Dembski's ID and Logical positivism
John Stockwell
an e-mail discussion about Dembski's ID stuff with Richard Wein a few months ago,
it occurred to me that the so-called ID theory of Dembski and others seems to
have the feeling of pure logical positivism in action.
Indeed, it seems to me that Dembski's explanatory filter (at least as he employs it)
must be a kind of probabilistic "inductive logic machine" that can always inductively
identify the general attribute of "intelligently designed object"
from specific information of a probability estimate, one which is made *without*
any auxilliary information, such as a "theory of the designer".
How many of us smell the "stink" of a lack of understanding of science when we
read ID claims.
My conjecture:
ID proponents really do not understand science in that they believe
that science operates in a way with the old idea that science is an
exercise in logical positivism. They do not seem to be aware of this fact, nor
the fact that logical positivism collapsed a few decades ago.
--
John Stockwell | jo...@dix.Mines.EDU
Center for Wave Phenomena (The Home of Seismic Un*x)
Colorado School of Mines
Golden, CO 80401 | http://www.cwp.mines.edu/cwpcodes
voice: (303) 273-3049
Our new book:
Norman Bleistein, Jack K. Cohen, John W. Stockwell Jr., [2000],
Mathematics of multidimensional seismic imaging, migration, and inversion,
(Interdisciplinary Applied Mathematics, V. 13.), Springer-Verlag, New York.
Mike Goodrich
You've got it just backwards, no?
########################
Main Entry: logical positivism:
a 20th century philosophical movement that holds
characteristically that all meaningful statements are
either analytic or conclusively verifiable or at least
confirmable by observation and experiment and that
metaphysical theories are therefore strictly
meaningless -- called also logical empiricism
###########################
If anything, evolutionism holds to logical positivism
and Dembski's filter would tacitly deny this doctrine
as it is concerned with the design *inference* (as the
inference of LAST resort and not first as sophomorically
caracaturized)
perhaps of few more turns over the coals? ;-)
-mg
"John Stockwell" <jo...@dix.Mines.EDU> wrote in message
news:Pine.LNX.4.21.010201...@wenzel.Mines.EDU...
leonardo dasso
John Stockwell <jo...@dix.Mines.EDU> wrote in message
news:Pine.LNX.4.21.010201...@wenzel.Mines.EDU...
I fail to get the link between ID and positivism.
Also I resent not having been been informed of the collapse of positivism.
Please somebody tell Van Fraassen.
regards
leo
wilkins
me either....
> Also I resent not having been been informed of the collapse of positivism.
See David Hull's big book. He refers to them as the "all-purpose evil
demons of philosophy"...
> Please somebody tell Van Fraassen.
Van Fraassen is a *positivist*? Do you really think so? Internal
realist, yes, but positivist I doubt.
> regards
> leo
--
John Wilkins, Head, Graphic Production, The Walter and Eliza Hall
Institute of Medical Research, Melbourne, Australia
Homo homini aut deus aut lupus - Erasmus of Rotterdam
<http://www.users.bigpond.com/thewilkins/darwiniana.html>
scot...@my-deja.com
"Mike Goodrich" <tachy...@home.com> wrote:
> ????????????????
>
> You've got it just backwards, no?
>
> ########################
> Main Entry: logical positivism:
> a 20th century philosophical movement that holds
> characteristically that all meaningful statements are
> either analytic or conclusively verifiable or at least
> confirmable by observation and experiment and that
> metaphysical theories are therefore strictly
> meaningless -- called also logical empiricism
> ###########################
>
> If anything, evolutionism holds to logical positivism
> and Dembski's filter would tacitly deny this doctrine
> as it is concerned with the design *inference* (as the
> inference of LAST resort and not first as sophomorically
> caracaturized)
>
some bookmarks i had hanging around
http://pratt.edu/~arch543p/help/logical_positivism.html
http://www.newrenaissance.com/positiv1.htm
http://www.newrenaissance.com/positiv2.htm
The positivists today, who have rejected this so-called Vienna school
of philosophy, prefer to call themselves logical empiricists in order
to dissociate themselves from the emphasis of the earlier thinkers on
scientific verification. They maintain that the verification principle
itself is philosophically unverifiable.
scott
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
leonardo dasso
<scot...@my-deja.com> wrote in message news:95de03$43j$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
Isn't that a pity!! I always thought that a little bit of unverifiable
metaphysics could be acceptable if its purpose is to stop tons of it.
regards
leo
leonardo dasso
wilkins <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
news:1eo7dox.10h7itl1bau8gqN%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
I'd say so. Ian Hacking in "Representing and Intervening" calls his book
the Scientific Image, "the most recent distinguished example of the
positivist tradition" (p 41). And then says "Van-Fraassen's is the most
coherent present-day positivism" (p 51).
Regards
leo
John Stockwell
>
>> John Stockwell <jo...@dix.Mines.EDU> wrote in message
>> news:Pine.LNX.4.21.010201...@wenzel.Mines.EDU...
>> > Just a though to throw out this half-baked idea out to the group. When was
>> having
Well, I said it was 'half-baked'.
>> > an e-mail discussion about Dembski's ID stuff with Richard Wein a few
>> months ago,
>> > it occurred to me that the so-called ID theory of Dembski and others seems
>> to
>> > have the feeling of pure logical positivism in action.
...snip....
>> > My conjecture:
>> > ID proponents really do not understand science in that they believe
>> > that science operates in a way with the old idea that science is an
>> > exercise in logical positivism. They do not seem to be aware of this fact,
>> nor
>> > the fact that logical positivism collapsed a few decades ago.
>> >
>> > --
>>
>> I fail to get the link between ID and positivism.
>
>me either....
Well, what I was thinking is that the positivists, at least early in
the game, believed in "verificationism" and based this on validation
through "inductive logic". Of course, we know that it is likely that
there isn't any such thing. There is "induction" but there is no
"inductive logic".
But, isn't this exactly what the probability test for intelligent design
that Dembski is pushing actually is? Dembski claims that any event with
lower odds than probability X must be the result of intelligence. He does
this without a general theory of intelligence, a general theory of intelligent
design, and without any information about the specific designer. Is this
not an example of induction used as logic?
>
>> Also I resent not having been been informed of the collapse of positivism.
>
>See David Hull's big book. He refers to them as the "all-purpose evil
>demons of philosophy"...
Fredrich Suppes' book is also a good one.
>> regards
>> leo
scot...@my-deja.com
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/e/explanat.htm
Contemporary Developments in the Theory of Explanation
Contemporary developments in the theory of explanation in many ways
reflect the fragmented state of analytic philosophy since the decline
of logical positivism. In this article we will look briefly at examples
of how explanation has been conceived within the following five
traditions: (1) Causal Realism, (2) Constructive Empiricism, (3)
Ordinary Language Philosophy, (4) Cognitive Science and (5) Naturalism
and Scientific Realism....
....2) Explanation and Constructive Empiricism
In his book The Scientific Image (1980) Bas van Fraassen produced an
influential defense of anti-realism. Terming his view "constructive
empiricism" van Fraassen claimed that theoretical science was properly
construed as a creative process of model construction rather than one
of discovering truths about the unobservable world. While avoiding the
fatal excesses of logical positivism he argued strongly against the
realistic interpretation of theoretical terms, claiming that
contemporary scientific realism is predicated on a dire
misunderstanding of the nature of explanation. (See "Naturalism and
Scientific Realism" below). In support of his constructive empiricism
van Fraassen produced an epistemic theory of explanation that draws on
the logic of why-questions and draws on a Bayesian interpretation of
probability.
John Stockwell
> "Mike Goodrich" <tachy...@home.com> wrote:
>> ????????????????
>>
>> You've got it just backwards, no?
>>
>> ########################
>> Main Entry: logical positivism:
>> a 20th century philosophical movement that holds
>> characteristically that all meaningful statements are
>> either analytic or conclusively verifiable or at least
>> confirmable by observation and experiment and that
>> metaphysical theories are therefore strictly
>> meaningless -- called also logical empiricism
>> ###########################
>>
>> If anything, evolutionism holds to logical positivism
>> and Dembski's filter would tacitly deny this doctrine
>> as it is concerned with the design *inference* (as the
>> inference of LAST resort and not first as sophomorically
>> caracaturized)
The positivists were of the opinion that there was no need for
any metaphysical assumptions in scientific investigation, because
they could strictly verify everything via induction, which they viewed
as a branch of logic. I don't believe that there is any serious
contender for a reasonable school of science which believes in this
strict "anti-metaphysicalism," anymore. We pretty much all recognize that
there are metaphysical assumptions behind scientific investigations.
Now, to my argument about the Dembski design inference. Dembski and
his followers staunchly claim that they are *not* assuming anything
at all about the designer, not even that there a priori is a designer.
(Indeed, they have to take that position, lest they be obviously just
another pack of creationists.)
They claim that they can merely look at a system, note a large probability
against the item having occurred by "chance" and then infer design. This
is an _inductive inference. Now, in all regular science, we recognize
the possibility that our inductive inferences are wrong, and that what
constitutes science is the ability to test our inductive inferences.
But the Dembski-ites refuse to accept the possibility that they might
need auxilliary information (such as information about the designer, the
mechanism of design, or even a more complete understanding of natural
phenomena). They are claiming that their inductive inferences will
always be correct. Hence, I argue that what Dembski-ites are doing
is equivalent to claiming that they are doing inductive _logic_,
not merely an inference.
John Wilkins
> wilkins <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
> news:1eo7dox.10h7itl1bau8gqN%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
> > leonardo dasso <lda...@ukgateway.net> wrote:
<snip>
> > > Also I resent not having been been informed of the collapse of
> positivism.
> >
> > See David Hull's big book. He refers to them as the "all-purpose evil
> > demons of philosophy"...
> >
> > > Please somebody tell Van Fraassen.
> >
> > Van Fraassen is a *positivist*? Do you really think so? Internal
> > realist, yes, but positivist I doubt.
> >
> > > regards
> > > leo
> >
>
> I'd say so. Ian Hacking in "Representing and Intervening" calls his book
> the Scientific Image, "the most recent distinguished example of the
> positivist tradition" (p 41). And then says "Van-Fraassen's is the most
> coherent present-day positivism" (p 51).
> Regards
> leo
Like I said (well, David, actually) - the all-purpose evil demons of
philosophy. "Positivist" is one of those terms that gets thrown about
and as much as I respect Hacking's "new experimentalism" there is a
tendency to label opposing positions (often as positivist) in order to
make the position one holds seem more contrasting. In what way is van
Fraassen's view positivst? I ask because his view of theories, or rather
Frederick Suppe's which has a strong relation to v F's and is called the
Semantic Conception, is one that I share and if I'm a positivist, I'd
like to know...
--
John Wilkins at home
<http://www.users.bigpond.com/thewilkins/darwiniana.html>
John Wilkins
> >leonardo dasso <lda...@ukgateway.net> wrote:
> >
> >> John Stockwell <jo...@dix.Mines.EDU> wrote in message
> >> news:Pine.LNX.4.21.010201...@wenzel.Mines.EDU...
> >> > Just a though to throw out this half-baked idea out to the group.
> >> When was having
>
> Well, I said it was 'half-baked'.
and therefore capable of growing interesting things on it :-)
>
> >> > an e-mail discussion about Dembski's ID stuff with Richard Wein a few
> >> months ago, > it occurred to me that the so-called ID theory of Dembski
> >> and others seems to > have the feeling of pure logical positivism in
> >> action.
> ...snip....
> >> > My conjecture:
> >> > ID proponents really do not understand science in that they believe >
> >> that science operates in a way with the old idea that science is an >
> >> exercise in logical positivism. They do not seem to be aware of this
> >> fact, nor > the fact that logical positivism collapsed a few decades
> >> ago.
> >> >
> >> > --
> >>
> >> I fail to get the link between ID and positivism.
> >
> >me either....
>
> Well, what I was thinking is that the positivists, at least early in
> the game, believed in "verificationism" and based this on validation
> through "inductive logic". Of course, we know that it is likely that
> there isn't any such thing. There is "induction" but there is no
> "inductive logic".
I do not think that is exactly true - although in a formal logician's
sense it is. There are a slew of heuristics that are effective search
space strategies. The issue is whether Dembski's EF is one of those.
>
> But, isn't this exactly what the probability test for intelligent design
> that Dembski is pushing actually is? Dembski claims that any event with
> lower odds than probability X must be the result of intelligence. He does
> this without a general theory of intelligence, a general theory of
> intelligent design, and without any information about the specific
> designer. Is this not an example of induction used as logic?
sort of. What Dembski has failed entirely to do is to provide a way of
establishing the prior probabilities that would license statistically
the use of his line of logic, and as Wesley has often said in this
group, he fails to allow some other branching in the sequence of
inference (like "don't know"). This is a failure of his model, but not a
positivistic approach to knowledge as such (or if it is, then all
Bayesian models of inference are positivistic - an interesting claim if
you'd like to back it up).
>
> >
> >> Also I resent not having been been informed of the collapse of positivism.
> >
> >See David Hull's big book. He refers to them as the "all-purpose evil
> >demons of philosophy"...
>
> Fredrich Suppes' book is also a good one.
>
Oh totally. I am a Suppean :-)
> >> regards
> >> leo
John Wilkins
<snip>
> http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/e/explanat.htm
>
> Contemporary Developments in the Theory of Explanation
> Contemporary developments in the theory of explanation in many ways
> reflect the fragmented state of analytic philosophy since the decline
> of logical positivism. In this article we will look briefly at examples
> of how explanation has been conceived within the following five
> traditions: (1) Causal Realism, (2) Constructive Empiricism, (3)
> Ordinary Language Philosophy, (4) Cognitive Science and (5) Naturalism
> and Scientific Realism....
>
> ....2) Explanation and Constructive Empiricism
> In his book The Scientific Image (1980) Bas van Fraassen produced an
> influential defense of anti-realism. Terming his view "constructive
> empiricism" van Fraassen claimed that theoretical science was properly
> construed as a creative process of model construction rather than one
> of discovering truths about the unobservable world. While avoiding the
> fatal excesses of logical positivism he argued strongly against the
> realistic interpretation of theoretical terms, claiming that
> contemporary scientific realism is predicated on a dire
> misunderstanding of the nature of explanation. (See "Naturalism and
> Scientific Realism" below). In support of his constructive empiricism
> van Fraassen produced an epistemic theory of explanation that draws on
> the logic of why-questions and draws on a Bayesian interpretation of
> probability.
Nice link. I will read it more thoroughly later.
For now, I take the author to be asserting that anti-realism is
positivistic. I think this is not necessarily true, unless one takes
model construction to be positivistic (even allowing that the Kantian
noumena-phenomena distinction has validity that is relevant). So far as
I can see, all "realisms" assert that there is an unknowable or
indirectly knowable noumenal world and that we can claim that the
entities in our model are "true" representations of the noumenal
entities. But *positivism* is the claim that all knowledge begins and
ends in observables (and logical positivism that only verifiable
empirical propositions are knowledge), claims which I do not take v F to
be asserting.
V F's semantic conception, and that of Suppe (who I much prefer), is a
claim about inference from explanatory (quantified) entities, and so is
in the lineage of Quinean theoretical holism - "to be is to be the value
of a bound variable". How is this positivistic?
leonardo dasso
> >In article <QFme6.234159$j6.31...@news1.rdc1.va.home.com>,
> > "Mike Goodrich" <tachy...@home.com> wrote:
> >> ????????????????
> >>
> >> You've got it just backwards, no?
> >>
> >> ########################
> >> Main Entry: logical positivism:
> >> a 20th century philosophical movement that holds
> >> characteristically that all meaningful statements are
> >> either analytic or conclusively verifiable or at least
> >> confirmable by observation and experiment and that
> >> metaphysical theories are therefore strictly
> >> meaningless -- called also logical empiricism
> >> ###########################
> >>
> >> If anything, evolutionism holds to logical positivism
> >> and Dembski's filter would tacitly deny this doctrine
> >> as it is concerned with the design *inference* (as the
> >> inference of LAST resort and not first as sophomorically
> >> caracaturized)
>
> The positivists were of the opinion that there was no need for
> any metaphysical assumptions in scientific investigation,
Positivists dont *accept* metaphysics. That is very different from thinking
that there is "no need for metaphysical assumptions".
because
> they could strictly verify everything via induction, which they viewed
> as a branch of logic.
No. Not all positivists are inductivists and viceversa.
I don't believe that there is any serious
> contender for a reasonable school of science which believes in this
> strict "anti-metaphysicalism," anymore. We pretty much all recognize that
> there are metaphysical assumptions behind scientific investigations.
> Now, to my argument about the Dembski design inference. Dembski and
> his followers staunchly claim that they are *not* assuming anything
> at all about the designer, not even that there a priori is a designer.
> (Indeed, they have to take that position, lest they be obviously just
> another pack of creationists.)
> They claim that they can merely look at a system, note a large probability
> against the item having occurred by "chance" and then infer design. This
> is an _inductive inference. Now, in all regular science, we recognize
> the possibility that our inductive inferences are wrong, and that what
> constitutes science is the ability to test our inductive inferences.
>
To test our hypotheses, not our inductive inferences.
> But the Dembski-ites refuse to accept the possibility that they might
> need auxilliary information (such as information about the designer, the
> mechanism of design, or even a more complete understanding of natural
> phenomena). They are claiming that their inductive inferences will
> always be correct. Hence, I argue that what Dembski-ites are doing
> is equivalent to claiming that they are doing inductive _logic_,
> not merely an inference.
>
I think you are confusing inductivism with positivism. Inductivism is the
belief that induction is behind scientific discovery.
Positivism's key ideas are essentially: an emphasis on verification and
observation, the negation of the idea of causality, and a non-realist stance
regarding theories and/or non-observable entities.
Positivism doesnt imply inductivism; you can be a positivist and believe in
the hypothetico-deductive method.
regards
leo
leonardo dasso
John Wilkins <thewi...@bigpond.com> wrote in message
news:1eo94ls.1a25zs7mnqkkN%thewi...@bigpond.com...
Hi John,
I can see you are a scholar of philosophy of science -I'm just a dilettante.
Hacking (whose book Representing and Intervening is probably the most lucid
and insightful book on philosophy of science I've ever read) identifies six
key ideas that in his opinion define the positivistic position: 1. an
emphasis on verification 2. the thesis that sensory observation is the
foundation of all genuine knowledge 3. the idea that causality is just about
conjunctions between events 4. a deep suspicion about the role of deep
explanations 5. a hostility towards unobsevable or theoretical entities, and
6. an opposition to metaphysics.
Hacking claims that Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism shares these 6
ideas, with perhaps the exception of the emphasis on verification or some
variant.
regards
leo
Dave Sandborg
<lda...@ukgateway.net> wrote:
> Hacking (whose book Representing and Intervening is probably the most lucid
> and insightful book on philosophy of science I've ever read) identifies six
> key ideas that in his opinion define the positivistic position: 1. an
> emphasis on verification 2. the thesis that sensory observation is the
> foundation of all genuine knowledge 3. the idea that causality is just about
> conjunctions between events 4. a deep suspicion about the role of deep
> explanations 5. a hostility towards unobsevable or theoretical entities, and
> 6. an opposition to metaphysics.
> Hacking claims that Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism shares these 6
> ideas, with perhaps the exception of the emphasis on verification or some
> variant.
At least Hacking attempts to pin some criteria (an "explication",
perhaps?) on what it means to be a modern positivist. Usually it seems
the term is thrown around less carefully. All in all, I'd say the term
should only be used to refer to a historical movement in philosophy. I
find it too ambiguous to be used to meaningfully refer to any
contemporary philosopher. And Dembski can certainly be critiqued
without labeling him a positivist!
--
Dave Sandborg
Remove Spam-away to respond via e-mail.
leonardo dasso
Dave Sandborg <sand...@Spam-away.ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:030220011048319020%sand...@Spam-away.ix.netcom.com...
In my view (and again, following Hacking's considerations) the positivist
view is particularly relevant concerning the way we regard unobservable
entities and scientiific theories, ie Hacking's point number 5. A realist
will say that electrons, for instance are real entities, and that successful
scientific theories reflect reality. Positivism -by holding a non-realist
view- introduces an element of caution in the plot, suggesting that
electrons may be just theoretical constructions derived from our models, and
theories that work are just that: theories that work. In that respect I find
positivism rather attractive. Hacking goes on to say that we can be realist
regarding entities, and non-realist regarding theories and viceversa. It is
very interesting to read Hacking's chapter on "intervening" and how he
introduces the concept (rather new in philosophy of science) of the
importance of intervention to define what is real and what is not.
regards
leo
John Wilkins
Anti-realism is not the same as positivism. An anti-realist simply
hedges against direct ontological claims being inferred from scientific
models - the issue is not whether there is a real world but whether that
inference from theory to entity is licensed. It is essentially a claim
about language - just because we have a word for something in a theory
is not in itself enough reason to think that it exists (although if it
does that adds to the power and longevity of the theory). Positivism, on
the other hand, assumes that entities that are hidden from "direct"
phenomenological observation are useful fictions only, a bit like
Ptolemaic epicycles. Hacking's point that, if you can spray electrons
then electrons exist, is a good one, and one that a van Fraassen can
accept, I think (for some value of "exist" at any rate :-)
Dave Sandborg's point holds - terms like "positivist" are historical
terms, like "gothic" or "baroque" in art. Nothing more is gained by
labelling people outside a period the label is derived from than calling
the Levellers and Diggers of the English Civil War "Marxists" like
Christopher Hill did. It is anachronistic and it is Whiggish.
leonardo dasso
I agree with you that anti-realism is not the same as positivism, but
positivism, I think, is probably the most important anti-realist tradition
in it has been around for a long time.
>An anti-realist simply
> hedges against direct ontological claims being inferred from scientific
> models - the issue is not whether there is a real world but whether that
> inference from theory to entity is licensed. It is essentially a claim
> about language - just because we have a word for something in a theory
> is not in itself enough reason to think that it exists (although if it
> does that adds to the power and longevity of the theory). Positivism, on
> the other hand, assumes that entities that are hidden from "direct"
> phenomenological observation are useful fictions only, a bit like
> Ptolemaic epicycles.
I dont understand the difference you draw here. What is the difference
between the anti-realist claim that because we have a word for a certain
entity in a theory there is no reason to think that it exists, and the
positivist claim that unobservable entities are useful fictions?
>Hacking's point that, if you can spray electrons
> then electrons exist, is a good one, and one that a van Fraassen can
> accept, I think (for some value of "exist" at any rate :-)
I think Hacking's point is a very good one too. And he says that that is
what made him a realist.
> Dave Sandborg's point holds - terms like "positivist" are historical
> terms, like "gothic" or "baroque" in art. Nothing more is gained by
> labelling people outside a period the label is derived from than calling
> the Levellers and Diggers of the English Civil War "Marxists" like
> Christopher Hill did. It is anachronistic and it is Whiggish.
Maybe positivist is a term that due probably to a variety of
extra-philosophical issues acquired some funny connotations, but I dont
think it should necessarily be taken as anachronistic and Whiggish. Hacking,
for one, doesnt seem to think so.
regards
leo
> John Wilkins at home
>
John Wilkins
Anti-realism, per se, was developed by Putnam as internal realism in the
70s in response to Quinean, Kuhnian and other debates over the status of
entities in theories. Positivism was developed by Mach in the 1870s in
response to metaphysical issues raised by Kantian phenomenalism.
Positivism did not assert that theoretical entities did not exist but
that unobservable theoretical entities may or may not exist but are
useful fictions. Anti-realism asserts that the *only* reality
theoretical entities (including those of common sense folk metaphysics)
have is conferred upon them by their role in the theory. It is
misleading to say that anti-realism is a positivism.
>
>
> >An anti-realist simply
> > hedges against direct ontological claims being inferred from scientific
> > models - the issue is not whether there is a real world but whether that
> > inference from theory to entity is licensed. It is essentially a claim
> > about language - just because we have a word for something in a theory
> > is not in itself enough reason to think that it exists (although if it
> > does that adds to the power and longevity of the theory). Positivism, on
> > the other hand, assumes that entities that are hidden from "direct"
> > phenomenological observation are useful fictions only, a bit like
> > Ptolemaic epicycles.
>
> I dont understand the difference you draw here. What is the difference
> between the anti-realist claim that because we have a word for a certain
> entity in a theory there is no reason to think that it exists, and the
> positivist claim that unobservable entities are useful fictions?
Because the positivist says that only *observable* phenomena are real,
while the anti-realist says that *all* theoretical entities, observable
or not, are real only within the conceptual confines of the theory.
>
>
> >Hacking's point that, if you can spray electrons
> > then electrons exist, is a good one, and one that a van Fraassen can
> > accept, I think (for some value of "exist" at any rate :-)
>
> I think Hacking's point is a very good one too. And he says that that is
> what made him a realist.
Actually, no; it makes him an operationalist. A realist would say that
because electrons are so well founded in atomic theory and atomic theory
is so well established, electrons are real whether you can spray them or
not. Hacking's position, as I recall it, is an experimental
operationalism or empiricism.
>
> > Dave Sandborg's point holds - terms like "positivist" are historical
> > terms, like "gothic" or "baroque" in art. Nothing more is gained by
> > labelling people outside a period the label is derived from than calling
> > the Levellers and Diggers of the English Civil War "Marxists" like
> > Christopher Hill did. It is anachronistic and it is Whiggish.
>
> Maybe positivist is a term that due probably to a variety of
> extra-philosophical issues acquired some funny connotations, but I dont
> think it should necessarily be taken as anachronistic and Whiggish. Hacking,
> for one, doesnt seem to think so.
>
Well, he's not god. I also happen to think Larry Laudan, Philip Kitcher
and David Hull have some equally useful things to say about the nature
of science... Dave's point is, I think (and it is certainly mine), that
theories are historical sequences of ideas, and nothing much is gained
from identifying sequences on the basis of superficial similarity.
Let me use a biological analogy. If we identified a Cretaceous bird with
a modern parrot on the basis of beak shape, for example, any inductive
conclusions we reached about the Cretaceous "parrot" would be founded on
analogy, not homology. Hence we would stand a very good chance of making
the wrong inferences. To assert that an idea in the early 20th century
is "the same" as an idea in the late 20th century, when those two may
*not* be lineally related, is to argue from analogy, not homology.
Hence, it is not a secure way to argue. To make "positions" in
philosophy a timeless set of abstractions (itself a contentious
philosophical move) is typological thinking, and doesn't help us to
understand ideas in their context.
> regards
> leo
>
> > John Wilkins at home
> >
leonardo dasso
John Wilkins <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
news:1eockiv.6jgs1l15y6xbuN%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
> leonardo dasso <lda...@ukgateway.net> wrote:
> > > >
[snip]
> > and it has been around for a long time.
>
> Anti-realism, per se, was developed by Putnam as internal realism in the
> 70s in response to Quinean, Kuhnian and other debates over the status of
> entities in theories. Positivism was developed by Mach in the 1870s in
> response to metaphysical issues raised by Kantian phenomenalism.
> Positivism did not assert that theoretical entities did not exist but
> that unobservable theoretical entities may or may not exist but are
> useful fictions. Anti-realism asserts that the *only* reality
> theoretical entities (including those of common sense folk metaphysics)
> have is conferred upon them by their role in the theory. It is
> misleading to say that anti-realism is a positivism.
I never said that anti-realism is a positivism. I said that positivism was
probably the most important anti-realist tradition around.
> >
> > >An anti-realist simply
> > > hedges against direct ontological claims being inferred from
scientific
> > > models - the issue is not whether there is a real world but whether
that
> > > inference from theory to entity is licensed. It is essentially a claim
> > > about language - just because we have a word for something in a theory
> > > is not in itself enough reason to think that it exists (although if it
> > > does that adds to the power and longevity of the theory). Positivism,
on
> > > the other hand, assumes that entities that are hidden from "direct"
> > > phenomenological observation are useful fictions only, a bit like
> > > Ptolemaic epicycles.
> >
> > I dont understand the difference you draw here. What is the difference
> > between the anti-realist claim that because we have a word for a
certain
> > entity in a theory there is no reason to think that it exists, and the
> > positivist claim that unobservable entities are useful fictions?
>
> Because the positivist says that only *observable* phenomena are real,
> while the anti-realist says that *all* theoretical entities, observable
> or not, are real only within the conceptual confines of the theory.
> >
I disagree. Anti-realism denies the existence of *theoretical* entities; it
says that they are fictions, logical constructions, or part of an
intellectual instrument for reasoning about the world. That is why
positivism is an anti-realism.
I have never heard of any anti-realist who suggests that *observable*
entities are real only with the confines of the theories.
How can an entity be theoretical and observable at the same time? If we cou
ld see electrons bouncing around with our bare eyes then they would not be
theoretical entities any more.
> >
> > >Hacking's point that, if you can spray electrons
> > > then electrons exist, is a good one, and one that a van Fraassen can
> > > accept, I think (for some value of "exist" at any rate :-)
> >
> > I think Hacking's point is a very good one too. And he says that that is
> > what made him a realist.
>
> Actually, no; it makes him an operationalist. A realist would say that
> because electrons are so well founded in atomic theory and atomic theory
> is so well established, electrons are real whether you can spray them or
> not. Hacking's position, as I recall it, is an experimental
> operationalism or empiricism.
> >
I disagree, and so does Hacking himself. If you believe in the reality of
theoretical entities you are a realist about entities, regardless of the
reasons that led you to believe in those entities.
Hacking is very clear about this. In Representing and Intervening, telling
the story of how the experiments with electrons made him a realist Hacking
says:
"For my part I never thought twice about scientific realism until a friend
told me about an ongoing experiment to detect the existence of fractional
electric charges. These are called quarks. Now it is not the quarks that
made me a realist, but rather electrons."
Further down he says:
"Experimental work provides the strongest evidence for scientific realism.
This is not because we test hypotheses about entities. ***It is because
entities that in principle cannot be observed are regularly manipulated***
to produce new phenomena and to investigate other aspects of nature."
> > > Dave Sandborg's point holds - terms like "positivist" are historical
> > > terms, like "gothic" or "baroque" in art. Nothing more is gained by
> > > labelling people outside a period the label is derived from than
calling
> > > the Levellers and Diggers of the English Civil War "Marxists" like
> > > Christopher Hill did. It is anachronistic and it is Whiggish.
> >
> > Maybe positivist is a term that due probably to a variety of
> > extra-philosophical issues acquired some funny connotations, but I dont
> > think it should necessarily be taken as anachronistic and Whiggish.
Hacking,
> > for one, doesnt seem to think so.
> >
> Well, he's not god. I also happen to think Larry Laudan, Philip Kitcher
> and David Hull have some equally useful things to say about the nature
> of science... Dave's point is, I think (and it is certainly mine), that
> theories are historical sequences of ideas, and nothing much is gained
> from identifying sequences on the basis of superficial similarity.
>
Actually, nobody that I know of is god.
Theories are indeed historical sequences of ideas; some change a little over
time, some change a lot, some change beyond recognition, some are forgotten.
In the case of positivism we can define a number of relevant points that
define the theory, and that is why, regardless of how old, or how demode' it
may be, we can determine who shares these points and who doesnt.
> Let me use a biological analogy. If we identified a Cretaceous bird with
> a modern parrot on the basis of beak shape, for example, any inductive
> conclusions we reached about the Cretaceous "parrot" would be founded on
> analogy, not homology. Hence we would stand a very good chance of making
> the wrong inferences. To assert that an idea in the early 20th century
> is "the same" as an idea in the late 20th century, when those two may
> *not* be lineally related, is to argue from analogy, not homology.
> Hence, it is not a secure way to argue. To make "positions" in
> philosophy a timeless set of abstractions (itself a contentious
> philosophical move) is typological thinking, and doesn't help us to
> understand ideas in their context.
> > regards
> > leo
> >
> > > John Wilkins at home
> > >
Again, we have a number of key points that define the core of positivism and
therefore there is no need to use "analogy" here. We know what we mean.
Furthermore, I fail to see why positivism is supposed to have become a
useless term, when other terms like secularism, liberalism, marxism,
empiricism, rationalism, or modernism which go back a long way too seem to
be happily used without any trouble.
regards
leo