> Well, it was you who brought tit up

> > What I think is at stake is whether the organisms which were selected
> > by natural selection (NS) were selected because NS is a tracking-truth
> > process.
> > A first question then arises: is it possible to define a tracking-
> > truth process?
> > To define a tracking-truth process it is necessary to define the
> > truth.

> No it isn't. It works perfectly well for a whole class of possible
> definitions of truth, as long as they imply some correspondence to reality

> Here I see a major issue because I think the truth doesn't

> > exist per se. What exists is the physical world with which the
> > organisms interact. To survive an organism should have specific and
> > relevant interactions with its environment (ie, its close, local
> > physical world) which allow it to adapt itself to it.
> > Then NS will select the organisms which have these specific and
> > relevant interactions with their local environment as these are
> > required for their survival.
> > I don t think necessary to introduce the notion of truth to explain
> > why NS selects such organisms. To say that these interactions are true
> > because there is an adequacy between the organisms and the local
> > physical world adds nothing more.

> Nobody says the interactions are true. The beliefs (or representations)
> of the world that the organism forms are true, or reasonably close to it.

> An organism, say early human, hunts prey by throwing spears at it. For
> this it needs to have an idea of the distance between itself and teh
> target.
> Selection scenario:
> A's vision is such that it allows him to approximate the distance to
> target well - throws spear, hits prey, eats, survives, has offspring
> B's brain is off - he consistently overestimates the distance to moving
> objects. Throws spear, misses, dies from starvation, does not procreate.

> In this case, the selection process is truth tracking - those people
> whose brain forms the correct belief about the distance to an object
> survive, the others not.

> No it doesn't. "Corresponds closer to reality than the belief not
> selected for" is perfectly good.
> I think less> complicated and ambiguous to explain the process of NS via these
> > interactions.
> > The integration of these interactions by the highest complex organisms
> > in their worldview (what would be their beliefs on the physical
> > world) is a very late phase in evolution. Of course the worldview (ie,
> > the cognitive evaluation of the local world) by such organisms surely
> > has an impact on their survival but it is impossible to quantify it.

> So? The only thing Wilkins had to do was to make it plausible that the
> impact will normally mean that beliefs (or world-views) are correct and
> not false.

> >On 16 ao t, 20:45, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 10:43:40 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:

> >> >On 16 ao t, 17:47, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> >> >> Indeed. So what would follow from this? We have at any point in time a
> >> >> whole set of beliefs. They are supported in varying degrees with
> >> >> evidence. So we rationally belief them. We also have good reasons to
> >> >> belief that some, if not all of them, can be refined or falsified at a
> >> >> later stage. Some of them furthermore may well be true - we just have
> >> >> no way of knowing for certain which ones.

> >> >> In the

> >> >> > future it is always possible that it will be falsified, at least
> >> >> > partly (ie, within specific conditions of observation and/or
> >> >> > experiment) like in the example of the Newton's laws.
> >> >> > Then our knowledge about our physical world can only be approximate.
> >> >> > The truth doesn't exist per se.

> >> >> That is a non sequitur. "Truth" is an ontological category, knowledge an
> >> >> epistemological category. That what we think about the world is only
> >> >> ever approximately true does not mean there is no truth.

> >> >> The sentence: "at this place, 40.000 years ago, was a small frog eating
> >> >> a fly", is either true or false. We also understand perfectly well what
> >> >> it means for the sentence to be true or false. That we will never know
> >> >> if it is true or false doesn't change that a bit.

> >> >> > In 2a) and 3) Peter had a justification (reasonable and necessarily
> >> >> > plausible assertions/evidence/guidance) for believing it was true but
> >> >> > an important information was missing (in 2a): "someone fiddled with
> >> >> > the clock"; in 3) "the clock stopped working at three the previous
> >> >> > day"). Then I would say that Peter had a true and rational
> >> >> > justification to say that it was three o'clock. However Peter had an
> >> >> > incomplete information which made his knowlege falsifiable and
> >> >> > actually falsified. Then it was not a belief it was imperfect
> >> >> > knowledge, which is always the case in our physical world.

> >> >> "Imperfect knowledge" as you call it, simply IS belief. That prevents us
> >> >> from the extremely counter-intuitive situation where people "know"
> >> >> things that are not true.

> >> >> If someone tells you:
> >> >> "Peter knows it is 3. It is actually 5"
> >> >> or
> >> >> "John knows London is the capital of France. The capital of France is
> >> >> actually Paris, not London"

> >> >> we would tell this person that he is either crazy or does not understand
> >> >> the everyday meaning of "knows" .

> >> >> It also fits with the intuition that belief comes in degrees, knowledge not:
> >> >> "I believe that the theory of physics is true more than I believe that
> >> >> the theory of evolution is true - if there is a conflict, I go for
> >> >> physics"

> >> >> Is a perfectly good and intelligible sentence, as is:
> >> >> "Even though both prosecution and defence have presented strong
> >> >> evidence, I belief that the accused did it more than I believe he is
> >> >> innocent. "

> >> >> replace "believe" with "know" however and you get sentences that don;t
> >> >> sound right at all:

> >> >> "I know that the theory of physics is true more than I know that the
> >> >> theory of evolution us true - if there is a conflict, I go for physics

> >> >> "Even though both prosecution and defence have presented strong
> >> >> evidence, I know that the accused did it more than I know he is innocent."

> >> >Actually the issue is not the definition of beliefs .
> >> >What I think is at stake is whether the organisms which were selected
> >> >by natural selection (NS) were selected because NS is a tracking-truth
> >> >process.
> >> >A first question then arises: is it possible to define a tracking-
> >> >truth process?
> >> >To define a tracking-truth process it is necessary to define the
> >> >truth. Here I see a major issue because I think the truth doesn't
> >> >exist per se. What exists is the physical world with which the
> >> >organisms interact. To survive an organism should have specific and
> >> >relevant interactions with its environment (ie, its close, local
> >> >physical world) which allow it to adapt itself to it.
> >> >Then NS will select the organisms which have these specific and
> >> >relevant interactions with their local environment as these are
> >> >required for their survival.
> >> >I don t think necessary to introduce the notion of truth to explain
> >> >why NS selects such organisms. To say that these interactions are true
> >> >because there is an adequacy between the organisms and the local
> >> >physical world adds nothing more.
> >> >The expression tracking-truth is a philosophical concept which
> >> >requires a clear definition of what would be the truth. I think less
> >> >complicated and ambiguous to explain the process of NS via these
> >> >interactions.
> >> >The integration of these interactions by the highest complex organisms
> >> >in their worldview (what would be their beliefs on the physical
> >> >world) is a very late phase in evolution. Of course the worldview (ie,
> >> >the cognitive evaluation of the local world) by such organisms surely
> >> >has an impact on their survival but it is impossible to quantify it.

> >> I think you once again miss the entire point of the discussion.

> >> Humans have brains and intelligence and form concepts and ideas of how
> >> the world works. We create models in our head to explain what is
> >> happening in the real world. If evolution does produce such a
> >> phenomenon what reason do we have to accept that the creations of the
> >> "mind" (the activities of the brain more accurately) have any
> >> correspondence with reality?

> >Yes, but the conceptualization of such models has been possible only
> >after a sophisticated language emerged. This has been very recently in
> >human history. Regarding the history of evolution it is nothing, even
> >if some kind of thoughts was possible in superior animals. Of course
> >the emergence of homo sapiens langage was possible because particular
> >abilities were selected by NS, You can say that these abilities were
> >selected because the interactions with the environment they allowed
> >were adapted.

> >> Evolution certainly is capable of
> >> selecting against creatures who produce internal models of the world
> >> that result in inappropriate behavior. But the argument here is that
> >> evolution also selects for models of the world (or beliefs) that
> >> correspond with objective reality. Evolution acts so that our
> >> "common sense" beliefs and, by extension, our beliefs about science
> >> can be trusted as true in addition to merely being useful.

> >Before selecting abilities having allowed a language and elaborated
> >thoughts like beliefs evolution shaped the nervous system (NS) from
> >the body for its benefit, ie, to avoid hostile environments and to be
> >attracted by favorable ones. The emotional NS had a major role for
> >such abilities and the resulted behaviors, and thus in the survival of
> >the given multicellular organisms with a NS. Beliefs are really ultra-
> >recent by-products of such evolution.

> The construction of internal models to represent the world long
> predates language. That is essentially what the umwelt is really all
> about: the external world as perceived by an organism. All animals
> make such representations. We then add ourselves as actors within
> that world and are capable of producing scenarios of alternative
> actions, let them play out in the model, and select the best
> alternative to perform. Evolution ensures that our internal
> representation of the world agrees with the real world; that it is
> "true". Language and abstract beliefs can then be imposed on top of a
> structure that already is "truth tracking".

>>> On Aug 16, 11:12 am, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:04:10 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>>>> wrote:

>>>>> On 16 ao t, 01:43, *Hemidactylus* <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 08/15/2012 05:41 PM, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:

>>>>>>> On 15 ao t, 23:05, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>> The whole point of this discussion is that my personal conception of
>>>>>>>> belief is irrelevant to a philosophical argument.  You write,
>>>>>>>> correctly, that a belief is knowledge if it is true and justified.
>>>>>>>> Then you say you disagree.

>>>>>>> I modified my post when I realized my mistake (see the new version):
>>>>>>> now I say I agree but just add that, in such a case, the belief should
>>>>>>> be called knowledge and no more a belief.

>>>>>>>> OK.  But you must accept the philosophical
>>>>>>>> usage when doing philosophy.

>>>>>>> I was not doing philosophy, I commented the paper by Griffiths &
>>>>>>> Wilkins that John recommended me to read following my hypothesis on
>>>>>>> religious beliefs.
>>>>>>> When I comment a paper I try to be rational and critical. If an
>>>>>>> assertion is illogical or unclear I think anybody can notice it. But
>>>>>>> of course it is confortable to hide behind his professional jargon (as
>>>>>>> were doing the physicians of Moli re).

>>>>>> Wilkins can be terse, technical, or grumpy at times, but you may have
>>>>>> poured it on a bit too much from the onset, which didn't help.

>>>>> You are right I was too tough and would like to ask him to apologize
>>>>> (but it is probably too late).

>>>> The above might be a simple due to your use of English as a second
>>>> language.  If not, it is bold sarcasm.

>>> I think in this case we can give him the benefit of the doubt :o) .in
>>> French, it would be "M'excuse", with the personal pronoun  "me"
>>> disambiguating the sentence, so what he means is more like  "to pardon
>>> ME"

>> As in the mustard commercials?

> Please, can you explain?

> > > > This is ofcourse an incorrect way of looking at it, emotions are only
> > > > relevant with free will. You are explaining away the freedom, where
> > > > instead you should focus on it. You are dissing people by pretending
> > > > it is an issue of fact what emotions people have. You are not going to
> > > > make any trouble about this are you? Simply chose in identifying what
> > > > emotions people have and don't pretend to be able to measure or
> > > > calculate it. Express yourself, and let others express themselves.

> > > Did you feel unable to express yourself in this forum?

> > Yes. Due to that there are many such as yourself, who sideline
> > subjectivity.

> Where do you see I sideline subjectivity?

>>>> On Aug 16, 11:12 am, jillery <69jpi...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 01:04:10 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>>>>> wrote:

>>>>>> On 16 ao t, 01:43, *Hemidactylus* <ecpho...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>> On 08/15/2012 05:41 PM, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:

>>>>>>>> On 15 ao t, 23:05, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> The whole point of this discussion is that my personal conception of
>>>>>>>>> belief is irrelevant to a philosophical argument.  You write,
>>>>>>>>> correctly, that a belief is knowledge if it is true and justified.
>>>>>>>>> Then you say you disagree.

>>>>>>>> I modified my post when I realized my mistake (see the new version):
>>>>>>>> now I say I agree but just add that, in such a case, the belief should
>>>>>>>> be called knowledge and no more a belief.

>>>>>>>>> OK.  But you must accept the philosophical
>>>>>>>>> usage when doing philosophy.

>>>>>>>> I was not doing philosophy, I commented the paper by Griffiths &
>>>>>>>> Wilkins that John recommended me to read following my hypothesis on
>>>>>>>> religious beliefs.
>>>>>>>> When I comment a paper I try to be rational and critical. If an
>>>>>>>> assertion is illogical or unclear I think anybody can notice it. But
>>>>>>>> of course it is confortable to hide behind his professional jargon (as
>>>>>>>> were doing the physicians of Moli re).

>>>>>>> Wilkins can be terse, technical, or grumpy at times, but you may have
>>>>>>> poured it on a bit too much from the onset, which didn't help.

>>>>>> You are right I was too tough and would like to ask him to apologize
>>>>>> (but it is probably too late).

>>>>> The above might be a simple due to your use of English as a second
>>>>> language.  If not, it is bold sarcasm.

>>>> I think in this case we can give him the benefit of the doubt :o) .in
>>>> French, it would be "M'excuse", with the personal pronoun  "me"
>>>> disambiguating the sentence, so what he means is more like  "to pardon
>>>> ME"

>>> As in the mustard commercials?

>> Please, can you explain?

>People outside the US might not "get it".

>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_pGT8Q_tjk

>These were iconic commercials and often spoofed:

>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5xomArI4aJ0

>> >On 16 ao t, 20:45, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 10:43:40 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> wrote:

>> >> >On 16 ao t, 17:47, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>> >> >> Indeed. So what would follow from this? We have at any point in time a
>> >> >> whole set of beliefs. They are supported in varying degrees with
>> >> >> evidence. So we rationally belief them. We also have good reasons to
>> >> >> belief that some, if not all of them, can be refined or falsified at a
>> >> >> later stage. Some of them furthermore may well be true - we just have
>> >> >> no way of knowing for certain which ones.

>> >> >> In the

>> >> >> > future it is always possible that it will be falsified, at least
>> >> >> > partly (ie, within specific conditions of observation and/or
>> >> >> > experiment) like in the example of the Newton's laws.
>> >> >> > Then our knowledge about our physical world can only be approximate.
>> >> >> > The truth doesn't exist per se.

>> >> >> That is a non sequitur. "Truth" is an ontological category, knowledge an
>> >> >> epistemological category. That what we think about the world is only
>> >> >> ever approximately true does not mean there is no truth.

>> >> >> The sentence: "at this place, 40.000 years ago, was a small frog eating
>> >> >> a fly", is either true or false. We also understand perfectly well what
>> >> >> it means for the sentence to be true or false. That we will never know
>> >> >> if it is true or false doesn't change that a bit.

>> >> >> > In 2a) and 3) Peter had a justification (reasonable and necessarily
>> >> >> > plausible assertions/evidence/guidance) for believing it was true but
>> >> >> > an important information was missing (in 2a): "someone fiddled with
>> >> >> > the clock"; in 3) "the clock stopped working at three the previous
>> >> >> > day"). Then I would say that Peter had a true and rational
>> >> >> > justification to say that it was three o'clock. However Peter had an
>> >> >> > incomplete information which made his knowlege falsifiable and
>> >> >> > actually falsified. Then it was not a belief it was imperfect
>> >> >> > knowledge, which is always the case in our physical world.

>> >> >> "Imperfect knowledge" as you call it, simply IS belief. That prevents us
>> >> >> from the extremely counter-intuitive situation where people "know"
>> >> >> things that are not true.

>> >> >> If someone tells you:
>> >> >> "Peter knows it is 3. It is actually 5"
>> >> >> or
>> >> >> "John knows London is the capital of France. The capital of France is
>> >> >> actually Paris, not London"

>> >> >> we would tell this person that he is either crazy or does not understand
>> >> >> the everyday meaning of "knows" .

>> >> >> It also fits with the intuition that belief comes in degrees, knowledge not:
>> >> >> "I believe that the theory of physics is true more than I believe that
>> >> >> the theory of evolution is true - if there is a conflict, I go for
>> >> >> physics"

>> >> >> Is a perfectly good and intelligible sentence, as is:
>> >> >> "Even though both prosecution and defence have presented strong
>> >> >> evidence, I belief that the accused did it more than I believe he is
>> >> >> innocent. "

>> >> >> replace "believe" with "know" however and you get sentences that don;t
>> >> >> sound right at all:

>> >> >> "I know that the theory of physics is true more than I know that the
>> >> >> theory of evolution us true - if there is a conflict, I go for physics

>> >> >> "Even though both prosecution and defence have presented strong
>> >> >> evidence, I know that the accused did it more than I know he is innocent."

>> >> >Actually the issue is not the definition of beliefs .
>> >> >What I think is at stake is whether the organisms which were selected
>> >> >by natural selection (NS) were selected because NS is a tracking-truth
>> >> >process.
>> >> >A first question then arises: is it possible to define a tracking-
>> >> >truth process?
>> >> >To define a tracking-truth process it is necessary to define the
>> >> >truth. Here I see a major issue because I think the truth doesn't
>> >> >exist per se. What exists is the physical world with which the
>> >> >organisms interact. To survive an organism should have specific and
>> >> >relevant interactions with its environment (ie, its close, local
>> >> >physical world) which allow it to adapt itself to it.
>> >> >Then NS will select the organisms which have these specific and
>> >> >relevant interactions with their local environment as these are
>> >> >required for their survival.
>> >> >I don t think necessary to introduce the notion of truth to explain
>> >> >why NS selects such organisms. To say that these interactions are true
>> >> >because there is an adequacy between the organisms and the local
>> >> >physical world adds nothing more.
>> >> >The expression tracking-truth is a philosophical concept which
>> >> >requires a clear definition of what would be the truth. I think less
>> >> >complicated and ambiguous to explain the process of NS via these
>> >> >interactions.
>> >> >The integration of these interactions by the highest complex organisms
>> >> >in their worldview (what would be their beliefs on the physical
>> >> >world) is a very late phase in evolution. Of course the worldview (ie,
>> >> >the cognitive evaluation of the local world) by such organisms surely
>> >> >has an impact on their survival but it is impossible to quantify it.

>> >> I think you once again miss the entire point of the discussion.

>> >> Humans have brains and intelligence and form concepts and ideas of how
>> >> the world works. We create models in our head to explain what is
>> >> happening in the real world. If evolution does produce such a
>> >> phenomenon what reason do we have to accept that the creations of the
>> >> "mind" (the activities of the brain more accurately) have any
>> >> correspondence with reality?

>> >Yes, but the conceptualization of such models has been possible only
>> >after a sophisticated language emerged. This has been very recently in
>> >human history. Regarding the history of evolution it is nothing, even
>> >if some kind of thoughts was possible in superior animals. Of course
>> >the emergence of homo sapiens langage was possible because particular
>> >abilities were selected by NS, You can say that these abilities were
>> >selected because the interactions with the environment they allowed
>> >were adapted.

>> >> Evolution certainly is capable of
>> >> selecting against creatures who produce internal models of the world
>> >> that result in inappropriate behavior. But the argument here is that
>> >> evolution also selects for models of the world (or beliefs) that
>> >> correspond with objective reality. Evolution acts so that our
>> >> "common sense" beliefs and, by extension, our beliefs about science
>> >> can be trusted as true in addition to merely being useful.

>> >Before selecting abilities having allowed a language and elaborated
>> >thoughts like beliefs evolution shaped the nervous system (NS) from
>> >the body for its benefit, ie, to avoid hostile environments and to be
>> >attracted by favorable ones. The emotional NS had a major role for
>> >such abilities and the resulted behaviors, and thus in the survival of
>> >the given multicellular organisms with a NS. Beliefs are really ultra-
>> >recent by-products of such evolution.

>> The construction of internal models to represent the world long
>> predates language. That is essentially what the umwelt is really all
>> about: the external world as perceived by an organism. All animals
>> make such representations. We then add ourselves as actors within
>> that world and are capable of producing scenarios of alternative
>> actions, let them play out in the model, and select the best
>> alternative to perform. Evolution ensures that our internal
>> representation of the world agrees with the real world; that it is
>> "true". Language and abstract beliefs can then be imposed on top of a
>> structure that already is "truth tracking".

>Well, I see you are a fan of Griffiths & Wilkins' "truth tracking"
>concept.
>I agree that an organism has a kind of "umwelt", ie, a specific mode
>of interaction with the environment. However I don't think that other
>species than Homo sapiens (perhaps Homo neenderthalensis and Home
>erectus?) have/had what can be really called an internal
>representation of the world.

> >On 16 ao t, 22:55, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 13:40:23 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:

> >> >On 16 ao t, 20:45, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> >> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 10:43:40 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> >> wrote:

> >> >> >On 16 ao t, 17:47, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> >> >> >> Indeed. So what would follow from this? We have at any point in time a
> >> >> >> whole set of beliefs. They are supported in varying degrees with
> >> >> >> evidence. So we rationally belief them. We also have good reasons to
> >> >> >> belief that some, if not all of them, can be refined or falsified at a
> >> >> >> later stage. Some of them furthermore may well be true - we just have
> >> >> >> no way of knowing for certain which ones.

> >> >> >> In the

> >> >> >> > future it is always possible that it will be falsified, at least
> >> >> >> > partly (ie, within specific conditions of observation and/or
> >> >> >> > experiment) like in the example of the Newton's laws.
> >> >> >> > Then our knowledge about our physical world can only be approximate.
> >> >> >> > The truth doesn't exist per se.

> >> >> >> That is a non sequitur. "Truth" is an ontological category, knowledge an
> >> >> >> epistemological category. That what we think about the world is only
> >> >> >> ever approximately true does not mean there is no truth.

> >> >> >> The sentence: "at this place, 40.000 years ago, was a small frog eating
> >> >> >> a fly", is either true or false. We also understand perfectly well what
> >> >> >> it means for the sentence to be true or false. That we will never know
> >> >> >> if it is true or false doesn't change that a bit.

> >> >> >> > In 2a) and 3) Peter had a justification (reasonable and necessarily
> >> >> >> > plausible assertions/evidence/guidance) for believing it was true but
> >> >> >> > an important information was missing (in 2a): "someone fiddled with
> >> >> >> > the clock"; in 3) "the clock stopped working at three the previous
> >> >> >> > day"). Then I would say that Peter had a true and rational
> >> >> >> > justification to say that it was three o'clock. However Peter had an
> >> >> >> > incomplete information which made his knowlege falsifiable and
> >> >> >> > actually falsified. Then it was not a belief it was imperfect
> >> >> >> > knowledge, which is always the case in our physical world.

> >> >> >> "Imperfect knowledge" as you call it, simply IS belief. That prevents us
> >> >> >> from the extremely counter-intuitive situation where people "know"
> >> >> >> things that are not true.

> >> >> >> If someone tells you:
> >> >> >> "Peter knows it is 3. It is actually 5"
> >> >> >> or
> >> >> >> "John knows London is the capital of France. The capital of France is
> >> >> >> actually Paris, not London"

> >> >> >> we would tell this person that he is either crazy or does not understand
> >> >> >> the everyday meaning of "knows" .

> >> >> >> It also fits with the intuition that belief comes in degrees, knowledge not:
> >> >> >> "I believe that the theory of physics is true more than I believe that
> >> >> >> the theory of evolution is true - if there is a conflict, I go for
> >> >> >> physics"

> >> >> >> Is a perfectly good and intelligible sentence, as is:
> >> >> >> "Even though both prosecution and defence have presented strong
> >> >> >> evidence, I belief that the accused did it more than I believe he is
> >> >> >> innocent. "

> >> >> >> replace "believe" with "know" however and you get sentences that don;t
> >> >> >> sound right at all:

> >> >> >> "I know that the theory of physics is true more than I know that the
> >> >> >> theory of evolution us true - if there is a conflict, I go for physics

> >> >> >> "Even though both prosecution and defence have presented strong
> >> >> >> evidence, I know that the accused did it more than I know he is innocent."

> >> >> >Actually the issue is not the definition of beliefs .
> >> >> >What I think is at stake is whether the organisms which were selected
> >> >> >by natural selection (NS) were selected because NS is a tracking-truth
> >> >> >process.
> >> >> >A first question then arises: is it possible to define a tracking-
> >> >> >truth process?
> >> >> >To define a tracking-truth process it is necessary to define the
> >> >> >truth. Here I see a major issue because I think the truth doesn't
> >> >> >exist per se. What exists is the physical world with which the
> >> >> >organisms interact. To survive an organism should have specific and
> >> >> >relevant interactions with its environment (ie, its close, local
> >> >> >physical world) which allow it to adapt itself to it.
> >> >> >Then NS will select the organisms which have these specific and
> >> >> >relevant interactions with their local environment as these are
> >> >> >required for their survival.
> >> >> >I don t think necessary to introduce the notion of truth to explain
> >> >> >why NS selects such organisms. To say that these interactions are true
> >> >> >because there is an adequacy between the organisms and the local
> >> >> >physical world adds nothing more.
> >> >> >The expression tracking-truth is a philosophical concept which
> >> >> >requires a clear definition of what would be the truth. I think less
> >> >> >complicated and ambiguous to explain the process of NS via these
> >> >> >interactions.
> >> >> >The integration of these interactions by the highest complex organisms
> >> >> >in their worldview (what would be their beliefs on the physical
> >> >> >world) is a very late phase in evolution. Of course the worldview (ie,
> >> >> >the cognitive evaluation of the local world) by such organisms surely
> >> >> >has an impact on their survival but it is impossible to quantify it.

> >> >> I think you once again miss the entire point of the discussion.

> >> >> Humans have brains and intelligence and form concepts and ideas of how
> >> >> the world works. We create models in our head to explain what is
> >> >> happening in the real world. If evolution does produce such a
> >> >> phenomenon what reason do we have to accept that the creations of the
> >> >> "mind" (the activities of the brain more accurately) have any
> >> >> correspondence with reality?

> >> >Yes, but the conceptualization of such models has been possible only
> >> >after a sophisticated language emerged. This has been very recently in
> >> >human history. Regarding the history of evolution it is nothing, even
> >> >if some kind of thoughts was possible in superior animals. Of course
> >> >the emergence of homo sapiens langage was possible because particular
> >> >abilities were selected by NS, You can say that these abilities were
> >> >selected because the interactions with the environment they allowed
> >> >were adapted.

> >> >> Evolution certainly is capable of
> >> >> selecting against creatures who produce internal models of the world
> >> >> that result in inappropriate behavior. But the argument here is that
> >> >> evolution also selects for models of the world (or beliefs) that
> >> >> correspond with objective reality. Evolution acts so that our
> >> >> "common sense" beliefs and, by extension, our beliefs about science
> >> >> can be trusted as true in addition to merely being useful.

> >> >Before selecting abilities having allowed a language and elaborated
> >> >thoughts like beliefs evolution shaped the nervous system (NS) from
> >> >the body for its benefit, ie, to avoid hostile environments and to be
> >> >attracted by favorable ones. The emotional NS had a major role for
> >> >such abilities and the resulted behaviors, and thus in the survival of
> >> >the given multicellular organisms with a NS. Beliefs are really ultra-
> >> >recent by-products of such evolution.

> >> The construction of internal models to represent the world long
> >> predates language. That is essentially what the umwelt is really all
> >> about: the external world as perceived by an organism. All animals
> >> make such representations. We then add ourselves as actors within
> >> that world and are capable of producing scenarios of alternative
> >> actions, let them play out in the model, and select the best
> >> alternative to perform. Evolution ensures that our internal
> >> representation of the world agrees with the real world; that it is
> >> "true". Language and abstract beliefs can then be imposed on top of a
> >> structure that already is "truth tracking".

> >Well, I see you are a fan of Griffiths & Wilkins' "truth tracking"
> >concept.
> >I agree that an organism has a kind of "umwelt", ie, a specific mode
> >of interaction with the environment. However I don't think that other
> >species than Homo sapiens (perhaps Homo neenderthalensis and Home
> >erectus?) have/had what can be really called an internal
> >representation of the world.

> Call it what you will. They do have something in their brains that
> lets that manage in the world. It is not all just stimulus-response
> reflex, you know.

> > On 16 ao t, 15:12, Syamsu <nando_rontel...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > > > This is ofcourse an incorrect way of looking at it, emotions are only
> > > > > relevant with free will. You are explaining away the freedom, where
> > > > > instead you should focus on it. You are dissing people by pretending
> > > > > it is an issue of fact what emotions people have. You are not going to
> > > > > make any trouble about this are you? Simply chose in identifying what
> > > > > emotions people have and don't pretend to be able to measure or
> > > > > calculate it. Express yourself, and let others express themselves.

> > > > Did you feel unable to express yourself in this forum?

> > > Yes. Due to that there are many such as yourself, who sideline
> > > subjectivity.

> > Where do you see I sideline subjectivity?

> When you rejected religion. And more broadly this discussion is going
> on without recognition of people's subjectivity, their emotion
> tracking, tracking that which can only be subjectively identified, the
> human spirit.- Masquer le texte des messages pr c dents -

> - Afficher le texte des messages pr c dents -

> > On Aug 16, 3:46 pm, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:

> > > On 16 ao t, 15:12, Syamsu <nando_rontel...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > > > > This is ofcourse an incorrect way of looking at it, emotions are only
> > > > > > relevant with free will. You are explaining away the freedom, where
> > > > > > instead you should focus on it. You are dissing people by pretending
> > > > > > it is an issue of fact what emotions people have. You are not going to
> > > > > > make any trouble about this are you? Simply chose in identifying what
> > > > > > emotions people have and don't pretend to be able to measure or
> > > > > > calculate it. Express yourself, and let others express themselves.

> > > > > Did you feel unable to express yourself in this forum?

> > > > Yes. Due to that there are many such as yourself, who sideline
> > > > subjectivity.

> > > Where do you see I sideline subjectivity?

> > When you rejected religion. And more broadly this discussion is going
> > on without recognition of people's subjectivity, their emotion
> > tracking, tracking that which can only be subjectively identified, the
> > human spirit.- Masquer le texte des messages pr c dents -

> > - Afficher le texte des messages pr c dents -

> Do you agree that everybody is free to defend one's view in this
> forum? Then I am sorry for you but I am definitively an atheist. So I
> defend my view about religion and more generally about metaphysics.
> However I have no reason to sideline subjectivity. For example I think
> our emotional brain is very important to explain most of our behaviors
> and reactions and our subjectivity is mainly led by our emotional
> brain.
> Of course I understand that this interpretation doesn't suit you at
> all.

> > > Actually the issue is not the definition of beliefs .

> > Well, it was you who brought tit up

> > > What I think is at stake is whether the organisms which were selected
> > > by natural selection (NS) were selected because NS is a tracking-truth
> > > process.
> > > A first question then arises: is it possible to define a tracking-
> > > truth process?
> > > To define a tracking-truth process it is necessary to define the
> > > truth.

> > No it isn't. It works perfectly well for a whole class of possible
> > definitions of truth, as long as they imply some correspondence to reality

> > Here I see a major issue because I think the truth doesn't

> > > exist per se. What exists is the physical world with which the
> > > organisms interact. To survive an organism should have specific and
> > > relevant interactions with its environment (ie, its close, local
> > > physical world) which allow it to adapt itself to it.
> > > Then NS will select the organisms which have these specific and
> > > relevant interactions with their local environment as these are
> > > required for their survival.
> > > I don t think necessary to introduce the notion of truth to explain
> > > why NS selects such organisms. To say that these interactions are true
> > > because there is an adequacy between the organisms and the local
> > > physical world adds nothing more.

> > Nobody says the interactions are true. The beliefs (or representations)
> > of the world that the organism forms are true, or reasonably close to it.

> See my response to Richard Norman about the emergence of the ability
> for having "beliefs (or representations) of the world".

> > What it adds is the ability to distinguish between different types of
> > selection.

> > An organism, say early human, hunts prey by throwing spears at it. For
> > this it needs to have an idea of the distance between itself and teh
> > target.
> > Selection scenario:
> > A's vision is such that it allows him to approximate the distance to
> > target well - throws spear, hits prey, eats, survives, has offspring
> > B's brain is off - he consistently overestimates the distance to moving
> > objects. Throws spear, misses, dies from starvation, does not procreate.

> > In this case, the selection process is truth tracking - those people
> > whose brain forms the correct belief about the distance to an object
> > survive, the others not.

> You speak of selection within our species but the time of such
> evolution (if there was any) is nothing in comparison with the time of
> macroevolution, the one which led, in particular, to the emergence of
> our species.

> > But according to some recent research, our brain tends to systematically
> > underestimate the distance to objects if we like them Some laboratory
> > tests confirm that, people were shown money lying in the street and
> > asked how far it was, and then at the same spot another, boring object
> > (a stone). They systemically thought the money was nearer than the
> > stone. Evolutionary explanation: People who think the object they desire
> > is nearer than it is have greater motivation to make an effort to get it
> > - and as a result often succeed. So the brain tricks you into action.
> > In this case, selection was not truth tracking, beliefs that can be
> > shown to be false had the greater survival value.

> So?

> > > The expression tracking-truth is a philosophical concept which
> > > requires a clear definition of what would be the truth.

> > No it doesn't. "Corresponds closer to reality than the belief not
> > selected for" is perfectly good.
> > I think less> complicated and ambiguous to explain the process of NS via these
> > > interactions.
> > > The integration of these interactions by the highest complex organisms
> > > in their worldview (what would be their beliefs on the physical
> > > world) is a very late phase in evolution. Of course the worldview (ie,
> > > the cognitive evaluation of the local world) by such organisms surely
> > > has an impact on their survival but it is impossible to quantify it.

> > So? The only thing Wilkins had to do was to make it plausible that the
> > impact will normally mean that beliefs (or world-views) are correct and
> > not false.

> > On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 14:39:13 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > wrote:

> > >On 16 ao t, 22:55, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> > >> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 13:40:23 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > >> wrote:

> > >> >On 16 ao t, 20:45, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> > >> >> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 10:43:40 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> > >> >> wrote:

> > >> >> >On 16 ao t, 17:47, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> > >> >> >> Indeed. So what would follow from this? We have at any point in time a
> > >> >> >> whole set of beliefs. They are supported in varying degrees with
> > >> >> >> evidence. So we rationally belief them. We also have good reasons to
> > >> >> >> belief that some, if not all of them, can be refined or falsified at a
> > >> >> >> later stage. Some of them furthermore may well be true - we just have
> > >> >> >> no way of knowing for certain which ones.

> > >> >> >> In the

> > >> >> >> > future it is always possible that it will be falsified, at least
> > >> >> >> > partly (ie, within specific conditions of observation and/or
> > >> >> >> > experiment) like in the example of the Newton's laws.
> > >> >> >> > Then our knowledge about our physical world can only be approximate.
> > >> >> >> > The truth doesn't exist per se.

> > >> >> >> That is a non sequitur. "Truth" is an ontological category, knowledge an
> > >> >> >> epistemological category. That what we think about the world is only
> > >> >> >> ever approximately true does not mean there is no truth.

> > >> >> >> The sentence: "at this place, 40.000 years ago, was a small frog eating
> > >> >> >> a fly", is either true or false. We also understand perfectly well what
> > >> >> >> it means for the sentence to be true or false. That we will never know
> > >> >> >> if it is true or false doesn't change that a bit.

> > >> >> >> > In 2a) and 3) Peter had a justification (reasonable and necessarily
> > >> >> >> > plausible assertions/evidence/guidance) for believing it was true but
> > >> >> >> > an important information was missing (in 2a): "someone fiddled with
> > >> >> >> > the clock"; in 3) "the clock stopped working at three the previous
> > >> >> >> > day"). Then I would say that Peter had a true and rational
> > >> >> >> > justification to say that it was three o'clock. However Peter had an
> > >> >> >> > incomplete information which made his knowlege falsifiable and
> > >> >> >> > actually falsified. Then it was not a belief it was imperfect
> > >> >> >> > knowledge, which is always the case in our physical world.

> > >> >> >> "Imperfect knowledge" as you call it, simply IS belief. That prevents us
> > >> >> >> from the extremely counter-intuitive situation where people "know"
> > >> >> >> things that are not true.

> > >> >> >> If someone tells you:
> > >> >> >> "Peter knows it is 3. It is actually 5"
> > >> >> >> or
> > >> >> >> "John knows London is the capital of France. The capital of France is
> > >> >> >> actually Paris, not London"

> > >> >> >> we would tell this person that he is either crazy or does not understand
> > >> >> >> the everyday meaning of "knows" .

> > >> >> >> It also fits with the intuition that belief comes in degrees, knowledge not:
> > >> >> >> "I believe that the theory of physics is true more than I believe that
> > >> >> >> the theory of evolution is true - if there is a conflict, I go for
> > >> >> >> physics"

> > >> >> >> Is a perfectly good and intelligible sentence, as is:
> > >> >> >> "Even though both prosecution and defence have presented strong
> > >> >> >> evidence, I belief that the accused did it more than I believe he is
> > >> >> >> innocent. "

> > >> >> >> replace "believe" with "know" however and you get sentences that don;t
> > >> >> >> sound right at all:

> > >> >> >> "I know that the theory of physics is true more than I know that the
> > >> >> >> theory of evolution us true - if there is a conflict, I go for physics

> > >> >> >> "Even though both prosecution and defence have presented strong
> > >> >> >> evidence, I know that the accused did it more than I know he is innocent."

> > >> >> >Actually the issue is not the definition of beliefs .
> > >> >> >What I think is at stake is whether the organisms which were selected
> > >> >> >by natural selection (NS) were selected because NS is a tracking-truth
> > >> >> >process.
> > >> >> >A first question then arises: is it possible to define a tracking-
> > >> >> >truth process?
> > >> >> >To define a tracking-truth process it is necessary to define the
> > >> >> >truth. Here I see a major issue because I think the truth doesn't
> > >> >> >exist per se. What exists is the physical world with which the
> > >> >> >organisms interact. To survive an organism should have specific and
> > >> >> >relevant interactions with its environment (ie, its close, local
> > >> >> >physical world) which allow it to adapt itself to it.
> > >> >> >Then NS will select the organisms which have these specific and
> > >> >> >relevant interactions with their local environment as these are
> > >> >> >required for their survival.
> > >> >> >I don t think necessary to introduce the notion of truth to explain
> > >> >> >why NS selects such organisms. To say that these interactions are true
> > >> >> >because there is an adequacy between the organisms and the local
> > >> >> >physical world adds nothing more.
> > >> >> >The expression tracking-truth is a philosophical concept which
> > >> >> >requires a clear definition of what would be the truth. I think less
> > >> >> >complicated and ambiguous to explain the process of NS via these
> > >> >> >interactions.
> > >> >> >The integration of these interactions by the highest complex organisms
> > >> >> >in their worldview (what would be their beliefs on the physical
> > >> >> >world) is a very late phase in evolution. Of course the worldview (ie,
> > >> >> >the cognitive evaluation of the local world) by such organisms surely
> > >> >> >has an impact on their survival but it is impossible to quantify it.

> > >> >> I think you once again miss the entire point of the discussion.

> > >> >> Humans have brains and intelligence and form concepts and ideas of how
> > >> >> the world works. We create models in our head to explain what is
> > >> >> happening in the real world. If evolution does produce such a
> > >> >> phenomenon what reason do we have to accept that the creations of the
> > >> >> "mind" (the activities of the brain more accurately) have any
> > >> >> correspondence with reality?

> > >> >Yes, but the conceptualization of such models has been possible only
> > >> >after a sophisticated language emerged. This has been very recently in
> > >> >human history. Regarding the history of evolution it is nothing, even
> > >> >if some kind of thoughts was possible in superior animals. Of course
> > >> >the emergence of homo sapiens langage was possible because particular
> > >> >abilities were selected by NS, You can say that these abilities were
> > >> >selected because the interactions with the environment they allowed
> > >> >were adapted.

> > >> >> Evolution certainly is capable of
> > >> >> selecting against creatures who produce internal models of the world
> > >> >> that result in inappropriate behavior. But the argument here is that
> > >> >> evolution also selects for models of the world (or beliefs) that
> > >> >> correspond with objective reality. Evolution acts so that our
> > >> >> "common sense" beliefs and, by extension, our beliefs about science
> > >> >> can be trusted as true in addition to merely being useful.

> > >> >Before selecting abilities having allowed a language and elaborated
> > >> >thoughts like beliefs evolution shaped the nervous system (NS) from
> > >> >the body for its benefit, ie, to avoid hostile environments and to be
> > >> >attracted by favorable ones. The emotional NS had a major role for
> > >> >such abilities and the resulted behaviors, and thus in the survival of
> > >> >the given multicellular organisms with a NS. Beliefs are really ultra-
> > >> >recent by-products of such evolution.

> > >> The construction of internal models to represent the world long
> > >> predates language. That is essentially what the umwelt is really all
> > >> about: the external world as perceived by an organism. All animals
> > >> make such representations. We then add ourselves as actors within
> > >> that world and are capable of producing scenarios of alternative
> > >> actions, let them play out in the model, and select the best
> > >> alternative to perform. Evolution ensures that our internal
> > >> representation of the world agrees with the real world; that it is
> > >> "true". Language and abstract beliefs can then be imposed on top of a
> > >> structure that already is "truth tracking".

> > >Well, I see you are a fan of Griffiths & Wilkins' "truth tracking"
> > >concept.
> > >I agree that an organism has a kind of "umwelt", ie, a specific mode
> > >of interaction with the environment. However I don't think that other
> > >species than Homo sapiens (perhaps Homo neenderthalensis and Home
> > >erectus?) have/had what can be really called an internal
> > >representation of the world.

> > Call it what you will. They do have something in their brains that
> > lets that manage in the world. It is not all just stimulus-response
> > reflex, you know.

> I fully agree with you that "it is not all just stimulus-response
> reflex". Of course the perception of the local environment by animals
> with a central nervous system (CNS) is integrated in a complex
> specific manner

> another non sequitur - "tracking" does not imply intend,

> > > - Afficher le texte des messages pr c dents -

>> >On 16 ao t, 22:55, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 13:40:23 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> wrote:

>> >> >On 16 ao t, 20:45, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> >> On Thu, 16 Aug 2012 10:43:40 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
>> >> >> wrote:

>> >> >> >On 16 ao t, 17:47, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>> >> >> >> Indeed. So what would follow from this? We have at any point in time a
>> >> >> >> whole set of beliefs. They are supported in varying degrees with
>> >> >> >> evidence. So we rationally belief them. We also have good reasons to
>> >> >> >> belief that some, if not all of them, can be refined or falsified at a
>> >> >> >> later stage. Some of them furthermore may well be true - we just have
>> >> >> >> no way of knowing for certain which ones.

>> >> >> >> In the

>> >> >> >> > future it is always possible that it will be falsified, at least
>> >> >> >> > partly (ie, within specific conditions of observation and/or
>> >> >> >> > experiment) like in the example of the Newton's laws.
>> >> >> >> > Then our knowledge about our physical world can only be approximate.
>> >> >> >> > The truth doesn't exist per se.

>> >> >> >> That is a non sequitur. "Truth" is an ontological category, knowledge an
>> >> >> >> epistemological category. That what we think about the world is only
>> >> >> >> ever approximately true does not mean there is no truth.

>> >> >> >> The sentence: "at this place, 40.000 years ago, was a small frog eating
>> >> >> >> a fly", is either true or false. We also understand perfectly well what
>> >> >> >> it means for the sentence to be true or false. That we will never know
>> >> >> >> if it is true or false doesn't change that a bit.

>> >> >> >> > In 2a) and 3) Peter had a justification (reasonable and necessarily
>> >> >> >> > plausible assertions/evidence/guidance) for believing it was true but
>> >> >> >> > an important information was missing (in 2a): "someone fiddled with
>> >> >> >> > the clock"; in 3) "the clock stopped working at three the previous
>> >> >> >> > day"). Then I would say that Peter had a true and rational
>> >> >> >> > justification to say that it was three o'clock. However Peter had an
>> >> >> >> > incomplete information which made his knowlege falsifiable and
>> >> >> >> > actually falsified. Then it was not a belief it was imperfect
>> >> >> >> > knowledge, which is always the case in our physical world.

>> >> >> >> "Imperfect knowledge" as you call it, simply IS belief. That prevents us
>> >> >> >> from the extremely counter-intuitive situation where people "know"
>> >> >> >> things that are not true.

>> >> >> >> If someone tells you:
>> >> >> >> "Peter knows it is 3. It is actually 5"
>> >> >> >> or
>> >> >> >> "John knows London is the capital of France. The capital of France is
>> >> >> >> actually Paris, not London"

>> >> >> >> we would tell this person that he is either crazy or does not understand
>> >> >> >> the everyday meaning of "knows" .

>> >> >> >> It also fits with the intuition that belief comes in degrees, knowledge not:
>> >> >> >> "I believe that the theory of physics is true more than I believe that
>> >> >> >> the theory of evolution is true - if there is a conflict, I go for
>> >> >> >> physics"

>> >> >> >> Is a perfectly good and intelligible sentence, as is:
>> >> >> >> "Even though both prosecution and defence have presented strong
>> >> >> >> evidence, I belief that the accused did it more than I believe he is
>> >> >> >> innocent. "

>> >> >> >> replace "believe" with "know" however and you get sentences that don;t
>> >> >> >> sound right at all:

>> >> >> >> "I know that the theory of physics is true more than I know that the
>> >> >> >> theory of evolution us true - if there is a conflict, I go for physics

>> >> >> >> "Even though both prosecution and defence have presented strong
>> >> >> >> evidence, I know that the accused did it more than I know he is innocent."

>> >> >> >Actually the issue is not the definition of beliefs .
>> >> >> >What I think is at stake is whether the organisms which were selected
>> >> >> >by natural selection (NS) were selected because NS is a tracking-truth
>> >> >> >process.
>> >> >> >A first question then arises: is it possible to define a tracking-
>> >> >> >truth process?
>> >> >> >To define a tracking-truth process it is necessary to define the
>> >> >> >truth. Here I see a major issue because I think the truth doesn't
>> >> >> >exist per se. What exists is the physical world with which the
>> >> >> >organisms interact. To survive an organism should have specific and
>> >> >> >relevant interactions with its environment (ie, its close, local
>> >> >> >physical world) which allow it to adapt itself to it.
>> >> >> >Then NS will select the organisms which have these specific and
>> >> >> >relevant interactions with their local environment as these are
>> >> >> >required for their survival.
>> >> >> >I don t think necessary to introduce the notion of truth to explain
>> >> >> >why NS selects such organisms. To say that these interactions are true
>> >> >> >because there is an adequacy between the organisms and the local
>> >> >> >physical world adds nothing more.
>> >> >> >The expression tracking-truth is a philosophical concept which
>> >> >> >requires a clear definition of what would be the truth. I think less
>> >> >> >complicated and ambiguous to explain the process of NS via these
>> >> >> >interactions.
>> >> >> >The integration of these interactions by the highest complex organisms
>> >> >> >in their worldview (what would be their beliefs on the physical
>> >> >> >world) is a very late phase in evolution. Of course the worldview (ie,
>> >> >> >the cognitive evaluation of the local world) by such organisms surely
>> >> >> >has an impact on their survival but it is impossible to quantify it.

>> >> >> I think you once again miss the entire point of the discussion.

>> >> >> Humans have brains and intelligence and form concepts and ideas of how
>> >> >> the world works. We create models in our head to explain what is
>> >> >> happening in the real world. If evolution does produce such a
>> >> >> phenomenon what reason do we have to accept that the creations of the
>> >> >> "mind" (the activities of the brain more accurately) have any
>> >> >> correspondence with reality?

>> >> >Yes, but the conceptualization of such models has been possible only
>> >> >after a sophisticated language emerged. This has been very recently in
>> >> >human history. Regarding the history of evolution it is nothing, even
>> >> >if some kind of thoughts was possible in superior animals. Of course
>> >> >the emergence of homo sapiens langage was possible because particular
>> >> >abilities were selected by NS, You can say that these abilities were
>> >> >selected because the interactions with the environment they allowed
>> >> >were adapted.

>> >> >> Evolution certainly is capable of
>> >> >> selecting against creatures who produce internal models of the world
>> >> >> that result in inappropriate behavior. But the argument here is that
>> >> >> evolution also selects for models of the world (or beliefs) that
>> >> >> correspond with objective reality. Evolution acts so that our
>> >> >> "common sense" beliefs and, by extension, our beliefs about science
>> >> >> can be trusted as true in addition to merely being useful.

>> >> >Before selecting abilities having allowed a language and elaborated
>> >> >thoughts like beliefs evolution shaped the nervous system (NS) from
>> >> >the body for its benefit, ie, to avoid hostile environments and to be
>> >> >attracted by favorable ones. The emotional NS had a major role for
>> >> >such abilities and the resulted behaviors, and thus in the survival of
>> >> >the given multicellular organisms with a NS. Beliefs are really ultra-
>> >> >recent by-products of such evolution.

>> >> The construction of internal models to represent the world long
>> >> predates language. That is essentially what the umwelt is really all
>> >> about: the external world as perceived by an organism. All animals
>> >> make such representations. We then add ourselves as actors within
>> >> that world and are capable of producing scenarios of alternative
>> >> actions, let them play out in the model, and select the best
>> >> alternative to perform. Evolution ensures that our internal
>> >> representation of the world agrees with the real world; that it is
>> >> "true". Language and abstract beliefs can then be imposed on top of a
>> >> structure that already is "truth tracking".

>> >Well, I see you are a fan of Griffiths & Wilkins' "truth tracking"
>> >concept.
>> >I agree that an organism has a kind of "umwelt", ie, a specific mode
>> >of interaction with the environment. However I don't think that other
>> >species than Homo sapiens (perhaps Homo neenderthalensis and Home
>> >erectus?) have/had what can be really called an internal
>> >representation of the world.

>> Call it what you will. They do have something in their brains that
>> lets that manage in the world. It is not all just stimulus-response
>> reflex, you know.

>I fully agree with you that "it is not all just stimulus-response
>reflex". Of course the perception of the local environment by animals
>with a central nervous system (CNS) is integrated in a complex
>specific manner and then processed in order to produce adapted
>behaviors. However I wonder

>Sorry but your answer seems specious to me and doesn't convince me:
>when you track something you have an intent.
>I maintain that natural selection tracks nothing, it just selects the
>surviving organisms, that is all. To explain how such a non
>intentional selection combined with the other mechanisms of evolution
>led to the extant organisms is, as you know, a very long story of
>about 4 billion years. There were numerous steps with many different
>mechanisms, constraints, events etc. I agree with you that the final
>results are impressive and seem to be teleological. We both agree that
>the results are not teleological. Where we disagree is on Griffiths &
>Wilkins' interpretation: you consider it is a good one and doesn't
>mean that the results are teleological, I consider it is not because
>it would mean that the results are indeed teleological. That is the
>major point of our debate.

> >On 17 ao t, 14:48, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> You have again failed to appreciate the notion that natural selection
> >> is a mechanism that can produce results through a mechanistic method
> >> that we humans often think of as teleological or with intent because
> >> when we achieve similar results we have intent to reach those goals.

> >Sorry but your answer seems specious to me and doesn't convince me:
> >when you track something you have an intent.
> >I maintain that natural selection tracks nothing, it just selects the
> >surviving organisms, that is all. To explain how such a non
> >intentional selection combined with the other mechanisms of evolution
> >led to the extant organisms is, as you know, a very long story of
> >about 4 billion years. There were numerous steps with many different
> >mechanisms, constraints, events etc. I agree with you that the final
> >results are impressive and seem to be teleological. We both agree that
> >the results are not teleological. Where we disagree is on Griffiths &
> >Wilkins' interpretation: you consider it is a good one and doesn't
> >mean that the results are teleological, I consider it is not because
> >it would mean that the results are indeed teleological. That is the
> >major point of our debate.

> What you just describe is that we differ on my insistence that
> evolution produces a result that is "seemingly teleological" whereas
> you insist that the result is "truly teleological" and hence cannot
> have an evolutionary basis.- Masquer le texte des messages pr c dents -

> - Afficher le texte des messages pr c dents -

>> >On 17 ao t, 14:48, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> >> You have again failed to appreciate the notion that natural selection
>> >> is a mechanism that can produce results through a mechanistic method
>> >> that we humans often think of as teleological or with intent because
>> >> when we achieve similar results we have intent to reach those goals.

>> >Sorry but your answer seems specious to me and doesn't convince me:
>> >when you track something you have an intent.
>> >I maintain that natural selection tracks nothing, it just selects the
>> >surviving organisms, that is all. To explain how such a non
>> >intentional selection combined with the other mechanisms of evolution
>> >led to the extant organisms is, as you know, a very long story of
>> >about 4 billion years. There were numerous steps with many different
>> >mechanisms, constraints, events etc. I agree with you that the final
>> >results are impressive and seem to be teleological. We both agree that
>> >the results are not teleological. Where we disagree is on Griffiths &
>> >Wilkins' interpretation: you consider it is a good one and doesn't
>> >mean that the results are teleological, I consider it is not because
>> >it would mean that the results are indeed teleological. That is the
>> >major point of our debate.

>> What you just describe is that we differ on my insistence that
>> evolution produces a result that is "seemingly teleological" whereas
>> you insist that the result is "truly teleological" and hence cannot
>> have an evolutionary basis.- Masquer le texte des messages pr c dents -

>> - Afficher le texte des messages pr c dents -

>I think perhaps there is a misunderstanding (perhaps because of my
>English ...again!).
>We fully agree that:
>1. evolution produces a result that is "seemingly teleological";
>2. it is not teleological in fact.
>Where we disagree, I think, is in the interpretation of how natural
>selection works.

> >On 17 ao t, 16:05, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Fri, 17 Aug 2012 06:44:37 -0700 (PDT), marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr
> >> wrote:

> >> >On 17 ao t, 14:48, Richard Norman <r_s_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> >> You have again failed to appreciate the notion that natural selection
> >> >> is a mechanism that can produce results through a mechanistic method
> >> >> that we humans often think of as teleological or with intent because
> >> >> when we achieve similar results we have intent to reach those goals.

> >> >Sorry but your answer seems specious to me and doesn't convince me:
> >> >when you track something you have an intent.
> >> >I maintain that natural selection tracks nothing, it just selects the
> >> >surviving organisms, that is all. To explain how such a non
> >> >intentional selection combined with the other mechanisms of evolution
> >> >led to the extant organisms is, as you know, a very long story of
> >> >about 4 billion years. There were numerous steps with many different
> >> >mechanisms, constraints, events etc. I agree with you that the final
> >> >results are impressive and seem to be teleological. We both agree that
> >> >the results are not teleological. Where we disagree is on Griffiths &
> >> >Wilkins' interpretation: you consider it is a good one and doesn't
> >> >mean that the results are teleological, I consider it is not because
> >> >it would mean that the results are indeed teleological. That is the
> >> >major point of our debate.

> >> What you just describe is that we differ on my insistence that
> >> evolution produces a result that is "seemingly teleological" whereas
> >> you insist that the result is "truly teleological" and hence cannot
> >> have an evolutionary basis.- Masquer le texte des messages pr c dents -

> >> - Afficher le texte des messages pr c dents -

> >I think perhaps there is a misunderstanding (perhaps because of my
> >English ...again!).
> >We fully agree that:
> >1. evolution produces a result that is "seemingly teleological";
> >2. it is not teleological in fact.
> >Where we disagree, I think, is in the interpretation of how natural
> >selection works.

> Now I am very confused but I am happy simply to agree that we disagree
> on something.

> Just in care there is misunderstanding on one point: in no way do I
> think that natural selection is in any way teleological even though
> biologists frequently use teleological language as a convenience in
> describing aspects of it.- Masquer le texte des messages pr c dents -

> > So you keep saying, but without backing it up, and in direct
> > contradiction to what the paper, and people on the forum, have said.
> > another example, this time non human. Some non-human animals have for
> > instance an idea how many offspring they have, so that a mother can
> > carry one by one in her mouth. Having a correct ("truthfull")
> > representation of this is selected (truth is tracked) over those who
> > leave all the offsping behind, and to those who return needlessly
> > again and again searching for offspirng they  dont have.

> I have no problem with that. It is a different story when you say that
> non-human animals have "an internal representation of the world", with
> specific and well-defined beliefs.

> > > On the contrary natural selection tracks nothing as there is no intent
> > > except if you believe in intelligence design.

> > another non sequitur - "tracking" does not imply intend,

> When a hunter tracks an animal you don't think he has an intend?

> > it just
> > describes tah fact that systematically, correct representations of the
> > environment give an advantage over incorrect ones/

> If you agree with the concept of "umwelt" you would also agree that
> different groups of animals with a CNS have very different modes of
> representation of their local environment. One is not truer than the
> other one,

> > > - Masquer le texte des messages pr c dents -

> > > > - Afficher le texte des messages pr c dents -

> > On 17 ao t, 12:53, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:

> > > So you keep saying, but without backing it up, and in direct
> > > contradiction to what the paper, and people on the forum, have said.
> > > another example, this time non human. Some non-human animals have for
> > > instance an idea how many offspring they have, so that a mother can
> > > carry one by one in her mouth. Having a correct ("truthfull")
> > > representation of this is selected (truth is tracked) over those who
> > > leave all the offsping behind, and to those who return needlessly
> > > again and again searching for offspirng they dont have.

> > I have no problem with that. It is a different story when you say that
> > non-human animals have "an internal representation of the world", with
> > specific and well-defined beliefs.

> And who said this? The argument is pretty much agnostic to the type of
> internal representation that is present in the species under
> consideration

> > > another non sequitur - "tracking" does not imply intend,

> > When a hunter tracks an animal you don't think he has an intend?

> Yes, because it is a hunter that does the tracking. Whether or not a
> specific type of tracking is intentional or purely mechanical depends
> on the nature of the agent, not the nature of tracking.

> > If you agree with the concept of "umwelt" you would also agree that
> > different groups of animals with a CNS have very different modes of
> > representation of their local environment. One is not truer than the
> > other one,

> that may or may not be the case. If you have two species that compete
> for food, and one of them has evolved a mechanism to judge distance to
> food more accurately ("truer") than its competitor, then ceteruis
> paribus the one closer to the actual distance might eventually replace
> the less accurate one.

> Again, nothing there contradicts the argument in the paper

> > > > > - Afficher le texte des messages pr c dents -

>You may be interested in the following article:
>NeuralEncoding: The Brain’s Representation of Space
>Ruadhan A. O’Flanagan, Charles F. Stevens
>_Current Biology_ 15 (2005)
>http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982205008651

>"Recent studies have shown that a part of the brain makes use of a grid
>of equilateral triangles to encode the location of the animal
>[specifically, rats] within the local environment."

> <eci...@curioustax.onomy.net> wrote:
> >On 8/16/12 2:39 PM, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> >> [...]
> >> I agree that an organism has a kind of "umwelt", ie, a specific mode
> >> of interaction with the environment. However I don't think that other
> >> species than Homo sapiens (perhaps Homo neenderthalensis and Home
> >> erectus?) have/had what can be really called an internal
> >> representation of the world.

> >You may be interested in the following article:
> >NeuralEncoding: The Brain s Representation of Space
> >Ruadhan A. O Flanagan, Charles F. Stevens
> >_Current Biology_ 15 (2005)
> >http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982205008651

> >"Recent studies have shown that a part of the brain makes use of a grid
> >of equilateral triangles to encode the location of the animal
> >[specifically, rats] within the local environment."

> It starts:

> "In order to navigate successfully through its environment, an animal
> must use its brain to keep track of where it is. Recent studies have
> shed light on how animals do this: an important clue for how the
> animal s location is represented in the brain has been provided by the
> discovery of grid cells in the entorhinal cortex of rats. Each of
> these cells acts as if the surface of the animal s local environment
> has a triangular grid painted all over it the grid spacing is two or
> three times the length of the animal and the cell is active whenever
> the animal is at a vertex of any of the triangles, but inactive for
> locations in between the vertices"

> It concludes:

> "The results of these studies point to the entorhinal cortex as part
> of a neural map of the spatial environment, and provide insights into
> the way that the map is organized."

> It has long been known that animals have representations (maps) of
> their own body, both sensory and motor, and of the visual field.