The PoD is a western decision to try to drive into Czechoslavakia as much as possible. They're seeking some degree of concrete influence in east-central Europe, as they've gotten a little upset with some Soviet actions in Poland and Romania in February and March, and some manuevers towards Turkey in March. (If we consider it too much of a stretch for the Americans to be thinking in such competitive terms vis- a-vis the Soviets, we could say the American and Commonwealth beaches are switched on D-Day, and its the British who man the central vector towards saxony, northern Bavaria and Bohemia). While plunging east into Bohemia is a less bold way of curtailing Soviet influence than pshing for Berlin, it should be a bit less costly.
For alot of reasons, this is unlikely to actually earn the west much influence. Liberation from the west may not wipe away disgust at the west over Munich. Plus, Munich entirely aside, based on the post-WWI experience, the Czechs will likely believe that the western allies will leave and demobilize soon, and the Soviets are the essential ally against a resurgent Germany. There's not much anticommunism in Czecoslovakia either. Plus, even if the Czechs were less amenable to the Soviets, the Soviets could choose to leverage their significant presence in Slovakia, and probably Moravia, for concessions on Czech internal and external policies.
But, what might the knock-ons be of this somewhat forward western policy?
Would the Soviets retaliate, and how? By speeding up satellitization in east-central Europe? By giving the west more trouble over Berlin (excludingtem?) or Trieste, by refusing to ask the Greek communists (or Italian or French communists) for restraint, by being more defiant on issues related to turkey or Iran. Or, if the west is making faits accompli in CCentral Europe, might the Soviets do something similar when they get involved in the Pacific War, for example moving to occupy Seoul or Inchon or Beijing in advance of the Americans?
In article <75c9dab1-1fd5-41d4-b95c-e0045a914...@e1g2000hsh.googlegroups.com>,
raharris1...@my-deja.com (Rob Harris) wrote: > The PoD is a western decision to try to drive into Czechoslavakia as > much as possible.
Occupation zones had been fixed well before the Western Allies crossed the Rhine. At Yalta IIRC. As it was the Soviets and Western Allies ended up actually turning over captured territory to each other. Failing this agreement I doubt if the Soviets would have stopped after Berlin but kept going until they reached Allied troops. Breaching it could be considered an act of war.
Neither the US or the UK had troops or logistics to spare for a dash to Czechoslovakia anyway. Their high command was concentrating on defeating Germany not side shows.
> In article > <75c9dab1-1fd5-41d4-b95c-e0045a914...@e1g2000hsh.googlegroups.com>,
> raharris1...@my-deja.com (Rob Harris) wrote: > > The PoD is a western decision to try to drive into Czechoslavakia as > > much as possible.
> Occupation zones had been fixed well before the Western Allies crossed > the Rhine. At Yalta IIRC. As it was the Soviets and Western Allies ended > up actually turning over captured territory to each other. Failing this > agreement I doubt if the Soviets would have stopped after Berlin but > kept going until they reached Allied troops. Breaching it could be > considered an act of war.
> Neither the US or the UK had troops or logistics to spare for a dash to > Czechoslovakia anyway. Their high command was concentrating on defeating > Germany not side shows.
> Ken Young
On Nov 19, 2:32 pm, ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
> Neither the US or the UK had troops or logistics to spare for a dash to > Czechoslovakia anyway. Their high command was concentrating on defeating > Germany not side shows.
From Hof, Patton was directed South, skirting the Czech Border to the Danube in late March and April, to attack the non-existant 'Nazi National Redoubt'. Patton's request to go East was repeatedly denied by Bradley and then by Ike, until May 4th. During this time, Patton had a number of units withdrawn from his control.
16 Armored and V Corps going to Pilsen, and 4 Armored and IIRC XII Corps to Ceske: but this was after the end in the War was in sight, as with the Bulge, HQ didn't believe that Patton could change his Axis of attack as quick as he did, and Ike ordered Patton to stop advancing on the 7th.
9th Armored was in Reserve in April, and could have been sent West towards Prauge around April 20 , and VIII Corps and part of XX Corps kept in Third Army control rather than be passed to First Army and then even further North to Ninth Army, for the drive on the Elbe.
When Patton did get the OK, V Corps was added to Third Army, to make up for units transferred earlier,with a total of 18 infantry and armored divisions, plus the typical US additional support battalions.
There was enough logistics for a drive East, had the will been there. the German 7th Army was pretty much a mob at this point, not able to defend well: the active units were resisting the Soviets, but not the US with the limited amount of fueled tanks remaining
> In article > <75c9dab1-1fd5-41d4-b95c-e0045a914...@e1g2000hsh.googlegroups.com>,
> raharris1...@my-deja.com (Rob Harris) wrote: > > The PoD is a western decision to try to drive into Czechoslavakia as > > much as possible.
> Occupation zones had been fixed well before the Western Allies crossed > the Rhine. At Yalta IIRC. As it was the Soviets and Western Allies ended > up actually turning over captured territory to each other. Failing this > agreement I doubt if the Soviets would have stopped after Berlin but > kept going until they reached Allied troops. Breaching it could be > considered an act of war.
> Neither the US or the UK had troops or logistics to spare for a dash to > Czechoslovakia anyway. Their high command was concentrating on defeating > Germany not side shows.
> Ken Young
# 1 Yalta was specific on German occupation zones. Did it say anything specific about Czechoslovakia? And while Germany needed some years of occuption administration, in liberated countries, like Czechoslovakia, once one allied army disarms the Germans, there's no rationale foranother allied army to ocupy that territory.
# 2 Hey what if they change their mind? By mid-summer they were starting to reassess the endgame in the Pacific.
On Nov 20, 7:38 am, Rob Harris <raharris1...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> # 1 Yalta was specific on German occupation zones. Did it say > anything specific about Czechoslovakia?
No.
And that was why the Communist takeover was such a big deal -- it was the first clear evidence of the USSR expanding beyond what had been agreed at Yalta and the "percentages agreement" of 1944. Moscow had pulled out from northern Iran -- grudgingly, but they'd done it; had withdrawn their claim against Turkey for the 1877 boundaries; and had tacitly allowed the Greek Communists to be crushed. So, up until 1948, it was still possible to claim with a straight face that the USSR wasn't expansionist.
As to the west taking Prague, IMO it would have been possible and it would have made a difference. Note that the liberating troops would have been Americans, and so not tainted with the Munich connection.
Of course, Czecheslovakia would still have a large and powerful Communist party, and -- as noted -- not a strong tradition of anti- Communism. So there might be a coup anyway. I'm not conversant enough with Czech history to say for sure.
> As to the west taking Prague, IMO it would have been possible and it > would have made a difference.
As it was, recon elements from 16th Armored got within 17 miles of Prague when Ike's May 6 Halt order was received from Third Army HQ, and the 69th Armored Infantry Battalion was at 11 miles: there was little organized resistance on the way to the city, and there was a full scale uprising of the Czech Resistance in the city that the recon elements noted on their radios.
ObWI: Patton thought of staying incommunicado, just not taking messages from Bradley or Ike, and let his troops keep running East to grab as much of CZ before the war ended.
>> As to the west taking Prague, IMO it would have been possible and it >> would have made a difference.
> As it was, recon elements from 16th Armored got within 17 miles > of Prague when Ike's May 6 Halt order was received from Third > Army HQ, and the 69th Armored Infantry Battalion was at 11 miles: > there was little organized resistance on the way to the city, and > there was a full scale uprising of the Czech Resistance in the city > that the recon elements noted on their radios.
> ObWI: Patton thought of staying incommunicado, just not taking > messages from Bradley or Ike, and let his troops keep running > East to grab as much of CZ before the war ended.
As the deal has been done I imagine the only real effect would be an influx of Czech refugees into the areas held by the Western Allies.
-- William Black
I've seen things you people wouldn't believe. Barbeques on fire by the chalets past the castle headland I watched the gift shops glitter in the darkness off the Newborough gate All these moments will be lost in time, like icecream on the beach Time for tea.
> On Nov 20, 7:38 am, Rob Harris <raharris1...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> > # 1 Yalta was specific on German occupation zones. Did it say > > anything specific about Czechoslovakia?
> No.
> And that was why the Communist takeover was such a big deal -- it was > the first clear evidence of the USSR expanding beyond what had been > agreed at Yalta and the "percentages agreement" of 1944. Moscow had > pulled out from northern Iran -- grudgingly, but they'd done it; had > withdrawn their claim against Turkey for the 1877 boundaries; and had > tacitly allowed the Greek Communists to be crushed. So, up until > 1948, it was still possible to claim with a straight face that the > USSR wasn't expansionist.
Hmm, I'd seen some scholarship that the Czech coup was not entirely a shock to government circles in OTL, and, according to David Tenner, the west had written it off to a degree by 46 & 47.
> As to the west taking Prague, IMO it would have been possible and it > would have made a difference.
Hmm, see the linked thread in the first post to see arguments why it might not have, at least as far as the future Czech regime was concerned.
But, supposing it makes a difference - what kind?
The Czechs getting in on the Marshall Plan?
How would the Czechs deal with the superpowers? My suspicion is that they would really be advocates of east-west detente, not that they could have a decisive impact on it.
How ticked would the Russians be and what would they do about it? Might the Soviets support a Slovak secession if the Czechs were too defiant on too many issues?
Are the Czechs still selling arms to the Israelis (I suspect so, I think it was approved by, not necessarilly directed by Stalin in OTL).
Note that the liberating troops would
> have been Americans, and so not tainted with the Munich connection.
Hmm, what if the PoD is that the Brits have the central sector and they do the liberation?
> Of course, Czecheslovakia would still have a large and powerful > Communist party, and -- as noted -- not a strong tradition of anti- > Communism. So there might be a coup anyway. I'm not conversant > enough with Czech history to say for sure.
The coup would even be more of a shock if th Allies had gotten deep into the country before demobilizing. Anticipation of that shock might, just might have made Stalin more cautious about approving the coup. But, he did authorize the North Koreans to go south in 1950, despite that area's recent occupation by the US, so its a toss-up.
> Doug M.
On a completely unrelated note Doug, I was looking up some Japan stuff, and I believe you once mentioned that if the Japanese had won Midway, and if they could get their chain of command in order (this second "if" is huge), they might have made a peace offer to the US. You said a professor you knew was going to elaborate on it. Do you remember this, and did you hear any more theories about it?
> As to the west taking Prague, IMO it would have been possible and it > would have made a difference. Note that the liberating troops would > have been Americans, and so not tainted with the Munich connection.
> Of course, Czecheslovakia would still have a large and powerful > Communist party, and -- as noted -- not a strong tradition of anti- > Communism. So there might be a coup anyway. I'm not conversant > enough with Czech history to say for sure.
The events which eventually resulted in absolute power of the communist party had started long before the liberation of the country.
Communist party was the leading part of anti-German resistance, at least they and the Germans claimed so and not being associated with the old system they could soundly promise to solve severe social problems of the first republic.
> > As to the west taking Prague, IMO it would have been possible and it > > would have made a difference. Note that the liberating troops would > > have been Americans, and so not tainted with the Munich connection.
> > Of course, Czecheslovakia would still have a large and powerful > > Communist party, and -- as noted -- not a strong tradition of anti- > > Communism. So there might be a coup anyway. I'm not conversant > > enough with Czech history to say for sure.
> The events which eventually resulted in absolute power of the communist > party > had started long before the liberation of the country.
> Communist party was the leading part of anti-German resistance, > at least they and the Germans claimed so and not being > associated with the old system they could soundly promise > to solve severe social problems of the first republic.
> /Pavel
Interesting, Krystof Zietara was making somewhat similar points the last time we discussed this on the NG. Please forgive me, but your name sounds Czech, and I wonder if his is as well. It has seemed from an anecdotal sampling that Czechs in this group and Ian Montgomerie's are not very optimistic about Czechoslovakia chances to fight off either the communists or Nazis. That adds a little bit of credibility to Czecho-pessimist interpretations.
So, assuming that basically a western liberation makes no difference within Czechoslovakia, which, for largely internal reasons, gives itself away to communism, will there be any consequences that alter the situation outside of Czechoslovakia, possibly due to earlier competition between the Soviets and US?
> So, assuming that basically a western liberation makes no difference > within Czechoslovakia, which, for largely internal reasons, gives > itself away to communism,
I admit I don't know the internal situation of Czechoslovakia well. But I'd like to point out that Italy and Greece had fine internal reasons to go Communist, were liberated by the Westerners, were not in the Soviet sphere, and somehow those internal reasons failed to work.
So I think the difference is being, or not, in the Soviet sphere.
>> > As to the west taking Prague, IMO it would have been possible and it >> > would have made a difference. Note that the liberating troops would >> > have been Americans, and so not tainted with the Munich connection.
>> > Of course, Czecheslovakia would still have a large and powerful >> > Communist party, and -- as noted -- not a strong tradition of anti- >> > Communism. So there might be a coup anyway. I'm not conversant >> > enough with Czech history to say for sure.
>> The events which eventually resulted in absolute power of the communist >> party >> had started long before the liberation of the country.
>> Communist party was the leading part of anti-German resistance, >> at least they and the Germans claimed so and not being >> associated with the old system they could soundly promise >> to solve severe social problems of the first republic.
>> /Pavel
> Interesting, Krystof Zietara was making somewhat similar points the > last time we discussed this on the NG. Please forgive me, but your > name sounds Czech, and I wonder if his is as well. It has seemed from > an anecdotal sampling that Czechs in this group and Ian Montgomerie's > are not very optimistic about Czechoslovakia chances to fight off > either the communists or Nazis. That adds a little bit of credibility > to Czecho-pessimist interpretations.
> So, assuming that basically a western liberation makes no difference > within Czechoslovakia, which, for largely internal reasons, gives > itself away to communism, will there be any consequences that alter > the situation outside of Czechoslovakia, possibly due to earlier > competition between the Soviets and US?
Yes, I am a Czech. Krystof Zietara could be Polish.
The post-war political and economical framework was drawn before the end of the war (mid of 44). The interim Czechoslovak government was already acting over Slovakia and much of the country would be liberated by the Soviet troops anyway.
One consequence of Patton in Prague could be that the communist takeover of power gets opposed violently (OTL events were bloodless). Even then it is hard to imagine an OTL person with enough of power and ability to successfully resist the very well organized CP.
Answering Michele A.: one difference between Greece and Italy and Czechoslovakia (the Czech lands) was Germany as neighbour and the Munich Agreement. Close cooperation with Soviet Union (didn't betray us, will keep Germans down, Slavic) was the rule no political party dared to dispute and top card for communist propaganda.
Such motivation was much weaker in Slovakia (where the CP was only second in 1946 elections).
