For Pagano On Induction
Bill Rogers
314. Imagine that the schoolboy really did ask, "and is there a table
there even when I turn round, and even when no one is there to see
it?" Is the teacher to reassure him- and say "of course there is!"?
Perhaps the teacher will get a bit impatient, but think that the boy
will grow out of asking such questions.
315. That is to say that the teacher will feel that this is not
really a legitimate question at all.
And it would be just the same if the pupil cast doubt on the
uniformity of nature, that is to say on the justification of inductive
arguments. - The teacher would feel that this was only holding them
up, that this way the pupil would only get stuck and make no progress.
- And he would be right. It would be as if someone were looking for
some object in a room; he opens a drawer and doesn't see it there;
then he closes it again, waits, and opens it once more to see if
perhaps it isn't there now, and keeps on like that. He has not learned
to look for things. And in the same way this pupil has not learned to
ask questions. He has not learned the game that we are trying to teach
him.
- L.W.
John Wilkins
bro...@noguchi.mimcom.net (Bill Rogers) wrote:
PI or OC?
--
John Wilkins
john...@wilkins.id.au www.wilkins.id.au
Non scholae, sed vitae discimus
[We learn for life, not for school] Seneca, epistolae morales 106,12
Hiero5ant
"John Wilkins" <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
news:wilkins-1B8A94...@individual.net...
> In article <8984713a.04103...@posting.google.com>,
> bro...@noguchi.mimcom.net (Bill Rogers) wrote:
>
>> I just couldn't help thinking of Tony Pagano when I read this....
>>
>> 314. Imagine that the schoolboy really did ask, "and is there a table
>> there even when I turn round, and even when no one is there to see
>> it?" Is the teacher to reassure him- and say "of course there is!"?
>> Perhaps the teacher will get a bit impatient, but think that the boy
>> will grow out of asking such questions.
>>
>> 315. That is to say that the teacher will feel that this is not
>> really a legitimate question at all.
>> And it would be just the same if the pupil cast doubt on the
>> uniformity of nature, that is to say on the justification of inductive
>> arguments. - The teacher would feel that this was only holding them
>> up, that this way the pupil would only get stuck and make no progress.
>> - And he would be right. It would be as if someone were looking for
>> some object in a room; he opens a drawer and doesn't see it there;
>> then he closes it again, waits, and opens it once more to see if
>> perhaps it isn't there now, and keeps on like that. He has not learned
>> to look for things. And in the same way this pupil has not learned to
>> ask questions. He has not learned the game that we are trying to teach
>> him.
>>
>> - L.W.
>
> PI or OC?
Undoubtedly the greatest L.W. epigram relevant to our resident
Credentialed Supernaturalist is
"If there were a verb meaning 'to believe falsely,' it would not have any
significant first person, present indicative."
Bill Rogers
> bro...@noguchi.mimcom.net (Bill Rogers) wrote:
>
> > I just couldn't help thinking of Tony Pagano when I read this....
> >
> > 314. Imagine that the schoolboy really did ask, "and is there a table
> > there even when I turn round, and even when no one is there to see
> > it?" Is the teacher to reassure him- and say "of course there is!"?
> > Perhaps the teacher will get a bit impatient, but think that the boy
> > will grow out of asking such questions.
> >
> > 315. That is to say that the teacher will feel that this is not
> > really a legitimate question at all.
> > And it would be just the same if the pupil cast doubt on the
> > uniformity of nature, that is to say on the justification of inductive
> > arguments. - The teacher would feel that this was only holding them
> > up, that this way the pupil would only get stuck and make no progress.
> > - And he would be right. It would be as if someone were looking for
> > some object in a room; he opens a drawer and doesn't see it there;
> > then he closes it again, waits, and opens it once more to see if
> > perhaps it isn't there now, and keeps on like that. He has not learned
> > to look for things. And in the same way this pupil has not learned to
> > ask questions. He has not learned the game that we are trying to teach
> > him.
> >
> > - L.W.
>
> PI or OC?
OC. Some time back I asked you how to get started with LW and you made
a few recommendations. It takes a while for books to get to me in
Ghana, but I just finished Pitcher's collection of various essays on
PI, and was reading OC when the thought of Pagano as the schoolboy
occurred to me.
It's great. I'm hardly in a state to discuss with you yet, but one
thing I think is striking, from a novice's point of view. If you think
his rhetorical approach was anything other than a gimmick, then it's
clear that he was not trying to construct a philosophical system to
compete with other systems. And yet almost all of the interpretive
essays in the Pitcher book seem to try to figure out what
Wittgenstein's system was supposed to be (even though he expressed it
in such an inconvenient, unsystematic way). As an outsider, my
impression is that his style is as interesting and important as his
substance.
I want to say that LW is like an old lama who has freed himself of
passions and desires and is surrounded by young monks who passionately
desire to be free of passions and desires.
Rich Mathers
Bill Rogers wrote:
Ah yes, Pagano does suffer "inter alia" from EDS (the "Empty Drawer
Syndrome"). It's clearly the primary source of most of his empty (read
vacuous) harsh criticisms. I wager he has an antiscientific bureau full
of them, and I visual his non materialist dresser levitates because of
them. It's a fecund metaphor, but I'll stop here before it gets more
personal. :)
John Wilkins
> John Wilkins <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote...
Yeah, sorry, I should have picked it up. But my copy of Über Gewissheit
(English-Deutsch) is presently in Austria with my German-speaking
paleontologist friend (I think it's now officially a gift, but hopefully
not eines Gift - I'd hate to think I contributed to confusion in
paleontology). Must replace it - but Wittgenstein books tend not to find
their way into the second hand shops.
>
> It's great. I'm hardly in a state to discuss with you yet, but one
> thing I think is striking, from a novice's point of view. If you think
> his rhetorical approach was anything other than a gimmick, then it's
> clear that he was not trying to construct a philosophical system to
> compete with other systems. And yet almost all of the interpretive
> essays in the Pitcher book seem to try to figure out what
> Wittgenstein's system was supposed to be (even though he expressed it
> in such an inconvenient, unsystematic way). As an outsider, my
> impression is that his style is as interesting and important as his
> substance.
In Pitcher's day (70s?) it was just assumed that Ludwig was a systematic
philosopher, because all Germans were ;-) The relaisation that while he
had a style and a general approach, he was not generating a single
philosophy, took a while after that. That said, I think he *did* have an
overarching set of principles in mind, but they mutated over time.
>
> I want to say that LW is like an old lama who has freed himself of
> passions and desires and is surrounded by young monks who passionately
> desire to be free of passions and desires.
I am reminded of a comment of Kierkegaard's, with whom he has a lot in
common - his philosophy is like a spice, but you cannot make a meal out
of spices.
If you are interested, he got a mention in my blog over the past few
weeks (although I am less interested in Wittgenstein scholarship than
turning him to my nefarious evil purposes).
--
John S. Wilkins jo...@wilkins.id.au
web: www.wilkins.id.au blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
God cheats
T Pagano
(Bill Rogers) wrote:
>I just couldn't help thinking of Tony Pagano when I read this....
>
>314. Imagine that the schoolboy really did ask, "and is there a table
>there even when I turn round, and even when no one is there to see
>it?" Is the teacher to reassure him- and say "of course there is!"?
> Perhaps the teacher will get a bit impatient, but think that the boy
>will grow out of asking such questions.
>
>315. That is to say that the teacher will feel that this is not
>really a legitimate question at all.
> And it would be just the same if the pupil cast doubt on the
>uniformity of nature, that is to say on the justification of inductive
>arguments.
Pagano replies:
True enough, but what's the point. Above the theory of "realism" is
being questioned by the schoolboy. But who in the secular community
questions the truth of scientific realism? Nonetheless even if one
were to abandon scientific realism in favor of instrumentalism, for
example, it's not clear how this would significantly effect scientific
inquiry or necessarily mislead its investigators. There are certainly
critical arguments for and against both positions (realism and
instrumentalism). Such is not the case with "inductivism."
As far as I know no such "principle of the uniformity of nature" has
ever been proven to exist even in some loose sense of the label
"proven." Hume showed, more or less conclusively, that no such
principle is even possible unless it is itself certified not by
empirical means but a priori. No one has shown that such an "a
priori" certification was ever successful.
Similar objections have been raised against similar proposals to
operate with formal rules of inductive inference that transmit
certainty from observational statements to theoretical ones. Again,
no rules that do this have ever been proposed. Induction is logically
invalid.
> - The teacher would feel that this was only holding them
>up, that this way the pupil would only get stuck and make no progress.
Pagano replies:
But it's not clear that abandoning realism in favor of instrumentalism
in the schoolboy example would necessarily impede or mislead
scientific inquiry. On the other hand presuming the truth of the
principle of the uniformity of nature which is pretty obviously false
has the potential of leading investigations and probably has lead them
in the wrong direction or into dead ends. The inductivist doctrine
that one or several observational statements has the ability to
justify or make more probable universal theoretical claims was dashed
by the anti christian Hume a long time ago. No one, I repeat no one,
has shown where Hume went wrong.
Regards,
T Pagano
Steven J.
"T Pagano" <not....@address.net> wrote in message
news:apagano-ihogo05r6daru...@4ax.com...
> On Mon, 1 Nov 2004 07:37:58 +0000 (UTC), bro...@noguchi.mimcom.net
> (Bill Rogers) wrote:
>
>>I just couldn't help thinking of Tony Pagano when I read this....
>>
>>314. Imagine that the schoolboy really did ask, "and is there a table
>>there even when I turn round, and even when no one is there to see
>>it?" Is the teacher to reassure him- and say "of course there is!"?
>> Perhaps the teacher will get a bit impatient, but think that the boy
>>will grow out of asking such questions.
>>
>>315. That is to say that the teacher will feel that this is not
>>really a legitimate question at all.
>
>
>> And it would be just the same if the pupil cast doubt on the
>>uniformity of nature, that is to say on the justification of inductive
>>arguments.
>
> Pagano replies:
> True enough, but what's the point. Above the theory of "realism" is
> being questioned by the schoolboy. But who in the secular community
> questions the truth of scientific realism? Nonetheless even if one
> were to abandon scientific realism in favor of instrumentalism, for
> example, it's not clear how this would significantly effect scientific
> inquiry or necessarily mislead its investigators. There are certainly
> critical arguments for and against both positions (realism and
> instrumentalism). Such is not the case with "inductivism."
>
turn your back (and the inference that, when you turn to face the table
again, you see the same table) is likewise deductively invalid. The entire
"common sense" assumption of the persistence of physical objects, and their
possession of the same properties they had the last time you investigated,
is reached inductively. The assumption that the table retains its
properties if you move it to another room, or another city, is likewise
impossible to demonstrate deductively or a priori. The argument is not over
"realism" vs. "instrumentalism," but over the assumption that it makes any
sense to study nature -- that anything learned in one place and time has any
relevance to phenomena in other places and times -- vs. the assumption that
nature is fundamentally unknowable.
>
> As far as I know no such "principle of the uniformity of nature" has
> ever been proven to exist even in some loose sense of the label
> "proven." Hume showed, more or less conclusively, that no such
> principle is even possible unless it is itself certified not by
> empirical means but a priori. No one has shown that such an "a
> priori" certification was ever successful.
>
epistomological nihilism been a mainstay of the Catholic faith?
>
> Similar objections have been raised against similar proposals to
> operate with formal rules of inductive inference that transmit
> certainty from observational statements to theoretical ones. Again,
> no rules that do this have ever been proposed. Induction is logically
> invalid.
>
>> - The teacher would feel that this was only holding them
>>up, that this way the pupil would only get stuck and make no progress.
>
> Pagano replies:
> But it's not clear that abandoning realism in favor of instrumentalism
> in the schoolboy example would necessarily impede or mislead
> scientific inquiry. On the other hand presuming the truth of the
> principle of the uniformity of nature which is pretty obviously false
> has the potential of leading investigations and probably has lead them
> in the wrong direction or into dead ends. The inductivist doctrine
> that one or several observational statements has the ability to
> justify or make more probable universal theoretical claims was dashed
> by the anti christian Hume a long time ago. No one, I repeat no one,
> has shown where Hume went wrong.
>
false," could you give any counterexamples to the principle?
Second, how does one investigate anything (and why does one bother) if one
starts with the assumption that what one learns here and now may have no
application to events in other times and places (which is what one assumes
if one assumes that nature is pretty obviously *not* uniform)?
>
> Regards,
> T Pagano
>
>
>
>> - And he would be right. It would be as if someone were looking for
>>some object in a room; he opens a drawer and doesn't see it there;
>>then he closes it again, waits, and opens it once more to see if
>>perhaps it isn't there now, and keeps on like that. He has not learned
>>to look for things. And in the same way this pupil has not learned to
>>ask questions. He has not learned the game that we are trying to teach
>>him.
>>
>>- L.W.
>
-- Steven J.
Elmer Bataitis
> Hume showed, more or less conclusively, that no such
> principle is even possible unless it is itself certified not by
> empirical means but a priori.
He did? Say Tony, how do you know this? Have you been using those old false materialistic methods to
gather information again? You naughty boy ;-)
Bill Rogers
So when we wonder where you are, shall we find you standing in front
of a dresser opening and closing the drawer over and over? Perhaps
next time the fragment of the true cross will be there.
What do you really mean when you say induction is not "logically
valid"? I doubt that a Martian observing you would conclude "Ha, there
is a man who thinks that induction is wrong."
When you write down "All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore
Socrates is mortal," isn't it induction that leads you to believe that
the words do not randomly change their meaning or form as you are
writing (or thinking) them? If induction is not valid, how can you
trust your deductions?
If I met a man who truly acted as though induction were invalid, I
couldn't even hold a conversation with him, nor could he be sure that
I was really the same person at the end of the conversation as at the
beginning.
Are you suggesting that someone (you, for example) might *believe*
that induction was invalid, but nevertheless *act* as though it *was*
valid? What sort of belief would that be? (I'm tempted to say it would
be very like religious belief indeed, but maybe that's extreme).
>
>
>
> > - The teacher would feel that this was only holding them
> >up, that this way the pupil would only get stuck and make no progress.
>
> Pagano replies:
> But it's not clear that abandoning realism in favor of instrumentalism
> in the schoolboy example would necessarily impede or mislead
> scientific inquiry. On the other hand presuming the truth of the
> principle of the uniformity of nature which is pretty obviously false
> has the potential of leading investigations and probably has lead them
> in the wrong direction or into dead ends. The inductivist doctrine
> that one or several observational statements has the ability to
> justify or make more probable universal theoretical claims was dashed
> by the anti christian Hume a long time ago. No one, I repeat no one,
> has shown where Hume went wrong.
What sort of "principle of the uniformity of nature" is it that you
think is pretty obviously wrong? Perhaps you mean that the whole world
does not have a permanent, calm, Mediterranean climate (with gentle
waves of calm, global-like flooding lapping at the shore)? But even
you know that that is not what we rash and hasty secularists mean by
the uniformity of nature.
Do you, on the other hand, really believe that it is "obviously false"
that the laws of physics do not change randomly, or that you might
wake up tomorrow morning as an elderly French widow in Nice?
Bobby D. Bryant
> What do you really mean when you say induction is not "logically
> valid"?
He means "I can ignore any facts that are in conflict with my personal
beliefs."
As to how he can *have* any beliefs in the induction-free-zone, that's
a difficult matter.
--
Bobby Bryant
Austin, Texas
Bob Pease
"Bobby D. Bryant" <bdbr...@mail.utexas.edu> wrote in message
news:cmaubu$alh$1...@geraldo.cc.utexas.edu...
Wikipedia observes.
Some philosophers consider the term "inductive logic" a misnomer because the
validity of inductive reasoning is not dependent on the rules of formal
logic which is by definition only deductive, not inductive
*******
I concur that It's difficult to have many beliefs nor even stay alive if
one doesn't use induction a lot.
On occasion, it fails.
Example
I've fallen 52 stories since I jumped off this building, so I guess I don't
have to open my parachute anytime soon!
However the anti-induction example
"I am afraid to eat this orange because induction is bogus when it says it
won't' be poisonous" is also pretty nutz
Induction isn't logical but it's safe!
Bob Pease
---
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Bobby D. Bryant
>
> "Bobby D. Bryant" <bdbr...@mail.utexas.edu> wrote in message
> news:cmaubu$alh$1...@geraldo.cc.utexas.edu...
>> On Wed, 03 Nov 2004, bro...@noguchi.mimcom.net (Bill Rogers) wrote:
>>
>> > What do you really mean when you say induction is not "logically
>> > valid"?
>>
>> He means "I can ignore any facts that are in conflict with my personal
>> beliefs."
>>
>> As to how he can *have* any beliefs in the induction-free-zone, that's
>> a difficult matter.
>
> Wikipedia observes.
> Some philosophers consider the term "inductive logic" a misnomer because the
> validity of inductive reasoning is not dependent on the rules of formal
> logic which is by definition only deductive, not inductive
>
> *******
> I concur that It's difficult to have many beliefs nor even stay alive if
> one doesn't use induction a lot.
> On occasion, it fails.
> Example
>
> I've fallen 52 stories since I jumped off this building, so I guess I don't
> have to open my parachute anytime soon!
>
> However the anti-induction example
> "I am afraid to eat this orange because induction is bogus when it says it
> won't' be poisonous" is also pretty nutz
>
> Induction isn't logical but it's safe!
One of my favorite quotes:
Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic
but praise-worthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.
- Willard van Orman Quine
Bobby D. Bryant
>
> "Bobby D. Bryant" <bdbr...@mail.utexas.edu> wrote in message
> news:cmaubu$alh$1...@geraldo.cc.utexas.edu...
>> On Wed, 03 Nov 2004, bro...@noguchi.mimcom.net (Bill Rogers) wrote:
>>
>> > What do you really mean when you say induction is not "logically
>> > valid"?
>>
>> He means "I can ignore any facts that are in conflict with my personal
>> beliefs."
>>
>> As to how he can *have* any beliefs in the induction-free-zone, that's
>> a difficult matter.
>>
>> --
>> Bobby Bryant