>
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0401.florida.html>
> Creative Class War
> How the GOP's anti-elitism could ruin America's economy.
> Washington Monthly, By Richard Florida, January/February 2004
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Last March, I had the opportunity to meet Peter Jackson, director of The Lord
> of the Rings trilogy, at his film complex in lush, green, otherworldly-looking
> Wellington, New Zealand. Jackson has done something unlikely in Wellington, an
> exciting, cosmopolitan city of 900,000, but not one previously considered a
> world cultural capital. He has built a permanent facility there, perhaps the
> world's most sophisticated filmmaking complex. He did it in New Zealand
> concertedly and by design. Jackson, a Wellington native, realized what many
> American cities discovered during the '90s: Paradigm-busting creative
> industries could single-handedly change the ways cities flourish and drive
> dynamic, widespread economic change. It took Jackson and his partners a while
> to raise the resources, but they purchased an abandoned paint factory that, in
> a singular example of adaptive reuse, emerged as the studio responsible for
> the most breathtaking trilogy of films ever made. He realized, he told me,
> that with the allure of the Rings trilogy, he could attract a diversely
> creative array of talent from all over the world to New Zealand; the best
> cinematographers, costume designers, sound technicians, computer graphic
> artists, model builders, editors, and animators.
>
> When I visited, I met dozens of Americans from places like Berkeley and MIT
> working alongside talented filmmakers from Europe and Asia, the Americans
> asserting that they were ready to relinquish their citizenship. Many had begun
> the process of establishing residency in New Zealand.
>
> Think about this. In the industry most symbolic of America's international
> economic and cultural might, film, the greatest single project in recent
> cinematic history was internationally funded and crafted by the best
> filmmakers from around the world, but not in Hollywood. When Hollywood
> produces movies of this magnitude, it creates jobs for directors, actors, and
> key grips in California. Because of the astounding level of technical
> innovation which a project of this size requires, in such areas as computer
> graphics, sound design, and animation, it can also germinate whole new
> companies and even new industries nationwide, just as George Lucas's Star Wars
> films fed the development of everything from video games to product tie-in
> marketing. But the lion's share of benefits from The Lord of the Rings is
> likely to accrue not to the United States but to New Zealand. Next, with a
> rather devastating symbolism, Jackson will remake King Kong in Wellington,
> with a budget running upwards of $150 million.
>
> Peter Jackson's power play hasn't been mentioned by any of the current
> candidates running for president. Yet the loss of U.S. jobs to overseas
> competitors is shaping up to be one of the defining issues of the 2004
> campaign. And for good reason. Voters are seeing not just a decline in
> manufacturing jobs, but also the outsourcing of hundreds of thousands of
> white-collar brain jobs--everything from software coders to financial analysts
> for investment banks. These were supposed to be the "safe" jobs, for which
> high school guidance counselors steered the children of blue-collar workers
> into college to avoid their parents' fate.
>
>
> But the loss of some of these jobs is only the most obvious--and not even the
> most worrying--aspect of a much bigger problem. Other countries are now
> encroaching more directly and successfully on what has been, for almost two
> decades, the heartland of our economic success -- the creative economy. Better
> than any other country in recent years, America has developed new technologies
> and ideas that spawn new industries and modernize old ones, from the Internet
> to big-box stores to innovative product designs. And these have proved the
> principal force behind the U.S. economy's creation of more than 20 million
> jobs in the creative sector during the 1990s, even as it continued to shed
> manufacturing, agricultural, and other jobs.
>
> We came up with these new technologies and ideas largely because we were able
> to energize and attract the best and the brightest, not just from our country
> but also from around the world. Talented, educated immigrants and smart,
> ambitious young Americans congregated, during the 1980s and 1990s, in and
> around a dozen U.S. city-regions. These areas became hothouses of innovation,
> the modern-day equivalents of Renaissance city-states, where scientists,
> artists, designers, engineers, financiers, marketers, and sundry entrepreneurs
> fed off each other's knowledge, energy, and capital to make new products, new
> services, and whole new industries: cutting-edge entertainment in southern
> California, new financial instruments in New York, computer products in
> northern California and Austin, satellites and telecommunications in
> Washington, D.C., software and innovative retail in Seattle, biotechnology in
> Boston. The economic benefits of these advances soon spread to much of the
> rest of the country, as Ohio-born MBAs in Raleigh-Durham built credit-card
> call centers in Iowa, and Indian computer whizzes in Chicago devised inventory
> software that brought new profitability to car factories in Ohio, Kentucky,
> and Tennessee.
>
> But now the rest of the world has taken notice of our success and is trying to
> copy it. The present surge of outsourcing is the first step--or if you will,
> the first pincer of the claw. The more routinizable aspects of what we
> consider brainwork--writing computer code, analyzing X-rays--are being lured
> away by countries like India and Romania, which have lower labor costs and
> educated workforces large enough to do the job. Though alarming and
> disruptive, such outsourcing might be manageable if we could substitute a new
> tier of jobs derived from the new technologies and ideas coming out of our
> creative centers. But so far in this economic recovery, that hasn't happened.
>
> What should really alarm us is that our capacity to so adapt is being eroded
> by a different kind of competition--the other pincer of the claw--as cities in
> other developed countries transform themselves into magnets for higher
> value-added industries. Cities from Sydney to Brussels to Dublin to Vancouver
> are fast becoming creative-class centers to rival Boston, Seattle, and Austin.
> They're doing it through a variety of means--from government-subsidized labs
> to partnerships between top local universities and industry. Most of all,
> they're luring foreign creative talent, including our own. The result is that
> the sort of high-end, high-margin creative industries that used to be the
> United States' province and a crucial source of our prosperity have begun to
> move overseas. The most advanced cell phones are being made in Salo, Finland,
> not Chicago. The world's leading airplanes are being designed and built in
> Toulouse and Hamburg, not Seattle.
>
> As other nations become more attractive to mobile immigrant talent, America is
> becoming less so. A recent study by the National Science Board found that the
> U.S. government issued 74,000 visas for immigrants to work in science and
> technology in 2002, down from 166,000 in 2001--an astonishing drop of 55
> percent. This is matched by similar, though smaller-scale, declines in other
> categories of talented immigrants, from finance experts to entertainers. Part
> of this contraction is derived from what we hope are short-term security
> concerns--as federal agencies have restricted visas from certain countries
> after September 11. More disturbingly, we find indications that fewer educated
> foreigners are choosing to come to the United States. For instance, most of
> the decline in science and technology immigrants in the National Science Board
> study was due to a drop in applications.
>
> Why would talented foreigners avoid us? In part, because other countries are
> simply doing a better, more aggressive job of recruiting them. The technology
> bust also plays a role. There are fewer jobs for computer engineers, and even
> top foreign scientists who might still have their pick of great cutting-edge
> research positions are less likely than they were a few years ago to make
> millions through tech-industry partnerships.
>
> But having talked to hundreds of talented professionals in a half dozen
> countries over the past year, I'm convinced that the biggest reason has to do
> with the changed political and policy landscape in Washington. In the 1990s,
> the federal government focused on expanding America's human capital and
> interconnectedness to the world--crafting international trade agreements,
> investing in cutting edge R&D, subsidizing higher education and public access
> to the Internet, and encouraging immigration. But in the last three years, the
> government's attention and resources have shifted to older sectors of the
> economy, with tariff protection and subsidies to extractive industries.
> Meanwhile, Washington has stunned scientists across the world with its
> disregard for consensus scientific views when those views conflict with the
> interests of favored sectors (as has been the case with the issue of global
> climate change). Most of all, in the wake of 9/11, Washington has inspired the
> fury of the world, especially of its educated classes, with its
> my-way-or-the-highway foreign policy. In effect, for the first time in our
> history, we're saying to highly mobile and very finicky global talent, "You
> don't belong here."
>
> Obviously, this shift has come about with the changing of the political guard
> in Washington, from the internationalist Bill Clinton to the aggressively
> unilateralist George W. Bush. But its roots go much deeper, to a tectonic
> change in the country's political-economic demographics. As many have noted,
> America is becoming more geographically polarized, with the culturally more
> traditionalist, rural, small-town, and exurban "red" parts of the country
> increasingly voting Republican, and the culturally more progressive urban and
> suburban "blue" areas going ever more Democratic. Less noted is the degree to
> which these lines demarcate a growing economic divide, with "blue" patches
> representing the talent-laden, immigrant-rich creative centers that have
> largely propelled economic growth, and the "red" parts representing the
> economically lagging hinterlands. The migrations that feed creative-center
> economies are also exacerbating the contrasts. As talented individuals, eager
> for better career opportunities and more adventurous, diverse lifestyles, move
> to the innovative cities, the hinterlands become even more culturally
> conservative. Now, the demographic dynamic which propelled America's creative
> economy has produced a political dynamic that could choke that economy off.
> Though none of the candidates for president has quite framed it that way, it's
> what's really at stake in the 2004 elections.
>
> Yankees doodle
>
> Roger Pederson is one of the leading researchers in the field of stem cells.
> But in 2001, he left his position at the University of California, San
> Francisco, to take up residency at the Centre for Stem Cell Biology Medicine
> at Cambridge University in the United Kingdom. His departure illustrates how
> the creative economy is being reshaped--by our competitors growing savvy and
> by our own cluelessness. Pederson bolted because the British government
> aggressively recruited him, but also because the Bush administration put heavy
> restrictions on stem-cell research. "I have a soft spot in my heart for
> America," he recently told Wired magazine. "But the U.K. is much better for
> this research.... more working capital." And, he continued, "they haven't made
> such a political football out of stem cells."
>
> Stem cells are vital to the body because of their ability to develop any kind
> of tissue. Scientists play a similar role in the economy; their discoveries
> (silicon circuitry, gene splicing) are the source of most big new industries
> (personal computers, biotechnology). Unfortunately, Roger Pederson's departure
> may be among the first of many. "Over the last few years, as the conservative
> movement in the U.S. has become more entrenched, many people I know are
> looking for better lives in Canada, Europe, and Australia," a noted
> entymologist at the University of Illinois emailed me recently. "From bloggers
> and programmers to members of the National Academy I have spoken with, all
> find the Zeitgeist alien and even threatening. My friend says it is like
> trying to research and do business in the 21st century in a culture that wants
> to live in the 19th, empires, bibles and all. There is an E.U. fellowship
> through the European Molecular Biology Laboratory in Amsterdam that everyone
> and their mother is trying to get."
>
> But the bigger problem isn't that Americans are going elsewhere. It's that for
> the first time in modern memory, top scientists and intellectuals from
> elsewhere are choosing not to come here. We are so used to thinking that the
> world's leading creative minds, like the world's best basketball and baseball
> players, always want to come to the States, while our people go overseas only
> if they are second-rate or washed up, that it's hard to imagine it could ever
> be otherwise. And it's still true that because of our country's size, its
> dynamism, its many great universities, and large government research budgets,
> we're the Yankees of science. But like the Yankees, we've been losing some of
> our best players. And even great teams can go into slumps.
>
> The altered flow of talent is already beginning to show signs of crimping the
> scientific process. "We can't hold scientific meetings here [in the United
> States] anymore because foreign scientists can't get visas," a top
> oceanographer at the University of California at San Diego recently told me.
> The same is true of graduate students, the people who do the legwork of
> scientific research and are the source of many powerful ideas. The graduate
> students I have taught at several major universities -- Ohio State, Harvard,
> MIT, Carnegie Mellon -- have always been among the first to point out the
> benefits of studying and doing research in the United States. But their
> impressions have changed dramatically over the past year. They now complain of
> being hounded by the immigration agencies as potential threats to security,
> and that America is abandoning its standing as an open society. Many are
> thinking of leaving for foreign schools, and they tell me that their friends
> and colleagues back home are no longer interested in coming to the United
> States for their education but are actively seeking out universities in
> Canada, Europe, and elsewhere.
>
> It would be comforting to think that keeping out the foreigners would mean
> more places for home-grown talent in our top graduate programs and research
> faculties. Alas, it doesn't work that way: We have many brilliant young
> people, but not nearly enough to fill all the crucial slots. Last year, for
> instance, a vast, critical artificial intelligence project at MIT had to be
> jettisoned because the university couldn't find enough graduate students who
> weren't foreigners and who could thus clear new security regulations.
>
> Nor is this phenomenon limited to science; other sectors are beginning to
> suffer. The pop-music magazine Tracks, for instance, recently reported that a
> growing number of leading world musicians, from South African singer and
> guitarist Vusi Mahlasela to the Bogota-based electronica collective
> Sidestepper, have had to cancel their American tours because they were refused
> visas, while Youssou N'Dour, perhaps the globe's most famous music artist,
> cancelled his largest-ever U.S. tour last spring to protest the invasion of
> Iraq.
>
> These may seem small signs, but they're not. America's music industry has
> been, for decades, the world's standard setter. The songs of American artists
> are heard on radio stations from Caracas to Istanbul; their soundtracks are an
> integral part of the worldwide appeal of American movies. The profits earned
> from American music exports help keep America's balance-of-payments deficits
> from getting too far into the red zone. Yet part of what makes American music
> so vital is its ability to absorb and incorporate the sounds of other
> countries--from American hip-hop picking up Caribbean Reggae and Indian
> Bhangra beats, to hard rock musicians using industrial instrumentation from
> Germany. For American artists and fans, not being able to see touring foreign
> bands is the equivalent of the computer industry not getting access to the
> latest chips: It dulls the competitive edge.
>
> Our loss of access to high-level foreign talent hasn't drawn much attention
> from political leaders and the media, for understandable reasons: We seem to
> have bigger, more immediate problems, from the war on terrorism to the loss of
> jobs in the manufacturing, service, and creative sectors to China, India, and
> Mexico. But just as our obsession with the Soviet Union in the last years of
> the Cold War caused us to miss the emerging economic challenge of Japan, our
> eyes may not be on the biggest threat to our economic well-being.
>
> For several years now, my colleagues and I have been measuring the underlying
> factors common to those American cities and regions with the highest level of
> creative economic growth. The chief factors we've found are: large numbers of
> talented individuals, a high degree of technological innovation, and a
> tolerance of diverse lifestyles. Recently my colleague Irene Tinagli of
> Carnegie Mellon and I have applied the same analysis to northern Europe, and
> the findings are startling. The playing field is much more level than you
> might think. Sweden tops the United States on this measure, with Finland, the
> Netherlands, and Denmark close behind. The United Kingdom and Belgium are also
> doing well. And most of these countries, especially Ireland, are becoming more
> creatively competitive at a faster rate than the United States.
>
> Though the data are not as perfect at the metropolitan level, other cities are
> also beating us for fresh new talent, diversity, and brainpower. Vancouver and
> Toronto are set to take off: Both city-regions have a higher concentration of
> immigrants than New York, Miami, or Los Angeles. So too are Sydney and
> Melbourne. As creative centers, they would rank alongside Washington, D.C. and
> New York City. Many of these places also offer such further inducements as
> spectacular waterfronts, beautiful countryside, and great outdoor life.
> They're safe. They're rarely at war. These cities are becoming the global
> equivalents of Boston or San Francisco, transforming themselves from small,
> obscure places to creative hotbeds that draw talent from all over--including
> your city and mine.
>
> Catch the waves
>
> The sudden stalling of our creative economy threatens to undermine two decades
> of progress. Twenty years ago, America's economy had hit a crisis point, with
> record unemployment, stagnant productivity, a rusting industrial base, and an
> oil crisis that highlighted a dangerous dependence upon raw materials whose
> supply it could not necessarily guarantee.
>
> But underneath the surface, some interesting things were happening. Previous
> investments in scientific research by both government and industry were
> yielding new technologies, from inexpensive computer chips to fiber optics.
> New financial instruments and practices were making capital more available for
> innovative new ventures. American film, television, and music were finding new
> export markets. U.S. corporations, spurred by competition from Japan and
> guided by best-selling books like Tom Peters's In Search of Excellence, were
> restructuring, pushing decision-making down the chain of command and into the
> hands of high-initiative line employees. And everywhere, economists and
> managers were talking about the need for more "human capital"--the buzz phrase
> meaning educated workers who could think on their feet.
>
> Eventually, supply met demand thanks to two great migrations: first, a wave of
> foreign immigrants, following a loosening of immigration laws in the late
> 1960s. By the 1980s, more than six million immigrants settled in the United
> States, the greatest number in half a century. In the 1990s, 12 million more
> arrived. Most were unskilled and found work in factories, restaurants, and
> construction. But many came with good schooling and went into our universities
> and leading industries. Today, 11 percent of foreign-born adults in the United
> States have a graduate or professional degree, compared to only 9 percent of
> natives. Most of these educated immigrants originally congregated in a handful
> of big vibrant cities such as New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los
> Angeles, but many have since moved to smaller hotspots like Tucson, Chapel
> Hill, and Colorado Springs.
>
> Without these immigrants, our high-tech economy would be unthinkable. Intel,
> Sun Microsystems, Google: All were founded or co-founded by immigrants from
> places like Russia, India, and Hungary. Nearly a third of all businesses
> founded in Silicon Valley during the 1990s were started by Chinese- or
> Indian-born entrepreneurs, according to the detailed statistical research of
> Annalee Saxenian of the University of California at Berkeley. And thousands
> upon thousands more constitute the technical core of our high-tech economy.
>
> The second great migration was an internal one: Millions of young, energetic
> and talented Americans from traditional industrial centers, small towns, and
> rural areas, packed up their Hondas and moved to more-thriving metro
> areas--generally the same ones that the immigrants came to. These native-born
> migrants helped to design and then feed the emerging creative industries that
> during the 1990s would come to define the age.
>
> This influx of talent turned America's creative centers into boomtowns.
> Salaries skyrocketed, followed by housing prices--especially those in the
> funky inner-city neighborhoods and gracious close-in suburbs favored by the
> product designers, video editors, hedge-fund analysts, and marketing
> consultants who made up this emerging new creative class. The rising living
> costs and go-go lifestyles engendered by the incoming creative class in turn
> drove out some of the lesser-educated natives, and even many of these creative
> migrants eventually had their fill and returned to their hometowns. The
> statistician Robert Cushing has come up with telling evidence of the economic
> impacts of these reciprocal migrations. Using Internal Revenue Service data,
> he found that families moving from Austin, a high-tech boomtown, to
> slower-growth Kansas City in the 1990s earned an average of $25,912 a year.
> Those going in the other direction, from Kansas City to Austin, earned over
> $65,000. He found similar disparities between Austin and other older cities:
> Cleveland, Louisville, Indianapolis, St. Louis, and Pittsburgh.
>
> But it's not as if the Clevelands and Kansas Cities didn't advance at all.
> Most added some jobs thanks to local nodes of creativity, such as
> university-connected medical centers, or managed not to lose as many jobs in
> their existing companies as they might have absent the help of
> innovations--primarily information technology--that the creative centers gave
> birth to. Average incomes in these places rose more slowly, or in some cases
> declined, but people's purchasing power generally increased, again thanks to
> creative-center innovations. Patrons of 7-Elevens in Moberly, Mo., could pick
> up a Motorola cell phone designed by Chinese-born engineers in suburban
> Chicago for $30, or order any number of ever-lower-priced goods from
> Seattle-based Amazon.com (founded by the son of a Cuban immigrant) using
> ever-cheaper computers purchased at CompUSA, headquartered in Dallas.
>
> The big sort
>
> These migrations had not only economic consequences but cultural ones. The
> last 20 years has seen the rise of the "culture wars"--between those who value
> traditional virtues, and others drawn to new lifestyles and diversity of
> opinion. In truth, this clash mostly played out among intellectuals of the
> left and right; as sociologist Alan Wolfe has shown, most Americans manage a
> subtle balance between the two tendencies. Still, the cleavages exist, roughly
> paralleling the ideologies of the two political parties. And increasingly in
> the 1990s, they expressed themselves geographically, as more and more
> Americans chose to live in places that suited their culture and lifestyle
> preferences.
>
> This movement of people is what the journalist Bill Bishop and I have referred
> to as the Big Sort, a sifting with enormous political and cultural
> implications, which has helped to give rise to what political demographer
> James Gimpel of the University of Maryland calls a "patchwork nation." City by
> city, neighborhood to neighborhood, Gimpel and others have found, our politics
> are becoming more concentrated and polarized. We may live in a 50-50 country,
> but the actual places we live (inner-ring v. outer-ring suburbs, San Francisco
> v. Fresno) are much more likely to distribute their loyalties 60-40, and
> getting more lopsided rather than less. These divisions arise not from some
> master plan but from millions upon millions of individual choices. Individuals
> are sorting themselves into communities of like-minded people which validate
> their choices and identities. Gay sales reps buy ramshackle old houses in the
> city and renovate them; straight, married sales reps purchase newly-built
> houses with yards on the suburban fringe. Conservative tech geeks move to
> Dallas, while liberal ones are more likely to go to San Francisco. Young
> African Americans who can write code find their way to Atlanta or Washington,
> D.C., while whites with the same education and skills are more likely to
> migrate to Seattle or Austin. Working-class Southern Californian whites priced
> out of the real estate market and perhaps feeling overwhelmed by the influx of
> Mexicans move to suburban Phoenix. More than ever before, those who possess
> the means move to the city and neighborhood that reinforces their social and
> cultural view of the world.
>
> And while there are no hard and fast rules--some liberals prefer suburbs of
> modest metro areas with lots of churches and shopping malls, some
> conservatives like urban neighborhoods with coffee shops--in general, these
> cultural and lifestyle preferences overlap with political ones (which the
> political parties have accentuated with computer-assisted redistricting). In
> 1980, according to Robert Cushing's detailed analysis of the election results,
> there wasn't a significant difference between how high-tech and low-tech
> regions voted for president; the difference between the parties still depended
> upon other factors. By 2000, however, the 21 regions with the largest
> concentrations of the creative class and the highest-tech economies voted
> Democratic at rates 17 percent above the national average. Regions with lower
> levels of creative people and low-tech economies, along with rural America,
> went Republican. In California, the most Democratic of states, George Bush won
> the state's 14 low-tech regions and rural areas by 210,000 votes. Al Gore took
> the 12 high-tech regions and their suburbs by over 1.5 million.
>
> Mutual contempt
>
> Bill Clinton was, in many ways the midwife of the new creative economy.
> Present at the birth of the '90s boom, he recognized it quickly for what it
> was and helped spur it by such projects as wiring poor and middle-class school
> classrooms around the country for the Internet and beating back Republican
> efforts to cut immigration. For this, he was beloved not only by creatives,
> but also by many of those in Red America whom he convinced would benefit from
> the new economy. But he also personally symbolized the creative-class
> archetype--its libertine character, its cleverness, its global-mindedness. For
> this, he drew the lasting enmity of many millions of those in the "other"
> America. It's often been said that Clinton was the embodiment of the '60s, and
> one's position for or against him revealed one's attitude towards that era.
> It's perhaps more precise to say that with his constant hyping of new
> technologies and "bridge to the twenty-first century" rhetoric, Clinton was
> the embodiment of what the '60s became--the creative class '90s, hip but
> pro-growth, open-minded and progressive but ambitious.
>
> While Clinton and the Democrats increasingly drew their support from the
> high-tech parts of the country, the Republicans increasingly came to represent
> the low-tech areas. Republican leaders like Tom DeLay and Dick Armey were
> beginning, during the early 1990s, to articulate the cultural and political
> antagonism Red America felt towards the emerging creative-class culture. But
> the politician who most skillfully spoke to these grievances was George W.
> Bush.
>
> Clinton's whole life is a testimony to the power of education to change class.
> Bush prides himself on the idea that his Yale education had no effect on how
> he sees things. Clinton was a famous world traveler, appreciative of foreign
> cultures and ideas. Bush, throughout his life, has been indifferent if not
> hostile to all of that. Clinton, especially in the early years of his
> administration, had the loose, unstructured management style of an academic
> department or a dot-com--manic work hours, meetings that went on forever, lots
> of diffuse power centers, young people running around in casual clothing, and
> a constant reappraising of plans and strategies. The Bush management style
> embodies the pre-creative corporate era--formal, hierarchal, with
> decision-making concentrated in the hands of only the most senior executives.
> Clinton was happy in Hollywood and vacationed in Martha's Vineyard. Bush can't
> wait to get back to Crawford. Clinton reveled in the company of writers,
> artists, scientists, and members of the intellectual elite. Bush has little
> tolerance for them. Clinton, in his rhetoric and policies, wanted to bring the
> gifts of the creative class--high technology, a tolerant culture--to the
> hinterlands. Bush aimed to bring the values and economic priorities of the
> hinterlands to that ultimate creative center, Washington, D.C.
>
> As president, Bush chose a group of senior advisors whose economic backgrounds
> have a century-old flavor. His vice president is an oil man. His treasury
> secretary, John Snow, is a railroad man. The White House's economic and fiscal
> policies have been similarly designed to provide life support for these aging
> red-state industries: $190 billion in subsidies for farmers; tariffs for
> steel; subsidies, tax breaks, and regulatory relief for logging, mining, coal,
> and natural gas. Even Bush's tax policy shows the same old-economy preference.
> His dividend tax cut was supported by mainstream, blue-chip companies, which
> stood to gain, but opposed by high-tech executives, whose company stocks
> seldom pay dividends.
>
> Thanks to the GOP takeover of Washington, and the harsh realities of the Big
> Sort, economically lagging parts of the country now wield ultimate political
> power, while the creative centers--source of most of America's economic
> growth--have virtually none. Democrats Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer
> speak for Silicon Valley and Hollywood. New York's Charles Schumer and Hillary
> Clinton, also Democrats, represent New York's finance and publishing
> industries. Washington State, home to Starbucks and Microsoft, has two
> Democratic senators, Patty Murray and Maria Cantwell. Boston's Route 128 and
> Washington's high-tech Maryland suburbs are also represented by Democratic
> senators. It's hard to understate how little influence these senators have
> with the Bush White House and in the GOP-controlled Congress.
>
> The new Ellis Island
>
> You don't have to be a Democrat to recognize that the political polarization
> of America and GOP dominance of Washington are not necessarily good news for
> America's economic future. Yet it's clear that Democrats themselves don't
> quite get it.
>
> All the current Democratic aspirants to the White House have whacked Bush for
> undermining our alliances and diplomatic capabilities through his
> unilateralism. A few, including Sen. John Kerry, have criticized the president
> as "anti-science." But none seems to have understood--or at least
> articulated--the disastrous economic consequences of these Know-Nothing views.
> In the post-1990s global economy, America must aggressively compete with other
> developed countries for the international talent that can spur new industries
> and new jobs. By thumbing our nose at the world and dismissing the consensus
> views of the scientific community, we are scaring off that talent and sending
> it to our competitors.
>
> If there is any candidate who speaks for the creative class right now, it is
> Howard Dean. His educated, tech-savvy supporters and grass-roots,
> non-hierarchal campaign structure perfectly represent the creative economy.
> Yet his economic message has so far focused on luring swing-state
> unionists--criticizing Bush, for instance, for not extending steel tariffs.
>
> America must not only stop making dumb mistakes, like starting trade wars with
> Europe and China; it must also put in place new policies that enhance our
> creative economy. Here, too, neither party quite gets it. Most of the
> Democratic candidates for president have rightly sounded the alarm about
> rising college-tuition costs and offered ideas to expand college access.
> That's well and good, but we need to think far, far bigger. Our research
> universities are immigrant magnets, the Ellis Islands of the 21st century.
> And, with the demand among our own citizens for elite education far
> outstripping the supply, we should embark on a massive university building
> spree, for which we will be paid back many-fold in future economic growth.
> Building some of these top-flight universities in struggling red-state regions
> might give their economies a shot at a better future and help bridge the
> growing political divide.
>
> Democrats have understandably seized on the corporate outsourcing of jobs as a
> campaign issue. But let's get real: Demanding higher labor and environmental
> standards in trade agreements--the Democrats' favorite fix--is not going to
> keep software jobs from migrating to Eastern Europe. Our only hope is to
> strengthen our creative economy so that it produces more jobs to replace the
> ones we're losing. That will require taking on the Washington lobbyists who
> put the fix in for established industries at the expense of emerging ones.
> Millions of new jobs in the wireless networking field, for instance, could be
> created if unused broadcast spectrum, currently controlled by TV networks and
> the military, could be freed up. When's the last time you heard a presidential
> candidate talk about that?
>
> It is a sad irony: America's creative economy sparked a demographic shift and
> a political polarization that now threaten to choke that economy off. What
> America desperately needs now is political leadership savvy enough to bridge
> that gap. To his credit, President Bush has made the Republican Party much
> more immigrant-friendly. But his talk about diversity seems almost entirely
> pitched to win the working-class Hispanic vote; he seems uninterested, to say
> the least, in changing other policies that are driving away the high-end
> immigrants and generally undermining the creative economy. To his credit,
> Howard Dean has tried to speak to his party of the need to put forth policies
> that appeal to citizens in both blue and red parts of the country. But as he
> showed with remarks about reaching out to guys with rebel flags on their
> pickups, he seems, to say the least, not to have found the language to do so.
>
> The challenge for the GOP, if it wants to avoid running the economy into the
> ground, is to stop sneering at the elites, the better to win votes in their
> base, and to start paying attention to economic policies that might lift all
> boats. The challenge for Democrats, if they want to win, is to find ways of
> reaching out to the rest of the country, to convince at least some of its many
> regions that policies which operate to the interests of the creative class are
> in their interests as well.
>
> Richard Florida is the Heinz professor of economic development at Carnegie
> Mellon University and the author of The Rise of the Creative Class.