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Omnipotent God, and the rock in his driveway

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Morphesius

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Mar 2, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/2/97
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First, assume god is omnipotent. Therefore, he has infinite
ability.
Can god create a rock so heavy he cannot lift it?
Yes, because he has infinite ability.

Proclaiming that logically imossible things are precluded from
existing is a great fallacy of this arguement. First, logic is based
upon empirical observations from things that we decide exist.
Therefore, to say that if it is not logical, it must not exist, is
going backwards. It is self-referential, and incorrect.
A}} Human sees object A
B}} Human concludes that object A exists
C}} It is logical that object A exists, because it can be seen
D}} Therefore, things which can be seen are logical

One can then say
E}} If it cannot be seen, it is illogical
but one cannot, as so many have, say
F}} If it is illogical, it cannot be seen.

Secondly, the movement to rule out logical paradoxes from the
definition of omnipotence is incorrect. Omnipotence requires
conception of infinite ability, where those who are conceiveing
logical paradoxes do not have infinite conception. IE- just because
you cannot understand it does not make it untrue.

Morphesius.

Charles W. Johnson

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Mar 3, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/3/97
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Thusly spake Morphesius <Morph...@usa.net> unto alt.atheism:

>
> First, assume god is omnipotent. Therefore, he has infinite
> ability.
> Can god create a rock so heavy he cannot lift it?

This is known as the "Big Rock" conundrum. It is used a lot by
atheists seeking to disprove the possibility of the Xian god.
Sadly, it is flawed.

> Proclaiming that logically imossible things are precluded from
> existing is a great fallacy of this arguement. First, logic is based
> upon empirical observations from things that we decide exist.
> Therefore, to say that if it is not logical, it must not exist, is
> going backwards. It is self-referential, and incorrect.

This is incorrect. Were deductive logic based purely upon our empirical
perceptions of the Universe around us, we would only be able to use it
to model systems that are subsets of our own Universe. And yet, it can
be used to define an infinite number of arbitrary systems that have no
referrant in our Universe.

> A}} Human sees object A
> B}} Human concludes that object A exists
> C}} It is logical that object A exists, because it can be seen
> D}} Therefore, things which can be seen are logical

> One can then say
> E}} If it cannot be seen, it is illogical

This is the fallacy of Denial of the Antecedent. You are stating
(A -> B) -> (~A -> ~B), or "A implies B, ergo not-A implies not-B."
This is akin to saying "All chickens have feathers. Thus, if object A
is not a chicken, it does not have feathers."

[splut]

Remember that omnipotence means "the ability to do all things."
However, things that are self-contradictory, such as square circles
are non-things, and thus are not real actions for an omnipotent
entity to do. The "Big Rock" conundrum disappears when you consider
this. In short:

Given:
1. The Universal set of tasks U
2. Proposed task A
3. Omnipotent entity B
4. A rock R
5. Proposed task of creating object X C(X)
6. Proposed task of moving object X M(X)

Assuming:
1. Omnipotence is the ability to perform all tasks. (All U)
2. If the definition of proposed task A is self-contradictory,
then A is not a member of U.
3. If A is not a member of U, then A is a nontask.
4. Any entity C can only perform real tasks (elements of U)

One can infer that:
1. If A is self-contradictory, A is a nontask (prem. 2-3)
2. B has the ability to perform all tasks (prem 1)
3. B only has the ability to perform real tasks (prem 4)
4. B does not have the ability to perform nontasks (inf 3)
5. B has the ability to perform all members of U (prem 1)
6. If B performed C(R) such that M(R) is a nontask, B could not
perform M(R) (inf 4)
7. If B can perform all M(R), then B cannot perform C(R) such that
M(R) is a nontask (inf 4)

Conclusion:
Either B can perform M(R) for all R xor B can perform C(R) such that
M(R) is a nontask.

The argument leads to the conclusion that an omnipotent being could
rationally be able to do one xor the other and still be omnipotent.
The conclusion to this argument is (A xor ~A), which simplifies to
TRUE. IOW, this is a tautology. And proves the argument to be valid
rather than contradictory (in which case it would end in a paradox of
self-reference, (A and ~A)).

The obvious points of attack are premises 1 and 4. However, if you
assume that an omnipotent entity is able to perform both tasks
and nontasks, you will ALWAYS end up with logical paradoxes of self-
reference (A and ~A). GIGO. So, I submit that such a definition of
omnipotence is inherently empty and will not get you anywhere with
relatively rational theists.

If there is a contradictory conclusion of omnipotence, it lies elsewhere.

--
Charles W. Johnson, Heathen on IRC ---- Undernet #atheism channel operator
--
These opinions are mine. They may not be those of my employer or my internet
provider. They are almost certainly not those of the Christian Coalition.
--
Per the FCA, this email address may not be added to any commercial mail list.
Violators will have complaints sent to their postmasters. DIE, you
scum-sucking braindead scourges of society!

ki...@amuon.imep.univie.ac.at

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Mar 3, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/3/97
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In article <slrn5hkfv...@eskimo.com>, cw...@eskimo.com (Charles W.
Johnson) writes:

>Thusly spake Morphesius <Morph...@usa.net> unto alt.atheism:
>>
>> First, assume god is omnipotent. Therefore, he has infinite
>> ability.
>> Can god create a rock so heavy he cannot lift it?
>
>This is known as the "Big Rock" conundrum. It is used a lot by
>atheists seeking to disprove the possibility of the Xian god.
>Sadly, it is flawed.

Bravo, Charles! Excellent post - should be required reading for atheists
and theists alike.

I also believe that it is very important that, when arguing with theists,
one does not get sidetracked by inappropriate or incorrect arguments.

- Ross

.:.Richard.:.

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Mar 4, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/4/97
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Charles W. Johnson wrote:

...perhaps the most concise explanation of the fallacy of the "rock..."
paradox that I have ever read.

I congratulate you, and thank you for sharing this -- it's a keeper!

______ _ _ _
(_____ \ (_) | | | |
_____) ) _ ____ | |__ _____ ____ __| |
| __ / | | / ___)| _ \ (____ | / ___) / _ |
| | \ \ | |( (___ | | | |/ ___ || | ( (_| |
|_| |_||_| \____)|_| |_|\_____||_| \____|
rha...@cybercomm.net


Morphesius

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Mar 5, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/5/97
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On Mon, 3 Mar 1997 03:05:32 GMT, cw...@eskimo.com (Charles W. Johnson)
wrote:

>Thusly spake Morphesius <Morph...@usa.net> unto alt.atheism:
>>
>> First, assume god is omnipotent. Therefore, he has infinite
>> ability.
>> Can god create a rock so heavy he cannot lift it?
>
>This is known as the "Big Rock" conundrum. It is used a lot by
>atheists seeking to disprove the possibility of the Xian god.
>Sadly, it is flawed.

Strange, I thought that's exactly what I was saying there...

>> Proclaiming that logically imossible things are precluded from
>> existing is a great fallacy of this arguement. First, logic is based
>> upon empirical observations from things that we decide exist.
>> Therefore, to say that if it is not logical, it must not exist, is
>> going backwards. It is self-referential, and incorrect.
>
>This is incorrect. Were deductive logic based purely upon our empirical
>perceptions of the Universe around us, we would only be able to use it
>to model systems that are subsets of our own Universe. And yet, it can
>be used to define an infinite number of arbitrary systems that have no
>referrant in our Universe.

But *logically*, as so many people seem to believe, it is
illogical to accept a description of reality which is not consitent
with reality. For example, take speed. There is no logical reason why
objects cannot travel faster than the speed of light, if indeed as you
say it is used without referrant to our universe. Speed=distance/time,
so the faster one goes, the more distance one covers, and the less
time one takes. Infinite speed would therefore cover unlimited
distance in zero time. That's logical, according to your usage there.
But, if one takes the scientific view of logic, it is illogical, since
superlight speeds are not attainable. *Scientifically*, that makes the
above description of an existant infinite speed illogical. So, while
to logicians, logic may well exist seperately, to scientists, the flow
is from observance--->logic. I used that in my arguement, since it is
the scientific notion of logic which has the flaw when used in the
"Big Rock" conundrum, which is what I was saying in the first place.
Since the view of logic that you gave does not have this flaw when
addressing the big rock, I did not mention it. Be assured, however,
that I was not attacking that particular form.

>> A}} Human sees object A
>> B}} Human concludes that object A exists
>> C}} It is logical that object A exists, because it can be seen
>> D}} Therefore, things which can be seen are logical
>
>> One can then say
>> E}} If it cannot be seen, it is illogical
>
>This is the fallacy of Denial of the Antecedent. You are stating
>(A -> B) -> (~A -> ~B), or "A implies B, ergo not-A implies not-B."

I'm only using it as an example of a case in which this holds
true, ie- the scientific view of logic. I was not using it to attempt
to show that "not-A implies not-B". Again, differing logic systems. I
used it in contrast to the fallacious reversal which would be "not-B
implies not-A".

>This is akin to saying "All chickens have feathers. Thus, if object A
>is not a chicken, it does not have feathers."

It wasn't meant as an exclusive statement, nor was it stated
as one. Logic itself would not say that, but the logic used by science
does.

>[splut]
>
>Remember that omnipotence means "the ability to do all things."

Which is exactly what I was saying.

>However, things that are self-contradictory, such as square circles
>are non-things, and thus are not real actions for an omnipotent
>entity to do.

If you would explain this, that would be most appreciated. You
have just jumped from logic to science. Logic does not preclude
"non-things" from the set of "all". That is as fallacious as saying
that only a limited amount of numbers can exist in infinity.

>The "Big Rock" conundrum disappears when you consider
>this. In short:
>
>Given:
>1. The Universal set of tasks U
>2. Proposed task A

Lifting an unliftable rock?

>3. Omnipotent entity B
>4. A rock R
>5. Proposed task of creating object X C(X)

Just to get it straight, X=rock, C(X)=infinitely heavy rock?
Is that right?

>6. Proposed task of moving object X M(X)

Again, for clarity, X=rock, M(X)=moving rock?

>Assuming:
>1. Omnipotence is the ability to perform all tasks. (All U)
>2. If the definition of proposed task A is self-contradictory,
>then A is not a member of U.

If you could explain why you think this is so, it might help.
Otherwise, you are using scientific logic, the likes of which I argued
against above, and you argued back against me with normal logic, and
youn have since gone back to using the flawed scientific knowledge
that you were so critical of earlier.

>3. If A is not a member of U, then A is a nontask.
>4. Any entity C can only perform real tasks (elements of U)

But an omnipotent entity B could also perform nontasks.

>One can infer that:
>1. If A is self-contradictory, A is a nontask (prem. 2-3)

Yup.

>2. B has the ability to perform all tasks (prem 1)

Yup.

>3. B only has the ability to perform real tasks (prem 4)

A flaw in the arguement due to the use of exclusive scientific
logic.

>4. B does not have the ability to perform nontasks (inf 3)

Again, incorrect.

>5. B has the ability to perform all members of U (prem 1)
>6. If B performed C(R) such that M(R) is a nontask, B could not
>perform M(R) (inf 4)
>7. If B can perform all M(R), then B cannot perform C(R) such that
>M(R) is a nontask (inf 4)
>
>Conclusion:
>Either B can perform M(R) for all R xor B can perform C(R) such that
>M(R) is a nontask.
>
>The argument leads to the conclusion that an omnipotent being could
>rationally be able to do one xor the other and still be omnipotent.
>The conclusion to this argument is (A xor ~A), which simplifies to
>TRUE. IOW, this is a tautology. And proves the argument to be valid
>rather than contradictory (in which case it would end in a paradox of
>self-reference, (A and ~A)).
>
>The obvious points of attack are premises 1 and 4. However, if you
>assume that an omnipotent entity is able to perform both tasks
>and nontasks, you will ALWAYS end up with logical paradoxes of self-
>reference (A and ~A). GIGO. So, I submit that such a definition of
>omnipotence is inherently empty and will not get you anywhere with
>relatively rational theists.

Only when using scientific knowledge. You seemed to agree with
me before, but now I am not sure if you see the difference. Logic
itself gives no reason for a logical paradox of self-reference to be
non-true. The definition of omnipotence including nontasks is
necessitated by the fact that the potence is omni.

>If there is a contradictory conclusion of omnipotence, it lies elsewhere.
>--
>Charles W. Johnson, Heathen on IRC ---- Undernet #atheism channel operator
>--
>These opinions are mine. They may not be those of my employer or my internet
>provider. They are almost certainly not those of the Christian Coalition.
>--
>Per the FCA, this email address may not be added to any commercial mail list.
>Violators will have complaints sent to their postmasters. DIE, you
>scum-sucking braindead scourges of society!


Morphesius.

RodWilson

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Mar 5, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/5/97
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I had always assumed that both atheists and theists viewed the 'rock'
paradox as just a trick of words. I always thought it was hint that
omnipotence is an abstraction, and can't exist in reality. The
preceding discussions have convinced me that I'm probably wrong. I
still think omnipotence is an abstraction but I'm no longer sure that
the rock paradox is 'proof' of it. The only way around the above
arguements that I can think of is that logic doesn't apply: God's
omnipotence can override all logic, therefore this arguement should be
able to also. To say that anything is 'impossible', anywhere, under
any conditions, is to say that omnipotence can't exist. I guess a
theist would answer the paradox as 'yes God can create a rock he can't
lift AND he can lift it' If those 2 statements are logically
impossble, well, Gods omnipotent MAKES them possible.

Marjan P.

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Mar 5, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/5/97
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RodWilson <rwi...@panda.uchc.edu> wrote in article
<5fk7nu$d...@threed.uchc.edu>...

To me looks logic. As about Christians we will se in next days.

Any Colour You Like

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Mar 6, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/6/97
to Marjan P.

Marjan P. wrote:
>
> RodWilson <rwi...@panda.uchc.edu> wrote in article
> <5fk7nu$d...@threed.uchc.edu>...
> >
> > I had always assumed that both atheists and theists viewed the 'rock'
> > paradox as just a trick of words. I always thought it was hint that
> > omnipotence is an abstraction, and can't exist in reality. The

[snipsnipsnip]

> > impossble, well, Gods omnipotent MAKES them possible.
>
> To me looks logic. As about Christians we will se in next days.

This is an argument that has been something I tried to avoid using,
because where does it actually *say that God is omnipotent?

I think it is just something that is assumed, but not having read the
Bible I am probably wrong.

--
---
----
-----

Morphesius

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Mar 6, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/6/97
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On 5 Mar 1997 16:41:34 GMT, rwi...@panda.uchc.edu (RodWilson) wrote:

>
> I had always assumed that both atheists and theists viewed the 'rock'
>paradox as just a trick of words. I always thought it was hint that
>omnipotence is an abstraction, and can't exist in reality. The

>preceding discussions have convinced me that I'm probably wrong. I
>still think omnipotence is an abstraction but I'm no longer sure that
>the rock paradox is 'proof' of it. The only way around the above
>arguements that I can think of is that logic doesn't apply: God's
>omnipotence can override all logic, therefore this arguement should be
>able to also. To say that anything is 'impossible', anywhere, under
>any conditions, is to say that omnipotence can't exist. I guess a
>theist would answer the paradox as 'yes God can create a rock he can't
>lift AND he can lift it' If those 2 statements are logically

>impossble, well, Gods omnipotent MAKES them possible.

If I may say so, I agree, and this was what I was trying to
show. The reason that logic would not apply to omnipotence is that
omnipotence, by definition, is an infinite system, whereas logic,
which cannot deal with logical contradictions, is limited, and the use
of the scientific logic, where things must exist to be logical, is
even more so. Then, when observing and describing an unlimited system
with the aid of limited logic, one cannot expect absolute answers.


Morphesius.

Derek Harley

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Mar 7, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/7/97
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I think some posters were a bit unclear about the difference between
physics and logic. Pure logic is entirely conceptual, while scientific
logic is a subset of pure logic, and is entirely physical. If God is
omnipotent, then He/She/It/They can perform all tasks that are
physically possible, and some tasks that are physically impossible.
However, God cannot perform tasks that are logically impossible.

The key is, if it can be imagined, then it is logically possible and God
can do it. Otherwise, it is logically impossible and God cannot do it.
For example, God could turn my car into a pumpkin, like in Cinderella.
It's *physically impossible*, but not logically impossible, because one
can imagine it happenning. But God cannot create a circle with 4 corners
or find a solution to the equation x=x+3, because one can't imagine it
happenning.

Peter Kirby

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Mar 8, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/8/97
to Any Colour You Like

Any Colour You Like wrote:
[snip]

>
> This is an argument that has been something I tried to avoid using,
> because where does it actually *say that God is omnipotent?

The ability to create the universe ex nihilo and perform fantastic
miracles is one hint towards omnipotence. For a specific verse:

"Behold, I am the LORD, the God of all flesh: is there
any thing too hard for me?" (Jeremiah 32:27)

There are also verses to support omniscience:

"Then the word of the LORD came unto me, saying,
Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee; and
before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified
thee, and I ordained thee a prophet unto the nations."
(Jeremiah 1:4-5) "Great is our Lord, and of great
power: his understanding is infinite." (Psalms 147:5)

But what is just assumed by Christians is omnibenevolence. Except for
perhaps "God is love," I don't know of any hint of this in the Bible,
and given the atrocities recorded in the Bible, I think that it is an
unjustified assumption on the part of Christians.

> I think it is just something that is assumed, but not having read the
> Bible I am probably wrong.

"I thought I was wrong once, but I was mistaken."

Cheers,
Pete

Morphesius

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Mar 8, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/8/97
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On Fri, 07 Mar 1997 16:26:31 -0500, Derek Harley <dha...@umbc.edu>
wrote:

What you are doing is using scientific logic. Scientific logic
needs something to exist for it to be logical, or more specifically,
if something exists, it is logical (scientifically). Pure logic *does*
tell you when you are up against a logical contradiction, but it *does
not* tell you that the logical contradiction is impossible, or does
not exist. The idea that God cannot perform logically impossible tasks
is an idea from science, not logic. The problem is that you are
examining an infinite system with a finite system (omniscience, logic,
respectively). Logic cannnot be used to expound upon logically
impossible things, but it does not preclude the existence of logically
impossible things.

>The key is, if it can be imagined, then it is logically possible and God
>can do it. Otherwise, it is logically impossible and God cannot do it.
>For example, God could turn my car into a pumpkin, like in Cinderella.
>It's *physically impossible*, but not logically impossible, because one
>can imagine it happenning. But God cannot create a circle with 4 corners
>or find a solution to the equation x=x+3, because one can't imagine it
>happenning.

To quote Garfield "Close, but no banana". First, your
imagination is a finite system. Omnipotence is an infinite system.
Infinite systems are not restricted by the existence of finite
systems, and so God can do things that you are totally unable to
imagine. Your inability to imagine them is a limitatrion of the logic
which you use to think.

Morphesius.

Morphesius

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Mar 8, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/8/97
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On Sat, 08 Mar 1997 15:58:46 GMT, Morph...@usa.net (Morphesius)
wrote:

>examining an infinite system with a finite system (omniscience, logic,

^^^^^^^^^^^

OOps! Should read "omnipotence".

Morphesius.

Brian E. Clark

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Mar 10, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/10/97
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Morphesius <Morph...@usa.net)> wrote:

> Pure logic *does* tell you when you are up against a logical
> contradiction, but it *does not* tell you that the logical
> contradiction is impossible, or does not exist.

"A square circle cannot exist on a Euclidean plane."

We know that because of "pure" logic applied to the axioms and
theorems of geometry, not because of science.

A_____E_____B The square ABCD cannot describe a circle
| | | whose center is at X and whose radius is
| |(r) | r, because r=EX and AX > EX, but
| X | for a circle it should be the case that
| | AX=EX=BX...
|___________|
C D

I did not write a formal proof, of course, but only the gist of one
way of demonstrating the contradiction: assume that AX=EX (which
would be true if points A and E were on the same circle), then derive
AX>EX. We need no application of science to establish that the
assumptions of our system, if correct, preclude the existence of
square circles on flat surfaces. Such square circles are *logically*
impossible. They exist nowhere, and they *can* exist nowhere.

Perhaps a clever topologist could write for us the formula for a non-
Euclidean surface on which square circles can exist. But note that if
he did so, he would provide an example of a system in which square
circles were logically *possible*, not a system in which "the
logically impossible is possible." The quoted phrase amounts to
nonsense!

> The idea that God cannot perform logically impossible tasks
> is an idea from science, not logic.

What ever gave you that idea?

"Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction
in terms is numbered among those possibles in respect of
which God is called omnipotent; whereas whatever implies
contradiction does not come within the scope of divine
omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of
possibility. Hence it is more appropriate to say that such
things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them."

The above is the work of that well-known "scientist," Thomas Aquinas.

> The problem is that you are examining an infinite system with a
> finite system (omniscience, logic, respectively).

You present just another, even weaker version of the theistic
mysticism that appeals to some "mystery" that lies outside human
knowledge or experience. But whether claimed by the finite or by the
infinite, the sentence, "A person can do what he cannot do," is
nonsensical, contradictory, false.

______________
Brian E. Clark
br...@telerama.lm.com

Morphesius

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Mar 11, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/11/97
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On Mon, 10 Mar 1997 16:33:23 -0500, br...@real.address.in.sig (Brian
E. Clark) wrote:

>> Pure logic *does* tell you when you are up against a logical
>> contradiction, but it *does not* tell you that the logical
>> contradiction is impossible, or does not exist.
>
>"A square circle cannot exist on a Euclidean plane."

A Euclidean plane is a concept within the realms of logic, and
not within the realms of existence. Yes, it models two-dimensional
existence, but it does so in such a way that it models a
two-dimesional existence which Must Be Logical for its rules to work.
There is a huge difference between saying "A square circle cannot
exist on a Euclidean plane" and saying "A square circle cannot exist".
The statement you gave is true, but a Euclidean plane is a logical
system, and, as I said, does not deal with logical contradictions such
as square circles.

>We know that because of "pure" logic applied to the axioms and
>theorems of geometry, not because of science.

Geometry is a system lying within the system of logic. I did
not say that systems of logic are developed through science, I said
that science has its specific logic which necessitates that if a
things exists, it is logical.

> A_____E_____B The square ABCD cannot describe a circle
> | | | whose center is at X and whose radius is
> | |(r) | r, because r=EX and AX > EX, but
> | X | for a circle it should be the case that
> | | AX=EX=BX...
> |___________|
> C D
>
>I did not write a formal proof, of course, but only the gist of one
>way of demonstrating the contradiction: assume that AX=EX (which
>would be true if points A and E were on the same circle), then derive
>AX>EX. We need no application of science to establish that the
>assumptions of our system, if correct, preclude the existence of
>square circles on flat surfaces. Such square circles are *logically*
>impossible. They exist nowhere, and they *can* exist nowhere.

No, they "can" exist nowhere in logical systems such as
geometry. To be even more specific, they "cannot" exist "somewhere",
if "somewhere" is any point in the universe, and "nowhere" is a point
outside of it, but that is beside the point...

>Perhaps a clever topologist could write for us the formula for a non-
>Euclidean surface on which square circles can exist. But note that if
>he did so, he would provide an example of a system in which square
>circles were logically *possible*, not a system in which "the
>logically impossible is possible." The quoted phrase amounts to
>nonsense!

Correct. If he did, he has shown where square circles are
possible. Therefore, in such a system, the logical contradiction of a
square circle is not a logical contradiction at all. The system you
proposed might be based upon four dimensional space, rather than two.
It is the presence of extra variables that accounts for a wider range
of measurements, events, things, etc...
In any cse, what you said looks much like what I was saying
earlier: logic is a limited system, which shows logical contradictions
as impossible, where in fact, such things might be possible in a less
limited system. Logic will realise that, and will not deny the
existence of possibilities outside of events that it can deal with.

>> The idea that God cannot perform logically impossible tasks
>> is an idea from science, not logic.
>
>What ever gave you that idea?
>
> "Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction
> in terms is numbered among those possibles in respect of
> which God is called omnipotent; whereas whatever implies
> contradiction does not come within the scope of divine
> omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of
> possibility. Hence it is more appropriate to say that such
> things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them."
>
>The above is the work of that well-known "scientist," Thomas Aquinas.

Ahem, dear boy (or girl, I do not know), the quote from Thomas
Aquinas, a "scientist" as you put it, says that God cannot do
logically impossible things (given here as that which "implies a
contradiction in terms"). Therefore, the idea that God cannot do
logically impossible things is an idea from science, as I said
earlier.

>> The problem is that you are examining an infinite system with a
>> finite system (omniscience, logic, respectively).
>
>You present just another, even weaker version of the theistic
>mysticism that appeals to some "mystery" that lies outside human
>knowledge or experience.

If you are not infinite, then there is something which lies
outside your knowledge or experience-- infinity. Noting mysterious
about it at all, and in fact, more reasonavle than any theistic ideas
that this must be a personality-bearing God. You present the idea that
your cognition is infinite, or at least has the capability of being
so. If it does not, then your cognition is limited. If your cognition
is limited, your ability to understand is limited. Specifically, your
ability to understand those things which are not restricted by your
finite cognition is limited.

>But whether claimed by the finite or by the
>infinite, the sentence, "A person can do what he cannot do," is
>nonsensical, contradictory, false.

Because you are finite. If you were not, it would not. Or
might not. Or could not. I don't know. I'm still finite.

>______________
>Brian E. Clark
>br...@telerama.lm.com


Morphesius.

Brian E. Clark

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Mar 11, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/11/97
to

Morphesius <Morph...@usa.net)> wrote:

> In any cse, what you said looks much like what I was
> saying earlier: logic is a limited system, which shows logical
> contradictions as impossible, where in fact, such things might
> be possible in a less limited system.

You've read me precisely backwards. :) The logic that forbids square
circles on Euclidean planes is the SAME logic that allows square
circles on a certain non-Euclidean planes. Neither case has more or
fewer "limits" than the other.

You're make an implicit comparison that does not work. Logic allows
us to discount square circles on Euclidean surfaces, but as you noted
(correctly), the application of logic to Euclidean geometry does not
exhaust all possibilities. On other, non-Euclidean surfaces, square
circles might exist. That does NOT, however, mean that the logic we
used in describing the impossibility of Euclidean square circles was
"limited" or incorrect; it just means that the two cases had
different assumptions. The application of logic in the Euclidean
situation yields results different than the application of logic in
the non-Euclidean situation, yes. That does not entitle us to to the
idea that logic *itself* does not apply in certain situations.

> Logic will realise that, and will not deny the existence of
> possibilities outside of events that it can deal with.

What could you be talking about? Logic does not know such boundaries.
Science does, but that is beside the point. Can you give an example
of an "event" that is outside the scope of login. (And do not say, "A
square circle on a flat plane," as I have no wish to see you beg the
question.)

> > [Aquinas wrote] Hence it is more appropriate to say that such


> > things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them."
> >
> >The above is the work of that well-known "scientist," Thomas Aquinas.

> Ahem, dear boy (or girl, I do not know),

I have been male all my life, and was still so the last time I had
occassion to check. I am indeed dear, and I admire your insight. ;-)

> the quote from Thomas
> Aquinas, a "scientist" as you put it,

I put it that way because I assumed that everyone involved in this
discussion knew Thomas Aquinas was not a scientist but a philosopher,
and that his life predated the scientific era. I.e., Aquinas'
exposition on the impossibility of God's doing the logically
impossible discredits your assertion that the notion arose from
science.

> says that God cannot do logically impossible things (given here
> as that which "implies a contradiction in terms"). Therefore, the
> idea that God cannot do logically impossible things is an idea from
> science, as I said earlier.

But Aquinas was not a scientist! His objection to the idea of God's
performing logically impossible tasks was purely logical.

> If you are not infinite, then there is something which lies
> outside your knowledge or experience-- infinity.

Hmm. Our discussing infinity makes it clear that the concept is not
outside our knowledge. I do, however, humbly admit that much lies
outside my understanding. :)

> Noting mysterious about it at all, and in fact, more
> reasonavle than any theistic ideas that this must be a
> personality-bearing God.

But you seem to be offering homage to infinity, turning the concept
into a concretion.

> You present the idea that your cognition is infinite, or
> at least has the capability of being so.

I never presented any such notion. That I refrain from adopting a
quasi-superstitious view of "infinity" does mean I presume my
knowledge is boundless.

> If it does not, then your cognition is limited.

Of course it is. I can't speak Basque, for example.

> If your cognition is limited, your ability to understand is limited.

Non sequitur. I may understand some things fully. You equivocate from
posession of limited knowledge to a universal denunciation of all
human systems of knowledge as limited.

> Specifically, your ability to understand those things which are not
> restricted by your finite cognition is limited.

There are things I don't know, yes.



> > But whether claimed by the finite or by the infinite, the sentence,
> > "A person can do what he cannot do," is nonsensical, contradictory,
> > false.

> Because you are finite.

No, because to say otherwise renders literal nonsense.

> If you were not, it would not. Or
> might not. Or could not. I don't know. I'm still finite.

I don't really see how your position, ultimately, differs from that
of the Christians who demand that "real" knowledge must be
encompassing.

Morphesius

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Mar 12, 1997, 3:00:00 AM3/12/97
to

On Tue, 11 Mar 1997 17:36:52 -0500, br...@real.address.in.sig (Brian
E. Clark) wrote:

>You've read me precisely backwards. :)

Wow. Guess I have some talent after all...

>The logic that forbids square
>circles on Euclidean planes is the SAME logic that allows square
>circles on a certain non-Euclidean planes. Neither case has more or
>fewer "limits" than the other.

Euclidean geometry has a two-dimensional limit. Non-Euclidean
geometry does not. A geometry based upon an infinite number of
dimensions might allow all sorts of inconceivable things, because the
logic itself is not limited to operating within a confined number of
dimensions.

>You're make an implicit comparison that does not work. Logic allows
>us to discount square circles on Euclidean surfaces, but as you noted
>(correctly), the application of logic to Euclidean geometry does not
>exhaust all possibilities. On other, non-Euclidean surfaces, square
>circles might exist. That does NOT, however, mean that the logic we
>used in describing the impossibility of Euclidean square circles was
>"limited" or incorrect; it just means that the two cases had
>different assumptions. The application of logic in the Euclidean
>situation yields results different than the application of logic in
>the non-Euclidean situation, yes. That does not entitle us to to the
>idea that logic *itself* does not apply in certain situations.

True. But I did not say that. I said that logic does not apply
in cases where a thing entails a logical contradiction.

>> Logic will realise that, and will not deny the existence of
>> possibilities outside of events that it can deal with.
>

>What could you be talking about? Logic does not know such boundaries.

When a system of logic comes up against an irresistable force
and an immovable object (big rock thingy) existing in the same
universe, much less adjacently, it says "Oh, ok, logical
contradiction, which is not in my job description. I can't do logical
contradictions, go hire someone else" (for want of a better metaphor).


>Science does, but that is beside the point. Can you give an example
>of an "event" that is outside the scope of login. (And do not say, "A
>square circle on a flat plane," as I have no wish to see you beg the
>question.)

The concept of begging the question cannot be applied here,
because you are asking me to give an example of a thing without giving
an example of a thing! Any time a system of logic (eg- geometry) comes
uop against a situation which is outside the rules of logic, such as a
logical contradiction (eg- square circle), in its own range of
dimensional analysis (eg- flat plane), it is something which is
outside the scope of logic.

>> > [Aquinas wrote] Hence it is more appropriate to say that such


>> > things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them."
>> >
>> >The above is the work of that well-known "scientist," Thomas Aquinas.
>
>> Ahem, dear boy (or girl, I do not know),
>

>I have been male all my life, and was still so the last time I had
>occassion to check. I am indeed dear, and I admire your insight. ;-)
>

>> the quote from Thomas
>> Aquinas, a "scientist" as you put it,
>

>I put it that way because I assumed that everyone involved in this
>discussion knew Thomas Aquinas was not a scientist but a philosopher,
>and that his life predated the scientific era. I.e., Aquinas'
>exposition on the impossibility of God's doing the logically
>impossible discredits your assertion that the notion arose from
>science.

Well, then, if he was using the assumption that the logically
impossible cannot exist, then he was using a scientific notion. While
logic says "Sorry, can't do it", science says "Sorry, can't be done".

>> says that God cannot do logically impossible things (given here
>> as that which "implies a contradiction in terms"). Therefore, the
>> idea that God cannot do logically impossible things is an idea from
>> science, as I said earlier.
>

>But Aquinas was not a scientist! His objection to the idea of God's
>performing logically impossible tasks was purely logical.

His logic was scientific in nature, in that it denied the
existence of things outside the scope of logic.

>> If you are not infinite, then there is something which lies
>> outside your knowledge or experience-- infinity.
>

>Hmm. Our discussing infinity makes it clear that the concept is not
>outside our knowledge. I do, however, humbly admit that much lies
>outside my understanding. :)

Well, the concept, yes, is within our grasp, thankfully, or we
wouldn't have calculus and such.

>> Noting mysterious about it at all, and in fact, more
>> reasonavle than any theistic ideas that this must be a
>> personality-bearing God.
>

>But you seem to be offering homage to infinity, turning the concept
>into a concretion.

Well, if you want to call me a theist, then the only thing I
could possibly be a theist of is infinity. So, ok, can I be tax exempt
now?
But seriously, I didn't mean to turn the concept into a
concretion. But since infinity is impossible to fully understand in
this finite body I have, I am awed by it, and as such, it is
supernatural (to me).

>> You present the idea that your cognition is infinite, or
>> at least has the capability of being so.
>

>I never presented any such notion. That I refrain from adopting a
>quasi-superstitious view of "infinity" does mean I presume my
>knowledge is boundless.

That's not what I meant. If you presume that logic is capable
of handling anything, and that what logic cannot handle does not
exist, then you have effectively said that logic can handle anything
and everything which exists, which is everything. That would be
infinite knowledge.

>> If it does not, then your cognition is limited.
>

>Of course it is. I can't speak Basque, for example.
>

>> If your cognition is limited, your ability to understand is limited.
>

>Non sequitur. I may understand some things fully. You equivocate from
>posession of limited knowledge to a universal denunciation of all
>human systems of knowledge as limited.

They are. In relation to infinity, any finite understanding is
limited.

>> Specifically, your ability to understand those things which are not
>> restricted by your finite cognition is limited.
>

>There are things I don't know, yes.

And, by the characteristic of your cognition as limited, there
are some things you cannot know as well.

>> > But whether claimed by the finite or by the infinite, the sentence,
>> > "A person can do what he cannot do," is nonsensical, contradictory,
>> > false.
>
>> Because you are finite.
>

>No, because to say otherwise renders literal nonsense.

Because you are finite. If your are infinite, such a
contradiction is not nonsense because you encompass it.

>> If you were not, it would not. Or
>> might not. Or could not. I don't know. I'm still finite.
>

>I don't really see how your position, ultimately, differs from that
>of the Christians who demand that "real" knowledge must be
>encompassing.

Not "real", "infinite". I do not equate the two, unlike most
Christian fundies. I would use the word "real" in a limited sense, in
that what we can know and experience is real, but limited. The reality
of our knowledge is not diminished by the existence of things outside
of it. What we know is real, yet it is not all-encompassing. Within
our limited systems of understanding, we can reach reality, but not
absolut reality. Therefore, to claim any absolute without infinite
understanding is incorrect.

the...@gmail.com

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Feb 21, 2015, 12:42:57 PM2/21/15
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Fantastic post, I come back to it time and time again.
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