Hesitation led to Bulge?
Ken S. Tucker
Western Front, had set-backs, like Market Garden here's an
opinion,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/23/opinion/23colley.html
claiming Ike was too conservative.
Was he?
Ken
Don Phillipson
news:7b0a5a5c-68b3-48cd...@m7g2000prd.googlegroups.com...
This is an old and familiar debate. Ingredients include:
1. In August 1944 many Allied leaders expected to defeat
Germany before Christmas; in November no one expected
such rapid victory.
2. The main technical point is logistics, viz. the capacity
of the Allies to supply the front line. Early German tactics included
holding the Channel seaports as late as possible (and
destroying port facilities before surrender.) Late Allied tactics
focussed on the seaport of Antwerp but neglected German
occupation of the 50-mile estuary of the Scheldt which
rendered Antwerp useless until cleared by the Canadians
in S. Beveland, commandos at Walcheren, etc.
3. As is known, some high commanders interacted with
various degrees of personal dislike. This is usually judged
a factor but a minor one i.e. less important than #2.
4. Refilling the ranks (replacing battle casualties) became
increasingly difficult as the campaign continued. This is
another technical question, requiring evaluation of
manpower estimates and plans before D-Day and
the efficiency of the Replacement Depot system
after D-Day. All armies were slowed by the shortage
of replacement riflemen (and supplies, #2). There
may be a consensus that the US replacement system
was worse than the British and Canadian systems
(although all ran out of manpower: Britain diverted
new conscripts to coal mines, fearing coal shortages
and Canada reversed its all-volunteer policy to
send conscripts overseas.)
Historian Colley writes "in November 1944, the war in Europe
was at a stalemate." This metaphor must not be taken
literally. Allied armies were short of riflemen and supplies
but were not actually stale-mated. Commanders agreed
Germany could not possibly hold out late in 1945. The
strategic question was how much blood and ammunition
should be spent on the inevitable conquest of Germany.
Market Garden was Montgomery's attempt to seize
the initiative -- which failed. After this failure Eisenhower
allowed no such independent freedom to his other commanders
(e.g. Patton, Devers). While Allied commanders were dithering
(although fighting savagely in some places e.g. Aachen) Germany
seized the initiative in the Battle of the Bulge. Market Garden
and the Bulge by themselves show:
-- there was no literal stalemate in Sept. 1944 or Nov. 1944;
-- Russian armies and RAF/US air power meant the inevitable
defeat of Germany in 1945 if not in 1944. All commanders
knew this. Their practical question was how many of their
own resources to expend in order to secure victory.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
David H Thornley
> 4. Refilling the ranks (replacing battle casualties) became
> increasingly difficult as the campaign continued. This is
> another technical question, requiring evaluation of
> manpower estimates and plans before D-Day and
> the efficiency of the Replacement Depot system
> after D-Day. All armies were slowed by the shortage
> of replacement riflemen (and supplies, #2). There
> may be a consensus that the US replacement system
> was worse than the British and Canadian systems
> (although all ran out of manpower: Britain diverted
> new conscripts to coal mines, fearing coal shortages
> and Canada reversed its all-volunteer policy to
> send conscripts overseas.)
>
This was partly a matter of finding sufficient manpower, and
partly a matter of training and deploying it effectively, and
integrating it into the units at the front.
The British problem, as pointed out, was a lack of warm bodies
and plenty of other uses for them. This caused Montgomery
some frustration in Normandy. He had a solid German front to
crack, and the British and Canadians were on the correct part
to crack. He didn't have the replacements to carry on a hard
grind. In fact, the last British offensive before the US
broke out was deliberately armor-heavy, since the British could
afford to lose tanks much more than men.
The US replacement system was still working itself out. Only
recently had the Army imposed uniform standards across the system.
Before then, commanders had become increasingly demanding of
the quality of the replacements, with the result that replacements
that one level considered acceptable were piling up, since
the depots closer to the front didn't want them. Moreover, the
estimates of losses had been badly off, and the US Army was
losing far more riflemen, proportionally, than had been expected.
That, too, could be worked out. There was also a pernicious
policy of treating men like interchangeable parts, and making no
effort to get them back to their own outfits, which the Army
slowly started to address.
That left the problem of integrating replacements into their
new units. Most of us have read of what happened in the Huertgen
Forest, with replacements ordered to crawl forward at night and
try to find their destination squads. Most of the replacements
became casualties really quickly, and the more experienced
soldiers didn't want to break them in because it was dangerous
in the face of the enemy.
What I've read about Seventh Army replacements is very different.
Apparently, it was policy to pull units out of the line briefly
to assimilate replacements, and the system worked quite well there.
That is information from First and Seventh Armies. I don't know how
Ninth and Third handled things, and I really haven't read much
about replacement depots from tehre.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-