What if Metaxas lives through the beginning of 1942 instead? Does it
change Greek strategy or any outcomes, at least in the short-term?
What if the Italians invaded Crete and or the Ionians at the beginning
of the war or within a week or two of its start? Per the ever--
reliable wikipedia analysis, "Another notable failure of the Italian
offense is the lack of any attack on the Ionian Islands or Crete,
which were obvious and relatively undefended targets and could have
provided Italy with strong forward naval and air bases."
What would a good Italian plan to invade Greece in autumn 1940 have
looked like?
Could the Greeks and British have seized Rhodes and the Dodecanese
from the Italians between October 1940 and May 1941?
What's the hardest possible time the Axis could have in Greece, with
any PoD after October 1940?
> What if Metaxas lives through the beginning of 1942 instead? Does it
> change Greek strategy or any outcomes, at least in the short-term?
Not that I see.
> What if the Italians invaded Crete and or the Ionians at the beginning
> of the war or within a week or two of its start? Per the ever--
> reliable wikipedia analysis, "Another notable failure of the Italian
> offense is the lack of any attack on the Ionian Islands or Crete,
> which were obvious and relatively undefended targets and could have
> provided Italy with strong forward naval and air bases."
Corfu, maybe. But for what the air and sea parts of the campaign mattered, that's not all that useful. Crete, no. There isn't the strategic capability to support such a long-ranging operation. The Greeks would have little to oppose the first-day operations, but then it would just be up to the weather, distances, shortage of logistical lift, and British submarines.
> What would a good Italian plan to invade Greece in autumn 1940 have
> looked like?
Well, not starting with that few troops in Albania to start with; but having a sufficient number of troops means substantially boosting Albania as a logistical platform. Building up port handling capacity, military bases, and above all roads. You just can't do it with the Italian annexation of Albania on its actual date.
A landing not on Corfu but on the mainland Ionian coast, say at Igoumenitsa, would have been a good idea; but not a quick war-winner, considering, once again logistical constraints (small port, bad road leaving it etc.). It would have given the Greeks more of a headache.
Naturally to do that, you probably also have to land on Corfu.
Such naval operations require, of course, time to prepare, which the Italians lacked in OTL.
> Could the Greeks and British have seized Rhodes and the Dodecanese
> from the Italians between October 1940 and May 1941?
No. The British however are likely to bomb it at will one day or another, making a propaganda point mostly.
> What's the hardest possible time the Axis could have in Greece, with
> any PoD after October 1940?
The Germans don't intervene and the Italians remain stalemated and humiliated more or less where they were at the end of their largely unsuccessful March 1941 counteroffensive. For this to happen, Yugoslavia has to be German-friendly. The British might also not intervene save in sending the Greeks war materiel. That has a kncok-on in North Africa, with the Italians probably pushed back all the way to Tripolitania. I don't think that even in this case Tripoli falls, but Tripolitania remains the only African bridgehead in Italian hands by the end of 1941.
On Monday, October 8, 2012 6:06:33 AM UTC-4, Michele wrote:
Is there any way the Greeks under anyone (not just Metaxas) could have changed deployments to make the conquest of Greece slow down past April 41 and make the Axis pay much more dearly for getting down to Attica and the Pelopponese? Could we end up with an outcome where virtually all the Aegean islands (less Euboea and the Dodecanese most likely) end up permanently in allied hands?
On Monday, October 8, 2012 6:06:33 AM UTC-4, Michele wrote:
> Is there any way the Greeks under anyone (not just Metaxas) could have > changed deployments to make the > conquest of Greece slow down past April > 41 and make the Axis pay much more dearly for getting down to Attica and > the Pelopponese?
I doubt that. They stopped the last Italian attempt, largely successfully, and remained solidly in Albanian territory - by scraping the bottom of their barrels. They can keep the Bulgarian and Yugoslavian borders manned, but in that case the Italians will probably make some more progress. Puny, mind you; but maybe enough to encourage Mussolini to keep pushing. And when the Germans do come, that different distribution of the Greek forces mean the Germans pay a higher price in blood, I doubt in days, I'd rule out weeks.
On Mon, 8 Oct 2012 12:06:33 +0200, "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelN...@tln.it>
wrote:
>The Germans don't intervene and the Italians remain stalemated and >humiliated more or less where they were at the end of their largely >unsuccessful March 1941 counteroffensive. For this to happen, Yugoslavia has >to be German-friendly. The British might also not intervene save in sending >the Greeks war materiel. That has a kncok-on in North Africa, with the >Italians probably pushed back all the way to Tripolitania. I don't think >that even in this case Tripoli falls, but Tripolitania remains the only >African bridgehead in Italian hands by the end of 1941.
For Yugoslavia to be pro-German in 1941 is not that big a POD - though
I don't pretend I know enough about Yugoslavia in this era to suggest
a scenario where there's no anti-German coup (which is what triggered
the German invasion in the first place)
With no British landing in Greece they MIGHT take El Agheila but
anything further west seems unlikely. Logistically I just don't think
they had the means to do so in early 1941.
I've always wondered why Bulgaria entered the war since their main
role seems to have been against Yugoslavia in May/June 1941 and to
surrender to the Soviets in 1944. If they stay neutral I don't see how
the Communists come to power in 1944-46. Nor can I envision a scenario
where they play any kind of serious role in the war on the scale of
Hungary or even Slovakia.
On Oct 8, 4:04 pm, The Horny Goat <lcra...@home.ca> wrote:
> I've always wondered why Bulgaria entered the war since their main
> role seems to have been against Yugoslavia in May/June 1941 and to
> surrender to the Soviets in 1944. If they stay neutral I don't see how
> the Communists come to power in 1944-46. Nor can I envision a scenario
> where they play any kind of serious role in the war on the scale of
> Hungary or even Slovakia.
Bulgarian neutrality would seem to make for a fascinating TL. What if
they avoided commitment as carefully as the Turks did?
I guess their problem was they had territorial claims on Greece and
Yugoslavia. They didn't want to be the ones to say "no" to Hitler at
that point (and Yugoslavia's experience probably vindicated that
judgement). Also, they had taken Romanian territory and Romania was
aligning with the Germans. They didn't want to be forced to cough
that back up, even if you set aside the risk of a total invasion.
> On Oct 8, 4:04 pm, The Horny Goat <lcra...@home.ca> wrote:
>> I've always wondered why Bulgaria entered the war since their main
>> role seems to have been against Yugoslavia in May/June 1941 and to
>> surrender to the Soviets in 1944. If they stay neutral I don't see how
>> the Communists come to power in 1944-46. Nor can I envision a scenario
>> where they play any kind of serious role in the war on the scale of
>> Hungary or even Slovakia.
> Bulgarian neutrality would seem to make for a fascinating TL. What if
> they avoided commitment as carefully as the Turks did?
> I guess their problem was they had territorial claims on Greece and
> Yugoslavia. They didn't want to be the ones to say "no" to Hitler at
> that point (and Yugoslavia's experience probably vindicated that
> judgement). Also, they had taken Romanian territory and Romania was
> aligning with the Germans. They didn't want to be forced to cough
> that back up, even if you set aside the risk of a total invasion.
And don't forget that at least they weren't forced to join Barbarossa or even break diplomatic relations with the USSR. After Pearl Harbor, the Bulgarians probably viewed a declaration of war against the US and UK as the minimum they could do to appease the Germans under those circumstances.
<dten...@ameritech.net> wrote:
>> Bulgarian neutrality would seem to make for a fascinating TL. What if
>> they avoided commitment as carefully as the Turks did?
>> I guess their problem was they had territorial claims on Greece and
>> Yugoslavia. They didn't want to be the ones to say "no" to Hitler at
>> that point (and Yugoslavia's experience probably vindicated that
>> judgement). Also, they had taken Romanian territory and Romania was
>> aligning with the Germans. They didn't want to be forced to cough
>> that back up, even if you set aside the risk of a total invasion.
>And don't forget that at least they weren't forced to join Barbarossa or even >break diplomatic relations with the USSR. After Pearl Harbor, the Bulgarians >probably viewed a declaration of war against the US and UK as the minimum >they could do to appease the Germans under those circucumstances.
Well that's the kind of thing I'm thinking of but to me it seems that
Bulgarian belligerency means a great deal of risk for next to no
reward.. What did the Bulgarians hope to gain? The FYROM? Thessalnika?
> On Mon, 8 Oct 2012 12:06:33 +0200, "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelN...@tln.it>
> wrote:
>>The Germans don't intervene and the Italians remain stalemated and
>>humiliated more or less where they were at the end of their largely
>>unsuccessful March 1941 counteroffensive. For this to happen, Yugoslavia >>has
>>to be German-friendly. The British might also not intervene save in >>sending
>>the Greeks war materiel. That has a kncok-on in North Africa, with the
>>Italians probably pushed back all the way to Tripolitania. I don't think
>>that even in this case Tripoli falls, but Tripolitania remains the only
>>African bridgehead in Italian hands by the end of 1941.
> For Yugoslavia to be pro-German in 1941 is not that big a POD - though
> I don't pretend I know enough about Yugoslavia in this era to suggest
> a scenario where there's no anti-German coup (which is what triggered
> the German invasion in the first place)
In fact.
> With no British landing in Greece they MIGHT take El Agheila but
> anything further west seems unlikely. Logistically I just don't think
> they had the means to do so in early 1941.
The italians, however, had little to oppose them with and what's more, Graziani was of a mind to withdrawing all the way to Tripolitania. Logistics is a problem, yes, but much less so if the enemy isn't making you expend ammo.
> I've always wondered why Bulgaria entered the war since their main
> role seems to have been against Yugoslavia in May/June 1941 and to
> surrender to the Soviets in 1944. If they stay neutral I don't see how
> the Communists come to power in 1944-46. Nor can I envision a scenario
> where they play any kind of serious role in the war on the scale of
> Hungary or even Slovakia.
Bulgaria entered the war as a German ally because the alternative would have been to have been a neutral, yes, a neutral like Denmark. The Germans wanted passage and they were going to get it. The Bulgarians, like so many others, decided they'd be better to side with the... winners. Note indeed that the proof that Bulgaria wasn't out for territorial aggrandizement per se, is the fact that they turned down an offer by Ciano to join in the attack on Greece; Italy had no means to force them. They accepted when the proposal came from Germany, the country that already had an army-sized "military mission" in neighboring Romania.
>> On Oct 8, 4:04 pm, The Horny Goat <lcra...@home.ca> wrote:
>>> I've always wondered why Bulgaria entered the war since
>>> their main role seems to have been against Yugoslavia in
>>> May/June 1941 and to surrender to the Soviets in 1944. If
>>> they stay neutral I don't see how the Communists come to
>>> power in 1944-46. Nor can I envision a scenario where they
>>> play any kind of serious role in the war on the scale of
>>> Hungary or even Slovakia.
>> Bulgarian neutrality would seem to make for a fascinating TL.
>> What if they avoided commitment as carefully as the Turks
>> did?
>> I guess their problem was they had territorial claims on
>> Greece and
>> Yugoslavia. They didn't want to be the ones to say "no" to
>> Hitler at that point (and Yugoslavia's experience probably
>> vindicated that
>> judgement). Also, they had taken Romanian territory and
>> Romania was
>> aligning with the Germans. They didn't want to be forced to
>> cough that back up, even if you set aside the risk of a total
>> invasion.
> And don't forget that at least they weren't forced to join
> Barbarossa or even
> break diplomatic relations with the USSR. After Pearl Harbor,
> the Bulgarians probably viewed a declaration of war against
> the US and UK as the minimum they could do to appease the
> Germans under those circumstances.
It is worth mentioning that Bulgaria protected her Jews.
> Bulgaria entered the war as a German ally because the alternative would
> have been to have been a neutral, yes, a neutral like Denmark. The
> Germans wanted passage and they were going to get it. The Bulgarians,
> like so many others, decided they'd be better to side with the...
> winners. Note indeed that the proof that Bulgaria wasn't out for
> territorial aggrandizement per se, is the fact that they turned down an
> offer by Ciano to join in the attack on Greece; Italy had no means to
> force them. They accepted when the proposal came from Germany, the
> country that already had an army-sized "military mission" in neighboring
> Romania.
Trivia note: Bulgaria was the only Axis nation to come out of the war with a net gain in territory (Southern Dobrudja).
On Tue, 09 Oct 2012 16:55:08 +0200, Bradipus <ahem-a...@never.mind.it>
wrote:
>It is worth mentioning that Bulgaria protected her Jews.
As I recall, their stated reason for doing so was along the lines that
they were Bulgarians first and Jews second. Not that, aiui, they
necessarily treated any minorities particularly well ... they just
kept the pogroms within bounds.
<dten...@ameritech.net> wrote:
>> Bulgaria entered the war as a German ally because the alternative would
>> have been to have been a neutral, yes, a neutral like Denmark. The
>> Germans wanted passage and they were going to get it. The Bulgarians,
>> like so many others, decided they'd be better to side with the...
>> winners. Note indeed that the proof that Bulgaria wasn't out for
>> territorial aggrandizement per se, is the fact that they turned down an
>> offer by Ciano to join in the attack on Greece; Italy had no means to
>> force them. They accepted when the proposal came from Germany, the
>> country that already had an army-sized "military mission" in neighboring
>> Romania.
>Trivia note: Bulgaria was the only Axis nation to come out of the war with a >net gain in territory (Southern Dobrudja).
True - but given the price was 45 years of Communism I doubt they'd
say they were better off for it!
>On Tue, 09 Oct 2012 17:58:24 -0500, David Tenner
><dten...@ameritech.net> wrote:
>>> Bulgaria entered the war as a German ally because the alternative would
>>> have been to have been a neutral, yes, a neutral like Denmark. The
>>> Germans wanted passage and they were going to get it. The Bulgarians,
>>> like so many others, decided they'd be better to side with the...
>>> winners. Note indeed that the proof that Bulgaria wasn't out for
>>> territorial aggrandizement per se, is the fact that they turned down an
>>> offer by Ciano to join in the attack on Greece; Italy had no means to
>>> force them. They accepted when the proposal came from Germany, the
>>> country that already had an army-sized "military mission" in neighboring
>>> Romania.
>>Trivia note: Bulgaria was the only Axis nation to come out of the war with a >>net gain in territory (Southern Dobrudja).
>True - but given the price was 45 years of Communism I doubt they'd
>say they were better off for it!
Do you *really* *seriously* think that they would have been able to
*avoid* a communist dominated government, if not a Soviuet
"liberation" *even if* they had remained a neutral?
<asp...@pacific.net.au> wrote:
>>>Trivia note: Bulgaria was the only Axis nation to come out of the war with a >>>net gain in territory (Southern Dobrudja).
>>True - but given the price was 45 years of Communism I doubt they'd
>>say they were better off for it!
>Do you *really* *seriously* think that they would have been able to
>*avoid* a communist dominated government, if not a Soviuet
>"liberation" *even if* they had remained a neutral?
Obviously not if Stalin thought he NEEDED Bulgaria or if Bulgaria was
perceived to be any kind of threat to the Soviet Union.
Otherwise sure why not? Finland managed it quite well and they were
_far_ more of a threat to the USSR than the Bulgarians ever were even
in OTL. Obviously if Bulgaria stays neutral they're likely to be
considered far less of a threat.
Similarly Tito's Yugoslavia escaped Soviet invasion in 1949-50 despite
essentially telling Stalin in p*** up a rope.
The flip side of this is that there was plenty of Soviet repression in
what became Warsaw Pact countries that did not involve Soviet troops.
East Germany Poland and Romania all had clampdowns in the postwar era.
So no question a non-communist Bulgaria COULD have been forced into
the Soviet bloc but it was by no means inevitable as the Finnish
example shows. Bulgaria was by no means as important to Stalin as was
Greece or Estonia.
On Tuesday, October 9, 2012 2:07:46 AM UTC-5, The Horny Goat wrote:
Well that's the kind of thing I'm thinking of but to me it seems that Bulgarian belligerency means a great deal of risk for next to no reward.. What did the Bulgarians hope to gain? The FYROM? Thessalnika?
Horny Goat, it seems to me this question applies with even more force to Bulgaria in World War I than WWII.
All they could hope to gain was Macedonia and Salonika, Romania (a neutral at the time) and Turkey, a Central Power, were not obliged to give up territories Bulgaria claimed by Bulgaria's 1915 DoW.
It also seems to me that the Central Powers were far less well position ed to force Bulgaria into the war or threaten her with harm had she stayed steadfastly neutral in WWI.
Anybody remember if Bulgaria declared war on Czarist Russia in WWI?
Another ObWI - Bulgaria benefits in the interwar era from an "Ataturk" figure, who gains some territory back and makes a later policy of neutrality stick.
<raharris1...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>On Tuesday, October 9, 2012 2:07:46 AM UTC-5, The Horny Goat wrote:
> Well that's the kind of thing I'm thinking of but to me it seems that Bulgarian belligerency means a great deal of risk for next to no reward.. What did the Bulgarians hope to gain? The FYROM? Thessalnika?
>Horny Goat, it seems to me this question applies with even more force to Bulgaria in World War I than WWII.
>All they could hope to gain was Macedonia and Salonika, Romania (a neutral at the time) and Turkey, a Central Power, were not obliged to give up territories Bulgaria claimed by Bulgaria's 1915 DoW.
>It also seems to me that the Central Powers were far less well position ed to force Bulgaria into the war or threaten her with harm had she stayed steadfastly neutral in WWI.
>Anybody remember if Bulgaria declared war on Czarist Russia in WWI?
>Another ObWI - Bulgaria benefits in the interwar era from an "Ataturk" figure, who gains some territory back and makes a later policy of neutrality stick.
Yup - I agree with you. That said WW1 was originally seen in Serbia,
Rumania and Bulgaria as a "Third Balkan War" and Bulgaria was smarting
from its defeat in the Second Balkan War. Given Serbia and Rumania
were Entente powers (as was Montenegro) this pretty much ensured
Bulgaria would be pro-Central Powers.
I've heard it argued that the 1939-40 Winter War pretty much ensured
Finnish belligerancy if and when German and Russia went to war and
that that was about the only scenario where Finland WOULD go to war
against Russia. That minus the Winter War Finland would have been
nearly as neutral as Switzerland. That to me overstates the case but I
do think the legacy of the Second Balkan War of 1913 pretty much
ensured Bulgaria would enter on the opposite side to Serbia.
> On Mon, 08 Oct 2012 21:37:22 -0500, David Tenner
> <dten...@ameritech.net> wrote:
>>> Bulgarian neutrality would seem to make for a fascinating TL. What if
>>> they avoided commitment as carefully as the Turks did?
>>> I guess their problem was they had territorial claims on Greece and
>>> Yugoslavia. They didn't want to be the ones to say "no" to Hitler at
>>> that point (and Yugoslavia's experience probably vindicated that
>>> judgement). Also, they had taken Romanian territory and Romania was
>>> aligning with the Germans. They didn't want to be forced to cough
>>> that back up, even if you set aside the risk of a total invasion.
>>And don't forget that at least they weren't forced to join Barbarossa or
>>even break diplomatic relations with the USSR. After Pearl Harbor, the
>>Bulgarians probably viewed a declaration of war against the US and UK as
>>the minimum they could do to appease the Germans under those
>>circucumstances.
> Well that's the kind of thing I'm thinking of but to me it seems that
> Bulgarian belligerency means a great deal of risk for next to no
> reward.. What did the Bulgarians hope to gain? The FYROM? Thessalnika?
You are talking as if this was a voluntary decision. Marshall Lee Miller in *Bulgaria During the Second World War* (Stanford University Press 1975), p. 68, gives some reason to think it was not: "When asked a year and a half later why he had favored this declaration, [Prime Minister] Filov replied that Germany had been so insistent that there had been no possibility of avoiding it. The architect Yordan Sevov, the Tsar's closest friend and adviser, said that the decision had been made only after the German Ambassador had had three meeings with the Tsar in one day. Rumania and Hungary had already declared war, and Bulgaria was told that it must show solidarity with the other nations of the Axis."
http://books.google.com/books?id=HjSsAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA68
Miller concludes the chapter (pp. 69-70) by writing,
"The year 1941 marked a distinct change in Bulgarian relations with Germany. Prior to 1941, Bulgaria had been under German influence and generally pro-Axis, but there had been no major issues on which Germany had compelled Bulgaria to make a definite decision against its will. On the questions of rearmament and the Dobruja, for example, Germany had provided support to Bulgaria but had required no immediate concessions in return.
During 1941, however, Germany had put considerable pressure on the Bulgarian government--first to sign the Tripartite Pact, and later to declare war on the United States and Great Britain. Although the Bulgarian government may not have fully realized the risks involved in either case, considerable German persuasion was necessary before the decisions were taken. Signifcantly, though, Bulgaria's adherence to the Tripartite Pact and declaration of war on Great Britain and the United States were not only the first major decisions taken under German pressure, but the last.
Bulgaria managed to avoid breaking off relations with the USSR, participating in the war on the Eastern Front, or expelling the Bulgarian Jews to German extermination camps. As we shall see in the following chapters, the Germans were sufficiently convinced of Bulgaria's friendship and loyalty that they accepted the Tsar's excuses with a surprising lack of skepticism."
In short, the issue is not what Bulgaria expected to gain in a positive sense from the declarations of war. Rather, it is that she had a great deal to lose (quite apart from the areas she had gained in 1941 from Greece and Yugoslavia and in 1940 from Romania) if she did not yield to German pressure--the Germans could easily have overthrown a recalcitrant Bulgarian government and replaced it with a true puppet.
> In short, the issue is not whatBulgariaexpected to gain in a positive
> sense from the declarations of war. Rather, it is that she had a great
> deal to lose (quite apart from the areas she had gained in 1941 from Greece
> and Yugoslavia and in 1940 from Romania) if she did not yield to German
> pressure--the Germans could easily have overthrown a recalcitrant Bulgarian
> government and replaced it with a true puppet.
More on Bulgaria in WWII. Alexander Rooksmoor in his "Other Paths III
- Alternate Outcomes of the Second World War" deals with Bulgaria
attempting to maintain neutrality and *spoiler*
...getting invaded and occupied for its troubles. Pretty interesting
development from there.
