Human Rights Situation inside Tibet
Lionheart
Human Rights Situation inside Tibet
[Thursday, 5 November 2009, 12:16 p.m.]
Dharamshala: The UN, EU and Human Rights Desk of the Department of Information
and International Relations of the Central Tibetan Administration has brought
out a paper on "Human Rights Situation inside Tibet" on Thursday, 4 November.
Following is the full text:
Human Rights Situation inside Tibet
Department of Information and International Relations
Central Tibetan Administration
Gangchen Kyishong
Dharamsala, HP, INDIA
October 2009
PRC’s ETHNIC POLICY: A Brief Overview
China has 154 ethnic autonomous areas including five provincial-level
autonomous regions, namely, Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and
Guangzi, 30 autonomous prefectures, and 119 autonomous counties.
Beijing’s nationality and ethnic policy is clearly stated in its Regional
Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities. The Communist Party of China adopted Stalin’s
definition of ethnic groups—“a historically constituted, stable community of
people, formed on the basis of common language, territory, economic life, and
psychological make-up manifested in a common culture”.1
When Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978, China pursued relatively moderate
ethnic policies.2 Rather than integrationist policies, the state prioritized
co-existence of ethnic minorities. Regional autonomy for ethnic minorities was
further increased on paper in 1982 when the PRC Constitution of 1954 was
amended.
In response to pro-independence demonstrations in Tibet during the late
eighties, the PRC authorities embarked on “economic and cultural integration
of ethnic minorities”. This policy seems to be further reaffirmed in China’s
White Paper on Ethnic Policy3 when it asserts, “Adhering to common prosperity
and development of all ethnic groups is the fundamental stance of China’s
ethnic policy”.4
The PRC explains fundamental features of its ethnic policy as thus:
* Equality among ethnic groups
* Regional Autonomy
* Preferential policies in political, economic, cultural and educational
spheres
* Prohibition of racial discrimination
I. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
The PRC claim that there is an increase in ethnic minority officials; 2.994
million ethnic minority officials countrywide by 2006 end which is 3.8 times
that of 1978.5 It is true that all the governors of China’s five provincial-
level ethnic minority autonomous regions have ethnic minority backgrounds.
In actuality, members of ethnic minorities rarely occupied decision-making
posts. An estimated 50% government cadres are Tibetans, yet their
representation and authority in decision-making bodies is only nominal.
The most important and powerful post in the provincial minority autonomous
region is that of the Party Secretary. Currently, none of the five autonomous
provinces has an ethnic minority leader on this post.6 Since the establishment
of “Tibet Autonomous Region” (“TAR”) in 1965, no Tibetan has ever held this
post.
II. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Beijing claims to prioritize and realize economic development for Tibetans in
Tibet. The PRC discussed two models of development for Tibet in the 1980s. The
first model promotes Tibetans actively participating in and leading the
development process. The second model urges rapid development in Tibet with
the help of experienced and skilled Han Chinese in the initial phases. Around
mid-1980s, the PRC authorities decided on the second model.
During China’s Third Work Forum on Tibet in 1994, stronger emphasis was laid
on “stability and security control” through economic development. The 2001
Fourth Work Forum re-emphasized the strategy of encouraging economic
prosperity with the aim to eliminate nationalist sentiments.
PRC’s development model / strategy lacks right-based and need-based approach
i) Right-based approach is not considered as the Tibetans lack decision-
making authority and participatory power in the development process due to
absence of real autonomy.
ii) Need-based approach is violated when the state investment is heavily
focused on infrastructure development such as highways, railways, etc. Even
within the hard infrastructure, development efforts are concentrated on trade,
services, and government and communist party administration where the Tibetan
participation is minimal. China’s economic growth circumvents 80 percent of
Tibetan population that still subsist on agriculture and nomadic pastoralism.
The White Paper on Ethnic Policy issued by the PRC government acknowledges the
priority that China has given to construction projects when it states,
“Priority given to construction projects is to consolidate the foundation for
further development”.7
Inadequate effort towards Human Development
According to 1997 report by the United Nations Development Programme, Human
Poverty Index is identified as survival, knowledge and a decent standard of
living.8 It is found that the government spending on education, health and
agriculture is relatively less and Tibet lags behind in all of these areas.
Gabrielle Lafitte, a development expert, argues that despite large state
investments into Tibet, “Tibet would still rank at the very bottom of the UN’s
list of nations (if it were a nation) along with countries like Rwanda, Sudan,
Somalia, Mozambique etc.”9 Another expert, June Teufel Dreyer, said, “Even a
cursory glance at the Statistical Yearbook of China will confirm that the
“TAR” ranks last on virtually every indicator: total revenue, taxes remitted,
per capita income, literary and even life expectancy at birth”.10
Economy as political control
Chinese Marxism held a viewpoint that a population that is economically
prosperous is less inclined to hold nationalist view. Chen Kuiyan, former
Party Secretary of the “TAR”, once said, “Only with economic development and
improvement of prestige of the country, and with people getting rich and tired
of splittist groups can they finally make correct judgments and give up their
purpose of splitting the country”.11 Most of the development projects in
Tibet such as the Western Development Programme have an underlying political
agenda to maintain stability.
Wang Lixiong, a Chinese scholar has rightly said, “Economic benefits plus the
“carrot” and “big stick” policy of high political pressure have superficially
maintained peace in Tibet for the past 13 years. But, the recent Lhasa riots
once again proved that this policy cannot solve the Tibet question, and under
China’s political system, the authorities have no other way to govern
Tibet.”12
Urban-oriented development
China’s development policy has largely benefited the urban areas in Tibet
where majority of the Han immigrants live and where only 20 percent of Tibet’s
population resides.
Gongmeng (Open Constitution Initiative), a Beijing-based lawyer’s organization
and think-tank, in their investigative report noted, “In the process of
modernization, agriculture as the traditional industry is in a vulnerable
position.” The report acknowledges “Lhasa’s urban standard of living as no
less than in city found in the developed Han areas”. At the same time, it
expresses concern that “when comparing Tibetan areas and Han areas amid the
process of rapid modernization and hastened marketization, different regions
within Tibetan areas and urban and rural areas within Tibetan areas all
demonstrate a relentless trend of growing disparities”.13
Tibetans as marginalized group
It is reported that, “The people drawing the greatest benefit from the
thriving economy are the incomers, non-Tibetans; and because Tibetans lack
capital and skills, this is contributing to them becoming increasingly
marginalized. In Lhasa, there are Sichuan restaurants everywhere, run by
people from Sichuan. Taxi drivers are mainly non-Tibetan outsiders from Henan,
Sichuan, Hunnan and Shaanxi.”14
The report further notes, “Economically, in terms of skills and in terms of
adapting to value systems, Tibetans have no way of competing with non-Tibetans
in the modernization process” due to lack of skills and Chinese language
proficiency.
Wang Lixiong believes that though the “government does not organize large-
scale immigration, it nevertheless encourages it”. This has resulted in what
he calls “Chinasization of Tibet, the root cause of conflict today”.15
GDP versus human development
It is said that government funding to Tibet has led to growth of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) but not the income and actual living condition of the
Tibetan population. This is because of the fact that central government
spending is concentrated in the state-sector.
Tibetan development versus Chinese development
There is a conflict between Chinese and Tibetans over what development means.
For the Tibetans, “prosperity is more about freedoms such as religious belief,
a respect for people, a respect for life, the kind of prosperity you get from
extending charity to others” (Gongmeng report).
The PRC authorities, on the other hand, are adamant to follow its old
developmental model. China’s White Paper on Ethnic Policy states, “The state
is convinced that quickening the social and economic development of minority
areas is the fundamental solution to China’s ethnic issues”.
Robert Barnett sums up the core development problem in Tibet as “the
squandering of political capital by interfering in cultural life”.16
Falsified official statistics
In the process of reporting to the central leadership, many reports are
exaggerated and based on falsified statistics. UNDP reports that “TAR” fares
poorly than other areas in China in income, poverty, health and education.
Therefore, it is imperative to understand that GNP and GDP do not always give
an accurate picture of economic development.
Local officials exaggerate and inflate development statistics thereby
distorting the actual picture of progress. One such incident is reported by
Luwo Tsetan:
In October 2007 when the data for the Universal Nine-Year Compulsory
Education and the Elimination of Illiteracy among the Youths and Adults was
initially collected and established [in Chigdril County, Golog], it was
required that the number of students in the county must reach about 1,300 and
at that time the number of students in the school was 700. Among these
students, some are graduates from a certain senior high school, and others
were students who graduated from the Tibetan school but were herding at home.
Still others were monks. They all came to school to deal with inspection,
thus, as soon as the inspection team left, the students could go home.
Initially when the students came to register for the classes, the county
authorities promised to give them salaries…though they lived in the school for
no more than two months, in the dossier it was recorded as four-year intensive
class”.17
On account of such happenings, Gyaltsen Norbu, former “TAR” Chairman, said in
1997, “We should do away with these unhealthy trends in boasting and
exaggeration and hiding the truth from the higher levels in the work of aiding
the poor”.18
III. EDUCATION
Ideo-political content in education
Education in Tibet is used as a tool to inculcate love for communism and the
“motherland”.
The ideological education has been strengthened in 2009 with the re-launch of
the “patriotic re-education” campaign, integration of ethnic unity education
into both examination and education system etc. China’s Ministry of Education
and State Ethnic Affairs Commission issued “Guiding Program on Ethnic Unity
Education in Schools” on 26 November 2008, to promote Communist Party policy
on ethnic minorities with emphasis on issues “safeguarding the unification of
the motherland”, “opposing separatism” etc.19
Assimilation
With the aim of assimilation, religious, historical and cultural education of
the minority is curtailed in Tibet. Minority group’s histories, traditions,
languages and culture in education are neither fully respected nor taught, as
it should be. This is evident from the standard nationalized curriculum that
China’s education system uses all over the country. It is held that “despite
wide variation in geography, agriculture, climate, language and local customs,
the same subjects are taught with the same materials almost all over the
country”.20
Hence, minority children face a sense of inferiority about their racial
identity. One problem is “that minority nationality children become very self-
abased when they find no reference to their own culture or history in school
materials. When they find there is no content which can make them feel proud
of being a person of their own nationality, they lose self-esteem and interest
in schooling. This is reflected in high drop-out rate of minority children.”21
The educational curriculum should include world history, Tibet’s history and
the history of China.
Tibetan language
It is said that positive development of school education is difficult as long
as the language problem is not solved. Language is described as “a carrier of
the knowledge and experiences accumulated by a nation, or a group throughout
history”.22
In acknowledging the problems related to China’s language in Tibet, Prof.
Badeng Nima said, “During the years that Tibet has been influenced by the
Chinese economy, the language problem has steadily worsened”.23 Despite legal
guarantees for linguistic rights to minorities, Chinese language is used in
administration and commerce. It is said that since 1997, Chinese became the
medium of instruction in almost every Tibetan schools.
Tibetan language should be given priority both in the course curriculum, as a
medium of instruction and as a language of commerce and administration.
Rhetoric and reality
China came under examination at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) conducted
by the UN Human Rights Council in February 2009. China’s report to the Working
Group on the UPR claims, “By the end of 2000, nine-year compulsory education
had been made virtually universal throughout the country”. 24
On the contrary, some outside observers put the illiteracy rate in Tibet as
high as 74.31 percent.25 Tibet, therefore, remains one of the least literate
regions in China.26
Gongmeng’s report sheds light on the state of education in Tibet’s remote
areas,
When conducting interviews in the Qingshui region, the local villagers
said that whenever the higher administrations came to inspect illiteracy
eradication work, the township called the youths who had left to work back for
10 days of mandatory training. Ten days later, they are issued with an
elementary school graduation certificate, and as such they are counted during
the inspection as having “escaped illiteracy”.
In addition, the local quality of teachers and standards of education are
low... In particular there is a lack of high-level and highly educated
teaching talent, and in remote areas there is even only “one school, one
teacher”.
IV. TIBETAN BUDDHISM
“Patriotic re-education” Campaign: In the aftermath of the 2008 protests in
Tibet, China has increased the strength and frequency of “patriotic re-
education” campaign for both the monastic and general populace. Hao Peng, the
Deputy Communist Party Chief for Tibet, called for strengthening “patriotic
education so as to guide the masses of monks to continuously display the
patriotic tradition.”27
The campaign is one of the major tools used by Beijing to conform Buddhism
within Communist framework and to test clergy’s allegiance to the State. It is
virtually impossible to obtain full and proper religious education under this
campaign. Thousands of monks and nuns have faced arrest, expulsion and
detention for non-obedience to the official diktats.
Internal versus external Buddhism
The PRC tries to appropriate Tibetan Buddhism with its legal stipulation on
so-called normal religion. The “normal” religion is state-controlled and
“patriotic”.
China’s emphasis on externalized form of Buddhism is apparent when its White
Paper on Ethnic Policy states:
In Tibet, there are over 1,700 venues for Tibetan Buddhist activities,
with 46,000 monks and nuns living in temples. Traditional Buddhist activities
are carried out there normally – from sutra studies and debates to tonsure and
Abhisheka (consecration) and other Buddhist practices, as well as the system
of academic degrees and ordination through examination. Prayer flags, Mani
piles and Tibetan Buddhist believers are seen everywhere in Tibet.
A Buddhist practitioner requires long hours of study, contemplation and
meditation on fundamental aspects of Tibetan Buddhism. A Gonpa (lit.
seclusion), or a monastery, is usually located at a distance of approx. two
miles from villages and towns. Such seclusion and distance helps a
practitioner to achieve and maintain physical and mental detachment from
worldly life.
Currently, the monks and nuns are subjected to regular political education
session that in itself is a major intrusion into their religious study. They
are also appraised for their loyalty. All such acts hamper the acquisition of
essential Tibetan Buddhism.
“TAR” –Specific Implementing and Reincarnation Measures
On 19 September 2006, “TAR” People’s Government passed the “TAR”-Specific
Implementing Measure as well as the Reincarnation Measures. The Implementing
Measures specifies state control over religious practitioners, reincarnated
lamas, religious practice and the places of Tibetan Buddhism. It also includes
a legal framework for the Reincarnation Measures and the two together codify a
comprehensive approach to control the selection, installation and education of
reincarnate lamas. It is evident that the PRC authorities are trying to make
way for future control of the reincarnation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
Democratic Management Committees
As the administrative body of a monastery and nunnery, the DMC consists of
politically vetted monks and nuns who supervise the functioning, activities
and curriculum of the religious institution. Every monks and nuns have to be
on guard as to whether their religious study, belief and practice are in
conformity with the requirements of the “work teams” that come to conduct
“patriotic re-education” campaigns in the monastery.
Anti-Dalai Lama Campaign
The Dalai Lama is the embodiment of Tibetan Buddhism. Ninety percent of
Tibetan population is Buddhists. Hence, the anti-Dalai Lama campaign that PRC
authorities impose on the Tibetans through different forms and manners, puts
the monastic community in a direct conflict between their religious loyalty to
the Dalai Lama, or their required allegiance to the Communist Party. The
clergy are the most affected by this battle of choices and consequences.
Religious figures and Geshes
It is a recurring pattern that popular religious figures always face Chinese
persecution and harassment on some pretext or the other. Such religious
figures are believed to have the potential to influence the local populace
into political activism. Therefore, these religious figures come under attack.
Some were put in prison while others remain under house arrests.
Geshes have a significant role in the transmission of religion and
preservation of Tibetan culture. Only the “politically correct” lamas enjoy
“full rights of religious freedom”. While others are denied registration and
their access to monasteries to teach lay Tibetans are hindered.
V. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Ethnic animosity and discrimination
As noted by Beijing scholars of Gongmeng, China’s “over-propagandizing of
ethnic violence” during 2008 protests has resulted in increased ethnic tension
and discrimination. Tibetans have reportedly been turned away from hotels on
the basis of their ethnicity.
In her blog posting titled “Ethnic Cleansing in Lhasa”, Woeser reports that
Tibetans from Amdo and Kham, who do not possess household registration or
temporary residence permits, are either expelled or detained. Woeser laments,
“Lhasa is currently being silenced and experiencing ethnic discrimination,
ethnic segregation, and ethnic cleansing”28
Minority versus majority
Tibetans as a minority group are objectified and portrayed as exotic and
backward. Rather than promote and protect the actual culture and tradition of
Tibetans, such representation only serves the larger propaganda and purpose of
the PRC.
Some scholars such as Dru C. Gladney argue that such representation of
minorities only helps to construct the majority discourse. China calls itself
as a multi-national and democratic nation based on the Soviet model. But
everyone knows that actual autonomy is only but in name. In order to project
itself as a modern multi-national state and to avert outside criticism over
its Tibet policies, Gladney says, “it is not surprising that Tibetans are
often represented as the most willing subjects of Chinese ‘democratic
liberation”.29
Endnotes:
1 Bin Yang, Between Winds and Clouds: The Making of Yunnan, Second Century BCE
to Twentieth Century CE, Gutenburg, Columbia University Press, p. 19
2 Lai Hongyi, “The Evolution of China’s Ethnic Policies”, EAI Background Brief
440, 12 March 2009, available at http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB440.pdf [3
November 2009]
3 “Full Text of White Paper on Ethnic Policy”, China Daily, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-09/27/content_8743072.htm [17 October
2009]
4 “China issues White Paper on Ethnic Policy”, China Daily, 27 September 2009,
http://www.chinaethnicgroups.com/china/2009-09/27/content_8742753.htm [3
November 2009]
5 Duan Jiulong, Director General of the Department of Treaty and Law,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, “PRC’s combined tenth to thirteenth
report on their implementation of the provision of International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination”, presented to the
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 10 August 2009, available at
http://www.hrea.org/wv/index.php?base_id=116&list_id=18&language_id=1&msg_id=13841
[3 November 2009]
6 Cheng Li, “Ethnic Minority Elites in China’s Party-State Leadership: An
Empirical Assessment”, China Leadership Monitor, No.25, Summer 2008, available
at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2008/summer_china_li.aspx [3 November
2009]
7 “Full Text of White Paper on Ethnic Policy”, China Daily, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-09/27/content_8743072.htm [17 October
2009]
8 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1997, New York,
Oxford University Press, 1997, available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1997/chapters/ [2 November 2009]
9 As cited in Melvyn C. Goldstein, “Development and Change in Rural Tibet”,
Asian Survey, The University of North Carolina Press, Vo. 43, October 2003
10 June Teufel Dreyer, “Economic Development in Tibet under the People’s
Republic of China”, Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 12, Issue 36, August
2003, pages 411-430
11 Chen Kuiyuan, “Requirements and hopes for the Third Working Meeting on
Tibet”, Xizang de Jiaobu (Tibet’s Steps), Gaoji Ganbu Wenku (High Level Cadre
Documents Series), Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, Beijing, 1999, pp.
194, 196-197, as cited in Robert Barnett (East Asian Institute, Columbia
University), “The Chinese Frontier man and the Winter Worms – Chen Kuiyan in
the T.A.R, 1992-2000”, in paper s from the History of Tibet Seminar, St.
Andrew’s University, Scotland, August 2001
12 Wang Lixiong, “A True ‘Middle-Way’ Solution to Tibet Unrest”, China
Security, Vol. 4,.No.2, Spring 2008
13 Gongmeng Law Research Center, “An investigative report into the social and
economic causes of the 3.14 incident in Tibetan areas”, 12 May 2009
14 Ibid.
15 Wang Lixiong, “A True ‘Middle-Way’ Solution to Tibetan Unrest”, China
Security, Vol.4. No.2, Spring 2008
16 Robert Barnett, “The Tibet Protests of Spring, 2008: Conflict between the
Nation and the State”, China Perspectives, 2009
17 Luwo Tsetan, “An Account of the Serious Falsification of Data Concerning
the Universal Nine-Year Compulsory Education and the Elimination of Illiteracy
Among Youths and Adults in Chidril Country, Qinghai Province”, available at
http://www.highpeakspureearth.com/2008/09/lies-damned-lies-and-statistics.html
[3 November 2009]
18 As cited in Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Annual Report
on Human Rights Situation Inside Tibet 2004”, available at
www.tchrd.org/publications/annual.../2004/chapter1_1.html [17 October 2009]
19 “Chinese Government mandates ethnic unity education to promote party
policy”, Congressional Executive Commission on China, 19 December 2008,
available at
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=115663# [3
November 2009]
20 G. Postiglione, “China’s National Minority Education: Culture, Schooling
and Development”, New York, Falmer Press, 1999
21 Nima, as cited in G. Postiglione, 1999, p. 134
22 Zhuo Xiulan (2007) “China’s Policy Towards Minority Language in a
Globalising Age”, Transnational Curriculum Inquiry, 4 (1), available at
http:nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci [8 October 2009]
23 Nima, Badeng “Problems related to bilingual Education in Tibet”, Kham Aid
Education Program, available at
http://www.khamaid.org/programs/education/Tibetan%20language%20in%20education.htm
[1 November 2009]
24 “National Report Submitted in accordance with Paragraph 15 (a) of the Annex
to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1”, Fourth session of the UN General
Assembly Human Rights Council on the Universal Periodic Review, 2-13 February
2009, available at
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session4/CN/A_HRC_WG6_4_CHN_1_E.pdf
[1 November 2009]
25 Nima, Badeng “Problems related to bilingual Education in Tibet”, Kham Aid
Education Program, available at
http://www.khamaid.org/programs/education/Tibetan%20language%20in%20education.htm
[1 November 2009]
26 Bonnie Johnson and Nalini Chhetri, “Exclusionary Policies and Practices in
Chinese Minority Education: The Case of Tibetan Education”, Current Issues in
Comparative Education, Columbia University, 30 April 2002
27 Barbara Demick, “China orders Tibetans re-educated about Dalai Lama”, Los
Angeles Time, 8 April 2008, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/apr/08/world/fg-reeducate8 [2 November 2009]
28 Woeser, “Ethnic cleansing in Lhasa”, Translated by Highpeakspureearth on
January 10, 2009, available at
http://www.highpeakspureearth.com/2009/01/ethnic-cleansing-in-lhasa-by-
woeser.html [1 November 2009]
29 Dru C. Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring
Majority/Minority Identities”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.53, No 1:
92-123. Special Issue on Ethnic and Cultural Nationalism in Asia, 1994,
available at http:www.hawai.edu/dru/articles/exotic.pdf [7 October 2009]
--
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niet beseffend dat ze binnen een paar uur zullen worden afgeslacht.
--Thich Nhat Hanh