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Is the distinction between science and metaphysics fuzzy?
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marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 25, 2012, 6:14:38 AM5/25/12
to
“I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
themselves, the Absolute, and such like” (Carnap 1935).
Rudolf Carnap, in his book Philosophy and Logical Syntax, used the
concept of verifiability to reject metaphysics. Metaphysicians cannot
avoid making their statements non-verifiable, because if they made
them verifiable, the decision about the truth or falsehood of their
doctrines would depend upon experience and therefore belong to the
region of empirical science. This consequence they wish to avoid,
because they pretend to teach knowledge which is of a higher level
than that of empirical science. Thus they are compelled to cut all
connection between their statements and experience; and precisely by
this procedure they deprive them of any sense (Carnap 1935).
For me this is the main difference with the scientific approach.
Reference:
Carnap R. 1996 (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. Bristol UK:
Thoemmes
represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
themselves, the Absolute, and such like” (Carnap 1935).
Rudolf Carnap, in his book Philosophy and Logical Syntax, used the
concept of verifiability to reject metaphysics. Metaphysicians cannot
avoid making their statements non-verifiable, because if they made
them verifiable, the decision about the truth or falsehood of their
doctrines would depend upon experience and therefore belong to the
region of empirical science. This consequence they wish to avoid,
because they pretend to teach knowledge which is of a higher level
than that of empirical science. Thus they are compelled to cut all
connection between their statements and experience; and precisely by
this procedure they deprive them of any sense (Carnap 1935).
For me this is the main difference with the scientific approach.
Reference:
Carnap R. 1996 (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. Bristol UK:
Thoemmes
Kalkidas
May 25, 2012, 12:29:32 PM5/25/12
to
On 5/25/2012 3:14 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> “I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
> themselves, the Absolute, and such like” (Carnap 1935).
That, of course, is a metaphysical proposition. No one can "experience"
> “I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
> themselves, the Absolute, and such like” (Carnap 1935).
a proposition, so a proposition is itself a metaphysical thing. This
includes Carnap's proposition about what is "metaphysical".
Glenn
May 25, 2012, 12:39:53 PM5/25/12
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John S. Wilkins
May 25, 2012, 3:22:18 PM5/25/12
to
few people take it seriously these days:
Call the principle that any claim to knowledge that is not founded on
experience the E-principle. Now ask: "Is the E-principle founded on
experience?" It cannot be, since it deals with questions that are beyond
experience (how does one know that the E-principle is right or true?).
Hence the E-principle is self-defeating.
It's taught this way to undergraduate philosophy students, although it
is usually framed in terms of the Verifiability Principle.
Metaphysics is one of those things that scienitsts often use, but in my
view rarely require, to do science.
--
John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydney
http://evolvingthoughts.net
But al be that he was a philosophre,
Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 25, 2012, 4:06:51 PM5/25/12
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On 25 mai, 21:22, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
> John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydneyhttp://evolvingthoughts.net
scientific approach:
1. the stage of the formulation of a hypothesis, a theory, a model
etc.
During this stage the scientist use everything he can, the
metaphysical concepts included: he is fully free in his approach..
2. the stage of verification by observations and/or experiments
Now the scientist must be quite rigorous and logic in his approach: he
is no more free in his approach.
> But al be that he was a philosophre,
> Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
Couldn't we say that there are two stages in the process of the
> Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
scientific approach:
1. the stage of the formulation of a hypothesis, a theory, a model
etc.
During this stage the scientist use everything he can, the
metaphysical concepts included: he is fully free in his approach..
2. the stage of verification by observations and/or experiments
Now the scientist must be quite rigorous and logic in his approach: he
is no more free in his approach.
J. J. Lodder
May 25, 2012, 4:23:16 PM5/25/12
to
<marc.t...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
> "I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
> themselves, the Absolute, and such like" (Carnap 1935).
Indeed the standard position of positivism.
> "I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
> themselves, the Absolute, and such like" (Carnap 1935).
It goes back to Mach.
> Rudolf Carnap, in his book Philosophy and Logical Syntax, used the
> concept of verifiability to reject metaphysics. Metaphysicians cannot
> avoid making their statements non-verifiable, because if they made
> them verifiable, the decision about the truth or falsehood of their
> doctrines would depend upon experience and therefore belong to the
> region of empirical science. This consequence they wish to avoid,
> because they pretend to teach knowledge which is of a higher level
> than that of empirical science. Thus they are compelled to cut all
> connection between their statements and experience; and precisely by
> this procedure they deprive them of any sense (Carnap 1935).
> For me this is the main difference with the scientific approach.
for it assumes that verifiability is an unproblematic concept.
The position is also too much naive for doing real science,
for it leaves no room for doing theoretical science.
Max Planck for example attacked it vehemently,
for just this reason.
Why bother with it?
Those disputes are long past,
and (logical) positivism is no longer seen
as a viable philosophy of science,
Jan
--
"Aber haben Sie eine gesehen?" (Ernst Mach)
J. J. Lodder
May 25, 2012, 5:21:29 PM5/25/12
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(nothing wrong with it)
> Metaphysics is one of those things that scienitsts often use, but in my
> view rarely require, to do science.
but not in Mach's curious view of 'metaphysics'.
By Mach's standards all of modern theoretical physics
is nothing but 'metaphysics'.
(things like atoms, quarks, wave functions, etc)
It's a poor kind of science,
that restricts itself to the directly verifiable.
Too poor, already in Mach's time,
Jan
John S. Wilkins
May 25, 2012, 9:14:26 PM5/25/12
to
> Couldn't we say that there are two stages in the process of the
> scientific approach:
> 1. the stage of the formulation of a hypothesis, a theory, a model
> etc.
> During this stage the scientist use everything he can, the
> metaphysical concepts included: he is fully free in his approach..
> 2. the stage of verification by observations and/or experiments
> Now the scientist must be quite rigorous and logic in his approach: he
> is no more free in his approach.
You could, but then there is little evidence that this actually happens
> scientific approach:
> 1. the stage of the formulation of a hypothesis, a theory, a model
> etc.
> During this stage the scientist use everything he can, the
> metaphysical concepts included: he is fully free in his approach..
> 2. the stage of verification by observations and/or experiments
> Now the scientist must be quite rigorous and logic in his approach: he
> is no more free in his approach.
in most sciences. I am not saying that scientists never appela to
metaphysics - there were plenty who did. I am saying that usually they
don't.
The other point is that you should never believe a scientist who makes
philosophical claims, but check that their practice matches their
rhetoric. Usually it doesn't, and the philosophy is used for, well,
rhetorical and polemic purposes.
See my argument here
http://evolvingthoughts.net/2012/05/metaphysical-determinism/
David Canzi
May 25, 2012, 9:29:08 PM5/25/12
to
Kalkidas <e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>On 5/25/2012 3:14 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>> “I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
>> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
>> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
>> themselves, the Absolute, and such like” (Carnap 1935).
>
>That, of course, is a metaphysical proposition. No one can "experience"
>a proposition,
Have you ever become aware of a previously unfamiliar proposition
>On 5/25/2012 3:14 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>> “I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
>> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
>> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
>> themselves, the Absolute, and such like” (Carnap 1935).
>
>That, of course, is a metaphysical proposition. No one can "experience"
>a proposition,
as a result of seeing something written or hearing something
spoken? Seeing and hearing are experiences, aren't they?
--
David Canzi | TIMTOWWTDI (tim-toe-woe-dee): There Is More Than One
| Wrong Way To Do It
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 26, 2012, 4:13:40 AM5/26/12
to
> But al be that he was a philosophre,
> Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
I read your paper "Metaphysical determinism" (20 May 2012) which I
> Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
found very interesting.
You assert that "the idea that somehow metaphysics forces scientists
and occasionally scientific views to think in particular ways "is
false.
However when you use the term 'metaphysics' you miss something which
is less elaborated than such a concept as the one of "metaphysics":
the scientist's beliefs.
In the first stage of his research approach I am sure that the
scientist's beliefs have a great influence on the new hypothesis,
model or theory he proposes.
I have an example: the search for the origin of what most scientists
call 'life'.
As you know I personaly consider the distinction between living
systems and non living ones as arbitrary and metaphysical the concept
of 'life'. This is why I highly recommend to shift our paradigm and
instead to search for the origin of what I call "type 2 evolution"
because such a new paradigm opens new perspectives (e.g., the model I
propose).
This example is typical of the influence of metaphysical prejudices on
research.
John S. Wilkins
May 26, 2012, 10:27:34 AM5/26/12
to
> I read your paper "Metaphysical determinism" (20 May 2012) which I
> found very interesting.
> You assert that "the idea that somehow metaphysics forces scientists
> and occasionally scientific views to think in particular ways "is
> false.
No, what I said was:
> found very interesting.
> You assert that "the idea that somehow metaphysics forces scientists
> and occasionally scientific views to think in particular ways "is
> false.
"the idea that somehow metaphysics forces scientists and occasionally
false, or at least only weakly true."
Very occasionally scientists do use metaphysics. I say so later in the
piece. But the determinism thesis is that they always do and must. That
is false.
> However when you use the term 'metaphysics' you miss something which
> is less elaborated than such a concept as the one of "metaphysics":
> the scientist's beliefs.
> In the first stage of his research approach I am sure that the
> scientist's beliefs have a great influence on the new hypothesis,
> model or theory he proposes.
> I have an example: the search for the origin of what most scientists
> call 'life'.
> As you know I personaly consider the distinction between living
> systems and non living ones as arbitrary and metaphysical the concept
> of 'life'. This is why I highly recommend to shift our paradigm and
> instead to search for the origin of what I call "type 2 evolution"
> because such a new paradigm opens new perspectives (e.g., the model I
> propose).
> This example is typical of the influence of metaphysical prejudices on
> research.
> However when you use the term 'metaphysics' you miss something which
> is less elaborated than such a concept as the one of "metaphysics":
> the scientist's beliefs.
> In the first stage of his research approach I am sure that the
> scientist's beliefs have a great influence on the new hypothesis,
> model or theory he proposes.
> I have an example: the search for the origin of what most scientists
> call 'life'.
> As you know I personaly consider the distinction between living
> systems and non living ones as arbitrary and metaphysical the concept
> of 'life'. This is why I highly recommend to shift our paradigm and
> instead to search for the origin of what I call "type 2 evolution"
> because such a new paradigm opens new perspectives (e.g., the model I
> propose).
> This example is typical of the influence of metaphysical prejudices on
> research.
Kalkidas
May 26, 2012, 12:25:11 PM5/26/12
to
On 5/25/2012 6:29 PM, David Canzi wrote:
> Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>> On 5/25/2012 3:14 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>>> “I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
>>> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
>>> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
>>> themselves, the Absolute, and such like” (Carnap 1935).
>>
>> That, of course, is a metaphysical proposition. No one can "experience"
>> a proposition,
>
> Have you ever become aware of a previously unfamiliar proposition
> as a result of seeing something written or hearing something
> spoken? Seeing and hearing are experiences, aren't they?
What does a proposition "look" like? What does it "sound" like? Likewise
> Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>> On 5/25/2012 3:14 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>>> “I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
>>> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
>>> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
>>> themselves, the Absolute, and such like” (Carnap 1935).
>>
>> That, of course, is a metaphysical proposition. No one can "experience"
>> a proposition,
>
> Have you ever become aware of a previously unfamiliar proposition
> as a result of seeing something written or hearing something
> spoken? Seeing and hearing are experiences, aren't they?
smell, taste, touch?
Propositions are metaphysical.
Craig Franck
May 26, 2012, 1:26:42 PM5/26/12
to
idea that the likelihood of a belief being true is directly
proportional to the evidence in its favor. The basic technique
of the creationist was to take a proposition, apply it to itself,
and watch it implode because it fails its own test.
One way around this is to claim evidentialism is in fact a
logical principle that is applied to empirical theories. It is
not itself an empirical theory, so such self-application is a
category error.
The response was it's either false (as an empirical theory) or
trivially true (as a logical principle). I said so is arithmetic,
but no one seriously questions applying counting to real life.
Craig
Craig Franck
May 26, 2012, 1:37:22 PM5/26/12
to
On 5/25/2012 9:29 PM, David Canzi wrote:
> Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>> On 5/25/2012 3:14 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>>> “I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
>>> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
>>> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
>>> themselves, the Absolute, and such like” (Carnap 1935).
>>
>> That, of course, is a metaphysical proposition. No one can "experience"
>> a proposition,
>
> Have you ever become aware of a previously unfamiliar proposition
> as a result of seeing something written or hearing something
> spoken? Seeing and hearing are experiences, aren't they?
I believe the argument that you cannot dispense with metaphysics
> Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>> On 5/25/2012 3:14 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>>> “I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
>>> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
>>> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
>>> themselves, the Absolute, and such like” (Carnap 1935).
>>
>> That, of course, is a metaphysical proposition. No one can "experience"
>> a proposition,
>
> Have you ever become aware of a previously unfamiliar proposition
> as a result of seeing something written or hearing something
> spoken? Seeing and hearing are experiences, aren't they?
without doing metaphysics is sound. That was the point of
Wittgenstein's ladder analogy.
Craig
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 26, 2012, 3:15:10 PM5/26/12
to
metaphysics and must do is false.
However what do you think of the slightly different assertion that
scientists always have beliefs, even when they are not aware of the
fact they have?
In addition I would be pleased to have your comment on my example of
such a situation.
John S. Wilkins
May 27, 2012, 12:52:06 AM5/27/12
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<marc.t...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
> On 26 mai, 16:27, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
> > > You assert that "the idea that somehow metaphysics forces scientists
> > > and occasionally scientific views to think in particular ways "is false.
> > No, what I said was:
> > "the idea that somehow metaphysics forces scientists and occasionally
> > scientific views to think in particular ways. It is this that I think is
> > false, or at least only weakly true."
> > Very occasionally scientists do use metaphysics. I say so later in the
> > piece. But the determinism thesis is that they always do and must. That
> > is false.
>
> > > However when you use the term 'metaphysics' you miss something which
> > > is less elaborated than such a concept as the one of "metaphysics":
> > > the scientist's beliefs.
> > >
> > > In the first stage of his research approach I am sure that the
> > > scientist's beliefs have a great influence on the new hypothesis,
> > > model or theory he proposes.
If your point is that scientists believe things and they influence them
> On 26 mai, 16:27, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
> > > You assert that "the idea that somehow metaphysics forces scientists
> > > and occasionally scientific views to think in particular ways "is false.
> > No, what I said was:
> > "the idea that somehow metaphysics forces scientists and occasionally
> > scientific views to think in particular ways. It is this that I think is
> > false, or at least only weakly true."
> > Very occasionally scientists do use metaphysics. I say so later in the
> > piece. But the determinism thesis is that they always do and must. That
> > is false.
>
> > > However when you use the term 'metaphysics' you miss something which
> > > is less elaborated than such a concept as the one of "metaphysics":
> > > the scientist's beliefs.
> > >
> > > In the first stage of his research approach I am sure that the
> > > scientist's beliefs have a great influence on the new hypothesis,
> > > model or theory he proposes.
individually, I have to agree. Some of these things may even be
metaphysical. However, coming up with ideas is insufficient to qualify
them as scientific. ;ess so a consensual view. It turns out that
scientists can believe any kind of silly shit and still do good science,
and the acceptance has to do with internal professional criteria rather
than some metaphysical belief system. Darwin was not believed because of
capitalism, for example.
> > >
> > > I have an example: the search for the origin of what most scientists
> > > call 'life'.
> > >
> > > As you know I personaly consider the distinction between living
> > > systems and non living ones as arbitrary and metaphysical the concept
> > > of 'life'. This is why I highly recommend to shift our paradigm and
> > > instead to search for the origin of what I call "type 2 evolution"
> > > because such a new paradigm opens new perspectives (e.g., the model I
> > > propose).
You used the p-word. Go to the back of the queue. When a term of history
> > > I have an example: the search for the origin of what most scientists
> > > call 'life'.
> > >
> > > As you know I personaly consider the distinction between living
> > > systems and non living ones as arbitrary and metaphysical the concept
> > > of 'life'. This is why I highly recommend to shift our paradigm and
> > > instead to search for the origin of what I call "type 2 evolution"
> > > because such a new paradigm opens new perspectives (e.g., the model I
> > > propose).
and philosophy of science is used by advertisers, you know it means
nothing. And it means too many things in HPS to be useful anyway.
> > >
> > > This example is typical of the influence of metaphysical prejudices on
> > > research.
>
> Ok, I agree with you that the assertion that scientists always use
> metaphysics and must do is false.
Progress.
> > > This example is typical of the influence of metaphysical prejudices on
> > > research.
>
> Ok, I agree with you that the assertion that scientists always use
> metaphysics and must do is false.
> However what do you think of the slightly different assertion that
> scientists always have beliefs, even when they are not aware of the
> fact they have?
scientists have beliefs.
That's not at issue. The claim that the progress of *science* is founded
upon metaphysics, however, is hard to sustain.
> In addition I would be pleased to have your comment on my example of
> such a situation.
us; this needs no metaphysician to tell us that. The issue is one of
criteria for inclusion, and it has *always* been hard to develop those.
In that respect Aristotle's four souls theory is still as useful now as
it was when produced (at least, people still use modern equivalents),
but this is purely definitional. It motivates NASA, but not biology as a
whole.
John S. Wilkins
May 27, 2012, 12:52:07 AM5/27/12
to
claim entails its own defeat, you win.
>
> One way around this is to claim evidentialism is in fact a
> logical principle that is applied to empirical theories. It is
> not itself an empirical theory, so such self-application is a
> category error.
This is exactly what the jeirs and successors to the logical positivists
> One way around this is to claim evidentialism is in fact a
> logical principle that is applied to empirical theories. It is
> not itself an empirical theory, so such self-application is a
> category error.
said: the logical empiricists argued that once we abandon the
distinction between sensible empirical claims and nonsensical
metaphysical claims, the problem goes away; I agree that it does.
>
> The response was it's either false (as an empirical theory) or
> trivially true (as a logical principle). I said so is arithmetic,
> but no one seriously questions applying counting to real life.
Ther'e nothing wrong with trivial truth. In fact, I'm all for it.
> The response was it's either false (as an empirical theory) or
> trivially true (as a logical principle). I said so is arithmetic,
> but no one seriously questions applying counting to real life.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 27, 2012, 1:44:30 AM5/27/12
to
> But al be that he was a philosophre,
> Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
> Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre
"The issue of life? That is hardly metaphysical. Life is observed
around us; this needs no metaphysician to tell us that. The issue is
one of criteria for inclusion, and it has *always* been hard to
develop those. In that respect Aristotle's four souls theory is still
as useful now as it was when produced (at least, people still use
modern equivalents),"
The fact you are reduced to quoting Aristotle's four souls theory
around us; this needs no metaphysician to tell us that. The issue is
one of criteria for inclusion, and it has *always* been hard to
develop those. In that respect Aristotle's four souls theory is still
as useful now as it was when produced (at least, people still use
modern equivalents),"
means that the issue of 'life' is truly metaphysical.
Besides you acknowledge the issue of the dictinction between living
and non living systems when admitting that "the issue is one of
criteria for inclusion".
Then you confirm that a metaphysical paradigm can be so strong that a
rational discussion about it is not possible: you just assert "The
issue of life? That is hardly metaphysical. Life is observed around
us; this needs no metaphysician to tell us that" but you are unable to
define what is meant by this statement scientifically as some say the
soul exists: everybody can realize it.
I have another example that perhaps you will accept to discuss:
Einstein's example:
1. He was convinced that the universe was static. then he invented the
cosmological constant to make it such;
2. As he believed in God he could not accept that God plays dice. Then
he devised an experiment that could refute Quantum Mechanics: the EPR
experiment.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 27, 2012, 3:17:07 AM5/27/12
to
totally fuzzy?
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 27, 2012, 3:24:46 AM5/27/12
to
On 25 mai, 22:23, nos...@de-ster.demon.nl (J. J. Lodder) wrote:
So for you, for example, string theories are scientific theories while
they are presently pure speculations as today no one can conceive any
observation and/or experiment to test these.
they are presently pure speculations as today no one can conceive any
observation and/or experiment to test these.
J. J. Lodder
May 27, 2012, 7:17:15 AM5/27/12
to
that do not depend on any particular belief system,
or any particular way of talking about it.
Jan
J. J. Lodder
May 27, 2012, 7:17:16 AM5/27/12
to
and the boot, and asked if he needs it, or can he get lost graciously?
Jan
J. J. Lodder
May 27, 2012, 7:17:16 AM5/27/12
to
Jan
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 27, 2012, 12:39:57 PM5/27/12
to
someone who has not the same as yours? This is rather poor.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 27, 2012, 12:44:23 PM5/27/12
to
On 27 mai, 13:17, nos...@de-ster.demon.nl (J. J. Lodder) wrote:
> Craig Franck <craiglfra...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On 5/25/2012 9:29 PM, David Canzi wrote:
> > > Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
> > On 5/25/2012 9:29 PM, David Canzi wrote:
> > > Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
> > >> On 5/25/2012 3:14 AM, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > >>> "I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
> > >>> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
> > >>> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
> > >>> themselves, the Absolute, and such like" (Carnap 1935).
>
> > >> That, of course, is a metaphysical proposition. No one can "experience"
> > >> a proposition,
>
> > > Have you ever become aware of a previously unfamiliar proposition
> > > as a result of seeing something written or hearing something
> > > spoken? Seeing and hearing are experiences, aren't they?
>
> > I believe the argument that you cannot dispense with metaphysics
> > without doing metaphysics is sound. That was the point of
> > Wittgenstein's ladder analogy.
>
> The physicist's way is that physics deals with those things
> that do not depend on any particular belief system,
> or any particular way of talking about it.
>
> Jan
And what about Einstein's example:
> > >>> "I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
> > >>> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
> > >>> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
> > >>> themselves, the Absolute, and such like" (Carnap 1935).
>
> > >> That, of course, is a metaphysical proposition. No one can "experience"
> > >> a proposition,
>
> > > Have you ever become aware of a previously unfamiliar proposition
> > > as a result of seeing something written or hearing something
> > > spoken? Seeing and hearing are experiences, aren't they?
>
> > I believe the argument that you cannot dispense with metaphysics
> > without doing metaphysics is sound. That was the point of
> > Wittgenstein's ladder analogy.
>
> The physicist's way is that physics deals with those things
> that do not depend on any particular belief system,
> or any particular way of talking about it.
>
> Jan
1. He was convinced that the universe was static. then he invented
the
cosmological constant to make it such;
2. As he believed in God he could not accept that God plays dice.
Then
he devised an experiment that could refute Quantum Mechanics: the EPR
experiment.
I could say that your opinion is quite naive ...
the
cosmological constant to make it such;
2. As he believed in God he could not accept that God plays dice.
Then
he devised an experiment that could refute Quantum Mechanics: the EPR
experiment.
jillery
May 27, 2012, 1:37:48 PM5/27/12
to
David Canzi
May 27, 2012, 3:46:36 PM5/27/12
to
experiencing that object? When you look at a glowing light bulb,
are you experiencing electricity?
J. J. Lodder
May 27, 2012, 4:04:27 PM5/27/12
to
Jan
J. J. Lodder
May 27, 2012, 4:04:28 PM5/27/12
to
Try producing something better than third-hand hearsay,
and I might start to take your opinions seriously,
Jan
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 27, 2012, 4:21:19 PM5/27/12
to
Kalkidas
May 27, 2012, 4:54:26 PM5/27/12
to
On 5/27/2012 12:46 PM, David Canzi wrote:
> Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>> On 5/25/2012 6:29 PM, David Canzi wrote:
>>> Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>>>> On 5/25/2012 3:14 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>>>>> “I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
>>>>> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
>>>>> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
>>>>> themselves, the Absolute, and such like” (Carnap 1935).
>>>>
>>>> That, of course, is a metaphysical proposition. No one can "experience"
>>>> a proposition,
>>>
>>> Have you ever become aware of a previously unfamiliar proposition
>>> as a result of seeing something written or hearing something
>>> spoken? Seeing and hearing are experiences, aren't they?
>>
>> What does a proposition "look" like? What does it "sound" like? Likewise
>> smell, taste, touch?
>>
>> Propositions are metaphysical.
>
> When you look at some common object, such as a chair, are you
> experiencing that object? When you look at a glowing light bulb,
> are you experiencing electricity?
Either you draw a distinction between physical and metaphysical or you
> Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>> On 5/25/2012 6:29 PM, David Canzi wrote:
>>> Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>>>> On 5/25/2012 3:14 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>>>>> “I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
>>>>> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
>>>>> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
>>>>> themselves, the Absolute, and such like” (Carnap 1935).
>>>>
>>>> That, of course, is a metaphysical proposition. No one can "experience"
>>>> a proposition,
>>>
>>> Have you ever become aware of a previously unfamiliar proposition
>>> as a result of seeing something written or hearing something
>>> spoken? Seeing and hearing are experiences, aren't they?
>>
>> What does a proposition "look" like? What does it "sound" like? Likewise
>> smell, taste, touch?
>>
>> Propositions are metaphysical.
>
> When you look at some common object, such as a chair, are you
> experiencing that object? When you look at a glowing light bulb,
> are you experiencing electricity?
don't. This thread does draw such a distinction, as per the quote from
Carnap. Carnap's definition of metaphysical is, however,
self-contradictory, as many in this thread have shown.
A "proposition" is not detectable by the physical senses, therefore it
is metaphysical. A "common object" is detectable by the physical senses,
therefore it is physical.
A "proposition", whether it is about physics or metaphysics, is itself a
metaphysical entity.
jonathan
May 27, 2012, 7:49:09 PM5/27/12
to
"Kalkidas" <e...@joes.pub> wrote in message
news:jpoc1g$ab1$1...@dont-email.me...
> On 5/25/2012 3:14 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>> "I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
>> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
>> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
>> themselves, the Absolute, and such like" (Carnap 1935).
>
> That, of course, is a metaphysical proposition. No one can "experience" a
> proposition, so a proposition is itself a metaphysical thing. This
>> "I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to
>> represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all
>> experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in
>> themselves, the Absolute, and such like" (Carnap 1935).
>
> That, of course, is a metaphysical proposition. No one can "experience" a
> includes Carnap's proposition about what is "metaphysical".
Would you say things like our dreams, imagination or
desires qualify as metaphysical?
If so, then our 'scientific method' needs a complete makeover.
Since our current reality is...mostly the result
of the dreams and imagination of the past.
Just as the future is highly dependent upon our dreams
and hopes.
There is a way to turn metaphysical aspects of reality
into cold hard mathematics. But it takes a certain willingness
to forget all you've learned, but just for now, and start
over from scratch.
Instead of using different methods based on what things ..are
such as having different 'sciences' for physical, living and
spiritual systems, the mathematics of...effects could
care less about the nature of the system at hand.
This allows them ALL to be dealt with by a common
mathematical concept. And I should mention that 'Darwin'
in ..abstract...form is the Grand Solution. If uniting all the realms
of reality into a single science isn't good enough, the true wonder
of this new approach is that once you can view all aspects
of reality through a ...single mathematical lens, something
wonderful happens.
Suddenly you can what is common to them ...all.
The light switch is turned on!
And when that day comes, you'd be well-advised
to be sitting down.
Jonathan
Self-Organizing Faq
http://calresco.org/sos/sosfaq.htm
Calresco Themes (*in essay form)
http://calresco.org/themes.htm
Dynamics of Complex Systems
(full online textbook)
http://www.necsi.org/publications/dcs/
Steinhardt
Director, Princeton Center for Theoretical Physics
http://wwwphy.princeton.edu/~steinh/cycliccosmology.html
s
>
>> Rudolf Carnap, in his book Philosophy and Logical Syntax, used the
>> concept of verifiability to reject metaphysics. Metaphysicians cannot
>> avoid making their statements non-verifiable, because if they made
>> them verifiable, the decision about the truth or falsehood of their
>> doctrines would depend upon experience and therefore belong to the
>> region of empirical science.
> This consequence they wish to avoid,
>> because they pretend to teach knowledge which is of a higher level
>> than that of empirical science. Thus they are compelled to cut all
>> connection between their statements and experience; and precisely by
>> this procedure they deprive them of any sense (Carnap 1935).
>> For me this is the main difference with the scientific approach.
>>
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 28, 2012, 3:27:18 AM5/28/12
to
On 27 mai, 22:54, Kalkidas <e...@joes.pub> wrote:
> On 5/27/2012 12:46 PM, David Canzi wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
> >> On 5/25/2012 6:29 PM, David Canzi wrote:
> >>> Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
> On 5/27/2012 12:46 PM, David Canzi wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
> >> On 5/25/2012 6:29 PM, David Canzi wrote:
> >>> Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
metaphysics.
There are definitions, for example, in mathematics: do you consider
that mathematics is of metaphysics?
Kalkidas
May 28, 2012, 10:31:03 AM5/28/12
to
entities. Certainly there's no physical object that is a "number".
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 28, 2012, 3:55:46 PM5/28/12
to
On 28 mai, 16:31, Kalkidas <e...@joes.pub> wrote:
Mathematics has no generally accepted definition. Different schools of
thought, particularly in philosophy, have put forth radically
different definitions. All are controversial.
However, as mathematicians pursued greater rigor and more-abstract
foundations, some proposed definitions purely in terms of logic. Then,
according to Bertrand Russell, all Mathematics is Symbolic Logic
while, according to Benjamin Peirce, mathematics is the science that
draws necessary conclusions. Peirce did not think that mathematics is
the same as logic, since he thought mathematics makes only
hypothetical assertions, not categorical ones.
Personally I think mathematics was created by human beings as a tool,
the first abstraction, which is shared by many animals, being probably
that of numbers. Then the evolution of mathematics might be seen as an
ever-increasing series of abstractions based on the exploration of the
logical consequences of assumptions. Actually mathematics shares much
in common with many fields in the physical sciences, in particular
this exploration of the logical consequences of assumptions. Intuition
and experimentation also play a role in the formulation of conjecture
in both mathematics and the (other) sciences. Experimental mathematics
continues to grow in importance within mathematics, and computation
and simulation are playing an increasing role in both the sciences and
mathematics, weakening the objection that mathematics does not use the
scientific method.
thought, particularly in philosophy, have put forth radically
different definitions. All are controversial.
However, as mathematicians pursued greater rigor and more-abstract
foundations, some proposed definitions purely in terms of logic. Then,
according to Bertrand Russell, all Mathematics is Symbolic Logic
while, according to Benjamin Peirce, mathematics is the science that
draws necessary conclusions. Peirce did not think that mathematics is
the same as logic, since he thought mathematics makes only
hypothetical assertions, not categorical ones.
Personally I think mathematics was created by human beings as a tool,
the first abstraction, which is shared by many animals, being probably
that of numbers. Then the evolution of mathematics might be seen as an
ever-increasing series of abstractions based on the exploration of the
logical consequences of assumptions. Actually mathematics shares much
in common with many fields in the physical sciences, in particular
this exploration of the logical consequences of assumptions. Intuition
and experimentation also play a role in the formulation of conjecture
in both mathematics and the (other) sciences. Experimental mathematics
continues to grow in importance within mathematics, and computation
and simulation are playing an increasing role in both the sciences and
mathematics, weakening the objection that mathematics does not use the
scientific method.
Kalkidas
May 28, 2012, 4:57:17 PM5/28/12
to
that there is a standard position to which it is contrary, so the
standard, non-controversial idea must exist. The non-controversial idea
about mathematics is, as I said, that numbers and other mathematical
entities are not physical objects, but metaphysical ones.
All one has to do to realize the non-controversial position is to try to
produce a physical object called "the cardinal number two". It can't be
done. Therefore, "the cardinal number two" is not physical, but
metaphysical.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 29, 2012, 5:22:27 AM5/29/12
to
On May 28, 10:57 pm, Kalkidas <e...@joes.pub> wrote:
> It is not true that "all" are controversial. "Controversial" implies
> that there is a standard position to which it is contrary, so the
> standard, non-controversial idea must exist. The non-controversial idea
> about mathematics is, as I said, that numbers and other mathematical
> entities are not physical objects, but metaphysical ones.
>
> All one has to do to realize the non-controversial position is to try to
> produce a physical object called "the cardinal number two". It can't be
> done. Therefore, "the cardinal number two" is not physical, but
> metaphysical.
You assert that "numbers and other mathematical entities are not
> It is not true that "all" are controversial. "Controversial" implies
> that there is a standard position to which it is contrary, so the
> standard, non-controversial idea must exist. The non-controversial idea
> about mathematics is, as I said, that numbers and other mathematical
> entities are not physical objects, but metaphysical ones.
>
> All one has to do to realize the non-controversial position is to try to
> produce a physical object called "the cardinal number two". It can't be
> done. Therefore, "the cardinal number two" is not physical, but
> metaphysical.
physical objects, but metaphysical ones".
Animals "can do a rough sort of math by summing sets of objects
without actually using numbers" and that ability would be innate (M.
Tennesen. 2009. Animals by the Numbers. Scientific American
19/09/2009, pages 13-14).
Do you consider that these animals are capable of metaphysical skill?
Have you any references supporting your assertion that "it is
generally agreed that mathematics are metaphysical entities"?
nick_keigh...@hotmail.com
May 29, 2012, 6:49:45 AM5/29/12
to
On Sunday, May 27, 2012 5:44:23 PM UTC+1, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
<snip>
>> The physicist's way is that physics deals with those things
>> that do not depend on any particular belief system,
>> or any particular way of talking about it.
> 2. As he believed in God
Einstein did not believe in god at best this isa metaphor. He *did* have conceptual problems with QM. And gave Bohr a series of conumdrums.
> he could not accept that God plays dice.
> Then he devised an experiment that could refute Quantum Mechanics:
> the EPR experiment.
which of course doesn't refute QM...
> I could say that your opinion is quite naive ...
yes but einstein's opinions didn't make any difference to the things. The universe was still expanding and uncertainty still ruled at the microscopic level
<snip>
>> The physicist's way is that physics deals with those things
>> that do not depend on any particular belief system,
>> or any particular way of talking about it.
> And what about Einstein's example:
>
> 1. He was convinced that the universe was static. then he invented
> the cosmological constant to make it such;
and so?
>
> 1. He was convinced that the universe was static. then he invented
> the cosmological constant to make it such;
> 2. As he believed in God
> he could not accept that God plays dice.
> Then he devised an experiment that could refute Quantum Mechanics:
> the EPR experiment.
> I could say that your opinion is quite naive ...
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 29, 2012, 8:02:44 AM5/29/12
to
scientists are influenced by their beliefs when they make their
hypotheses.
What do you thing of my other example: the concept of 'life'?
Kalkidas
May 29, 2012, 1:13:01 PM5/29/12
to
On 5/29/2012 2:22 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> On May 28, 10:57 pm, Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>> It is not true that "all" are controversial. "Controversial" implies
>> that there is a standard position to which it is contrary, so the
>> standard, non-controversial idea must exist. The non-controversial idea
>> about mathematics is, as I said, that numbers and other mathematical
>> entities are not physical objects, but metaphysical ones.
>>
>> All one has to do to realize the non-controversial position is to try to
>> produce a physical object called "the cardinal number two". It can't be
>> done. Therefore, "the cardinal number two" is not physical, but
>> metaphysical.
>
> You assert that "numbers and other mathematical entities are not
> physical objects, but metaphysical ones".
> Animals "can do a rough sort of math by summing sets of objects
> without actually using numbers" and that ability would be innate (M.
> Tennesen. 2009. Animals by the Numbers. Scientific American
> 19/09/2009, pages 13-14).
> Do you consider that these animals are capable of metaphysical skill?
Very few beings are capable of "metaphysical skill". It is not necessary
> On May 28, 10:57 pm, Kalkidas<e...@joes.pub> wrote:
>> It is not true that "all" are controversial. "Controversial" implies
>> that there is a standard position to which it is contrary, so the
>> standard, non-controversial idea must exist. The non-controversial idea
>> about mathematics is, as I said, that numbers and other mathematical
>> entities are not physical objects, but metaphysical ones.
>>
>> All one has to do to realize the non-controversial position is to try to
>> produce a physical object called "the cardinal number two". It can't be
>> done. Therefore, "the cardinal number two" is not physical, but
>> metaphysical.
>
> You assert that "numbers and other mathematical entities are not
> physical objects, but metaphysical ones".
> Animals "can do a rough sort of math by summing sets of objects
> without actually using numbers" and that ability would be innate (M.
> Tennesen. 2009. Animals by the Numbers. Scientific American
> 19/09/2009, pages 13-14).
> Do you consider that these animals are capable of metaphysical skill?
to philosophize about metaphysics to utilize it. Fish don't have to
speculate about the nature of water in order to swim in it. Children, or
crows, don't have to speculate about the nature of number in order to
learn to count.
> Have you any references supporting your assertion that "it is
> generally agreed that mathematics are metaphysical entities"?
or "a Hilbert Space" or "two plus two equals four".
If you can show a physical object that is a mathematical object, more
power to you, and we'll all agree that mathematics are physical.
Otherwise, it will be generally agreed that mathematics are metaphysical.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 29, 2012, 1:52:55 PM5/29/12
to
On 29 mai, 19:13, Kalkidas <e...@joes.pub> wrote:
I see you cannot quote any reference and thus this is just your own
opinion and that it.
To show you that your response is illogical: you say " Fish don't have
construction of your sentence, "numbers" seem to be too.
opinion and that it.
To show you that your response is illogical: you say " Fish don't have
to speculate about the nature of water in order to swim in it.
Children, or crows, don't have to speculate about the nature of number
in order to learn to count".
"Water'" is indeed a physical thing. Then, according to the
Children, or crows, don't have to speculate about the nature of number
in order to learn to count".
construction of your sentence, "numbers" seem to be too.
Kalkidas
May 29, 2012, 2:08:23 PM5/29/12
to
that you can't produce a shred of evidence of any physical object called
"mathematics".
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 29, 2012, 4:54:33 PM5/29/12
to
On 29 mai, 20:08, Kalkidas <e...@joes.pub> wrote:
I think the innate ability to count, either in human beings or in some
other animals, is real and thus belongs to the physical world. Then
the evolution to mathematics, in human beings, from this ability
belongs also to the physical world. The ability to metaphysical
thoughts too.
Only things like the soul or gods or the concept of 'life' are indeed
metaphysical.
other animals, is real and thus belongs to the physical world. Then
the evolution to mathematics, in human beings, from this ability
belongs also to the physical world. The ability to metaphysical
thoughts too.
Only things like the soul or gods or the concept of 'life' are indeed
metaphysical.
Mitchell Coffey
May 29, 2012, 5:05:55 PM5/29/12
to
On May 27, 1:37 pm, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sun, 27 May 2012 14:52:07 +1000, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S.
>
>
>
>
>
> Wilkins) wrote:
> >> > <marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
You haven't been reading this newsgroup long, have you?
Mitchell
> On Sun, 27 May 2012 14:52:07 +1000, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S.
>
>
>
>
>
> Wilkins) wrote:
> >> > <marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
Mitchell
Kalkidas
May 29, 2012, 5:19:41 PM5/29/12
to
Evidently it includes non-physical objects like "ability to count".
Where is there a physical object called "ability" or "to count"?
The physical world is the class of physical objects. If it is not a
physical object, then it is metaphysical, or non-physical, or
transcendental, or some other appellation that distinguishes it from
what is physical.
Mitchell Coffey
May 29, 2012, 5:05:06 PM5/29/12
to
Mitchell
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 29, 2012, 5:36:34 PM5/29/12
to
On 29 mai, 23:19, Kalkidas <e...@joes.pub> wrote:
Is the ablility of thinking, for you, the product of our brain which
is, I hope you will agree, a physical thing?
is, I hope you will agree, a physical thing?
Ernest Major
May 30, 2012, 8:16:43 AM5/30/12
to
In message
<48218086-9fac-4d21...@b26g2000vbt.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
Kalkidas appears to be assuming that an entity must be either physical
or metaphysical. You may also have made that assumption. I would
disagree - mathematical entities are mathematical, not physical, and not
metaphysical.
(Referring to a dictionary, I find four meanings given for metaphysical,
one of which, labelled as "popular" (presumably meaning non-technical),
is "abstract, abtruse, or unduly theoretical". Mathematical entities
could squeeze in under that definition, but I doubt that either of you
intends that definition.)
--
alias Ernest Major
<48218086-9fac-4d21...@b26g2000vbt.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes
or metaphysical. You may also have made that assumption. I would
disagree - mathematical entities are mathematical, not physical, and not
metaphysical.
(Referring to a dictionary, I find four meanings given for metaphysical,
one of which, labelled as "popular" (presumably meaning non-technical),
is "abstract, abtruse, or unduly theoretical". Mathematical entities
could squeeze in under that definition, but I doubt that either of you
intends that definition.)
--
alias Ernest Major
Ernest Major
May 30, 2012, 8:21:31 AM5/30/12
to
In message <jq3ehe$dha$1...@speranza.aioe.org>, Kalkidas <e...@joes.pub>
writes
Do you consider erosion to be metaphysical? Do you consider gravitation
to be metaphysical? Do you consider voltage to be metaphysical?
If not you need to clarify your definition.
--
alias Ernest Major
writes
to be metaphysical? Do you consider voltage to be metaphysical?
If not you need to clarify your definition.
--
alias Ernest Major
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 30, 2012, 9:17:26 AM5/30/12
to
On May 30, 2:16 pm, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> Kalkidas appears to be assuming that an entity must be either physical
> or metaphysical. You may also have made that assumption. I would
> disagree - mathematical entities are mathematical, not physical, and not
> metaphysical.
>
> (Referring to a dictionary, I find four meanings given for metaphysical,
> one of which, labelled as "popular" (presumably meaning non-technical),
> is "abstract, abtruse, or unduly theoretical". Mathematical entities
> could squeeze in under that definition, but I doubt that either of you
> intends that definition.)
> --
> alias Ernest Major
There is a problem with having a third category out of the categories
> Kalkidas appears to be assuming that an entity must be either physical
> or metaphysical. You may also have made that assumption. I would
> disagree - mathematical entities are mathematical, not physical, and not
> metaphysical.
>
> (Referring to a dictionary, I find four meanings given for metaphysical,
> one of which, labelled as "popular" (presumably meaning non-technical),
> is "abstract, abtruse, or unduly theoretical". Mathematical entities
> could squeeze in under that definition, but I doubt that either of you
> intends that definition.)
> --
> alias Ernest Major
"physical" and "metaphysical" because the "physical world" means the
real world while the "metaphysical world" means the imaginary world:
can be another world? .
I have the same question to you as the one I asked to Kalkidas: "Is,
for you, the ablility to think the product of the brain (only) which
is indeed a physical thing?"
jillery
May 30, 2012, 10:39:00 AM5/30/12
to
you understand what I wrote. If someone disagrees with a truth,
that's prima facie evidence they don't think it's trivial, at least to
the degree they find it worthwhile to post an objection. Just like I
did.
Mark Isaak
May 30, 2012, 10:39:07 AM5/30/12
to
On 5/30/12 6:17 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> On May 30, 2:16 pm, Ernest Major<{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>> Kalkidas appears to be assuming that an entity must be either physical
>> or metaphysical. You may also have made that assumption. I would
>> disagree - mathematical entities are mathematical, not physical, and not
>> metaphysical.
>>
>> (Referring to a dictionary, I find four meanings given for metaphysical,
>> one of which, labelled as "popular" (presumably meaning non-technical),
>> is "abstract, abtruse, or unduly theoretical". Mathematical entities
>> could squeeze in under that definition, but I doubt that either of you
>> intends that definition.)
>
> On May 30, 2:16 pm, Ernest Major<{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>> Kalkidas appears to be assuming that an entity must be either physical
>> or metaphysical. You may also have made that assumption. I would
>> disagree - mathematical entities are mathematical, not physical, and not
>> metaphysical.
>>
>> (Referring to a dictionary, I find four meanings given for metaphysical,
>> one of which, labelled as "popular" (presumably meaning non-technical),
>> is "abstract, abtruse, or unduly theoretical". Mathematical entities
>> could squeeze in under that definition, but I doubt that either of you
>> intends that definition.)
>
> There is a problem with having a third category out of the categories
> "physical" and "metaphysical" because the "physical world" means the
> real world while the "metaphysical world" means the imaginary world:
> can be another world? .
Does that mean phasers, transporter beams, warp speed, and the United
> "physical" and "metaphysical" because the "physical world" means the
> real world while the "metaphysical world" means the imaginary world:
> can be another world? .
Federation of Planets are all metaphysical? I would call them "fictional."
As I understand, the title of Aristotle's "Metaphysics" meant simply,
"the writings after Physics" -- in other words, "Miscellaneous." The
modern meaning of the word has evolved and, I gather from this
discussion, still has not landed in a fixed spot. My own understanding
is that metaphysics means the branch of philosophy dealing with the
nature of existence. Historically, that branch of philosophy has
covered areas (e.g. atoms) that are solidly within science today, and I
think it is inevitable that that history will continue.
A second common meaning, that Marc refers to above, relates to supposed
phenomena whose nature and very existence are unknown. For that sort of
stuff, I prefer the term "paranormal" to distinguish it from the philosophy.
--
Mark Isaak eciton (at) curioustaxonomy (dot) net
"It is certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural
honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most
pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems." - D. Hume
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 30, 2012, 11:03:35 AM5/30/12
to
On May 30, 4:39 pm, Mark Isaak <eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net>
wrote:
of what means "metaphysics": I would say it is a reflection about the
physical world (as philosophy).
However I would be grateful if you could answer my question: for you,
is the ablility to think the product of the brain only?
wrote:
> > There is a problem with having a third category out of the categories
> > "physical" and "metaphysical" because the "physical world" means the
> > real world while the "metaphysical world" means the imaginary world:
> > can be another world? .
>
> Does that mean phasers, transporter beams, warp speed, and the United
> Federation of Planets are all metaphysical? I would call them "fictional."
>
> As I understand, the title of Aristotle's "Metaphysics" meant simply,
> "the writings after Physics" -- in other words, "Miscellaneous." The
> modern meaning of the word has evolved and, I gather from this
> discussion, still has not landed in a fixed spot. My own understanding
> is that metaphysics means the branch of philosophy dealing with the
> nature of existence. Historically, that branch of philosophy has
> covered areas (e.g. atoms) that are solidly within science today, and I
> think it is inevitable that that history will continue.
>
> A second common meaning, that Marc refers to above, relates to supposed
> phenomena whose nature and very existence are unknown. For that sort of
> stuff, I prefer the term "paranormal" to distinguish it from the philosophy.
Thank you for your reply. It is true that there is no clear definition
> > "physical" and "metaphysical" because the "physical world" means the
> > real world while the "metaphysical world" means the imaginary world:
> > can be another world? .
>
> Does that mean phasers, transporter beams, warp speed, and the United
> Federation of Planets are all metaphysical? I would call them "fictional."
>
> As I understand, the title of Aristotle's "Metaphysics" meant simply,
> "the writings after Physics" -- in other words, "Miscellaneous." The
> modern meaning of the word has evolved and, I gather from this
> discussion, still has not landed in a fixed spot. My own understanding
> is that metaphysics means the branch of philosophy dealing with the
> nature of existence. Historically, that branch of philosophy has
> covered areas (e.g. atoms) that are solidly within science today, and I
> think it is inevitable that that history will continue.
>
> A second common meaning, that Marc refers to above, relates to supposed
> phenomena whose nature and very existence are unknown. For that sort of
> stuff, I prefer the term "paranormal" to distinguish it from the philosophy.
of what means "metaphysics": I would say it is a reflection about the
physical world (as philosophy).
However I would be grateful if you could answer my question: for you,
is the ablility to think the product of the brain only?
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 30, 2012, 1:07:43 PM5/30/12
to
On 30 mai, 16:39, Mark Isaak <eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:
> Does that mean phasers, transporter beams, warp speed, and the United
> Federation of Planets are all metaphysical? I would call them "fictional."
>
> As I understand, the title of Aristotle's "Metaphysics" meant simply,
> "the writings after Physics" -- in other words, "Miscellaneous." The
> modern meaning of the word has evolved and, I gather from this
> discussion, still has not landed in a fixed spot. My own understanding
> is that metaphysics means the branch of philosophy dealing with the
> nature of existence. Historically, that branch of philosophy has
> covered areas (e.g. atoms) that are solidly within science today, and I
> think it is inevitable that that history will continue.
>
> A second common meaning, that Marc refers to above, relates to supposed
> phenomena whose nature and very existence are unknown. For that sort of
> stuff, I prefer the term "paranormal" to distinguish it from the philosophy.
>
> Mark Isaak
> Does that mean phasers, transporter beams, warp speed, and the United
> Federation of Planets are all metaphysical? I would call them "fictional."
>
> As I understand, the title of Aristotle's "Metaphysics" meant simply,
> "the writings after Physics" -- in other words, "Miscellaneous." The
> modern meaning of the word has evolved and, I gather from this
> discussion, still has not landed in a fixed spot. My own understanding
> is that metaphysics means the branch of philosophy dealing with the
> nature of existence. Historically, that branch of philosophy has
> covered areas (e.g. atoms) that are solidly within science today, and I
> think it is inevitable that that history will continue.
>
> A second common meaning, that Marc refers to above, relates to supposed
> phenomena whose nature and very existence are unknown. For that sort of
> stuff, I prefer the term "paranormal" to distinguish it from the philosophy.
>
You are right, I have to change my way of qualifying the 'metaphysical
world': it is not an imaginary world. It is a world that should be
taken into consideration because many people believe in its existence
(even, if, personally, I don't).
It is all what is not the physical world or inversly the physical
world is everything that can be known, the 'metaphysical world'
excepted because it can't be known.
Then the physical world includes all the fictions human beings can
imagine, our dreams, our thoughts and of course mathematics but not
gods nor the soul nor even the concept of 'life', nor the 'life' after
the death etc.
Kalkidas
May 30, 2012, 1:35:37 PM5/30/12
to
physical.
Ernest Major
May 30, 2012, 1:59:27 PM5/30/12
to
In message <jq5lpf$hdn$1...@dont-email.me>, Kalkidas <e...@joes.pub> writes
It would have helped if your clarification had also addressed the
examples given, especially as you seem to think that the process of
counting is an abstraction.
--
alias Ernest Major
examples given, especially as you seem to think that the process of
counting is an abstraction.
--
alias Ernest Major
Mark Isaak
May 30, 2012, 4:41:44 PM5/30/12
to
On 5/30/12 8:03 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> However I would be grateful if you could answer my question: for you,
> is the ability to think the product of the brain only?
> However I would be grateful if you could answer my question: for you,
Yes, with caveats. (1) The brain itself, and by implication the ability
to think, requires support from the rest of the body. (This is not
trivial; things like fatigue, hunger, and, of course, hormones affect
your thinking.)
(2) A thinking "brain" need not be an organic one. Arguably (depending
on what you mean by thinking) some computers already have the ability to
think. In theory, the brain could be based on silicon, entirely
different organic chemistry, magnetic fields in a plasma, light
interactions in some kind of crystal, or something we have never yet
imagined.
(3) The brain is itself a product of evolutionary and environmental
factors. To say that thinking is a product of the brain is to say that
it is a product of all of those factors as well.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
May 30, 2012, 5:09:29 PM5/30/12
to
On 30 mai, 22:41, Mark Isaak <eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:
(1) I fully agree with you: in the evolution process the body came
first then the central nervous system and then the brain. The brain
came for the body and not the contrary. Then there is a close
relationship between the body and the brain but the body is the primum
movens. This is why our thoughts are relevant only by reference to
our body and thus are not metaphysical at all!
(2) Because of (1) I am less convinced by your comparison with a
computer. I am convinced that the animal brain function is quite
different from how a computer works, particularly because of the
impact of our emotions on the function of our brain.
(3) I agree with you that our way of thinking is a product of all of
those factors as well.
What do you think of my point of view on the physical world and the
metaphysical one?
first then the central nervous system and then the brain. The brain
came for the body and not the contrary. Then there is a close
relationship between the body and the brain but the body is the primum
movens. This is why our thoughts are relevant only by reference to
our body and thus are not metaphysical at all!
(2) Because of (1) I am less convinced by your comparison with a
computer. I am convinced that the animal brain function is quite
different from how a computer works, particularly because of the
impact of our emotions on the function of our brain.
(3) I agree with you that our way of thinking is a product of all of
those factors as well.
What do you think of my point of view on the physical world and the
metaphysical one?
Mark Isaak
May 31, 2012, 6:16:14 PM5/31/12
to
On 5/30/12 2:09 PM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> On 30 mai, 22:41, Mark Isaak<eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:
>> On 5/30/12 8:03 AM, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>>
>>> However I would be grateful if you could answer my question: for you,
>>> is the ability to think the product of the brain only?
>>
>> Yes, with caveats. (1) The brain itself, and by implication the ability
>> to think, requires support from the rest of the body. (This is not
>> trivial; things like fatigue, hunger, and, of course, hormones affect
>> your thinking.)
>>
>> (2) A thinking "brain" need not be an organic one. Arguably (depending
>> on what you mean by thinking) some computers already have the ability to
>> think. In theory, the brain could be based on silicon, entirely
>> different organic chemistry, magnetic fields in a plasma, light
>> interactions in some kind of crystal, or something we have never yet
>> imagined.
>>
>> (3) The brain is itself a product of evolutionary and environmental
>> factors. To say that thinking is a product of the brain is to say that
>> it is a product of all of those factors as well.
>
> On 30 mai, 22:41, Mark Isaak<eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:
>> On 5/30/12 8:03 AM, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>>
>>> However I would be grateful if you could answer my question: for you,
>>> is the ability to think the product of the brain only?
>>
>> Yes, with caveats. (1) The brain itself, and by implication the ability
>> to think, requires support from the rest of the body. (This is not
>> trivial; things like fatigue, hunger, and, of course, hormones affect
>> your thinking.)
>>
>> (2) A thinking "brain" need not be an organic one. Arguably (depending
>> on what you mean by thinking) some computers already have the ability to
>> think. In theory, the brain could be based on silicon, entirely
>> different organic chemistry, magnetic fields in a plasma, light
>> interactions in some kind of crystal, or something we have never yet
>> imagined.
>>
>> (3) The brain is itself a product of evolutionary and environmental
>> factors. To say that thinking is a product of the brain is to say that
>> it is a product of all of those factors as well.
>
> (1) I fully agree with you: in the evolution process the body came
> first then the central nervous system and then the brain. The brain
> came for the body and not the contrary. Then there is a close
> relationship between the body and the brain but the body is the primum
> movens. This is why our thoughts are relevant only by reference to
> our body and thus are not metaphysical at all!
> (2) Because of (1) I am less convinced by your comparison with a
> computer. I am convinced that the animal brain function is quite
> different from how a computer works, particularly because of the
> impact of our emotions on the function of our brain.
There is no reason why computers could not be given emotions. For that
> first then the central nervous system and then the brain. The brain
> came for the body and not the contrary. Then there is a close
> relationship between the body and the brain but the body is the primum
> movens. This is why our thoughts are relevant only by reference to
> our body and thus are not metaphysical at all!
> (2) Because of (1) I am less convinced by your comparison with a
> computer. I am convinced that the animal brain function is quite
> different from how a computer works, particularly because of the
> impact of our emotions on the function of our brain.
matter, once computers start manufacturing copies of themselves, they
could evolve emotions.
(Can you tell that I have read a lot of science fiction?)
> (3) I agree with you that our way of thinking is a product of all of
> those factors as well.
>
> What do you think of my point of view on the physical world and the
> metaphysical one?
"metaphysical world" does not make a lot of sense. "Metaphysical"
refers to ideas about things (often, in fact, ideas about ideas about
things), not things themselves, so a "metaphysical world" would be like
"utilitarian world" or "ethical world." It could be used to refer to
aspects of the real world, but it is not something separate from the
physical.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Jun 1, 2012, 3:10:59 AM6/1/12
to
On 1 juin, 00:16, Mark Isaak <eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:
> There is no reason why computers could not be given emotions. For that
> matter, once computers start manufacturing copies of themselves, they
> could evolve emotions.
>
> (Can you tell that I have read a lot of science fiction?)
>
> > (3) I agree with you that our way of thinking is a product of all of
> > those factors as well.
>
> > What do you think of my point of view on the physical world and the
> > metaphysical one?
>
> I have not been following this thread very closely, but to me,
> "metaphysical world" does not make a lot of sense. "Metaphysical"
> refers to ideas about things (often, in fact, ideas about ideas about
> things), not things themselves, so a "metaphysical world" would be like
> "utilitarian world" or "ethical world." It could be used to refer to
> aspects of the real world, but it is not something separate from the
> physical.
>
> --
> Mark Isaak
About the comparison between animal brain functioning and computer
> There is no reason why computers could not be given emotions. For that
> matter, once computers start manufacturing copies of themselves, they
> could evolve emotions.
>
> (Can you tell that I have read a lot of science fiction?)
>
> > (3) I agree with you that our way of thinking is a product of all of
> > those factors as well.
>
> > What do you think of my point of view on the physical world and the
> > metaphysical one?
>
> I have not been following this thread very closely, but to me,
> "metaphysical world" does not make a lot of sense. "Metaphysical"
> refers to ideas about things (often, in fact, ideas about ideas about
> things), not things themselves, so a "metaphysical world" would be like
> "utilitarian world" or "ethical world." It could be used to refer to
> aspects of the real world, but it is not something separate from the
> physical.
>
> --
> Mark Isaak
working you should remember your point (1) which points out the
importance of the relationship between the body and the brain in
animals. This cannot be the case for computers whatever they are
because such a relationship took about 5 hundred million years to be
progressively built by evolution.
Many people believe in a metaphysical world: for instance in which
world do you put gods? Of course I suppose you are like me and don't
believe in gods.
But not only religious people believe in a metaphysical world. For
example Plato believed in a world of forms/ideas: "Aristotle merely
suggests that his idea of forms can be discovered through
investigation of the natural world, unlike Plato's Forms that exist
beyond and outside the ordinary range of human
understanding." (Wikipedia: "Plato").
Moreover some people, in particular some mathematicians, believe in a
world of mathematics (like Ernest Major?): they consider that
mathematicians did not invent mathematics but discovered it.
Mark Isaak
Jun 1, 2012, 2:40:12 PM6/1/12
to
On 6/1/12 12:10 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> On 1 juin, 00:16, Mark Isaak<eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:
>> There is no reason why computers could not be given emotions. For that
>> matter, once computers start manufacturing copies of themselves, they
>> could evolve emotions.
>>
>> (Can you tell that I have read a lot of science fiction?)
>>
>>> (3) I agree with you that our way of thinking is a product of all of
>>> those factors as well.
>>
>>> What do you think of my point of view on the physical world and the
>>> metaphysical one?
>>
>> I have not been following this thread very closely, but to me,
>> "metaphysical world" does not make a lot of sense. "Metaphysical"
>> refers to ideas about things (often, in fact, ideas about ideas about
>> things), not things themselves, so a "metaphysical world" would be like
>> "utilitarian world" or "ethical world." It could be used to refer to
>> aspects of the real world, but it is not something separate from the
>> physical.
>
> On 1 juin, 00:16, Mark Isaak<eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:
>> There is no reason why computers could not be given emotions. For that
>> matter, once computers start manufacturing copies of themselves, they
>> could evolve emotions.
>>
>> (Can you tell that I have read a lot of science fiction?)
>>
>>> (3) I agree with you that our way of thinking is a product of all of
>>> those factors as well.
>>
>>> What do you think of my point of view on the physical world and the
>>> metaphysical one?
>>
>> I have not been following this thread very closely, but to me,
>> "metaphysical world" does not make a lot of sense. "Metaphysical"
>> refers to ideas about things (often, in fact, ideas about ideas about
>> things), not things themselves, so a "metaphysical world" would be like
>> "utilitarian world" or "ethical world." It could be used to refer to
>> aspects of the real world, but it is not something separate from the
>> physical.
>
> About the comparison between animal brain functioning and computer
> working you should remember your point (1) which points out the
> importance of the relationship between the body and the brain in
> animals. This cannot be the case for computers whatever they are
> because such a relationship took about 5 hundred million years to be
> progressively built by evolution.
Computers also have bodies, you know.
> working you should remember your point (1) which points out the
> importance of the relationship between the body and the brain in
> animals. This cannot be the case for computers whatever they are
> because such a relationship took about 5 hundred million years to be
> progressively built by evolution.
Evolution goes considerably faster with the application principles of
intelligent design (the real stuff, not the creationism buzzword), such
as modelling and testing before full production, and libraries to store
and retrieve lessons from multiple times and lineages. I bet what took
Darwinian evolution 500 million years, designers could do in less than
500 thousand.
> Many people believe in a metaphysical world: for instance in which
> world do you put gods? Of course I suppose you are like me and don't
> believe in gods.
different senses. In the sense that (as I understand) you mean, I
believe the metaphysical refers to some things that do not exist and
some things that are uncertain, which might or might not exist.
However, even when the things do not exist, they can still have a clear
referent, as we understand what "Sherlock Holmes" means even if we do
not believe in him.
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr
Jun 3, 2012, 6:17:06 AM6/3/12
to
On 1 juin, 20:40, Mark Isaak <eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:
> However, even when the things do not exist, they can still have a clear
> referent, as we understand what "Sherlock Holmes" means even if we do
> not believe in him.
Among the things which do not exist there are at least two types:
> However, even when the things do not exist, they can still have a clear
> referent, as we understand what "Sherlock Holmes" means even if we do
> not believe in him.
- fictions: everybody knows these do not exist (e.g., "Sherlock
Holmes");
- metaphysical things like "gods", "soul" ... "life" (!): there are
many people who consider that these do exist.
Mark Isaak
Jun 3, 2012, 10:11:03 AM6/3/12
to
too. That does not prevent him from being fictional.
Of course, "God" and "soul" have the additional difficulty of not having
a clear referent. If I hear two different people (from different
communities) using those words, I do not know whether they are referring
to the same thing.
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