5.
June 29 and 30, and July 1 and 2, 1940 see some desultory air fighting over
the Channel. Upon orders by Kesselring, the Germans are now more actively
seeking confrontations, but a combination of unstable weather and sheer
chance prevents any serious action to take place.
This, however, allows the Germans time to set up for the immediate task at
hand. Goering has singled out two Fliegerkorps for the specific objective of
closing the Channel to the enemy shipping, one from each Luftflotte. Sperrle
is lukewarm about the task, thus most of the work seems likely to end up in
the hands of General Lörzer's II Fliegerkorps, in the Pas de Calais. Lörzer,
in turn, is tempted to delegate the task to Oberst Fink, commander of KG 2.
This would mean the Kanalkampfführer (commander of the Channel battle) would
be a bomber Geschwader commander, having to ask to his peers for fighter
escort. The fact alone that the leader would be a bomber commander
implicitly points out that the objective of the operation is indeed the
shipping.
But Kesselring will have none of that. At this time, while Deichmann is
setting up his HQ in Paris, he is working on the general plan for a short
air war against Britain, with the final aim of achieving air superiority
which would allow the landing operation. Therefore, he has by now very clear
in his mind that the ships in the Channel are interesting in that the
British fighters would have to defend them (outside the Führer's no-go zone
over the British soil); to him, the primary target are the British fighters.
If ships could be sunk, so much the better, but that's secondary.
He orders Stumpff and Lörzer not to delegate down the chain of command; Fink
might be the tip of Lörzer's and Stumpff's sword, but he wants Stumpff
commanding the operation, since he's the one having under his command not
only bombers but also fighters and fighter-bombers. Stumpff also transfers
ZG26 to the II Fliegerkorps, which add to the elite ErProGr 210. This is a
telling decision, because the vague job description of the Bf 110 has left,
until this time, most of the machines in Jagdfliegerführer units, i.e.
fighter units.
At the same time, Kesselring reminds Sperrle that Goering's order mentioned
Von Richtofen's VIII Fliegerkorps. The focus of the action will be the
Straits of Dover, thus Luftflotte 3 is to be in the front seat, but
Kesselring's main task is to make sure the Luftflotten's efforts are
coordinated, and thus he fully expects Von Richtofen's assets to support
Lörzer. When, by July 2, it has become clear that Sperrle is about to
obfuscate, object to and obstruct any attempt to "order him around",
Kesslering simply crossedsthe city and shows up for a half-day visit at
Sperrle's HQ, with Sperrle snorting and chafing. Kesselring doesn't go away
until Sperrle has accepted to commit Von Richtofen in coordinated operations
with Lörzer.
On July 3, the Kanalkampf begins in earnest. At first sight, the attacks
might seem not unlike those taking place in OTL, but there are operational
and tactical differences, caused by the awareness of what are the real
pirmary targets and what the end purpose of the operation is.
The Stukas are committed only very sparingly; the main anti-ship platform is
the Bf 110 in its fighter-bomber role (on a few occasions, II./LG 2, now
testing the Bf 109 as a fighter bomber, also has a go). This means less
ships are sunk outright than in OTL; smaller bombs are used, and the shallow
fighter-bomber dive is far less accurate than what a Stuka can do in its
near vertical dive. However, many of these ships are smallish trawlers and
coalers, not particularly tough, and the Bf 110s pepper them with good
bursts of 20mm fire; if in OTL it might be a matter of either being sunk or
missed, in this ATL virtually no ship in an attacked convoy gets away
without extensive damage and casualties to the crew. Which means the British
have to come up and try to defend the convoys.
In the air, the near absence of Stukas means, first, less losses for them,
obviously. It also means more losses for the British fighters, since most of
the German fighters are not tethered to the slow, highly vulnerable Ju 87s
and can react not just by fending off the enemy, but by actively
counterattacking. It also means less losses on the Bf 109s, for the same
reason. The price to pay is a higher loss rate for the Bf 110s themselves,
but Kesselring is willing to pay that; he won't tell this to his Zerstörer
crews, but he thinks they are more expendable. Pure fighters will always be
needed to achieve and maintain air superiority, bombers will be needed later
as flying artillery,... Bf 110s will always be useful as fighter-bombers,
but less indispensable than the other two.
Another difference is the greater cooperation between Luftflotten. Convoys
are often attacked throughout the day, with the two large units taking
turns.
Additionally, Kesselring, by encouraging Stumpff, Lörzer and Osterkamp, and
by goading Sperrle and his subordinates, manages to do, already in this
first stage in the ATL, what he did later in OTL: change tactics often. The
British will never know if a raid on a convoy will be immediately followed
by a second, or not; or whether it will have Stukas or not. on a couple of
occasions, the Germans send in simultaneously a high raid with Stukas and
escorts, and a low raid with Bf 110s without bombs, just to strafe the
ships, and the British are hard-pressed to react properly and timely. it
does not always work, because the more complex the choreography, the greater
the potential for mistakes; but OTOH, the British are also still learning
their ropes. Sometimes, the radar operators misjudge the height of a raid, a
mistake which is bad enough if that's the one and only raid coming; but much
worse if there is a complex pattern to be sprung on the defenders.
Air Chief Marshal Dowding has no easy choices. He can scramble his fighters
from forward airfields upon detection of enemy raids, but the targets are
often quite off the coast, and it repeatedly happens that the scrambled
Squadrons arrive late, or worse yet, are still climbing to altitude and are
"bounced" from above by the enemy, taking losses. Alternatively he can keep
constantly flying CAPs over the convoys, but this is exhausting for the
pilots and a waste of resources, so these patrols have to be small, maybe a
flight (6 fighters). This in turn means they can be quickly outnumbered by a
fast fighter-only attack, of which the Germans send in some too. In both
situations, the British fighters take heavy casualties.
Throughout these days of July, Wever is working about the requirements for
achieving air superiority over the Channel and the coast, and no matter
which way he tackles the problem, he always comes down to the kill ratio
needed. If the Luftwaffe is to provide cover to the landing forces and the
convoys, and to serve as flying artillery, it needs to survive in sizable
numbers after the fight for air superiority; this means it must down many
more enemy aircraft than it loses itself. A choice might be to engage the
enemy only when advantaged; choose the sure kills, so to speak. But the
problem with this is, given the numbers involved and the very short time
window, that the Luftwaffe cannot waste any sunny day; it needs to attack
very very often, it cannot pass an opportunity to fight just because it
implies the risk of losing some aircraft.
The solution is to find ways to stack the conditions; force the enemy to
fight at a disadvantage as often as possible. What Kesselring is doing with
the convoys until now is a good starting point.
Indeed, over the time between July 3 and July 21, the Luftwaffe often comes
out ahead. The final average kill ratio is 1.5:1, in favor of the Luftwaffe.
It is far from being enough to achieve air superiority by September,
especially given the rate of replacements. But Kesselring, anway, even after
discounting a bit his pilots' inflated kill claims, still believes the real
ratio to be something like 2:1, so he's convinced there's a chance.
The German losses are thus lower than for the same period in OTL, overall;
less Bf 109s and especially less Stukas are lost, at the price of more Bf
110s. The British lose more fighters than in OTL.
Most of the pilots downed are also lost in this context, since the fighting
takes place over the sea. The Germans come out slightly ahead, having a sea
rescue service (the British, by and large, have none). They also come out
slightly better off than in OTL, because this stage lasted a bit longer in
OTL, and therefore they had to make do without their He 59 seaplanes for a
longer time; in this ATL, the British decide not to acknowledge these rescue
planes' right to use the Red Cross symbol on July 17, that is, only a few
days before the end of the Kanalkampf.
Indeed, on July 21 (5 days earlier than in OTL), the Admiralty decides to
suspend, at least temporarily, the merchant convoy transit in the Dover
area. On July 23, daylight warship movements in the area are also
discontinued. The Kanalkampf is over.
Meanwhile, on July 11 Hitler's Directive 16 is issued; Seelöwe becomes a
contingency plan. On July 15, the first top joint service meeting is held;
Raeder, Von Brauchitsch and Wever are present. Since the Luftwaffe's first
task is to achieve air superiority over the Channel and the coast, Wever
understandably asks for the ban against attacks on British soil to be
lifted. Hitler agrees.
This sends the planning for operation Adlerangriff, the beginning of the air
warfare against Britain proper, into high gear. Wever, Kesselring and
Deichmann have been working on it already. The staff meeting that in OTL
took place in the Hague on August 1, in this ATL takes place in Paris, at
Kesselring's HQ, on July 22. And, unlike OTL, there is somebody present who
has already done his homework and has a
...
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