No imagination
Robert Grumbine
to be science occurred to me as I'm home sick (Martian Death Flu,
good thing I'm not martian) and reading _Chariots of the Gods_.
These people are extremely, profoundly, devoid of imagination or
creativity.
Let's ignore the fact that the argument from lack of imagination
("I can't imagine how it could have happened, so it must be ...")
is one of their staples.
I'm thinking more of the fact that, for instance, they can't
imagine that the Bible could be partly nonliteral, or that von
Daniken can't imagine that an artist would paint on a cave wall
without space aliens (gods) telling him to. von Daniken's problem
with Nazca (can't imagine people doing it) is another example.
This is a guy who never made sand castles at the beach just because.
Rather than multiply examples myself, I'll throw it open for
discussion and perhaps some more illustration. I'm more interested,
though, in folks who can come up with counterexamples (Gish
being a sculptor?).
--
Robert Grumbine http://www.radix.net/~bobg/ Science faqs and amateur activities notes and links.
Sagredo (Galileo Galilei) "You present these recondite matters with too much
evidence and ease; this great facility makes them less appreciated than they
would be had they been presented in a more abstruse manner." Two New Sciences
Bigdakine
>From: bo...@radix.net (Robert Grumbine)
>Date: 11/5/03 7:58 AM Hawaiian Standard Time
>Message-id: <bobdqe$k75$1...@news1.radix.net>
>
> A generalization regarding YECS and other crackpotteries claiming
>to be science occurred to me as I'm home sick (Martian Death Flu,
>good thing I'm not martian) and reading _Chariots of the Gods_.
>These people are extremely, profoundly, devoid of imagination or
>creativity.
>
> Let's ignore the fact that the argument from lack of imagination
>("I can't imagine how it could have happened, so it must be ...")
>is one of their staples.
>
> I'm thinking more of the fact that, for instance, they can't
>imagine that the Bible could be partly nonliteral, or that von
>Daniken can't imagine that an artist would paint on a cave wall
>without space aliens (gods) telling him to. von Daniken's problem
>with Nazca (can't imagine people doing it) is another example.
>This is a guy who never made sand castles at the beach just because.
>
If nothing else, Von Daniken is entertaining. Which is more than I can say for
IDers
Dr. Stuart A. Weinstein
Ewa Beach Institute of Tectonics
"To err is human, but to really foul things up
requires a creationist"
Tom McDonald
Stuart,
Well, if by entertaining you mean infuriating, I suppose.
I've lost too much occlusal enamel from my molars to be much
entertained by tripe the likes of his.
Tom McDonald
--
remove 'nohormel' to reply
Bob Casanova
appeared in talk.origins, posted by bo...@radix.net (Robert
Grumbine):
> A generalization regarding YECS and other crackpotteries claiming
>to be science occurred to me as I'm home sick (Martian Death Flu,
>good thing I'm not martian) and reading _Chariots of the Gods_.
>These people are extremely, profoundly, devoid of imagination or
>creativity.
>
> Let's ignore the fact that the argument from lack of imagination
>("I can't imagine how it could have happened, so it must be ...")
>is one of their staples.
>
> I'm thinking more of the fact that, for instance, they can't
>imagine that the Bible could be partly nonliteral, or that von
>Daniken can't imagine that an artist would paint on a cave wall
>without space aliens (gods) telling him to. von Daniken's problem
>with Nazca (can't imagine people doing it) is another example.
>This is a guy who never made sand castles at the beach just because.
>
> Rather than multiply examples myself, I'll throw it open for
>discussion and perhaps some more illustration. I'm more interested,
>though, in folks who can come up with counterexamples (Gish
>being a sculptor?).
You might want to consider this, especially when claims
arise that "The (insert culture here) couldn't have (insert
accomplishment here)!". In all the cases I've seen, the
claimant is absolutely sure that although some group of
"others" lacked the intelligence and/or skill to perform
some task, they *never* make such claims about any product
of "modern" (i.e., Roman or later) western culture. Why not
the Chartres cathedral, for instance, or the various
fortresses erected by nearly everyone (Cadiz comes to mind
as a good example) during the late Medieval and early modern
period? I detect more than just a hint of racial and
cultural bigotry.
--
Bob C.
Reply to Bob-Casanova @ worldnet.att.net
(without the spaces, of course)
"The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"
- Isaac Asimov
Robert Grumbine
Hmm. I'm not sure if it's so much racial/cultural as
temporal. I've definitely noticed that theme. But I've
also heard it for 'western' locations/constructions such
as Stonehenge, and for somewhat more modern things, such
as (honest) Chartres (something about the blue shade in
the stained glass that 'all our modern science cannot match').
But the line that stand out most strongly is "I'm modern
and therefore much superior to all those ancient people.
For example, I know the earth is round and they all thought
it was flat." (von Daniken came close to saying the second
one directly.) They then combine their profound lack of
creativity with that to conclude that if _they_ can't imagine
how something was done, then certainly the ancients couldn't
either.
On the other hand, you could be right. I have a great
lack of understanding of racism. And von Daniken (for example)
is quite explicit about not including the classical Romans
and Greeks or their time frame forward 'when the record gets
better'. Pretty obvious attempt to hide his gods in the gaps.
The gaps have shrunk, as is terribly obvious in his chapter on
Easter Island (he was babbling about how there were no trees on
the island. There were, just not for very long after the
people arrived).
Huck Turner
Dawkins calls these failures of imagination "arguments from personal
incredulity". Unfortunately, such arguments are actually quite common
in science. It's not just the crackpots. And in casual conversation,
I'm always hearing people saying things like "I don't know why anyone
would want to x!" which is just a conventional way of saying "I think
x is stupid". Taken literally though it means "I don't understand,
therefore it's stupid" which is not valid at all. Indeed, when you
said "I have a great lack of understanding of racism" I'm assuming you
just mean "I think racism is wrong" and actually know a thing or two
about some of the causes of racism like fear of the unknown, the
tendency to generalise, need for scapegoats, outgroup homogeneity
bias, the media and limitations on the ability to empathise that come
from yes, having a lack of imagination.
In general, I think encouraging imagination in children is potentially
one of the biggest vaccines against all kinds of social ills. If you
have a good imagination then you are much more likely to empathise
with others (a vaccine against predjudice and anti-social behaviour)
and you have a better chance of appreciating the consequences of your
own actions (a vaccine against self-destructive behaviour). And of
course, if you have a good imagination you're much more likely to come
up with solutions to life's problems.
H.
---
Like-minds don't notice shared mistakes. Talk to someone else.
A Pagano
Grumbine) wrote:
> A generalization regarding YECS and other crackpotteries claiming
>to be science occurred to me as I'm home sick (Martian Death Flu,
>good thing I'm not martian) and reading _Chariots of the Gods_.
>These people are extremely, profoundly, devoid of imagination or
>creativity.
Pagano replies:
Assuming for the sake of argument that one was guilty of offering an
argument which lacked "imagination" would NOT deductively lead to the
conclusion that the argument was false. Also there is no evidence
that such a class of arguments (assuming they exist at all) are
fallacious. This pretty much collapses everything else below.
>
> Let's ignore the fact that the argument from lack of imagination
>("I can't imagine how it could have happened, so it must be ...")
>is one of their staples.
Pagano replies:
In the case of YECs and in most Christians prior to the Enlightenment
the belief in Special Creation came affirmatively from statements in
Scripture not from a lack of credulity or imagination in purely
materialistic evolution.
Furthermore In the case of hypothesized biological transformism
"imagined" by practical atheists YECists need not resort to a lack of
credulity or imagination but a simple lack of empirical evidence.
>
> I'm thinking more of the fact that, for instance, they can't
>imagine that the Bible could be partly nonliteral,
Pagano replies:
The converse could also be true that Grumbine is arguing from a lack
of imagination when he refuses to see the literal.
> or that von
>Daniken can't imagine that an artist would paint on a cave wall
>without space aliens (gods) telling him to. von Daniken's problem
>with Nazca (can't imagine people doing it) is another example.
>This is a guy who never made sand castles at the beach just because.
Pagano replies:
Or that evolutionists can't imagine that such drawings were made by
humans less than 6000 years ago.
>
> Rather than multiply examples myself, I'll throw it open for
>discussion and perhaps some more illustration. I'm more interested,
>though, in folks who can come up with counterexamples (Gish
>being a sculptor?).
Pagano replies:
I guess I should bottom line the problem in Grumbine's thinking.
Grumbine labels someone as arguing from a "lack of imagination"
whenever that persons fails to succumb to the class of statements he
(and a consensus of others) believes are true. I and YECists could
use the same reasoning to label Grumbine as arguing from a lack of
imagination with regard to the class of ideas we hold. Since there
is no arbitor or the truth Grumbine's lablel is practically useless.
In other words Grumbine's "lack of imagination" lablel while possibly
applicable when solving a problem where there might be many solutions
has no value when there is only one objective, historical truth.
Regards,
T Pagano
Bob Casanova
Well, Stonehenge *definitely* qualifies as "done by others".
As for Chartres, this is the first time I've heard this one,
but I notice that the actual *construction* isn't mentioned,
as it almost certainly would have been if the cathedral had
been found in, say, Mohenjo-Daro.
> But the line that stand out most strongly is "I'm modern
>and therefore much superior to all those ancient people.
Yeah, the type of insular moron who thinks that knowledge
equals intelligence.
>For example, I know the earth is round and they all thought
>it was flat." (von Daniken came close to saying the second
>one directly.) They then combine their profound lack of
>creativity with that to conclude that if _they_ can't imagine
>how something was done, then certainly the ancients couldn't
>either.
That's about the way I see it, too.
> On the other hand, you could be right. I have a great
>lack of understanding of racism. And von Daniken (for example)
>is quite explicit about not including the classical Romans
>and Greeks or their time frame forward 'when the record gets
>better'. Pretty obvious attempt to hide his gods in the gaps.
>The gaps have shrunk, as is terribly obvious in his chapter on
>Easter Island (he was babbling about how there were no trees on
>the island. There were, just not for very long after the
>people arrived).
And completely ignoring the fact that the inhabitants
actually demonstrated erecting one of the heads for Thor
Heyerdahl (described, IIRC, in _Aku-Aku_). Some people can't
manage to find their butts with both hands and a flashlight,
but blithely assume they're "smarter" than those who hadn't
nearly the knowledge base we do, but who helped *build* that
knowledge base.
Sorry; pet peeve.
Bob Casanova
appeared in talk.origins, posted by huckt...@hotmail.com
(Huck Turner):
<snip>
>In general, I think encouraging imagination in children is potentially
>one of the biggest vaccines against all kinds of social ills. If you
>have a good imagination then you are much more likely to empathise
>with others (a vaccine against predjudice and anti-social behaviour)
>and you have a better chance of appreciating the consequences of your
>own actions (a vaccine against self-destructive behaviour). And of
>course, if you have a good imagination you're much more likely to come
>up with solutions to life's problems.
Good post overall, but I *really* liked this part, and I
wholeheartedly agree. Thanks.
Arne Vogel
> On Wed, 5 Nov 2003 17:58:22 +0000 (UTC), bo...@radix.net (Robert
> Grumbine) wrote:
>
>
>> A generalization regarding YECS and other crackpotteries claiming
>>to be science occurred to me as I'm home sick (Martian Death Flu,
>>good thing I'm not martian) and reading _Chariots of the Gods_.
>>These people are extremely, profoundly, devoid of imagination or
>>creativity.
>
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> Assuming for the sake of argument that one was guilty of offering an
> argument which lacked "imagination" would NOT deductively lead to the
> conclusion that the argument was false. Also there is no evidence
> that such a class of arguments (assuming they exist at all) are
> fallacious. This pretty much collapses everything else below.
To your information: A fallacious argument is not one the conclusion of
which is necessarily false, but one in which the conclusion does not
follow from the facts.
Imagine you were driving past a car standing at the side of the road,
and your co-driver would say 'They ran out of gas!'. The reasoning in
this case is:
Observation: A car stands at the side of the road.
Knowledge: Running out of gas forces a driver to stop at the side of the
road.
Conclusion: The observed car ran out of gas.
While this *may* really be the reason for the stop, the logic is
fallacious, because the conclusion *does not follow* from the premises,
since there are many more reasons why the car could be standing there. A
motor damage, a flat tire, etc., or the driver may have had a flight of
nausea and thus decided it would be safer to stop. (This particular
logical fallacy is called affirming the consequent.)
>> Let's ignore the fact that the argument from lack of imagination
>>("I can't imagine how it could have happened, so it must be ...")
>>is one of their staples.
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> In the case of YECs and in most Christians prior to the Enlightenment
> the belief in Special Creation came affirmatively from statements in
> Scripture not from a lack of credulity or imagination in purely
> materialistic evolution.
Right, but it's been a while since.
> Furthermore In the case of hypothesized biological transformism
> "imagined" by practical atheists YECists need not resort to a lack of
> credulity or imagination but a simple lack of empirical evidence.
Why do you say 'practical atheists' when you mean people who are
convinced by the theory of evolution (evolutionists if you want so)?
Your "simple lack of empirical evidence" is fallacious, too -- it's
called special pleading. If you applied the same level of skepticism to
"Creation Theory" (whatever that is), you'd tie it to a block of
concrete and sink it on the open sea.
http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/comdesc/
>> I'm thinking more of the fact that, for instance, they can't
>>imagine that the Bible could be partly nonliteral,
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> The converse could also be true that Grumbine is arguing from a lack
> of imagination when he refuses to see the literal.
It is obvious to me that any sentence one reads must be interpreted (or
remain a meaningless sequence of words). In some cases, there cannot be
much doubt about the literal meaning of a sentence ("and Irad begat
Mehujael: and Mehujael begat Methusael: and Methusael begat Lamech"),
but then, most sentences are inherently ambiguous because the exact
meaning of the words cannot be pinned down without some amount of
arbitrariness and subjectivity. E.g. consider the word "bachelor" (with
respect to marriage). How would you define it?
1. attempt: unmarried man
-> Problem: Most people would not include divorced men or widowers.
2. attempt: man who was never married
-> Problem: Most people would not include elderly men.
3. attempt: young man who was never married
-> Problem: What age range is specified by "young man"? 16 to 45? 20 to
35? 18 to 40?
4. attempt: man of 18 to 40 years (picked an arbitrary limit) who was
never married
-> Problem: What about a homosexual (rsp. bisexual) or a eunuch? Hardly
anyone would call these bachelors.
5. attempt: heterosexual, 'intact' man of 18 to 40 years who was never
married.
-> Problem: Would anyone call a convicted murderer waiting to be
executed in a week a bachelor?
You see, an almost endless amount of criticisms can be raised against
any 'absolute' definition of even a seemingly simple term. You could
*never* come up with a definition that everyone agrees with, especially
in usage (who would use an exact definition of "bachelor" instead of
"fuzzy logic"?). When reading the Bible *literally*, you would not only
have to find exact definitions of terms, before that, you would need to
know what they meant 2000+ years ago, in an entirely different culture,
a different language. Is the seventh day the saturday or the sunday? At
which time does it begin or end (which timezone?). With or without
daylight savings time? What constitutes forbidden work on the sabbath?
Is rescuing people from a collapsed building permissible, or do they
deserve death because God sent the earthquake?
What about the conflicting creation accounts in Genesis chapter 1 (man
created after animals) and chapter 2 (animals created after man)? The
literal reading of which is actually contrary to what most of us would
assume?
At the same time of lambasting other Christians for interpreting the
Bible, fundies put their own interpretation into Bible verses. Take for
example the idea that masturbation is a deadly sin. Is this the literal
meaning of Onan's story? This interpretation:
1. Asserts that Onan's sin was actually masturbation and not coitus
interruptus.
2. Asserts that since God kills Onan, masturbation in *general* is a
deadly sin. Ignores the fact that there is no general commandment in
this story or elsewhere in the Bible.
3. Ignores the more obvious conclusion that God killed Onan for
disobedience (not impregnating his brother's wife).
(Gen 38:8-10)
038:008 And Judah said unto Onan, Go in unto thy brother's wife, and
marry her, and raise up seed to thy brother.
038:009 And Onan knew that the seed should not be his; and it came to
pass, when he went in unto his brother's wife, that he spilled
it on the ground, lest that he should give seed to his
brother.
038:010 And the thing which he did displeased the LORD: wherefore he
slew him also.
Is saying that these verses condemn masturbation a stretch, or am I the
chinese emperor? (This is an ironical version of the 'false dilemma'
fallacy.)
(Note: I do not believe Onan, if he was a real person, was killed by a
supernatural entity.)
IOW, the interpretation of the Bible by fundies is still just another
interpretation.
>>or that von
>>Daniken can't imagine that an artist would paint on a cave wall
>>without space aliens (gods) telling him to. von Daniken's problem
>>with Nazca (can't imagine people doing it) is another example.
>>This is a guy who never made sand castles at the beach just because.
>
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> Or that evolutionists can't imagine that such drawings were made by
> humans less than 6000 years ago.
Oh, I can imagine that. But if the evidence suggests otherwise, you must
actually show where you think the evidence errs, and/or provide
counterevidence to disprove the "old age" conclusion. Merely saying "I
can't imagine it's *that* old." is an argument from incredulity.
>> Rather than multiply examples myself, I'll throw it open for
>>discussion and perhaps some more illustration. I'm more interested,
>>though, in folks who can come up with counterexamples (Gish
>>being a sculptor?).
>
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> I guess I should bottom line the problem in Grumbine's thinking.
> Grumbine labels someone as arguing from a "lack of imagination"
> whenever that persons fails to succumb to the class of statements he
> (and a consensus of others) believes are true. I and YECists could
He believes they are true because there is massive evidence in their
favor. Until we see massive evidence for Young Earth Creationism, this
is a legitimate position. He also knows that many creationist claims
(e.g. the global flood) are disproved by the evidence (unless you allow
for an arbitrary amount of miracles with unclear motivation -- an
omnipotent, deceitful creator). Rejecting them is thus not a matter of
lacking imagination.
> use the same reasoning to label Grumbine as arguing from a lack of
> imagination with regard to the class of ideas we hold. Since there
> is no arbitor or the truth Grumbine's lablel is practically useless.
I could not interpret this sentence.
> In other words Grumbine's "lack of imagination" lablel while possibly
> applicable when solving a problem where there might be many solutions
> has no value when there is only one objective, historical truth.
And that objective, historical truth on the origin of species is found
in the Bible? What a joke!
> Regards,
> T Pagano
--
I'm ahead, the man
I'm the first mammal to wear pants
(Pearl Jam)
Robert Grumbine
A Pagano <anthony...@verizon.net> wrote:
>On Wed, 5 Nov 2003 17:58:22 +0000 (UTC), bo...@radix.net (Robert
>Grumbine) wrote:
>
>> A generalization regarding YECS and other crackpotteries claiming
>>to be science occurred to me as I'm home sick (Martian Death Flu,
>>good thing I'm not martian) and reading _Chariots of the Gods_.
>>These people are extremely, profoundly, devoid of imagination or
>>creativity.
>
> Pagano replies:
>Assuming for the sake of argument that one was guilty of offering an
>argument which lacked "imagination" would NOT deductively lead to the
>conclusion that the argument was false. Also there is no evidence
>that such a class of arguments (assuming they exist at all) are
>fallacious. This pretty much collapses everything else below.
As I then continued:
>> Let's ignore the fact that the argument from lack of imagination
>>("I can't imagine how it could have happened, so it must be ...")
>>is one of their staples.
i.o.w., I'm really not interested in the argument from incredulity
(as it's more commonly known) and who uses it more, or its philosophical
validity (nil, but not the matter at hand).
> Pagano replies:
>In the case of YECs and in most Christians prior to the Enlightenment
>the belief in Special Creation came affirmatively from statements in
>Scripture not from a lack of credulity or imagination in purely
>materialistic evolution.
Not relevant to my question, which is regarding a general
absence of imagination or creativity among modern YECS.
>Furthermore In the case of hypothesized biological transformism
>"imagined" by practical atheists YECists need not resort to a lack of
>credulity or imagination but a simple lack of empirical evidence.
Evolution is observed by people of all religions.
>> I'm thinking more of the fact that, for instance, they can't
>>imagine that the Bible could be partly nonliteral,
>
> Pagano replies:
>The converse could also be true that Grumbine is arguing from a lack
>of imagination when he refuses to see the literal.
And another demonstration of not being able to imagine what the
other guy is talking about. Read more closely. Partly nonliteral
is what I said. That already includes that part of it could be literal.
Part of it must be nonliteral if it is to be (literally) true, such as the
conflicting order of creation in Genesis 1 and 2.
>> or that von
>>Daniken can't imagine that an artist would paint on a cave wall
>>without space aliens (gods) telling him to. von Daniken's problem
>>with Nazca (can't imagine people doing it) is another example.
>>This is a guy who never made sand castles at the beach just because.
>
> Pagano replies:
>Or that evolutionists can't imagine that such drawings were made by
>humans less than 6000 years ago.
Name 5. Certainly I have no problem imagining that the cave paintings
were done 4000 years ago instead of 40,000 years ago. von Daniken can't
even imagine a humain painting them in the first place. Anyhow, after
imagining that they might be 4000 years old instead of 40,000, I set
about trying to imagine ways of telling which it is. So, let's see ...
tools change through time, pigments change, species of animals change,
some go extinct, plant communities change, dwelling habits change,
etc. Ok, so then I (by my proxy of the published literature, and
then perhaps some fieldwork of my own) go over the cave painting
area and look to see which time frame the tools, pigments, subjects
of the paintings, midden contents, ... correspond to. 14C would be nice,
but not particularly necessary.
After I'd tested out these several independant lines of evidence
for 4 vs 40 ky, then I'd pull them together and see where the weight
came down. If it's uniformly on one side, then I have a confident
answer. If it's evenly split, then I have a puzzle and will try to
imagine more ways of telling the difference. Or I'll try a new
imagining -- that there were two different groups who occupied the
site and only one of them did the painting; and I'll try to imagine
some ways of testing that idea too.
>> Rather than multiply examples myself, I'll throw it open for
>>discussion and perhaps some more illustration. I'm more interested,
>>though, in folks who can come up with counterexamples (Gish
>>being a sculptor?).
>
> Pagano replies:
>I guess I should bottom line the problem in Grumbine's thinking.
>Grumbine labels someone as arguing from a "lack of imagination"
>whenever that persons fails to succumb to the class of statements he
>(and a consensus of others) believes are true. I and YECists could
>use the same reasoning to label Grumbine as arguing from a lack of
>imagination with regard to the class of ideas we hold. Since there
>is no arbitor or the truth Grumbine's lablel is practically useless.
>
>In other words Grumbine's "lack of imagination" lablel while possibly
>applicable when solving a problem where there might be many solutions
>has no value when there is only one objective, historical truth.
I gave a couple of examples up there of what kind of creativity
and imagination I was talking about -- making sand castles,
painting, and sculpting. These are creative acts of imagination,
not ones of historical truth. Rather than respond to that, you
demonstrate my point. Thanks, I guess.
David Jensen
<kbhlqv4v8t2o1qnh4...@4ax.com>:
>On Thu, 6 Nov 2003 01:04:21 +0000 (UTC), the following
>appeared in talk.origins, posted by bo...@radix.net (Robert
>Grumbine):
>> On the other hand, you could be right. I have a great
>>lack of understanding of racism. And von Daniken (for example)
>>is quite explicit about not including the classical Romans
>>and Greeks or their time frame forward 'when the record gets
>>better'. Pretty obvious attempt to hide his gods in the gaps.
>>The gaps have shrunk, as is terribly obvious in his chapter on
>>Easter Island (he was babbling about how there were no trees on
>>the island. There were, just not for very long after the
>>people arrived).
>
>And completely ignoring the fact that the inhabitants
>actually demonstrated erecting one of the heads for Thor
>Heyerdahl (described, IIRC, in _Aku-Aku_).
That's the one. Pictures and clear description included.
Don't read the cave chapters if you have claustrophobia.
Steven J.
"A Pagano" <anthony...@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:4omlqv82i4p76fs34...@4ax.com...
> On Wed, 5 Nov 2003 17:58:22 +0000 (UTC), bo...@radix.net (Robert
> Grumbine) wrote:
>
> > A generalization regarding YECS and other crackpotteries claiming
> >to be science occurred to me as I'm home sick (Martian Death Flu,
> >good thing I'm not martian) and reading _Chariots of the Gods_.
> >These people are extremely, profoundly, devoid of imagination or
> >creativity.
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> Assuming for the sake of argument that one was guilty of offering an
> argument which lacked "imagination" would NOT deductively lead to the
> conclusion that the argument was false. Also there is no evidence
> that such a class of arguments (assuming they exist at all) are
> fallacious. This pretty much collapses everything else below.
>
argument. Being based on false premises, or reasoning fallaciously about
those premises, or both, makes an argument defective, and one may be quite
imaginative in coming up with false premises and bad arguments. Grumbine is
suggesting, rather, that lack of imagination is why creationists reject the
theory of evolution. He is discussing, not a class of arguments, but the
reasons people would seek out, accept, and present such arguments.
>
> > Let's ignore the fact that the argument from lack of imagination
> >("I can't imagine how it could have happened, so it must be ...")
> >is one of their staples.
>
> Pagano replies:
> In the case of YECs and in most Christians prior to the Enlightenment
> the belief in Special Creation came affirmatively from statements in
> Scripture not from a lack of credulity or imagination in purely
> materialistic evolution.
>
statements in scripture as settling a scientific question. Many
creationists don't seem to imagine that someone might honestly be unable to
see why the Bible, more than the Qur'an, or the _Bhagavad Gita_, or the
_Urantia Book_, is either self-evidently the absolute truth, or at least the
*only* possible alternative to "secularism." Indeed, this lack of
imagination extends not only to the Bible itself, but often to their own
sect's hermeneutic tradition -- they can't imagine why anyone could read the
text differently from them.
And of course, when they try to defend their views against "secularists,"
they often do resort to apologetics based on their own (or their reader's
presumed) inability to imagine something.
>
> Furthermore In the case of hypothesized biological transformism
> "imagined" by practical atheists YECists need not resort to a lack of
> credulity or imagination but a simple lack of empirical evidence.
>
As noted above, the assumption that anyone who doesn't think God would weave
lies into the fabric of creation is a "practical atheist" shows a certain
lack of imagination. One might stretch a point and suggest that the
assumption that if *you* haven't heard of some evidence, then evolutionists
have not heard of it, and it does not exist, shows a lack of imagination --
the inability to imagine that people who think differently from you might
just have evidence to support their beliefs (or, of course, they might not,
but you ought to consider the possibility).
If it were a simple lack of empirical evidence that persuaded YECs to
disbelieve evolution, then one might expect to find two things: first, a
much wider array of evolutionary theories than exists (since there would be
no evidence to support, e.g. Darwin's version over Lamarck's, or theropods
over ornithopods as ancestors of birds), and second, less distortion of the
evidence on the part of YECs. Why bother with fake arguments (from the moon
dust argument to "man tracks" at Paluxy to Gish's mistatements about the
dissimilarities of human and chimp lysozome) when you could simply show that
there was no evidence supporting evolution?
>
> >
> > I'm thinking more of the fact that, for instance, they can't
> >imagine that the Bible could be partly nonliteral,
>
> Pagano replies:
> The converse could also be true that Grumbine is arguing from a lack
> of imagination when he refuses to see the literal.
>
I suspect he can see the literal sense of scripture. What he has trouble
imagining, I suspect, is how layers of evaporites found between layers of
marine sediments, or fossils sorted by species rather than size or shape,
could result from a year-long global flood, or why a truthful Creator would
bother creating a universe with an appearance of a false history. I don't
think it's "imagination," strictly speaking, to blithely and vaguely invoke
"creation models" that are never explained, or "distinctive empirical
consequences" of Noah's Flood that seem to amount to no more than "the
standard geological theories don't (as far as I can see) explain
everything."
>
> > or that von
> >Daniken can't imagine that an artist would paint on a cave wall
> >without space aliens (gods) telling him to. von Daniken's problem
> >with Nazca (can't imagine people doing it) is another example.
> >This is a guy who never made sand castles at the beach just because.
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> Or that evolutionists can't imagine that such drawings were made by
> humans less than 6000 years ago.
>
Evolutionists can certainly *imagine* the drawings being less than 6000
years old. In point of fact, just about every evolutionist with an opinion
on the matter thinks the Nazca lines are less than 6000 years old. Again,
it isn't "imagination" to suppose that "somehow, something must be wrong
with the evidence that the paintings are four or five times as old as my
dogma says the Earth is," or to handwave that somehow the Flood changed
radiometric decay rates (unless you can figure out a way for floodwaters to
actually do this).
>
> > Rather than multiply examples myself, I'll throw it open for
> >discussion and perhaps some more illustration. I'm more interested,
> >though, in folks who can come up with counterexamples (Gish
> >being a sculptor?).
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> I guess I should bottom line the problem in Grumbine's thinking.
> Grumbine labels someone as arguing from a "lack of imagination"
> whenever that persons fails to succumb to the class of statements he
> (and a consensus of others) believes are true. I and YECists could
> use the same reasoning to label Grumbine as arguing from a lack of
> imagination with regard to the class of ideas we hold. Since there
> is no arbitor or the truth Grumbine's lablel is practically useless.
>
I would think, myself, that "evidence" makes a nice arbiter of truth. You
don't believe that, of course. For all your occasional insistence on
"objective truth," you seem to be an adamant subjectivist, a believer that
evidence is irrelevant to truth and that all positions are equally
faith-based. Given that you (and other opponents of "naturalistic thinking"
and "inductivism") will nonetheless cite evidence if you think you have it,
I think your disdain for evidence with regard to evolution vs. creationism
is rather telling.
>
> In other words Grumbine's "lack of imagination" lablel while possibly
> applicable when solving a problem where there might be many solutions
> has no value when there is only one objective, historical truth.
>
It's good to have you back, Tony. Sort of.
>
> Regards,
> T Pagano
>
-- Steven J.
Huck Turner
> On Thu, 6 Nov 2003 12:56:49 +0000 (UTC), the following
> appeared in talk.origins, posted by huckt...@hotmail.com
> (Huck Turner):
>
>
> <snip>
>
> >In general, I think encouraging imagination in children is potentially
> >one of the biggest vaccines against all kinds of social ills. If you
> >have a good imagination then you are much more likely to empathise
> >with others (a vaccine against predjudice and anti-social behaviour)
> >and you have a better chance of appreciating the consequences of your
> >own actions (a vaccine against self-destructive behaviour). And of
> >course, if you have a good imagination you're much more likely to come
> >up with solutions to life's problems.
>
> Good post overall, but I *really* liked this part, and I
> wholeheartedly agree. Thanks.
>
Thanks Bob. It's nice to know my thoughts are appreciated here.
Bill Rogers
> Grumbine) wrote:
>
> > A generalization regarding YECS and other crackpotteries claiming
> >to be science occurred to me as I'm home sick (Martian Death Flu,
> >good thing I'm not martian) and reading _Chariots of the Gods_.
> >These people are extremely, profoundly, devoid of imagination or
> >creativity.
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> Assuming for the sake of argument that one was guilty of offering an
> argument which lacked "imagination" would NOT deductively lead to the
> conclusion that the argument was false. Also there is no evidence
> that such a class of arguments (assuming they exist at all) are
> fallacious. This pretty much collapses everything else below.
> >
While I agree with Grumbine about the lack of imagination bit, there
is something else that is even more striking to me about "YEC and
other crackpottery." Most of these guys do not seem capable of
presenting the opposing viewpoint in a way that makes it clear they
understand it, even if they disagree with it.
This is in clear contrast to most scientists engaged in scientific
dispute (or politicians or lawyers or what have you). I may completely
disagree with a colleague's interpretation of, say, associations
between particular genetic markers and resistance to a particular
disease. But I can certainly reproduce his arguments in a way that he
would consider a fair representation of what he thinks. Being able to
do that gives me at least the confidence that I fully understand the
position I disagree with.
In contrast, I have not heard any YEC in t.o. explain any evolutionary
argument in a way that convinces me that he understands the position
he is disagreeing with.
So here is a challenge. Lots of people who accept evolution very
successfully pretend to be creationists on t.o., fooling both the
evolution accepters and the evolution deniers and racking up Loki
points. Is there a creationist out there who can do a successful
sustained impersonation of a real "evolutionist," in such a way that
he fools not just his fellow creationists, but also the other
evolutionists? If he could, I would believe he really understood the
evolutionary theory he was rejecting.
Bill
>
> Regards,
> T Pagano
Theda
Now, now. Reading this sort of book served to innoculate me against
the influence of - this sort of books. There was one about pyramid
power. It touted the unfathomable mystery that a toad held
upside-down in one's hand would be hypnotized and not hop away.
Okay, that sounds interesting. Go out to the garden. Pick up a toad.
Gently turn it upside-down in the palm of my hand. It gets up and
hops away.
Lifelong vaccine.
Love,
Theda
A Pagano
Grumbine) wrote:
<snip>
>> Pagano replies:
>>Assuming for the sake of argument that one was guilty of offering an
>>argument which lacked "imagination" would NOT deductively lead to the
>>conclusion that the argument was false. Also there is no evidence
>>that such a class of arguments (assuming they exist at all) are
>>fallacious. This pretty much collapses everything else below.
>
> As I then continued:
>
>>> Let's ignore the fact that the argument from lack of imagination
>>>("I can't imagine how it could have happened, so it must be ...")
>>>is one of their staples.
>
> i.o.w., I'm really not interested in the argument from incredulity
>(as it's more commonly known) and who uses it more, or its philosophical
>validity (nil, but not the matter at hand).
Pagano replies:
I suggest Grumbine reread his own post. The premise of the whole post
is the lack of imagination and how it leads people astray. The title
of the post is "No Imagination." And Grumbine's very next paragraph
reintroduces the lack of imagination as his central premise. Let's
look:
[BEGIN QUOTE GRUMBINE]
"I'm thinking more of the fact that, for instance, THEY CAN'T IMAGINE
that the Bible could be partly nonliteral, or that von
DANIKEN CAN'T IMAGINE that an artist would paint on a cave wall
without space aliens (gods) telling him to. von Daniken's problem
with Nazca (CAN'T IMAGINEpeople doing it) is another example.
This is a guy who never made sand castles at the beach just because"
[END QUOTE GRUMBINE]
>
>> Pagano replies:
>>In the case of YECs and in most Christians prior to the Enlightenment
>>the belief in Special Creation came affirmatively from statements in
>>Scripture not from a lack of credulity or imagination in purely
>>materialistic evolution.
>
> Not relevant to my question, which is regarding a general
>absence of imagination or creativity among modern YECS.
Pagano replies:
Not relevent? How is it possible to claim "not relevent" after your
openning paragraph: Let's look again at Grumbine's own words:
[BEGIN QUOTE FROM GRUMBINE]
" A generalization regarding YECS and other crackpotteries claiming
to be science occurred to me as I'm home sick (Martian Death Flu,
good thing I'm not martian) and reading _Chariots of the Gods_.
These people are extremely, profoundly, devoid of imagination or
creativity."
[END QUOTE FROM GRUMBINE]
>
>>Furthermore In the case of hypothesized biological transformism
>>"imagined" by practical atheists YECists need not resort to a lack of
>>credulity or imagination but a simple lack of empirical evidence.
>
> Evolution is observed by people of all religions.
Pagano replies:
Indeed it has, but evolution is a rather broad term applying to
virtually every change. That my progeny are taller than I is strictly
speaking evolution but that change is not in dispute.
In any event I didn't assert that "evolution" has not been observed.
I charged that the hypothesized transformism of neoDarwinism has never
been observed by anyone. NeoDarwinian claims that the neoDarwian
mechanism can create novelty and transform one kind of species into a
completely different kind has never been observed. For example the
claim that the mesonychid species transformed into species of whale
and bat has never been observed.
>
>>> I'm thinking more of the fact that, for instance, they can't
>>>imagine that the Bible could be partly nonliteral,
>>
>> Pagano replies:
>>The converse could also be true that Grumbine is arguing from a lack
>>of imagination when he refuses to see the literal.
>
> And another demonstration of not being able to imagine what the
>other guy is talking about. Read more closely. Partly nonliteral
>is what I said. That already includes that part of it could be literal.
>Part of it must be nonliteral if it is to be (literally) true, such as the
>conflicting order of creation in Genesis 1 and 2.
Pagano replies:
Whether Grumbine doesn't see any of Scripture as literal or is willing
to see some of it as literal doesn't turn back my assertion that I
could characterize him as lacking imagination when he fails to see the
possibility that all of Scripture has a literal sense.
Grumbine's lack of imagination accusation can be subjectively slung
whenever any possibility is eliminated. This is why it is useless for
discovering the truth. The truth always eliminates ALL other
possibilities.
In this particular instance the problem isn't really whether all of
Scripture has a literal sense or not because surely it does. The
problem is whether and when the literal sense refers to actual
historical events. How does Grumbine decide which are historical and
which are not? Surely not on the basis of unproven scientific
theories which the history of science has consistently shown are short
lived.
>
>>> or that von
>>>Daniken can't imagine that an artist would paint on a cave wall
>>>without space aliens (gods) telling him to. von Daniken's problem
>>>with Nazca (can't imagine people doing it) is another example.
>>>This is a guy who never made sand castles at the beach just because.
>>
>> Pagano replies:
>>Or that evolutionists can't imagine that such drawings were made by
>>humans less than 6000 years ago.
>
> Name 5. Certainly I have no problem imagining that the cave paintings
>were done 4000 years ago instead of 40,000 years ago.
Pagano replies:
Can't name any off the top of my head, but I think many of your
evolutionist brothers would disagree with you. Some cave drawings are
believed to pre-date spoken language which would be considerably
earlier than 4000 years ago according to secular time tables of
prehistory.
> von Daniken can't
>even imagine a humain painting them in the first place.
Pagano replies:
In the movie "Contact" Carl Sagan (one of the great heros of modern
atheists and secularists) has the atheist hero of the movie
practically deify extraterrestrials. The fact that Daniken requires
E.T. to "push" hypothesized pre-humans in the right direction is
hardly out-of-line with practical atheism or modern secular thinking.
And whether it lacks imagination is not an indication that Daniken's
reasoning is flawed. He may simply be mistaken.
> Anyhow, after
>imagining that they might be 4000 years old instead of 40,000, I set
>about trying to imagine ways of telling which it is. So, let's see ...
>tools change through time, pigments change, species of animals change,
>some go extinct, plant communities change, dwelling habits change,
>etc. Ok, so then I (by my proxy of the published literature, and
>then perhaps some fieldwork of my own) go over the cave painting
>area and look to see which time frame the tools, pigments, subjects
>of the paintings, midden contents, ... correspond to. 14C would be nice,
>but not particularly necessary.
>
> After I'd tested out these several independant lines of evidence
>for 4 vs 40 ky, then I'd pull them together and see where the weight
>came down. If it's uniformly on one side, then I have a confident
>answer. If it's evenly split, then I have a puzzle and will try to
>imagine more ways of telling the difference. Or I'll try a new
>imagining -- that there were two different groups who occupied the
>site and only one of them did the painting; and I'll try to imagine
>some ways of testing that idea too.
Pagano replies:
The problem with this is that determining the truth of an
prehistorical event is not a simple matter of determining which
possibilies under consideration has a greater level of corroboration.
All false theories have true consequences and hence corroborations can
always be found. How does Grumbine know that the possibilities that
have been considered are even close to the truth? He never says.
In his attack on YECists in general and Daniken in particular Grumbine
doesn't really attack either for a lack of imagination, per se, but
specifically for a failure to consider Grumbine's pet possibilities.
>
>>> Rather than multiply examples myself, I'll throw it open for
>>>discussion and perhaps some more illustration. I'm more interested,
>>>though, in folks who can come up with counterexamples (Gish
>>>being a sculptor?).
>>
>> Pagano replies:
>>I guess I should bottom line the problem in Grumbine's thinking.
>>Grumbine labels someone as arguing from a "lack of imagination"
>>whenever that persons fails to succumb to the class of statements he
>>(and a consensus of others) believes are true. I and YECists could
>>use the same reasoning to label Grumbine as arguing from a lack of
>>imagination with regard to the class of ideas we hold. Since there
>>is no arbitor or the truth Grumbine's lablel is practically useless.
>>
>>In other words Grumbine's "lack of imagination" lablel while possibly
>>applicable when solving a problem where there might be many solutions
>>has no value when there is only one objective, historical truth.
>
> I gave a couple of examples up there of what kind of creativity
>and imagination I was talking about -- making sand castles,
>painting, and sculpting. These are creative acts of imagination,
>not ones of historical truth. Rather than respond to that, you
>demonstrate my point. Thanks, I guess.
Pagano replies:
The study of origins is not about engineering problems but about
historical events. Daniken didn't argue against the mechanics of
painting or the engineering problem of constructing sand castles both
of which have a large number of possible solutions. Neither do
YECists. The problem is in discovering the SINGULAR TRUTH OF a
prehistorical event.
Finally the failure of Daniken in particular or YECists in particular
to imagine one of the solutions which Grumbine believes they should is
only a problem if Grumbine has some insight into the truth unavailable
to the rest of us. I don't think that's likely. Perhaps that's a
failure of my imagination. I report, you decide.
Regards,
T Pagano
Elmer Bataitis
> In the movie "Contact" Carl Sagan (one of the great heros of modern
> atheists and secularists) has the atheist hero of the movie
> practically deify extraterrestrials. The fact that Daniken requires
> E.T. to "push" hypothesized pre-humans in the right direction is
> hardly out-of-line with practical atheism or modern secular thinking.
Yeah, and Genesis mythology has a diety forcing early humans in the
right directions too ;-)
**********************************************************
Elmer Bataitis "Hot dog! Smooch city here I come!"
Planetech Services -Hobbes
585-442-2884
"Proudly wearing and displaying, as a badge of honor,
the straight jacket of conventional thought." - C.
Cagle
**********************************************************
Bob Casanova
>Bob Casanova <nos...@buzz.off> wrote in message news:<5rhlqvga448t9kpek...@4ax.com>...
>> On Thu, 6 Nov 2003 12:56:49 +0000 (UTC), the following
>> appeared in talk.origins, posted by huckt...@hotmail.com
>> (Huck Turner):
>>
>>
>> <snip>
>>
>> >In general, I think encouraging imagination in children is potentially
>> >one of the biggest vaccines against all kinds of social ills. If you
>> >have a good imagination then you are much more likely to empathise
>> >with others (a vaccine against predjudice and anti-social behaviour)
>> >and you have a better chance of appreciating the consequences of your
>> >own actions (a vaccine against self-destructive behaviour). And of
>> >course, if you have a good imagination you're much more likely to come
>> >up with solutions to life's problems.
>>
>> Good post overall, but I *really* liked this part, and I
>> wholeheartedly agree. Thanks.
>>
>
>Thanks Bob. It's nice to know my thoughts are appreciated here.
You're perfectly welcome. Clear thoughts should be
appreciated *anywhere*.
G
> In general, I think encouraging imagination in children is potentially
> one of the biggest vaccines against all kinds of social ills. If you
> have a good imagination then you are much more likely to empathise
> with others (a vaccine against predjudice and anti-social behaviour)
> and you have a better chance of appreciating the consequences of your
> own actions (a vaccine against self-destructive behaviour). And of
> course, if you have a good imagination you're much more likely to come
> up with solutions to life's problems.
The flip side to this is that you can have such a healthy imagination
that you live in a whacked-out delirium (perhaps by choice). Although I
think this is necessary to some degree to create certain kinds of art
and to have certain kinds of fun, it doesn't bode so well for spaced out
mind freaks like me accepting the squeaky-clean, well-scrubbed,
whitewashed moral demands ("hey, we *should* explain it!") of
rationality, logic and science (and utopian society). All that stuff may
"make sense," but to someone with a hyped up imagination, it ends up
being kind of boring and ultimately unsatisfying.
But maybe we're talking about different kinds of imagination. Mine tends
to construct very fancy forms of self-destructive behaviour, often
involving large numbers of other homo sapiens who can share in the fun.
Plus, who says that self-destructive behavior is bad?
Don't listen to me, though. I failed the Rorschach test.
G.
There's no way you're going make it out of here in time
Only lovers are going to be left alive
Arne Vogel
> On Thu, 6 Nov 2003 23:47:53 +0000 (UTC), bo...@radix.net (Robert
> Grumbine) wrote:
>
[snip]
> Pagano replies:
> Indeed it has, but evolution is a rather broad term applying to
> virtually every change. That my progeny are taller than I is strictly
> speaking evolution but that change is not in dispute.
>
> In any event I didn't assert that "evolution" has not been observed.
> I charged that the hypothesized transformism of neoDarwinism has never
> been observed by anyone. NeoDarwinian claims that the neoDarwian
> mechanism can create novelty and transform one kind of species into a
> completely different kind has never been observed. For example the
> claim that the mesonychid species transformed into species of whale
> and bat has never been observed.
Who claims so? Apart from the fact Mesonychidae is an entire biological
family, could you please give us a list of biologists, or biology books
or websites, which argue that bats derive from, or are closely related
to the mesonychids?
According to the Tree of Life project, the literature says they are much
more closely related to primates and tree shrews.
http://www.tolweb.org/tree?group=Eutheria&contgroup=Mammalia
>>>> I'm thinking more of the fact that, for instance, they can't
>>>>imagine that the Bible could be partly nonliteral,
>>>
>>> Pagano replies:
>>>The converse could also be true that Grumbine is arguing from a lack
>>>of imagination when he refuses to see the literal.
>>
>> And another demonstration of not being able to imagine what the
>>other guy is talking about. Read more closely. Partly nonliteral
>>is what I said. That already includes that part of it could be literal.
>>Part of it must be nonliteral if it is to be (literally) true, such as the
>>conflicting order of creation in Genesis 1 and 2.
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> Whether Grumbine doesn't see any of Scripture as literal or is willing
> to see some of it as literal doesn't turn back my assertion that I
> could characterize him as lacking imagination when he fails to see the
> possibility that all of Scripture has a literal sense.
Genesis 1: (other) animals created before man
Genesis 2: man created before animals
Pick the one you think is meant literally.
You may also want to tell us what were the last words of Jesus on the cross:
Lk.23:46
"And when Jesus had cried with a loud voice, he said, Father, into
thy hands I commend my spirit: and having said thus, he gave up the ghost."
Jn.19:30
"When Jesus therefore had received the vinegar, he said, It is
finished: and he bowed his head, and gave up the ghost."
When you're done with that, you can explain the rest of this list to us
(note that you are not allowed to resort to theological interpretations
-- only the *literal* meaning counts):
http://www.skepticsannotatedbible.com/contra
> Grumbine's lack of imagination accusation can be subjectively slung
> whenever any possibility is eliminated. This is why it is useless for
When that 'elimination' is based solely on ignorance, it isn't a
subjective thing to dismiss it.
> discovering the truth. The truth always eliminates ALL other
> possibilities.
And since the Bible is The Only Truth, no evidence to the contrary
counts. Fine. Stay out of science. (And mathematics: Pi is not 3 as in 1
Kings, 7:23.)
> In this particular instance the problem isn't really whether all of
> Scripture has a literal sense or not because surely it does. The
> problem is whether and when the literal sense refers to actual
> historical events. How does Grumbine decide which are historical and
> which are not? Surely not on the basis of unproven scientific
> theories which the history of science has consistently shown are short
> lived.
I posit that pi, being defined as the ratio of the circumference of a
circle to its diameter, was never 3, never in history. Ok, maybe space
on Earth showed some serious deviations from Euclidean metrics. This
would be rather funny, because Euclid didn't notice that.
>>>>or that von
>>>>Daniken can't imagine that an artist would paint on a cave wall
>>>>without space aliens (gods) telling him to. von Daniken's problem
>>>>with Nazca (can't imagine people doing it) is another example.
>>>>This is a guy who never made sand castles at the beach just because.
>>>
>>> Pagano replies:
>>>Or that evolutionists can't imagine that such drawings were made by
>>>humans less than 6000 years ago.
>>
>> Name 5. Certainly I have no problem imagining that the cave paintings
>>were done 4000 years ago instead of 40,000 years ago.
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> Can't name any off the top of my head, but I think many of your
> evolutionist brothers would disagree with you. Some cave drawings are
> believed to pre-date spoken language which would be considerably
> earlier than 4000 years ago according to secular time tables of
> prehistory.
Hello? When somebody is able to imagine something, this means (s)he
thinks it's true?
>>von Daniken can't
>>even imagine a humain painting them in the first place.
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> In the movie "Contact" Carl Sagan (one of the great heros of modern
> atheists and secularists) has the atheist hero of the movie
> practically deify extraterrestrials. The fact that Daniken requires
> E.T. to "push" hypothesized pre-humans in the right direction is
> hardly out-of-line with practical atheism or modern secular thinking.
> And whether it lacks imagination is not an indication that Daniken's
> reasoning is flawed. He may simply be mistaken.
Yes, that was one embarrassingly sentimental film ending. Can't say I've
never seen a better movie with Jodie Foster. But then, it never meant to
be taken as *science*.
Science is not about knowing something for sure. Humans can't know
anything about nature to 100% certainty, no matter whether with or
without religious scripture (my experience suggests that, when learning
about nature, it's best to put aside religious books). Therefore,
science deals with theories and the evidence to support them. The
evidence for the theory of common descent (and specific scenarios of
common descent) is overwhelming, whereas there isn't even a scientific
"Creation Theory". Of course you can postulate that God, or a race of
space aliens, created the Earth with only the appearance of age, but
that's -- as long as the evidence is on the side of the ToE -- not
science, because it fails the test of Occam's Razor. The ToE relies only
on known natural forces, creation relies on miracles.
> In his attack on YECists in general and Daniken in particular Grumbine
> doesn't really attack either for a lack of imagination, per se, but
> specifically for a failure to consider Grumbine's pet possibilities.
And? Isn't failure to consider a prominent possibility (especially one
as prominent as the theory of evolution) a sign of ignorance? In the
last few months, I ran across a lot of arguments for Creationism,
considered them, so I consider, very fairly, but found them all lacking
in the end (well, and I found out that quite a large number of them are
blatant lies, such as Gish's bullsh^H^Hfrog protein).
As I said before, science does not bother about the (impossible) feat of
discovering the "SINGULAR TRUTH", it deals with likelihoods.
> Finally the failure of Daniken in particular or YECists in particular
> to imagine one of the solutions which Grumbine believes they should is
> only a problem if Grumbine has some insight into the truth unavailable
> to the rest of us. I don't think that's likely. Perhaps that's a
> failure of my imagination. I report, you decide.
The problem is that anti-evolutionists (ideally at least) try to think
of some possibilities, dismiss them, and then conclude that there *are*
none. Most don't even seem to need a deep knowledge of biochemistry for
that. I could just as well posit that there is no blue beetle with green
spots. I've certainly never seen one. Maybe scientists already know such
a beetle. That would be akin to Michael Behe's assertion that blood
clotting or the human eye could not have evolved, at a time when
evolutionary theories of their origins already existed. (He did not
address these in his book.)
Or maybe such a beetle is not known yet, but *does* exist and only
wasn't discovered so far. Who would have thought it plausible even half
a year ago that there was a pointy-nosed purple frog like this:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3200214.stm
Steven J.
>
> > i.o.w., I'm really not interested in the argument from incredulity
> >(as it's more commonly known) and who uses it more, or its philosophical
> >validity (nil, but not the matter at hand).
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> I suggest Grumbine reread his own post. The premise of the whole post
> is the lack of imagination and how it leads people astray. The title
> of the post is "No Imagination." And Grumbine's very next paragraph
> reintroduces the lack of imagination as his central premise. Let's
> look:
>
psychological motives for accepting it (in this case, that one simply was
handed it at an impressionable age, and didn't have to think about it) --
and the grounds for that belief (the justifications one can offer for its
probable truth). In a court case, the defendant's motive for his arguments
is to escape criminal or civil penalties, but his case would have to be
desperate indeed for him to offer "if I lose this case, I will suffer" as a
reason for the court to decide in his favor. Rather, he argues such facts
or legal principles happen, in this particular case, to work to his
advantage. Grumbine is dealing with "lack of imagination" as a *motive* for
creationism. He disclaims any interest in lack of imagination as *grounds*
for creationism, noting in passing that it has been seriously presented as
an argument.
>
-- [snip of first Grumbine quote -- the second makes the point]
>
> >> Pagano replies:
> >>In the case of YECs and in most Christians prior to the Enlightenment
> >>the belief in Special Creation came affirmatively from statements in
> >>Scripture not from a lack of credulity or imagination in purely
> >>materialistic evolution.
> >
> > Not relevant to my question, which is regarding a general
> >absence of imagination or creativity among modern YECS.
>
>
> Pagano replies:
> Not relevent? How is it possible to claim "not relevent" after your
> openning paragraph: Let's look again at Grumbine's own words:
>
> [BEGIN QUOTE FROM GRUMBINE]
>
> " A generalization regarding YECS and other crackpotteries claiming
> to be science occurred to me as I'm home sick (Martian Death Flu,
> good thing I'm not martian) and reading _Chariots of the Gods_.
> These people are extremely, profoundly, devoid of imagination or
> creativity."
>
dino-bird transitional would survive to leave offspring," or "I can't
imagine how a land mammal could become a whale" as arguments against
evolution, none have ever offered "I lack imagination or creativity in
general" as a reason (ground) for rejecting evolution. Grumbine is
suggesting that it may nonetheless be a reason (motive) for them being
antievolutionists in the first place. Again, he is speculating on the
psychology of creationists, not analyzing their actual arguments. You may
object to that, if you wish, but you ought to grasp his point if you want to
refute it.
>
> [END QUOTE FROM GRUMBINE]
>
> >
> >>Furthermore In the case of hypothesized biological transformism
> >>"imagined" by practical atheists YECists need not resort to a lack of
> >>credulity or imagination but a simple lack of empirical evidence.
> >
> > Evolution is observed by people of all religions.
>
> Pagano replies:
> Indeed it has, but evolution is a rather broad term applying to
> virtually every change. That my progeny are taller than I is strictly
> speaking evolution but that change is not in dispute.
>
evolution. Americans have been growing taller (and fatter) over the last
century as a result of better nutrition; this is a change in the population
caused by a change in environment, not by a change in gene frequencies in
the population. Not all variation within a population is inheritable
(genetic), and changes in the frequency of non-inheritable variations are
not biological evolution. Even if your children are taller than you are
because their genes incline them to greater height, that would not mean that
alleles for greater height were actually commoner in their generation than
in yours.
>
> In any event I didn't assert that "evolution" has not been observed.
> I charged that the hypothesized transformism of neoDarwinism has never
> been observed by anyone. NeoDarwinian claims that the neoDarwian
> mechanism can create novelty and transform one kind of species into a
> completely different kind has never been observed. For example the
> claim that the mesonychid species transformed into species of whale
> and bat has never been observed.
>
mesonychids (a group of even-toed hoofed carnivores, ranging from cat to
rhino-sized) were ancestral to bats. For the last few years, since
Gingerich discovered pakicetid fossils with distinctive skull features of
whales and distinctive ankle features of artiodactyls (a mammalian order
including cattle, deer, pigs, hippos, etc.) -- confirming evidence from
shared pseudogenes and ERVs connecting whales and hippos -- it has been
generally held that whales are derived from artiodactyl ancestors.
Mesonychids are widely regarded as a sister group to the artiodactyls, no
more ancestral to whales than they are to goats or giraffes.
Note, by the way, that while no one has directly observed dolphins and cows
sharing a common ancestor, there is *evidence* linking them -- the
aforementioned fossils, other fossils of whales with hind legs and skulls
more like those of land mammals than skulls of current whales, and the
extensive genetic homologies which show cetacean genomes nested amidst
artiodactyl genomes -- to that common ancestor. Such indirect observation
is common in science; virtually all of physics depends on indirect
observations of things that cannot be directly seen, heard, or touched. By
the way, the "transformism of neoDarwinism" is usually called "common
descent."
>
> >>> I'm thinking more of the fact that, for instance, they can't
> >>>imagine that the Bible could be partly nonliteral,
> >>
> >> Pagano replies:
> >>The converse could also be true that Grumbine is arguing from a lack
> >>of imagination when he refuses to see the literal.
> >
> > And another demonstration of not being able to imagine what the
> >other guy is talking about. Read more closely. Partly nonliteral
> >is what I said. That already includes that part of it could be literal.
> >Part of it must be nonliteral if it is to be (literally) true, such as
the
> >conflicting order of creation in Genesis 1 and 2.
>
> Pagano replies:
> Whether Grumbine doesn't see any of Scripture as literal or is willing
> to see some of it as literal doesn't turn back my assertion that I
> could characterize him as lacking imagination when he fails to see the
> possibility that all of Scripture has a literal sense.
>
> Grumbine's lack of imagination accusation can be subjectively slung
> whenever any possibility is eliminated. This is why it is useless for
> discovering the truth. The truth always eliminates ALL other
> possibilities.
>
You actually have a point here, though you state it badly. I think you mean
to state that Grumbine's assertion that creationists lack imagination
depends on leaving "imagination" as poorly defined as, well, "created
kinds," with the result that he can't show that creationists are really more
lacking in imagination than "evotees." He needs a testable definition of
"imagination" to make a compelling case for his speculation. Without
testability, one can't have evidence, and it is *evidence* that eliminates
possibilities, although (as you've pointed out in other posts) it rarely
leaves you with only one possibility. It is *dogma* that eliminates all
other possibilities -- but it's perfectly possible for dogma to be utterly
false (as judged by the evidence, or by rival dogmas).
>
> In this particular instance the problem isn't really whether all of
> Scripture has a literal sense or not because surely it does. The
> problem is whether and when the literal sense refers to actual
> historical events. How does Grumbine decide which are historical and
> which are not? Surely not on the basis of unproven scientific
> theories which the history of science has consistently shown are short
> lived.
>
The Church (Catholic and Protestant alike) once treated heliocentrism as a
"short-lived unproven theory." Heliocentrism is still around; a literal
reading of Biblical passages referring to the fixity of Earth, or of Joshua
commanding the sun to stand still, is nearly extinct. It seems to me that
your epistomological nihilism is very inconsistently applied. That, along
with your apparent inability to notice that, if one doesn't judge evidence
(interpreted in light of our best understanding of the laws of nature)
relevant to deciding between beliefs, then nothing remains except arbitrary
whim or arbitrary force, is surely the best support for Grumbine's claim
that creationists are marked by a gross lack of imagination.
>
> >>> or that von
> >>>Daniken can't imagine that an artist would paint on a cave wall
> >>>without space aliens (gods) telling him to. von Daniken's problem
> >>>with Nazca (can't imagine people doing it) is another example.
> >>>This is a guy who never made sand castles at the beach just because.
> >>
> >> Pagano replies:
> >>Or that evolutionists can't imagine that such drawings were made by
> >>humans less than 6000 years ago.
> >
> > Name 5. Certainly I have no problem imagining that the cave paintings
> >were done 4000 years ago instead of 40,000 years ago.
>
> Pagano replies:
> Can't name any off the top of my head, but I think many of your
> evolutionist brothers would disagree with you. Some cave drawings are
> believed to pre-date spoken language which would be considerably
> earlier than 4000 years ago according to secular time tables of
> prehistory.
>
I think you misread Grumbine here. His point is that (as I pointed out in
my earlier post) paleontologists and archaeologists can certainly *imagine*
that the paintings date to less than 4000 years ago. Their dating methods
don't compel a date tens of thousands, as opposed to mere hundreds, of years
old. It is not the assumption of evolution, but the assumptions that the
dating methods don't magically and undetectably start overstating the age of
things just when the dates start to contradict creationist chronologies,
that leads to dating the cave paintings to, say, 40,000 years ago. You
ought to at least take notice of what you are asking us to try to imagine.
I had not heard, for what it's worth, that any cave art was believed to
predate spoken language. Indeed, I had the vague impression that the oldest
definite artworks were widely thought to be roughly contemporaneous with the
origin of language.
>
> > von Daniken can't
> >even imagine a humain painting them in the first place.
>
> Pagano replies:
> In the movie "Contact" Carl Sagan (one of the great heros of modern
> atheists and secularists) has the atheist hero of the movie
> practically deify extraterrestrials. The fact that Daniken requires
> E.T. to "push" hypothesized pre-humans in the right direction is
> hardly out-of-line with practical atheism or modern secular thinking.
> And whether it lacks imagination is not an indication that Daniken's
> reasoning is flawed. He may simply be mistaken.
>
See? You can grasp the motives vs. grounds issue.
But the point is that von Daniken doesn't appreciate just how intellectually
complex and demanding human existence in a technologically primitive
environment can be, or how difficult it can be for even a brilliant mind --
one capable of great art, for example -- to come up with ideas for literacy
or major technological innovations. And he can't, er, imagine, that the
limits of what he understands are not the limits of the possible. This
seems to me a different matter from being able to "imagine" that, somehow,
some unknown physical processes operating in Noah's Flood could both leave
layers of evaporites between layers of sediment, as well as systematically
accelerating nuclear decay rates and somehow dissipating all the excess
waste heat to ... somewhere.
I suppose that all false theories have true consequences, in that they do
more or less explain the facts they were originally formulated to explain.
That's rather different from *predicting* the outcomes of observations made
after the theories. It is rare, I would think, for such theories to be
completely overturned rather than subsumed as approximations in special
cases of more successful and comprehensive theories. Kepler's theories, and
Newtons, as well as Darwin's, had this characteristic; phlogiston theory did
not.
Note, by the way, that determining the truth even of historical events is
not a simple matter of reading eyewitness accounts. Eyewitnesses can
contradict each other; they can lie (even about being witnesses), or be
mistaken, or be misunderstood. To evaluate an eyewitness's testimony, one
must make inferences about a unique, unwitnessed phenomenon: the state of
mind of the alleged witness. The investigation of historical events is not
different in principle from the investigation of prehistoric events,
although the sorts of evidence available and the exact techniques for
evaluating it differ.
>
> In his attack on YECists in general and Daniken in particular Grumbine
> doesn't really attack either for a lack of imagination, per se, but
> specifically for a failure to consider Grumbine's pet possibilities.
>
Erik von Daniken certainly accepts evolution. I doubt he understands it (he
speaks of aliens mating with ape-men in order to "skip a step in evolution,"
implying an early Lamarckian "evolutionary ladder" concept rather than
neoDarwinian "evolutionary tree" concept), but he believes we evolved from
nonhuman apes. And dismissing the views of thousands of scientists who've
spent their lives examining and trying to explain the evidence as
"Grumbine's pet possibilities" is, well, another example of Grumbine's
point. You don't seem able to imagine the sheer magnitude of what you're
asking him to consider: that the people who examine the evidence are all
mistaken, deluded, or lying, while people who assume before looking at the
evidence that the "real" facts must support their particular dogma (not,
note, any other creation account), all just happen to be right.
Of course, reconstructing some historical events involves engineering
problems, whether "how to construct a pyramid using bronze age technology,"
to "how to construct a novel structure by incremental advantageous
modifications of some previous structure." Again, it does not seem to me
that the best way to discover a unique truth is to assume, before examining
the evidence, that your inherited dogma just happens to be that unique
truth. I don't *think* that reflects a lack of imagination on my part;
rather, I can imagine adherents to many rival dogmas that might might the
same claim, and see how not all of them could be right.
>
> Finally the failure of Daniken in particular or YECists in particular
> to imagine one of the solutions which Grumbine believes they should is
> only a problem if Grumbine has some insight into the truth unavailable
> to the rest of us. I don't think that's likely. Perhaps that's a
> failure of my imagination. I report, you decide.
>
Yes, the secret key is to trust the evidence, not your imagination or lack
of it.
Huck Turner
> >
> >>> or that von
> >>>Daniken can't imagine that an artist would paint on a cave wall
> >>>without space aliens (gods) telling him to. von Daniken's problem
> >>>with Nazca (can't imagine people doing it) is another example.
> >>>This is a guy who never made sand castles at the beach just because.
> >>
> >> Pagano replies:
> >>Or that evolutionists can't imagine that such drawings were made by
> >>humans less than 6000 years ago.
> >
> > Name 5. Certainly I have no problem imagining that the cave paintings
> >were done 4000 years ago instead of 40,000 years ago.
>
> Pagano replies:
> Can't name any off the top of my head, but I think many of your
> evolutionist brothers would disagree with you. Some cave drawings are
> believed to pre-date spoken language which would be considerably
> earlier than 4000 years ago according to secular time tables of
> prehistory.
>
I don't know where you got this from. The consensus among language
evolution researchers is that language is much older than any of the
cultural artefacts that have ever been found, language being widely
regarded as a prerequisite for complex culture. Independent sources of
evidence for the emergence of spoken language are also used including
evidence of vocal tract lengthening in our ancestors (Lieberman, 1984)
from fossils that predate cultural artefacts. Arguments rage over
whether our Neanderthal cousins (who died out only around 35,000 years
ago) possessed language given that there is some evidence that they
had complex burial rituals. If they had language, then this would
suggest that the capacity for language actually predates the evolution
of anatomically modern homo sapiens (i.e., some form of language may
have existed upwards of 200,000 years ago).
Ref:
Lieberman, P. (1984). The biology and evolution of language.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Huck Turner
> Huck Turner wrote:
> > In general, I think encouraging imagination in children is potentially
> > one of the biggest vaccines against all kinds of social ills. If you
> > have a good imagination then you are much more likely to empathise
> > with others (a vaccine against predjudice and anti-social behaviour)
> > and you have a better chance of appreciating the consequences of your
> > own actions (a vaccine against self-destructive behaviour). And of
> > course, if you have a good imagination you're much more likely to come
> > up with solutions to life's problems.
>
> The flip side to this is that you can have such a healthy imagination
> that you live in a whacked-out delirium (perhaps by choice). Although I
> think this is necessary to some degree to create certain kinds of art
> and to have certain kinds of fun, it doesn't bode so well for spaced out
> mind freaks like me accepting the squeaky-clean, well-scrubbed,
> whitewashed moral demands ("hey, we *should* explain it!") of
> rationality, logic and science (and utopian society). All that stuff may
> "make sense," but to someone with a hyped up imagination, it ends up
> being kind of boring and ultimately unsatisfying.
>
> But maybe we're talking about different kinds of imagination.
Yes, I think we are talking about different things. You seem to be
talking about opening up the mind to certain things and closing it off
to certain others. I'm only talking about the opening up aspect and I
don't think that one necessarily leads to the other. Creativity and
rationality for instance find a happy balance in scientific
theorizing. Indeed, Einstein famously said that "imagination is more
important than knowledge". He certainly liked to look at problems in
unusual ways imagining for instance what the world would look like if
he were travelling on a beam of light.
> Mine tends
> to construct very fancy forms of self-destructive behaviour, often
> involving large numbers of other homo sapiens who can share in the fun.
>
But it's not obvious that having a good time at some cost to your
health is self-destructive. That's only the case if the cost is
greater than the benefit. The trouble is that people with lousy
imaginations can't see far enough ahead to evaluate the long-term
costs of having a good time in the here-and-now. Some times the costs
are justified and other times they aren't.
> Plus, who says that self-destructive behavior is bad?
The dictionary! It's what it means.
I guess one of the things that you're hinting at in your post is that
a rich imagination could be applied to all kinds of ends - good and
bad - which is of course equally true of a good education. But if
there are more acts committed with good intentions than acts committed
with bad intentions, then we'd still be proportionately better off if
everyone had a better imagination (or education). This isn't
immediately obvious and it's a bit complicated to explain, but if you
do the calculations you'll see that this is because the number of bad
acts committed as the unforeseen result of people with good intentions
would decrease more than the number of good acts committed as the
unforeseen result of people with bad intentions, even assuming that
probability of doing something good when you intend to do something
bad is as high as the probability of doing something bad when you
intend to do something good. Note that this is true regardless of how
you define 'good' and 'bad'.
Of course you could argue that there are more acts committed with bad
intentions than good intentions in which case encouraging imagination
(and education) might just make matters worse, but I think there are
compelling reasons to believe otherwise. Even the Sept 11 hijackers
seemed to believe they were doing something for a noble cause, and
George Bush probably does too even though people with an imagination
(and an education) could see that attacking an Arab country is much
more likely to stir up terrorism than end it. After all, that's
exactly what the earlier Gulf war did if Osama Bin Laden's rhetoric is
anything to go by.
G
>> But maybe we're talking about different kinds of imagination.
>>
>
> Yes, I think we are talking about different things. You seem to be
> talking about opening up the mind to certain things and closing it
> off to certain others. I'm only talking about the opening up aspect
> and I don't think that one necessarily leads to the other.
> Creativity and rationality for instance find a happy balance in
> scientific theorizing. Indeed, Einstein famously said that
> "imagination is more important than knowledge". He certainly liked
> to look at problems in unusual ways imagining for instance what the
> world would look like if he were travelling on a beam of light.
Well, I meant the sort of imagination that opens up the mind to *every
possible thing that can be imagined*, which happens to include all
sorts of things that cannot be accounted for based on the scientific
method. Even if the mind sits atop physical processes, my belief is
that the mind *transcends* those physical processes, simply by the
fact that the mind can consider an infinite number of possibilities -
while the underlying physical processes operate by definition within a
finite set of possibilities (the laws of nature). Of course, the word
"transcends" makes pure naturalists/materialists uncomfortable for
some reason, although I would submit that any human actually believes
that their mind is transcendent in the way I mean. Even if the brain
is completely mapped and the firing of every neuron is understood, the
consciousness that sits atop these processes is somehow more important
and capable than the mechanics of the process. To suggest otherwise
seems to imply that science could eventually predict the actual novel,
word for word, a writer would write, for instance. That doesn't seem
rationally feasible to me.
The one firm belief I have (all others are up to revision and
modification), is that each individual human has the right to imagine,
believe, think and (pretty much) do whatever they want to. Of course,
I inject a moral demand when I say that one individual's actions
shouldn't detract from another individual's ability to imagine,
believe, think and do. The moral demand I make actually has no basis
in nature or science (what moral demand does?), but I don't see how I
could make any statement about what "should" be without injecting a
moral claim, however baseless.
Anyway, the point is I am mostly in agreement with what you said,
although I'm not convinced that formal education is necessarily the
best path to a totally open mind for everyone (we have to imagine that
the formal educational system exists primarily to socialize people,
don't we?).
And I jumped in this thread late, but I don't see how my metaphysical
conclusions regarding the origins of existence have anything to do
with imagination or creativity in a human cultural sense. I can
certainly "imagine" that the universe always existed, or came from
nothing for some unknown reason (or no reason at all), or was spoken
into existence by some uber-entity. I can probably imagine many more
scenarios. The one I end up believing, for whatever set of provisional
and personal reasons, seems to have nothing to do with my imaginative
capacity.
G.
Arne Vogel
> huckt...@hotmail.com wrote on Sun, 9 Nov 2003 12:44:00 -0500:
>
>>>But maybe we're talking about different kinds of imagination.
>>>
>>
>>Yes, I think we are talking about different things. You seem to be
>>talking about opening up the mind to certain things and closing it
>>off to certain others. I'm only talking about the opening up aspect
>>and I don't think that one necessarily leads to the other.
>>Creativity and rationality for instance find a happy balance in
>>scientific theorizing. Indeed, Einstein famously said that
>>"imagination is more important than knowledge". He certainly liked
>>to look at problems in unusual ways imagining for instance what the
>>world would look like if he were travelling on a beam of light.
>
>
> Well, I meant the sort of imagination that opens up the mind to *every
> possible thing that can be imagined*, which happens to include all
> sorts of things that cannot be accounted for based on the scientific
> method. Even if the mind sits atop physical processes, my belief is
> that the mind *transcends* those physical processes, simply by the
> fact that the mind can consider an infinite number of possibilities -
> while the underlying physical processes operate by definition within a
> finite set of possibilities (the laws of nature). Of course, the word
Why do you assert that the mind has infinitely many possible states?
Let's assume, for simplicity, that the state of mind is completely
determined by the state of the brain's neurons, and each neuron can be
either excited or relaxed. This means there are about 2 ^ (100 billion)
states the human mind can assume -- this corresponds to a "storage
capacity" of more than 10 gigabytes. This seems to be easily enough to
account for all possible states of the human mind I've witnessed (though
of course always through very limited samples). Two further objections:
- If the mind can have any of infinitely many states, why do I forget
things? I wouldn't need to.
- Assuming a finite lifetime and a finite learning speed (I think these
are good assumptions...), how can anyone's mind ever be fed with more
than a finite amount of information?
> "transcends" makes pure naturalists/materialists uncomfortable for
> some reason, although I would submit that any human actually believes
> that their mind is transcendent in the way I mean. Even if the brain
> is completely mapped and the firing of every neuron is understood, the
> consciousness that sits atop these processes is somehow more important
> and capable than the mechanics of the process. To suggest otherwise
Neurological research indicates that much of our conscious activity is a
posteriori, happening about 3/10th of a second *after* we started to do
what we thought we were just consciously deciding to do. This delay is
very likely exactly the reason why we have reflexes *in addition* to a
consciousness. The consciousness just produces too much delay in many
"fight-or-flight" or "take the hand off the hot stove before it's
charcoal" situations, and is instead used for:
a) Planning for the non-immediate future.
b) Reflecting upon past events in order to optimize future (instinctive
or planned) behavior.
> seems to imply that science could eventually predict the actual novel,
> word for word, a writer would write, for instance. That doesn't seem
> rationally feasible to me.
It rather seems to me that you reject the idea because you abhor it. I
don't think it's actually possible to predict the human mind by
reconstructing the brain, for two reasons (essentially the same that
make long-term weather predictions futile):
- We will never be able to sample the brain to perfect precision.
- Quantum uncertainty implies that even if we *could* sample it
perfectly at one time, we have no way of predicting the state it is in
after a given time has passed.
Both result in chaotic effects (in the brain we try to predict and the
world outside) that quickly spoil any way of reliably telling what a
person would do later in life.
> The one firm belief I have (all others are up to revision and
> modification), is that each individual human has the right to imagine,
> believe, think and (pretty much) do whatever they want to. Of course,
> I inject a moral demand when I say that one individual's actions
> shouldn't detract from another individual's ability to imagine,
> believe, think and do. The moral demand I make actually has no basis
> in nature or science (what moral demand does?), but I don't see how I
> could make any statement about what "should" be without injecting a
> moral claim, however baseless.
>
> Anyway, the point is I am mostly in agreement with what you said,
> although I'm not convinced that formal education is necessarily the
> best path to a totally open mind for everyone (we have to imagine that
> the formal educational system exists primarily to socialize people,
> don't we?).
As Einstein put it: It is a miracle that curiosity survives formal
education.
> And I jumped in this thread late, but I don't see how my metaphysical
> conclusions regarding the origins of existence have anything to do
> with imagination or creativity in a human cultural sense. I can
> certainly "imagine" that the universe always existed, or came from
> nothing for some unknown reason (or no reason at all), or was spoken
> into existence by some uber-entity. I can probably imagine many more
> scenarios. The one I end up believing, for whatever set of provisional
> and personal reasons, seems to have nothing to do with my imaginative
> capacity.
>
> G.
Good to hear that you don't constrain your imagination with theological
or philosophical certitudes! :D
G
> Why do you assert that the mind has infinitely many possible
> states? Let's assume, for simplicity, that the state of mind is
> completely determined by the state of the brain's neurons, and each
> neuron can be either excited or relaxed. This means there are about
> 2 ^ (100 billion) states the human mind can assume -- this
> corresponds to a "storage capacity" of more than 10 gigabytes. This
> seems to be easily enough to account for all possible states of the
> human mind I've witnessed (though of course always through very
> limited samples). Two further objections:
>
> - If the mind can have any of infinitely many states, why do I
> forget things? I wouldn't need to.
> - Assuming a finite lifetime and a finite learning speed (I think
> these are good assumptions...), how can anyone's mind ever be fed
> with more than a finite amount of information?
Well, let's say that storage space isn't an issue. Why? Because I'm
not talking about storing every thing the brain has ever thought
indefinitely. I'm assuming that some data is overwritten by new stuff.
Sure, some is read-only, like my name, unless I experience a brain
injury that knocks those areas offline.
What I am talking about is that there is an infinite number of
combinations of "words" (or pictures, or sounds) I can store (not all
at once) at any given moment; regardless of whether I remember it
thirty minutes from now. I can decide to store: "Pleasure, the
she-beam, riding toward filament, stiff like Jacqueline, pilfering my
grope with the coma whore, silvery and wet."
Yes, it's all English words, so you may argue that I haven't really
done anything except scramble some English words. But to me, those
words serve as a saved neural state (a neural Polaroid) that can
trigger other emotions, memories, etc. Do you have an algorithm that
can even get in the same ballpark of what I am going to think at any
given moment?
If you are thinking of just storing facts, then I would obviously
agree that there is an upper limit.
>> seems to imply that science could eventually predict the actual
>> novel, word for word, a writer would write, for instance. That
>> doesn't seem rationally feasible to me.
>>
>
> It rather seems to me that you reject the idea because you abhor
> it. I don't think it's actually possible to predict the human mind
> by reconstructing the brain, for two reasons (essentially the same
> that make long-term weather predictions futile):
It's not that I abhor it. I just don't think it's rationally feasible.
It seems you are saying yourself that predicting the human mind is
futile. Doesn't futility suggest that it's not rationally feasible?
Take a look at James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* and let me know what
kind of algorithms could ever predict that's what a human mind could
do.
> - We will never be able to sample the brain to perfect precision. -
> Quantum uncertainty implies that even if we *could* sample it
> perfectly at one time, we have no way of predicting the state it is
> in after a given time has passed.
>
> Both result in chaotic effects (in the brain we try to predict and
> the world outside) that quickly spoil any way of reliably telling
> what a person would do later in life.
Well, I wasn't really getting into why it wasn't possible, but since
you brought it up... okay. I'll take your word for it. Spoiling the
reliable telling is all that matters to me.
> Good to hear that you don't constrain your imagination with
> theological or philosophical certitudes! :D
The imagination can't really be constrained anyway. It sort of does
what it wants to do. At least for me.
G.
Robert Grumbine
Huck Turner <huckt...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>bo...@radix.net (Robert Grumbine) wrote in message
>news:<boc6p8$i2n$1...@news1.radix.net>...
>> In article <2muiqvghpj8nspvha...@4ax.com>,
>> Bob Casanova <nos...@buzz.off> wrote:
>> >On Wed, 5 Nov 2003 17:58:22 +0000 (UTC), the following
>> >appeared in talk.origins, posted by bo...@radix.net (Robert
>> >Grumbine):
[snippage]
>> On the other hand, you could be right. I have a great
>> lack of understanding of racism. And von Daniken (for example)
>> is quite explicit about not including the classical Romans
>> and Greeks or their time frame forward 'when the record gets
>> better'. Pretty obvious attempt to hide his gods in the gaps.
>> The gaps have shrunk, as is terribly obvious in his chapter on
>> Easter Island (he was babbling about how there were no trees on
>> the island. There were, just not for very long after the
>> people arrived).
>
>Dawkins calls these failures of imagination "arguments from personal
>incredulity". Unfortunately, such arguments are actually quite common
>in science. It's not just the crackpots. And in casual conversation,
>I'm always hearing people saying things like "I don't know why anyone
>would want to x!" which is just a conventional way of saying "I think
>x is stupid". Taken literally though it means "I don't understand,
>therefore it's stupid" which is not valid at all.
[break inserted by me]
>Indeed, when you
>said "I have a great lack of understanding of racism" I'm assuming you
>just mean "I think racism is wrong" and actually know a thing or two
>about some of the causes of racism like fear of the unknown, the
>tendency to generalise, need for scapegoats, outgroup homogeneity
>bias, the media and limitations on the ability to empathise that come
>from yes, having a lack of imagination.
You'd be wrong in assuming that, though we might be using terms
somewhat differently. Different context -- I'm not afraid of snakes
myself, but I do understand (as in, I can imagine doing so myself)
being afraid of snakes. While I have an intellectual understanding
of the fact that some people are afraid of differences between people,
the human habit of stereotyping, and such, it's a very abstract set
of facts. I can't imagine doing it myself, and even if I can make
the operative stretch of keeping those facts at hand, it doesn't
occur to me to use them in interpreting other people's actions.
(A bit of lack of imagination on my own part.)
>In general, I think encouraging imagination in children is potentially
>one of the biggest vaccines against all kinds of social ills. If you
>have a good imagination then you are much more likely to empathise
>with others (a vaccine against predjudice and anti-social behaviour)
>and you have a better chance of appreciating the consequences of your
>own actions (a vaccine against self-destructive behaviour). And of
>course, if you have a good imagination you're much more likely to come
>up with solutions to life's problems.
Amen!
Huck Turner
> huckt...@hotmail.com wrote on Sun, 9 Nov 2003 12:44:00 -0500:
> >> But maybe we're talking about different kinds of imagination.
> >>
> >
> > Yes, I think we are talking about different things. You seem to be
> > talking about opening up the mind to certain things and closing it
> > off to certain others. I'm only talking about the opening up aspect
> > and I don't think that one necessarily leads to the other.
> > Creativity and rationality for instance find a happy balance in
> > scientific theorizing. Indeed, Einstein famously said that
> > "imagination is more important than knowledge". He certainly liked
> > to look at problems in unusual ways imagining for instance what the
> > world would look like if he were travelling on a beam of light.
>
> Well, I meant the sort of imagination that opens up the mind to *every
> possible thing that can be imagined*, which happens to include all
> sorts of things that cannot be accounted for based on the scientific
> method.
Okay, nothing particularly controversial here. We can come up with all
kinds of ideas about reality that we can never test scientifically
like ideas about what happens inside black holes and we can probably
evaluate such ideas to some extent by appealling to notions of
elegance (Occam's razor), but I don't think that we should base any of
life's important decisions on beliefs that we can never back up with
evidence.
> Even if the mind sits atop physical processes, my belief is
> that the mind *transcends* those physical processes, simply by the
> fact that the mind can consider an infinite number of possibilities -
> while the underlying physical processes operate by definition within a
> finite set of possibilities (the laws of nature).
Nothing controversial here if all you mean is that the mind can make
"infinite use of finite means". For instance, we can come up with an
infinite number of sentences using a finite set of recursive 'rules'
of grammar.
> Of course, the word
> "transcends" makes pure naturalists/materialists uncomfortable for
> some reason, although I would submit that any human actually believes
> that their mind is transcendent in the way I mean. Even if the brain
> is completely mapped and the firing of every neuron is understood, the
> consciousness that sits atop these processes is somehow more important
> and capable than the mechanics of the process. To suggest otherwise
> seems to imply that science could eventually predict the actual novel,
> word for word, a writer would write, for instance. That doesn't seem
> rationally feasible to me.
>
The uncertainty principle suggests that complex predictions of this
sort may be impossible so I agree with your conclusion but for
different reasons. Why should we believe that the inability to predict
has anything to do with consciousness? Note that you are using an
argument from personal incredulity which is exactly what the original
post in this thread was criticising.
> The one firm belief I have (all others are up to revision and
> modification), is that each individual human has the right to imagine,
> believe, think and (pretty much) do whatever they want to. Of course,
> I inject a moral demand when I say that one individual's actions
> shouldn't detract from another individual's ability to imagine,
> believe, think and do. The moral demand I make actually has no basis
> in nature or science (what moral demand does?), but I don't see how I
> could make any statement about what "should" be without injecting a
> moral claim, however baseless.
>
Your moral demand does relate to a biologically mandated desire to
preserve your self-interests and you won't be able to do this in a
society unless you agree to treat others as you'd have them treat you.
This kind of morality is just enlightened self-interest.
When you said "The moral demand I make actually has no basis in nature
or science (what moral demand does?)" you produced a perfect example
of an argument from personal incredulity. You have failed to imagine
how your moral demand could relate to your biology and so concluded
that it doesn't. This is not a valid argument.
> Anyway, the point is I am mostly in agreement with what you said,
> although I'm not convinced that formal education is necessarily the
> best path to a totally open mind for everyone (we have to imagine that
> the formal educational system exists primarily to socialize people,
> don't we?).
>
I also doubt that formal education is the only good path to an open
mind.
> And I jumped in this thread late, but I don't see how my metaphysical
> conclusions regarding the origins of existence have anything to do
> with imagination or creativity in a human cultural sense. I can
> certainly "imagine" that the universe always existed, or came from
> nothing for some unknown reason (or no reason at all), or was spoken
> into existence by some uber-entity. I can probably imagine many more
> scenarios. The one I end up believing, for whatever set of provisional
> and personal reasons, seems to have nothing to do with my imaginative
> capacity.
>
Your earlier comments suggest otherwise. Firstly, you failured to
imagine how scientists could predict what an author will write and so
concluded that they can't. Secondly, you failed to imagine how
morality could relate to nature and so concluded that it doesn't.
Of course, now that I've pointed out how morality could relate to
nature, I'm sure you can imagine it. The issue is not whether you can
imagine something or not once a possibility is pointed out to you.
There were people before Darwin and Wallace who believed based on
taxonomic evidence that life had evolved, but I guess it would have
been quite hard for them to imagine how this process really worked
without having been exposed to the idea of natural selection. Once
this simple idea was pointed out, it made sense and people could
imagine it (at least those who understood it).
G
>> Well, I meant the sort of imagination that opens up the mind to *
>> every possible thing that can be imagined*, which happens to
>> include all sorts of things that cannot be accounted for based on
>> the scientific method.
>>
>
> Okay, nothing particularly controversial here. We can come up with
> all kinds of ideas about reality that we can never test
> scientifically like ideas about what happens inside black holes and
> we can probably evaluate such ideas to some extent by appealling to
> notions of
> elegance (Occam's razor), but I don't think that we should base any
> of life's important decisions on beliefs that we can never back up
> with evidence.
Well, I'm glad I escaped controversy. I didn't even know I was in
danger.
Do you really think the only sort of imagination there is has to do
with things like what happens inside black holes? Perhaps we should
check your pulse. Do you have a sex life? Have you ever done anything
crazy? Are you middle-aged?
>> Even if the mind sits atop physical processes, my belief is
>> that the mind *transcends* those physical processes, simply by
>> the fact that the mind can consider an infinite number of
>> possibilities - while the underlying physical processes operate
>> by definition within a finite set of possibilities (the laws of
>> nature).
>>
>
> Nothing controversial here if all you mean is that the mind can
> make "infinite use of finite means". For instance, we can come up
> with an infinite number of sentences using a finite set of
> recursive 'rules' of grammar.
Sure, that's pretty much what I mean. The 26 letters of the English
alphabet go a long way.
>> To suggest otherwise seems to imply that science could
>> eventually predict the actual novel, word for word, a writer
>> would write, for instance. That doesn't seem rationally feasible
>> to me.
>>
>
> The uncertainty principle suggests that complex predictions of this
> sort may be impossible so I agree with your conclusion but for
> different reasons. Why should we believe that the inability to
> predict has anything to do with consciousness? Note that you are
> using an argument from personal incredulity which is exactly what
> the original post in this thread was criticising.
But if something is impossible and almost anyone would agree with the
conclusions (including scientists), what does personal incredulity
have to do with it? Wouldn't you be incredulous if I suggested that it
may be possible to stuff the entire universe into a knapsack with your
bare hands? Plus, me saying "that doesn't seem rationally feasible" is
a lot different than "no way! I just can't believe it! there is
absolutely no way that could happen!" I can "imagine" the point where
the human mind could be completely mapped, predicted and controlled.
Isn't there some difference between incredulity and thinking "slim
chance that could happen" - especially when I haven't seen anyone
suggest that it's feasible?
And in any case, what would be left to do if the human mind is
completely mapped and can be predicted precisely? What a nightmare.
>> The one firm belief I have (all others are up to revision and
>> modification), is that each individual human has the right to
>> imagine, believe, think and (pretty much) do whatever they want
>> to. Of course, I inject a moral demand when I say that one
>> individual's actions shouldn't detract from another individual's
>> ability to imagine, believe, think and do. The moral demand I
>> make actually has no basis in nature or science (what moral
>> demand does?), but I don't see how I could make any statement
>> about what "should" be without injecting a moral claim, however
>> baseless.
>>
>
> Your moral demand does relate to a biologically mandated desire to
> preserve your self-interests and you won't be able to do this in a
> society unless you agree to treat others as you'd have them treat
> you. This kind of morality is just enlightened self-interest.
Okay. But what if I choose to ignore my enlightened self-interest?
Surely you aren't thinking that you are going to enforce your idea of
morals on me. I will resist. You might *convince* me via argument, but
you'd have to go a little further than just making a claim.
> When you said "The moral demand I make actually has no basis in
> nature or science (what moral demand does?)" you produced a perfect
> example of an argument from personal incredulity. You have failed
> to imagine how your moral demand could relate to your biology and
> so concluded that it doesn't. This is not a valid argument.
Heh heh heh. This is just too funny. I *have* imagined that a "moral"
demand could relate only to my biology. In fact, I have imagined it
more than I should. I don't know every moral realist theory there is,
but I've done a brief sampling. They all seem weak to me, in the sense
of just not being very motivating. I'm not trying to say, "ooo ooo, I
know the answer to moral questions, I have a better system." I'm just
saying if that's all there is to it, I'd rather not buy into or adhere
to *any* moral system. I guess I'd be with the hedonists if I had to
choose.
The thing is, I don't think the biological basis for morals retains a
very strong correspondence in the twenty-first century, in the modern
industrialized, technological world. Pretend for a moment that I am a
complete naturalist like yourself, because everything I am telling you
is coming from that point of view. Biology may have been the basis for
morals/ethics at one point, and it probably still has weak influence
on them (and of course to a large degree it must depend on the
individual and how cognizant they are of their biological needs and
the sort of environment they live in).
BUT... I mean, come on, at this point, I don't really have to adhere
to any biologically-driven code of conduct. There are no wild beasts
attacking me. I don't have to attack any neighboring tribes in order
to satisfy my mating habits. I don't have to kill bears to make myself
a parka. I don't have to grow my own food - but I also don't have to
be kind or giving or nice to my local grocer, either. All I have to do
is buy food. I give money; they give me what I want. I don't see what
moral demand that places on me, other than perhaps that I can't go
into the grocery store and point a gun at the grocer if I don't want
the police to come after me. Okay. I can see that this one moral
demand still has some basis in nature - I want to eat and not get
chased by the police. But me rejecting any moral system you come up
with that's more elaborate than that hardly seems to be from personal
incredulity; it would be more from a personal feeling of I just don't
give a shit. Those are two different things.
And how would you ever determine which "morals" or "ethics" are
biologically based as opposed to ones that are cultural and completely
arbitrary? Sure, okay, human culture is based on biology, too, at some
dusty, fundamental level in the human past, but the thing is, human
biology just stays pretty much the same (in the short timeframe of
only a few thousand years) while culture keeps changing at a more
rapid pace. Culture has outpaced the biological fundamentals, IMHO.
Any moral system you devise is going to be mostly cultural.
If "I just don't give a shit" is "not a valid argument," well, sorry.
You see, I'm not a calculator. Are you?
What if you tell me *your* "valid argument* for why there is a moral
demand that comes from nature? You can talk about distant human
societies if you must, but what about modern human societies?
Here is my reasoning, and you can point out my flaws now that I know
I'm trying to formulate a valid argument.
1. Nature exists.
2. Nature has no inherent meaning.
3. Nature surely doesn't give a shit what humans do one way or the
other. Nature is just existence; it makes no demands.
4. Any type of "moral" demand is simply invented by humans. Yes, the
invention may have been due to biological circumstances in some
distant past. But humans can also un-invent, or rather, change the
course of their societies.
5. Nature is mute on all things, so she surely doesn't tell us
anything about anything humans do, including the creation of moral
systems. She is rather like a dead wife. She isn't going to respond.
> I also doubt that formal education is the only good path to an open
> mind.
I am pleased to have made a valid argument. I do so like to avoid the
stack overflow. Error, error.... Danger Will Robinson.
>
>> And I jumped in this thread late, but I don't see how my
>> metaphysical conclusions regarding the origins of existence have
>> anything to do with imagination or creativity in a human cultural
>> sense. I can certainly "imagine" that the universe always
>> existed, or came from nothing for some unknown reason (or no
>> reason at all), or was spoken into existence by some uber-entity.
>> I can probably imagine many more scenarios. The one I end up
>> believing, for whatever set of provisional and personal reasons,
>> seems to have nothing to do with my imaginative capacity.
>>
>
> Your earlier comments suggest otherwise. Firstly, you failured to
> imagine how scientists could predict what an author will write and
> so concluded that they can't. Secondly, you failed to imagine how
> morality could relate to nature and so concluded that it doesn't.
What? Have you already discovered the means by which you can predict
(and retrodict) my thoughts? If so, I don't think it's quite working
properly yet. I had *already* imagined the things you are talking
about. I think the problem you are having is that I don't just accept
everything I imagine right off the bat. Now, I don't know what your
imagination is like, but I would warrant a guess that you probably
don't either.
> Of course, now that I've pointed out how morality could relate to
> nature, I'm sure you can imagine it. The issue is not whether you
> can imagine something or not once a possibility is pointed out to
> you. There were people before Darwin and Wallace who believed based
> on taxonomic evidence that life had evolved, but I guess it would
> have been quite hard for them to imagine how this process really
> worked without having been exposed to the idea of natural
> selection. Once this simple idea was pointed out, it made sense and
> people could imagine it (at least those who understood it).
>
But imagining and believing are two different things. I imagined that
scientists could predict what an author would write and that morality
relates to nature before you told me that I didn't. In fact, I
imagined them long ago. I'm not really imagining any better now based
on your post. You hardly pointed out some self-evident truth that can
now be readily accepted just because you pointed it out. What is the
evidence that moral demands can be based in nature? And, more
important, what makes them relevant NOW, even if they bubbled up from
the days when we all lived out in the middle of nowhere roasting
caribou on the spit?
G.
a letter in your writing doesn't mean you're not dead
Earle Jones
huckt...@hotmail.com (Huck Turner) wrote:
> of grammar....
*
Not if all of the following are true:
1. We have an finite number of characters in the character set.
2. The longest word has a finite number of characters.
3. The longest sentence has a finite number of words.
earle
*
Arne Vogel
> Arne Vogel wrote on Mon, 10 Nov 2003 03:05:30 -0500:
>
>>Why do you assert that the mind has infinitely many possible
>>states? Let's assume, for simplicity, that the state of mind is
>>completely determined by the state of the brain's neurons, and each
>>neuron can be either excited or relaxed. This means there are about
>>2 ^ (100 billion) states the human mind can assume -- this
>>corresponds to a "storage capacity" of more than 10 gigabytes. This
>>seems to be easily enough to account for all possible states of the
>>human mind I've witnessed (though of course always through very
>>limited samples). Two further objections:
>>
>>- If the mind can have any of infinitely many states, why do I
>>forget things? I wouldn't need to.
>>- Assuming a finite lifetime and a finite learning speed (I think
>>these are good assumptions...), how can anyone's mind ever be fed
>>with more than a finite amount of information?
>
>
> Well, let's say that storage space isn't an issue. Why? Because I'm
> not talking about storing every thing the brain has ever thought
> indefinitely. I'm assuming that some data is overwritten by new stuff.
> Sure, some is read-only, like my name, unless I experience a brain
> injury that knocks those areas offline.
Neither was I referring to "everything the brain has *ever* thought", I
was talking about a 'snapshot' of someone's state of mind in one given
moment, not explicitly, but excited and relaxed neurons were meant to
imply it, since hardly a neuron is in one state for a prolonged time.
> What I am talking about is that there is an infinite number of
> combinations of "words" (or pictures, or sounds) I can store (not all
> at once) at any given moment; regardless of whether I remember it
> thirty minutes from now. I can decide to store: "Pleasure, the
> she-beam, riding toward filament, stiff like Jacqueline, pilfering my
> grope with the coma whore, silvery and wet."
That's a sentence with 127 characters. Even if each could be freely
chosen from 10000 different characters in the alphabet, there are "only"
10^508 different sentences of this length. That is a *lot*, but, well,
infinitely less than infinity. To think any of infinitely many different
sentences, you need:
An infinite alphabet
*or* infinitely long sentences
*or* both.
> Yes, it's all English words, so you may argue that I haven't really
> done anything except scramble some English words. But to me, those
> words serve as a saved neural state (a neural Polaroid) that can
> trigger other emotions, memories, etc. Do you have an algorithm that
> can even get in the same ballpark of what I am going to think at any
> given moment?
No I don't. Nobody has, so far. But then, is it reasonable to assume
that no one ever will? Neuroinformatics is still far from creating a
artificial neural network that passes the Turing test
(http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test). But the things ANNs *can*
already do make them useful enough to be employed outside of research
facilities (e.g. in speech recognition and OCR). Compared to
'conventional' programming one could use to solve these problems, they
are amazingly simple: Take several layers of "neurons" that calculate a
simple mathematical function (typically a variation on "multiply each
input with a 'weight', calculate the sum, and fire if it exceeds a
certain threshold), connect the layers with 'synapses', and add a
learning rule derived from a differential equation. (Okay, for the
layman this may sound complicated, but compared to old-fashioned
programming to solve the example problem, it is *incredibly* easy).
Then, feed it samples of letters, in form of a pixel map (always telling
them, which letter it was). After enough repetitions, it can not only
classify the exact letters it saw (now that would be trivial), but it
can correctly classify letters that only look *similar* to the examples
it has been given. IOW, the computer learns to read, one letter at a
time. In comparison with what human learning can achieve wrt reading,
its successes pale (except that the ANN can learn *much* faster than a
human, on an average PC, the entire alphabet can be learned in seconds),
but compared to conventional programming approaches, it's a nice trick.
> If you are thinking of just storing facts, then I would obviously
> agree that there is an upper limit.
I don't think so. Emotions, associations, concepts are as well part of
the mind as facts. But I don't see why there should be an infinite
diversity of them. The basic feelings are easy to enumerate. Then there
are combinations (finitely many) and nuances (which *could* be
infinitely many, but "very fine-grained, but finite" would work just as
well for explaining human behavior). So far, neither of us can use that
to back up his point. But when we assume that the brain is governed by
quantum mechanics -- just like all other matter -- and the mind is
governed by the brain (evidence for that: the undisputed effect of brain
injuries and physiological manipulations of the brain, e.g.
hallucinatory drugs or electric stimulation, on the mind), then there
are *finitely many* (though a really really really huge number of)
different states of mind, since there are only so and so many ways of
arranging matter to form a (living) human brain.
>>>seems to imply that science could eventually predict the actual
>>>novel, word for word, a writer would write, for instance. That
>>>doesn't seem rationally feasible to me.
>>>
>>
>>It rather seems to me that you reject the idea because you abhor
>>it. I don't think it's actually possible to predict the human mind
>>by reconstructing the brain, for two reasons (essentially the same
>>that make long-term weather predictions futile):
>
>
> It's not that I abhor it. I just don't think it's rationally feasible.
> It seems you are saying yourself that predicting the human mind is
> futile. Doesn't futility suggest that it's not rationally feasible?
> Take a look at James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* and let me know what
> kind of algorithms could ever predict that's what a human mind could
> do.
I agree with your conclusion, but not with the argument that leads you
to it. E.g. in your response to Huck Turner, you wrote
"And in any case, what would be left to do if the human mind is
completely mapped and can be predicted precisely? What a nightmare."
I'd also say that it's a very unpleasant idea. But that doesn't make it
impossible, just like human cloning or even the A-bomb. What makes it
impossible, IMNSHO, are limits to precision in measurement and quantum
uncertainty, combined with chaos theory (which basically says small
approximation errors accumulate into ever larger ones the longer the
parts of the chaotic system -- the brain, the weather, the universe,
etc. -- are allowed to interact).
>>- We will never be able to sample the brain to perfect precision. -
>>Quantum uncertainty implies that even if we *could* sample it
>>perfectly at one time, we have no way of predicting the state it is
>>in after a given time has passed.
>>
>>Both result in chaotic effects (in the brain we try to predict and
>>the world outside) that quickly spoil any way of reliably telling
>>what a person would do later in life.
>
>
> Well, I wasn't really getting into why it wasn't possible, but since
> you brought it up... okay. I'll take your word for it. Spoiling the
> reliable telling is all that matters to me.
Unfortunately, you're not alone in this -- people who don't mind so much
whether the argument is valid, as long as the conclusion pleases them.
*sigh*
I for my part want to know the truth, as accurately as we can know it,
and whether I like it is secondary.
>>Good to hear that you don't constrain your imagination with
>>theological or philosophical certitudes! :D
>
>
> The imagination can't really be constrained anyway. It sort of does
> what it wants to do. At least for me.
>
> G.
Well, imagination is a double-edged sword. It can enlighten, and it can
deceive. It seems to be a good idea to simply to keep the enlightened
thoughts, and discard the delusions as soon as one realizes that they
were just that (most delusions I've discarded were, oddly, negative ones).
John Wilkins
Umm... earle? How many finite numbers are there? [Hint: Löwenheim-Skolem
theorem]
--
John Wilkins wilkins.id.au
For long you live and high you fly,
and smiles you'll give and tears you'll cry
and all you touch and all you see is all your life will ever be
Huck Turner
I don't understand your point, but if it relies on there being such a
thing as the longest sentence, then it doesn't follow. There is no
longest sentence (and possibly no longest word) just as there is no
highest integer. To illustrate, take any sentence and append "Earle
thinks that..." to the beginning and you have a longer sentence.
Sven Silow
<earle...@comcast.net> wrote:
>3. The longest sentence has a finite number of words.
1) This is a sentence.
2) There is a sentence that reads 'This is a sentence'.
3) There is a sentence that reads "There is a sentence that reads
'This is a sentence'".
Sven
G
>> Well, let's say that storage space isn't an issue. Why? Because
>> I'm not talking about storing every thing the brain has ever
>> thought indefinitely. I'm assuming that some data is overwritten
>> by new stuff. Sure, some is read-only, like my name, unless I
>> experience a brain injury that knocks those areas offline.
>
> Neither was I referring to "everything the brain has *ever*
> thought", I was talking about a 'snapshot' of someone's state of
> mind in one given moment, not explicitly, but excited and relaxed
> neurons were meant to imply it, since hardly a neuron is in one
> state for a prolonged time.
I can more easily envision and accept the probability that we will
reach the capability to take a "neural snapshot" in the sense you mean
here, which is the state of all the neurons at any given moment. I
still doubt that it will be an equivalence of the thought, for
basically the same reasons you give below and a couple of my own.
If I have a snapshot of the contents of all the memory addresses in a
computer's RAM, does it follow that I know everything about what's
going on in the software at the higher level - IF I don't know how to
reverse engineer the values? I don't speak machine language, so I'm
not sure whether this would work or not with computers. It seems it
might if you know how to reconstruct the gestalt from the individual
values.
In any case the brain isn't a standard platform: this little of tangle
of neurons in my brain may represent "all the bankers will talk," but
that same little bundle of specific cells is not going to be the same
in another head - because we all have different cells; that other head
doesn't have the same cells or even the same network. Sure, there are
major areas of brain function, but we don't have a cell-for-cell match
between multiple humans do we? And what if I only think "all the
bankers will talk" once?
>> "Pleasure, the she-beam, riding toward filament, stiff like
>> Jacqueline, pilfering my grope with the coma whore, silvery and
>> wet."
>>
>
> That's a sentence with 127 characters. Even if each could be freely
> chosen from 10000 different characters in the alphabet, there are
> "only" 10^508 different sentences of this length. That is a *lot*,
> but, well, infinitely less than infinity. To think any of
> infinitely many different sentences, you need:
>
> An infinite alphabet
> *or* infinitely long sentences
> *or* both.
But these could be infinitely long. Obviously there would be a limit
to how much can be stored inside the brain at any given moment and
still be recalled (can we bring paper and other storage mechanisms
into this?). But I could fill up my limit with arbitrary sentences
that I find lyrical while someone else fills up with "the battle of
Hastings was in 1066." In any case, I'm not convinced that "the battle
of Hastings was in 1066" is going to light up across brains in the
exact same way (specific individual neurons), although it's going to
light up in the same general region of the brain. Of course, I have a
limited knowledge of neurology, so feel free to correct me, as I find
it fascinating in any case.
Yep, as incredulous as it may seem, I know what the Turing test is and
I know what neural nets are. In fact, I was obsessed with AI for
several years. And yes, OCR is very lovely when I want to avoid
retyping.
I use a Bayesian spam filter, which correctly classifies 99.67% of my
email based on textual analysis and probabilities. You would think
this would make me quite willing to accept that a similar thing could
be done on my mind, and *in general* I don't think it's far-fetched. I
think we might get so far as making a pretty good guess as to what
types of thoughts are going to come next, but I also think it's
limited to a certain kind of thought. The kind that go on in most of
day to day life are pretty predictable at present without any deep
understanding of how the brain works anyway. A couple of decades of
observing human behavior is all you need. I just think there is
another, broader set of imaginative thinking that is essentially more
chaotic and random. Sure, you might be able to statistically analyze
these thoughts to some degree, but the fact that many of them are
short-lived and singular just doesn't seem to bode well for accurate
word-by-word, scene-by-scene prediction. It seems like it would be
more like analyzing handwriting (getting a general, vague picture)
rather than fingerprints (explicit detail). In addition, there is some
fuzzy edge on the outside of thought where language, sense data,
memory, and emotions all blur together into something that is
definitely there but is so foggy that it could never be expressed by
words or numbers in any case. The available symbols aren't rich enough
to translate this borderland into something that could be
communicated. You might have the raw data printout of the neural
states, but that doesn't necessarily get you any closer to putting a
set of symbols on what is actually occupying that area of the
super-set of the mind (the aggregate of all the individual neurons).
>> If you are thinking of just storing facts, then I would obviously
>> agree that there is an upper limit.
>>
>
> I don't think so. Emotions, associations, concepts are as well part
> of the mind as facts. But I don't see why there should be an
> infinite diversity of them. The basic feelings are easy to
> enumerate. Then there are combinations (finitely many) and nuances
> (which *could* be infinitely many, but "very fine-grained, but
> finite" would work just as well for explaining human behavior). So
> far, neither of us can use that to back up his point. But when we
> assume that the brain is governed by quantum mechanics -- just like
> all other matter -- and the mind is governed by the brain (evidence
> for that: the undisputed effect of brain injuries and physiological
> manipulations of the brain, e.g. hallucinatory drugs or electric
> stimulation, on the mind), then there are *finitely many* (though a
> really really really huge number of) different states of mind,
> since there are only so and so many ways of arranging matter to
> form a (living) human brain.
I see your point but still don't buy it. I will tentatively agree that
there are a finite number of ways to arrange matter to form a brain...
sort of. Once you get down to the individual cellular level, or even
atoms, or sub-atomic particles, surely these things are arranged in
patterns and quantities that are individual? Are there a finite number
of fingerprints in a set of an infinite number of humans? Is there a
finite number of possible DNA combinations? And from a purely
intuitive stance, I look out the window and I see a bunch of trees - I
know they are all running on the same underlying natural processes,
but they all exhibit entirely unique forms. What I feel like you're
saying is the equivalent of saying that the particular growth pattern
of every individual tree (down to the number of leaves and every
microscopic nook and cranny on its bark, not to mention the precise
coordinates, velocity, and twitch of antennae of every bug that will
crawl on the tree) could be predicted.
My main resistance seems to be about scale. For instance, you can
reduce biology to physics, but then you lose some information you had
that was valuable when you were looking at it from the scale of the
organism. That doesn't mean physics is wrong or can't inform biology,
but it doesn't seem like you can think about biology in a meaningful
way if you never get above the atomic level. I'm simply suggesting
that human consciousness seems similar. Sure, you can look at it
purely at the level of neurons firing (or a lower level), but that's
not going to tell you everything about it.
>> It's not that I abhor it. I just don't think it's rationally
>> feasible. It seems you are saying yourself that predicting the
>> human mind is futile. Doesn't futility suggest that it's not
>> rationally feasible? Take a look at James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*
>> and let me know what kind of algorithms could ever predict
>> that's what a human mind could do.
>>
>
> I agree with your conclusion, but not with the argument that leads
> you to it. E.g. in your response to Huck Turner, you wrote
>
> "And in any case, what would be left to do if the human mind is
> completely mapped and can be predicted precisely? What a nightmare."
>
> I'd also say that it's a very unpleasant idea. But that doesn't
> make it impossible, just like human cloning or even the A-bomb.
> What makes it impossible, IMNSHO, are limits to precision in
> measurement and quantum uncertainty, combined with chaos theory
> (which basically says small approximation errors accumulate into
> ever larger ones the longer the parts of the chaotic system -- the
> brain, the weather, the universe, etc. -- are allowed to interact).
But if we're agreeing that it's impossible...? We're just arguing
about the subtlety or methodology of the argument that led us to that
conclusion? For what it's worth, I actually think my reasons *are* in
the same ballpark as yours. Basically my point was that the mind is a
chaotic system, interacting with itself and other chaotic systems, and
that prediction is futile. I tend to think in terms of personal
experience outward (I'm my favorite guy, after all), and to me science
is a secondary rather than primary input stream, but it's still an
input stream that I use and that ends up shaping my personal
experience. If two roads lead to the same bus stop, why does it
matter?
And I don't believe that if something's unpleasant, it's impossible.
But, predictably enough, humans like to assert their distaste about
certain possible future circumstances. Me saying "what a nightmare"
has no relation to what I think is possible or impossible.
>> Well, I wasn't really getting into why it wasn't possible, but
>> since you brought it up... okay. I'll take your word for it.
>> Spoiling the reliable telling is all that matters to me.
>>
> Unfortunately, you're not alone in this -- people who don't mind so
> much whether the argument is valid, as long as the conclusion
> pleases them. *sigh*
>
> I for my part want to know the truth, as accurately as we can know
> it, and whether I like it is secondary.
That's nice. I guess it's very noble or something. But why so quick to
think it's "unfortunate" that I'm not quite like that? First of all,
I'm generally inclined to want to get closer to the truth. If I
wasn't, I wouldn't have scrapped every belief I had (that I knew
about) and begun to re-examine from scratch. But my conclusion about
the utility of the truth is different. My own, real-time, actual life
trumps valid arguments and even the truth where necessary in the
individual moments that I experience. This hardly seems irrational;
after all, it's my life and the only one I get - why shouldn't I shape
it as I see fit? And you may have noticed that every single human
being lives like this in actuality if not in words. Do you stop to
prepare a valid argument every few minutes for the next few minutes of
your existence? Based on the anecdotal evidence (interactions with all
humans I've ever known), I'd say that it is highly improbable that
that is the case.
I'm actually not even quite sure what you're getting at. When I say
something like "Spoiling the reliable telling is all that matters to
me," that's as true as it gets - "to me" being a great qualifier that
limits the statement to my own personal opinion about some matter. I
guess you could really think that it's unfortunate that I have some
personal feeling about something that only exists in an unknown
future, but I have to confess I don't see any "valid argument" about
why it's unfortunate. Either this stance is slight intellectual
posturing for the sake of this context (no harm done there, obviously
I and others do the same), or you really are just one of the weirdest
people I've come across (no harm there, either, I like weird people).
I'm just wondering where the line on argument for the sake of argument
and how you honestly feel is really drawn. I'd suggest that if you
really feel people should limit their lives to the non-stop pursuit of
truth, then I will run you out of my neighborhood. I mean, go for it
if that's really your thing, but don't start trying to shape my world
like that. I will get claustrophobia.
Obviously you are committed to getting closer to the truth. I'm not
saying there's anything wrong with that (not sure that there's
anything right about it either - it just seems to have whatever value
is assigned to it). But are you so self-sacrificing that your primary
motive is to further some distant apex of human achievement which you
won't even be alive to witness? Again, that might be a great thing to
do as a job or in part of your spare time, but surely you don't live
every minute of every day without the actual, real-world experience of
your own life ever overtaking logical generalizations and the still
uncertain pinnacle of discovery that you seem to long for? Are you
like an ascetic monk?
Anyway, my feeling is that I have maybe a few decades left, assuming
my luck holds. Am I going to sit around waiting for science to map out
my thoughts? No. Should someone stop trying? No, that's up to them.
>> The imagination can't really be constrained anyway. It sort of
>> does what it wants to do. At least for me.
>>
> Well, imagination is a double-edged sword. It can enlighten, and it
> can deceive. It seems to be a good idea to simply to keep the
> enlightened thoughts, and discard the delusions as soon as one
> realizes that they were just that (most delusions I've discarded
> were, oddly, negative ones).
It may seem a good idea. But why does it really matter? That may work
great for you, but it's not going to matter even to you when you're
dead - nothing will matter to you then. I'd say it's also a delusion
that the really enjoyable thing is to sit in a cage of logic waiting
for the great leap forward (that may never come) and is in any case
just something someone decided at one point that would be worthwhile.
I'd rather just decide for myself what is worthwhile and keep it
contained within my own lifespan so I can witness it. Selfish? Sure.
There is no marker in nature that tells me I shouldn't be selfish.
There is nothing in nature that tells me *anything* - so I can make it
up. I have a modest interest in the future beyond myself for whatever
weird reason, and I might like to keep one foot in the cage of logic
(and keep the door open), but the eventual future is a weak, weak
factor when compared to the fact that I'm alive, right here, right now
and I'm going to make the most of it in my own way. That just hardly
seems "unfortunate" to me.
G.
Drive anywhere the road goes
See the lighted windows
Lives as if in dreams, I should have lived one
Huck Turner
> G wrote:
> > huckt...@hotmail.com wrote on Sun, 9 Nov 2003 12:44:00 -0500:
> >
> >>>But maybe we're talking about different kinds of imagination.
> >>>
> >>
> >>Yes, I think we are talking about different things. You seem to be
> >>talking about opening up the mind to certain things and closing it
> >>off to certain others. I'm only talking about the opening up aspect
> >>and I don't think that one necessarily leads to the other.
> >>Creativity and rationality for instance find a happy balance in
> >>scientific theorizing. Indeed, Einstein famously said that
> >>"imagination is more important than knowledge". He certainly liked
> >>to look at problems in unusual ways imagining for instance what the
> >>world would look like if he were travelling on a beam of light.
> >
> >
> > Well, I meant the sort of imagination that opens up the mind to *every
> > possible thing that can be imagined*, which happens to include all
> > sorts of things that cannot be accounted for based on the scientific
> > method. Even if the mind sits atop physical processes, my belief is
> > that the mind *transcends* those physical processes, simply by the
> > fact that the mind can consider an infinite number of possibilities -
> > while the underlying physical processes operate by definition within a
> > finite set of possibilities (the laws of nature). Of course, the word
>
> Why do you assert that the mind has infinitely many possible states?
The mind/brain can exist in a finite number of states at any given
moment, but as soon as you allow the temporal dimension then the
mind/brain is capable of doing an infinite number of things. For
instance, if our lives were not limited by time we could count to any
number, counting being a purely recursive procedure that can be
achieved by a device with a finite number of states.
> Let's assume, for simplicity, that the state of mind is completely
> determined by the state of the brain's neurons, and each neuron can be
> either excited or relaxed. This means there are about 2 ^ (100 billion)
> states the human mind can assume -- this corresponds to a "storage
> capacity" of more than 10 gigabytes.
No, it's much more. The number of states would correspond to a 1
followed by about 30 billion zeros (100 billion as a binary number).
Note that it would take nearly 1000 years to write this number out (in
decimal) if you wrote one zero every second!.
Huck Turner
> huckt...@hotmail.com wrote on Mon, 10 Nov 2003 09:43:53 -0500:
> >> Well, I meant the sort of imagination that opens up the mind to *
> >> every possible thing that can be imagined*, which happens to
> >> include all sorts of things that cannot be accounted for based on
> >> the scientific method.
> >>
> >
> > Okay, nothing particularly controversial here. We can come up with
> > all kinds of ideas about reality that we can never test
> > scientifically like ideas about what happens inside black holes and
> > we can probably evaluate such ideas to some extent by appealling to
> > notions of
> > elegance (Occam's razor), but I don't think that we should base any
> > of life's important decisions on beliefs that we can never back up
> > with evidence.
>
> Well, I'm glad I escaped controversy. I didn't even know I was in
> danger.
>
> Do you really think the only sort of imagination there is has to do
> with things like what happens inside black holes? Perhaps we should
> check your pulse. Do you have a sex life? Have you ever done anything
> crazy? Are you middle-aged?
>
Well, the black hole thing was just an example chosen specifically to
show that your view is uncontroversial. By the way, I am an artist
(experimental film maker, photographer and writer) as well as a
scientist and yes I do enjoy doing crazy things. I'm 28 and my sex
life is okay although there is always room for more (in lunch breaks
and so forth).
Arguments from personal incredulity might be very convincing, but that
doesn't make them valid. It's the validity of the argument that is the
problem.
> Wouldn't you be incredulous if I suggested that it
> may be possible to stuff the entire universe into a knapsack with your
> bare hands?
Yes, but if I were to argue seriously against this possibility, I
wouldn't do so on the basis of incredulity. I would have to provide
some evidence about the forces required and the forces available,
etc., or I would weigh the evidence for against the evidence against.
> Plus, me saying "that doesn't seem rationally feasible" is
> a lot different than "no way! I just can't believe it! there is
> absolutely no way that could happen!" I can "imagine" the point where
> the human mind could be completely mapped, predicted and controlled.
> Isn't there some difference between incredulity and thinking "slim
> chance that could happen" - especially when I haven't seen anyone
> suggest that it's feasible?
>
I put both of these kinds of statements in the same basket. Absence of
evidence is not the same as evidence of absence.
> And in any case, what would be left to do if the human mind is
> completely mapped and can be predicted precisely? What a nightmare.
>
It might be unfortunate, but that has no bearing on whether it is
possible. This is another kind of argumentive fallacy called 'the
argument from consequences'.
I'm criticising the argument as you presented it. You were trying to
convince us that your moral demand had "no basis in nature or science"
by appealing to the lack of obvious links. Regardless of whether
you've actually thought about the relationship between instincts and
morals, you have presented an argument that there is no relationship
using incredulity as 'evidence' and that is what is invalid. If you
had made this point by arguing against particular theories of a
relationship, or by evaluating the evidence for and against, then that
would have been different.
> The thing is, I don't think the biological basis for morals retains a
> very strong correspondence in the twenty-first century, in the modern
> industrialized, technological world. Pretend for a moment that I am a
> complete naturalist like yourself, because everything I am telling you
> is coming from that point of view. Biology may have been the basis for
> morals/ethics at one point, and it probably still has weak influence
> on them (and of course to a large degree it must depend on the
> individual and how cognizant they are of their biological needs and
> the sort of environment they live in).
>
> BUT... I mean, come on, at this point, I don't really have to adhere
> to any biologically-driven code of conduct. There are no wild beasts
> attacking me. I don't have to attack any neighboring tribes in order
> to satisfy my mating habits. I don't have to kill bears to make myself
> a parka. I don't have to grow my own food - but I also don't have to
> be kind or giving or nice to my local grocer, either. All I have to do
> is buy food. I give money; they give me what I want. I don't see what
> moral demand that places on me, other than perhaps that I can't go
> into the grocery store and point a gun at the grocer if I don't want
> the police to come after me.
"I don't see..." is another example of the argument from personal
incredulity.
> Okay. I can see that this one moral
> demand still has some basis in nature - I want to eat and not get
> chased by the police. But me rejecting any moral system you come up
> with that's more elaborate than that hardly seems to be from personal
> incredulity; it would be more from a personal feeling of I just don't
> give a shit. Those are two different things.
>
> And how would you ever determine which "morals" or "ethics" are
> biologically based as opposed to ones that are cultural and completely
> arbitrary? Sure, okay, human culture is based on biology, too, at some
> dusty, fundamental level in the human past, but the thing is, human
> biology just stays pretty much the same (in the short timeframe of
> only a few thousand years) while culture keeps changing at a more
> rapid pace. Culture has outpaced the biological fundamentals, IMHO.
> Any moral system you devise is going to be mostly cultural.
>
I don't know if you know anything about memetics (cultural evolution),
but viewed from this perspective culture is non-arbitrary in important
respects. Some memes (ideas, rituals, cultural practices) will
replicate better than others and so endure for longer. Factors that
influence whether memes replicate better include things like how
interesting they are (gossip, etc.), how true they are, and whether
they fit into systems of memes that encourage their own propagation
(e.g., religious doctrines that hold that it is a virtue to convert
people, threats of punishments like eternal damnation for not
believing, 'faith' considered as a virtue, commandments that serve to
keep the sabbath holy, banish idolatry, and so forth).
More importantly for the present debate, memes don't survive if they
destroy their carriers so we can expect practices like suicide rituals
to be quite rare, and practices that keep people behaving in ways that
help spread memes to be more common. Actually, now that the media
provides heavy 'publicity' to suicide bombings, the meme that suicide
can be an effective tool of terrorism is doing very well. In general
though, I think it is no surprise that the moral values of religions
like Christianity include prohibitions against things like murder,
adultery, stealing, because these values also contribute to the
propagation of religious memes by preserving the health and prosperity
of the people that carry them (that is, they are aligned with
biologically determined self-interests).
> If "I just don't give a shit" is "not a valid argument," well, sorry.
> You see, I'm not a calculator. Are you?
>
If you see an argument as a way of testing your own ideas, challenging
them, learning where you might be going wrong, then the whole
enterprise looks positive even when you are losing. I don't mean to
make you angry, but I suspect we're getting to the point where we have
to agree to disagree.
Arne Vogel
Well, I had a 'temporal snapshot' in mind, maybe I'm biased to think
that states always correspond to a single moment in time (because of my
computer science background).
> instance, if our lives were not limited by time we could count to any
> number, counting being a purely recursive procedure that can be
> achieved by a device with a finite number of states.
No, we couldn't, at least not without "external memory" (with, in turn,
infinite storage space). In CS terms, counting is logarithmically
bounded wrt to space. This means that a finite state machine like the
brain (one with finitely many possible states) can only reliably count
to a certain maximum number (starting at 1, at most the number of
states). It will either not be able to count beyond that number, or, as
is likely the case for the human brain, there will necessarily be gaps
(that grow ever larger on the average the further you count). In the
end, you will only have counted to finitely many numbers, before you
give up or screw up (e.g. start to mention numbers that you mentioned
before).
>>Let's assume, for simplicity, that the state of mind is completely
>>determined by the state of the brain's neurons, and each neuron can be
>>either excited or relaxed. This means there are about 2 ^ (100 billion)
>>states the human mind can assume -- this corresponds to a "storage
>>capacity" of more than 10 gigabytes.
>
>
> No, it's much more. The number of states would correspond to a 1
> followed by about 30 billion zeros (100 billion as a binary number).
> Note that it would take nearly 1000 years to write this number out (in
> decimal) if you wrote one zero every second!.
Why, soitenly! I wanted to point out that it's immense, yet finite. The
"storage capacity" in bits, is, however, likely to be much less, though
it depends on the "application" (photographic memory might be able to
store information more efficiently than "phone-number memory").
> H.
G
>> Well, I'm glad I escaped controversy. I didn't even know I was in
>> danger.
>>
>> Do you really think the only sort of imagination there is has to
>> do with things like what happens inside black holes? Perhaps we
>> should check your pulse. Do you have a sex life? Have you ever
>> done anything crazy? Are you middle-aged?
>>
>
> Well, the black hole thing was just an example chosen specifically
> to show that your view is uncontroversial. By the way, I am an
> artist (experimental film maker, photographer and writer) as well
> as a
> scientist and yes I do enjoy doing crazy things. I'm 28 and my sex
> life is okay although there is always room for more (in lunch
> breaks and so forth).
Okay, I feel better now. I'm glad you're still alive!
I wasn't trying to willfully put forth a controversial view, so I'm
not sure what the point is in pointing out that it's uncontroversial.
>> But if something is impossible and almost anyone would agree with
>> the conclusions (including scientists), what does personal
>> incredulity have to do with it?
>
> Arguments from personal incredulity might be very convincing, but
> that doesn't make them valid. It's the validity of the argument
> that is the problem.
At least in the context of logical argument. But who lives their lives
solely based on logical argument? I guess I just need to make it clear
where I am coming from. If I reach the same conclusion, even if it
wasn't a logical path, to me it seems impractical to continue just for
the sake of improving my logic. But I could just be lazy.
>> Wouldn't you be incredulous if I suggested that it
>> may be possible to stuff the entire universe into a knapsack with
>> your bare hands?
>>
>
> Yes, but if I were to argue seriously against this possibility, I
> wouldn't do so on the basis of incredulity. I would have to provide
> some evidence about the forces required and the forces available,
> etc., or I would weigh the evidence for against the evidence
> against.
I understand. I just think it seems like an impractical effort for
things that are known to be impossible. I can, in effect,
short-circuit the problem by simply accepting, without need for
argument, the fact that I "know" you can't stuff the entire universe
into a knapsack with your bare hands. Isn't this the same kind of
short-circuiting that goes on at the basic level when people decide to
go with "I know the world exists"?
> I put both of these kinds of statements in the same basket. Absence
> of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence.
But the only way you can know is through evidence, correct? What
qualifies as evidence of absence? What does something that's not there
leave behind as evidence, or what kind of evidence points to the
absence of some other thing?
>> And in any case, what would be left to do if the human mind is
>> completely mapped and can be predicted precisely? What a
>> nightmare.
>>
>
> It might be unfortunate, but that has no bearing on whether it is
> possible. This is another kind of argumentive fallacy called 'the
> argument from consequences'.
Right, but I wasn't making any declaration about what is or isn't
possible with that paragraph. I was simply asserting my distaste for
the consequences. Two different things.
> I'm criticising the argument as you presented it. You were trying
> to convince us that your moral demand had "no basis in nature or
> science" by appealing to the lack of obvious links. Regardless of
> whether
> you've actually thought about the relationship between instincts
> and morals, you have presented an argument that there is no
> relationship using incredulity as 'evidence' and that is what is
> invalid. If you had made this point by arguing against particular
> theories of a
> relationship, or by evaluating the evidence for and against, then
> that would have been different.
Okay. So what logical conclusion can I come to in the absence of
evidence? I haven't seen any evidence to suggest that I'm wrong, in
regard to nature having anything to say about morals. Morals only
exist in the mind.
>> BUT... I mean, come on, at this point, I don't really have to
>> adhere to any biologically-driven code of conduct. There are no
>> wild beasts attacking me. I don't have to attack any neighboring
>> tribes in order to satisfy my mating habits. I don't have to kill
>> bears to make myself a parka. I don't have to grow my own food -
>> but I also don't have to be kind or giving or nice to my local
>> grocer, either. All I have to do is buy food. I give money; they
>> give me what I want. I don't see what moral demand that places on
>> me, other than perhaps that I can't go into the grocery store and
>> point a gun at the grocer if I don't want the police to come
>> after me.
>>
>
> "I don't see..." is another example of the argument from personal
> incredulity.
Okay. What do I need to make it not be an argument from personal
incredulity? Where do I find any evidence that biological need has
anything to do with modern life? I will look if I know where to look.
The few moral realist theories I've checked out so far seemed to be
little more than something someone just made up - pleasant stories. I
didn't stumble across any big collection of evidence.
So biologically determined self-interest means to "stay alive,"
correct?
>> If "I just don't give a shit" is "not a valid argument," well,
>> sorry. You see, I'm not a calculator. Are you?
>
> If you see an argument as a way of testing your own ideas,
> challenging them, learning where you might be going wrong, then the
> whole
> enterprise looks positive even when you are losing. I don't mean to
> make you angry, but I suspect we're getting to the point where we
> have to agree to disagree.
Well, I'm not angry. And I agree to disagree with everyone. No one
exists that I am in complete agreement with.
I'm open to learning and changing my ideas. I have changed them many
times before. My point was that what I have seen from naturalist moral
theories to date has been so weak that I don't get any desire to dig
deeper; I'm assuming it's going to be more of the same. That may be
logically unsound, but I only have so much time. I'm basically waiting
until someone else digs up some really good evidence that I can
review. I guess the thing for me to do at this point is not to modify
my belief (not enough evidence yet) but to modify my language when
talking about the belief.
G.
Huck Turner
> huckt...@hotmail.com wrote on Tue, 11 Nov 2003 08:00:55 -0500:
> >> Well, I'm glad I escaped controversy. I didn't even know I was in
> >> danger.
> >>
> >> Do you really think the only sort of imagination there is has to
> >> do with things like what happens inside black holes? Perhaps we
> >> should check your pulse. Do you have a sex life? Have you ever
> >> done anything crazy? Are you middle-aged?
> >>
> >
> > Well, the black hole thing was just an example chosen specifically
> > to show that your view is uncontroversial. By the way, I am an
> > artist (experimental film maker, photographer and writer) as well
> > as a
> > scientist and yes I do enjoy doing crazy things. I'm 28 and my sex
> > life is okay although there is always room for more (in lunch
> > breaks and so forth).
>
> Okay, I feel better now. I'm glad you're still alive!
>
> I wasn't trying to willfully put forth a controversial view, so I'm
> not sure what the point is in pointing out that it's uncontroversial.
>
Other people reading this might have taken your comment as a criticism
of the scientific method. I just wanted to make it clear that it
wasn't. Your original comment was "Well, I meant the sort of
imagination that opens up the mind to *every possible thing that can
be imagined*, which happens to include all sorts of things that cannot
be accounted for based on the scientific method".
> >> But if something is impossible and almost anyone would agree with
> >> the conclusions (including scientists), what does personal
> >> incredulity have to do with it?
> >
> > Arguments from personal incredulity might be very convincing, but
> > that doesn't make them valid. It's the validity of the argument
> > that is the problem.
>
> At least in the context of logical argument. But who lives their lives
> solely based on logical argument? I guess I just need to make it clear
> where I am coming from. If I reach the same conclusion, even if it
> wasn't a logical path, to me it seems impractical to continue just for
> the sake of improving my logic. But I could just be lazy.
>
The trouble is that science is riddled with examples of cases where
researchers have concluded things based on incredulity that turn out
to be false. If you have any interest in whether the conclusions you
reach are valid/true, then you should care. And of course, you should
also care if you want to convince others using the same line of
reasoning.
Logical argument only has something to contribute to that small part
of our lives concerned with drawing conclusions. You can walk, eat, or
paint a picture without much need for it.
> >> Wouldn't you be incredulous if I suggested that it
> >> may be possible to stuff the entire universe into a knapsack with
> >> your bare hands?
> >>
> >
> > Yes, but if I were to argue seriously against this possibility, I
> > wouldn't do so on the basis of incredulity. I would have to provide
> > some evidence about the forces required and the forces available,
> > etc., or I would weigh the evidence for against the evidence
> > against.
>
> I understand. I just think it seems like an impractical effort for
> things that are known to be impossible. I can, in effect,
> short-circuit the problem by simply accepting, without need for
> argument, the fact that I "know" you can't stuff the entire universe
> into a knapsack with your bare hands. Isn't this the same kind of
> short-circuiting that goes on at the basic level when people decide to
> go with "I know the world exists"?
>
> > I put both of these kinds of statements in the same basket. Absence
> > of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence.
>
> But the only way you can know is through evidence, correct? What
> qualifies as evidence of absence? What does something that's not there
> leave behind as evidence, or what kind of evidence points to the
> absence of some other thing?
>
I've already discussed some ways you might argue against the
universe-in-knapsack idea and the predicting-author's-text idea. In
general, you can argue from the simplest explanation that is
consistent with observations, or you can attempt to show that
something is impossible in principle.
There is a lot in the psychology literature about human needs,
desires, motivation, and rewards and punishments. Even in modern life,
humans feel pain, love, lust, anger, loneliness, hunger, hot and cold,
and they make distinctions between good and bad tasting food
(judgements which are closely aligned with nutritional value),
attractive and unattractive mates (aligned with their healthiness),
and so on. These judgements are biologically wired and presumably got
that way because they are adaptive. And they still affect our
decisions on a day-to-day level, although some are overridden by
cultural influences (vows of celibacy for instance) and some of them
are no longer aligned with survival advantage under conditions of
modern life (sugar was presumably a very valuable source of energy for
our ancestors and we got it from fruit high in other valuable
nutrients, which would explain why we like it so much, but now that we
are in the age of processed foods we're having too much of it).
More-or-less.
> >> If "I just don't give a shit" is "not a valid argument," well,
> >> sorry. You see, I'm not a calculator. Are you?
> >
> > If you see an argument as a way of testing your own ideas,
> > challenging them, learning where you might be going wrong, then the
> > whole
> > enterprise looks positive even when you are losing. I don't mean to
> > make you angry, but I suspect we're getting to the point where we
> > have to agree to disagree.
>
> Well, I'm not angry. And I agree to disagree with everyone. No one
> exists that I am in complete agreement with.
>
> I'm open to learning and changing my ideas. I have changed them many
> times before. My point was that what I have seen from naturalist moral
> theories to date has been so weak that I don't get any desire to dig
> deeper; I'm assuming it's going to be more of the same. That may be
> logically unsound, but I only have so much time. I'm basically waiting
> until someone else digs up some really good evidence that I can
> review. I guess the thing for me to do at this point is not to modify
> my belief (not enough evidence yet) but to modify my language when
> talking about the belief.
>
> G.
G
>> I wasn't trying to willfully put forth a controversial view, so
>> I'm not sure what the point is in pointing out that it's
>> uncontroversial.
>>
>
> Other people reading this might have taken your comment as a
> criticism of the scientific method. I just wanted to make it clear
> that it wasn't. Your original comment was "Well, I meant the sort of
> imagination that opens up the mind to *every possible thing that
> can be imagined*, which happens to include all sorts of things that
> cannot be accounted for based on the scientific method".
I do not have a criticism of the scientific method as it applies
within its domain. You would seem to agree when you say:
"Logical argument only has something to contribute to that small part
of our lives concerned with drawing conclusions. You can walk, eat, or
paint a picture without much need for it."
> There is a lot in the psychology literature about human needs,
> desires, motivation, and rewards and punishments. Even in modern
> life, humans feel pain, love, lust, anger, loneliness, hunger, hot
> and cold, and they make distinctions between good and bad tasting
> food (judgements which are closely aligned with nutritional value),
> attractive and unattractive mates (aligned with their healthiness),
> and so on. These judgements are biologically wired and presumably
> got that way because they are adaptive. And they still affect our
> decisions on a day-to-day level, although some are overridden by
> cultural influences (vows of celibacy for instance) and some of
> them are no longer aligned with survival advantage under conditions
> of modern life (sugar was presumably a very valuable source of
> energy for our ancestors and we got it from fruit high in other
> valuable
> nutrients, which would explain why we like it so much, but now that
> we are in the age of processed foods we're having too much of it).
Okay. I'll have to think about how I feel about diving into
psychology. It's hardly on the same "truth" level as physics.
G.
Robert Grumbine
A Pagano <anthony...@verizon.net> wrote:
>On Thu, 6 Nov 2003 23:47:53 +0000 (UTC), bo...@radix.net (Robert
>Grumbine) wrote:
[large snippage]
> Pagano replies:
[snip]
>Grumbine's lack of imagination accusation can be subjectively slung
>whenever any possibility is eliminated. This is why it is useless for
>discovering the truth. The truth always eliminates ALL other
>possibilities.
Not a bad statement of your problem. The thing is, deciding what
is most likely does not eliminate other possibilities. If they were
possible, they're still possible. That they're less probable than
some other explanation simply means that the other explanation is
better. Nor are we in science dealing with Truth. We deal with
the best current answers. We can imagine that they will be shown
to be incorrect later. There was, for example, a good thread
a while back on ways that the current theory of evolution could
be shown false. It is possible to imagine such evidence (though,
again, it was only the scientists, not the YECs, who could imagine
such examples).
I am, in my own thinking, being fairly specific about the 'lack of
imagination'. Whether my writing is expressing this clearly is
a different matter. Von Daniken, for instance, in his repeated saying
-- without discussing alternatives -- that "This could _only_ happen
if the gods caused it." ('it' being painting in caves, for example)
is displaying a lack of imagination. Surely many routes can be
imagined for the construction of paintings in caves. After thinking
of several, in addition to his pet explanation, then he could have
presented the _evidence_ that said one of them was more likely correct.
One demonstration of imagination, to be more clearly specific,
is to construct alternatives to ones' preferred solution. Alternatives
are not straw men, I'll note.
[mini-snip]
>>>> or that von
>>>>Daniken can't imagine that an artist would paint on a cave wall
>>>>without space aliens (gods) telling him to. von Daniken's problem
>>>>with Nazca (can't imagine people doing it) is another example.
>>>>This is a guy who never made sand castles at the beach just because.
>>>
>>> Pagano replies:
>>>Or that evolutionists can't imagine that such drawings were made by
>>>humans less than 6000 years ago.
>>
>> Name 5. Certainly I have no problem imagining that the cave paintings
>>were done 4000 years ago instead of 40,000 years ago.
>
> Pagano replies:
>Can't name any off the top of my head, but I think many of your
>evolutionist brothers would disagree with you. Some cave drawings are
>believed to pre-date spoken language which would be considerably
>earlier than 4000 years ago according to secular time tables of
>prehistory.
The fact that people have concluded, based on evidence, that
specific paintings are greater than 4000 years ago is far from
meaning that they can't imagine that the paintings might only
be 4000 years old. Indeed, when great ages were first being
given to the paintings, the scientists involved had to mount
and evidential battle to show that the paintings were indeed
quite old, rather than an easier to believe younger age. To
win the battle required imagining what evidence for younger
ages would look like, and then demonstrating to scientists who
would prefer a younger age, that that explanation was not
supportable by the evidence.
Imaginings are not conclusions. While we typically hold only
one conclusion at a time on a particular point, we (scientists)
can and do imagine multiple options around that conclusion.
>> von Daniken can't
>>even imagine a humain painting them in the first place.
>
> Pagano replies:
>In the movie "Contact" Carl Sagan (one of the great heros of modern
>atheists and secularists) has the atheist hero of the movie
>practically deify extraterrestrials. The fact that Daniken requires
>E.T. to "push" hypothesized pre-humans in the right direction is
>hardly out-of-line with practical atheism or modern secular thinking.
>And whether it lacks imagination is not an indication that Daniken's
>reasoning is flawed. He may simply be mistaken.
He may _also_ be mistaken. He definitely shows lack of imagination.
What that has to do with 'practical atheism' or 'modern secular thinking'
is rather mystifying. I don't know or care what his religious sentiments
are.
Nor is it clear what Sagan's rather poor novel has to do with much
relevant to this thread, except to demonstrate that a particular
scientist had enough imagination to write a work of fiction that
sold well and prompted a movie. Rather supports my point again
about YECs -- where is Duane Gish's best-selling novel?
[Digression: Anyone who liked the subject of _Contact_ should
read instead _The Listeners_ by James Gunn. Much, much better
book.]
[snip]
> Pagano replies:
>The problem with this is that determining the truth of an
>prehistorical event is not a simple matter of determining which
>possibilies under consideration has a greater level of corroboration.
>All false theories have true consequences and hence corroborations can
>always be found. How does Grumbine know that the possibilities that
>have been considered are even close to the truth? He never says.
>
>In his attack on YECists in general and Daniken in particular Grumbine
>doesn't really attack either for a lack of imagination, per se, but
>specifically for a failure to consider Grumbine's pet possibilities.
Von Daniken in particular, I condemn for not considering _any_
alternatives. Whether yours, mine, or the milkman's, he considers
no alternatives.
YECs are there again with their "It's either evolution or our
religion", being totally unable to consider that there are other
religions around to provide alternatives to theirs.
Points to another, already mentioned, demonstration of imagination:
To be able to state the views of someone you disagree with. YECs
are notorious for sentences that start "Evolutionists think ..."
and which are followed with things that no such person thinks, has
said, nor has written.