How stupid is Plantinga, really?
Mark Isaak
are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
cast into doubt.
The more I think about it, the harder it is for me to take this
argument seriously. The most obvious objection is that we *know* our
brains are imperfect, but we still do some pretty impressive stuff
with them. Does Plantinga not know that already? His argument is no
better, logically, than arguing that it is impossible to make a
functional chair if the wood has any knots in it. And given our
fallibility, does it make more sense that one philosopher is wrong or
that thousands of specialists in the subject are wrong?
And who says an evolved brain is unreliable? Imperfect, yes, but
*all* creatures' brains are reliable enough for the creatures to
survive in the world. Evolution requires as much. Plantinga must
show that our brains are not reliable for scientific reasoning. I
think he just assumes that would follow from not having a god make our
brains. It does not. I would argue that the historical record shows
the contrary, that our brains are pretty darn reliable for doing
science.
Moreover, what does Plantinga suggest as an alternative? Suppose our
brains were created "perfectly." If perfect implies good reasoning
powers, and we reason that we evolved, then the conclusion of
evolution becomes all the more certain. If perfect implies the errors
in logic, judgment, and observation that are all too typical of human
reasoning, then his argument argues as much against creation as
against evolution.
I may not remember the nuances of Plantinga's argument, but I find it
hard to believe that a professional philosopher could be so careless
in his reasoning. (Perhaps I have been exposed only to an atypically
astute sample.) Am I missing something, or is Plantinga really,
really out to lunch on this?
--
Mark Isaak eciton (at) earthlink (dot) net
"Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of
the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are
being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and
exposing the country to danger." -- Hermann Goering
eNo
news:1kbs91ljpvnkmb26f...@4ax.com...
I must say that from time to time I have mused along the same lines. We are,
after all, the only evolved creatures pondering how/whether we evolved. I
would echo what you said: an unreliable mind argument cuts both ways.
1. It could be that impulses toward religiosity and/or supernatural
explanations are themselves caused by the imperfection.
2. If the mind is created/designed, and hence, reliable, why does it arrive
at unreliable conclusions, such as, "we evolved"?
--
`昂,,,,喊`昂,,,,喊`昂,,,,喊`昂,,,,喊`昂,,,,喊
,,喊`昂,,,,喊`昂,,,,喊`昂,,,,喊`昂,,,,喊`昂,,
eNo
"Test everything; hold on to the good."
Augray
<eci...@earthlinkNOSPAM.next> wrote in
news:<1kbs91ljpvnkmb26f...@4ax.com>:
Doesn't this imply that Plantinga's argument, because it originated from
a unreliable brain, is unreliable as well?
Robert Carroll
"eNo" <e...@abuse.aol.com> wrote in message
news:m3rne.17$7_...@dfw-service2.ext.ray.com...
Plantinga seems to be echoing Darwin's "horrid doubt."
Bob
eNo
news:0pfs91dp7lnlg629f...@4ax.com...
Only if Plantinga accepts his brain is the result of evolution, which,
apparently, is the opposite of his position.
John Harshman
> An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
> are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
> brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
> unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
> cast into doubt.
The more I think about it, this seems to be a Catch-22 situation for
Plantinga.
If our brains are unreliable in the way Plantinga says, then we can't
suppose that anything we think is correct. Trivially, this includes
Plantinga's claims. But it also includes anything else we might think.
The logical conclusion is that reason is useless. But of course that's
unreliable too. There is in fact no such thing as a logical conclusion
in the world of Plantinga's argument. There's no point in thinking,
speaking, or writing. (OK, there's already no point in posting to TO,
but this applies to everything, not just usenet.)
Then again if our brains are not unreliable, then Plantinga's conclusion
is false.
So either he's wrong or we have no way to tell if he's wrong or right
about anything he says. Which do you think he would prefer?
[snip]
John Harshman
The only way out of the paradox is for us to suppose that the brains of
those who accept evolution are the result of evolution, and therefore
unreliable, but Plantinga's isn't the result of evolution, and is
therefore reliable. His idea only works if he can be outside the system
he's commenting on.
Ian H Spedding
>
> An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
> are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
> brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
> unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
> cast into doubt.
Whether evolved or designed, it is trivially true that we are
imperfect. So what? If Plantinga's argument is true then his own
reasonings are also unreliable. Where does that get us?
> The more I think about it, the harder it is for me to take this
> argument seriously. The most obvious objection is that we *know* our
> brains are imperfect, but we still do some pretty impressive stuff
> with them. Does Plantinga not know that already? His argument is no
> better, logically, than arguing that it is impossible to make a
> functional chair if the wood has any knots in it. And given our
> fallibility, does it make more sense that one philosopher is wrong or
> that thousands of specialists in the subject are wrong?
>From the way you put it, Plantinga is simply saying our conclusions are
unreliable - not that they are necessarily wrong. As above, if
Plantinga is claiming the theory of evolution is wrong then that
conclusion is, by his own argument, unreliable.
Ian
--
Ian H Spedding
Frank Sullivan
r norman
>An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
>are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
>brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
>unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
>cast into doubt.
>
>The more I think about it, the harder it is for me to take this
>argument seriously.
<snip>
Philosophers tend to do this kind of this for a living. Sometimes
their arguments really do have serious and important philosophical
implications when interpreted in a very technical sense, even though
they seem quite silly and trivial when viewed in the light of ordinary
language,.
On the other hand, sometimes their arguments are just silly and
trivial from any perspective. Still, that is what they do for a
living. And that is why they earn the big bucks.
The notion of unreliable components producing reliable results is a
well known problem in engineering, information processing, and
philosophy. Engineers have long known that unreliable components,
when placed in redundant system, can result in very reliable behavior.
Cellular level physiologists know full well just how unreliable
neurons are, often changing their behavior at the tiniest change in
conditions that the experimenter let go uncontrolled. Often they
change their behavior seemingly on a whim, just to confuse the poor
experimentalist. However we know from personal experience that large
neural systems can behave quite consistently under the right
conditions, although hideously inconsistent under many others.
Philosophers have long puzzled over the ability of the flawed mental
capacity of a human to produce systems of abstract logic, like pure
mathematics, that are seemingly perfect in consistency and
reliability.
Mark VandeWettering
> An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
> are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
> brains are unreliable.
That pegged my "well, duh!" meter.
> It follows that our reasoning would be unreliable, and thus the
> conclusion that we have evolved is itself cast into doubt.
Perhaps we should doubt whether our reasoning is unreliable.
> The more I think about it, the harder it is for me to take this
> argument seriously.
It took you a moment to come to this conclusion?
The spectrum of reliability would appear to run the gamut from
"completely delusional" to "not rational 100% of the time". Saying that
you can get nothing done with a brain which isn't 100% perfect does
indeed seem to be a comical argument.
John Wilkins
but he has *revelation* which is not the result of evolution.
[Hey, I didn't say it was a *good* argument.]
--
John S. Wilkins, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Biohumanities Project
University of Queensland - Blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
"Darwin's theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other
hypothesis in natural science." Tractatus 4.1122
John Wilkins
basically that we know the world because we are adapted to knowing the world.
This was an overdrawn conclusion, since we all know (sorry) that evolution is
a satisficer, not an optimiser. Darwin had a similar complaint:
"But then arises the doubt幼an the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe,
been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animal, be
trusted when it draws such grand conclusions ? May not these be the result of
the connection between cause and effect which strikes us as a necessary one,
but probably depends merely on inherited experience ? Nor must we overlook the
probability of the constant inculcation in a belief in God on the minds of
children producing so strong and perhaps an inherited effect on their brains
not yet fully developed, that it would be as difficult for them to throw off
their belief in God, as for a monkey to throw off its instinctive fear and
hatred of a snake." Autobiography, Barlow edition, page 93:
<http://pages.britishlibrary.net/charles.darwin3/barlow.html>
But *his* complaint was that we cannot trust reasoning for the existence of
God. I call this the Modified Monkey Brain Objection.
The reason why Darwin did not apply the same argument to scientific reasoning
is simple - scientific reasoning works. Plantinga's claim, while perhaps it
can reject the panadaptationism of evolutionary epistemology of old, fails
when it comes to science for a simple reason - science did not evolve
biologically. We are not born with our epistemology, we acquire it from our
culture, and science is a result of cultural evolution, not biological. And it
*is* largely (but not entirely!) optimised.
Mad Mambo Master of Macedonia
news:1kbs91ljpvnkmb26f...@4ax.com:
> The most obvious objection is that we *know* our
> brains are imperfect, but we still do some pretty impressive stuff
> with them.
We-have-traveled-the-galaxy-to-study-your-viewmasters...your-
toasters...this-thing-you-humans-call-"love".
Bobby D. Bryant
> An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our
> brains are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then
> our brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
> unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
> cast into doubt.
8<
> I may not remember the nuances of Plantinga's argument, but I find
> it hard to believe that a professional philosopher could be so
> careless in his reasoning. (Perhaps I have been exposed only to an
> atypically astute sample.) Am I missing something, or is Plantinga
> really, really out to lunch on this?
It's simple, really. His brain isn't reliable.
--
Bobby Bryant
Austin, Texas
John Harshman
Obviously not, because the brain that tells him to accept the revelation
may be faulty. If you accept his argument, you can't know anything, even
the truth of revelation. And therefore if you accept his argument, you
must reject it.
Denis Loubet
"Mark Isaak" <eci...@earthlinkNOSPAM.next> wrote in message
news:1kbs91ljpvnkmb26f...@4ax.com...
> An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
> are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
> brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
> unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
> cast into doubt.
Aside from the self-referential zanyness if such a claim, all one has to do
is look at the technology made possible by science. Since our technology
wouldn't work if science was unreliable, we must conclude that science ISN'T
unreliable, and that the TOE, being a product of science, is a good bet.
--
Denis Loubet
dlo...@io.com
http://www.io.com/~dloubet
John Harshman
But what if we're unreliable judges of what works? If we can't trust our
judgments, we can't trust of judgments of whether technology works either.
catshark
Well, if revelation is right, then his brain is in a "fallen" state and
therefore *definitely* unreliable . . .
>If you accept his argument, you can't know anything, even
>the truth of revelation. And therefore if you accept his argument, you
>must reject it.
As a victim of original sin, he can know nothing reliably, even in the
"best" case.
--
---------------
J. Pieret
---------------
It ain't the parts of the Bible
that I can't understand that bother me,
it is the parts that I do understand.
- Mark Twain -
John Harshman
Ah, I see the way out here. Original sin causes unreliability. But if
you accept Jesus Christ as your own personal savior, you are cleansed of
sin, and thus your brain starts working properly. This is proven by the
fact that you can now decide that evolutionists' brains are not working
properly, and you can be right about that. Their criticisms of your
reasoning are irrelevant, because their brains aren't working and yours
is. Jesus: tuneup for the mind.
Von R. Smith
Mark Isaak wrote:
> An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
> are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
> brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
> unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
> cast into doubt.
I think the funniest thing about Plantinga's argument is that it is
only relevant if the theory he is trying to refute is correct. He is
essentially arguing: "If the conclusion that we evolved is true, then
it is unreliable." Now I know that the Wilkins has invited us to view
this argument in the context of discussions about evolutionary
epistemology, but I suspect that is a rather charitable
contextualization.
Von Smith
John Wilkins
hasn't yet managed to throw that shackle off...
--
John S. Wilkins : evolvethought.blogspot.com
All life is a struggle in the dark
- Titus Lucretius Carus, On the Nature of Things 2.54
John Wilkins
> On Wed, 01 Jun 2005 22:45:29 GMT, Mark Isaak
> <eci...@earthlinkNOSPAM.next> wrote:
>
>
>>An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
>>are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
>>brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
>>unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
>>cast into doubt.
>>
>>The more I think about it, the harder it is for me to take this
>>argument seriously.
>
>
> <snip>
>
> Philosophers tend to do this kind of this for a living. Sometimes
> their arguments really do have serious and important philosophical
> implications when interpreted in a very technical sense, even though
> they seem quite silly and trivial when viewed in the light of ordinary
> language,.
>
> On the other hand, sometimes their arguments are just silly and
> trivial from any perspective. Still, that is what they do for a
> living. And that is why they earn the big bucks.
Umm... Richard, can you point me at your department of philosophy there? I
think I'm being gypped.
Denis Loubet
"John Harshman" <jharshman....@pacbell.net> wrote in message
news:0Otne.1119$IE7...@newssvr21.news.prodigy.com...
Well, if he's suggesting that we're THAT unreliable, he's a solipsist, and
can be safely dismissed.
Mike Dworetsky
"Mark Isaak" <eci...@earthlinkNOSPAM.next> wrote in message
news:1kbs91ljpvnkmb26f...@4ax.com...
To paraphrase what Richard Feynman said, science is a method we use to avoid
letting our imperfect brains fool themselves. In other words, we know our
brains are not perfect, and subject to all sorts of irrational biases, so we
devise means of ensuring we do not fool ourselves into believing something
that is not true. But aside from formal logic (more like maths than
philosophy), philosophy has only limited means of self-correction, and, in
some cases like Plantinga's, no self-correction feedback loop at all.
--
Mike Dworetsky
(Remove "pants" spamblock to send e-mail)
catshark
<jharshman....@pacbell.net> wrote:
Excellent try. But as I understand evangelical theology (i.e. not much)
Christ's self-sacrifice makes you "positionally justified" not actually
justified. IOW, God overlooks the nature of the fallen sinner because it
is covered by Christ's nature, but the fallen remain fallen.
>This is proven by the
>fact that you can now decide that evolutionists' brains are not working
>properly, and you can be right about that. Their criticisms of your
>reasoning are irrelevant, because their brains aren't working and yours
>is. Jesus: tuneup for the mind.
A consummation devoutly to be wished . . .
--
---------------
J. Pieret
---------------
There has been only one Christian.
They caught him and crucified him -- early.
-- Mark Twain --
TomS
<d7libe$i14$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>, John Wilkins stated..."
I'm trying to restrain myself from riding my old hobby-horse,
but I can't.
I don't see, not for a moment, how this argument of Plantinga's
relates to evolution rather than to reproductive biology.
After all, our knowledge is a rather personal thing. It isn't
something that we have in virtue of being a member of a population
(species, genus, "kind", whatever).
If the argument has any weight at all, it is an argument against
a scientific claim of knowledge of how an individual comes to be,
and how an individual acquires knowledge.
My brain is a product of development.
--
---Tom S. <http://talkreason.org/articles/chickegg.cfm>
"...if...we can demonstrate that...everything...could have sprung forth as if
from certain seeds, even if we know that things did not happen that way; we
shall in that way explain their nature better than...as we believe them to be
created..." Descartes, Principles of Philosophy (1644) Part III section 45
r norman
<j.wil...@uq.edu.au> wrote:
>r norman wrote:
>> Philosophers tend to do this kind of this for a living. Sometimes
>> their arguments really do have serious and important philosophical
>> implications when interpreted in a very technical sense, even though
>> they seem quite silly and trivial when viewed in the light of ordinary
>> language,.
>>
>> On the other hand, sometimes their arguments are just silly and
>> trivial from any perspective. Still, that is what they do for a
>> living. And that is why they earn the big bucks.
>
>Umm... Richard, can you point me at your department of philosophy there? I
>think I'm being gypped.
The problem is figuring out which category you are in. Also, you
realize, I mean "big bucks" as measured in Mother Teresa units.
Tracy Hamilton
"Mark Isaak" <eci...@earthlinkNOSPAM.next> wrote in message
news:1kbs91ljpvnkmb26f...@4ax.com...
> An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
> are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
> brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
> unreliable,
Er, wouldn't that include Platinga's reasoning? A self-refuting argument,
it appears.
> and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
> cast into doubt.
[snip]
Tracy P. Hamilton
John Harshman
If he's not suggesting that we're that unreliable, his argument
collapses, because we would need to be that unreliable to make it work.
Of course if we are that unreliable, his argument collapses too because
we have no way of evaluating its validity.
Lt. Kizhe Catson
I ran into evo-epist a few years back, and it made a lot of sense to me
that our brains are adapted (by a long history of selection) to perceive
the world more-or-less correctly. (See also the W.V.O.Quine quote, which
IIRC was your .sig for a while). Now you're telling me that's all
wrong? I don't think I (or anyone who paid any attention at all to
themselves or to history) would claim that our understanding of the
world is perfect, ie. optimized (either as individuals, or the sum total
of all human knowledge). But surely it falls into the category of "good
enough, so far" which is exactly what we expect from evolution driven by
selection.
> "But then arises the doubt幼an the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe,
> been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animal, be
> trusted when it draws such grand conclusions ? May not these be the result of
> the connection between cause and effect which strikes us as a necessary one,
> but probably depends merely on inherited experience ? Nor must we overlook the
> probability of the constant inculcation in a belief in God on the minds of
> children producing so strong and perhaps an inherited effect on their brains
> not yet fully developed, that it would be as difficult for them to throw off
> their belief in God, as for a monkey to throw off its instinctive fear and
> hatred of a snake." Autobiography, Barlow edition, page 93:
> <http://pages.britishlibrary.net/charles.darwin3/barlow.html>
>
> But *his* complaint was that we cannot trust reasoning for the existence of
> God. I call this the Modified Monkey Brain Objection.
>
> The reason why Darwin did not apply the same argument to scientific reasoning
> is simple - scientific reasoning works. Plantinga's claim, while perhaps it
> can reject the panadaptationism of evolutionary epistemology of old, fails
> when it comes to science for a simple reason - science did not evolve
> biologically. We are not born with our epistemology, we acquire it from our
> culture, and science is a result of cultural evolution, not biological. And it
> *is* largely (but not entirely!) optimised.
-- Kizhe
Glend
the talkorigins server ate it up. Probably just as well, since I think
I can say it all in fewer words.
Plantinga's concern exists evolution or not. Our ability to be sure of
our senses and our reasoning has been a problem since the ancient
skeptics raised it. Descartes dealt naively with the problem
(Plantinga is close to Descartes' "God solution"), and Kant explained
how we really can't know that we actually understand our world at all.
Modern science still sticks largely with Kant and the positivism
(despite the latter's philosophical death) that came substantially out
of Kantianism, believing that we can deal with "the world" in our very
human way, yet we can never be sure even that we're anything other than
brains in vats, let alone that "evolution is true" or that "Einstein
was right".
Plantinga's not altogether stupid, of course, but he essentially uses
Descartes' resort to God to make sure that our minds know the world and
rationally consider it. As such he is really very naive. Starting
with Kant, modern philosophy has moved well past this simple chicanery,
sometimes with stupidity aforethought, and sometimes with useful
discussion and progress in the area of epistemology. Plantinga is
positioned like all IDists, solidly opposed to moving into greater
understanding of our limitations and capabilities by insisting that if
we don't have the great robot manufacturer in the sky to provide truth
and knowledge of reality to us, then we're hopelessly lost.
Kant was no evolutionist at all, even edging toward a sort of Paleyism
in his "practical reason". But he wasn't nearly as naive as Plantinga,
since he recognized that nothing we know about God provides adequate
knowledge of reality, or proper reasoning ability.
Many have mentioned that our minds are quite obviously not the exact,
precise computers that IDists and Plantinga wish to reduce us to. I'd
move even further to note that clearly there are minds which cannot
grasp "reality" at all, that God's vouching of reality us has failed
completely, as it did for John Nash (A Beautiful Mind) for a
considerable period, and the many sadder cases where the mind has never
returned. Some minds work well, some do not. Very few minds really
get past human prejudice, however, which is something that evolution
does explain relatively well, and which the resort to a God who grants
"perfect knowledge" explains not at all.
Science has moved beyond Kant and positivism to some degree, mainly due
to evolutionary ideas. Kant could not tell us why humans have the
faculties that they do, and why they think in the categories that they
use to think. Evolution meshes environment and mental faculties in a
way that explains why it is that the mind is almost certainly in much
closer correspondence with "the world" than Kant could ever properly
suppose in his essentially theistic world. While we cannot KNOW that
we are anything but brains in vats, the story of evolution tells us why
we might in practical terms understand that we see straight lines
because seeing straight lines is the simplest interpretation that
evolution, plus development, can make of straight lines that exist "out
there in the world".
That is to say, Plantinga in fact has no reason to suppose that any God
has given us minds which correspond with "the world", any more than
Kant did. He thinks he does, but he's obviously a couple centuries
behind in philosophical and scientific thought. We do not know for
sure that evolution has granted us the ability to understand our
"world", however the narrative of evolution makes a great deal of sense
in telling us why we apparently are adapted to this "world". And since
Plantinga's notions actually give us no reason even to suspect that a
Creator beyond "our world" in fact adapted us to "this world", I think
I'll stick with the ideas that make sense all around.
There is no absolute guarantee that I am right about any of this, of
course. What does seem advantageous in my position is that in keeping
the lines of inquiry open to the evidence of evolution, neuroscience,
and psychology, I have a better chance of lighting upon a good
explanation than if I take Plantinga's shortcut. If Plantinga's right,
science should probably come to his position eventually. If he's
wrong, he's backed himself into an inescapable hole from which he's
very unlikely to be able to discover that he is wrong.
Ferrous Patella
> An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
> are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
> brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
> unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
> cast into doubt.
>
> The more I think about it, the harder it is for me to take this
> argument seriously.
Maybe he was trying to demonstrate just how unreliable our brains our by
using this argument.
--
Ferrous Patella (Homo gerardii)
T.A., Philosophy Lab
University of Ediacara
"Nature as God's "reality" show - what a concept!"
--A t.o. poster who wishes to remain anonymous
Ferrous Patella
> An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
> are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
> brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
> unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
> cast into doubt.
>
> The more I think about it, the harder it is for me to take this
> argument seriously.
Maybe he was trying to demonstrate just how unreliable our brains our (SIC
since this too shows the point) by using this argument.
John Harshman
> I wrote a fairly long response last night to the original post, then
> the talkorigins server ate it up. Probably just as well, since I think
> I can say it all in fewer words.
Fine reply, to which I have nothing to reply myself and have so snipped.
But I do have something to add. There's a real issue hiding behind
Plantinga's nonsense, something I expect few here would disagree with.
Our minds are indeed imperfect, and the ways they are imperfect can
affect what we can understand. I think the analogy to sight is
instructive. There are are great many phenomena that can be classed
under the heading "optical illusion", and they all spring from ways that
the brain can be fooled by taking advantage of its workings. We don't
see what we think we see; instead, our brains "cheat" in many ways. This
cheating works most of the time, which is why evolution has maintained
it. But optical illusions expose the cheating, evidence of imperfect
processing on a pre-conscious level.
Applied to conscious thought, this analogy leads us to wonder what, in
what we imagine to be our pure rationality, are the analogous processes
that usually work well enough but are really cheating. And it leads us
to wonder whether we can detect them (by means of an analogy to optical
illusions) and correct for them. It's been suggested already in this
thread that a tendency to believe in unseen deities is one such
illusion. But of course that's at issue. How can we tell? How can we
correct?
Mark Isaak
<rwca...@optonline.net> wrote:
>"eNo" <e...@abuse.aol.com> wrote in message
>news:m3rne.17$7_...@dfw-service2.ext.ray.com...
>> "Mark Isaak" <eci...@earthlinkNOSPAM.next> wrote in message
>> news:1kbs91ljpvnkmb26f...@4ax.com...
>>> An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
>>> are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
>>> brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
>>> unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
>>> cast into doubt.
>>>[...]
>>
>> I must say that from time to time I have mused along the same lines. We
>> are,
>> after all, the only evolved creatures pondering how/whether we evolved. I
>> would echo what you said: an unreliable mind argument cuts both ways.
>>
>> 1. It could be that impulses toward religiosity and/or supernatural
>> explanations are themselves caused by the imperfection.
>>
>> 2. If the mind is created/designed, and hence, reliable, why does it
>> arrive
>> at unreliable conclusions, such as, "we evolved"?
>
>Plantinga seems to be echoing Darwin's "horrid doubt."
In fact, he quotes it verbatim in making his argument.
Don Cates
wrote:
>news:1kbs91ljpvnkmb26f...@4ax.com by Mark Isaak:
>
>> An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
>> are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
>> brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
>> unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
>> cast into doubt.
>>
>> The more I think about it, the harder it is for me to take this
>> argument seriously.
>
>Maybe he was trying to demonstrate just how unreliable our brains our by
>using this argument.
>
planting, v. To use twentieth-century fertilizer to encourage new
shoots from eleventh -century ideas which everyone thought had gone to
seed; hence, plantinger, n. one who plantings.
From _THE PHILOSOPHICAL LEXICON_, DANIEL DENNETT, EDITOR.
<http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/lexicon/#P>
Enjoy(B-)
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" - PN)
Earle Jones
Ferrous Patella <mail1...@pop.net> wrote:
> news:1kbs91ljpvnkmb26f...@4ax.com by Mark Isaak:
>
> > An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
> > are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
> > brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
> > unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
> > cast into doubt.
> >
> > The more I think about it, the harder it is for me to take this
> > argument seriously.
>
> Maybe he was trying to demonstrate just how unreliable our brains our (SIC
> since this too shows the point) by using this argument.
*
Reminds me of Emo Phillips:
"I used to think the human brain was the most fascinating part of
the body. Then I realized, well, look what's telling me that."
-- Emo Phillips
earle
*
John Wilkins
Assume P is a straight creationist. He therefore is of the view that *any* act
of cognition is flawed, in the sense that it fails to achieve the third
property of knowledge on the older view - certainty (and assume he hasn't read
Wittgenstein's _On Certainty_, or is unconvinced).
In this case he's using a tu quoque. Sure, *he* thnks our natural knowledge is
flawed, but so must *we* (in the background is that lurking weasel, revealed
knowledge by the action of the Holy Spirit). So if our theory of evolution
depends on flawed knowledge processes, at least he can appeal to the authority
of revelation here.
Mark - what's the source for this argument? I might bestir myself and go and
have a look at it.
John Wilkins
get from evolution in ethics - a prescriptive rule. You simply cannot justify
(or metajustify) a heuristic on the basis of the past. Hume writ large...
I remain an evolutionary epistemologist in the decriptive sense - sure we
evolved our knowledge gathering faculties (and practices, for knowledge is
always in a social context). But what we will find works in the future will
not be foreseeable with any certainty. Things change. Paraconsistent logics
lacking De Morgan's Law may turn out to be better than classical consistent
logics. We may have to give up certain kinds of induction, and so forth, when
the environment (say, subatomic physics or cosmology) ceases to even remotely
resemble the conditions under which our biological and social congitive skills
evolved.
In short, in the Quine quote "Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions
have a pathetic, but praiseworthy, tendency to die before reproducing their
kind" (from memory), we need to excise the phrase "but praiseworthy". They
just do, that's all.
catshark
wrote:
[...]
>Mark - what's the source for this argument? I might bestir myself and go and
>have a look at it.
Apparently it comes from one or more lectures he has given including at
Biola University:
<http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/an_evolutionary_argument_against_naturalism.pdf>
But if you Google on "An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism" (or
EAAN) there is a fair amount about it on the web.
He apparently also expounds on it in his books _Warrant and Proper
Function_ and _Warranted Christian Belief_.
--
---------------
J. Pieret
---------------
In the name of the bee
And of the butterfly
And of the breeze, amen
- Emily Dickinson -
John Wilkins
> On Fri, 03 Jun 2005 09:27:13 +1000, John Wilkins <j.wil...@uq.edu.au>
> wrote:
>
> [...]
>
>
>>Mark - what's the source for this argument? I might bestir myself and go and
>>have a look at it.
>
>
> Apparently it comes from one or more lectures he has given including at
> Biola University:
> <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/an_evolutionary_argument_against_naturalism.pdf>
>
> But if you Google on "An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism" (or
> EAAN) there is a fair amount about it on the web.
>
> He apparently also expounds on it in his books _Warrant and Proper
> Function_ and _Warranted Christian Belief_.
>
talking about whether or not we can naturalise epistemology, of which
evolutionary epistemology is one example. There are a few too many red
herrings for me to care much about it. I might, if I ever think about it, get
the first book and see. A nice little article could be had out of that.
Walter Bushell
John Wilkins <j.wil...@uq.edu.au> wrote:
<snip>
> Assume P is a straight creationist.
My mind boggles at the _idea_ of a gay creationist. Oh, well, I'm easily
boggled. Maybe by feeling it's wrong they get a bigger kick from it?
--
Guns don't kill people; automobiles kill people.
John Wilkins
> In article <d7o4kb$1hob$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
> John Wilkins <j.wil...@uq.edu.au> wrote:
> <snip>
>
>>Assume P is a straight creationist.
>
> <snip>
>
> My mind boggles at the _idea_ of a gay creationist. Oh, well, I'm easily
> boggled. Maybe by feeling it's wrong they get a bigger kick from it?
>
TomS
<d7o4kb$1hob$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>, John Wilkins stated..."
I'm single-minded about this.
I don't care whether P. has a proof of the existence of God.
(Although I have to comment that, if he's talking about *designers*,
then having been designed by designers is no assurance of our
knowledge. Designers are no more reliable than naturalistic,
materialistic processes. Maybe worse, because they can be
deliberately misleading.)
I'm concerned that he's bringing in *evolution*. When he ought
to be worried about whether *development* of the *individual* can
give some basis for knowledge.
And I'm worried that he's bringing up evolution for some other
reason, other than it's significance for this particular argument.
How does this argument change (except, I would say, for the
better) if we would replace "evolution" throughout with "development"?
TomS
<earle.jones-4F5D...@comcast.dca.giganews.com>, Earle Jones
stated..."
"What's the dirtiest part of your body? ... I say it's your
brain."
-- Frank Zappa
John Harshman
> "On Thu, 02 Jun 2005 15:29:01 -0700, in article
> <earle.jones-4F5D...@comcast.dca.giganews.com>, Earle Jones
> stated..."
>
>>In article <Xns96696722A1597...@199.45.49.11>,
>>Ferrous Patella <mail1...@pop.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>news:1kbs91ljpvnkmb26f...@4ax.com by Mark Isaak:
>>>
>>>
>>>>An argument made by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is that, if our brains
>>>>are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
>>>>brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
>>>>unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
>>>>cast into doubt.
>>>>
>>>>The more I think about it, the harder it is for me to take this
>>>>argument seriously.
>>>
>>>Maybe he was trying to demonstrate just how unreliable our brains our (SIC
>>>since this too shows the point) by using this argument.
>>
>>*
>>Reminds me of Emo Phillips:
>>
>> "I used to think the human brain was the most fascinating part of
>>the body. Then I realized, well, look what's telling me that."
>>
>> -- Emo Phillips
>
>
> "What's the dirtiest part of your body? ... I say it's your
> brain."
> -- Frank Zappa
That's "ugliest" and "mind".
r norman
<j.wil...@uq.edu.au> wrote:
>Hmmm, that article/lecture precis is too brief, but in that context he's
>talking about whether or not we can naturalise epistemology, of which
>evolutionary epistemology is one example. There are a few too many red
>herrings for me to care much about it. I might, if I ever think about it, get
>the first book and see. A nice little article could be had out of that.
Just what I first said: "Philosophers tend to do this kind of this for
a living. Sometimes their arguments really do have serious and
important philosophical implications when interpreted in a very
technical sense, even though they seem quite silly and trivial when
viewed in the light of ordinary language,. On the other hand,
sometimes their arguments are just silly and trivial from any
perspective. "
Scientists are no different, of course.
r norman
wrote:
>In article <d7o4kb$1hob$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
> John Wilkins <j.wil...@uq.edu.au> wrote:
><snip>
>> Assume P is a straight creationist.
><snip>
>
>My mind boggles at the _idea_ of a gay creationist. Oh, well, I'm easily
>boggled. Maybe by feeling it's wrong they get a bigger kick from it?
Why shouldn't a creationist be full of joy and mirth, lighthearted and
carefree?
Oh, you mean THAT kind of gay!
John WIlkins
You overgeneralise. Some philosophers - most IMO - do quite the opposite. I
exempt critical studies and French philosophers, of course.
--
John Wilkins - Biohumanities Project, University of Queensland
"What's a philosopher ?" said Brutha.
"Someone who's bright enough to find a job with no heavy lifting,"
said a voice in his head. (Terry Pratchett, Small Gods)
John Wilkins
> "On Fri, 03 Jun 2005 09:27:13 +1000, in article
> <d7o4kb$1hob$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>, John Wilkins stated..."
>>TomS wrote:
>>
>>>"On Thu, 02 Jun 2005 10:02:59 +1000, in article
>>><d7libe$i14$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>, John Wilkins stated..."
>>>
>>>
>>>>Mark Isaak wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
ns
>>>>>are the product of natural evolution from lesser beings, then our
>>>>>brains are unreliable. It follows that our reasoning would be
>>>>>unreliable, and thus the conclusion that we have evolved is itself
>>>>>cast into doubt.
>>>>>
>>>>>The more I think about it, the harder it is for me to take this
r
>>>>>brains are imperfect, but we still do some pretty impressive stuff
o
>>>>>better, logically, than arguing that it is impossible to make a
>>>>>functional chair if the wood has any knots in it. And given our
r
>>>>>that thousands of specialists in the subject are wrong?
>>>>>
>>>>>And who says an evolved brain is unreliable? Imperfect, yes, but
>>>>>*all* creatures' brains are reliable enough for the creatures to
>>>>>survive in the world. Evolution requires as much. Plantinga must
>>>>>show that our brains are not reliable for scientific reasoning. I
ur
>>>>>brains. It does not. I would argue that the historical record show=
s
>>>>>the contrary, that our brains are pretty darn reliable for doing
>>>>>science.
>>>>>
r
>>>>>brains were created "perfectly." If perfect implies good reasoning
>>>>>powers, and we reason that we evolved, then the conclusion of
rs
>>>>>in logic, judgment, and observation that are all too typical of huma=
n
>>>>>reasoning, then his argument argues as much against creation as
>>>>>against evolution.
>>>>>
t
>>>>>hard to believe that a professional philosopher could be so careless
y
>>>>>astute sample.) Am I missing something, or is Plantinga really,
>>>>>really out to lunch on this?
>>>>>
>>>>
=20
>>>>basically that we know the world because we are adapted to knowing th=
e world.
>>>>This was an overdrawn conclusion, since we all know (sorry) that evol=
ution is
>>>>a satisficer, not an optimiser. Darwin had a similar complaint:
>>>>
ly believe,
>>>>been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest ani=
mal, be=20
>>>>trusted when it draws such grand conclusions ? May not these be the r=
esult of
>>>>the connection between cause and effect which strikes us as a necessa=
ry one,=20
>>>>but probably depends merely on inherited experience ? Nor must we ove=
rlook the
>>>>probability of the constant inculcation in a belief in God on the min=
ds of=20
>>>>children producing so strong and perhaps an inherited effect on their=
brains=20
>>>>not yet fully developed, that it would be as difficult for them to th=
row off=20
>>>>their belief in God, as for a monkey to throw off its instinctive fea=
r and=20
>>>>hatred of a snake." Autobiography, Barlow edition, page 93:=20
>>>><http://pages.britishlibrary.net/charles.darwin3/barlow.html>
>>>>
>>>>But *his* complaint was that we cannot trust reasoning for the existe=
nce of=20
>>>>God. I call this the Modified Monkey Brain Objection.
>>>>
easoning
>>>>is simple - scientific reasoning works. Plantinga's claim, while perh=
aps it=20
>>>>can reject the panadaptationism of evolutionary epistemology of old, =
fails=20
>>>>when it comes to science for a simple reason - science did not evolve=
=20
>>>>biologically. We are not born with our epistemology, we acquire it fr=
om our=20
>>>>culture, and science is a result of cultural evolution, not biologica=
l. And it
>>>>*is* largely (but not entirely!) optimised.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm trying to restrain myself from riding my old hobby-horse,
>>>but I can't.
>>>
>>> I don't see, not for a moment, how this argument of Plantinga's
>>>relates to evolution rather than to reproductive biology.
>>>
>>> After all, our knowledge is a rather personal thing. It isn't
>>>something that we have in virtue of being a member of a population
>>>(species, genus, "kind", whatever).
>>>
>>> If the argument has any weight at all, it is an argument against
>>>a scientific claim of knowledge of how an individual comes to be,
>>>and how an individual acquires knowledge.
>>>
>>> My brain is a product of development.
>>>
>>>
>>
ny* act=20
>>of cognition is flawed, in the sense that it fails to achieve the third=
=20
>>property of knowledge on the older view - certainty (and assume he hasn=
't read=20
>>Wittgenstein's _On Certainty_, or is unconvinced).
>>
edge is=20
>>flawed, but so must *we* (in the background is that lurking weasel, rev=
ealed=20
>>knowledge by the action of the Holy Spirit). So if our theory of evolut=
ion=20
>>depends on flawed knowledge processes, at least he can appeal to the au=
thority=20
>>of revelation here.
>>
>>Mark - what's the source for this argument? I might bestir myself and g=
o and=20
>>have a look at it.
>=20
> I'm single-minded about this.
> I don't care whether P. has a proof of the existence of God.
> (Although I have to comment that, if he's talking about *designers*,
> knowledge. Designers are no more reliable than naturalistic,
> materialistic processes. Maybe worse, because they can be
> deliberately misleading.)
> I'm concerned that he's bringing in *evolution*. When he ought
> to be worried about whether *development* of the *individual* can
>=20
> And I'm worried that he's bringing up evolution for some other
> reason, other than it's significance for this particular argument.
> How does this argument change (except, I would say, for the
> better) if we would replace "evolution" throughout with "development"?
I would hope it would bar the spontaneous generation of novel arguments...
It won't matter if he's arguing for an infallibilist epistemology because=
none=20
of them are accessible to rdinary beings. But evolution is supposed to be=
some=20
kind of limiter on how infallible one can be, while development isn't, I =
guess.
--=20
Lt. Kizhe Catson
> In article <d7o4kb$1hob$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
> John Wilkins <j.wil...@uq.edu.au> wrote:
> <snip>
>
>>Assume P is a straight creationist.
>
> <snip>
>
> My mind boggles at the _idea_ of a gay creationist. Oh, well, I'm easily
> boggled. Maybe by feeling it's wrong they get a bigger kick from it?
My kids have a friend/school-chum from a fundy family, who occasionally
spouted Creationist stuff within ear-shot of me (at which you bite your
tongue: 40yo vs. 12yo is *not* a fair fight). Also occasionally emitted
predictable anti-gay sentiments (once sent my son the "Gay Jesus Movie"
UL, in earnest). Otherwise he's a nice kid; smart too.
A couple of years back (age ~19, I think) he came out gay. Caused a few
conflicts with his parents, also internal conflicts vs. previous
attitudes (or so I gather from dropped hints. It's really none of my
business). Doesn't go to church much any more; no idea what (if any)
kind of Creationism he might still espouse.
-- Kizhe
shane
I think Frank Z was wrong.
Six words a man is never likely to hear from a woman;
"My, that's a good looking scrotum."
Nantko Schanssema
>You overgeneralise. Some philosophers - most IMO - do quite the opposite. I
>exempt critical studies and French philosophers, of course.
Ah, French philosophers. They have the grace to write in French.
Unfortunaltely their works get translated.
regards,
Nantko
--
The invisible and the nonexistent look very much alike. (Delos McKown)
John WIlkins
> John WIlkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au>:
>
>
>
>>You overgeneralise. Some philosophers - most IMO - do quite the opposite. I
>>exempt critical studies and French philosophers, of course.
>
>
> Ah, French philosophers. They have the grace to write in French.
> Unfortunaltely their works get translated.
>
Not just philosophers. A historian on my floor came up to me with a book on
methods for prehistory. The cover was a large photo of the French author. The
back cover had three more photos of the same guy.
The tend to a cult of personality a bit...
TomS
<d7plo1$4l4$2...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>, John Wilkins stated..."
I'll tell you what really irritates me about this.
What irritates me about this is that it is just so obvious
that this argument of Plantinga's has so little to do with
evolution.
No, that isn't what irritates me about it. People do disagree
with me, and I can be wrong, and even if I am right, people have a
right to disagree with me.
What irritates me is that this point of mine, even if it is a
stupid mistake, is surely something that somebody would have
mentioned. Somebody surely could have written, "Now, possibly a
person could reply by saying that this argument is not relevant
to evolutionary biology, but to developmental biology; But that is
a major blunder and misunderstanding because of X, Y, and Z."
I can take being told that I have made a major blunder and
misunderstanding. It's happened enough times. I even (sort of)
like being corrected. I don't like being wrong, but I even less
like being wrong and not finding out that I am wrong.
Some day, maybe, some kind soul will take me aside and have
a little chat with me about how my hobby-horse about development
vs. evolution is something that is best left forgotten, and I'm
just embarrassing myself in bringing it up so often. Until that
happens, I'm afraid that you folks are going to have to hear me
repeating it, over and over again, in as many different ways that
I can phrase it.
Until that happens, I guess I'm going to have to live with
being irritated.
Walter Bushell
Nantko Schanssema <nan...@xs4all.nl> wrote:
> John WIlkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au>:
>
>
> >You overgeneralise. Some philosophers - most IMO - do quite the opposite. I
> >exempt critical studies and French philosophers, of course.
>
> Ah, French philosophers. They have the grace to write in French.
> Unfortunaltely their works get translated.
>
> regards,
> Nantko
French is a difficult language to do philosophy in, because it is such a
beautiful language that one would be constantly tempted to write what
sounds good rather than what is sound.
Nantko Schanssema
>Nantko Schanssema wrote:
>> John WIlkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au>:
>>>You overgeneralise. Some philosophers - most IMO - do quite the opposite. I
>>>exempt critical studies and French philosophers, of course.
>> Ah, French philosophers. They have the grace to write in French.
>> Unfortunaltely their works get translated.
>Not just philosophers. A historian on my floor came up to me with a book on
>methods for prehistory. The cover was a large photo of the French author. The
>back cover had three more photos of the same guy.
That doesn't surprise me a bit. :)
I remember a book shop in Paris, in which dozens of portraits smiled
(or grumped) at me from book covers. I can't imagine they were all
philosophers' mugs.
>The tend to a cult of personality a bit...
I wouldn't rule out vanity as a cause so quickly.
[resurrected .sig]
>"What's a philosopher ?" said Brutha.
>"Someone who's bright enough to find a job with no heavy lifting,"
>said a voice in his head. (Terry Pratchett, Small Gods)
What a coincedence. I'm currenlty re-re-re-reading _Small Gods_ and
just went through that passage last night.
r norman
wrote:
>r norman wrote:
>> On Fri, 03 Jun 2005 14:06:17 +1000, John Wilkins
>> <j.wil...@uq.edu.au> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Hmmm, that article/lecture precis is too brief, but in that context he's
>>>talking about whether or not we can naturalise epistemology, of which
>>>evolutionary epistemology is one example. There are a few too many red
>>>herrings for me to care much about it. I might, if I ever think about it, get
>>>the first book and see. A nice little article could be had out of that.
>>
>>
>> Just what I first said: "Philosophers tend to do this kind of this for
>> a living. Sometimes their arguments really do have serious and
>> important philosophical implications when interpreted in a very
>> technical sense, even though they seem quite silly and trivial when
>> viewed in the light of ordinary language,. On the other hand,
>> sometimes their arguments are just silly and trivial from any
>> perspective. "
>>
>> Scientists are no different, of course.
>>
>
>You overgeneralise. Some philosophers - most IMO - do quite the opposite. I
>exempt critical studies and French philosophers, of course.
Let's see, now. In mathematics, an element which is equal to its own
inverse is idempotent Does that mean that a logical argument that is
its own converse is impotent?
(OK, so I stretched the definition of idempotent a bit -- it was
necessary in the context, though)
John Wilkins
Don't you believe what those English professors tell you.
--
John S. Wilkins : evolvethought.blogspot.com
All life is a struggle in the dark
- Titus Lucretius Carus, On the Nature of Things 2.54
John Wilkins
<Snip Plantinga garden>
Two things. One is that development is being rediscovered after a hiatus of a
century of subjugation to genetics, and it is always a Good Thing when it gets
discussed. The other is that the generation debates to which you refer in
these posts is historically *crucial* for the ideas that are brought into play
against evolution. In fact I am almost at the point of making a historical
claim that generation is the foundation for *all* species concepts ever, right
back to Aristotle.
So stick with it.
--
Augray
On Fri, 03 Jun 2005 10:40:24 -0400, Walter Bushell <pr...@panix.com>
wrote in news:<proto-F92196....@reader1.panix.com>: