even with a universe with such characteristics).
> >> >How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
> >> >universe?
> >> >With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the probability
> >> >of the emergence of our universe can be explained rationally, even if
> >> >infinitely unlikely.
> >> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
> >> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and atheism. 嚙磐our
> >> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. 嚙瘩ealing a deck of shuffled
> >> cards produces an "unlikely" event according to people who abuse
> >> probability theory. 嚙確he fact is that "some" result must necessarily
> >> occur. 嚙磅imilarly when a universe forms it necessarily has "some"
> >> specific set of properties. 嚙磕hy these instead of those? 嚙磕hy this
> >> dealt set of cards instead of that? 嚙瘢t is the same thing.
>
> >My point is that to have the occurrence of a universe as ours which is
> >so particular many attempts must have occurred. Thus many universes
> >would have emerged before the emergence of ours and then a multiverse
> >would have likely resulted.
> >Otherwise the probability that the cause of the emergence of our
> >universe was random would have been too low.
> >That is why I think atheism requires the existence of a multiverse.
>
> You still have not connected your probability argument (which I still
> think is terribly flawed) with atheism. 嚙磐ou seem to think that the
> >My point is that to have the occurrence of a universe as ours which is
> >so particular many attempts must have occurred. Thus many universes
> >would have emerged before the emergence of ours and then a multiverse
> >would have likely resulted.
> >Otherwise the probability that the cause of the emergence of our
> >universe was random would have been too low.
> >That is why I think atheism requires the existence of a multiverse.
>
> You still have not connected your probability argument (which I still
> fact that we live in a universe suitable for life requires a god. 嚙瘢
> think that the fact we live in a universe suitable for life simply
> reflects that fact that we couldn't live in a universe unsuitable for
> life.
Of course Darwinian evolution couldn't occur in a universe unsuitable
> reflects that fact that we couldn't live in a universe unsuitable for
> life.
for such an occurrence. That is not the question. The question is how
is it possible to explain the emergence of a universe suitable for the
occurrence of Darwinian evolution given that an infinite number of
combinations of physical constants was a priori possible?
Richard Norman
Dec 23, 2012, 6:12:34 PM12/23/12
to
On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 14:39:01 -0800 (PST), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
>On Dec 23, 1:58�pm, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 13:30:59 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>>
>> >> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and atheism. �Your
>> >> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. �Dealing a deck of shuffled
>> >> dealt set of cards instead of that? �It is the same thing.
>> fact that we live in a universe suitable for life requires a god. �I
Why does the emergence of a universe suitable for life have anything
whatsoever to do with atheism?
wrote:
>On Dec 23, 1:58�pm, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 13:30:59 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> wrote:
>>
>> >On 23 d�c, 12:23, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:08:28 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> wrote:
>>
>> ><snip for focus>
>>
>> >> >> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
>> >> >> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
>> >> >> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
>> >> >> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
>> >> >> particular one? �That is equally unlikely.
>> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:08:28 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> wrote:
>>
>> ><snip for focus>
>>
>> >> >> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
>> >> >> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
>> >> >> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
>> >> >> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
>> >> > >Of course not. Once our universe has emerged with its characteristics
>> >> >so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
>> >> >understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its probability was
>> >> >not so high (even with a universe with such characteristics).
>> >> >How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
>> >> >universe?
>> >> >With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the probability
>> >> >of the emergence of our universe can be explained rationally, even if
>> >> >infinitely unlikely.
>> >> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
>> >> > I don't understand what point you don't understand. �My main point is
>> >> >so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
>> >> >understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its probability was
>> >> >not so high (even with a universe with such characteristics).
>> >> >How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
>> >> >universe?
>> >> >With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the probability
>> >> >of the emergence of our universe can be explained rationally, even if
>> >> >infinitely unlikely.
>> >> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
>> >> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and atheism. �Your
>> >> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. �Dealing a deck of shuffled
>> >> cards produces an "unlikely" event according to people who abuse
>> >> probability theory. �The fact is that "some" result must necessarily
>> >> occur. �Similarly when a universe forms it necessarily has "some"
>> >> specific set of properties. �Why these instead of those? �Why this
>> >> occur. �Similarly when a universe forms it necessarily has "some"
>> >> dealt set of cards instead of that? �It is the same thing.
>>
>> >My point is that to have the occurrence of a universe as ours which is
>> >so particular many attempts must have occurred. Thus many universes
>> >would have emerged before the emergence of ours and then a multiverse
>> >would have likely resulted.
>> >Otherwise the probability that the cause of the emergence of our
>> >universe was random would have been too low.
>> >That is why I think atheism requires the existence of a multiverse.
>>
>> You still have not connected your probability argument (which I still
>> think is terribly flawed) with atheism. �You seem to think that the
>> >My point is that to have the occurrence of a universe as ours which is
>> >so particular many attempts must have occurred. Thus many universes
>> >would have emerged before the emergence of ours and then a multiverse
>> >would have likely resulted.
>> >Otherwise the probability that the cause of the emergence of our
>> >universe was random would have been too low.
>> >That is why I think atheism requires the existence of a multiverse.
>>
>> You still have not connected your probability argument (which I still
>> fact that we live in a universe suitable for life requires a god. �I
>> think that the fact we live in a universe suitable for life simply
>> reflects that fact that we couldn't live in a universe unsuitable for
>> life.
>
>Of course Darwinian evolution couldn't occur in a universe unsuitable
>for such an occurrence. That is not the question. The question is how
>is it possible to explain the emergence of a universe suitable for the
>occurrence of Darwinian evolution given that an infinite number of
>combinations of physical constants was a priori possible?
You still refuse to accept the simple word "life".
>> reflects that fact that we couldn't live in a universe unsuitable for
>> life.
>
>Of course Darwinian evolution couldn't occur in a universe unsuitable
>for such an occurrence. That is not the question. The question is how
>is it possible to explain the emergence of a universe suitable for the
>occurrence of Darwinian evolution given that an infinite number of
>combinations of physical constants was a priori possible?
Why does the emergence of a universe suitable for life have anything
whatsoever to do with atheism?
jillery
Dec 23, 2012, 6:26:09 PM12/23/12
to
moment infinitely many planets, there will be necessarily infinitely
many planets that have produced intelligent life.
jillery
Dec 23, 2012, 6:49:42 PM12/23/12
to
On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 13:30:59 -0800 (PST), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
wrote:
IIUC you're saying above in papraphrase that our Universe is so
unlikely that it would take an infinity of universes to make one just
like ours. And based on that, either there are an infinity of
universes, almost all of which are not like ours, or some designer
outside our Universe made our one Universe just so in order to evolve
intelligent life. And based on that, the option to accept the
presence of multiverses allows one to more easily reject the presence
of said designer.
However, the idea of multiverses doesn't obligate one to assume that
each universe is different in its fundamental parameters. And it
doesn't obligate one to assume that fundamental parameters are
infinitely variable.
And even if one assumes a conventional single Universe, it may be that
the fundamental parameters that we observe are the only values they
can have, that if any universe can exist for any length of time, it
must have the values we observe. This also make an external designer
equally unnecessary.
wrote:
unlikely that it would take an infinity of universes to make one just
like ours. And based on that, either there are an infinity of
universes, almost all of which are not like ours, or some designer
outside our Universe made our one Universe just so in order to evolve
intelligent life. And based on that, the option to accept the
presence of multiverses allows one to more easily reject the presence
of said designer.
However, the idea of multiverses doesn't obligate one to assume that
each universe is different in its fundamental parameters. And it
doesn't obligate one to assume that fundamental parameters are
infinitely variable.
And even if one assumes a conventional single Universe, it may be that
the fundamental parameters that we observe are the only values they
can have, that if any universe can exist for any length of time, it
must have the values we observe. This also make an external designer
equally unnecessary.
Robert Carnegie: Fnord: cc talk-origins@moderators.isc.org
Dec 23, 2012, 9:17:27 PM12/23/12
to
is at least tricky to apply to infinite things.
Even if fifty per cent of planets produce intelligent life eventually
during the lifetime of their star, and there are infinitely many planets -
since the past history of the universe is finite and started with
a Big Bang and no planets, there must be one planet where intelligent life
arose /first/, that, therefore, was the only one - although there were
infinitely many, very soon afterwards. There also is a problem of
defining and measuring intelligence, and measuring indefinitely small
intervals of time, across infinite distance.
Having said that, consider as light relief Douglas Adams' "proof"
that the intelligent population of the universe is zero.
But there's hope; I hear the secret is to bang the rocks together,
and take it on from there.
jillery
Dec 23, 2012, 11:11:04 PM12/23/12
to
On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 18:17:27 -0800 (PST), "Robert Carnegie: Fnord: cc
>Even if fifty per cent of planets produce intelligent life eventually
>during the lifetime of their star, and there are infinitely many planets -
>since the past history of the universe is finite and started with
>a Big Bang and no planets, there must be one planet where intelligent life
>arose /first/, that, therefore, was the only one - although there were
>infinitely many, very soon afterwards. There also is a problem of
>defining and measuring intelligence, and measuring indefinitely small
>intervals of time, across infinite distance.
You're adding some additional qualifiers and waffling on your own use
of terms. But if I look as the process, as opposed to the end result,
I acknowledge the point there must be a first planet. Of course, I
could ask about the process of making infinitely many planets, but
that will just confuse me more than I already am.
So going back to your hypothetical, you intend your question, "what is
the probability of a planet producing intelligent life?" to apply to
only that point in time when the first planet evolves intelligent
life. AIUI that answer is still certainty by definition, because
there must be a first planet.
Since you're focusing on a process, ISTM a more useful question is
what is the probability of evolving intelligent life on different
planets over time? That's a question that directly relates to
directed panspermia, but that's another topic.
>Having said that, consider as light relief Douglas Adams' "proof"
>that the intelligent population of the universe is zero.
>But there's hope; I hear the secret is to bang the rocks together,
>and take it on from there.
Listen to the mice.
talk-o...@moderators.isc.org" <rja.ca...@excite.com> wrote:
>On Sunday, 23 December 2012 23:26:09 UTC, jillery wrote:
>> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 12:21:28 -0800 (PST), "Robert Carnegie: Fnord: cc
>> talk-o...@moderators.isc.org" <rja.ca...@excite.com> wrote:
>>
>> >I mean this: if there are infinitely many planets, and if only one planet
>> >has produced intelligent life, in the passing of history of the universe
>> >up to now, then, what is the correct number for the probability of
>> >a planet producing intelligent life?
>>
>> ISTM your premises are contradictory. AIUI if there are at this
>> moment infinitely many planets, there will be necessarily infinitely
>> many planets that have produced intelligent life.
>
>Not so - although really I wanted to make the point that probability
>is at least tricky to apply to infinite things.
On that point you and I agree.
>On Sunday, 23 December 2012 23:26:09 UTC, jillery wrote:
>> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 12:21:28 -0800 (PST), "Robert Carnegie: Fnord: cc
>> talk-o...@moderators.isc.org" <rja.ca...@excite.com> wrote:
>>
>> >I mean this: if there are infinitely many planets, and if only one planet
>> >has produced intelligent life, in the passing of history of the universe
>> >up to now, then, what is the correct number for the probability of
>> >a planet producing intelligent life?
>>
>> ISTM your premises are contradictory. AIUI if there are at this
>> moment infinitely many planets, there will be necessarily infinitely
>> many planets that have produced intelligent life.
>
>Not so - although really I wanted to make the point that probability
>is at least tricky to apply to infinite things.
>Even if fifty per cent of planets produce intelligent life eventually
>during the lifetime of their star, and there are infinitely many planets -
>since the past history of the universe is finite and started with
>a Big Bang and no planets, there must be one planet where intelligent life
>arose /first/, that, therefore, was the only one - although there were
>infinitely many, very soon afterwards. There also is a problem of
>defining and measuring intelligence, and measuring indefinitely small
>intervals of time, across infinite distance.
of terms. But if I look as the process, as opposed to the end result,
I acknowledge the point there must be a first planet. Of course, I
could ask about the process of making infinitely many planets, but
that will just confuse me more than I already am.
So going back to your hypothetical, you intend your question, "what is
the probability of a planet producing intelligent life?" to apply to
only that point in time when the first planet evolves intelligent
life. AIUI that answer is still certainty by definition, because
there must be a first planet.
Since you're focusing on a process, ISTM a more useful question is
what is the probability of evolving intelligent life on different
planets over time? That's a question that directly relates to
directed panspermia, but that's another topic.
>Having said that, consider as light relief Douglas Adams' "proof"
>that the intelligent population of the universe is zero.
>But there's hope; I hear the secret is to bang the rocks together,
>and take it on from there.
Mitchell Coffey
Dec 23, 2012, 11:17:53 PM12/23/12
to
your forehead.
Mitchell Coffey
Michael Siemon
Dec 23, 2012, 11:31:06 PM12/23/12
to
In article <kb8l1f$bsl$1...@dont-email.me>,
What Marc doesn't quite seem to get is that John _is_ a very, very
good philosopher. And he (Marc) would do well to attend carefully to
what John writes in this froup. I have, very occasionally, managed to
wean John from extreme positions -- but he is far more likely to make
me change my mind than I am to change his. Because he is bloody well
competent.
good philosopher. And he (Marc) would do well to attend carefully to
what John writes in this froup. I have, very occasionally, managed to
wean John from extreme positions -- but he is far more likely to make
me change my mind than I am to change his. Because he is bloody well
competent.
Mitchell Coffey
Dec 23, 2012, 11:42:18 PM12/23/12
to
On 12/23/2012 12:31 AM, Richard Norman wrote:
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:33:51 -0500, *Hemidactylus*
> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:33:51 -0500, *Hemidactylus*
>>>> <marc.t...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 22 d�c, 08:41, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>>>>> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 22 d�c, 08:41, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>>>>> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 05:20:11 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 22 d�c, 01:18, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> <snip for focus>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
>>>>>>>> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
>>>>>>>> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
>>>>>>>> uninteresting.
>>>>>>>> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> <snip for focus>
>>>>>>>> That is the sort of philosophy paper written by a nonphilosopher who
>>>>>>>> thinks he has to introduce Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, and so is writing
>>>>>>>> to a second year undergraduate audience. It was slight and
>>>>>>>> uninteresting.
>>>>>>>> The nonphilosopher concerned seems to be an IT theorist.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
>>>>>>> paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
>>>>>> response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
>>>>>> argumentation.
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
>>>>> debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
>>>>> scientists.
>>>>
>>>> Dont be a fool. I work with (am coauthoring a book with) scientists all
>>>> the time. But when a scientist tries to do philosophy and does it
>>>> poorly, I am unimpressed. If I did science poorly, then a scientist
>>>> would have a right to be unimpressed also.
>>>
>>> Why do you say "if"?
>>
>> Wilkins is one of the good ones regardless of what Myers and Moran might
>> whine about from the "Muppet balcony" or their ivory tower blogs.
>> Sometimes we howlers have to set him straight, but with less brutality.
>> And at least Wilkins still hangs with the common folk (Plato's "hoi
>> polloi") like us and hasn't let blogging (or publishing books) totally
>> go to his head.
>
>>>>>>> Pr. Wilkins gives his opinion on some formal aspects of Robertson's
>>>>>>> paper but I don't see any argumentation on the heart of the question.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I certainly don't presume to speak for him but my reading of his
>>>>>> response is that the heart of the question did not deserve
>>>>>> argumentation.
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course, when you are challenged the best solution is to escape the
>>>>> debate: the great philosopher Pr. Wilkins despises petty-minded
>>>>> scientists.
>>>>
>>>> Dont be a fool. I work with (am coauthoring a book with) scientists all
>>>> the time. But when a scientist tries to do philosophy and does it
>>>> poorly, I am unimpressed. If I did science poorly, then a scientist
>>>> would have a right to be unimpressed also.
>>>
>>> Why do you say "if"?
>>
>> Wilkins is one of the good ones regardless of what Myers and Moran might
>> whine about from the "Muppet balcony" or their ivory tower blogs.
>> Sometimes we howlers have to set him straight, but with less brutality.
>> And at least Wilkins still hangs with the common folk (Plato's "hoi
>> polloi") like us and hasn't let blogging (or publishing books) totally
>> go to his head.
>
> I should be more careful with my Wilkins-baiting because you are right
> in general with the important things and what I think of as a little
> jab might well be interpreted by some here improperly.
And Wilkins is known to possess a fiercely loyal ban of psychologically
> in general with the important things and what I think of as a little
> jab might well be interpreted by some here improperly.
unstable followers, skilled with the bowie knife, who fight on a
hair-trigger and recognize no rules. Good thing there's no way anyone
can know what you're writing here.
> Outside of his
> views on reductionism/emergence and whether genes contain
> "information", he is quite a sensible bloke.
> I don't follow either Myers or Moran but from what I remember in the
> past, I tend to agree with Larry on at least some issues with John.
"sensible."
Mitchell Coffey
Mark Isaak
Dec 24, 2012, 1:42:27 AM12/24/12
to
> The analogy with a desk of cards is misleading because in this example
> you start with a desk of cards and a finite number of possible
> combinations. In the case of the emergence of a universe there is a
> priori nothing at the beginning and the number of possible
> combinations is infinite.
First, it doesn't matter. The principle works the same with an infinite
> you start with a desk of cards and a finite number of possible
> combinations. In the case of the emergence of a universe there is a
> priori nothing at the beginning and the number of possible
> combinations is infinite.
deck.
Second, you don't know that. Nobody knows what the a priori odds of a
universe are.
There is reason to suspect that the possible combinations are
constrained and/or have enough slop so that the odds of life do not come
out infinitessimal. Consider the law of gravity, for example:
F = G*m1*m2/r^2
Sure, G appears to be an arbitrary number, which, presumably, might have
taken any of an infinite number of values, but can you really say that
if it varied by 0.00001% from the value it has, that life would be
impossible? And then there's that 2 in the exponent -- not 2.074419346,
but exactly 2.000000000. My suspicion is that the number of
possibilities for that exponent are far from infinite.
--
Mark Isaak eciton (at) curioustaxonomy (dot) net
"It is certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural
honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most
pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems." - D. Hume
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 24, 2012, 3:37:57 AM12/24/12
to
On 23 d锟絚, 15:12, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 14:39:01 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and atheism. 锟結our
> >> >> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. 锟紻ealing a deck of shuffled
> >> >> occur. 锟絊imilarly when a universe forms it necessarily has "some"
> >> >> specific set of properties. 锟絎hy these instead of those? 锟絎hy this
> >> >> dealt set of cards instead of that? 锟絀t is the same thing.
> >> fact that we live in a universe suitable for life requires a god. 锟絀
it is a metaphysical concept.
Whatever you say either the emergence of "Darwinian evolution" or of
organisms you want to call 'living' systems the question is not in the
emergence of these (once our universe has emerged).
Again the question is how is it possible to explain the probability
(so low) of the emergence of our universe which is so particular with
extremely specific characteristics?
> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 14:39:01 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On Dec 23, 1:58锟絧m, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 13:30:59 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On Dec 23, 1:58锟絧m, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 13:30:59 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:
>
> >> >On 23 d锟絚, 12:23, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:08:28 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >> wrote:
>
> >> ><snip for focus>
>
> >> >> >> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
> >> >> >> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
> >> >> >> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
> >> >> >> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
> >> >> >> particular one? 锟絋hat is equally unlikely.
> >> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:08:28 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >> wrote:
>
> >> ><snip for focus>
>
> >> >> >> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our universe, with
> >> >> >> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
> >> >> >> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
> >> >> >> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to live in this
> >> >> > >Of course not. Once our universe has emerged with its characteristics
> >> >> >so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
> >> >> >understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its probability was
> >> >> >not so high (even with a universe with such characteristics).
> >> >> >How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
> >> >> >universe?
> >> >> >With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the probability
> >> >> >of the emergence of our universe can be explained rationally, even if
> >> >> >infinitely unlikely.
> >> >> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
> >> >> > I don't understand what point you don't understand. 锟組y main point is
> >> >> >so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
> >> >> >understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its probability was
> >> >> >not so high (even with a universe with such characteristics).
> >> >> >How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
> >> >> >universe?
> >> >> >With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the probability
> >> >> >of the emergence of our universe can be explained rationally, even if
> >> >> >infinitely unlikely.
> >> >> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
> >> >> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and atheism. 锟結our
> >> >> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. 锟紻ealing a deck of shuffled
> >> >> cards produces an "unlikely" event according to people who abuse
> >> >> probability theory. 锟絋he fact is that "some" result must necessarily
> >> >> occur. 锟絊imilarly when a universe forms it necessarily has "some"
> >> >> specific set of properties. 锟絎hy these instead of those? 锟絎hy this
> >> >> dealt set of cards instead of that? 锟絀t is the same thing.
>
> >> >My point is that to have the occurrence of a universe as ours which is
> >> >so particular many attempts must have occurred. Thus many universes
> >> >would have emerged before the emergence of ours and then a multiverse
> >> >would have likely resulted.
> >> >Otherwise the probability that the cause of the emergence of our
> >> >universe was random would have been too low.
> >> >That is why I think atheism requires the existence of a multiverse.
>
> >> You still have not connected your probability argument (which I still
> >> think is terribly flawed) with atheism. 锟結ou seem to think that the
> >> >My point is that to have the occurrence of a universe as ours which is
> >> >so particular many attempts must have occurred. Thus many universes
> >> >would have emerged before the emergence of ours and then a multiverse
> >> >would have likely resulted.
> >> >Otherwise the probability that the cause of the emergence of our
> >> >universe was random would have been too low.
> >> >That is why I think atheism requires the existence of a multiverse.
>
> >> You still have not connected your probability argument (which I still
> >> fact that we live in a universe suitable for life requires a god. 锟絀
> >> think that the fact we live in a universe suitable for life simply
> >> reflects that fact that we couldn't live in a universe unsuitable for
> >> life.
>
> >Of course Darwinian evolution couldn't occur in a universe unsuitable
> >for such an occurrence. That is not the question. The question is how
> >is it possible to explain the emergence of a universe suitable for the
> >occurrence of Darwinian evolution given that an infinite number of
> >combinations of physical constants was a priori possible?
>
> You still refuse to accept the simple word "life".
>
> Why does the emergence of a universe suitable for life have anything
> whatsoever to do with atheism?
I see the word 'life' is magic to you and thus confirm my thesis that
> >> reflects that fact that we couldn't live in a universe unsuitable for
> >> life.
>
> >Of course Darwinian evolution couldn't occur in a universe unsuitable
> >for such an occurrence. That is not the question. The question is how
> >is it possible to explain the emergence of a universe suitable for the
> >occurrence of Darwinian evolution given that an infinite number of
> >combinations of physical constants was a priori possible?
>
> You still refuse to accept the simple word "life".
>
> Why does the emergence of a universe suitable for life have anything
> whatsoever to do with atheism?
it is a metaphysical concept.
Whatever you say either the emergence of "Darwinian evolution" or of
organisms you want to call 'living' systems the question is not in the
emergence of these (once our universe has emerged).
Again the question is how is it possible to explain the probability
(so low) of the emergence of our universe which is so particular with
extremely specific characteristics?
The analogy with a desk of cards is misleading because in this example
you start with a desk of cards and a finite number of possible
combinations: in any case a given combination will be sorted out.
you start with a desk of cards and a finite number of possible
In the case of the emergence of a universe there is a priori nothing
before it and the number of possibilities is infinite.
eridanus
Dec 24, 2012, 3:43:44 AM12/24/12
to
El domingo, 23 de diciembre de 2012 21:58:00 UTC, Richard Norman escribi�:
that was very good.
I do not see how people is able to philosophy this way. The simple fact
that life exist in this planet has not any special meaning; it is a
simple fact. We cannot go much farther than that, except to say all the
common statements like water, some atmosphere, some distance from the sun,
etc. So, we figure out that life is not probable in an asteroid, or the
atmosphere of Jupiter, etc. In the sun there is not probably any life,
as well other planets too close or too far from the sun.
In fact the problems with some people is how easily they hasten to
philosophy about anything we barely know about. How can we philosophy from
the Universe, if we barely know a little more than our own planetary
system?
Eridanus
I do not see how people is able to philosophy this way. The simple fact
that life exist in this planet has not any special meaning; it is a
simple fact. We cannot go much farther than that, except to say all the
common statements like water, some atmosphere, some distance from the sun,
etc. So, we figure out that life is not probable in an asteroid, or the
atmosphere of Jupiter, etc. In the sun there is not probably any life,
as well other planets too close or too far from the sun.
In fact the problems with some people is how easily they hasten to
philosophy about anything we barely know about. How can we philosophy from
the Universe, if we barely know a little more than our own planetary
system?
Eridanus
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 24, 2012, 3:48:46 AM12/24/12
to
On 23 d�c, 15:49, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 13:30:59 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
If you google a little bit on the topic "multiverse" you will find
examples of simulations that show the possibility for other viable
universes.
> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 13:30:59 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
examples of simulations that show the possibility for other viable
universes.
Ernest Major
Dec 24, 2012, 4:12:07 AM12/24/12
to
In message
<8c50e811-4214-44cc...@r14g2000vbd.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
Conceivable does not mean possible; possible does not mean existing.
--
alias Ernest Major
<8c50e811-4214-44cc...@r14g2000vbd.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
--
alias Ernest Major
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 24, 2012, 4:18:13 AM12/24/12
to
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 24, 2012, 4:22:53 AM12/24/12
to
On 23 d�c, 20:31, Michael Siemon <mlsie...@sonic.net> wrote:
> In article <kb8l1f$bs...@dont-email.me>,
> �Mitchell Coffey <mitchelldotcof...@gmail.com> wrote:
Perhaps you are a little bit blind to your love for John.
> In article <kb8l1f$bs...@dont-email.me>,
> �Mitchell Coffey <mitchelldotcof...@gmail.com> wrote:
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 24, 2012, 4:52:34 AM12/24/12
to
On 23 d�c, 22:42, Mark Isaak <eci...@curioustax.onomy.net> wrote:
Your example with the law of gravity is all grist for my mill: it
confirms that our universe is very very etc. specific!
What is misleading in your reasoning is to start from the result. You
take the example of the emergence of 'life' but it is not necessary,
you could have just taken the example of the emergence of our
universe.
Of course once knowing that a universe like ours can exist with
interactions as we know them (the law of gravity included) it is
easier and possible to ask what were the constraints for the emergence
of such interactions, baryons, stars, galaxies etc.. But before the
emergence of such a universe the problem was how to predict such an
occurrence?
If the response is that it was not foreseeable because the cause was
fully random then I think the multiverse hypothesis is the only viable
one.
confirms that our universe is very very etc. specific!
What is misleading in your reasoning is to start from the result. You
take the example of the emergence of 'life' but it is not necessary,
you could have just taken the example of the emergence of our
universe.
Of course once knowing that a universe like ours can exist with
interactions as we know them (the law of gravity included) it is
easier and possible to ask what were the constraints for the emergence
of such interactions, baryons, stars, galaxies etc.. But before the
emergence of such a universe the problem was how to predict such an
occurrence?
If the response is that it was not foreseeable because the cause was
fully random then I think the multiverse hypothesis is the only viable
one.
jillery
Dec 24, 2012, 5:06:08 AM12/24/12
to
On Mon, 24 Dec 2012 00:48:46 -0800 (PST), marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
That's not the same question. That a simulation can be mathematically
demonstrated, given X values, then a Universe would behave a certain
way, is not the same as to say that Universe could actually have X
values. After all, so far there is only a sample of one, and it has
the values we observe.
But that's actually beside the point. You were speculating on whether
multiverses necessarily assume atheism, not whether multiverses
actually exist. My point remains, that multiverses don't require
atheism, and atheism doesn't require multiverses. They are separate
questions. Your argument is like saying that biological evolution
requires the Big Bang.
demonstrated, given X values, then a Universe would behave a certain
way, is not the same as to say that Universe could actually have X
values. After all, so far there is only a sample of one, and it has
the values we observe.
But that's actually beside the point. You were speculating on whether
multiverses necessarily assume atheism, not whether multiverses
actually exist. My point remains, that multiverses don't require
atheism, and atheism doesn't require multiverses. They are separate
questions. Your argument is like saying that biological evolution
requires the Big Bang.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 24, 2012, 5:03:29 AM12/24/12
to
> <8c50e811-4214-44cc-9b18-071a57093...@r14g2000vbd.googlegroups.com>,
> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
So? Could you develop your point?
> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 24, 2012, 5:12:31 AM12/24/12
to
On 24 d�c, 02:06, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, 24 Dec 2012 00:48:46 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
It is exactly what I am saying! Without the emergence of our universe
or any universe with very specific characteristics there wouldn't have
been a story like the one we know it: why do you think otherwise?
> On Mon, 24 Dec 2012 00:48:46 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
or any universe with very specific characteristics there wouldn't have
been a story like the one we know it: why do you think otherwise?
Ernest Major
Dec 24, 2012, 5:23:30 AM12/24/12
to
In message
<fa256f90-7eb3-4263...@u16g2000vbn.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
You adduce the existence of simulations as showing that other universes
are possible (and hence in context imply that we live in a multiverse).
You weren't specific about the nature of the simulations, but I suspect
you of referring to the studies that showed that some different values
for fundamental constants still produced universes that looked somewhat
like ours - that is with long-lived stars. That makes such universes
conceivable - it doesn't make them possible - there might be constraints
on what values the fundamental constants can take.
Even if such universes are possible, that doesn't make necessarily
existent. That is, it doesn't warrant the conclusion of a multiverse.
--
alias Ernest Major
<fa256f90-7eb3-4263...@u16g2000vbn.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
are possible (and hence in context imply that we live in a multiverse).
You weren't specific about the nature of the simulations, but I suspect
you of referring to the studies that showed that some different values
for fundamental constants still produced universes that looked somewhat
like ours - that is with long-lived stars. That makes such universes
conceivable - it doesn't make them possible - there might be constraints
on what values the fundamental constants can take.
Even if such universes are possible, that doesn't make necessarily
existent. That is, it doesn't warrant the conclusion of a multiverse.
--
alias Ernest Major
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 24, 2012, 5:53:16 AM12/24/12
to
> <fa256f90-7eb3-4263-a0ee-9e34eab4a...@u16g2000vbn.googlegroups.com>,
> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
I have never said that these simulations were a proof for the
existence of multiverse. However these are in favor of such an
existence.
Actually I was just replying to Jillery's assertion that "it may be
My conviction that multiverse must exist is the logical consequence of
the hypothesis that the cause of the emergence of our universe was
just random..
> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
existence of multiverse. However these are in favor of such an
existence.
Actually I was just replying to Jillery's assertion that "it may be
that the fundamental parameters that we observe are the only values
they can have" as these simulations prove the opposite.
My conviction that multiverse must exist is the logical consequence of
the hypothesis that the cause of the emergence of our universe was
just random..
Ernest Major
Dec 24, 2012, 6:11:00 AM12/24/12
to
In message
<c5f6fca9-05ab-4f23...@r4g2000vbi.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
You are still failing to make the distinction between conceivable and
possible.
>My conviction that multiverse must exist is the logical consequence of
>the hypothesis that the cause of the emergence of our universe was
>just random..
>
You seem to be unreasonably confident of the truth of that hypothesis.
--
alias Ernest Major
<c5f6fca9-05ab-4f23...@r4g2000vbi.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
>> >> >> >> >of the emergence of our universe can be explained
>> >> >> >> >rationally, even if
>> >> >> >> >infinitely unlikely.
>> >> >> >> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
>> >> >> >> > I don't understand what point you don't understand. �My
>> >> >> >> >main point is
>> >> >> >> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and
>> >> >> >>atheism. �Your
>> >> >> >> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. �Dealing a deck
>> >> >> >> >rationally, even if
>> >> >> >> >infinitely unlikely.
>> >> >> >> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
>> >> >> >> > I don't understand what point you don't understand. �My
>> >> >> >> >main point is
>> >> >> >> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and
>> >> >> >>atheism. �Your
>> >> >> >> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. �Dealing a deck
possible.
>My conviction that multiverse must exist is the logical consequence of
>the hypothesis that the cause of the emergence of our universe was
>just random..
>
--
alias Ernest Major
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 24, 2012, 6:18:55 AM12/24/12
to
> <c5f6fca9-05ab-4f23-839e-c67de504d...@r4g2000vbi.googlegroups.com>,
That is another question: so I understand that your hypothesis is that
the cause of the emergence of our universe was determinisitic? That no
other universe was possible?
the cause of the emergence of our universe was determinisitic? That no
other universe was possible?
Ernest Major
Dec 24, 2012, 6:38:06 AM12/24/12
to
In message
<339f1e7a-9677-4243...@h5g2000vbb.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
You understand incorrectly. (You may well understand Jillery incorrectly
as well.) My position is that I don't know.
You might also note that you've have invoked a false dichotomy between
"just random" and completed deterministic ("no other universe was
possible").
--
alias Ernest Major
<339f1e7a-9677-4243...@h5g2000vbb.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
>On 24 d�c, 03:11, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>> In message
>> <c5f6fca9-05ab-4f23-839e-c67de504d...@r4g2000vbi.googlegroups.com>,
>> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> >On 24 d c, 02:23, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>> >> In message
>> >> <fa256f90-7eb3-4263-a0ee-9e34eab4a...@u16g2000vbn.googlegroups.com>,
>> >> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
>>
>> >> >On 24 d c, 01:12, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>> >> >> In message
>> >> >> <8c50e811-4214-44cc-9b18-071a57093...@r14g2000vbd.googlegroups.com>,
>> >> >> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
>>
>> >> >> >On 23 d c, 15:49, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >> >> >> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 13:30:59 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> >> >> wrote:
>>
>> >> >> >> >On 23 d c, 12:23, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> >> >> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:08:28 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> >> >> >> wrote:
>>
>> >> >> >> ><snip for focus>
>>
>> >> >> >> >> >> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our
>> >> >> >> >> >> >universe, with
>> >> >> >> >> >> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
>> >> >> >> >> >> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
>> >> >> >> >> >> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to
>> >> >> >> >> >>
>> In message
>> <c5f6fca9-05ab-4f23-839e-c67de504d...@r4g2000vbi.googlegroups.com>,
>> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> >On 24 d c, 02:23, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>> >> In message
>> >> <fa256f90-7eb3-4263-a0ee-9e34eab4a...@u16g2000vbn.googlegroups.com>,
>> >> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
>>
>> >> >On 24 d c, 01:12, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>> >> >> In message
>> >> >> <8c50e811-4214-44cc-9b18-071a57093...@r14g2000vbd.googlegroups.com>,
>> >> >> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
>>
>> >> >> >On 23 d c, 15:49, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >> >> >> On Sun, 23 Dec 2012 13:30:59 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> >> >> wrote:
>>
>> >> >> >> >On 23 d c, 12:23, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> >> >> >> On Sat, 22 Dec 2012 23:08:28 -0800 (PST), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> >> >> >> wrote:
>>
>> >> >> >> ><snip for focus>
>>
>> >> >> >> >> >> >How do you explain the fact that the emergence of our
>> >> >> >> >> >> >universe, with
>> >> >> >> >> >> >its characteristics so specific, was infinitely unlikely?
>> >> >> >> >> >> How do you explain the fact that, with the infinite number of
>> >> >> >> >> >> individual universes in the multiverse, we happen to
>> >> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> >> particular one? That is equally unlikely.
>> >> >> >> >> > >Of course not. Once our universe has emerged with its
>> >> >> >> >> > >characteristics
>> >> >> >> >> >so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
>> >> >> >> >> >understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its
>> >> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >> > >Of course not. Once our universe has emerged with its
>> >> >> >> >> > >characteristics
>> >> >> >> >> >so specific, the emergence of Darwinian evolution is rather
>> >> >> >> >> >understandable (at least a posteriori), even if its
>> >> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >> >not so high (even with a universe with such characteristics).
>> >> >> >> >> >How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
>> >> >> >> >> >universe?
>> >> >> >> >> >With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the
>>
>> >> >> >> >> >of the emergence of our universe can be explained
>> >> >> >> >> >rationally, even if
>> >> >> >> >> >infinitely unlikely.
>> >> >> >> >> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
>> >> >> >> >> > I don't understand what point you don't understand. My
>> >> >> >> >> >main point is
>> >> >> >> >> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and
>> >> >> >> >>atheism. Your
>> >> >> >> >> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. Dealing a deck
>> >> >> >> >>shuffled
>> >> >> >> >> cards produces an "unlikely" event according to people who abuse
>> >> >> >> >> probability theory. The fact is that "some" result must
>> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> >How can you assert that Darwinian evolution only emerged in our
>> >> >> >> >> >universe?
>> >> >> >> >> >With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the
>>
>> >> >> >> >> >of the emergence of our universe can be explained
>> >> >> >> >> >rationally, even if
>> >> >> >> >> >infinitely unlikely.
>> >> >> >> >> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
>> >> >> >> >> > I don't understand what point you don't understand. My
>> >> >> >> >> >main point is
>> >> >> >> >> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and
>> >> >> >> >>atheism. Your
>> >> >> >> >> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. Dealing a deck
>> >> >> >> >>shuffled
>> >> >> >> >> cards produces an "unlikely" event according to people who abuse
>> >> >> >> >> probability theory. The fact is that "some" result must
>> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> occur. Similarly when a universe forms it necessarily has "some"
>> >> >> >> >> specific set of properties. Why these instead of those? Why this
>> >> >> >> >> dealt set of cards instead of that? It is the same thing.
>>
>> >> >> >> >My point is that to have the occurrence of a universe as
>> >> >> >> >ours which is
>> >> >> >> >so particular many attempts must have occurred. Thus many universes
>> >> >> >> >would have emerged before the emergence of ours and then a
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >> specific set of properties. Why these instead of those? Why this
>> >> >> >> >> dealt set of cards instead of that? It is the same thing.
>>
>> >> >> >> >My point is that to have the occurrence of a universe as
>> >> >> >> >ours which is
>> >> >> >> >so particular many attempts must have occurred. Thus many universes
>> >> >> >> >would have emerged before the emergence of ours and then a
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >would have likely resulted.
>> >> >> >> >Otherwise the probability that the cause of the emergence of our
>> >> >> >> >universe was random would have been too low.
>> >> >> >> >That is why I think atheism requires the existence of a multiverse.
>>
>> >> >> >> IIUC you're saying above in papraphrase that our Universe is so
>> >> >> >> unlikely that it would take an infinity of universes to make
>> >> >> >>one just
>> >> >> >> like ours. And based on that, either there are an infinity of
>> >> >> >> universes, almost all of which are not like ours, or some designer
>> >> >> >> outside our Universe made our one Universe just so in order
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >Otherwise the probability that the cause of the emergence of our
>> >> >> >> >universe was random would have been too low.
>> >> >> >> >That is why I think atheism requires the existence of a multiverse.
>>
>> >> >> >> IIUC you're saying above in papraphrase that our Universe is so
>> >> >> >> unlikely that it would take an infinity of universes to make
>> >> >> >>one just
>> >> >> >> like ours. And based on that, either there are an infinity of
>> >> >> >> universes, almost all of which are not like ours, or some designer
>> >> >> >> outside our Universe made our one Universe just so in order
>> >> >> >>
as well.) My position is that I don't know.
You might also note that you've have invoked a false dichotomy between
"just random" and completed deterministic ("no other universe was
possible").
--
alias Ernest Major
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Dec 24, 2012, 6:50:19 AM12/24/12
to
> <339f1e7a-9677-4243-85b8-6bc37a965...@h5g2000vbb.googlegroups.com>,
So, what do you want to show?
According to you, what are the alternative to the hypothesis that the
cause of the emergence of our universe was random?
According to you, what are the alternative to the hypothesis that the
cause of the emergence of our universe was random?
Ernest Major
Dec 24, 2012, 7:11:19 AM12/24/12
to
In message
<52e8dd6a-51cf-4a4c...@p17g2000vbn.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
That your argument is fallacious.
>According to you, what are the alternative to the hypothesis that the
>cause of the emergence of our universe was random?
>
That the physical possible forms of the universe are constrained to a
some range, perhaps a narrow range, or
That some physically possible forms are more likely than others, perhaps
much more likely, or
The universe can only take one of a finite, perhaps small, number of
forms, or, even,
That the universe is complete deterministic.
--
alias Ernest Major
<52e8dd6a-51cf-4a4c...@p17g2000vbn.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
>> >> >> >> >> >> >universe?
>> >> >> >> >> >> >With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the
>>
>> >> >> >> >> >> >of the emergence of our universe can be explained
>> >> >> >> >> >> >rationally, even if
>> >> >> >> >> >> >infinitely unlikely.
>> >> >> >> >> >> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
>> >> >> >> >> >> > I don't understand what point you don't understand. My
>> >> >> >> >> >> >main point is
>> >> >> >> >> >> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and
>> >> >> >> >> >>atheism. Your
>> >> >> >> >> >> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. Dealing a deck
>> >> >> >> >> >>shuffled
>> >> >> >> >> >> cards produces an "unlikely" event according to people
>> >> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> >> >With the hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse, the
>>
>> >> >> >> >> >> >of the emergence of our universe can be explained
>> >> >> >> >> >> >rationally, even if
>> >> >> >> >> >> >infinitely unlikely.
>> >> >> >> >> >> >I don't understand your point: could you develop it?
>> >> >> >> >> >> > I don't understand what point you don't understand. My
>> >> >> >> >> >> >main point is
>> >> >> >> >> >> that I don't see any connection between multiverses and
>> >> >> >> >> >>atheism. Your
>> >> >> >> >> >> condition of "unlikelyness" doesn't apply. Dealing a deck
>> >> >> >> >> >>shuffled
>> >> >> >> >> >> cards produces an "unlikely" event according to people
>> >> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> >> probability theory. The fact is that "some" result must
>>
>> >> >> >> >> >> occur. Similarly when a universe forms it necessarily
>> >> >> >> >> >>
>>
>> >> >> >> >> >> occur. Similarly when a universe forms it necessarily
>> >> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> >> specific set of properties. Why these instead of
>> >> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> >> dealt set of cards instead of that? It is the same thing.
>>
>> >> >> >> >> >My point is that to have the occurrence of a universe as
>> >> >> >> >> >ours which is
>> >> >> >> >> >so particular many attempts must have occurred. Thus
>> >> >> >> >> >
>>
>> >> >> >> >> >My point is that to have the occurrence of a universe as
>> >> >> >> >> >ours which is
>> >> >> >> >> >so particular many attempts must have occurred. Thus
>> >> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >> >would have emerged before the emergence of ours and then a
>>
>> >> >> >> >> >would have likely resulted.
>> >> >> >> >> >Otherwise the probability that the cause of the emergence of our
>> >> >> >> >> >universe was random would have been too low.
>> >> >> >> >> >That is why I think atheism requires the existence of a
>> >> >> >> >> >
>>
>>
>> >> >> >> >> >would have likely resulted.
>> >> >> >> >> >Otherwise the probability that the cause of the emergence of our
>> >> >> >> >> >universe was random would have been too low.
>> >> >> >> >> >That is why I think atheism requires the existence of a
>> >> >> >> >> >
>>
>> >> >> >> >> IIUC you're saying above in papraphrase that our Universe is so
>> >> >> >> >> unlikely that it would take an infinity of universes to make
>> >> >> >> >>one just
>> >> >> >> >> like ours. And based on that, either there are an infinity of
>> >> >> >> >> universes, almost all of which are not like ours, or some
>> >> >> >> >>designer
>> >> >> >> >> outside our Universe made our one Universe just so in order
>>
>> >> >> >> >> intelligent life. And based on that, the option to accept the
>> >> >> >> >> presence of multiverses allows one to more easily reject the
>> >> >> >> >>presence
>> >> >> >> >> of said designer.
>>
>> >> >> >> >> However, the idea of multiverses doesn't obligate one to
>> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> unlikely that it would take an infinity of universes to make
>> >> >> >> >>one just
>> >> >> >> >> like ours. And based on that, either there are an infinity of
>> >> >> >> >> universes, almost all of which are not like ours, or some
>> >> >> >> >>designer
>> >> >> >> >> outside our Universe made our one Universe just so in order
>>
>> >> >> >> >> intelligent life. And based on that, the option to accept the
>> >> >> >> >> presence of multiverses allows one to more easily reject the
>> >> >> >> >>presence
>> >> >> >> >> of said designer.
>>
>> >> >> >> >> However, the idea of multiverses doesn't obligate one to
>> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> each universe is different in its fundamental parameters. And it
>> >> >> >> >> doesn't obligate one to assume that fundamental parameters are
>> >> >> >> >> infinitely variable.
>>
>> >> >> >> >> And even if one assumes a conventional single Universe, it
>> >> >> >> >>may be that
>> >> >> >> >> the fundamental parameters that we observe are the only
>> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> doesn't obligate one to assume that fundamental parameters are
>> >> >> >> >> infinitely variable.
>>
>> >> >> >> >> And even if one assumes a conventional single Universe, it
>> >> >> >> >>may be that
>> >> >> >> >> the fundamental parameters that we observe are the only
>> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> can have, that if any universe can exist for any length
>According to you, what are the alternative to the hypothesis that the
>cause of the emergence of our universe was random?
>
some range, perhaps a narrow range, or
That some physically possible forms are more likely than others, perhaps
much more likely, or
The universe can only take one of a finite, perhaps small, number of
forms, or, even,
That the universe is complete deterministic.
--
alias Ernest Major
John S. Wilkins
Dec 24, 2012, 7:39:48 AM12/24/12
to
>
> > Outside of his
> > views on reductionism/emergence and whether genes contain
> > "information", he is quite a sensible bloke.
>
> Well, maybe you know him better than I do.
>
> > I don't follow either Myers or Moran but from what I remember in the
> > past, I tend to agree with Larry on at least some issues with John.
>
> Knowing Larry as I do, he'll be after your skin for implying he's
> "sensible."
>
So long as you avoid his triggers, he's fine. Of course he has many
> > Outside of his
> > views on reductionism/emergence and whether genes contain
> > "information", he is quite a sensible bloke.
>
> Well, maybe you know him better than I do.
>
> > I don't follow either Myers or Moran but from what I remember in the
> > past, I tend to agree with Larry on at least some issues with John.
>
> Knowing Larry as I do, he'll be after your skin for implying he's
> "sensible."
>
triggers.
--
John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydney
Honorary Fellow, University of Melbourne
- http://evolvingthoughts.net
John S. Wilkins
Dec 24, 2012, 7:39:50 AM12/24/12
to
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