> >> >> > Let's start over. I asked this question:
> >> >> > "How does that [=vague descriptions] make it possible to prove > >> >> > that God does not exist?"
> >> >> > Your reply was
> >> >> > "Because the term "God" doesn't refer to anything specific > >> >> > enough to relate to a thing that does exist."
> >> >> > In context, you appear to be explaining why vague descriptions > >> >> > make it possible to prove that God does not exist, which implies > >> >> > that you think this is a valid argument. Do you think existiing > >> >> > vague descriptions make it possible to prove God does not exist?
> >> >> Taking the vagueness of the description as given, yes, since by > >> >> definition the definition can't be pinned down to any specific > >> >> thing that *Does* exist.
> >> > Hang on, wouldn't this mean that nothing which hasn't been defined > >> > can exist? And how do you tell when something has been adequately > >> > defined?
> >> Sure, there are certainly lots of things that haven't been defined, > >> simply because they have yet to be observed and described. But if the > >> description is that it can't be described, what have you got?
> > Yes, but God is supposed to be infinite, so you could never observe > > enough of Him to form a representative sample and form a definative > > description. Even if He was homogonous, you could never be sure of > > that, because a change might be just beyond your ability to perceive.
> There are an infinite number of infinite things that can be adequately > defined by finite descriptions.
Although for all practical purpouses this is infinite, mathematically it's only a finite set and so doesn't count. Combinatorial systems can only generate vast numbers of posibilities, not infinite ones.
> > So what have we got? We have a definition that can't be tested > > logically, that's what we've got and that means we can't say certainly > > whether or not He exists.
> I would contend that you've got a definition that is logically > incoherent, not just untestable. QED, no such thing can exist.
Just for clarity, what do you think renders it incoherent?
> > We also have a doctrine which says that He's invisible and won't come > > unless you already believe and then only if you're incredibly > > fortunate (nay _chosen_).
> Since that is also logically incoherent the question of proof doesn't > even enter the picture.
Again, what makes this incoherent? Bearing in mind of course, that invisibility wouldn't be an inherent characteristic of god, but a choice He made.
> > That's about as far beyond logic as you can get, so logically, the > > only safe position is true agnosticism, as Huxley defined it.
> Once again, when you go "beyond" logic, you're into the realm of the > incoherent and therefore logically impossible.
Well certainly, I agree that when you go beyond logic you become incoherent, because logic tests for consistency and by definition, that which is inconsistent is incoherent too. However, what logic can test in principle is a much larger set than what we can test using logic.
This is the limited sense in which I use the phrase beyond logic.
My position is that there is a set of objects, which are definable in principle, but beyond _our_ ability to define only because we lack the perspicacity or imagination.
If you accept this, then I think you should also accept that God might fall into this catagory as a coherent, but untestable object.
The problem I have with your position as I interpret it, is that if an object cannot be defined by us, then it can't exist. This would kill exploration stone dead, because such efforts are done in the wholly logical (to me, at least) assumption that there _is_ something there to discover.
You see, I see logic's function as not merely to confirm what we may know, but as a guide to what we may have yet to learn. For instance, using concepts like guage symmetry, physicists know to go looking for the Higgs Boson and roughly where they'll find it in the scheme of things.
The downside to this is that it provides a convenient bolt hole for all sort of hocus pocus, including God.
prabb...@shamrocksgf.com wrote: >In talk.atheism Steve Schaffner <s...@darwin.broad.mit.edu> wrote: >> "Christopher A. Lee" <ca...@optonline.net> writes: >> Well, that would depend on what is meant by unknowable, wouldn't it? >> The universe as a whole, for example, is clearly unknowable, but I >> think it would be a mistake to argue that the entire universe is >> a logical impossibility.
>How is it unknowable? What about it can't be known, given enough time, etc?
The universe *as *a* *whole* is what is unknowable. This does *not* mean that any given fact about the Universe is unknowable.
>> >> >> > Let's start over. I asked this question:
>> >> >> > "How does that [=vague descriptions] make it possible to >> >> >> > prove that God does not exist?"
>> >> >> > Your reply was
>> >> >> > "Because the term "God" doesn't refer to anything specific >> >> >> > enough to relate to a thing that does exist."
>> >> >> > In context, you appear to be explaining why vague >> >> >> > descriptions make it possible to prove that God does not >> >> >> > exist, which implies that you think this is a valid argument. >> >> >> > Do you think existiing vague descriptions make it possible >> >> >> > to prove God does not exist?
>> >> >> Taking the vagueness of the description as given, yes, since by >> >> >> definition the definition can't be pinned down to any specific >> >> >> thing that *Does* exist.
>> >> > Hang on, wouldn't this mean that nothing which hasn't been >> >> > defined can exist? And how do you tell when something has been >> >> > adequately defined?
>> >> Sure, there are certainly lots of things that haven't been >> >> defined, simply because they have yet to be observed and >> >> described. But if the description is that it can't be described, >> >> what have you got?
>> > Yes, but God is supposed to be infinite, so you could never observe >> > enough of Him to form a representative sample and form a definative >> > description. Even if He was homogonous, you could never be sure of >> > that, because a change might be just beyond your ability to >> > perceive.
>> There are an infinite number of infinite things that can be >> adequately defined by finite descriptions.
> Although for all practical purpouses this is infinite, mathematically > it's only a finite set and so doesn't count. Combinatorial systems can > only generate vast numbers of posibilities, not infinite ones.
>> > So what have we got? We have a definition that can't be tested >> > logically, that's what we've got and that means we can't say >> > certainly whether or not He exists.
>> I would contend that you've got a definition that is logically >> incoherent, not just untestable. QED, no such thing can exist.
> Just for clarity, what do you think renders it incoherent?
The part about how it can't be tested logically.
>> > We also have a doctrine which says that He's invisible and won't >> > come unless you already believe and then only if you're incredibly >> > fortunate (nay _chosen_).
>> Since that is also logically incoherent the question of proof doesn't >> even enter the picture.
> Again, what makes this incoherent? Bearing in mind of course, that > invisibility wouldn't be an inherent characteristic of god, but a > choice He made.
It's an illogical choice, requiring belief before giving the evidence that would allow belief to be formed logically.
>> > That's about as far beyond logic as you can get, so logically, the >> > only safe position is true agnosticism, as Huxley defined it.
>> Once again, when you go "beyond" logic, you're into the realm of the >> incoherent and therefore logically impossible.
> Well certainly, I agree that when you go beyond logic you become > incoherent, because logic tests for consistency and by definition, > that which is inconsistent is incoherent too. However, what logic can > test in principle is a much larger set than what we can test using > logic.
> This is the limited sense in which I use the phrase beyond logic.
> My position is that there is a set of objects, which are definable in > principle, but beyond _our_ ability to define only because we lack the > perspicacity or imagination.
> If you accept this, then I think you should also accept that God might > fall into this catagory as a coherent, but untestable object.
> The problem I have with your position as I interpret it, is that if an > object cannot be defined by us, then it can't exist. This would kill > exploration stone dead, because such efforts are done in the wholly > logical (to me, at least) assumption that there _is_ something there > to discover.
Yes, but discovery implies observation.
> You see, I see logic's function as not merely to confirm what we may > know, but as a guide to what we may have yet to learn. For instance, > using concepts like guage symmetry, physicists know to go looking for > the Higgs Boson and roughly where they'll find it in the scheme of > things.
Yes, but the theory of which gauge symmetry is a part was derived from observable facts about nature. The "scheme of things" isn't sitting waiting for us to believe in it before revealing itself.
> The downside to this is that it provides a convenient bolt hole for > all sort of hocus pocus, including God.
Yeah, but it's not usually very hard at all to tell when it's hocus pocus and just dismiss all the metaphysical woohoo that tries to justify it.
-- Fred Stone aa# 1369 Cthulhu for President! Why vote for a lesser evil?
> >> I would contend that you've got a definition that is logically > >> incoherent, not just untestable. QED, no such thing can exist.
> > Just for clarity, what do you think renders it incoherent?
> The part about how it can't be tested logically.
Without regard as to why it can't be tested?
To use Bertand Russell's famous example, what if there was a chocolate teapot orbiting Mars. Although patently absurd, there's nothing logically incoherent about this untestable idea. You can't prove that there isn't a chocolate teapot orbiting Mars at this moment, can you?
> >> > We also have a doctrine which says that He's invisible and won't > >> > come unless you already believe and then only if you're incredibly > >> > fortunate (nay _chosen_).
> >> Since that is also logically incoherent the question of proof doesn't > >> even enter the picture.
> > Again, what makes this incoherent? Bearing in mind of course, that > > invisibility wouldn't be an inherent characteristic of god, but a > > choice He made.
> It's an illogical choice, requiring belief before giving the evidence > that would allow belief to be formed logically.
Ahhh. So, because she hasn't caught any enemy agents in the last fortnight, the head of counter intelligence at MI5 is safe in assuming that no one has infiltrated the organisation? I'll sleep safer in my bed tonight, thanks.
We on alt.atheism know that belief in God is irrational, but that isn't the question we're addressing, is it?
What is incoherent about a God who doesn't want to reveal Himself to all and sundry? The desire _might_ be illogical, but if illogical motivations proved the nonexistence of the subject, then you've just proved that humans don't exist.
> >> > That's about as far beyond logic as you can get, so logically, the > >> > only safe position is true agnosticism, as Huxley defined it.
> >> Once again, when you go "beyond" logic, you're into the realm of the > >> incoherent and therefore logically impossible.
> > Well certainly, I agree that when you go beyond logic you become > > incoherent, because logic tests for consistency and by definition, > > that which is inconsistent is incoherent too. However, what logic can > > test in principle is a much larger set than what we can test using > > logic.
> > This is the limited sense in which I use the phrase beyond logic.
> > My position is that there is a set of objects, which are definable in > > principle, but beyond _our_ ability to define only because we lack the > > perspicacity or imagination.
> > If you accept this, then I think you should also accept that God might > > fall into this catagory as a coherent, but untestable object.
> > The problem I have with your position as I interpret it, is that if an > > object cannot be defined by us, then it can't exist. This would kill > > exploration stone dead, because such efforts are done in the wholly > > logical (to me, at least) assumption that there _is_ something there > > to discover.
> Yes, but discovery implies observation.
Again, that isn't the point I'm making. I'm talking about the justification of the exploration _before_ the discovery is made.
Your position seems to exclude the possibility that something can exist if it hasn't been defined. How then could anything new ever be discovered?
The problem isn't that the principles you support doesn't do what you want, but that when generalised, they throw up absurdities.
> > You see, I see logic's function as not merely to confirm what we may > > know, but as a guide to what we may have yet to learn. For instance, > > using concepts like guage symmetry, physicists know to go looking for > > the Higgs Boson and roughly where they'll find it in the scheme of > > things.
> Yes, but the theory of which gauge symmetry is a part was derived from > observable facts about nature. The "scheme of things" isn't sitting > waiting for us to believe in it before revealing itself.
Like all theories, Guage symmetry is a logical extension from observation of the world. The assumption is that the world is lawful and that because of this, it will act in ways which are predicable. In effect by formulating theories, we are able to predefine things which as yet haven't been discovered.
One the other hand, religious ideas are arbitary in that they are not the product of logical extention or any other systematic process of generation.
If you accept this position, we have discovered a very powerful reason to reject the idea that belief in Darwinian evolution is religious; because Darwin composed the theory after observing the apparent adapted nature of organisms and the nature of heredity.
Intelligent Design however, is not a product of logical extension and so qualifies as a religious idea, inappropriate for a science class.
Okay, you've satisfied me that you have rational criterior for catching false positives: by examining their provenance and corroborating the initial evidence, you can exclude ideas with insufficient backup.
What you haven't established is that your test won't give false negatives: say something is false when in fact it's true.
Your approach can confirm directly observed facts and new discoveries predicted by a properly applied and complete theory. However, unless you have a theory of everything, there must be a class of real things for which you neither have no direct observation or theory and what'smore have no way of telling what they are.
Your stance would say that any description of such an object is incoherent, but to me this is clearly wrong. Coherence is a measure of _internal_ consistency and I see nothing incoherent in the idea of an agent wishing to hide itself, even if that decision isn't rational in itself.
There is no positive reason to believe in God, but no absolute proof that He doesn't exist either, which is why I insist that Huxley was right.
> > The downside to this is that it provides a convenient bolt hole for > > all sort of hocus pocus, including God.
> Yeah, but it's not usually very hard at all to tell when it's hocus > pocus and just dismiss all the metaphysical woohoo that tries to justify > it.
Well, I think that on this point I've shown that you're over-reaching.
Stanley Friesen <sar...@friesen.net> wrote in message <news:scveh0pgh59s13fg43rkg3tpki8lpd32ds@4ax.com>... > diri.g...@virgin.net (Ian Braidwood) wrote: > >We also have a doctrine which says that He's invisible and won't come > >unless you already believe and then only if you're incredibly > >fortunate (nay _chosen_).
> That "doctrine" is not really the orthodox one. "Behold I stand at the > door and knock". The orthodox position is thus that he is always there > if we have the wisdom to see him.
I stand corrected. However this doesn't help the situation at all, because it offers no means of corroboration.
How is a person supposed to tell whether he is wise or deluded? More importantly, how are other people supposed to know, especially when so many people who claim such knowledge are evidently insane or stupid?
>> >> I would contend that you've got a definition that is logically >> >> incoherent, not just untestable. QED, no such thing can exist.
>> > Just for clarity, what do you think renders it incoherent?
>> The part about how it can't be tested logically.
> Without regard as to why it can't be tested?
The alleged reason is that it can *never* be tested.
> To use Bertand Russell's famous example, what if there was a chocolate > teapot orbiting Mars. Although patently absurd, there's nothing > logically incoherent about this untestable idea. You can't prove that > there isn't a chocolate teapot orbiting Mars at this moment, can you?
If I can formulate ways to test for the presence of chocolate teapots, then yes, I can prove whether there is or is not a chocolate teapot orbiting Mars, unless you start giving said teapot impossible attributes, ala Sagan's dragon in the garage.
>> >> > We also have a doctrine which says that He's invisible and won't >> >> > come unless you already believe and then only if you're >> >> > incredibly fortunate (nay _chosen_).
>> >> Since that is also logically incoherent the question of proof >> >> doesn't even enter the picture.
>> > Again, what makes this incoherent? Bearing in mind of course, that >> > invisibility wouldn't be an inherent characteristic of god, but a >> > choice He made.
>> It's an illogical choice, requiring belief before giving the evidence >> that would allow belief to be formed logically.
> Ahhh. So, because she hasn't caught any enemy agents in the last > fortnight, the head of counter intelligence at MI5 is safe in assuming > that no one has infiltrated the organisation? I'll sleep safer in my > bed tonight, thanks.
That ignores the distinction between a hypothesis and a belief. (Hypothesis being a *provisional* acceptance of a claim in order to formulate a method of testing.)
> We on alt.atheism know that belief in God is irrational, but that > isn't the question we're addressing, is it?
> What is incoherent about a God who doesn't want to reveal Himself to > all and sundry? The desire _might_ be illogical, but if illogical > motivations proved the nonexistence of the subject, then you've just > proved that humans don't exist.
God is supposed to be as irrational as humans? That rather obviates any point in believing in him, doesn't it?
>> >> > That's about as far beyond logic as you can get, so logically, >> >> > the only safe position is true agnosticism, as Huxley defined >> >> > it.
>> >> Once again, when you go "beyond" logic, you're into the realm of >> >> the incoherent and therefore logically impossible.
>> > Well certainly, I agree that when you go beyond logic you become >> > incoherent, because logic tests for consistency and by definition, >> > that which is inconsistent is incoherent too. However, what logic >> > can test in principle is a much larger set than what we can test >> > using logic.
>> > This is the limited sense in which I use the phrase beyond logic.
>> > My position is that there is a set of objects, which are definable >> > in principle, but beyond _our_ ability to define only because we >> > lack the perspicacity or imagination.
>> > If you accept this, then I think you should also accept that God >> > might fall into this catagory as a coherent, but untestable object.
>> > The problem I have with your position as I interpret it, is that if >> > an object cannot be defined by us, then it can't exist. This would >> > kill exploration stone dead, because such efforts are done in the >> > wholly logical (to me, at least) assumption that there _is_ >> > something there to discover.
>> Yes, but discovery implies observation.
> Again, that isn't the point I'm making. I'm talking about the > justification of the exploration _before_ the discovery is made.
I'm setting off to get that chocolate teapot that's circling Mars then. I won't be bothering to make any other observations, I already know what I'm looking for.
> Your position seems to exclude the possibility that something can > exist if it hasn't been defined. How then could anything new ever be > discovered?
You're confusing "hasn't been defined" with "cannot be defined".
> The problem isn't that the principles you support doesn't do what you > want, but that when generalised, they throw up absurdities.
That's because you're making absurdities and calling them generalizations. The principle you're missing is that of hypothesis and testing.
>> > You see, I see logic's function as not merely to confirm what we >> > may know, but as a guide to what we may have yet to learn. For >> > instance, using concepts like guage symmetry, physicists know to go >> > looking for the Higgs Boson and roughly where they'll find it in >> > the scheme of things.
>> Yes, but the theory of which gauge symmetry is a part was derived >> from observable facts about nature. The "scheme of things" isn't >> sitting waiting for us to believe in it before revealing itself.
> Like all theories, Guage symmetry is a logical extension from > observation of the world. The assumption is that the world is lawful > and that because of this, it will act in ways which are predicable. In > effect by formulating theories, we are able to predefine things which > as yet haven't been discovered.
> One the other hand, religious ideas are arbitary in that they are not > the product of logical extention or any other systematic process of > generation.
> If you accept this position, we have discovered a very powerful reason > to reject the idea that belief in Darwinian evolution is religious; > because Darwin composed the theory after observing the apparent > adapted nature of organisms and the nature of heredity.
> Intelligent Design however, is not a product of logical extension and > so qualifies as a religious idea, inappropriate for a science class.
> Okay, you've satisfied me that you have rational criterior for > catching false positives: by examining their provenance and > corroborating the initial evidence, you can exclude ideas with > insufficient backup.
> What you haven't established is that your test won't give false > negatives: say something is false when in fact it's true.
> Your approach can confirm directly observed facts and new discoveries > predicted by a properly applied and complete theory. However, unless > you have a theory of everything, there must be a class of real things > for which you neither have no direct observation or theory and > what'smore have no way of telling what they are.
Which does not describe the situation with respect to "God".
> Your stance would say that any description of such an object is > incoherent, but to me this is clearly wrong. Coherence is a measure of > _internal_ consistency and I see nothing incoherent in the idea of an > agent wishing to hide itself, even if that decision isn't rational in > itself.
> There is no positive reason to believe in God, but no absolute proof > that He doesn't exist either, which is why I insist that Huxley was > right.
Only if nobody has even tried to describe any aspect of God.
>> > The downside to this is that it provides a convenient bolt hole for >> > all sort of hocus pocus, including God.
>> Yeah, but it's not usually very hard at all to tell when it's hocus >> pocus and just dismiss all the metaphysical woohoo that tries to >> justify it.
> Well, I think that on this point I've shown that you're over-reaching.
I think you've just shown that you've missed a few things about your "absurdities" that don't really prove my overreaching.
-- Fred Stone aa# 1369 Cthulhu for President! Why vote for a lesser evil?
diri.g...@virgin.net (Ian Braidwood) wrote: >Stanley Friesen <sar...@friesen.net> wrote in message <news:scveh0pgh59s13fg43rkg3tpki8lpd32ds@4ax.com>... >> diri.g...@virgin.net (Ian Braidwood) wrote: >> >We also have a doctrine which says that He's invisible and won't come >> >unless you already believe and then only if you're incredibly >> >fortunate (nay _chosen_).
>> That "doctrine" is not really the orthodox one. "Behold I stand at the >> door and knock". The orthodox position is thus that he is always there >> if we have the wisdom to see him.
>I stand corrected. However this doesn't help the situation at all, >because it offers no means of corroboration.
>How is a person supposed to tell whether he is wise or deluded? More >importantly, how are other people supposed to know, especially when so >many people who claim such knowledge are evidently insane or stupid?
Well, yes, that is a difficult question. I do not pretend to know the answer to that one. -- The peace of God be with you.
> On Mon, 9 Aug 2004 19:09:36 +0000 (UTC), Steve Schaffner > <s...@darwin.broad.mit.edu> wrote:
> >"Christopher A. Lee" <ca...@optonline.net> writes: > >> IF the deity in question is defined with mutually exclusive > >> attributes, in this case "unknowable" and knowledge that it is > >> unknowable" then this deity WITH THESE ATTRIBUTES CANNOT EXIST. > >> Period.
> >> It is defined in such a way that it cannot exist.
> >Yes, I know that's what you said. What you didn't do was demonstrate > >that the deity *is* defined with mutually exclusive attributes.
> Not my problem - plenty of believers insist that it is unknowable. > However you redefined "unknowable" to pretend the universe was equally > unknowable. Which equivocates between the original meaning and your > new meaning.
Pretty much everything you wrote here is wrong. I have not redefined "unknowable": I'm trying to find out what definition is being used. I have not pretended that the universe is as unknowable as some theists' God; I have tried to find out from you what theists mean by "unknowable". You seem not to know.
> > In > >order to do so, you have to demonstrate that the "unknowable" in > >theological statements about the deity has the meaning that you are > >assuming (which seems to be "nothing whatsoever can be known about > >X"). You have not done this.
> The whet the heck does "unknowable" mean?
I have a pretty good idea what it means for a fact to be unknowable. I don't really know what it means for an entity to be unknowable, which would seem to be important to understanding what the religious claims in question are trying to say.
If I have understood you correctly, your argument is that any statement of the form "X is unknowable" is self-contradictory, since it supposes knowledge of something unknowable. Is that really what you are arguing?
-- Steve Schaffner s...@broad.mit.edu Immediate assurance is an excellent sign of probable lack of insight into the topic. Josiah Royce
prabb...@shamrocksgf.com writes: > In talk.atheism Steve Schaffner <s...@darwin.broad.mit.edu> wrote: > > "Christopher A. Lee" <ca...@optonline.net> writes:
> >> On Mon, 9 Aug 2004 12:39:27 +0000 (UTC), Steve Schaffner > >> <s...@darwin.broad.mit.edu> wrote:
> >> >None of the major religious traditions that I'm aware of define God as > >> >"that which cannot be defined" or the like. The incomprehensibility > >> >of God is often included in their descriptions of him, but it is > >> >hardly the only element; e.g. they usually include "creator of the > >> >physical universe" in their description of God.
> >> Which of course contradicts its supposed unknowability. If it really > >> were unknowable they wouldn't know that it created the universe. They > >> can't have it both ways. But if they want to then they have defined an > >> impossibility because of two mutually exclusive properties..
> > Well, that would depend on what is meant by unknowable, wouldn't it? > > The universe as a whole, for example, is clearly unknowable, but I > > think it would be a mistake to argue that the entire universe is > > a logical impossibility.
> How is it unknowable? What about it can't be known, given enough time, etc?
We cannot know the full details, down to the atom, about any macroscopic object -- too much information is required. (And imagine your brain being able to fully comprehend every detail of its own operation -- how could it understand itself understanding itself?)
We cannot know whether we are part of a quantum multiverse.
We cannot know (and will never be able to know) whether there are galaxies 10^15 light years away, or anything else about conditions there (if indeed there is a "there" there).
Plus there is also the fact that we do not and probably cannot know why the universe is the way it is and follows the rules it does.
-- Steve Schaffner s...@broad.mit.edu Immediate assurance is an excellent sign of probable lack of insight into the topic. Josiah Royce
<s...@darwin.broad.mit.edu> wrote: >"Christopher A. Lee" <ca...@optonline.net> writes:
>> On Mon, 9 Aug 2004 19:09:36 +0000 (UTC), Steve Schaffner >> <s...@darwin.broad.mit.edu> wrote:
>> >"Christopher A. Lee" <ca...@optonline.net> writes: >> >> IF the deity in question is defined with mutually exclusive >> >> attributes, in this case "unknowable" and knowledge that it is >> >> unknowable" then this deity WITH THESE ATTRIBUTES CANNOT EXIST. >> >> Period.
>> >> It is defined in such a way that it cannot exist.
>> >Yes, I know that's what you said. What you didn't do was demonstrate >> >that the deity *is* defined with mutually exclusive attributes.
>> Not my problem - plenty of believers insist that it is unknowable. >> However you redefined "unknowable" to pretend the universe was equally >> unknowable. Which equivocates between the original meaning and your >> new meaning.
>Pretty much everything you wrote here is wrong. I have not redefined >"unknowable": I'm trying to find out what definition is being used. I >have not pretended that the universe is as unknowable as some theists' >God; I have tried to find out from you what theists mean by >"unknowable". You seem not to know.
OK then. If you had not heard the word before, how would you interpret it?
I know perfectly well how I would, especially as it is not qualified by "almost", "nearly" etc.
But it's not really my problem, it is the theists' who insist on these paradoxical attributes. The same thing happens with the omni-whatevers.
>> > In >> >order to do so, you have to demonstrate that the "unknowable" in >> >theological statements about the deity has the meaning that you are >> >assuming (which seems to be "nothing whatsoever can be known about >> >X"). You have not done this.
>> The whet the heck does "unknowable" mean?
>I have a pretty good idea what it means for a fact to be unknowable. >I don't really know what it means for an entity to be unknowable, >which would seem to be important to understanding what the religious >claims in question are trying to say.
Then you are redefining it already, because if it is unknowable you can't know it is a fact.
>If I have understood you correctly, your argument is that any >statement of the form "X is unknowable" is self-contradictory, since >it supposes knowledge of something unknowable. Is that really what >you are arguing?
Rather oversimplified, but along those lines. It's not a "something" but an abstract logical variable.
> The research goes on, with theories being formulated and then refuted > or corroborated by new data. That's how science works. Here is one of > them:
> > How did totally-blind, mindless-at-every-level processes generate the > > meaning-laden sequences of nucleotides that code for all the different > > biological structures and body plans and organisms in biology?
> Trial and error with successes increasing exponentially, a la compound > interest.
> > > How did totally-blind, mindless-at-every-level processes generate the > > > meaning-laden sequences of nucleotides that code for all the different > > > biological structures and body plans and organisms in biology?
> > Trial and error with successes increasing exponentially, a la compound > > interest.
> References, please.
Get an education, David. It's called natural selection. It's been studied and researched intensively for 150 years. There are whole libraries of books on the subject. Try reading a few of them for comprehension rather than skimming them for quotes.
>Get an education, David. It's called natural selection. It's been >studied and researched intensively for 150 years. There are whole >libraries of books on the subject. >Richard
But...Richard, didn't you just deny what "the books says" on Natural Selection? In Origin of Species? Did not you, and John Harshman, and "doctor John" tell us that Darwin was WRONG on Natural Selection?
> >> >> I would contend that you've got a definition that is logically > >> >> incoherent, not just untestable. QED, no such thing can exist.
> >> > Just for clarity, what do you think renders it incoherent?
> >> The part about how it can't be tested logically.
> > Without regard as to why it can't be tested?
> The alleged reason is that it can *never* be tested.
> > To use Bertand Russell's famous example, what if there was a chocolate > > teapot orbiting Mars. Although patently absurd, there's nothing > > logically incoherent about this untestable idea. You can't prove that > > there isn't a chocolate teapot orbiting Mars at this moment, can you?
> If I can formulate ways to test for the presence of chocolate teapots, > then yes, I can prove whether there is or is not a chocolate teapot > orbiting Mars, unless you start giving said teapot impossible > attributes, ala Sagan's dragon in the garage.
One of the nice things about the chocolate teapot example is that in principle, it is testable, but beyond our abilities at the moment, while being so absurd no one sensible would believe it; that is why I chose to use it.
The point is that your position rejects a possibility irrationally, because you haven't proven that there isn't a chocolate teapot orbiting Mars. Similarly, your (anybody's) rejection of God isn't rational, precisely because it hasn't been defined. The incompleteness of the definition means that you can't guarantee the efficiency of any test for God you make.
> >> It's an illogical choice, requiring belief before giving the evidence > >> that would allow belief to be formed logically.
> > Ahhh. So, because she hasn't caught any enemy agents in the last > > fortnight, the head of counter intelligence at MI5 is safe in assuming > > that no one has infiltrated the organisation? I'll sleep safer in my > > bed tonight, thanks.
> That ignores the distinction between a hypothesis and a belief. > (Hypothesis being a *provisional* acceptance of a claim in order to > formulate a method of testing.)
I'm actually more interested in the difference between belief and knowledge. You claim that the insufficiency of the definition _proves_ that the subject(God) doesn't exist. You claim it as fact.
I am saying that insufficiency in definition renders knowledge of the subject impossible. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to justify belief, but no absolute proof that the subject doesn't exist.
A given definition might be rejected as a possibility if it contains something _inherently_ impossible, but that only proves the definition flawed, it doesn't prove the non-existence of the subject.
> > We on alt.atheism know that belief in God is irrational, but that > > isn't the question we're addressing, is it?
> > What is incoherent about a God who doesn't want to reveal Himself to > > all and sundry? The desire _might_ be illogical, but if illogical > > motivations proved the nonexistence of the subject, then you've just > > proved that humans don't exist.
> God is supposed to be as irrational as humans? That rather obviates any > point in believing in him, doesn't it?
If He exists, then it is rational to believe in Him, even if He is irrational; though whether He is _worthy_ of worship is another question.
It might be rational to worship Him even if he is not worthy, in the same way as it might be rational to pay money to a gangster, if you consider police protection to be inadequate.
> >> Yes, but discovery implies observation.
> > Again, that isn't the point I'm making. I'm talking about the > > justification of the exploration _before_ the discovery is made.
> I'm setting off to get that chocolate teapot that's circling Mars then. > I won't be bothering to make any other observations, I already know what > I'm looking for.
And you'd be irrational to do so, on that we agree. Where we do not agree is whther the case for a chocolate teapot orbiting Mars is _proven_. You says it is - against - while I say it isn't proven; though I regard the possiblilty as so unlikely as to render it not worth investigation. As the aphorism states: absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence.
> > Your position seems to exclude the possibility that something can > > exist if it hasn't been defined. How then could anything new ever be > > discovered?
> You're confusing "hasn't been defined" with "cannot be defined".
I'm not confusing these things. After all, I was the one who made the distinction between things which can't be proven in principle and things which can't be proven through lack of percipience.
One possibility is that the definition isn't a good representation of its subject, that zealous exageration might have inflated the definition of the subject beyond all reason. After all, the bible is hardly the acme of veracity it is claimed to be, we know that from internal consistencies. God might have been a Vorlon. :-)
> > The problem isn't that the principles you support doesn't do what you > > want, but that when generalised, they throw up absurdities.
> That's because you're making absurdities and calling them > generalizations. The principle you're missing is that of hypothesis and > testing.
Trouble is that I'm making the absurdities by logical extension, not pure invention, so they're a real problem for your position.
> > Your approach can confirm directly observed facts and new discoveries > > predicted by a properly applied and complete theory. However, unless > > you have a theory of everything, there must be a class of real things > > for which you neither have no direct observation or theory and > > what'smore have no way of telling what they are.
> Which does not describe the situation with respect to "God".
That assumes that the definition of God is accurate for its subject when it's not even complete and contains logical absurdities. We don't have a coherent definition of God, so we can't test His existence. The descrition is obviously wrong, no such being could exist, so _either_ He doesn't exist _or_ the definition is flawed, but we can't tell which and that is why the nonexistence of god is _not_ proven.
> > There is no positive reason to believe in God, but no absolute proof > > that He doesn't exist either, which is why I insist that Huxley was > > right.
> Only if nobody has even tried to describe any aspect of God.
But your disproof applies to the subject only as far as the original definitin is accurate. Since it is not even coherent, let alone accurate, there is reason to assume the definition is no accurate representation of God Himself.
> >> > The downside to this is that it provides a convenient bolt hole for > >> > all sort of hocus pocus, including God.
> >> Yeah, but it's not usually very hard at all to tell when it's hocus > >> pocus and just dismiss all the metaphysical woohoo that tries to > >> justify it.
> > Well, I think that on this point I've shown that you're over-reaching.
> I think you've just shown that you've missed a few things about your > "absurdities" that don't really prove my overreaching.
You're confusing the description with the subject and that is why you're over-reaching. Proving the definition incoherent does not prove that there was no subject to inspire the definition in the first place.
diri.g...@virgin.net (Ian Braidwood) wrote: > > > To use Bertand Russell's famous example, what if there was a chocolate > > > teapot orbiting Mars. Although patently absurd, there's nothing > > > logically incoherent about this untestable idea. You can't prove that > > > there isn't a chocolate teapot orbiting Mars at this moment, can you?
> > If I can formulate ways to test for the presence of chocolate teapots, > > then yes, I can prove whether there is or is not a chocolate teapot > > orbiting Mars, unless you start giving said teapot impossible > > attributes, ala Sagan's dragon in the garage.
> One of the nice things about the chocolate teapot example is that in > principle, it is testable, but beyond our abilities at the moment, > while being so absurd no one sensible would believe it; that is why I > chose to use it.
> The point is that your position rejects a possibility irrationally, > because you haven't proven that there isn't a chocolate teapot > orbiting Mars. Similarly, your (anybody's) rejection of God isn't > rational, precisely because it hasn't been defined. The incompleteness > of the definition means that you can't guarantee the efficiency of any > test for God you make.
If "God" has no complete definition, then what are you talking about that may or may not exist? Nothing...
A more accurate analogy would be for someone to assert that blobulot exists, and challenge any others to prove him wrong. Whats a blobulot? That someone refuses to explain.
So, we can't prove that blobulot exists, nor can we prove that it doesn't. But then, since *no one* knows what blobulot is, neither position can ever be proven.
> > > > To use Bertand Russell's famous example, what if there was a chocolate > > > > teapot orbiting Mars. Although patently absurd, there's nothing > > > > logically incoherent about this untestable idea. You can't prove that > > > > there isn't a chocolate teapot orbiting Mars at this moment, can you?
> > > If I can formulate ways to test for the presence of chocolate teapots, > > > then yes, I can prove whether there is or is not a chocolate teapot > > > orbiting Mars, unless you start giving said teapot impossible > > > attributes, ala Sagan's dragon in the garage.
> > One of the nice things about the chocolate teapot example is that in > > principle, it is testable, but beyond our abilities at the moment, > > while being so absurd no one sensible would believe it; that is why I > > chose to use it.
> > The point is that your position rejects a possibility irrationally, > > because you haven't proven that there isn't a chocolate teapot > > orbiting Mars. Similarly, your (anybody's) rejection of God isn't > > rational, precisely because it hasn't been defined. The incompleteness > > of the definition means that you can't guarantee the efficiency of any > > test for God you make.
> If "God" has no complete definition, then what are you talking about > that may or may not exist? Nothing...
> A more accurate analogy would be for someone to assert that blobulot > exists, and challenge any others to prove him wrong. Whats a blobulot? > That someone refuses to explain.
> So, we can't prove that blobulot exists, nor can we prove that it > doesn't. But then, since *no one* knows what blobulot is, neither > position can ever be proven.
> > > > > To use Bertand Russell's famous example, what if there was a > > > > > chocolate > > > > > teapot orbiting Mars. Although patently absurd, there's nothing > > > > > logically incoherent about this untestable idea. You can't prove that > > > > > there isn't a chocolate teapot orbiting Mars at this moment, can you?
> > > > If I can formulate ways to test for the presence of chocolate teapots, > > > > then yes, I can prove whether there is or is not a chocolate teapot > > > > orbiting Mars, unless you start giving said teapot impossible > > > > attributes, ala Sagan's dragon in the garage.
> > > One of the nice things about the chocolate teapot example is that in > > > principle, it is testable, but beyond our abilities at the moment, > > > while being so absurd no one sensible would believe it; that is why I > > > chose to use it.
> > > The point is that your position rejects a possibility irrationally, > > > because you haven't proven that there isn't a chocolate teapot > > > orbiting Mars. Similarly, your (anybody's) rejection of God isn't > > > rational, precisely because it hasn't been defined. The incompleteness > > > of the definition means that you can't guarantee the efficiency of any > > > test for God you make.
> > If "God" has no complete definition, then what are you talking about > > that may or may not exist? Nothing...
> > A more accurate analogy would be for someone to assert that blobulot > > exists, and challenge any others to prove him wrong. Whats a blobulot? > > That someone refuses to explain.
> > So, we can't prove that blobulot exists, nor can we prove that it > > doesn't. But then, since *no one* knows what blobulot is, neither > > position can ever be proven.
> You have my position exactly, sir.
As I understand your point, God could exist simply because we don't know what God is. But as you have just agreed that nothing can be shown to exist if we don't have a definition for it, how could you take that postion?
> > > > > > To use Bertand Russell's famous example, what if there was a > > > > > > chocolate > > > > > > teapot orbiting Mars. Although patently absurd, there's nothing > > > > > > logically incoherent about this untestable idea. You can't prove that > > > > > > there isn't a chocolate teapot orbiting Mars at this moment, can you?
> > > > > If I can formulate ways to test for the presence of chocolate teapots, > > > > > then yes, I can prove whether there is or is not a chocolate teapot > > > > > orbiting Mars, unless you start giving said teapot impossible > > > > > attributes, ala Sagan's dragon in the garage.
> > > > One of the nice things about the chocolate teapot example is that in > > > > principle, it is testable, but beyond our abilities at the moment, > > > > while being so absurd no one sensible would believe it; that is why I > > > > chose to use it.
> > > > The point is that your position rejects a possibility irrationally, > > > > because you haven't proven that there isn't a chocolate teapot > > > > orbiting Mars. Similarly, your (anybody's) rejection of God isn't > > > > rational, precisely because it hasn't been defined. The incompleteness > > > > of the definition means that you can't guarantee the efficiency of any > > > > test for God you make.
> > > If "God" has no complete definition, then what are you talking about > > > that may or may not exist? Nothing...
> > > A more accurate analogy would be for someone to assert that blobulot > > > exists, and challenge any others to prove him wrong. Whats a blobulot? > > > That someone refuses to explain.
> > > So, we can't prove that blobulot exists, nor can we prove that it > > > doesn't. But then, since *no one* knows what blobulot is, neither > > > position can ever be proven.
> > You have my position exactly, sir.
> As I understand your point, God could exist simply because we don't know > what God is. But as you have just agreed that nothing can be shown to > exist if we don't have a definition for it, how could you take that > postion?
Simple, I argue that the set of things which can exist is larger than the set of things which have been defined. Therefore, there must be things which exist, but have not been defined.
If you hold disproved the existence of any object which has not been defined, then you erroneously dismiss all those objects which haven't yet been discovered.
You could use this position to argue that Caeser had no haemoglobin, because haemoglobin was not defined until much later in history and therefore could not have existed. Yet who seriously doubts Ceaser's haemoglobin? This is the sort of absurdity which this position throws up.
There is another reason why I'm sceptical and that is that, while a definition is dependent on the thing which it defines, there is no reciprocal dependence on the object's part. A flawed definition implies no flaw in its subject.
Undiscovered bird species don't wait in a state of quasi-existence for an explorer to stumble through the undergrowth with her binoculars. Neither does the alimentry canal of a mammal exist independently browsing leaves, while biologists only know of the species through its droppings. Both species are complete and doing their own sweet thing _sans_ definition.
This is why logical deductions require corroboration and the real reason people say 'in theory anyway', because any flaw in the definition will cause logic and reality to diverge.
When you manipulate words, you are manipulating tokens which stand in for the things, not the things themselves. These tokens only notionally share the characteritics of the subjects and any differnce - whether through error or incompleteness - will cause divergence between the the predictions and the events themselves.
The fact that the token God lacks a definition only proves the insufficiency of the token, not its subject. On that, we are simply unable to draw any meaningful conclusions, including His existence.
> > As I understand your point, God could exist simply because we don't know > > what God is. But as you have just agreed that nothing can be shown to > > exist if we don't have a definition for it, how could you take that > > postion?
> Simple, I argue that the set of things which can exist is larger than > the set of things which have been defined. Therefore, there must be > things which exist, but have not been defined.
> If you hold disproved the existence of any object which has not been > defined, then you erroneously dismiss all those objects which haven't > yet been discovered.
You are making a claim that undefined things exist. You can prove this claim by simply presenting *one* thing that you can demonstrate exists but is undefined. However, that can't be done, even in principle.
> You could use this position to argue that Caeser had no haemoglobin, > because haemoglobin was not defined until much later in history and > therefore could not have existed. Yet who seriously doubts Ceaser's > haemoglobin? This is the sort of absurdity which this position throws > up.
You could not argue any such thing because haemoglobain is well defined at the time the argument is taking place, therefore it is not among the "set of things which are not defined".
Instead lets argue that Caeser had balfblot. There is no possible way that this positive claim can be proven. There is no way of testing for the presents of balfblot until after its properties are defined.
In taking your position, one could argue that Caeser had balfblot and then insist that it has already been proven simply because Ceaser had things, any one of which may very well be balfblot simply because we don't know what balfblot is.
> When you manipulate words, you are manipulating tokens which stand in > for the things, not the things themselves.
And when you minipulate words that have no definition, you manipulate *no thing*. Such words represent nothing at all.
>> > > > > > To use Bertand Russell's famous example, what if there was a >> > > > > > chocolate >> > > > > > teapot orbiting Mars. Although patently absurd, there's nothing >> > > > > > logically incoherent about this untestable idea. You can't prove that >> > > > > > there isn't a chocolate teapot orbiting Mars at this moment, can you?
>> > > > > If I can formulate ways to test for the presence of chocolate teapots, >> > > > > then yes, I can prove whether there is or is not a chocolate teapot >> > > > > orbiting Mars, unless you start giving said teapot impossible >> > > > > attributes, ala Sagan's dragon in the garage.
>> > > > One of the nice things about the chocolate teapot example is that in >> > > > principle, it is testable, but beyond our abilities at the moment, >> > > > while being so absurd no one sensible would believe it; that is why I >> > > > chose to use it.
>> > > > The point is that your position rejects a possibility irrationally, >> > > > because you haven't proven that there isn't a chocolate teapot >> > > > orbiting Mars. Similarly, your (anybody's) rejection of God isn't >> > > > rational, precisely because it hasn't been defined. The incompleteness >> > > > of the definition means that you can't guarantee the efficiency of any >> > > > test for God you make.
>> > > If "God" has no complete definition, then what are you talking about >> > > that may or may not exist? Nothing...
>> > > A more accurate analogy would be for someone to assert that blobulot >> > > exists, and challenge any others to prove him wrong. Whats a blobulot? >> > > That someone refuses to explain.
>> > > So, we can't prove that blobulot exists, nor can we prove that it >> > > doesn't. But then, since *no one* knows what blobulot is, neither >> > > position can ever be proven.
>> > You have my position exactly, sir.
>> As I understand your point, God could exist simply because we don't know >> what God is. But as you have just agreed that nothing can be shown to >> exist if we don't have a definition for it, how could you take that >> postion? > Simple, I argue that the set of things which can exist is larger than > the set of things which have been defined. Therefore, there must be > things which exist, but have not been defined. > If you hold disproved the existence of any object which has not been > defined, then you erroneously dismiss all those objects which haven't > yet been discovered. > You could use this position to argue that Caeser had no haemoglobin, > because haemoglobin was not defined until much later in history and > therefore could not have existed. Yet who seriously doubts Ceaser's > haemoglobin? This is the sort of absurdity which this position throws > up.
No, this is the absurdity that your strawman throws up. Fred has already made the distinction that it's not "something doesn't exist if it HAS not been defined" but instead has stated that "something can't exist if it CAN not be defined." "Has" and "can" are not the same thing. If you can't, in any fashion, form or way, define "blobulot" then "blobulot" is meaningless. If you define it in such a way that it's incoherent, then it's meaningless. This means that the god that is either not-definable or the one that is incoherently defined doesn't exist but the god that hasn't yet been defined might still exist.
I.e. a tri-omni god is incoherent. Thus a tri-omni god doesn't exist. But that doesn't mean some other god(s) do(es)n't exist.
> There is another reason why I'm sceptical and that is that, while a > definition is dependent on the thing which it defines, there is no > reciprocal dependence on the object's part. A flawed definition > implies no flaw in its subject. > Undiscovered bird species don't wait in a state of quasi-existence for > an explorer to stumble through the undergrowth with her binoculars.
CAN these unknown birds be defined? Of course they can. Can YOU define them? Maybe not (since they haven't been yet seen.) But this isn't a matter of "can YOU do X" but "is X even possible at all?"
> Neither does the alimentry canal of a mammal exist independently > browsing leaves, while biologists only know of the species through its > droppings. Both species are complete and doing their own sweet thing > _sans_ definition. > This is why logical deductions require corroboration and the real > reason people say 'in theory anyway', because any flaw in the > definition will cause logic and reality to diverge. > When you manipulate words, you are manipulating tokens which stand in > for the things, not the things themselves. These tokens only > notionally share the characteritics of the subjects and any differnce > - whether through error or incompleteness - will cause divergence > between the the predictions and the events themselves. > The fact that the token God lacks a definition only proves the > insufficiency of the token, not its subject. On that, we are simply > unable to draw any meaningful conclusions, including His existence.
Can god ever be defined? If he exists, then he can be defined in some way. So to say he's totally undefinable means he doesn't exist.
> Regards > (-: Ian :-)
-- Mike
W hat atheism: a non-prophet organization... W ould J enna D rink? ------------------------------- Creation Science: an oxymoron actually created by morons... ------------------------------- Before you criticize someone, walk a mile in their shoes. That way when you do criticize them, you're a mile away, and you have their shoes.
In talk.atheism Stanley Friesen <sar...@friesen.net> wrote:
> prabb...@shamrocksgf.com wrote: >>In talk.atheism Steve Schaffner <s...@darwin.broad.mit.edu> wrote: >>> "Christopher A. Lee" <ca...@optonline.net> writes: >>> Well, that would depend on what is meant by unknowable, wouldn't it? >>> The universe as a whole, for example, is clearly unknowable, but I >>> think it would be a mistake to argue that the entire universe is >>> a logical impossibility.
>>How is it unknowable? What about it can't be known, given enough time, etc?
> The universe *as *a* *whole* is what is unknowable. This does *not* > mean that any given fact about the Universe is unknowable.
You still haven't answered the question. How is the universe unknowable? The universe is composed of a finite amount of information. Thus that information can be contained somewhere. So how is it unknowable?
> -- > The peace of God be with you. > Stanley Friesen
-- Mike
W hat atheism: a non-prophet organization... W ould J enna D rink? ------------------------------- Creation Science: an oxymoron actually created by morons... ------------------------------- Before you criticize someone, walk a mile in their shoes. That way when you do criticize them, you're a mile away, and you have their shoes.
> prabb...@shamrocksgf.com writes: >> In talk.atheism Steve Schaffner <s...@darwin.broad.mit.edu> wrote: >> > "Christopher A. Lee" <ca...@optonline.net> writes:
>> >> On Mon, 9 Aug 2004 12:39:27 +0000 (UTC), Steve Schaffner >> >> <s...@darwin.broad.mit.edu> wrote:
>> >> >None of the major religious traditions that I'm aware of define God as >> >> >"that which cannot be defined" or the like. The incomprehensibility >> >> >of God is often included in their descriptions of him, but it is >> >> >hardly the only element; e.g. they usually include "creator of the >> >> >physical universe" in their description of God.
>> >> Which of course contradicts its supposed unknowability. If it really >> >> were unknowable they wouldn't know that it created the universe. They >> >> can't have it both ways. But if they want to then they have defined an >> >> impossibility because of two mutually exclusive properties..
>> > Well, that would depend on what is meant by unknowable, wouldn't it? >> > The universe as a whole, for example, is clearly unknowable, but I >> > think it would be a mistake to argue that the entire universe is >> > a logical impossibility.
>> How is it unknowable? What about it can't be known, given enough time, etc? > We cannot know the full details, down to the atom, about any > macroscopic object -- too much information is required. (And imagine > your brain being able to fully comprehend every detail of its own > operation -- how could it understand itself understanding itself?)
WE can't know it but that doesn't preclude a computer, etc knowing it. If the universe is limited in size, then there's a finite amount of info that can be held in a finite storage system.
> We cannot know whether we are part of a quantum multiverse.
But that's not something about THIS universe that's unknowable. That's something about possible things outside the universe.
> We cannot know (and will never be able to know) whether there are > galaxies 10^15 light years away, or anything else about conditions > there (if indeed there is a "there" there).
And those also wouldn't be part of THIS universe (where the universe is anything contained within your viewable lightcone.)
> Plus there is also the fact that we do not and probably cannot > know why the universe is the way it is and follows the rules it does.
The fact that we don't currently know something doesn't make it unknowable.
> -- > Steve Schaffner s...@broad.mit.edu > Immediate assurance is an excellent sign of probable lack of > insight into the topic. Josiah Royce
-- Mike
W hat atheism: a non-prophet organization... W ould J enna D rink? ------------------------------- Creation Science: an oxymoron actually created by morons... ------------------------------- Before you criticize someone, walk a mile in their shoes. That way when you do criticize them, you're a mile away, and you have their shoes.
prabb...@shamrocksgf.com writes: > In talk.atheism Steve Schaffner <s...@darwin.broad.mit.edu> wrote: > > prabb...@shamrocksgf.com writes: > >> How is it unknowable? What about it can't be known, given enough time, etc?
> > We cannot know the full details, down to the atom, about any > > macroscopic object -- too much information is required. (And imagine > > your brain being able to fully comprehend every detail of its own > > operation -- how could it understand itself understanding itself?)
> WE can't know it but that doesn't preclude a computer, etc knowing it. If > the universe is limited in size, then there's a finite amount of info that > can be held in a finite storage system.
Is the finite storage system part of your universe? If so, where is its description stored? And where do you store the description of the description of the description?
> > We cannot know whether we are part of a quantum multiverse.
> But that's not something about THIS universe that's unknowable. That's > something about possible things outside the universe.
If it's part of the same wave function, it's part of the same universe. That's my usage, at any rate.
> > We cannot know (and will never be able to know) whether there are > > galaxies 10^15 light years away, or anything else about conditions > > there (if indeed there is a "there" there).
> And those also wouldn't be part of THIS universe (where the universe is > anything contained within your viewable lightcone.)
That's normally called the visible universe, not the universe. Using the light cone as the definition of the universe has several awkward characteristics. It means that the universe has an edge, and that objects can travel back and forth across the edge. It also means that we each inhabit a different (but overlapping) universe with differing boundaries. That's certainly not what I mean by "universe".
> > Plus there is also the fact that we do not and probably cannot > > know why the universe is the way it is and follows the rules it does.
> The fact that we don't currently know something doesn't make it unknowable.
The fact that we can't conceive of how we might come to know something suggests that it might well be unknowable.
-- Steve Schaffner s...@broad.mit.edu Immediate assurance is an excellent sign of probable lack of insight into the topic. Josiah Royce
> > > > To use Bertand Russell's famous example, what if there was a chocolate > > > > teapot orbiting Mars. Although patently absurd, there's nothing > > > > logically incoherent about this untestable idea. You can't prove that > > > > there isn't a chocolate teapot orbiting Mars at this moment, can you?
> > > If I can formulate ways to test for the presence of chocolate teapots, > > > then yes, I can prove whether there is or is not a chocolate teapot > > > orbiting Mars, unless you start giving said teapot impossible > > > attributes, ala Sagan's dragon in the garage.
> > One of the nice things about the chocolate teapot example is that in > > principle, it is testable, but beyond our abilities at the moment, > > while being so absurd no one sensible would believe it; that is why I > > chose to use it.
> > The point is that your position rejects a possibility irrationally, > > because you haven't proven that there isn't a chocolate teapot > > orbiting Mars. Similarly, your (anybody's) rejection of God isn't > > rational, precisely because it hasn't been defined. The incompleteness > > of the definition means that you can't guarantee the efficiency of any > > test for God you make.
> If "God" has no complete definition, then what are you talking about > that may or may not exist? Nothing...
> A more accurate analogy would be for someone to assert that blobulot > exists, and challenge any others to prove him wrong. Whats a blobulot? > That someone refuses to explain.
I'm missing something here. "God" has no complete definition. "Blobulot" has no definition at all. Why are they analogous? The complaint has been that the definition of "God" is vague, not that it's absent.
-- Steve Schaffner s...@broad.mit.edu Immediate assurance is an excellent sign of probable lack of insight into the topic. Josiah Royce
