Replace scientific with falsificationtific ?

[backspace]

Nobody knows what it means to be 'scientific' , it is usually a
polemical device used as a synonym for materialism. To avoid confusion
replace science with falsificationism and scientific with
falsificationtific.

Thus the following will be more clear:
1) YEC are not falsificationtific because they believe in God.
This is correct because God himself has to assume things for which
faith is his only evidence and faith isn't falsifiable. Faith is
defined as being unfalsifiable and the Word tells us that ''.....
Jesus called those things that be not as though they were .....''

2) Creationism isn't falsificationtific ( scientific).
Are there assertions made that are not falsifiable by YEC - certainly
there are. For example Paul wrote that we only know in part but in
future will know in full. There is no way to falsify this.

3) YEC assumption that all semantic objects can only be logically used
to represent Platonic primary binary contrasts: we assume this ,
impossible to falsify , like reality itself can't be falsified.

4) Life itself isn't defined in terms of materialist premises and thus
like Darwin and Aristotle there can't be a theory about something
which cannot be defined.
------------

Take for example the unfalsifiable belief by all of us that the
universe wasn't created 5min ago, with all our apparent past
experiences a Yedi mind trick played by Loci the trick god.

The only evidence we have for this is our religious belief.

[John Stockwell]

On Feb 20, 10:54 am, backspace <stephan...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Nobody knows what it means to be 'scientific' , it is usually a
> polemical device used as a synonym for materialism. To avoid confusion
> replace science with falsificationism  and scientific with
> falsificationtific.

Not all of science fits the rigid falsificationist model that Karl
Popper proposed. To be
scientific we have to be willing to modify or abandon old ideas when a
sufficient amount
of counter evidence is amassed. However, we don't just toss a theory
that works well for some
range of phenomena. We wouldn't have the scientific theory in the
first place if it did not
describe physical reality to some degree. The issue becomes one of
considering what weight
of evidence will allow us to consider a theory to be "falsified" for a
particular collection of phenomena.

>
> Thus the following will be more clear:
> 1) YEC are not falsificationtific because they believe in God.
> This is correct because God himself has to assume things for which
> faith is his only evidence and faith isn't falsifiable. Faith is
> defined as being unfalsifiable and the Word tells us that ''.....
> Jesus called those things that be not as though they were .....''

Yes. That is true. But it is more to the point that YEC is not
investigative. They
start with the desired answer and accept no physical evidence to the
contrary.

>
> 2) Creationism isn't falsificationtific ( scientific).
> Are there assertions made that are not falsifiable by YEC - certainly
> there are. For example Paul wrote that we only know in part but in
> future will know in full. There is no way to falsify this.

Same as above.

>
> 3) YEC assumption that all semantic objects can only be logically used
> to represent Platonic primary binary contrasts: we assume this ,
> impossible to falsify , like reality itself can't be falsified.

It's much simpler than that. YEC assumes that a particular
interpretation of the Bible
is the base ontology from which all of the universe must be
understood. The real
problem with YEC, or any other worldview philosophy that has a very
definite ontology, is that it
leaves no room for being wrong, or being advanced through empirical
study.

>
> 4) Life itself isn't defined in terms of materialist premises and thus
> like Darwin and Aristotle there can't be a theory about something
> which cannot be defined.

We certainly can define life in terms of classification of what we
call living (i.e. that with a metabolism that
reproduces). There might be some sticky points with viruses, but the
majority of living objects can be
unambiguously can be identified as such. We find however, that the
notion of "living" has only a limited
usefulness, because when we talk about the processes inside organisms,
we find that there is no distinction
between chemistry inside of organisms from that outside. Chemistry is
chemistry.

> ------------
>
> Take for example the unfalsifiable belief by all of us that the
> universe wasn't created 5min ago, with all our apparent past
> experiences a Yedi mind trick played by Loci the trick god.
>
> The only evidence we have for this is our religious belief.

We have metaphysical assumptions that are based upon our common
experiences. Our metaphysics for doing
science assumes that there is a world of our experience that can be
studied objectively, in the sense that
we can divide our experience into localized units (objects) that have
properties that we can agree upon.

We have no reason to adopt a "last Tuesdayist" viewpoint, because we
cannot tell the alleged pre-created
world from the current world. If the YEC is against Last Tuesdayism,
then the YEC has no reason to believe
that the earth is young and was created with the appearance of age.

[backspace]

What is it about the age of the universe that you assume but will
never be able to prove?

[RAM]

"Prove" is not an issue for science. It is always about providing the
best estimate with the smallest margin of measurement error.
Scientists assume phenomena can never be measured absolutely. And if
you are implying scientist can't test assumptions that is patently
false. It is true they can't test all assumptions. But they can and
do build strong empirical cases for their theoretical predictions by
testing as many assumptions as possible so as not to be mislead by
incorrect theoretical assumptions. If you know otherwise please
inform us.

A good site is "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Age_of_the_universe#Assumption_of_strong_priors"

[TomS]

"On Mon, 20 Feb 2012 09:54:52 -0800 (PST), in article
<91515bf8-5666-43df...@b23g2000yqn.googlegroups.com>, backspace
stated..."

I think you mean "Jedi" and "Loki". :)

>
>The only evidence we have for this is our religious belief.
>

IMHO one can avoid useless discussions about what it means to be
scientific by simply pointing out how much of creationism is simply
empty advertising slogans and idle attacks on evolution without *any*
alternative, scientific or otherwise.

This is especially true of the "intelligent design" variety, where
there has been an overt policy of avoiding all issues.

But it is to a significant extent true of all varieties, as has
been noted as long ago as 1852 (sic! - seven years before publication
of "On the Origin of Species") by Herbert Spencer in his essay "The
Development Hypothesis")

<http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Development_Hypothesis>


--
---Tom S.
"Ah, yeah, well, whenever you notice something like that, a wizard did it"
Lucy Lawless, the Simpsons "Treehouse of Horror X: Desperately Xeeking Xena"
(1999)

[John Stockwell]

We assume nothing about the age of the universe per se.

The age of the universe is inferred from physical measurements.
Determining the age of the universe boils down to determining how far
away the most distant parts of the universe are, and then inferring
the age of the universe from the distance.

Now, if you want to ask about assumptions behind those inferences,
then what we have is our theoretical understanding of the physical
processes of the propagation of light. If the speed of light were
different in the past, we could expect to see processes that take an
estimable amount of time (such as the brightening of supernovae) run
either slow or fast, depending on whether the speed of light was
slower or faster in the past. indeed, astronomers do not see any
evidence for a large
difference in the speed of light of the past from the speed of light
today.
Nor do we see inconsistencies in the spectra of light from galaxies or
other objects at great distance that would indicate that the laws of
physics were different in the distant past.

-John

[John Stockwell]

On Feb 20, 12:26 pm, backspace <stephan...@gmail.com> wrote:

As far as metaphysics is concerned with the issue of the age of the
universe, the metaphysics is that same as what we use in our day to
day existences---causality, uniformity, objectifiability, which imply
persistence of phenomena over space and time.

-John

[backspace]

On Feb 20, 8:17 pm, TomS <TomS_mem...@newsguy.com> wrote:
> IMHO one can avoid useless discussions about what it means to be
> scientific by simply pointing out how much of creationism is simply
> empty advertising slogans and idle attacks on evolution without *any*
> alternative, scientific or otherwise.

If the universe was made in 6 days(assume the premise for sake of
argument), then on say day 4 did the very concept of distance exist?
The YEC premise is that there was no time,distance nor matter before
the creation event. Without time when do place matter and measure
distance.

Thus the very definition and association between
matter,space(distance) and time were only complete lets say after the
6th day. At say the second day God was still busy defining distance in
terms of time. Lets presume he made that Supernova Stockwell referred
to on day 3, but only defined distance on day 4, then our present
measurements about the Supernova is meaningless.

The very abstract notion of 'evidence' didn't even exist until after
the creation was complete. What was the speed of ligth during this 6
day event. Since God himself is light and provided light to the earth
when he had not yet made the sun, what was the speed of this light?

(this post is type draft, I will reply and work and amend it as time
allows,please remain calm, take a deep breath and try and assume my
premise, not accept it, for sake of argument. Point out logical
flaws ,there probably are)

[backspace]

On Feb 20, 8:17 pm, TomS <TomS_mem...@newsguy.com> wrote:

> <http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Development_Hypothesis>


Is spencer using modified in the pattern or design sense?

[J. J. Lodder]

backspace <steph...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Nobody knows what it means to be 'scientific' , it is usually a
> polemical device used as a synonym for materialism. To avoid confusion
> replace science with falsificationism and scientific with
> falsificationtific.

You are fifty years behind the times.
Falsificationism has been thoroughly demolished
as a philosophy of science.
Only taxonomists (aka stamp collectors)
still believe in it,

Jan

[backspace]

1)A boulder got dislodged from the mountain after a lightning strike,
rolling down the hill and *modifying* the house to the ground. -
pattern without a purpose.

2) Via a process of descent with modification, Toyota engineers
evolved the Prius from previous designs while making trade-offs
between complexity,redundancy and functionality. - pattern with a
purpose.

This of course isn't a falisfiable conjecture, its an argument.
Dawkins reply to this would be that we must not *assume* that purpose/
non-purpose are our only options. Maybe not but it risks ensnaring our
thinking into an infinite regress.

Even *infinite* isn't falsifiable. Thus what do you assume but will
never be able to prove.

[Ron O]

On Feb 20, 2:17 pm, TomS <TomS_mem...@newsguy.com> wrote:
> "On Mon, 20 Feb 2012 09:54:52 -0800 (PST), in article

> <91515bf8-5666-43df-b608-8acc74760...@b23g2000yqn.googlegroups.com>, backspace
> stated..."
>
>

SNIP:

> >Take for example the unfalsifiable belief by all of us that the
> >universe wasn't created 5min ago, with all our apparent past
> >experiences a Yedi mind trick played by Loci the trick god.
>
> I think you mean "Jedi" and "Loki". :)
>

This makes me believe that backspace has just been a loki troll for
years. I doubt that backspace even knows what loci are, at least, the
backspace he personifies. How mind numbing would it be to troll like
this for years? How probable would it be to get two apt mutations in
the same sentence to produce such a humerous phrase that is so
applicable to the topic? Should we start using the argument from
incredulity to determine that backspace isn't what he claims?
Wouldn't that be ironic?

Ron Okimoto

SNIP:

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

I totally agree with you when saying "There can't be a scientific,
i.e. falsifiable, theory about something which cannot be defined"
although I am not creationist.
It would be surely useful for you to read some of the comments in the
other topic "Can Scientists Define Life".

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

On 21 fév, 10:59, nos...@de-ster.demon.nl (J. J. Lodder) wrote:

I disagree with you. A theory which cannot be fasifiable cannot be
scientific: e.g. the string theory.

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

> Age_of_the_universe#Assumption_of_strong_priors"- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -
>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -

"Prove is not an issue for science."

I would say that scientific experiences or observations cannot prove
that something is true but can only prove that it is false. That is
why I agree with
backspace when saying "There can't be a scientific, i.e. falsifiable,

[jillery]

On Tue, 21 Feb 2012 04:09:14 -0800 (PST), Ron O <roki...@cox.net>
wrote:

Backspace usually comes across as a one-trick pony. Perhaps that was
his coming-out post.

[Burkhard]

That's not much of an argument,more an assertion, and a problematic
one for that. John Wilkins had a good saying on this:
"Creationists who say, "evolution is not like what
Popper said science should be, so it isn't science" are like the
janitor
who says that teachers don't keep their classrooms clean enough, so
they
aren't teachers".

Replace for the present purpose "creationist" by any non-scientist. If
a theory of science systematically contradicts what scientists
actually do, so much the worse for the theory. In a way, yuo could
argue then that string theory falsifies naive falsificationism. Now,
there is a core of truth in Popper's notion, and that is that theories
(eventually) need to have some empirical content. That means that
they must rule out at least some models, and that in turn is
"falsification in principle", but it becomes a very weak principle
indeed and very easy to meet, and at best a peripheral concern. And an
entirely different issue becomes how scientists deal with these issues
in everyday practice. Insulating a successful theory against a
"marginal" falsification is a perfectly sound strategy for instance,
Science can be a messy business, and as long as a theory keeps crating
interesting problems that can be solved with the means of that theory,
abandoning it just because teher are also some recognised problems
would be wasteful, irrational and futile.

[prawnster]

On Feb 20, 1:43 pm, John Stockwell <john.19071...@gmail.com> wrote:
> [...]

> The age of the universe is inferred from physical  measurements.
> Determining the age of the universe boils down to determining  how far
> away the most distant parts of the universe are, and then inferring
> the age of the universe from the distance.
>
> Now, if you want to ask about assumptions behind those inferences,
> then what we have is our theoretical understanding of the physical
> processes of the propagation of light. If the speed of light were
> different in the past, we could expect to see processes that take an
> estimable amount of time (such as the brightening of supernovae) run
> either slow or fast, depending on whether the speed of light was
> slower or faster in the past. indeed, astronomers do not see any
> evidence for a large
> difference in the speed of light of the past from the speed of light
> today.
> Nor do we see inconsistencies in the spectra of light from galaxies or
> other objects at great distance that would indicate that the laws of
> physics were different in the distant past.
>

All true. And when people say that red shift equals time, they assume
that red shift does not equal a decrease in the light's energy or
energeticness (a fugly corrupt back-formation word, but I want to be
clear).

An alternate interpretation of the red shift is that the light has
traveled a long distance, and so it has passed through hydrogen dust
clouds, near stars, etc, and this ennervates the light, causing it to
stretch out and shift toward red. Plus, passing near heavy objects
will cause the light to change course also. Interpreting red shift to
be both time and distance instead of just distance is pure assumption,
and has never been confirmed by any other measurement.

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

> would be wasteful, irrational and futile.- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -

>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -

"Science can be a messy business, and as long as a theory keeps

creating interesting problems that can be solved with the means of
that theory, abandoning it just because there are also some recognised

problems would be wasteful, irrational and futile."

This is too abstract for me: can you give some concrete examples?
I would like just to add that, for example, the huge strengh of
Quantum Physics is that there were a lot of attempts to falsify it but
all failed ... until now!
Astrology, creationism, psychanalyse theory etc. are not falsifiable
theories but nobody cares!

[Burkhard]

On Feb 21, 5:35 am, backspace <stephan...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 20, 8:17 pm, TomS <TomS_mem...@newsguy.com> wrote:
>
> > IMHO one can avoid useless discussions about what it means to be
> > scientific by simply pointing out how much of creationism is simply
> > empty advertising slogans and idle attacks on evolution without *any*
> > alternative, scientific or otherwise.
>
> If the universe was made in 6 days(assume the premise for sake of
> argument), then on say day 4 did the very concept of distance exist?
> The YEC premise

THE YEC premise? Or your own private theology?
It sounds not like a position i have ever encountered before. and a
difficult one to argue, since "distance" is not something that is
added to objects, but a very feature of object-hood (which is why Kant
called them synthetic a priori) So as soon as there was something at
all, we should assume that there was also distance, anything else
woudl not even be expressible in language as we know it.

>is that there was no time,distance nor matter before
> the creation event.

That sounds more like a mainstream position,
But above, you say that they also did not exist during the creation
week - and that is a rather different proposition

> Without time when do place matter and measure
> distance.
>
> Thus the very definition and association between
> matter,space(distance) and time were only complete lets say after the
> 6th day. At say the second day God was still busy defining distance in
> terms of time. Lets presume he made that Supernova Stockwell referred
> to on day 3, but only defined distance on day 4, then our present
> measurements about the Supernova is meaningless.
>

Much more radical, our words "time", "measurement", "distance" are
meaningless. If you use them in the normal way, the above are just a
string of self-contradictions. Without time, no days, just for
starters. And a above, no objects without distance as soon as yo have
any object, you also have the distance between the object's edges.

You could try and argue I suppose that the creation account does not
describe the actual physical creation, but God thinking about it, and
only after that speaking the result of the thinking into existence,
but apart from the lack of scriptural basis, it really only transfers
the problem one step back.

The only way out, really, is to argue that human language is not
designed to express metaphysical ideas like this, for us and our
conceptual schemata, , object-hood and distance are inseparable etc.
The consequence of that of course is to stop treating religious texts
as referential at all, they are not "about" anything, but with
necessity simply instruction for action. Religion is not reading texts
that describe physical reality, but mantras whose purpose is to
trigger certain type of experiences, and therefore performative, not
descriptive. Verbalisation is for religion but a tool, and an utterly
inadequate one for that.

i have lots of sympathy with that position, and it is definitely true
for the majority of religious systems. The idea to treat religion as a
set of sentences about the world is in my view an aberration that
occurred within some early Christian splinter groups that then became
mainstream as a consequence of contingent external events. Of course,
if you follow that route you can't have even possible conflicts
between science and religion, not any more than you can have between
science and listening to piano music. They stop being about the same
domain in a much more radical way than Gould's NOMA theory, not two
verbal accounts of the same reality, but as different as reading a
book about physics and the activity of running a marathon

[Ernest Major]

In message
<2da484f2-a33d-485e...@kk16g2000pbb.googlegroups.com>,
prawnster <zweib...@ymail.com> writes

Your alternative hypothesis turns out to be testable (and falsified).

Light from places in the Milky Way behind dense dust clouds is reddened
(IIRC the principal process is frequency dependent scattering - the same
process that makes the sky blue), but not systematically red-shifted.

> Interpreting red shift to
>be both time and distance instead of just distance is pure assumption,
>and has never been confirmed by any other measurement.
>

And your assertion is false. There are other means of measuring distance
than red shift (various "standard candles"). That red shift is a
workable proxy for distance is inferred from observed correlations with
distances derived from the use of standard candles.
--
alias Ernest Major

[J. J. Lodder]

<marc.t...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:

> On 21 fév, 10:59, nos...@de-ster.demon.nl (J. J. Lodder) wrote:
> > backspace <stephan...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > Nobody knows what it means to be 'scientific' , it is usually a
> > > polemical device used as a synonym for materialism. To avoid confusion
> > > replace science with falsificationism and scientific with
> > > falsificationtific.
> >
> > You are fifty years behind the times.
> > Falsificationism has been thoroughly demolished
> > as a philosophy of science.
> > Only taxonomists (aka stamp collectors)
> > still believe in it,
> >
> > Jan
>
> I disagree with you.

So what?

> A theory which cannot be fasifiable cannot be
> scientific: e.g. the string theory.

Repeating doctrine is not an argument.
You appear to have absorbed some slogans.
Have you actually read something on history of science
and/or philosophy of science?

Jan

[J. J. Lodder]

> "Science can be a messy business, and as long as a theory keeps
> creating interesting problems that can be solved with the means of
> that theory, abandoning it just because there are also some recognised
> problems would be wasteful, irrational and futile."
> This is too abstract for me: can you give some concrete examples?

You can start with Popper himself.
He was always complaining about the 'irrationality' of scientists.
By which he meant that they were doing their science in ways
that were not in accordance with his rules.
(which are of course perfectly rational)

It is also amusing to see how Popper (in response to criticisms)
constructed more and more complicated elaborations
of his naive falsificationism, untill litle of it was left.
Instead of throwing it all in the waste paper basket,
like he said all those irrational scientists should have done.

Jan

[jillery]

This is an old argument. Light that is red-shifted by spacetime
expansion looks very different than light that is redshifted by
passing through dust, as even a casual Internet search reveals:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tired_light

Short version: When light passes through dust, the relative frequency
distribution changes but the position of the emission lines stay the
same. When light is shifted by spacetime expansion, the emission
lines are shifted to lower frequencies (hence red-shifted) but the
relative frequency distribution remains the same.

But I bet you know that.

[John Stockwell]

Sorry, Prawnster, there is absolutely no physics to support your
notions.

First of all, the redshift is not a mere attenuation of light, it is a
transformation
of the full frequency band to correspondingly lower frequencies. This
happens
without dispersion, so there really is no physical model involving the
passage of light through intervening material that will induce the red
shift.

Furthermore, if the speed of light is not radically different in the
ancient past,
which is what the consistency of astronomical observations support,
shows
then distance is proportional to time, and the proportionality
constant is the
speed of light.

-John

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

> Jan- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -

>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -

I beg your pardon but you don't give any present concrete examples, do
you?

[TomS]

"On Tue, 21 Feb 2012 10:24:22 -0500, in article
<qhc7k7p4ch87kocs5...@4ax.com>, jillery stated..."

In general, it is safe to say that all of the "easy" alternative
explanations were proposed, studied, and rejected long ago. There
were lots of people who didn't like the idea of a Big Bang.
Ironically, there were people who thought that it looked too much
like creation.

>
>Short version: When light passes through dust, the relative frequency
>distribution changes but the position of the emission lines stay the
>same. When light is shifted by spacetime expansion, the emission
>lines are shifted to lower frequencies (hence red-shifted) but the
>relative frequency distribution remains the same.
>
>But I bet you know that.
>

[Burkhard]

Well, if we read Popper literally (a single observation can..) then I
have single handedly changes physics as we know it when I was at
school. At best, 10% of the experiments we did in class had the
expected results. Did I get any Nobel prices? No. Instead, I was fed
"just so" stories about 30 year old litmus paper, corroded electrical
wires etc.

So not any old observation counts, instead, we incorporate them in
complex theories of measurement, quality control, etc etc -all
auxiliary hypothesis that can protect a well established core of a
theory from refutation.

You can see that if you look in detail at the historical examples of
theory change (which typically did not behave like Popper predicted -
and when this was pointed out to him by Kuhn, Lakatos and others, he
"immunised" his own theory rather than giving it up, changing it from
a descriptive account of scientific practice to a non-falsifiable,
normative one) Typically, "anomalies" accumulate over time, but people
stick with what works until something better comes along. Typically
again, the "something better" contains the older theories as a special
case or as an approximation (as e.g. relativity theory vs Netwonian
physics) This routinely means to "reinterpret" the terms of the older
theory so that we don;t have tio give them up, and to argue that
their measurement results were "not quite right". You see this e.g.
in ther change from Kepler's theory of planetary motion to Newton's.
Newtonian gravitation theory replaces Kepler's ellipses with more
complicated curves. But we require form the new theory also that it is
consistent with the older astronomical observations, which is only
possible if they don't fit exactly into Kepler's theory .

So measurement and the theories of measurement form an important part
of the account of scientific theories, which just does not fit
Popper's overly neat proposal.

> I would like just to add that, for example, the huge strengh of
> Quantum Physics is that there were a lot of attempts to falsify it but
> all failed ... until now!
> Astrology, creationism, psychanalyse theory etc.  are not falsifiable
> theories but nobody cares!

I think there are good reasons why scientists don;t take astrology,
creationism etc serious - I just don't think falsification is the sole
reason, or even the most important one. It seems to me that most
epidemiologists have given up the "demarcation criteria" debate as
being itself rather fruitless, but one account that I find pretty
convincing on that score is Larry Laudan's. We want our theories to
solve problems, and to identify new and interesting problems. We also
quite like to improve them, by refining their conceptual machinery .
From that perspective, the problem with astrology, creationism etc is
not so much that they are "unscientific" measured against one abstract
criterion, but that they are boring, unproductive and stale.

[Bob Casanova]

On Mon, 20 Feb 2012 09:54:52 -0800 (PST), the following
appeared in talk.origins, posted by backspace
<steph...@gmail.com>:

>Nobody knows what it means to be 'scientific'

Stop assuming your ignorance is a universal constant.
--

Bob C.

"Evidence confirming an observation is
evidence that the observation is wrong."
- McNameless

[Bob Casanova]

On Tue, 21 Feb 2012 05:42:32 -0800 (PST), the following
appeared in talk.origins, posted by prawnster
<zweib...@ymail.com>:

Nope. What actually happens in such cases is a change in
frequency distribution caused by scattering of the higher
frequencies, but the frequency of the absorption lines in
the spectrum is unchanged. The red shift, OTOH, results in a
change in the frequencies of all absorption bands,
regardless of any intervening dust, etc.

> Plus, passing near heavy objects
>will cause the light to change course also.

Changing "course" has zero to do with any shift, red or
otherwise.

> Interpreting red shift to
>be both time and distance instead of just distance is pure assumption,
>and has never been confirmed by any other measurement.

Perhaps you could clarify exactly what you mean by "both
time and distance" in this case? Given the constant value of
c, time *is* distance. Or are you asserting that c is not a
constant?

[Bob Casanova]

On Mon, 20 Feb 2012 09:54:52 -0800 (PST), the following
appeared in talk.origins, posted by backspace
<steph...@gmail.com>:

>Nobody knows what it means to be 'scientific' , it is usually a
>polemical device used as a synonym for materialism. To avoid confusion
>replace science with falsificationism and scientific with
>falsificationtific.

That might be appropriate if science were nothing more than
falsification. Would you also like to replace "religion"
with "rejection of inconvenient evidence" to avoid
confusion?

>Thus the following will be more clear:

....for values of "clear" sufficiently close to "obscure and
incorrect".

>1) YEC are not falsificationtific because they believe in God.
>This is correct because God himself has to assume things for which
>faith is his only evidence and faith isn't falsifiable. Faith is
>defined as being unfalsifiable and the Word tells us that ''.....
>Jesus called those things that be not as though they were .....''
>

>2) Creationism isn't falsificationtific ( scientific).
>Are there assertions made that are not falsifiable by YEC - certainly
>there are. For example Paul wrote that we only know in part but in
>future will know in full. There is no way to falsify this.
>
>3) YEC assumption that all semantic objects can only be logically used
>to represent Platonic primary binary contrasts: we assume this ,
>impossible to falsify , like reality itself can't be falsified.
>
>4) Life itself isn't defined in terms of materialist premises and thus

>like Darwin and Aristotle there can't be a theory about something
>which cannot be defined.
>------------

>
>Take for example the unfalsifiable belief by all of us that the
>universe wasn't created 5min ago, with all our apparent past
>experiences a Yedi mind trick played by Loci the trick god.

"Yedi"? "Loci"?

Upon what locus do you rest your braincase, young BS?

>The only evidence we have for this is our religious belief.

If you actually believe that you're in more serious trouble
that I thought. Is our "religious belief" also the only
reason we don't think the sun orbits the Earth?

[Ernest Major]

In message <2ii7k7hu7vffp5pba...@4ax.com>, Bob Casanova
<nos...@buzz.off> writes

You could interpret his words as him using an unreasonably wide
definition of religion, such that he conceives that "faith" that
"evidence means something" is a religious belief.
--
alias Ernest Major

[Ernest Major]

In message
<3982a6ef-163e-4f6a...@1g2000yqv.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes

>> criterion, but that they are boring, unproductive and stale.- Masquer

>>le texte des messages précédents -
>>
>> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -
>

>Sorry but I am not convinced by your reasonment.
>Moreover I don't see any PRESENT examples of SCIENTIFIC theories which
>would not be falsifiable.
>Among some counterexamples of theories not being falsifiable I have
>already quoted the string theory but there are others:
>- multiverse theories (although Lee Smolin think there is one which
>could be falsifiable: his cosmological natural selection theory);
>- the belief that the concept of life' is scientific (!!!).
>etd
>
Arguing that naive falsificationism is failed to the demarcation problem
is not the same as arguing that scientific theories need not be
falsifiable.
--
alias Ernest Major

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

> criterion, but that they are boring, unproductive and stale.- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -

>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -

[Ernest Major]

In message <YJnJ0OaV...@meden.invalid>, Ernest Major
<{$to$}@meden.demon.co.uk> writes

I seem to have failed to type a couple of words - s/failed/a failed
solution/
--
alias Ernest Major

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

On 21 fév, 18:28, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:

> >>Sorry but I am not convinced by your reasonment.
> >>Moreover I don't see any PRESENT examples of SCIENTIFIC theories which
> >>would not be falsifiable.
> >>Among some counterexamples of theories not being falsifiable I have
> >>already quoted the string theory but there are others:
> >>- multiverse theories (although Lee Smolin think there is one which
> >>could be falsifiable: his cosmological natural selection theory);
> >>- the belief that the concept of life' is scientific (!!!).
> >>etd
>
> >Arguing that naive falsificationism is failed to the demarcation
> >problem is not the same as arguing that scientific theories need not be
> >falsifiable.
>
> I seem to have failed to type a couple of words - s/failed/a failed
> solution/
> --
> alias Ernest Major

"Arguing that naive falsificationism is failed to the demarcation
problem is not the same as arguing that scientific theories need not
be falsifiable."

Sorry but I would be grateful if you could reformulate your point.
What is NAIVE falsificationism?
Actually I don't care about any falsificatioNISM: I assert that a
scientific theory MUST be falsifiable. As long as it isn't it cannot
be called scientific.
TRUE scientists are always willing to consider either scientific
experiments or scientific observations to falsify their theory; e.g.,
Einstein did for his General Relativity Theory and, fortunately, he
showed that his theory agreed closely with the observed amount of
Mercury perihelion shift.
Regarding Lee Smolin's Cosmological Natural Selection theory I have
just read that, unfortunately, it seemed its theory has been recently
falsified according to Smolin's own criteria (actually I liked his
theory).

[Ernest Major]

In message
<51dfafe4-e023-4aaa...@9g2000yqo.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes

>On 21 fév, 18:28, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> >>Sorry but I am not convinced by your reasonment.
>> >>Moreover I don't see any PRESENT examples of SCIENTIFIC theories which
>> >>would not be falsifiable.
>> >>Among some counterexamples of theories not being falsifiable I have
>> >>already quoted the string theory but there are others:
>> >>- multiverse theories (although Lee Smolin think there is one which
>> >>could be falsifiable: his cosmological natural selection theory);
>> >>- the belief that the concept of life' is scientific (!!!).
>> >>etd
>>
>> >Arguing that naive falsificationism is failed to the demarcation
>> >problem is not the same as arguing that scientific theories need not be
>> >falsifiable.
>>
>> I seem to have failed to type a couple of words - s/failed/a failed
>> solution/
>> --
>> alias Ernest Major
>
>"Arguing that naive falsificationism is failed to the demarcation
>problem is not the same as arguing that scientific theories need not
>be falsifiable."
>Sorry but I would be grateful if you could reformulate your point.
>What is NAIVE falsificationism?

Naive falsificationism is the philosophical position that a scientific
theory is falsified by a single contrary observation.

>Actually I don't care about any falsificatioNISM: I assert that a
>scientific theory MUST be falsifiable. As long as it isn't it cannot
>be called scientific.
>TRUE scientists are always willing to consider either scientific
>experiments or scientific observations to falsify their theory; e.g.,
>Einstein did for his General Relativity Theory and, fortunately, he
>showed that his theory agreed closely with the observed amount of
>Mercury perihelion shift.
>Regarding Lee Smolin's Cosmological Natural Selection theory I have
>just read that, unfortunately, it seemed its theory has been recently
>falsified according to Smolin's own criteria (actually I liked his
>theory).
>

--
alias Ernest Major

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

On 21 fév, 20:02, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> In message
> <51dfafe4-e023-4aaa-8797-94e703007...@9g2000yqo.googlegroups.com>,
> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes

I don't see why such a position would be PHILOSOPHICAL. But, ok, a
single contrary observation is perhaps not sufficient by itself IF
there is any methodological doubt about the observation. If there is
no methodological doubt it is sufficient.
For instance, were General Relativity Theory falsified by the observed
amount of Mercury perihelion shift it would have been definitively
false.
Could you give us an example of a theory which was falsified once but
nevertheless is still alive?

[Craig Franck]

On 2/21/2012 2:48 PM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:

> Could you give us an example of a theory which was falsified once but
> nevertheless is still alive?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steady_State_theory#Quasi-steady_state

http://www.amazon.com/Different-Approach-Cosmology-Universe-through/dp/0521662230

Craig

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

On 21 fév, 21:42, Craig Franck <craiglfra...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On 2/21/2012 2:48 PM, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>
> > Could you give us an example of a theory which was falsified once but
> > nevertheless is still alive?
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steady_State_theory#Quasi-steady_state
>

> http://www.amazon.com/Different-Approach-Cosmology-Universe-through/d...
>
> Craig

Your example theory is interesting, i.e. the Steady State theory (also
known as the Infinite Universe theory or continuous creation) by Fred
Hoyle, G. Burbidge and J. V. Narlikar.
I am not aware of the most recent data about it, so I don't know how
many times the theory was falsified (!).
So, either it is a false scientific theory, at best or a non-
scientific theory, at worst!

[RAM]

On Feb 21, 6:29 am, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> On 20 fév, 21:10, RAM <ramather...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 20, 1:26 pm, backspace <stephan...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Feb 20, 6:26 pm, John Stockwell <john.19071...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> > > > On Feb 20, 10:54 am, backspace <stephan...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > Nobody knows what it means to be 'scientific' , it is usually a
> > > > > polemical device used as a synonym for materialism. To avoid confusion
> > > > > replace science with falsificationism  and scientific with
> > > > > falsificationtific.
>

> > > > Not all of science fits the rigid falsificationist model that Karl
> > > > Popper proposed.  To be
> > > > scientific we have to be willing to modify or abandon old ideas when a
> > > > sufficient amount
> > > > of counter evidence is amassed. However, we don't just toss a theory
> > > > that works well for some
> > > > range of phenomena. We wouldn't have the scientific theory in the
> > > > first place if it did not
> > > > describe physical reality to some degree. The issue becomes one of
> > > > considering what weight
> > > > of evidence will allow us to consider a theory to be "falsified" for a
> > > > particular collection of phenomena.

>
> > > > > Thus the following will be more clear:

> > > > > 1) YEC are not falsificationtific because they believe in God.
> > > > > This is correct because God himself has to assume things for which
> > > > > faith is his only evidence and faith isn't falsifiable. Faith is
> > > > > defined as being unfalsifiable and the Word tells us that ''.....
> > > > > Jesus called those things that be not as though they were .....''
>

> > > > Yes. That is true. But it is more to the point that YEC is not
> > > > investigative. They
> > > > start with the desired answer and accept no physical evidence to the
> > > > contrary.
>
> > > What is it about the age of the universe that you assume but will
> > > never be able to prove?
>
> > "Prove" is not an issue for science.  It is always about providing the
> > best estimate with the smallest margin of measurement error.
> > Scientists assume phenomena can never be measured absolutely.  And if
> > you are implying scientist can't test assumptions that is patently
> > false.  It is true they can't test all assumptions.  But they can and
> > do build strong empirical cases for their theoretical predictions by
> > testing as many assumptions as possible so as not to be mislead by
> > incorrect theoretical assumptions.  If you know otherwise please
> > inform us.
>
> > A good site is "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
> > Age_of_the_universe#Assumption_of_strong_priors"- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -

>
> > - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -
>

> "Prove is not an issue for science."
> I would say that scientific experiences or observations cannot prove
> that something is true but can only prove that it is false. That is
> why I agree with
> backspace when saying "There can't be a scientific, i.e. falsifiable,

> theory about something which cannot be defined" .

I disagree on the use of prove. In scientific research the words "do
not empirically demonstrate support" or "fail to empirically support"
are more accurate. Your model assumes all variables are specified
correctly, there is no substantive measurement error and all
appropriate methods have been employed. It may be your proof fails in
some future revaluation.

RAMathers

[Burkhard]

No scientific theory is falsifiable the way Popper thought about it,
as it is always possible to protect the core of the theory by adding
auxiliary hypothesis, or by restricting the scope of the theory. So
for any observation you claim falsifies my theory, I can, in
principle, formulate a theory that shows your observation was e.g.
based on a measurement error. Whether or not the scientific community
accepts it as falsification is not a matter of mere logic, bt a much
more complex cost-benefit balancing

> Among some counterexamples of theories not being falsifiable I have
> already quoted the string theory but there are others:
> - multiverse theories (although Lee Smolin think there is one which
> could be falsifiable: his cosmological natural selection theory);

If scientists consider these theories as scientific, why do you say
that the theory of falsification is correct and these theories
unscientific, rather then conclude that they falsify the concept of
falsification as a demarcation criteria? This is the same point as
above: when faced with a prima facie falsification, we have always ore
than one way to respond (that is essentially Quine's theory holism) .
Above, I argued that it is always possible, and often perfectly
sensible, to insulate your theory against a prima facie falsification.
Here you are doing it yourself.

> - the belief that the concept of 'life' is scientific (!!!).

That has been your claim, but as I and others pointed out, that seems
to be based on an overly simplistic concept of definition.

[Burkhard]

On Feb 21, 6:27 pm, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> On 21 fév, 18:28, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > >>Sorry but I am not convinced by your reasonment.
> > >>Moreover I don't see any PRESENT examples of SCIENTIFIC theories which
> > >>would not be falsifiable.
> > >>Among some counterexamples of theories not being falsifiable I have
> > >>already quoted the string theory but there are others:
> > >>- multiverse theories (although Lee Smolin think there is one which
> > >>could be falsifiable: his cosmological natural selection theory);
> > >>- the belief that the concept of life' is scientific (!!!).
> > >>etd
>
> > >Arguing that naive falsificationism is failed to the demarcation
> > >problem is not the same as arguing that scientific theories need not be
> > >falsifiable.
>
> > I seem to have failed to type a couple of words - s/failed/a failed
> > solution/
> > --
> > alias Ernest Major
>
> "Arguing that naive falsificationism is failed to the demarcation
> problem is not the same as arguing that scientific theories need not
> be falsifiable."
> Sorry but I would be grateful if you could reformulate your point.
> What is NAIVE falsificationism?

Inmre Lakatos, a student of popper, distinguished in his influential
work on "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research
Programs" between naive and sophisticated falsificationism.
Essentially, it was an attempt to preserve some of the core ideas by
Popper, while taking on board the observations by Kuhn and others on
the way in which science in real life progresses.

[Burkhard]

In our context, take the idea that birds are not dinosaurs, or the
aquatic ape theory. While both are rejected with good reasons by the
majority of working scientists, they both still have a small but
dedicated group of followers. These guts do not make a logical
mistake, the way popper described it. Rather, they come up with more
and more elaborate auxiliary theories that explain away contradictory
evidence.

[J. J. Lodder]

Of course not.
Do your own homework.

Jan

[J. J. Lodder]

<marc.t...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:

> On 21 fév, 17:12, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:

[snip]

> > I think there are good reasons why scientists don;t take astrology,
> > creationism etc serious - I just don't think falsification is the sole
> > reason, or even the most important one. It seems to me that most
> > epidemiologists have given up the "demarcation criteria" debate as
> > being itself rather fruitless, but one account that I find pretty
> > convincing on that score is Larry Laudan's. We want our theories to
> > solve problems, and to identify new and interesting problems. We also
> > quite like to improve them, by refining their conceptual machinery .
> > From that perspective, the problem with astrology, creationism etc is
> > not so much that they are "unscientific" measured against one abstract
> > criterion, but that they are boring, unproductive and stale

> > - Masquer le texte des messages précédents -

Can you cut this crap?

> > - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -
>

> Sorry but I am not convinced by your reasonment.
> Moreover I don't see any PRESENT examples of SCIENTIFIC theories which
> would not be falsifiable.

That's it.
For bona-fide scientific theories falsifiability is a non-issue,

Jan

[J. J. Lodder]

<marc.t...@wanadoo.fr> wrote:

> On 21 fév, 18:28, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > >>Sorry but I am not convinced by your reasonment.
> > >>Moreover I don't see any PRESENT examples of SCIENTIFIC theories which
> > >>would not be falsifiable.
> > >>Among some counterexamples of theories not being falsifiable I have
> > >>already quoted the string theory but there are others:
> > >>- multiverse theories (although Lee Smolin think there is one which
> > >>could be falsifiable: his cosmological natural selection theory);
> > >>- the belief that the concept of life' is scientific (!!!).
> > >>etd
> >
> > >Arguing that naive falsificationism is failed to the demarcation
> > >problem is not the same as arguing that scientific theories need not be
> > >falsifiable.
> >
> > I seem to have failed to type a couple of words - s/failed/a failed
> > solution/
> > --
> > alias Ernest Major
>
> "Arguing that naive falsificationism is failed to the demarcation
> problem is not the same as arguing that scientific theories need not
> be falsifiable."
> Sorry but I would be grateful if you could reformulate your point.
> What is NAIVE falsificationism?

Falsificationism as found in Popper's 'Logik der Forschung', (1934)

Jan

[J. J. Lodder]

It never was falsified.
It has been replaced by a better theory,

Jan

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

I am not sure that you are not a kind of creationist. In any case I
think that such approaches give the creationists the stick to beat
evolutionists!

[John S. Wilkins]

Burkhard <b.sc...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:

> On Feb 21, 1:52 pm, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > On 21 fév, 14:28, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:

...

> > "Science can be a messy business, and as long as a theory keeps
> > creating interesting problems that can be solved with the means of
> > that theory, abandoning it just because there are also some recognised
> > problems would be wasteful, irrational and futile."
> > This is too abstract for me: can you give some concrete examples?
>
> Well, if we read Popper literally (a single observation can..) then I
> have single handedly changes physics as we know it when I was at
> school. At best, 10% of the experiments we did in class had the
> expected results. Did I get any Nobel prices? No. Instead, I was fed
> "just so" stories about 30 year old litmus paper, corroded electrical
> wires etc.

Duhemist!

>
> So not any old observation counts, instead, we incorporate them in
> complex theories of measurement, quality control, etc etc -all
> auxiliary hypothesis that can protect a well established core of a
> theory from refutation.

On an unrelated note, Pasteur excised around 90% of his observations...
...

--
John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydney
http://evolvingthoughts.net
But al be that he was a philosophre,
Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre

[Burkhard]

Yes, authoritarian mindsets always think that admitting to mistakes or
shortcomings in one's own house gives comfort to the enemy. I always
found that attitude stupid and ultimately self defeating. Honesty to
yourself, admitting the limits and shortcomings of your knowledge, and
being stricter on your own side than the opposition pays in my
experience in the long run.

[Burkhard]

On Feb 21, 10:36 pm, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:

> Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> > On Feb 21, 1:52 pm, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > > On 21 fév, 14:28, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> ...
> > > "Science can be a messy business, and as long as a theory keeps
> > > creating interesting problems that can be solved with the means of
> > > that theory, abandoning it just because there are also some recognised
> > > problems would be wasteful, irrational and futile."
> > > This is too abstract for me: can you give some concrete examples?
>
> > Well, if we read Popper literally (a single observation can..) then I
> > have single handedly changes physics as we know it when I was at
> > school. At best, 10% of the experiments we did in class had the
> > expected results. Did I get any Nobel prices? No. Instead, I was fed
> > "just so" stories about 30 year old litmus paper, corroded electrical
> > wires etc.
>
> Duhemist!
>
>
>
> > So not any old observation counts, instead, we incorporate them in
> > complex theories of measurement, quality control, etc etc  -all
> > auxiliary hypothesis that can protect a well established core of a
> > theory from refutation.
>
> On an unrelated note, Pasteur excised around 90% of his observations...
> ...

and don't get me even started on Mendel, whose reported observations
fitted his theory with surprising...neatness ;o)

[Craig Franck]

The major criticism was the SS theory resulted from the application
of a logical principle (on *some* cosmological scale, the universe
looks the same for every observer, anywhere at any time) that kept
being reapplied to take into account the latest evidence.

http://www.astro.ucla.edu/~wright/stdystat.htm

It lives on in various inflation models and the idea that quantum
fluctuations setting the largest-scale structures of the observable
universe (CMBR variations) in some sense sets the scale of what
constitutes an observers "local" environment.

My own take on falsifiability is if states of affairs cause people
to have believes, then beliefs should be fairly sensitive to how
things actually are. It's hard to see how any empirical theory
could be true in every logically possible world.

What often trips people up is logical principles are often applied
to empirical theories. For example, the idea that degree of believe
in a proposition should be directly proportional to the evidence in
its favor would flunk its own test if applied to itself; but if
it's a logical principle being applied to empirical theories in
order to maximize true beliefs and minimize false ones, it slips
through.

Craig

[John S. Wilkins]

J. J. Lodder <nos...@de-ster.demon.nl> wrote:

> backspace <steph...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Nobody knows what it means to be 'scientific' , it is usually a
> > polemical device used as a synonym for materialism. To avoid confusion
> > replace science with falsificationism and scientific with
> > falsificationtific.
>
> You are fifty years behind the times.
> Falsificationism has been thoroughly demolished
> as a philosophy of science.
> Only taxonomists (aka stamp collectors)
> still believe in it,
>

First off, taxonomy is not stamp collecting; it is largey description.
What you mean here is that *systematists* (and damned few of them)
sometimes claim to be Popperians in their philosophy of classification,
whichis ironic because Popper thought the actions of classifiers were
unremarkable and not relevant in science.

Second, neither taxonomy nor systematics is stamp collecting.
Rutherford's dictum presumed that science was divided into two
activities, theory building in physics, and data collection. That this
is false, both historically and philosophically, should be obvious. In
any case, systematics is much much more than mere data collection; it is
an ordering of data into structures (phylogenies) and an explanation of
the data (evolutionary sequences).

Third, Nobody has demolished the idea of falsification - even if
Duhem-Quine is right, and we only test theoretical corpuses, we do test
some parts of the corpus much more severely with a negative result than
others. While observations that failed to find the big tenth planet
involved optics, I don't think *anyone* thought that failure tested the
theories of optics. Falsificationi*sm* however, has morphed into a
complex mixture of Bayesianism and structuralism.

[Garamond Lethe]

The Ideal Gas Law comes to mind.

It's false: atoms are not non-interacting point particles; to the extent
that gas molecules interact the predictions of the theory will be in
error.

Yet the ideal gas law is still taught. Why? It's useful. And utility
(rather than truth or falsity) is the measure of a theory.

[Rolf]

Intelligent Design is another useful theory/hypothesis As long as some
people finds it useful it will remain.

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

> experience in the long run.- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -

>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -

"Honesty to yourself, admitting the limits and shortcomings of your

knowledge, etc."
There is a misunderstanding: it is not a problem of "admitting the
limits and shortcomings of our knowledge" it is firstly a problem of
clarity and rigor in the scientific discourse: I don't see yours and
many of the others as such.
Then, when I wrote that "such approaches give the creationists the
stick to beat evolutionists" I am thinking of the concept of 'life'.
Considering 'life' as a scientific concept, while it is truly
metaphysical, evolutionists are trapped when having to argue with
creationists: they position the debate, without realising they do, in
metaphysics which is the ground of creationsits.

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

> (rather than truth or falsity) is the measure of a theory.- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -

>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -

"Yet the ideal gas law is still taugh."
It should be considered as an approximation of the reality and an
educational simplification for the students.
It is not a theory, it is an educational tool.

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

> people finds it useful it will remain.- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -

>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -

"Intelligent Design is another useful theory/hypothesis"

I suppose it's a joke!

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

On 21 fév, 23:06, nos...@de-ster.demon.nl (J. J. Lodder) wrote:

> Jan- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -

>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -

"It has been replaced by a better theory."
Which one?

[Garamond Lethe]

On Wed, 22 Feb 2012 01:54:50 -0800, marc.tessera wrote:

> On 22 fév, 06:14, Garamond Lethe <cartographi...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> (rather than truth or falsity) is the measure of a theory.- Masquer le

>> texte des messages précédents -
>>
>> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -
>

> "Yet the ideal gas law is still taugh."
> It should be considered as an approximation of the reality

As are all theories, I'm afraid.

> and a
> pedagogic simplification for the students.
> It is not a theory, it is a pedagogic tool.

I see you're not a chemist.

Rather than argue that theories don't come tagged with "pedagogic tool"
or "safe for real work" labels, I'll give you a more recent example:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amdahl's_law

This is also false, and it's not just taught to students.

There's also the Wright-Fisher and Moran models of evolution. Both are
false.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetic_drift

By "false" I mean a competent computer scientist or biologist can run a
set of experiments that fall outside the predictions of these models.

Not only is this expected, it's a good thing. Models are simplified
abstractions of the world; as such, there's not going to be a perfect fit
between the model and the world. Pointing out that the two don't match
is not sufficient grounds for abandoning the model (although it may be a
good reason to develop a better one with a different set of flaws).

Perfect models are just as complex as the phenomena they represent. If
you're a physicist and you're content to work with a handful of
particles, that may be tractable. Get much beyond that and you have to
pick what to simplify, which is to say you pick where your error will be.



BTW: It looks like you're using google groups. This does a reasonable
job of quoting the message you're replying to. Go ahead and inline your
reply rather than copying it --- it's less work for you, and easier to
read for us.

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

> read for us.- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -

>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -

Well done for Amdahl's law: I am not qualified to reply something I
would consider somewhat interesting. The same for Wright-Fisher and
Moran models.

I agree with you that "models are simplified abstractions of the

world; as such, there's not going to be a perfect fit between the
model and the world".

For instance the model I propose to understand the origin of Darwinian
evolution is just a simplified abstraction of the reality at the time
of early Earth, about 4 billion years ago: however the model is
falsifiable and I hope the best scientists will do the experiments to
test it.

Nevertheless Quantum Physics is a true theory which has never been
falsified by any experiment or observation until now: is it only a
model of the reality?
The same for General Relativity.
However these two major theories are antagonist, particularly when
dealing with the origin of our universe: this is one of the major
issue of Physics today.

When, about the Ideal Gas Law, you say "I see you're not a chemist"
can you specify exactly what you mean?

[J. J. Lodder]

Sure, it buys you some peace of mind,
if you happen to have a mind like that.

Be prepared though to be laughed at
if you want to call it scientific,

Jan

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

> metaphysics which is the ground of creationsits.- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -

>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -

I think I was too severe about your scientific discourse: I read it
again and find it quite interesting, while sometimes difficult to
read.

Regarding history of Science you are right that the father/mother of a
theory usually "immunised his rather than giving it up, changing it

from
a descriptive account of scientific practice to a non-falsifiable,

normative one".
Actually it is true that an obsolete theory frequently dies only with
its father/mother!
In the best cases, "the 'something better' contains the older theories

as a special case or as an approximation (as e.g. relativity theory vs
Netwonian

physics)".
At this occasion I do not understand the following sentence: "But we
require from the new theory also that it is consistent with the older

astronomical observations, which is only possible if they don't fit

exactly into Kepler's theory": can you explicit?

[J. J. Lodder]

John S. Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:

> J. J. Lodder <nos...@de-ster.demon.nl> wrote:
>
> > backspace <steph...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Nobody knows what it means to be 'scientific' , it is usually a
> > > polemical device used as a synonym for materialism. To avoid confusion
> > > replace science with falsificationism and scientific with
> > > falsificationtific.
> >
> > You are fifty years behind the times.
> > Falsificationism has been thoroughly demolished
> > as a philosophy of science.
> > Only taxonomists (aka stamp collectors)
> > still believe in it,
> >
> First off, taxonomy is not stamp collecting; it is largey description.
> What you mean here is that *systematists* (and damned few of them)
> sometimes claim to be Popperians in their philosophy of classification,
> whichis ironic because Popper thought the actions of classifiers were
> unremarkable and not relevant in science.

That's a subclass of the 'stmp collectors'.
I have met several of them.
What appeals to them is the irrefutable logic chopping.
(All ravns... etc.)

> Second, neither taxonomy nor systematics is stamp collecting.
> Rutherford's dictum presumed that science was divided into two
> activities, theory building in physics, and data collection. That this
> is false, both historically and philosophically, should be obvious. In
> any case, systematics is much much more than mere data collection; it is
> an ordering of data into structures (phylogenies) and an explanation of
> the data (evolutionary sequences).
>
> Third, Nobody has demolished the idea of falsification - even if
> Duhem-Quine is right, and we only test theoretical corpuses, we do test
> some parts of the corpus much more severely with a negative result than
> others. While observations that failed to find the big tenth planet
> involved optics, I don't think *anyone* thought that failure tested the
> theories of optics. Falsificationi*sm* however, has morphed into a
> complex mixture of Bayesianism and structuralism.

Falsificationism has been thoroughly demolished

both as a description of how science has been done, is done
and as a prescripotion for how science should be done.

Falsification otoh is always nice, if yo can get it.
(preferably of your worst enemy's theory)
However, it no longer has the unique status that Popper ascribed to it,
(as you imply above)

Jan

[J. J. Lodder]

Reports of that are much exaggerated,

Jan

[Walter Bushell]

In article
<29fd4d7f-c7da-4758...@b23g2000yqn.googlegroups.com>,

marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:

> On 22 fév, 06:14, Garamond Lethe <cartographi...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > (rather than truth or falsity) is the measure of a theory.- Masquer le

> > texte des messages précédents -
> >
> > - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -
>

> "Yet the ideal gas law is still taugh."

> It should be considered as an approximation of the reality and a

> pedagogic simplification for the students.
> It is not a theory, it is a pedagogic tool.

Its useful, but you do have to know the limitations. Newtonian physics
is in the same category, but you can sure do a lot of engineering with
it.

--
It is the nature of the human species to reject what is true but unpleasant
and to embrace what is obviously false but comforting. -- H. L. Mencken

[Ernest Major]

In message
<09dbc496-45f7-4d8c...@eb6g2000vbb.googlegroups.com>,
marc.t...@wanadoo.fr writes

>On 22 fév, 10:21, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>> On 21 fév, 23:46, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > On Feb 21, 10:15 pm, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>>
>> > > On 21 fév, 22:54, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>>
>> > > > On Feb 21, 7:48 pm, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
>>
>> > > > > On 21 fév, 20:02, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>
>> > > > > > In message
>> > > > > > <51dfafe4-e023-4aaa-8797-94e703007...@9g2000yqo.googlegroups.com>,
>> > > > > > marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes
>>
>> > > > > > >On 21 fév, 18:28, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>
>> > > > > > >> >>Sorry but I am not convinced by your reasonment.
>> > > > > > >> >>Moreover I don't see any PRESENT examples of
>> > > > > > >> >>SCIENTIFIC theories which
>> > > > > > >> >>would not be falsifiable.
>> > > > > > >> >>Among some counterexamples of theories not being
>> > > > > > >> >>falsifiable I have
>> > > > > > >> >>already quoted the string theory but there are others:
>> > > > > > >> >>- multiverse theories (although Lee Smolin think there
>> > > > > > >> >>is one which
>> > > > > > >> >>could be falsifiable: his cosmological natural

>> > > > > > >> >>theory);
>> > > > > > >> >>- the belief that the concept of life' is scientific (!!!).
>> > > > > > >> >>etd
>>
>> > > > > > >> >Arguing that naive falsificationism is failed to the
>> > > > > > >> >

>> > > > > > >> >problem is not the same as arguing that scientific
>> > > > > > >> >theories need not be
>> > > > > > >> >falsifiable.
>>
>> > > > > > >> I seem to have failed to type a couple of words -

>> > > > > > >>failed
>> > > > > > >> solution/
>> > > > > > >> --
>> > > > > > >> alias Ernest Major
>>
>> > > > > > >"Arguing that naive falsificationism is failed to the demarcation
>> > > > > > >problem is not the same as arguing that scientific

>> > > > > > >need not
>> > > > > > >be falsifiable."
>> > > > > > >Sorry but I would be grateful if you could reformulate your point.
>> > > > > > >What is NAIVE falsificationism?
>>
>> > > > > > Naive falsificationism is the philosophical position that a
>> > > > > >scientific
>> > > > > > theory is falsified by a single contrary observation.
>>
>> > > > > > >Actually I don't care about any falsificatioNISM: I assert that a
>> > > > > > >scientific theory MUST be falsifiable. As long as it isn't

>> > > > > > >cannot
>> > > > > > >be called scientific.
>> > > > > > >TRUE scientists are always willing to consider either scientific
>> > > > > > >experiments or scientific observations to falsify their

>> > > > > > >e.g.,
>> > > > > > >Einstein did for his General Relativity Theory and,
>> > > > > > >fortunately, he
>> > > > > > >showed that his theory agreed closely with the observed amount of
>> > > > > > >Mercury perihelion shift.
>> > > > > > >Regarding Lee Smolin's Cosmological Natural Selection
>> > > > > > >

>> > > > > > >just read that, unfortunately, it seemed its theory has

Kepler's Laws are wrong. (They are only an approximation to real
orbits.)

Even for a two body system they are only accurate if the smaller body
has a negligible mass.

OTOH, it's not immediately obvious that the observations of Newton's day
were precise enough to distinguish the two models.
--
alias Ernest Major

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

On 22 fév, 13:54, Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> In message

> <09dbc496-45f7-4d8c-9be5-42762c7c3...@eb6g2000vbb.googlegroups.com>,
> marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr writes

> alias Ernest Major- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -

>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -

Thank you for answering instead of Burkhard.
Actually I knew that Kepler's Laws were wrong but it was the way the
sentence was written making difficult to understand it.
With your specifications I now understand it

[Ymir]

In article <8fkgBONfWORPFwp$@meden.invalid>,

Ernest Major <{$to$}@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:

> Kepler's Laws are wrong. (They are only an approximation to real
> orbits.)
>
> Even for a two body system they are only accurate if the smaller body
> has a negligible mass.
>
> OTOH, it's not immediately obvious that the observations of Newton's day
> were precise enough to distinguish the two models.

I don't think 'wrong' is the best term to use here. Kepler's laws form a
model which is useful to a certain level of precision. Other, more
accurate models have since been proposed, but in situations where
greater precision isn't needed, Kepler's laws can still be employed.
'Wrong' is a term which I'd reserve for things which have been entirely
overthrown rather than simply refined. Phlogiston theory, for example.

André

[Bob Casanova]

On Tue, 21 Feb 2012 17:03:02 +0000, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Ernest Major
<{$to$}@meden.demon.co.uk>:

>In message <2ii7k7hu7vffp5pba...@4ax.com>, Bob Casanova
><nos...@buzz.off> writes
>>On Mon, 20 Feb 2012 09:54:52 -0800 (PST), the following
>>appeared in talk.origins, posted by backspace
>><steph...@gmail.com>:

>>
>>>Nobody knows what it means to be 'scientific' , it is usually a
>>>polemical device used as a synonym for materialism. To avoid confusion
>>>replace science with falsificationism and scientific with
>>>falsificationtific.
>>

>>That might be appropriate if science were nothing more than
>>falsification. Would you also like to replace "religion"
>>with "rejection of inconvenient evidence" to avoid
>>confusion?
>>
>>>Thus the following will be more clear:
>>
>>....for values of "clear" sufficiently close to "obscure and
>>incorrect".
>>
>>>1) YEC are not falsificationtific because they believe in God.
>>>This is correct because God himself has to assume things for which
>>>faith is his only evidence and faith isn't falsifiable. Faith is
>>>defined as being unfalsifiable and the Word tells us that ''.....
>>>Jesus called those things that be not as though they were .....''
>>>
>>>2) Creationism isn't falsificationtific ( scientific).
>>>Are there assertions made that are not falsifiable by YEC - certainly
>>>there are. For example Paul wrote that we only know in part but in
>>>future will know in full. There is no way to falsify this.
>>>
>>>3) YEC assumption that all semantic objects can only be logically used
>>>to represent Platonic primary binary contrasts: we assume this ,
>>>impossible to falsify , like reality itself can't be falsified.
>>>
>>>4) Life itself isn't defined in terms of materialist premises and thus
>>>like Darwin and Aristotle there can't be a theory about something
>>>which cannot be defined.
>>>------------
>>>
>>>Take for example the unfalsifiable belief by all of us that the
>>>universe wasn't created 5min ago, with all our apparent past
>>>experiences a Yedi mind trick played by Loci the trick god.
>>
>>"Yedi"? "Loci"?
>>
>>Upon what locus do you rest your braincase, young BS?
>>
>>>The only evidence we have for this is our religious belief.
>>
>>If you actually believe that you're in more serious trouble
>>that I thought. Is our "religious belief" also the only
>>reason we don't think the sun orbits the Earth?
>
>You could interpret his words as him using an unreasonably wide
>definition of religion, such that he conceives that "faith" that
>"evidence means something" is a religious belief.

I could interpret his words in a number of ways, which is
almost definitive for his posts. But no matter how often
he's asked, politely or otherwise, to clarify what he's
posted all he ever does, the few times he responds at all,
is to post additional opaque assertions. His interest in
actual discourse is apparently very close to zero.
--

Bob C.

"Evidence confirming an observation is
evidence that the observation is wrong."
- McNameless

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

About "The Ideal Gas Law" I would like to specify the following (from
Wikipedia):
- the "ideal gas law is the equation of state of a hypothetical ideal
gas";
- it is not a theory;
- it derives from kinetic theory;
- the kinetic theory of gases describes a gas as a large number of
small particles (atoms or molecules), all of which are in constant,
random motion;
- more modern developments relax the necessary assumptions for the
ideal gas law and are based on the Boltzmann equation. These can
accurately describe the properties of dense gases, because they
include the volume of the molecules;
- the necessary assumptions the Boltzmann equation are the absence of
quantum effects, molecular chaos and small gradients in bulk
properties;
- anyway Ideal Gas Law is NOT FALSE: it is a good approximation to the
behavior of many gases under many conditions, although it has several
limitations.

[Walter Bushell]

In article <1kfvbe9.1vz...@de-ster.xs4all.nl>,

nos...@de-ster.demon.nl (J. J. Lodder) wrote:

Hey, some make money from intelligent design. A small industry, but
still an industry.

[Bob Casanova]

On Wed, 22 Feb 2012 08:58:10 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Ymir <agi...@gmail.com>:

I've seen it argued both ways here; both sides have logical
points. IMHO it's a matter of philosophy and semantics.

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

On 22 fév, 19:46, Bob Casanova <nos...@buzz.off> wrote:
> On Wed, 22 Feb 2012 08:58:10 -0700, the following appeared

> in talk.origins, posted by Ymir <agis...@gmail.com>:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >In article <8fkgBONfWORPF...@meden.invalid>,

> > Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> >> Kepler's Laws are wrong. (They are only an approximation to real
> >> orbits.)
>
> >> Even for a two body system they are only accurate if the smaller body
> >> has a negligible mass.
>
> >> OTOH, it's not immediately obvious that the observations of Newton's day
> >> were precise enough to distinguish the two models.
>
> >I don't think 'wrong' is the best term to use here. Kepler's laws form a
> >model which is useful to a certain level of precision. Other, more
> >accurate models have since been proposed, but in situations where
> >greater precision isn't needed, Kepler's laws can still be employed.
> >'Wrong' is a term which I'd reserve for things which have been entirely
> >overthrown rather than simply refined. Phlogiston theory, for example.
>
> I've seen it argued both ways here; both sides have logical
> points. IMHO it's a matter of philosophy and semantics.
> --
>
> Bob C.
>
> "Evidence confirming an observation is
> evidence that the observation is wrong."
>                           - McNameless

I agree with Ymir: it is the same situation as for the Ideal Gas Law.
It is not a question of philosophy and semantics (and your opinion
doesn't seem humble!).

[Ymir]

In article <4tdak71p7nrm94sal...@4ax.com>,

The problem which I have with using 'wrong' in this context is that I am
fairly confident that *all* existing scientific models (along with
yet-to-exist models) will ultimately be supplanted by more refined
models which offer predictions which give a greater degree of precision
or which are applicable over a wider range of conditions. If this is
correct, then all scientific theories are 'wrong', which renders the
term rather vacuous.

Andre

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

On 22 fév, 20:45, Ymir <agis...@gmail.com> wrote:
> In article <4tdak71p7nrm94sali7j5gkktg4q8mj...@4ax.com>,

>  Bob Casanova <nos...@buzz.off> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Wed, 22 Feb 2012 08:58:10 -0700, the following appeared

> > in talk.origins, posted by Ymir <agis...@gmail.com>:
>
> > >In article <8fkgBONfWORPF...@meden.invalid>,

> > > Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > >> Kepler's Laws are wrong. (They are only an approximation to real
> > >> orbits.)
>
> > >> Even for a two body system they are only accurate if the smaller body
> > >> has a negligible mass.
>
> > >> OTOH, it's not immediately obvious that the observations of Newton's day
> > >> were precise enough to distinguish the two models.
>
> > >I don't think 'wrong' is the best term to use here. Kepler's laws form a
> > >model which is useful to a certain level of precision. Other, more
> > >accurate models have since been proposed, but in situations where
> > >greater precision isn't needed, Kepler's laws can still be employed.
> > >'Wrong' is a term which I'd reserve for things which have been entirely
> > >overthrown rather than simply refined. Phlogiston theory, for example.
>
> > I've seen it argued both ways here; both sides have logical
> > points. IMHO it's a matter of philosophy and semantics.
>
> The problem which I have with using 'wrong' in this context is that I am
> fairly confident that *all* existing scientific models (along with
> yet-to-exist models) will ultimately be supplanted by more refined
> models which offer predictions which give a greater degree of precision
> or which are applicable over a wider range of conditions. If this is
> correct, then all scientific theories are 'wrong', which renders the
> term rather vacuous.
>
> Andre

It's true that, in science, there is really an evolution towards more
and more accuracy in producing experimental predictions for a given
category of physical systems. Then the old theories become false only
beyond a certain degree of precision.
Thanks to the defining characteristic of a scientific theory that it
makes FALSIFIABLE or TESTABLE predictions it is refutable.
Otherwise science could not progress.

[John S. Wilkins]

There is a useful distinction to be had between "accurate" and
"precise". Kepler is accurate for some relaxed degree of precision.
Phlogiston theory is neither.
--
John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydney
http://evolvingthoughts.net
But al be that he was a philosophre,
Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre

[Burkhard]

On Feb 21, 10:36 pm, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:

> Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> > On Feb 21, 1:52 pm, marc.tess...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> > > On 21 fév, 14:28, Burkhard <b.scha...@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
> ...
> > > "Science can be a messy business, and as long as a theory keeps
> > > creating interesting problems that can be solved with the means of
> > > that theory, abandoning it just because there are also some recognised
> > > problems would be wasteful, irrational and futile."
> > > This is too abstract for me: can you give some concrete examples?
>
> > Well, if we read Popper literally (a single observation can..) then I
> > have single handedly changes physics as we know it when I was at
> > school. At best, 10% of the experiments we did in class had the
> > expected results. Did I get any Nobel prices? No. Instead, I was fed
> > "just so" stories about 30 year old litmus paper, corroded electrical
> > wires etc.
>
> Duhemist!
>

Please! The correct term is "holism propensitist" - now that I was
finally outed on this thread as a creationist. :0)

>
>
> > So not any old observation counts, instead, we incorporate them in
> > complex theories of measurement, quality control, etc etc  -all
> > auxiliary hypothesis that can protect a well established core of a
> > theory from refutation.
>
> On an unrelated note, Pasteur excised around 90% of his observations...
> ...
>

> --
> John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydneyhttp://evolvingthoughts.net

[Tim Anderson]

On Feb 23, 7:03 pm, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
> Ymir <agis...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > In article <8fkgBONfWORPF...@meden.invalid>,

> >  Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > Kepler's Laws are wrong. (They are only an approximation to real
> > > orbits.)
>
> > > Even for a two body system they are only accurate if the smaller body
> > > has a negligible mass.
>
> > > OTOH, it's not immediately obvious that the observations of Newton's day
> > > were precise enough to distinguish the two models.
>
> > I don't think 'wrong' is the best term to use here. Kepler's laws form a
> > model which is useful to a certain level of precision. Other, more
> > accurate models have since been proposed, but in situations where
> > greater precision isn't needed, Kepler's laws can still be employed.
> > 'Wrong' is a term which I'd reserve for things which have been entirely
> > overthrown rather than simply refined. Phlogiston theory, for example.
>
> There is a useful distinction to be had between "accurate" and
> "precise". Kepler is accurate for some relaxed degree of precision.
> Phlogiston theory is neither.
> --

> John S. Wilkins, Associate, Philosophy, University of Sydneyhttp://evolvingthoughts.net

> But al be that he was a philosophre,
> Yet hadde he but litel gold in cofre

Surely you can provide a better definition of the distinction between
"precise" and "accurate" than that.

[J. J. Lodder]

Positivist economy:
If someone can be screwed, a need has been satisfied.
They call it 'revealed preference',

Jan

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

> I suppose it's a joke!- Masquer le texte des messages précédents -

>
> - Afficher le texte des messages précédents -

Actually, you are right, "Intelligent Design" is a theory which is NOT
falsifiable but, fortunately, it is not scientific.

You can see the consequences, Burkhard, of a lack of rigor and clarity
in science: if scientists are not sufficiently vigilant (i.e., if they
don't apply the falsifiability condition to a given theory) they can
accept anything, like the 'Intelligent Design' theory or the 'Life/
NonLife Distinction' one, and be in a very difficult position when
arguing with creationists!

As the terms "aBIOtic" or "aBIOgenesis" or "BIOlogy" cannot have any
relevant scientific meanings (as "BIO" is a synonym of "LIFE") I have
formed a new word for the science (which indeed remains a chapter of
physics) dealing with systems stemming from Darwinian evolution:
excelixciology from "εξέλιξη" (very close to the word "excellency"!).
What do you think, Burkhard, of this new chapter of physics,
excelixciology?

[Bob Casanova]

On Wed, 22 Feb 2012 11:08:15 -0800 (PST), the following
appeared in talk.origins, posted by marc.t...@wanadoo.fr:

>On 22 fév, 19:46, Bob Casanova <nos...@buzz.off> wrote:
>> On Wed, 22 Feb 2012 08:58:10 -0700, the following appeared
>> in talk.origins, posted by Ymir <agis...@gmail.com>:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> >In article <8fkgBONfWORPF...@meden.invalid>,
>> > Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>
>> >> Kepler's Laws are wrong. (They are only an approximation to real
>> >> orbits.)
>>
>> >> Even for a two body system they are only accurate if the smaller body
>> >> has a negligible mass.
>>
>> >> OTOH, it's not immediately obvious that the observations of Newton's day
>> >> were precise enough to distinguish the two models.
>>
>> >I don't think 'wrong' is the best term to use here. Kepler's laws form a
>> >model which is useful to a certain level of precision. Other, more
>> >accurate models have since been proposed, but in situations where
>> >greater precision isn't needed, Kepler's laws can still be employed.
>> >'Wrong' is a term which I'd reserve for things which have been entirely
>> >overthrown rather than simply refined. Phlogiston theory, for example.
>>
>> I've seen it argued both ways here; both sides have logical
>> points. IMHO it's a matter of philosophy and semantics.

>I agree with Ymir: it is the same situation as for the Ideal Gas Law.

As it's stated the Ideal Gas Law, like Newtonian mechanics,
is incorrect, but that doesn't prevent either from being
useful within the ranges in which each is a close
approximation to reality. For some, that makes them "right"
within those ranges, even though they are demonstrable wrong
within *all* ranges. So, are they "right" or "wrong"?
Despite your assertion below, that is a matter of philosophy
and semantics.

>It is not a question of philosophy and semantics (and your opinion
>doesn't seem humble!).

OK, so it doesn't seem humble to you. So?

[Bob Casanova]

On Wed, 22 Feb 2012 12:45:16 -0700, the following appeared

Point taken, but I'd point out that unlike the case with
Ideal Gas Law (and Newtonian mechanics), we currently know
of no better representation of reality than current theory
expresses; IOW, while most would agree that they are both
almost certainly "wrong" in some sense, that is also a
philosophical expectation since we have no idea *how* (or
for that matter, if) they're wrong. And since that theory
demonstrates that neither of these older and less inclusive
theories actually represent reality in all circumstances
both are "more wrong" than current theory. That doesn't stop
me from using them over the appropriate restricted ranges,
but I know that only close approximations result from that
use. As I said, it's a matter more of philosophy and
semantics than of rigor.

[Bob Casanova]

On Thu, 23 Feb 2012 00:54:02 -0800 (PST), the following
appeared in talk.origins, posted by Tim Anderson
<timoth...@gmail.com>:

>On Feb 23, 7:03 pm, j...@wilkins.id.au (John S. Wilkins) wrote:
>> Ymir <agis...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> > In article <8fkgBONfWORPF...@meden.invalid>,
>> >  Ernest Major <{$t...@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>
>> > > Kepler's Laws are wrong. (They are only an approximation to real
>> > > orbits.)
>>
>> > > Even for a two body system they are only accurate if the smaller body
>> > > has a negligible mass.
>>
>> > > OTOH, it's not immediately obvious that the observations of Newton's day
>> > > were precise enough to distinguish the two models.
>>
>> > I don't think 'wrong' is the best term to use here. Kepler's laws form a
>> > model which is useful to a certain level of precision. Other, more
>> > accurate models have since been proposed, but in situations where
>> > greater precision isn't needed, Kepler's laws can still be employed.
>> > 'Wrong' is a term which I'd reserve for things which have been entirely
>> > overthrown rather than simply refined. Phlogiston theory, for example.
>>
>> There is a useful distinction to be had between "accurate" and
>> "precise". Kepler is accurate for some relaxed degree of precision.
>> Phlogiston theory is neither.

>Surely you can provide a better definition of the distinction between
>"precise" and "accurate" than that.

ISTM that was an example, not a definition.

[Bob Casanova]

On Tue, 21 Feb 2012 09:43:53 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Bob Casanova <nos...@buzz.off>:

>On Tue, 21 Feb 2012 05:42:32 -0800 (PST), the following
>appeared in talk.origins, posted by prawnster
><zweib...@ymail.com>:
>
>>On Feb 20, 1:43 pm, John Stockwell <john.19071...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> [...]
>>> The age of the universe is inferred from physical  measurements.
>>> Determining the age of the universe boils down to determining  how far
>>> away the most distant parts of the universe are, and then inferring
>>> the age of the universe from the distance.
>>>
>>> Now, if you want to ask about assumptions behind those inferences,
>>> then what we have is our theoretical understanding of the physical
>>> processes of the propagation of light. If the speed of light were
>>> different in the past, we could expect to see processes that take an
>>> estimable amount of time (such as the brightening of supernovae) run
>>> either slow or fast, depending on whether the speed of light was
>>> slower or faster in the past. indeed, astronomers do not see any
>>> evidence for a large
>>> difference in the speed of light of the past from the speed of light
>>> today.
>>> Nor do we see inconsistencies in the spectra of light from galaxies or
>>> other objects at great distance that would indicate that the laws of
>>> physics were different in the distant past.
>>>
>>
>>All true. And when people say that red shift equals time, they assume
>>that red shift does not equal a decrease in the light's energy or
>>energeticness (a fugly corrupt back-formation word, but I want to be
>>clear).
>>
>>An alternate interpretation of the red shift is that the light has
>>traveled a long distance, and so it has passed through hydrogen dust
>>clouds, near stars, etc, and this ennervates the light, causing it to
>>stretch out and shift toward red.
>
>Nope. What actually happens in such cases is a change in
>frequency distribution caused by scattering of the higher
>frequencies, but the frequency of the absorption lines in
>the spectrum is unchanged. The red shift, OTOH, results in a
>change in the frequencies of all absorption bands,
>regardless of any intervening dust, etc.
>
>> Plus, passing near heavy objects
>>will cause the light to change course also.
>
>Changing "course" has zero to do with any shift, red or
>otherwise.
>
>> Interpreting red shift to
>>be both time and distance instead of just distance is pure assumption,
>>and has never been confirmed by any other measurement.
>
>Perhaps you could clarify exactly what you mean by "both
>time and distance" in this case? Given the constant value of
>c, time *is* distance. Or are you asserting that c is not a
>constant?

[Crickets...]

[Mark Isaak]

On 2/23/12 6:02 AM, marc.t...@wanadoo.fr wrote:
> [big snip]

>
> Actually, you are right, "Intelligent Design" is a theory which is NOT
> falsifiable but, fortunately, it is not scientific.

The big problem with "Intelligent Design" is that it is not a theory in
the first place. It does not model anything. The reason it is not
falsifiable is that it does not say anything coherent.

> [...]

> As the terms "aBIOtic" or "aBIOgenesis" or "BIOlogy" cannot have any

> relevant scientific meanings (as "BIO" is a synonym of "LIFE") ...

I think biologists the world over would be surprised to learn that they
did not know what they were studying.

You are obsessed with definitions being perfect. Forget it. Perfection
is a *bad* thing, because it does not reflect how the world works. Can
you proved a definition of "chair" that includes everything that is a
chair and nothing that is not? How about "cup"? "book"? "pencil"?
"lake"? anything else you choose to name? Nature (with only rare
exceptions) does not divide things into perfectly clear-cut
well-delineated categories, so why should we? Well, we should do so
because it makes communication easier, but we should not let the fact
that we do so make us think that the world has to play along.

You are simply wrong when you say that "abiotic" and all those other
terms cannot have any relevant scientific meaning. They *do* have
relevant scientific meaning; it's just that the meaning is a little
fuzzy around the edges. But then, the concepts they are referring to
are fuzzy around the edges, too. If the meanings were as perfect as you
want them to be, then they would be unscientific because they would not
reflect the true nature of things.

> I have
> formed a new word for the science (which indeed remains a chapter of
> physics) dealing with systems stemming from Darwinian evolution:
> excelixciology from "εξέλιξη" (very close to the word "excellency"!).

Does it mean anything? If so, does that meaning correspond with
anything real?

--
Mark Isaak eciton (at) curioustaxonomy (dot) net
"It is certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural
honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most
pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems." - D. Hume

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

On 23 fév, 19:51, Bob Casanova <nos...@buzz.off> wrote:
> On Wed, 22 Feb 2012 12:45:16 -0700, the following appeared

> in talk.origins, posted by Ymir <agis...@gmail.com>:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >In article <4tdak71p7nrm94sali7j5gkktg4q8mj...@4ax.com>,

> > Bob Casanova <nos...@buzz.off> wrote:
>
> >> On Wed, 22 Feb 2012 08:58:10 -0700, the following appeared

> >> in talk.origins, posted by Ymir <agis...@gmail.com>:
>
> >> >In article <8fkgBONfWORPF...@meden.invalid>,

The use of acronyms (IOW, IMHO, OTOH, ISTM etc.) is irritating and
makes tiresome reading you: could you avoid these?
When you wrote "it's a matter more of philosophy and semantics" it
means, for me, it is arbitrary. I don't think it is when we are
speaking of old theories or models which became false only beyond a
certain degree of precision.

[Burkhard]

I'm sure you think that there is some point in the above.

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

On 23 fév, 20:36, Mark Isaak <eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:

"the true nature of things": this is typically the kind of expressions
which are clearly metaphysical.
"Excelixciology" would mean the science of evolution (more
specifically of Darwinian evolution): according to you, is Darwinian
evolution real?
For me Darwinian evolution is quite real while life is not: it is a
metaphysical creation of our human brain and language like the soul,
God etc.

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

For French you are not explicit enough: do you mean "you are sure that
I think relevant what I say, scientifically speaking"? If so, my
answer is surely yes!
But I would prefer clearer and more explicit comments, if possible.

[Burkhard]

The explicit comment is: this is word salad that is impossible to
understand. Your probably think it means something, but I have no idea
what it might be.

[marc.t...@wanadoo.fr]

Ok.
I mean that 'Life/NonLife Distinction' theory is not a scientific one
or is false (as you prefer) because:
- such a distinction is arbitrary;
- the theory is not falsifiable as it is not possible to find a
scientific experiment or observation which could refute it. This is
why I think that it is a metaphysical theory like, for example, the
'Intelligent Design' theory.

[Burkhard]

What theory would that be? Be specific.

> is not a scientific one
> or is false (as you prefer) because:
> - such a distinction is arbitrary;

That seems to be wrong on the face of it - if it were arbitrary, we
should not expect the overwhelming consent in classifying most things
as either alive or not alive. That there are grey areas
notwithstanding, as we should expect them, and are not different from
conceptual grey areas in other fields of science.

> - the theory is not falsifiable as it is not possible to find a
> scientific experiment or observation which could refute it.

So far you have not offered anything like a _theory_.. What you have
discussed are definitions, and definitions aren't falsifiable (unless
you treat them as empirical statements about word usage maybe)

[John S. Wilkins]

Correct. If I were to define it, I'd give an actual, you know,
definition.