Atomic Bomb
wolftheoverlord
Pacific fight of World War ii, but what are the arguments against it.
--
Joel Shepherd
In article <c41kp7$onm$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>,
wolfthe...@yahoo.com (wolftheoverlord) wrote:
> I know the argument for the atomic bomb is that it was to end the
> Pacific fight of World War ii, but what are the arguments against it.
There's a little more to it than that, right? It's possible the Pacific
War could have been ended by a complete blockade of Japan -- starving
her into submission -- or by invasion. All three options could be
justified as ways to end the war, but that's not interesting.
By summer 1945, intelligence increasingly indicated that the planned
invasion of Kyushu would be much more costly -- in terms of American
_and_ Japanese lives -- than was originally thought. A blockade probably
would have stretched the patience of the American people to the breaking
point: they wasted no time bringing their troops home from Europe and
wanted to be done with Japan just as quickly. A blockade also would have
taken a huge toll of Japanese lives by starvation and disease. And
meanwhile, as a backdrop to all this, mainland Asia casualties due to
Japanese aggression would have continued unabated: tens of thousands of
civilian deaths every month.
It was hoped that the atomic bombs would bring a quick end to the war
and, compared to the other two alternatives, save millions of lives. The
shock of a single bomb doing that much damage, and the realization that
the Potsdam Declaration's threat of Japan's "prompt and utter
destruction" wasn't idle, would quickly force Japan's emperor and armed
forces to sue for peace. That's what happened ... barely.
So, before you begin looking for detailed arguments about why dropping
the bomb was a bad idea, make sure you understand why it might have been
a good idea. "Ending the war" doesn't indicate that you have.
--
Joel.
http://www.cv6.org/
"May she also say with just pride:
I have done the State some service."
Michael Emrys
nospamatall_c...@hotmail.com wrote on 3/31/04 4:30 AM:
> clipped from another site...
[snipped for space]
Hmmm, didn't you post this exact same message a month or so back? I think if
you look back over the threads you'll find a pretty thorough discussion of
it there.
Michael
--
Nicholas Smid
news:c41kp7$onm$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> I know the argument for the atomic bomb is that it was to end the
> Pacific fight of World War ii, but what are the arguments against it.
Most current arguments against its use basically boil down to ether
political incorrectness, post 60's style, or beat up the Yanks. Hay I like
beating up on Yanks as much as the next guy but they give so many ligit
reasons theres no need to go making any up. As somebody who's father and
grand perants were in a jap intern camp at the time I'd have to say I'm in
favour of anything that ended the war faster. That it probably saved a half
million or so Jap lives is no doubt nice for them but of secondary interest
to me.
> --
>
--
Jonathan
"Nicholas Smid" <smi...@clear.net.nz> wrote in message
news:c4uk8g$11ie$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
Isn't it bizarre when an act of great violence ends up being the most humane
thing we could do?
But we have to measure our actions in a vacuum, we cannot replay the history
to compare outcomes, so we have to act on our best knowledge at the time,
and not stomp everyone with 20/20 hindsight...
Sure, some of the casualty estimates were exaggerated (but some weren't),
but you cannot judge an action 60 years later using hindsight and say they
made the wrong decision...
This is almost as bad as the attacks on Adm Kimmel and Gen. Short for Pearl
Harbor... They acted appropriately on the best information they had... To go
back and dig up the relevant evidence out of the tons of evidence that
showed a likely attack in the Philippines, and say "Aha! The evidence is
clear! You must have known the Japanese had six carriers 150 miles north of
Oahu, and were going to attack precisely at 0730 Zulu!"
The reality here is that if we had blockaded Japan, people would be
complaining now that we were barbarians for not ending the war quickly...
Jonathan
Jonathan
"Joel Shepherd" <joel...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:c4207q$p...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
>
> In article <c41kp7$onm$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>,
> wolfthe...@yahoo.com (wolftheoverlord) wrote:
>
> > I know the argument for the atomic bomb is that it was to end the
> > Pacific fight of World War ii, but what are the arguments against it.
>
> There's a little more to it than that, right? It's possible the Pacific
> War could have been ended by a complete blockade of Japan -- starving
> her into submission -- or by invasion. All three options could be
> justified as ways to end the war, but that's not interesting.
>
It also would have killed more civilians than the nukes did... The Army
would have been fed while the civilians starved.
> By summer 1945, intelligence increasingly indicated that the planned
> invasion of Kyushu would be much more costly -- in terms of American
> _and_ Japanese lives -- than was originally thought.
Especially considering the invasion plans of Kyushu grossly underestimated
enemy troop strength (by a factor of 4 IIRC).
> A blockade probably
> would have stretched the patience of the American people to the breaking
> point: they wasted no time bringing their troops home from Europe and
> wanted to be done with Japan just as quickly.
I heard a ETO vet say he cried when he heard Japan surrendered, he was on a
ship in the Panama Canal headed to the PTO when he heard...
> A blockade also would have
> taken a huge toll of Japanese lives by starvation and disease. And
> meanwhile, as a backdrop to all this, mainland Asia casualties due to
> Japanese aggression would have continued unabated: tens of thousands of
> civilian deaths every month.
>
> It was hoped that the atomic bombs would bring a quick end to the war
> and, compared to the other two alternatives, save millions of lives. The
> shock of a single bomb doing that much damage, and the realization that
> the Potsdam Declaration's threat of Japan's "prompt and utter
> destruction" wasn't idle, would quickly force Japan's emperor and armed
> forces to sue for peace. That's what happened ... barely.
>
> So, before you begin looking for detailed arguments about why dropping
> the bomb was a bad idea, make sure you understand why it might have been
> a good idea. "Ending the war" doesn't indicate that you have.
>
There is a valid question in there though...
Why didn't the US wait a few more days to drop the second bomb... Give the
Japanese a chance to evaluate the damage inflicted and make their own
assessment of their situation...
The reality, of course, is that the US wanted to give the Japanese an
impression that we would vaporize a city every three days until they
surrendered.
Which is good that they did when they did, as there were no more nukes until
December, 1945 (IIRC)...
Jonathan
Jonathan
"wolftheoverlord" <wolfthe...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:c41kp7$onm$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> Pacific fight of World War ii, but what are the arguments against it.
Killing large numbers of civilians.
Radiation poisoning and cancer rates... (which were not known at the time).
The Japanese could have been beaten with a blockade.
The Japanese could have been beaten with an invasion.
That losing a few hundred thousand Americans and several million Japanese
would have been preferable to nuking them...
Some of these are valid, some aren't...
Realistically, the US Gov't had a duty to its people to end the war as
quickly as possible... If the US had invaded, and it got out that there was
a bomb that could have ended the war sooner, Truman would have been
lynched... The idea that a US president would put the lives of an enemy
ahead of American lives was not even something to be considered.
Jonathan
--
Don Phillipson
posted April 22 re Nagasaki
> Why didn't the US wait a few more days to drop the second bomb... Give the
> Japanese a chance to evaluate the damage inflicted and make their own
> assessment of their situation...
Tactical control had been devolved on Gen. LeMay,
USAAC commander in Tinian. His general plan
(according to Pimlott's book Superfortress and other
sources) was to use atomic bombs at weekly intervals,
but approaching bad weather prompted him to launch
the second raid sooner.
> The reality, of course, is that the US wanted to give the Japanese an
> impression that we would vaporize a city every three days until they
> surrendered.
This supposition may be true: but it is not found in
strategic documents (in Washington) or tactical
ones (on Tinian.)
> Which is good that they did when they did, as there were no more nukes
until
> December, 1945 (IIRC)...
Not so: at the date of Nagasaki a USN ship was
waiting at San Diego to take the third bomb to
Tinian. Pres. Truman halted this movement.
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs (Ottawa, Canada)
--
Jonathan
"Don Phillipson" <d.phil...@trytel.com> wrote in message
news:c68r15$noa$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> Tactical control had been devolved on Gen. LeMay,
> USAAC commander in Tinian. His general plan
> (according to Pimlott's book Superfortress and other
> sources) was to use atomic bombs at weekly intervals,
> but approaching bad weather prompted him to launch
> the second raid sooner.
>
Personally, I think Nagasaki may have been excessive (I will not say for
sure, if only because I do not make a habit of second guessing difficult
decisions...)
> > The reality, of course, is that the US wanted to give the Japanese an
> > impression that we would vaporize a city every three days until they
> > surrendered.
>
> This supposition may be true: but it is not found in
> strategic documents (in Washington) or tactical
> ones (on Tinian.)
>
No, it isn't... It was just something a history professor of mine said years
ago... But it made sense... The bawsic idea of assaulting a defense is to
roll it up from one end... If you give the enemy an impression that he has
nothing left to fight for, he should quit... and it worked.
> > Which is good that they did when they did, as there were no more nukes
> until
> > December, 1945 (IIRC)...
>
> Not so: at the date of Nagasaki a USN ship was
> waiting at San Diego to take the third bomb to
> Tinian. Pres. Truman halted this movement.
>
Didn't know that...
I got the distinct impression that fissionable material was in incredibly
short supply... and with three bombs being built and detonated in under a
month, I would have suspected otherwise...
Jonathan
--
François Müller
Jonathan wrote:
> I got the distinct impression that fissionable material was in
> incredibly short supply... and with three bombs being built and
> detonated in under a month, I would have suspected otherwise...
AFAIK, enriched U supply (Hiroshima type)was short, but Pu supply allow
building of one or two more bombs.
F.
Louis Capdeboscq
> Isn't it bizarre when an act of great violence ends up being the most humane
> thing we could do?
It is very often, and is the usual justification for wars (the most
recent example not being very old).
Interestingly, it is also the justification for many atrocities, i.e.
Himmler and other major Nazi figures thought that they were ultimately
acting for the greater good in doing what they did.
Please note that I'm in no ways equating the atomic bombing (or the
recent contemporary example to which I alluded to) with the holocaust,
except in the motivations of some of the authors.
> This is almost as bad as the attacks on Adm Kimmel and Gen. Short for Pearl
> Harbor... They acted appropriately on the best information they had...
My understanding is that both got the sack because they hadn't, in fact,
acted all that appropriately on the informartion they had. They had
received war warnings and weren't really ready. That's particularly true
for Short, although I understand how a case could be made for Kimmel's
defence.
LC
--
Remove "e" from address to reply
--
Alan the Horse
soc.history.war.world-war-ii with:
Right. One of the reasons that the German atomic project did not
continue in earnest is that Heisenberg believed (or at least went on
record as believing) that enriched uranium was the only possible
ingredient for a usable atomic bomb, and Germany simply did not
possess the resource in sufficient abundance. It was the breakthrough
that plutonium was usable and effective that led to the ability of the
United States to build a sufficient quantity of atomic weapons within
a time frame short enough to be effective in ending the war.
--
Al
"If we do not change direction, we will end up where
we are headed." Lao Tsu
--
Jonathan
"Louis Capdeboscq" <loui...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:c6be4l$l6s$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> Jonathan wrote:
> > Isn't it bizarre when an act of great violence ends up being the most
humane
> > thing we could do?
>
> It is very often, and is the usual justification for wars (the most
> recent example not being very old).
What is entertaining is that if the US had acted against Japan in the 30s
over China, the PTO might have been avoided... Yet, the US would have been
labeled as the agressors...
Same with France and the UK, if Chamberlain had put his foot down in '38,
World War II might have been avoided, but France and the UK would be blamed
for starting the minor brushfire that might have resulted.
> Interestingly, it is also the justification for many atrocities, i.e.
> Himmler and other major Nazi figures thought that they were ultimately
> acting for the greater good in doing what they did.
>
Explain?
I know that Germany claimed that Poland attacked them first (which was
laughable), but there doesn't seem to be a genuine fear on the part of the
Germans against Poland (they outgunned Poland 10 to 1)...
Also, it would be difficult to make an intelligible argument that the Jews
posed a threat to the Germans (or any other Europeans).
> Please note that I'm in no ways equating the atomic bombing (or the
> recent contemporary example to which I alluded to) with the holocaust,
> except in the motivations of some of the authors.
>
The problem is that the argument fails, simply because Japan was at war with
the US et al... No such comparison could be made with the holocaust.
> > This is almost as bad as the attacks on Adm Kimmel and Gen. Short for
Pearl
> > Harbor... They acted appropriately on the best information they had...
>
> My understanding is that both got the sack because they hadn't, in fact,
> acted all that appropriately on the informartion they had. They had
> received war warnings and weren't really ready. That's particularly true
> for Short, although I understand how a case could be made for Kimmel's
> defence.
>
Gen Macarthur knew about the attacks on Pearl Harbor and was ordered into
action... He did nothing and his air force was destroyed on the ground.
Yet Macarthur was given the Medal of Honor for obeying an order to flee the
Philippines...
Kimmel and Short had vague instructions that implied an attack from
saboteurs... There were no operational orders, no statements suggesting that
Pearl was about to be attacked, and no reason to suspect such an attack....
In fact, all the messages they received suggested that the Philippines was
the likely target... and Macarthur ignored all of it, and got the MoH...
Jonathan
--
Chris Manteuffel
> I got the distinct impression that fissionable material was in incredibly
> short supply... and with three bombs being built and detonated in under a
> month, I would have suspected otherwise...
People were talking about having a total of 12 bombs (that is, nine
more to drop on Japan) before the end of 1945. There was talk about
using a few to blast a hole in the Japanese beach defenses for
Olympic.
The confusion arises because there were no more *assembled* bombs.
Early designs could not last long as assembled devices, and thus were
transporteed and stored in pieces. It took about 24 hours to assemble
and load a bomb. But the third bomb for Japan was definitely halted by
Truman.
Chris Manteuffel
--
Georg Schwarz
> Why didn't the US wait a few more days to drop the second bomb... Give the
> Japanese a chance to evaluate the damage inflicted and make their own
> assessment of their situation...
>
> The reality, of course, is that the US wanted to give the Japanese an
> impression that we would vaporize a city every three days until they
> surrendered.
not only to the Japanese, but also and maybe more importantly to the
Soviets.
If Japan had not surrendered, the Soviets would have landed, probably
successfully, on Hokkaido and would maybe have overrun Korea. That would
have created a worse post-war situation for the US. (ironically it was
the US that had explicitly asked for Soviet involvement against Japan).
Another detail I read is that the second bomb was of a different type
than the first one, and of course the US was interested to get to know
how it worked.
--
Georg Schwarz http://home.pages.de/~schwarz/
ge...@epost.de +49 177 8811442
--
Jonathan
"Chris Manteuffel" <cman...@ozmail.cjb.net> wrote in message
news:c6ca3i$nb8$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> "Jonathan" <jrc...@nospam.hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:<c69lcc$o4i$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
>
> > I got the distinct impression that fissionable material was in
incredibly
> > short supply... and with three bombs being built and detonated in under
a
> > month, I would have suspected otherwise...
>
> People were talking about having a total of 12 bombs (that is, nine
> more to drop on Japan) before the end of 1945. There was talk about
> using a few to blast a hole in the Japanese beach defenses for
> Olympic.
>
I have also heard rumors of nerve agent stockpiled in Australia in case
things went awry...
> The confusion arises because there were no more *assembled* bombs.
> Early designs could not last long as assembled devices, and thus were
> transporteed and stored in pieces. It took about 24 hours to assemble
> and load a bomb. But the third bomb for Japan was definitely halted by
> Truman.
>
Do you know on what date, precisely?
I only ask because I am curious if that decision was based on effects of the
two, by the Japanese surrender, or by Soviet invasion of Manchuria..
Jonathan
mike
"François Müller" <fcm_news...@yahoo.fr> wrote in message news:<c6bal2$p...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu>...
Oak Ridge could not seperate and enrich as fast as the Hanford
reactors could produce Pu, so there would always be more Plutonium
bombs availiable- 3 per month. By October '45, 5 bombs per month,
more reactors online by December '45, 7 bombs per month.
Not that there would have been any cities worth bombing by then,
considering how the fire raids were going.
**
mike
**
Cub Driver
>If Japan had not surrendered, the Soviets would have landed, probably
>successfully, on Hokkaido and would maybe have overrun Korea. That would
>have created a worse post-war situation for the US. (ironically it was
>the US that had explicitly asked for Soviet involvement against Japan).
I certainly agree with that, though the Russians may have needed U.S.
help for a successful invasion of Hokkaido. They did not find it easy
to subdue the Japanese defenders on Sakahlin. I think Korea would
certainly have been occupied by Russia.
The more important effect would have been a three- or four-power
occupation of Japan. I doubt the Russians would have settled for
Hokkaido; they would have demanded a part of Honshu, and I'm not sure
that MacArthur would have been able to persuade Truman to take the
risk of keeping them out.
all the best -- Dan Ford
email: war...@mailblocks.com (put Cubdriver in subject line)
The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org
Cub Driver
>Gen Macarthur knew about the attacks on Pearl Harbor and was ordered into
>action... He did nothing and his air force was destroyed on the ground.
Not at all a fair description of the Philippines air defense debacle.
The planes took off to intercept a certain air strike, but the air
strike was delayed by fog on Taiwan. (The same fog might have rendered
a counterstrike by B-17s moot, depending on when they took off.)
By noon, the fog had lifted and the Japanese were on their way. And by
the same token, the American planes had to land to refuel.
It was badly done, but the fault was more tactical than
strategic--that is to say, more the result of decisions made by
captains and colonels than by the General.
Chris Manteuffel
ge...@epost.de (Georg Schwarz) wrote in message news:<c6ca4c$nbm$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>...
> Another detail I read is that the second bomb was of a different type
> than the first one, and of course the US was interested to get to know
> how it worked.
The US had already tested the plutonium implosion type (Fat Man) bomb
in New Mexico. The Trinity test had demonstrated that the bomb worked
and gave scientists pretty good size numbers for how big the bomb was.
Dropping a bomb on an uninstrumented target is a terrible way to
figure out how well the bomb works. For decades we had only the
vaguest size range (12-18 kT, a 50% difference) on Little Boy (the
uranium gun type bomb used on Hiroshima) because there had been no
previous test of that type. But that bomb was dropped first, not
second. Everyone knew that Fat Man would work and what its approximate
size would be, beccause of the Trinity test.
Paul Tibbets, in his autobiography, _The Return of the Enola Gay_,
says that a major influencing factor was that the Japanese government
was conducting information denial on their people, not telling them
until August 9th that the Hiroshima had been bombed; it took a day to
even mention that something had happened, and the initial explanation
was that it had been a giant gas leak, IIRC. The US had dropped
leaflets to inform the people, but decided that they needed to make
the message clearer to everyone, according to Tibbets.
Chris Manteuffel
Don Phillipson
> if the US had acted against Japan in the 30s
> over China, the PTO might have been avoided... Yet, the US would have been
> labeled as the agressors...
Not necessarily so, because of evidence of Japanese
aggression in Manchuria. The point is that (by world
theory 1919-1939) the League of Nations was supposed
to be the world organization for joint action against
aggressors, and the USA was the only world power
that decided not to join the League.
There was a vigorous "China Lobby" seeking US aid
before 1941 and some Americans were sympathetic:
but FDR and his circle judged it impossible to help
beyond supplying aircraft and authorizing the "American
Volunteer Group" etc. Further US action would have
to be unilateral; (China did not seek German or
British or French help;) and "foreign entanglements"
was the reason Congresses voted (1920?) against
authorizing membership in the League of Nations.
(This was also why US government policy concerning
the United Nations Organization in 1945 was very
different.)
> Same with France and the UK, if Chamberlain had put his foot down in '38,
> World War II might have been avoided, but France and the UK would be blamed
> for starting the minor brushfire that might have resulted.
No, this does not reflect European beliefs and European
practice. The British and French governments followed
the League method of negotiated settlements (seeking
to avoid war) up to the 1938 Munich agreement (transferring
the Czech Sudetenland to Germany because most of the
local population was German). At the same time, because
suspicious of German rearmament, the French and British
rearmament programmes (begun 1937) continued.
Chamberlain was so pleased with himself in 1938 because
the League method of negotiations seemed to work.
He had Hitler's written agreement and Hitler's oral
guarantee that the Sudetenland was his "last territorial
demand in Europe."
Within seven months Hitler annexed Bohemia (i.e.
demonstrated he had yet again changed his mind) which
was why Britain and France then guaranteed Poland's
frontiers and sought (inefficiently) an alliance with Russia.
This is why both powers were ready for war in Sept.
1939 (however reluctantly.)
> if Chamberlain had put his foot down in '38,
> World War II might have been avoided, but France and the UK would be blamed
> for starting the minor brushfire that might have resulted.
This "minor brushfire" requires two things:
(1) practical reasons why Britain and France
should abandon the League method of negotiation
which appeared to have worked OK every time so far.
(This is a non-trivial point. The aim of the League
method was to avoid European wars like WW1. By
1939 there had been no such wars, even though there
had been wars elsewhere (Turkey, Abyssinia, Manchuria).
Thus the lack of war in Europe was proof the
League method worked.)
(2) reasons why the German army (victorious in 1940)
would not also have been victorious in 1938. There may be
cogent factual reasons, but it is the proposer of this
motion who is obliged to say what they are.
--
David Thornley
In article <c67vt6$g...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu>,
Jonathan <jrc...@nospam.hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>This is almost as bad as the attacks on Adm Kimmel and Gen. Short for Pearl
>Harbor... They acted appropriately on the best information they had...
No, the argument is that they, particularly Short, did not act
appropriately. (I'm inclined to cut Kimmel some slack. Defending the
Fleet in port wasn't really his job, and the Navy did much better at
getting AA rounds into the air than the Army.)
After all, if one has been warned that the most serious threat is
air attack (Marshall to Short, early 1941), and one has been supplied
with dozens of the most modern fighters despite great demand for
them elsewhere, it seems at best careless to have them lined up
where Japanese aerial attackers can destroy them easily.
To go
>back and dig up the relevant evidence out of the tons of evidence that
>showed a likely attack in the Philippines, and say "Aha! The evidence is
>clear! You must have known the Japanese had six carriers 150 miles north of
>Oahu, and were going to attack precisely at 0730 Zulu!"
>
Nope; the complaint is that Short and Kimmel disregarded their orders
of ten days previously, and acted inappropriately given the information
that war was imminent.
>The reality here is that if we had blockaded Japan, people would be
>complaining now that we were barbarians for not ending the war quickly...
>
You got that right.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
David Thornley
In article <c6ca3q$nbc$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>,
Jonathan <jrc...@nospam.hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>"Louis Capdeboscq" <loui...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>news:c6be4l$l6s$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
>> Jonathan wrote:
>> > Isn't it bizarre when an act of great violence ends up being the most
>humane
>> > thing we could do?
>>
>> It is very often, and is the usual justification for wars (the most
>> recent example not being very old).
>
>What is entertaining is that if the US had acted against Japan in the 30s
>over China, the PTO might have been avoided... Yet, the US would have been
>labeled as the agressors...
>
Japanese had to be stopped, and that the US had to get out and lead.
US diplomacy of the 1930s tended to be unhelpful and thoroughly
holier-than-thou, with the very strong suggestion (if not an actual
statement) that the US was too good to fight, no matter what the
cause. I find it very distasteful at times.
>Same with France and the UK, if Chamberlain had put his foot down in '38,
>World War II might have been avoided, but France and the UK would be blamed
>for starting the minor brushfire that might have resulted.
>
Why? If there was a quick war, it would have been started by the German
invasion of Czechoslovakia, and therefore it would have been very clear
who the aggressor was. France and the Soviet Union would have been
acting on defense treaties, and Britain could have joined the
non-aggressive side without being labeled an aggressor.
>> Interestingly, it is also the justification for many atrocities, i.e.
>> Himmler and other major Nazi figures thought that they were ultimately
>> acting for the greater good in doing what they did.
>
>Explain?
>
Look at what they were accomplishing. They were clearing land for the
Aryan people, reducing the number of inferior Slavs to reasonable
levels, and clearing large areas of the evil and subhuman Jews.
I'm not saying that I agree with their assumptions and morality, but
many of them firmly believed in these things. Himmler considered the
soldiers who had the job of exterminating Jews to be heroes, since their
jobs were extremely stressful and distasteful. Again, it isn't hard
to find people in the world who strongly believe in things you will find
extremely offensive; there has got to be some brand of fundamentalist
you disagree strongly with.
>Also, it would be difficult to make an intelligible argument that the Jews
>posed a threat to the Germans (or any other Europeans).
>
It doesn't matter if it's an intelligible argument, the question is
whether the argument is believed. Lots of people believe things
that there aren't real intelligible arguments for. Religion, in
particular, is normally just accepted on faith, rather than on the
basis of rational and intelligible arguments. Figure that, for the
real Nazis, National Socialism took the place of conventional religion.
Again, there are a lot of people nowadays who believe things on
religious grounds that you probably strongly disagree with, no matter
what you actually believe. There's a lot of difference of very strong
opinion in the world.
>Kimmel and Short had vague instructions that implied an attack from
>saboteurs... There were no operational orders, no statements suggesting that
>Pearl was about to be attacked, and no reason to suspect such an attack....
>
No, they had instructions that implied a naval attack. They were ordered
to make defensive dispositions, including reconnaisance. Read up
on their orders. They weren't advised that Pearl Harbor was going to
be attacked, since nobody on our side knew that, but as military
commanders they had to be prepared for attack.
Jonathan
"Georg Schwarz" <ge...@epost.de> wrote in message
news:c6ca4c$nbm$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> not only to the Japanese, but also and maybe more importantly to the
> Soviets.
>
What historical proof of this do you have?
I understand we are sorta speculating here, but I have heard this one
before... and I am curious of where it comes from.
> If Japan had not surrendered, the Soviets would have landed, probably
> successfully, on Hokkaido and would maybe have overrun Korea.
The Soviets had this sealift capacity in the pacific???
> That would
> have created a worse post-war situation for the US. (ironically it was
> the US that had explicitly asked for Soviet involvement against Japan).
>
Because we didn't know the nukes would be ready when we asked them at
Yalta... and we were looking at the bloodiest invasion in planetary history.
> Another detail I read is that the second bomb was of a different type
> than the first one, and of course the US was interested to get to know
> how it worked.
>
Little Boy (the Hiroshima Bomb) was a Uranium gun-type (two masses fired at
one another) device, Fat Man (Nagasaki) was a plutonium implosion (one mass,
imploded in on itself) device...
The bomb tested at Trinity was a plutonium bomb (they believed the Uranium
bomb did not need testing, because it was of a much simpler design)., the
plutonium bomb tested at Trinity was an implosion device, and they weren't
sure it would detonate.
So, the argument that it was 'tested' on Nagasaki is just simply not
accurate.
Jonathan
--
Michael Emrys
jrc...@nospam.hotmail.com wrote on 4/23/04 4:50 PM:
> ...if Chamberlain had put his foot down in '38, World War II might have been
> avoided...
The best time to have acted would have been 1936 when Hitler, against the
advice of his generals, ordered the remilitarization of the Rhineland. This
was in breach of the Versailles Treaty and the Allies had every legal right
to oppose the move by force. At that point, the Allies had an overwhelming
advantage in forces overall, and it is supposed that the Germans could not
have resisted. I have also read that it was likely in that eventuality there
would have been a coup and Hitler deposed and arrested.
Michael
--
Jonathan
"Alan the Horse" <nann...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:c6ca3a$nb4$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> Right. One of the reasons that the German atomic project did not
> continue in earnest is that Heisenberg believed (or at least went on
> record as believing) that enriched uranium was the only possible
> ingredient for a usable atomic bomb, and Germany simply did not
> possess the resource in sufficient abundance. It was the breakthrough
> that plutonium was usable and effective that led to the ability of the
> United States to build a sufficient quantity of atomic weapons within
> a time frame short enough to be effective in ending the war.
>
Also, could Germany have spared the number of workers, and the research
space for something that might not work?
Jonathan
--
Rich Rostrom
>Gen Macarthur knew about the attacks on Pearl Harbor and was ordered into
>action... He did nothing and his air force was destroyed on the ground.
This is not true (that MacArthur did nothing).
Macarthur's P-40s were sent up on Combat Air Patrol after the
news of Pearl Harbor came in. But the CAP operation was managed
clumsily. _All_ of the P-40s were sent up at once. Then they
all ran out of gas, they all landed to refuel, and they were
all on the ground when the Japanese attacked Clark Field.
Something similar happened with the B-17s, IIRC. Most of them
were sent on an abortive mission against Japanese forces in
Taiwan, then returned to base.
So, yes, the planes were caught on the ground -- but nearly all
of them had been in the air since the war news came in. The
claim that they had all been sitting on the ground from the
news of Pearl Harbor till the Japanese attack on Clark Field
is a myth.
--
Were there eight kings of the name of Henry in England, or were there eighty?
Never mind; someday it will be recorded that there was only one, and the
attributes of all of them will be combined into his compressed and consensus
story. --- R. A. Lafferty, _And Read the Flesh Between the Lines_
--
Jonathan
"Cub Driver" <war...@mailblocks.com> wrote in message
news:c6f79q$4...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
> Not at all a fair description of the Philippines air defense debacle.
> The planes took off to intercept a certain air strike, but the air
> strike was delayed by fog on Taiwan. (The same fog might have rendered
> a counterstrike by B-17s moot, depending on when they took off.)
>
> By noon, the fog had lifted and the Japanese were on their way. And by
> the same token, the American planes had to land to refuel.
>
> It was badly done, but the fault was more tactical than
> strategic--that is to say, more the result of decisions made by
> captains and colonels than by the General.
>
William Manchester in American Ceaser claims that Macarthur disobeyed direct
orders to alert his troops and get his planes in the air...
Jonathan
--
Don Phillipson
> Another detail I read is that the second bomb was of a different type
> than the first one, and of course the US was interested to get to know
> how it worked.
This is well documented and was never secret,
reflecting availability of fissile materials uranium
and plutonium. The uranium bomb was so simple
(forcing two subcritical masses together in a
gun barrel) everyone knew it would work, but the
supply of enriched uranium was small. There was
more plutonium available (from Hanford reactors)
but the structure of the bomb was much more
complex. Thus the Trinity test was of the plutonium
bomb, because no one could be sure it would work.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs (Ottawa, Canada)
--
Cub Driver
>It was the breakthrough
>that plutonium was usable and effective that led to the ability of the
>United States to build a sufficient quantity of atomic weapons within
>a time frame short enough to be effective in ending the war
The plans for Olympic called for allocating two atomic bombs to each
invasion beach, for a total of 20. While the author may not have had
exact knowledge of the production capabilities at Oak Ridge, that
seems about right, given that we know that following the explosion of
the Trinity device, three working bombs were available before August
15 within a very few weeks.
The plutonium bomb had other advantages in its simplicity. Postwar,
Fat Man became the U.S. standard.
all the best -- Dan Ford
email: war...@mailblocks.com (put Cubdriver in subject line)
The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org
--
Kelly McDonald
>more to drop on Japan) before the end of 1945. There was talk about
>using a few to blast a hole in the Japanese beach defenses for
>Olympic.
>
>The confusion arises because there were no more *assembled* bombs.
>Early designs could not last long as assembled devices, and thus were
>transporteed and stored in pieces. It took about 24 hours to assemble
>and load a bomb. But the third bomb for Japan was definitely halted by
>Truman.
There is also the discrepency between the number of bombs that could
have been produced vs. the number of bombs that were produced in the
months after the war ended.
Once the war ended production paused as there was no longer the same
need to produce bombs as fast as possible. Inefficient and expensive
processes were shut down, some facilities under construction were
cancelled, and work on the composite core design was delayed.
Had pre Japanese surrender plans continued the US could have been
producing upwards of 10-15 weapons a month by early-mid 1946.
Kelly McDonald
--
Cub Driver
>Another detail I read is that the second bomb was of a different type
>than the first one, and of course the US was interested to get to know
>how it worked.
Trinity was a plutonium bomb, so its workings were well known--better
than the uranium bomb, which was not closely observed.
Chris Manteuffel
> I have also heard rumors of nerve agent stockpiled in Australia in case
> things went awry...
There was discussion of using them on islands like Iwo Jima. I am not
aware of any plans for first use of any chemical agent on islands with
significant civilian population.
And I don't believe they were nerve agents. Nerve agents wouldn't make
sense for a number of reasons.
> Do you know on what date, precisely?
Truman issued the order on August 10th.
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1998/mj98/mj98goldberg.html suggests
that Truman was surprised by the use of Fatman. Truman himself never
admitted such, I do believe, so it's an intruging theory that fits the
facts but is not proven, IMO.
Chris Manteuffel
--
Cub Driver
>Do you know on what date, precisely?
See www.warbirdforum.com/third.htm for the story (from Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists) of how the bomb was stopped from being loaded on a
truck on August 10, 1945.
Carey Sublette
"mike" <mara...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:c6f6rd$4...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
>
> "François Müller" <fcm_news...@yahoo.fr> wrote in message
news:<c6bal2$p...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu>...
> > Jonathan wrote:
> >
> > > I got the distinct impression that fissionable material was in
> > > incredibly short supply... and with three bombs being built and
> > > detonated in under a month, I would have suspected otherwise...
> >
> > AFAIK, enriched U supply (Hiroshima type)was short, but Pu supply allow
> > building of one or two more bombs.
>
> Oak Ridge could not seperate and enrich as fast as the Hanford
> reactors could produce Pu, so there would always be more Plutonium
> bombs availiable- 3 per month. By October '45, 5 bombs per month,
> more reactors online by December '45, 7 bombs per month.
These estimates for production rates are based on the combined output of Oak
Ridge and Hanford, and the assumption that future U-235 deliveries would be
used in implosion bombs.
The plutonium production rate for Hanford peaked at 21 kg a month, enough
for 3.5 bombs. This was its maximum production rate until new reactor
capacity was added (years later).
The enriched uranium production rate kept climbing through 1945 as the
gaseous diffusion plant kept ramping up. Using U-235 in implosion bombs was
four times as efficient, and Oppenheimer even recommended after Trinity that
Little Boy not be dropped, but that its core be reworked to provide four
implosion bombs (Groves overruled him because it would delay dropping the
first bomb by roughly a week, and delay having two bomb ready by at least
two weeks).
In December 1945 the beta calutrons were producing 14 kg of U-235 a week,
enough for one bomb each week.
Carey Sublette
--
Jonathan
"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
news:c6f84q$4...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
>
> In article <c6ca3q$nbc$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>,
> Jonathan <jrc...@nospam.hotmail.com> wrote:
> >Same with France and the UK, if Chamberlain had put his foot down in '38,
> >World War II might have been avoided, but France and the UK would be
blamed
> >for starting the minor brushfire that might have resulted.
> >
> Why? If there was a quick war, it would have been started by the German
> invasion of Czechoslovakia, and therefore it would have been very clear
> who the aggressor was. France and the Soviet Union would have been
> acting on defense treaties, and Britain could have joined the
> non-aggressive side without being labeled an aggressor.
>
And it would look like a peaceful solution could have been reached, but the
UK et al declined...
> >> Interestingly, it is also the justification for many atrocities, i.e.
> >> Himmler and other major Nazi figures thought that they were ultimately
> >> acting for the greater good in doing what they did.
> >
> >Explain?
> >
> Look at what they were accomplishing. They were clearing land for the
> Aryan people, reducing the number of inferior Slavs to reasonable
> levels, and clearing large areas of the evil and subhuman Jews.
>
> I'm not saying that I agree with their assumptions and morality, but
> many of them firmly believed in these things. Himmler considered the
> soldiers who had the job of exterminating Jews to be heroes, since their
> jobs were extremely stressful and distasteful. Again, it isn't hard
> to find people in the world who strongly believe in things you will find
> extremely offensive; there has got to be some brand of fundamentalist
> you disagree strongly with.
>
I disagree with all fundamentalism (be it Christian, Islam, Judaism,
Republican, Democrat, Socialist, what have you)... Anyone who is not open to
other ideas is dangerous.
However, I got the impression from the OP that there was a moral justication
for the holocaust with the same level of validity as the atomic bombing...
i.e. a threat that needed to be stopped.
> >Kimmel and Short had vague instructions that implied an attack from
> >saboteurs... There were no operational orders, no statements suggesting
that
> >Pearl was about to be attacked, and no reason to suspect such an
attack....
> >
> No, they had instructions that implied a naval attack. They were ordered
> to make defensive dispositions, including reconnaisance. Read up
> on their orders. They weren't advised that Pearl Harbor was going to
> be attacked, since nobody on our side knew that, but as military
> commanders they had to be prepared for attack.
>
And if you look at their preceding three weeks, they were pretty much on
alert 24/7...
I think they got the impression that the idiots in Washington didn't know
what they were talking about, otherwise they would have manned their AAA....
As it was the USS Ward did some decent work that morning, and if it's
actions had been disseminated more quickly, it is likely that Pearl Harbor
would have been totally defended...
The problem is that there are a lot of little things that could have (if
only taken a little differently) avoided the destruction of the Pacific
Fleet.
Were Kimmel and Short negligent? No more so than Macarthur...
I guess the question comes down to the idea that someone must be blamed,
regardless of who...
Jonathan
Steve Sundberg
On 24 Apr 2004 21:33:58 -0500, thor...@visi.com (David Thornley)
wrote:
>
>[snip] it seems at best careless to have them lined up
>where Japanese aerial attackers can destroy them easily.
But, based on the best available local intel at the time, there wasn't
any belief that an attack was immient by air. There was, however, a
cause for concern of sabotage -- in which case, lining up the planes
as was done would have made sabotage a more difficult task.
Cub Driver
>the Japanese government
>was conducting information denial on their people, not telling them
>until August 9th that the Hiroshima had been bombed;
I think it would be fairer to say that the Japanese government simply
didn't know, or perhaps wasn't able to bring itself to believe, the
extent of the damage, or its cause. (Not that informing the people
would have been a high priority!)
Carey Sublette
"Jonathan" <jrc...@nospam.hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:c6f6b0$4...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
> "Chris Manteuffel" <cman...@ozmail.cjb.net> wrote in message
> news:c6ca3i$nb8$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> I have also heard rumors of nerve agent stockpiled in Australia in case
things went awry...
Certainly untrue.
Although the allies standardized a nerve agent during WWII (code named PF-3)
it was inferior to the agents the Germans discovered, and not stockpiled.
And the U.S. held its chemical agent stockpiles in the U.S.
...
> > But the third bomb for Japan was definitely halted by Truman.
> Do you know on what date, precisely? I only ask because I am curious if
that decision was based on
>effects of the two, by the Japanese surrender, or by Soviet invasion of
Manchuria..
It was due to the expectation of imminent surrender. If Japan had continued
delaying acceptance of final surrender after its initial in intention to do
so by a few more days its shipment would probably have been reauthorized.
Carey Sublette
Carey Sublette
"Don Phillipson" <d.phil...@ttrryytteell.com> wrote in message
news:c6f805$4...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
> "Jonathan" <jrc...@nospam.hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:c6ca3q$nbc$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> > if the US had acted against Japan in the 30s over China, the PTO might
have been avoided...
> > Yet, the US would have been labeled as the agressors...
> Not necessarily so, because of evidence of Japanese aggression in
Manchuria.
Certainly claims of aggression by the U.S. would not be universal.
But the prevalence of attempts in certain quarters of academia to assert
that the U.S. provoked the war with Japan by the hostile act of a trade
embargo as the sole material means of opposing the invasion and occupation
of China by Japan suggests that claims of U.S. aggression would certainly
have been heard, and become a staple assertion among those disposed to
finding the U.S. at fault for everything.
Carey Sublette
mike
>
> These estimates for production rates are based on the combined output of Oak
> Ridge and Hanford, and the assumption that future U-235 deliveries would be
> used in implosion bombs.
Right: assuming Groves would go for that to get maximum bomb numbers,
rather than the conservative design used so far. So few gun types,
going with the plutonium implosion type instead, with Oralloy cores.
Or am I going wrong?
> The enriched uranium production rate kept climbing through 1945 as the
> gaseous diffusion plant kept ramping up. Using U-235 in implosion bombs was
> four times as efficient, and Oppenheimer even recommended after Trinity that
> Little Boy not be dropped, but that its core be reworked to provide four
> implosion bombs (Groves overruled him because it would delay dropping the
> first bomb by roughly a week, and delay having two bomb ready by at least
> two weeks).
Would Groves, in your opinion, knowing that the bombs were working,
gone with a test of an solid Oralloy core type bomb to make sure
of that modification, and would he have gone with other ideas
floating around Los Alamos,like levitated pits and smaller polonium
inititors: or just stick with tried and true, even though fewer
bombs would be produced?
**
mike
**
--
Merlin Dorfman
...
: http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1998/mj98/mj98goldberg.html suggests
: that Truman was surprised by the use of Fatman. Truman himself never
: admitted such, I do believe, so it's an intruging theory that fits the
: facts but is not proven, IMO.
The reference says that Groves wanted the second bomb dropped
as soon as possible lest Japan surrender without both types being
used, which might lead to questions about the expense of building
both types.
I had read--possibly in Rhodes's "The Making of the Atomic
Bomb," that the second attack was scheduled for about August 11
but was moved up because of impending bad weather over Japan that
would probably prevent another mission for a week or so.
--
Merlin Dorfman
: "David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
: news:c6f84q$4...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
...
: > >Kimmel and Short had vague instructions that implied an attack from
: > >saboteurs... There were no operational orders, no statements suggesting
: that
: > >Pearl was about to be attacked, and no reason to suspect such an
: attack....
: > >
: > No, they had instructions that implied a naval attack. They were ordered
: > to make defensive dispositions, including reconnaisance. Read up
...
: And if you look at their preceding three weeks, they were pretty much on
: alert 24/7...
I disagree. Certainly the battleships in Pearl Harbor and the
air defenses of the island were not on 24/7 alert.
By contract, look at Admrial Halsey's Task Force 16. His
ships were on full war alert, flying combat air patrols, with all
guns manned. This is what should have been done at Pearl Harbor,
and its absence is why Kimmel and Short were fired.
As has been pointed out, Short was more to blame as his
responsibilities were limited to the Hawaiian Islands, while Kimmel's
were the entire Pacific area.
--
Michael Emrys
jrc...@nospam.hotmail.com wrote on 4/25/04 1:53 PM:
> Were Kimmel and Short negligent? No more so than Macarthur...
For my part, I am inclined to agree with you there. Macarthur had powerful
friends in Washington, Short and Kimmel did not. My impression is that Short
was clearly negligent and got what he deserved. I am not so sure about
Kimmel. I would much rather he had had the friends in Washington.
But that too would leave a problem. If Kimmel doesn't get the ax, what do
you do with him? If you leave him in place, then you might not get Nimitz as
ComCincPac, and that would be a bad thing. Could you move him to CominCh
with Pearl Harbor hanging over his reputation like a black cloud?
Doubtful...
But I think I would have liked to see Macarthur permanently sidelined.
Michael
--
Cub Driver
>William Manchester in American Ceaser claims that Macarthur disobeyed direct
>orders to alert his troops and get his planes in the air...
I read the book within the month, and I don't remember such a
scenario. You must be thinking of his alleged reluctance to send B-17s
to bomb Taiwan.
The planes were in the air! The P-40s were patrolling all morning;
they had landed to refuel when the Japanese came over about noon. As I
say, it was badly done, but at a lower level. (MacArthur may have
micromanaged many things, but he did not decide when and in what
sequence fighter squadrons were to land for refueling.)
all the best -- Dan Ford
email: war...@mailblocks.com (put Cubdriver in subject line)
The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org
--
Georg Schwarz
Carey Sublette <care...@earthling.net> wrote:
> And the U.S. held its chemical agent stockpiles in the U.S.
weren't some stocks of chemical agent shiped to Italy?
--
Georg Schwarz http://home.pages.de/~schwarz/
ge...@epost.de +49 177 8811442
David Thornley
In article <c6h8ej$9...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu>,
Steve Sundberg <dee...@mm.com> wrote:
>
>On 24 Apr 2004 21:33:58 -0500, thor...@visi.com (David Thornley)
>wrote:
>
>>
>>[snip] it seems at best careless to have them lined up
>>where Japanese aerial attackers can destroy them easily.
>
>But, based on the best available local intel at the time, there wasn't
>any belief that an attack was immient by air.
I really don't see that this matters. There was no evidence that
there was an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor in any case.
There was, however, a
>cause for concern of sabotage -- in which case, lining up the planes
>as was done would have made sabotage a more difficult task.
>
Why do you think there was evidence of intended sabotage but not
evidence of intended carrier air attack, aside from the fact that
sabotage would be easier to do? Even the impending war wasn't really
evidence of sabotage, since sabotage could be conducted either
under peacetime or wartime conditions.
David Thornley
In article <c6h3qg$ot6$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>,
Jonathan <jrc...@nospam.hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>"Georg Schwarz" <ge...@epost.de> wrote in message
>news:c6ca4c$nbm$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
>
>> successfully, on Hokkaido and would maybe have overrun Korea.
>
>The Soviets had this sealift capacity in the pacific???
>
planned to invade Hokkaido, and had overestimated the Japanese defense
forces there (Japanese forces were being moved to Kyushu as fast as
possible). On the other hand, considering how well the Soviets did
in Sakhalin and the Kuriles, invasions they did conduct, I have no
confidence in their invasion of Hokkaido.
>> That would
>> have created a worse post-war situation for the US. (ironically it was
>> the US that had explicitly asked for Soviet involvement against Japan).
>>
>
>Because we didn't know the nukes would be ready when we asked them at
>Yalta... and we were looking at the bloodiest invasion in planetary history.
>
We didn't know we wouldn't have to invade even after the nukes. Nor
did we know if the Japanese government could effectively surrender, or
could get troops overseas to surrender. It was considered possible
that, even if the US invaded the Japanese Home Islands, the Japanese
army in China and other such places would continue to hold out.
As it worked out, the Soviet participation turned out not to be in US
interests, but it could easily have happened otherwise.
David Thornley
In article <c6h9cp$9...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu>,
Carey Sublette <care...@earthling.net> wrote:
>
>And the U.S. held its chemical agent stockpiles in the U.S.
>
deploy chemical agents overseas. Hence the famous incident in
Bari, Italy, where a ship containing mustard agent was bombed
in harbor.
Merlin Dorfman
Cub Driver (war...@mailblocks.com) wrote:
...
: The plutonium bomb had other advantages in its simplicity. Postwar,
: Fat Man became the U.S. standard.
I know that the plutonium bomb became the standard, and no
more U-235 bombs were used, but is it true that simplicity was
the reason? Little Boy was far simpler than Fat Man, in fact Fat
Man was one of the more complex devices ever built, requiring the
invention of new technologies in conventional explosives and
electronics. Also the bombs could not be stored for long periods
after construction. Perhaps the post-war designs were different
from Fat Man.
Merlin Dorfman
Carey Sublette (care...@earthling.net) wrote:
...
: The enriched uranium production rate kept climbing through 1945 as the
: gaseous diffusion plant kept ramping up.
...
: In December 1945 the beta calutrons were producing 14 kg of U-235 a week,
: enough for one bomb each week.
It might be worth while to explain that the uranium enrichment
process (bringing U-235 from about 1.5% in natural uranium to 93%
or so in bomb-grade uranium) was done in two stages: first, gaseous
diffusion in the massive K-25 plant (so called because of its
location on the map grid), and then in electromagnetic separators
called Calutrons (after the University of California) located at
Y-12 on the grid.
Question: what was the U-235 concentration when the uranium
was moved from K-25 to Y-12?
Deeper question: since both U-235 and U-238 decay over time,
will the natural concentration of U-235 change over the centuries
and millenia? In which direction, and how fast?
Louis Capdeboscq
>>Jonathan wrote:
>>>Isn't it bizarre when an act of great violence ends up being the most
>>>humane thing we could do?
(snip)
"Louis Capdeboscq" wrote in message
>>Interestingly, it is also the justification for many atrocities, i.e.
>>Himmler and other major Nazi figures thought that they were ultimately
>>acting for the greater good in doing what they did.
Jonathan wrote:
> Explain?
I thought that my sentence was clear. I certainly can't make it clearer.
Many within the top Nazis, including Himmler, believed that they were
committing acts of great violence as an ultimately humane thing to do.
> I know that Germany claimed that Poland attacked them first (which was
> laughable), but there doesn't seem to be a genuine fear on the part of the
> Germans against Poland (they outgunned Poland 10 to 1)...
The Germans didn't fear Polish military might, at least not in 1939.
Being attacked first is neither here nor there.
> Also, it would be difficult to make an intelligible argument that the Jews
> posed a threat to the Germans (or any other Europeans).
It is extremely easy to make an intelligible, as opposed to intelligent,
argument to that effect. Hitler's arguments, that the Jews were a form
of social virus and that Germany risked racial contamination, certainly
were intelligible to a lot of Germans since they implemented his policies.
>>Please note that I'm in no ways equating the atomic bombing (or the
>>recent contemporary example to which I alluded to) with the holocaust,
>>except in the motivations of some of the authors.
>
> The problem is that the argument fails, simply because Japan was at war with
> the US et al... No such comparison could be made with the holocaust.
Of course it could be made.
That's social-darwinism for you.
> Gen Macarthur knew about the attacks on Pearl Harbor and was ordered into
> action... He did nothing and his air force was destroyed on the ground.
That is simply false. He put his forces on alert, and ordered his air
force to take some action.
His subordinate, Gen Brereton (who would later launch the disastrous
1943 raid on Ploesti, and be responsible for the air aspect of Market
Garden) got all his planes off the ground, but as the Japanese raid was
delayed the Americans were caught on the ground while refueling.
Bad tactics compounded by bad luck, but McArthur certainly did not do
nothing.
> Kimmel and Short had vague instructions that implied an attack from
> saboteurs... There were no operational orders, no statements suggesting that
> Pearl was about to be attacked, and no reason to suspect such an attack....
You need to read up on Pearl Harbor.
Both had received war warnings two weeks before Pearl Harbor, their
instructions were to defend the base and protect their forces. Short
decided that saboteurs were threat #1 and took no precautions against
other forms of attacks. That's not following orders.
Kimmel was more hamstrung by lack of means and his forces were more
alerted than Short's, but his reaction was still inadequate.
LC
--
Remove "e" from address to reply
Andy Hill
> The plutonium bomb had other advantages in its simplicity. Postwar,
> Fat Man became the U.S. standard.
>
only thing "simple" about Fat Man was that the fissionables could be
refined chemically. However, that was a huge advantage over uranium.
--
François Müller
"Merlin Dorfman" <dor...@rahul.net> escribió en el mensaje
news:c6joie$g...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
> Deeper question: since both U-235 and U-238 decay over time,
> will the natural concentration of U-235 change over the centuries
> and millenia?
Half period decay for U-235 is 0.7. 10^9 years, for U238 4.5.10^9 years. So
you can keep your U bombs for a while without any problems ;-))
>In which direction, and how fast?
today , natural concentration of U235 is 0.7%, but was 3.6% 2.10^9 years ago
(for this reason, there were on earth natural nuclear reactors , like Oklo
in Gabon)
F.
--
François Müller
"Merlin Dorfman" <dor...@rahul.net> escribió en el mensaje
news:c6joie$g...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
week,
> : enough for one bomb each week.
I don't think so. IIRC, critical mass for U-235 is 50 Kg
FM.
--
Cub Driver
>Macarthur had powerful
>friends in Washington,
I think it would be fairer to say that he had powerful enemies in
Washington.
MacArthur's strength came from his popular appeal, his constituency in
the Republican party, and his outstanding generalship. Roosevelt
feared the General, but he was no friend to him. Nor was Marshall.
Or perhaps you meant senators and congressmen? True, but only those in
the opposition party.
Cub Driver
>Nor
>did we know if the Japanese government could effectively surrender, or
>could get troops overseas to surrender
An important point. I don't know that it was a consideration in
American planning, but reading the Japanese accounts of the war
cabinet's discussions after the fact, it's certainly apparent that no
one was fully in control in Tokyo, never mind the far reaches of the
empire.
Carey Sublette
"François Müller" <fcm_news...@yahoo.fr> wrote in message
news:c6k7nv$l3k$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
> > : In December 1945 the beta calutrons were producing 14 kg of U-235 a
> week, enough for one bomb each week.
> I don't think so. IIRC, critical mass for U-235 is 50 Kg
In an uncompressed assembly without a reflector, yes.
Under similar conditions the critical mass of plutonium is 16 kg. Yet the
Gadget only used 6.2 kg - due to the benefits of compression and neutron
reflection.
In an implosion bomb about 15 kg of uranium is required.
Carey Sublette
--
Michael Emrys
war...@mailblocks.com wrote on 4/27/04 8:27 AM:
> Or perhaps you meant senators and congressmen? True, but only those in
> the opposition party.
That's what I meant. My understanding is that Roosevelt et al found it
easier overall to put up with Macarthur than to take the heat from the
Republicans that would be ensue if they canned him. If you or anyone has
information to the contrary I'm open.
Michael
--
Carey Sublette
"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
news:c6jo7h$g...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
...
> While I haven't looked into where they were, Allied forces did
> deploy chemical agents overseas. Hence the famous incident in Bari,
Italy...
That's correct.
I was intending to refer only to the Pacific theater, where no chemical
munitions
were deployed outside U.S. territory.
Cub Driver
>Fat
>Man was one of the more complex devices ever built, requiring the
>invention of new technologies in conventional explosives and
>electronics.
This may be true, but once the technology was proven (at Trinity) I
believe that Fat Man was simpler than Little Boy. Note that Little Boy
was armed in the air, so as not to obliterate Tinian if Enola Gay
should crash on takeoff, while Fat Man was armed on the ground.
I may be wrong about this, and that the USAF's preference for the Fat
Man design lay with the fact that the bomb was more powerful (that
deaths were fewer at Nagasaki had to do with geography rather than
explosive power) or availability of plutonium.
Uranium bombs were sometimes designed and deployed in the postwar
years.
What a pity Chuck Hansen is no longer posting here.
Cub Driver
>Fat
>Man was one of the more complex devices ever built, requiring the
>invention of new technologies in conventional explosives and
>electronics.
This may be true, but once the technology was proven (at Trinity) I
Carey Sublette
"Merlin Dorfman" <dor...@rahul.net> wrote in message
news:c6joie$g...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
>
> Carey Sublette (care...@earthling.net) wrote:
>
> ...
> : The enriched uranium production rate kept climbing through 1945 as the
> : gaseous diffusion plant kept ramping up.
> : In December 1945 the beta calutrons were producing 14 kg of U-235 a
week,
> : enough for one bomb each week.
...
> Question: what was the U-235 concentration when the uranium was moved from
K-25 to Y-12?
18% in June 1945, increasing to 30% by year's end, it remained at this level
for a number of years after, until a gaseous diffusion "topping" extension
was added.
> Deeper question: since both U-235 and U-238 decay over time,
> will the natural concentration of U-235 change over the centuries
> and millenia? In which direction, and how fast?
U-235 decays faster than U-238 (710 million years vs 4.51 billion years)
so its concentration drops with time, gradually. A couple of billion years
ago natural uranium had the same enrichment as typical commercial power
reactor fuel today. This led to the existence of natural nuclear reactors,
some of which have been discovered. The 1.9 billion year old reactor centers
discovered in 1972 at the Oklo mine in Gabon are the most famous. In the
most highly depleted core at Oklo the U-235 content was only 0.44% (it is
normally 0.7110% by mass).
Jonathan
"Carey Sublette" <care...@earthling.net> wrote in message
news:c6h9cp$9...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
>
>
> "Jonathan" <jrc...@nospam.hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:c6f6b0$4...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
> > "Chris Manteuffel" <cman...@ozmail.cjb.net> wrote in message
> > news:c6ca3i$nb8$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
>
> > I have also heard rumors of nerve agent stockpiled in Australia in case
> things went awry...
>
> Certainly untrue.
> Although the allies standardized a nerve agent during WWII (code named
PF-3)
> it was inferior to the agents the Germans discovered, and not stockpiled.
> And the U.S. held its chemical agent stockpiles in the U.S.
>
What about the US Army's Chemical Warfare Service in Australia?
They had 870 tons of Mustard Gas delivered to Australia... with some 14,000
bomb casings filled just after the Philippines were secured.
They also filled enough spray tanks to supply a 63 plane raid...
Supposedly, the CWS had given Macarthur a chemical weapons capability by
1943...
The ROE though, was if and only if the Japanese used CW first... The
equipment was deployed so that a CW response could occur immediately.
Jonathan
Cub Driver
>easier overall to put up with Macarthur than to take the heat from the
>Republicans that would be ensue if they canned him.
Yes, that's probably the case, to judge by Manchester's biography, and
by the national reaction when Truman did fire the General.
Steve Sundberg
On 26 Apr 2004 14:35:20 -0500, thor...@visi.com (David Thornley)
wrote:
>
>In article <c6h8ej$9...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu>,
>Steve Sundberg <dee...@mm.com> wrote:
>>
>>But, based on the best available local intel at the time, there wasn't
>>any belief that an attack was immient by air.
>
>I really don't see that this matters. There was no evidence that
>there was an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor in any case.
There was enough cause for concern of SOME form of attack that the PH
command was notified by the War Department in November, 1941, to take
appropriate measures. You may dismiss this as immaterial or
irrelevant; I do not.
>Why do you think there was evidence of intended sabotage but not
>evidence of intended carrier air attack, aside from the fact that
>sabotage would be easier to do?
Sabotage would have been more easily accomplished, at least according
to the prevailing thinking that existed on December 6, 1941. As has
been expressed in this newsgroup before, US military leaders did not
believe the IJN had the capability of mounting an air attack against
PH.
>Even the impending war wasn't really
>evidence of sabotage, since sabotage could be conducted either
>under peacetime or wartime conditions.
And your point is? The was a fear by PH command that the local
Japanese (i.e., not Japanese-American) population in Hawaii was
capable of sabotage. And 20/20 hindsight provided proof that there
were, indeed, Japanese spies gathering intel wrt ship movements and
placement at Pearl Harbor, and area air defences. That intel could
easily have been used for sabotage raids as it was for a full-scale
carrier-borne air attack.
Carey Sublette
"Cub Driver" <war...@mailblocks.com> wrote in message
news:c6n1hj$o...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
...
> This may be true, but once the technology was proven (at Trinity) I
> believe that Fat Man was simpler than Little Boy. Note that Little Boy
> was armed in the air, so as not to obliterate Tinian if Enola Gay
> should crash on takeoff, while Fat Man was armed on the ground.
Little Boy was armed in the air because they could.
They had no choice but to complete the assembly of Fat Man the ground
due to its complexity. It also had the possibility of obliterating a portion
of
Tinian in a crash, but nothing could be done about it at the time. Post war
implosion designs provided for in flight core insertion, either manually or
by means of an internal electric motor.
> I may be wrong about this, and that the USAF's preference for the Fat
> Man design lay with the fact that the bomb was more powerful (that
> deaths were fewer at Nagasaki had to do with geography rather than
> explosive power) or availability of plutonium.
Implosion bombs are intrinsically much more efficient than gun-assembly
types due to the compression of the core. They are also more versatile in
that they could use both uranium and plutonium, and thus were the only
single type that could be standardized for the entire arsenal. US production
of enriched uranium always exceeded that of plutonium because it is
intrinsically cheaper to do once the plant is built. What the USAF did a few
years after the war was standardize on a composite uranium-plutonium pit
whose composition roughly matched the production ratio of the materials
(about 3 to 1 in favor of uranium).
> Uranium bombs were sometimes designed and deployed in the postwar years.
Use of uranium was standard, in conjunction with plutonium (as noted above).
> What a pity Chuck Hansen is no longer posting here.
You are aware the Chuck died last year, right?
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/News/HansenRetrospective.html
Carey Sublette
Carey Sublette
> What about the US Army's Chemical Warfare Service in Australia?
> They had 870 tons of Mustard Gas delivered to Australia... with some
14,000
> bomb casings filled just after the Philippines were secured.
...
Thanks, I stand corrected. I had not been aware that stockpiles had been
moved
there. I had read some time ago about shipments to the Pacific being
requested
in 1944, after the establishment of the Twentieth Airforce in the Mariannas,
but
being turned down and reconsidered only during the Iwo Jima and Okinawa
campaigns. This had given me the impression that no shipments at all had
been authorized.
Where have you seen this detailed?
Carey Sublette
--
Cub Driver
>believe the IJN had the capability of mounting an air attack against
>PH.
It was the equivalent, in Atlantic terms, of the U.S. mounting a sneak
attack on Murmansk.
Ironically, the U.S. actually did something similar in its invasion of
North Africa, mounted from Virginia as I recall. But never again.
Pearl was an astonishing feat, and it is no wonder that the men on the
spot failed to anticipate it.
all the best -- Dan Ford
email: war...@mailblocks.com (put Cubdriver in subject line)
The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org
--
Andrew Clark
"Cub Driver" <war...@mailblocks.com> wrote
> Ironically, the U.S. actually did something similar
> in its invasion of North Africa, mounted from Virginia
> as I recall.
While Western Task Force did indeed sail from the United
States, the bulk of the troops and ships involved in Torch
sailed from the UK, and the air force flew from Gibraltar.
And the western landing of troops, as opposed to the naval
battle beforehand, was largely unopposed.
--
Cub Driver
>the air force flew from Gibraltar.
And from carriers, which presumably sallied from Hampton Roads.
>And the western landing of troops, as opposed to the naval
>battle beforehand, was largely unopposed.
Well, Pearl was largely unopposed also :)
Merlin Dorfman
...
: U-235 decays faster than U-238 (710 million years vs 4.51 billion years)
: so its concentration drops with time, gradually. A couple of billion years
: ago natural uranium had the same enrichment as typical commercial power
: reactor fuel today. This led to the existence of natural nuclear reactors,
: some of which have been discovered. The 1.9 billion year old reactor centers
: discovered in 1972 at the Oklo mine in Gabon are the most famous. In the
: most highly depleted core at Oklo the U-235 content was only 0.44% (it is
: normally 0.7110% by mass).
Thanks, the existence of natural nuclear reactors was news to
me. Slightly off topic, but there seem to be the conflicting
implications that (1) this only happened because the natural
concentration of U-235 was higher in the past and (2) the U-235
content in the natural reactor was less than the natural
concentration today.
To bring it back on topic, wasn't Fermi's U. of Chicago
reactor made with natural (un-enriched) uranium? If so, did it
depend on the existence of U-235 at all, and what concentration
is required? I sort of inferred that the Chicago reactor
required the graphite (moderator?) but did not understand
exactly what the graphite did...slow down the neutrons?...and
also inferred that it would work with pure U-238.
--
Jonathan
"Carey Sublette" <care...@earthling.net> wrote in message
news:c6r80b$c7e$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu...
>
> "Jonathan" <jrc...@nospam.hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:c6q5nt$8...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
> > "Carey Sublette" <care...@earthling.net> wrote in message
> > > And the U.S. held its chemical agent stockpiles in the U.S.
>
> > What about the US Army's Chemical Warfare Service in Australia?
>
> Where have you seen this detailed?
>
http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/NovDec02/MS744.htm
Is where I got the info... It is a US Army site.
Jonathan
Carey Sublette
with natural (un-enriched) uranium?
Yes, Fermi's CP-1 used natural uranium. There was no other kind in the world
at that time.
>If so, did it depend on the existence of U-235 at all, and what
concentration is required?
Yes, the reactor depended on U-235. This was the only isotope supporting the
chain reaction.
Except for fast reactors (an exotic breed of reactor, that) all nuclear
reactors require moderators to slow down neutrons; light (natural) water,
heavy water, or graphite. Neutrons are far more readily captured when they
are slowed down. Commercial power reactors use light water (as did the Oklo
reactor) and require enriched uranium. Heavy water and graphite work for
natural uranium.
I am not really sure what the minimum concentration for U-235 in uranium to
support a chain reaction with a graphite moderator, but I am inclined to say
something like 0.5%. If the Earth were 500 million years older than it is,
Fermi's reactor wouldn't have worked. Heavy water can support chain
reactions at lower concentrations than graphite since it is a better
moderator.
Carey Sublette
--
Merlin Dorfman
Carey Sublette (care...@earthling.net) wrote:
...
: >If so, did it depend on the existence of U-235 at all, and what
: concentration is required?
: Yes, the reactor depended on U-235. This was the only isotope supporting the
: chain reaction.
So, a top-level but hopefully not-too-inaccurate summary is:
only U-235 will fission producing more neutrons than were needed
to initiate the fission, and will sustain a chain reaction if the
neutrons are sufficiently slowed. (And Fermi predicted that from
his knowledge of physical properties of uranium.) The 99+% U-238
is a nonparticipant in the reaction but incidentally will absorb
some neutrons and transmute to Neptunium and then Plutonium. (And
there is natural Plutonium as a result of the natural reactors in
uranium deposits.)
("Only U-235" above refers to the natural isotopes of uranium.
Plutonium and Thorium also have isotopes that will sustain a chain
reaction.)
David Thornley
In article <c6s431$o08$1...@nntp6.u.washington.edu>,
Andrew Clark <acl...@starcottDELETETHISBIT.freeserve.co.uk> wrote:
>
>"Cub Driver" <war...@mailblocks.com> wrote
>
>> Ironically, the U.S. actually did something similar
>> in its invasion of North Africa, mounted from Virginia
>> as I recall.
>
>While Western Task Force did indeed sail from the United
>States,
Yup. One of the three main prongs, invading from the Atlantic because
some Allied planners were concerned about the Straits of Gibraltar
being closed if the Spanish took offense.
>And the western landing of troops, as opposed to the naval
>battle beforehand, was largely unopposed.
>
Given the experience and equipment of the US invaders, this was good.
Nevertheless, it was a sizable amphibious assault, with aircraft
support, that started from Virginia and landed in Africa.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Carey Sublette
"Merlin Dorfman" <dor...@rahul.net> wrote in message
news:c74jvs$a...@gazette.corp.bcm.tmc.edu...
> (And there is natural Plutonium as a result of the natural reactors in
uranium deposits.)
Plutonium exists in extremely small amounts in natural ore due to on-going
capture of neutrons by U-238 produced by spontaneous fission (also by
U-238). The plutonium produced in the Oklo natural reactor decayed to U-235
long ago - the process in essentially complete in less than a million years,
and the reactor has been extinct for well over a billion years.
> ("Only U-235" above refers to the natural isotopes of uranium.
> Plutonium and Thorium also have isotopes that will sustain a chain
reaction.)
Thorium does not. Only when transmuted by neutron capture to U-233 (in a
manner analogous to U-238 yielding Pu-239) can thorium provide fission fuel.
Drazen Kramaric
On 26 Apr 2004 16:21:25 GMT, Cub Driver <war...@mailblocks.com>
wrote:
>The planes were in the air! The P-40s were patrolling all morning;
>they had landed to refuel when the Japanese came over about noon.
I suppose some of the planes landed to refuel while new shift should
have been in the air flying combat air patrol, right?
Who was responsible for the organisation of air defense including
observation posts, communications etc.? It's not that MacArthur didn't
have plenty of time to get his troops prepared.
Were there any backup airfields for bombers to land outside the range
of Japanese bombers on Taiwan? What was the plan for the use of B-17s
in case of the Japanese invasion?
Drax
remove JAMRZIMSPAM for reply
Cub Driver
>I suppose some of the planes landed to refuel while new shift should
>have been in the air flying combat air patrol, right?
Yes, they should have refueled by squadron, or otherwise in relays.
>
>Who was responsible for the organisation of air defense including
>observation posts, communications etc.? It's not that MacArthur didn't
>have plenty of time to get his troops prepared.
MacArthur's air chief was Lewis Brereton. Part of the problem I think
was his inability to get through to the General. For instance,
Manchester tells how Brereton stormed up the steps to Mac's
headquarters and Sutherland said the General was busy. Brereton said:
"I'm going to attack Formosa." Sutherland claims he gave B permission
in Mac's name to make a reconnaissance. Brereton claims S told him
nothing could be done until the General approved, because Washington
had prohibited "offensive action." Brereton evidently was so much in
awe of the General that he dared not storm past his aide.
>
>Were there any backup airfields for bombers to land outside the range
>of Japanese bombers on Taiwan? What was the plan for the use of B-17s
>in case of the Japanese invasion?
Yes, there were supposed to be airports on the southern island.
Indeed, I think there had been plans to move the 17s south, before
they were destroyed on the ground, but for some reason this was not
done.
The 17s were to have bombed Formosa/Taiwan, and also the invasion
beaches. At that time, of course, there was a tremendous faith in the
efficacy of high-level bombing. In the event, by the time the Japanese
were on the beaches, there were effectively no B-17s remaining.
Chris Mark
>have been in the air flying combat air patrol, right?
There were not unlimited supplies of fighters and pilots available. The main
fighter forces was the 24th Pursuit Group and not all of the P-40s assigned to
it were in tactical commission when the Japanese attacked.
That morning, Iba radar picked up bogies 30 miles off the coast of Luzon
heading for Clark.
One squadron, the 17th, based at Nichols, was scrambled at 8 am, its 18
P-40Es, ordered to patrol over Tarlac, 20-some miles north of Clark. At 8:15
the P-40Bs of the 20th squadron, based at Clark, were scrambled and also headed
to Tarlac.
Then the P-35s of the 34th Squadron, based at Del Carmen, were scrambled to
patrol over Clark itself.
The 3rd Squadron's P-40Es, at Iba, and the 21st Squadron's P-40Es, at Nichols,
remained on the ground with the pilots in the cockpits, ready to scramble.
While the US fighters were patrolling the approaches to Clark Field, the
Japanese bombed Baguio and Tuguegarao, north of their patrol area. The
fighters were not diverted to intercept the Japanese hitting these areas
because doing so would have left the critical Clark Field area undefended.
At around 11, the patroling P-40s came in to refuel at Clark, the
shorter-ranged P-35s already having set down at Del Carmen to gas up. The
17th's transient planes parked by the hangers to be first served with gas so
they could get airborne again as quickly as possible while the 20th taxied back
to their protected revetments, where they would wait to refuel until after the
17th was taken care of.
It should be noted that the P-40 pilots had been awake since 2:30 am, and a
number had participated in a night interception attempt of intruders picked up
by Iba radar.
At 11:40 am Iba radar reported picking up bogies heading for the Manila area.
The 3rd was ordered to scramble to intercept them. A few minutes later, radar
reported another group of bogies heading also for the Manila area. The 21st
was scrambled to intercept them. The P-35s of the 34th were now refueled, and
they scrambled as well.
At 12:15, the 17th was refueled and scrambled again immediately.
At 12:20 radar reported another group of bogies heading for Clark. The only
fighters available to intercept this new group was the 20th, and it was held on
the ground as its planes were finally refueled, as a reserve in case even more
incoming bogies were reported. At 12:30 Iba radar reported a large formation
of bogies approaching Iba field. At 12:35 Japanese bombers were seen by the
20th's pilots directly over the field and they scrambled without waiting for
orders. Bombs walked across the field before many could take off, destroying
several of the fighters. Overhead, the already scrambled planes engaged the
attacking enemy forces, which consisted of 106 twin engine bombers and 85 Zero
fighters. These were engaged by the airborne fighter forces, which were as
much as 12,000 feet below them, and so engaged at a considerable disadvantage
without even considering the difference in numbers.
>Who was responsible for the organisation of air defense including
>observation posts, communications etc.?
The Philippine Dept. Air Force was commanded by BG Henry Clagett. The USFEAF
was commanded by MG Lewis Brereton, who had arrived in the PI on Nov. 4.
>It's not that MacArthur didn't
>have plenty of time to get his troops prepared.
On Dec. 6 MacArthur estimated he would need another four months to complete his
defense preparations.
>Were there any backup airfields for bombers to land outside the range
>of Japanese bombers on Taiwan?
Yes, at Del Monte on Mindanao. Gen. Brereton had stationed half of his B-17
force there a few days before Pearl Harbor, safely out of range of Japanese
bombers.
>What was the plan for the use of B-17s
>in case of the Japanese invasion?
To attack Japanese air bases on Taiwan. In the early morning of Dec. 8, after
hearing about Pearl Harbor, Brereton dispatched a B-17 to report on weather
conditions over Taiwan. At 7:15 am he requested permission of MacArthur to
launch an attack with his Clark -based B-17s on Taiwan. He couldn't reach
Mac., being told by his CoS MG Richard Sutherland that MacArthur was in
conference and couldn't talk to him. Over the next several hours, Brereton
repeatedly called Sutherland for permission to launch, finally annoying him so
much that he told B. not to call anymore. When and if permission was granted,
S. would call B. At 10:15, MacA., apparently having just learned of B's
request, called Brereton directly and told him to launch the attack. At 11:56
B reported to Sutherland that he would have his bombers launched soon and they
would be bombing Taiwan's airfields by late afteroon. At 12:35 Japanese
bombers walked a sweet pattern of over 600 132-lb daisy cutters across Clark
field and the fully fueled and bomb-laden B-17s, followed by strafing runs on
anything still surviving by dozens of Zeros.
Game over.
Why the delay of permission? Sutherland apparently interpreted the Nov. 28 War
Dept. radiogram stipulating that "if hostilities cannot be avoided the USG
desires that Japan commit the first overt act" to mean an "overt act" against
the Philippines. So the attack on Pearl Harbor didn't count.
There was hope, apparently, that the Japanese would not attack the PI as long
as US forces there made no hostile moves against them. Since we know what did
happen, we assume that those there at the time understood what the future would
bring. But they did not. They could not.
In any case, had the US bombers launched earlier, an attack by a dozen and a
half early model B-17s would scarcely have inflicted much damage on the enemy.
And they may well have run into the force of 85 Zeros bearing down on Clark.
Unescorted as they were, they would have provided the Zero pilots with a few
minutes of target practice. So whether they were launched or not really is of
no great consequence.
Chris Mark
--
charles...@ddddartmouth.edu
<dkra...@JAMRZIMSPAMfina.hr> wrote:
>I suppose some of the planes landed to refuel while new shift should
>have been in the air flying combat air patrol, right?
>
>Who was responsible for the organisation of air defense including
>observation posts, communications etc.? It's not that MacArthur didn't
>have plenty of time to get his troops prepared.
>
>Were there any backup airfields for bombers to land outside the range
>of Japanese bombers on Taiwan? What was the plan for the use of B-17s
>in case of the Japanese invasion?
Yes, of course it would have been wise to land and refuel by squadron.
Yes the B-17's had been ordered to Mindinao, but only a few actually
left. Those that did, ended up being the only surviving B-17's in the
Phillipines.
There was a failure in communications when the Japanese were finally
spotted coming in. There was radar there, I think, but in addition
there were spotters who's report was somehow not passed through to
Clark Field.
There is also a rather huge "coulda been". At the time of the war
warning and Brereton's rushing around to attempt to get permission to
bomb the Japanese airfields on Taiwan, the Japanese were grounded by
fog. The fog did not burn off for several hours. This begs the
question, of course, that the B-17's could have located the airfields
in the ground fog. But Saburo Sakai wrote in his book that the fog
was very dense but not very high. The pilots sat in their airplanes
getting more and more frustrated, positive that the warning had been
given and that american bombers were for sure on their way.
But they weren't. In a stroke of luck, the likes of which was
reversed 6 months later at the Battle of Midway, all the american
planes were back on the ground refueling and getting lunch when the
Japanese approached, having finally launched from their bases after
the fog burned off.
Had they launched when they had intended, at dawn, the Japanese would
have encountered the fully aroused fighter defense above Clark Field.
It's what they were anticipating. They were very surprised to find
all the fighters on the ground. Sakai said that he never again saw
the bombers bomb with such accuracy for the rest of the war.
Corky Scott
--
Chris Mark
>spotted coming in.
>There was radar there, I think,
The QA-1 system was elaborate and had proved effective at spotting aircraft and
relaying info to fighter interceptors during the few training exercizes
possible. The long-range SCR-270B radar at Iba was linked into the structure
and Iba radar had carried out intercept training with P-40s, using B-18s and
B-17s as targets.
On the morning in question the Iba radar provided accurate and timely
information on incoming formations, and fighters were scrambled appropriately.
The only squadron initially caught on the ground was deliberately held there as
a reserve, seeing that four incoming formations of enemy aircraft were already
reported and four squadrons of fighters sent to intercept them. (As the
attacks developed and fighters landed to refuel or with damage, a number were
caught on the ground, in particularly the short-ranged P-35s.)
With no knowledge of how many more enemy formations might be on the way, it was
a rational and prudent decision to hold the last fighter squadron available in
reserve.
The Iba radar operator who performed so well on this day was Pvt. Thomas Lloyd,
Air Warning Service. All his reports were radioed to AWS Nielson where they
were logged. Inbound Japanese aircraft were detected when they were 129 miles
from Iba, providing about three-quarters of an hour warning (as a data point,
for interception calculation purposes, a P-40 at assigned altitude [that is,
not climbing or descending] was deemed to have a ground speed of four miles per
minute).
Iba detected not only the four flights of Japanese Naval aircraft (Nells,
Betties and Zeros) directed at Iba and Clark but also the two raids by Japanese
Army bombers that struck Baguio (Sallys) and Tuguegarao (Lilies).
In addition to the radar at Iba, there was one at Aparri, which did good work
as well. However, both were destroyed by the Japanese air attacks of that day.
Another radar station just north of Legaspi was destroyed by its crew to keep
it from falling into the hands of Japanese who landed there.
Communications problems did occur with the Marine radar unit stationed at
Cavite. This was equipped with an SCR-270B as well as two short-range SCR-268
fire-control radars. Interservice communications problems made it of little use
in warning army forces of raids.
The biggest shortcoming of the SCR-270B was that while it could report the
approach, speed, course and number of aircraft, it could not report their
altitude. Thus on Dec.8, fighters were scrambled to altitudes assigned by
educated guess.
One interesting sidelight of the Dec.8 attack on Clark is that one of the
operators at the SCR-197 radio communications trailer relaying ground-to-air
intercept directions to the airborne interceptors was a Brit who somehow ended
up in the US Army Philippines. When Japanese bombs began falling he forgot
protocol and shouted in the clear over a voice channel out, "Tally Ho, Clark
Field! All fighters to Clark! Messerschmitts over Clark!" This led to some
brief consternation among the American pilots, as may be imagined. This
anecdote was related by Gen Joe Moore, who commanded the 4th Tactical Fighter
Wing (F-105s) in his later service career, but on that day was a lst Lt. with
the 20th Pursuit, waiting on the ground in his P-40B. He and his wingman got
airborne just as bombs walked across the field destroying several fighters on
the ground as they raced to take off.
The communications trailer was knocked off the air at 12:42, seven minutes
after the "Tally ho!' call, with fatalities.
Another interesting sidelight from the Japanese side is that as the Nells were
taking off, the lead plane blew a tire and the heavily laden bomber veered off
the runway, the gear collapsed and the plane exploded in a huge fireball. This
was viewed as a bad omen by the remaining crews, who figured it presaged even
worse things to come. (In the very long range, of course, it did. But not
that day.)
Chris Mark
--
Chris Mark
>Wing (F-105s) in his later service career, but on that day was a lst Lt. with
>the 20th Pursuit, waiting on the ground in his P-40B. He and his wingman got
>airborne just as bombs walked
>across the field
For anyone curious about what happened to Moore et al once airborne:
He and his wingman, Randy Keator, climbed to 21,000 feet where they attacked
nine Zeros, a buntai led by Sachio Maki. These planes were on their way to
Clark after having strafed Iba.
Edwin Gilmore had also gotten off the ground and was following the other two
P-40Bs, but was a few thousand feet below them and still climbing when the
engagement started.
Moore attacked Maki, and Maki's wingman, Yoshio Hirose, in turn came after
Moore. Keator shot him down in flames. Hirose who was killed in the attack.
Keator was then attacked by Zeros he could not shake off and so dove out of the
fight then climbed back up. He saw Moore engaged with three Zeros and broke up
their attack on him but saw Moore's plane spiraling down on fire. He was then
engaged by Zeros and dove out of the fight.
Gilmore, alone, also entered the fray but was quickly latched onto by a Zero he
shook off with a series of Dutch rolls. He then got on the tail of another
Zero and fired on it, seeing strikes, but the Zero out-turned him and got away.
A Zero was on his tail by this time and scoring hits, so he dove out of the
fight.
Moore was also engaged by Zeros he could not shake so he, too, dove out of the
fight.
All three P-40s were now alone, so they headed for home individually. Keator
saw a lone plane ahead of him, headed for Clark. Assuming it was Moore, he
close on it, only to discover it was a solitary Zero. He approached from
astern, the Zero took no evasive action, and he shot it down easily. No
confirmation, however.
Gilmore, assuming Clark was out of action, landed at Del Carmen, where he met
with the P-35-flying 34th Squadron pilots, who had been quite shaken by their
encounters with the Japanese Zeros. Not one of the hard-flown Severskys had
been shot down in the desperate dog fight, but every one was damaged and one
had been forced to make a dead-stick, wheels-up landing.
Keator landed back at Clark on an extension taxi strip constructed to handle
the B-17s, the main strip being cratered by bombs and littered with burning
wrecked planes. When debriefed he stated that he had seen Moore shot down in
flames, his plane hitting the ground with no sign of a parachute, so he was
sure Moore was dead.
Shortly afterward, Moore landed on the same taxi strip as Keator did, his plane
undamaged.
There was mention of communications foul-ups. There was one classic whopper:
The 17th Squadron's 18 P-40Es scrambled in timely fashion and climbed to 25,000
feet where they orbited over Manila Bay as directed. There they waited,
listening for further orders for two and a half hours. No order came, and
finally, low on gas, they returned to Nichols. Only after landing did they
learn of the devastating attacks on Clark and Iba. They had received no
further orders because the communications trailer had been knocked out in the
first few minutes of the attack.
This episode points out some interesting--and often studied--quadaries of war:
The 17th missed the fight because its CO, the legendary Buzz Wagner, obeyed
orders. The squadron was desperately needed, and had Wagner sidled toward
Clark or Iba, he would have been able to execute a strong attack against
bombers whose escort had been drawn off by the 3rd Squadron (which got creamed
in a savage battle with superior numbers of Zeros).
But the 20th's leader, Joe Moore, took off without orders, his squadron
following after him, taxing out of their protected revetments right into a
massive bomb pattern of fragmentation bombs (636 to be exact). Of the 23
P-40Bs in the squadron, only those first three that got airborne survived.
Twenty planes lost and eight pilots killed plus other wounde--on the ground.
It was a disaster. Support personnel who took cover in the L-shaped slit
trenches by the revetments were completely uninjured, despite the fact that
bombs had exploded within 50 feet of the trenches (the Japs were dropping
132-lb daisy cutters). Had the pilots taken shelter in the trenches and the
planes remained in their blast and shrapnel proof revetments.... Moore should
not have taken off without orders--orders that were not issued for good reason:
it was too late to scramble.
(To point out what an unnecessary loss this was, in March, some four months
later, when B-25s flew up from Australia to Mindanao to attack the Japanese on
Luzon, on their attacks they were escorted by a P-40B still surviving after all
those many weeks of fighting. What might not have been accomplished by those
20 P-40Bs lost on that very first day! [The B-model was apparently better at
dogfighting Zeros than later versions, perhaps because it was lighter weight,
so the loss was doubly felt.])
Wagner took his lesson to heart, and became one of the most aggressive leaders
of the early war, becoming famous in New Guinea for his daring attacks on the
Japanese. He did not survive the war.
Moore learned to be less impetuous and not only survived the war, but rose to
generalship.
Chris Mark
--
Cub Driver
>Gilmore, alone, also entered the fray but was quickly latched onto by a Zero he
>shook off with a series of Dutch rolls
What is a Dutch roll in this context? It's usually applied to
oscillations that can't be damped out, as in the Northrop YB-49 Flying
Wing bomber. I can't visualize it as a deliberate maneuver in combat.
all the best -- Dan Ford
email: war...@mailblocks.com (put Cubdriver in subject line)
The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org
--
Chris Mark
>What is a Dutch roll in this context?
The below website shows a diagram of a Dutch roll which may help give an idea
of how such a manoeuver might shake off a pursuing aircraft. As you say, it is
usually thought of as a design flaw to be corrected, but can be intentionally
entered into. Apparently, in the practice dogfighting of the pursuit squadrons
of 1930s Air Corps equipped with planes like the P-6, P-12 or P-26,
deliberately entering a Dutch roll to shake a pursuer was a routine procedure.
Gilmore was assigned directly to the Philippines from Kelly Field and flew
P-26s before transitioning to P-35As, which pilots of his squadron described as
"a 1,200-horsepower feather." In mid-1941 he began flying the P-40B. Joe Moore,
a commissioned pilot since 1938 assigned as squadron leader, drilled his
charges in the sorts of dogfighting tactics of the late biplane era.
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Theories_of_Flight/Stability_II/TH
27G13.htm
Chris Mark