Allied victory: luck or inevitability?
Benjamin
following issue: was the allied victory in wwii the result of a series
of lucky breaks, without which the outcome would have been different
(eg. D-day, battle of Britain, but also 'minor' breaks like the raid on
Telemark)? Or was the victory the inevitable result of a superior
fighting force, the lucky breaks cancelling out with just as many
unlucky breaks and Axis lucky breaks?
One central question was: was the fact that the US got involved in the
European war something that just almost didn´t happen (ie. Roosevelt
almost deciding not to go in view of pressure at home), or -again- the
inevitable result of political/military developement (ie. it would have
happened anyway, sooner or later)?
Your views are appreciated!
--
Roman Werpachowski
> I had a discussion recently with a friend and we differed on the
> following issue: was the allied victory in wwii the result of a series
> of lucky breaks, without which the outcome would have been different
> (eg. D-day, battle of Britain, but also 'minor' breaks like the raid on
> Telemark)? Or was the victory the inevitable result of a superior
> fighting force, the lucky breaks cancelling out with just as many
> unlucky breaks and Axis lucky breaks?
Economic superiority. As Napoleon said: "Three things are needed to win
a war: money, money and money".
>
> One central question was: was the fact that the US got involved in the
> European war something that just almost didn´t happen (ie. Roosevelt
> almost deciding not to go in view of pressure at home), or -again- the
> inevitable result of political/military developement (ie. it would have
> happened anyway, sooner or later)?
Germany declared war on the USA. It's not as if Roosevelt had much
choice after that.
--
Roman Werpachowski
/--------==============--------\
| http://www.cft.edu.pl/~roman |
\--------==============--------/
--
Benjamin
> On the Fri, 12 Aug 2005 20:24:55 +0000 (UTC), Benjamin wrote:
> > I had a discussion recently with a friend and we differed on the
> > following issue: was the allied victory in wwii the result of a series
> > of lucky breaks, without which the outcome would have been different
> > (eg. D-day, battle of Britain, but also 'minor' breaks like the raid on
> > Telemark)? Or was the victory the inevitable result of a superior
> > fighting force, the lucky breaks cancelling out with just as many
> > unlucky breaks and Axis lucky breaks?
>
> Economic superiority. As Napoleon said: "Three things are needed to win
> a war: money, money and money".
I agree with you here (the friend probably not, I'll ask him).
>
> >
> > One central question was: was the fact that the US got involved in the
> > European war something that just almost didn´t happen (ie. Roosevelt
> > almost deciding not to go in view of pressure at home), or -again- the
> > inevitable result of political/military developement (ie. it would have
> > happened anyway, sooner or later)?
>
> Germany declared war on the USA. It's not as if Roosevelt had much
> choice after that.
Why? I mean: Roosevelt was under enormous pressure te just focus on the
Pacific. What would he have to fear from Germany if he would not have
come to Europe's aid? Germany couldn´t possibly wage a naval war far
away from home like Japan did, without carriers. Why do you think that
he didn't have much choice? Isn't it more that he in fact HAD a choice,
but just, on the balance of things, went ahead as he did?
>
> --
> Roman Werpachowski
> /--------==============--------\
> | http://www.cft.edu.pl/~roman |
> \--------==============--------/
> --
--
Peter Winters
news:ddj0in$pt5$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>
> One central question was: was the fact that the US got involved in the
> European war something that just almost didn´t happen (ie. Roosevelt
> almost deciding not to go in view of pressure at home), or -again- the
> inevitable result of political/military developement (ie. it would have
> happened anyway, sooner or later)?
>
> Your views are appreciated!
I would say that it would have been almost impossible for the Allies to have
'lost' the war to the Axis.
Before Pearl Harbour, the best the Axis could hope for was a negotiated
settlement (albeit on favourable terms). After Pearl Harbour, they could
only look forward to Unconditional Surrender. There was never any evidence
that any of the Axis powers could have, or have wanted to have invaded the
USA and also that Roosevelt did all within his power to prevent a negotiated
settlement between Britain and Germany. At the same time, even before
Germany declared war on America, FDR was carrying out offensive naval
operations against the Germans in the Atlantic.
Roosevelt knew what he was doing. The Axis powers were in America's way and
by converting her economic power into military power, America's victory was
assured from day one.
--
Bill Shatzer
On Fri, 12 Aug 2005, Roman Werpachowski wrote:
> On the Fri, 12 Aug 2005 20:24:55 +0000 (UTC), Benjamin wrote:
> > I had a discussion recently with a friend and we differed on the
> > following issue: was the allied victory in wwii the result of a series
> > of lucky breaks, without which the outcome would have been different
> > (eg. D-day, battle of Britain, but also 'minor' breaks like the raid on
> > Telemark)? Or was the victory the inevitable result of a superior
> > fighting force, the lucky breaks cancelling out with just as many
> > unlucky breaks and Axis lucky breaks?
> Economic superiority. As Napoleon said: "Three things are needed to win
> a war: money, money and money".
He also said, "morale is to material as ten is to one".
There seems a bit of inconsistency there.
But, I think to attribute the ultimate Allied victory merely
to economic superiority over simplifies things a bit. Certainly
the economic resources of the US and the Commonwealth contributed
mightly but there were lots of instances when, if things had gone
a bit differently, the ultimate outcome might have been different.
This would have been especially true if someone other than
Churchill or FDR or both would have been the leader of those
countries during the early years of the conflict.
Wendell Willke (a-hisotrically winning the 1940 presidential election),
or Henry Wallace (becoming president following the a-historical premature
death of FDR) would have likely had a profound effect on the course
of WW2. Nor was Churchill necessarily pre-destined to become PM upon
Chamberlin's resignation.
Cheers,
--
yaakov_...@hotmail.com
the fact that Britain held out in 1940 and the USSR held out
in 1941-2. If either of them had sued for peace on Hitler's
terms, then things might have been very different.
Given that both of them did manage to hold out, then
the victory by the Allies was generally just a matter of time.
It could be claimed that, man for man, the German army
was better than any of the Allies, but the massive superiority
in arms production by the Allies, primarily the US, made
it impossible for the Germans to hold out in the long run.
--
b.ing...@shaw.ca
The will to fight and win must also have played a major role. The
Battle of Britain was "won" (the Germans were worn down more than
beaten) because they underestimated the tenacity of teenage RAF
Spitfire and Hurrican pilots, who "unreasonably" decided to take on the
vaunted Luftwaffe.
Political will certainly had a role in this as well. The French should
have easily withstood the Blitzkrieg if only numbers of soldiers,
planes, tanks, artillery pieces, etc. are considered. They had
numerical superiority. However, their leadership, both military and
political, was in disarray. The German victory was assured before they
even crossed the border.
Was Russia economically superior to the Third Reich? I don't know. But
I do know that the Germans never counted on the literal hoards of
Russians who confronted them at Stalingrad and Kursk, men and women who
poorly armed but were nevertheless utterly devoted to killing Germans.
Bob
--
tim gueguen
> following issue: was the allied victory in wwii the result of a series
> of lucky breaks, without which the outcome would have been different
> (eg. D-day, battle of Britain, but also 'minor' breaks like the raid on
> Telemark)?
What were the supposed lucky breaks involved in the Battle of Britain and D
Day? The attacks on the Telemark heavy water plant were in the end
redundant, since the Nazis were years away from developing an atomic bomb,
although this only became evident after the war.
The Allied victory was the result of Germany and Japan overestimating their
capabilities and underestimating the capabilities of their opponents. The
strength of the North American economy combined with the continent's
effective invulnerability to Axis attack allowed the production of massive
amounts of arms and material that complimented the industrial capability of
the Soviet Union and that of the UK, both of which the Axis proved incapable
of rendering ineffective. The German and Japanese economies ultimately
could not produce enough material to counter this advantage. North
America's geographic isolation also allowed the unmolested production of
food, the training of pilots in safety by the Commonwealth Air Training
program, and other advantages.
tim gueguen 101867
--
Keith B. Rosenberg
> following issue: was the allied victory in wwii the result of a series
> of lucky breaks, without which the outcome would have been different
> (eg. D-day, battle of Britain, but also 'minor' breaks like the raid on
> Telemark)? Or was the victory the inevitable result of a superior
> fighting force, the lucky breaks cancelling out with just as many
> unlucky breaks and Axis lucky breaks?
The main reasons the Allies won is that they had several times
the resources as the Axis and used them more efficiently to
boot. The Axis had little margin for error as a result and they
could not make good on many of their mistakes even if they
were counterbalanced by Allied error.
The main Allied strategy, was set by Churchill early in the war,
and was to gain allies until overwhelming strength could be
brought to bear against the Axis.
> One central question was: was the fact that the US got involved in the
> European war something that just almost didn´t happen (ie. Roosevelt
> almost deciding not to go in view of pressure at home), or -again- the
> inevitable result of political/military developement (ie. it would have
> happened anyway, sooner or later)?
It was inevitable. Despite campaign promises to the contrary, FDR
was under no illusions that the US would eventually be involved.
When you have aggressive systems (European Fascism and Japanese
militarism) so hostile to freedom and democracy, there is no room for
compromise or peaceful co-existence. In that circumstance the
only options are to fight or be absorbed.
--
Roman Werpachowski
>
> On Fri, 12 Aug 2005, Roman Werpachowski wrote:
>
>> Economic superiority. As Napoleon said: "Three things are needed to win
>> a war: money, money and money".
>
> He also said, "morale is to material as ten is to one".
Warsaw Uprising showed a lot of morale on Polish side. It didn't help
much. Morale may help you stand up longer, but the end effect is more or
less determined on more material factors. At least that is my view.
> This would have been especially true if someone other than
> Churchill or FDR or both would have been the leader of those
> countries during the early years of the conflict.
>
> Wendell Willke (a-hisotrically winning the 1940 presidential election),
> or Henry Wallace (becoming president following the a-historical premature
> death of FDR) would have likely had a profound effect on the course
> of WW2. Nor was Churchill necessarily pre-destined to become PM upon
> Chamberlin's resignation.
Certainly good leadership enabled the Allies to use their economic
superiority to good effect.
rdu...@pdq.net
powers had taken on a form that made them impossible to co-exist with.
I think FDR was quite astute when he made the assesment that trying to
accommodate the 3rd Reich would in practice buy the US one generation
of safety, if that. But when the crunch came later on, we would have no
worthwhile Allies and no way to land an army in Europe to carry the war
to the enemy.
So the question for him was: Do we fight them now when we can win
or later when we may not??
What would you have done as President in 1939-1940??
--
Curly C
know. But I do know that the Germans never counted on the literal hoards
of Russians who confronted them at Stalingrad and Kursk, men and women
who poorly armed but were nevertheless utterly devoted to killing
Germans."""""""""
The weather and the size of Russia are what saved her. Stalin moved all
of his industry by train east of the Urals where no German bomber could
reach. The lack of a German long-range bomber contributed to their
defeat, along with the logistics of supplying an army that big that far
from home.
If Hitler could have invaded in May instead of June 22, 1941, things
might have turned out alot different. That would have gave the Germans
enough time to take Moscow before winter set in and who knows what would
have happened to the morale of the Russian people if Moscow was lost.
--
Curly C
offerings (Hess, Dunkirk, offer of German aid to Britain in India) to
the west. Hitler did not want a 2 front war but because of Churchill, he
had no choice.
It was just a matter of time before the USA got involved in the war,
because FDR was trying every trick in the book (some illegal) to get the
other side to fire first, just like in WW1. The sanctions against Japan,
the US destroyer escorts, the Lend/Lease Act, the secret promises to
Churchill, the movement of the main part of the Navy from San Diego to
Pearl Harbour, sending US pilots to aid China and Britain, etc were all
moves by FDR that guaranteed that we would eventually join the conflict.
The people should have listened to Wilkie.
--
Peter Winters
news:ddoq00$8fk$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> So the question for him was: Do we fight them now when we can win
> or later when we may not??
> What would you have done as President in 1939-1940??
FDR was America's most far-sighted president. His strategy of involvement
not only won the war but also won the peace. (Whilst Stalin just wanted
territory FDR wanted the International Organisations which would reflect
American ideals and policies)
FDR's alternative in 1939-40 would have have been to have defended the
western hemisphere and relied on it for America's economy. America
controlled this hemisphere through the Monroe Doctrine and the Good Neighbor
Policy. Had he done this there probably wouldn't have been a world war -
just a series of regional wars. Casualty lists would have been relatively
insignificant (the heavy casualties were in the later stages of the war).
So FDR's choice was to consolidate the western hemisphere and defend a
stagnant autarchic economy or invest in a world war, which produced the
world we live in today.
Peter
--
David Thornley
Roman Werpachowski <"r o m a nNOSPAM"@theta1.cft.edu.pl> wrote:
>
>Germany declared war on the USA. It's not as if Roosevelt had much
>choice after that.
Roosevelt had plenty of choice in how much to send against
Germany and Italy. Of course, since he had ordered the Navy into
a shooting war in September 1941, we can see that he did want
the US into that war.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
--
phaedrus
involved with the attack of the west in 1940.
I get the unsubstantiated idea the Germany did not expect such an easy
victory over France and was unprepared to take the war across the
Channel to England at such an early date. The euphoria of taking
France so easily threw German planners into a quandry of how to best
procede next.
Anyway, if the Germans had been prepared to keep on going across the
Channel and did so, in all likelihood they would have conquered England
too. With the west in Nazi control, Germany could have taken on the
Soviets on a more favorable timetable.
The US would not have been a factor because they would not have the
English as an ally and England to use as a forward base.
And all of this might have given the Japanese second thoughts about
attacking Pearl Harbor because they would know that the US could
concentrate totally on them militarily.
Anyway. . .
--
Chris Morton
says...
>It could be claimed that, man for man, the German army
>was better than any of the Allies, but the massive superiority
>in arms production by the Allies, primarily the US, made
>it impossible for the Germans to hold out in the long run.
What really won the war for the Allies was the leadership deficits of the other
side. The quality of the Axis forces was largely obviated by the quality of
those who ordered them about.
The latter stages of Barbarosa and the Japanese campaign at Nomonhan demonstrate
the uphill intellectual battle that the Axis fought.
A chimp with a Muramasa samurai sword is still a chimp.
--
--
Gun control, the theory that 110lb. women should have to fistfight with 210lb.
rapists.
--
brandon
strategic leadership provided single handedly by Corporal Hitler.
Refusal for timely negotiations or strategic withdrawals, slumbering
along on D-day with sycophants not daring to wake him up, suicidal and
pointless attacks on Kursk/Bulge, interfering even in the design of
bullets and gun barrels (not to mention aircrafts), surrounded by a
crowd of sycophants who wouldnt dare go against him even in the final
stages of the war.....what more luck do you want?
--
David Thornley
Along with the efforts of the Soviet armed forces.
Stalin moved all
>of his industry by train east of the Urals where no German bomber could
>reach.
No, although a lot of industry was moved, a lot couldn't be. One of the
things Stalin had done before the war was concentrate on building up
industry in the Urals area.
The lack of a German long-range bomber contributed to their
>defeat, along with the logistics of supplying an army that big that far
>from home.
>
The Germans were lousy logisticians, but even if they had been good
ones they couldn't have supported a long-range bombing offensive.
Those things require a *lot* of supply, in the form of fuel and bombs
and replacements and parts and such. The Germans didn't have a good
long-range bomber, but one really wouldn't have been all that useful
to them.
>If Hitler could have invaded in May instead of June 22, 1941, things
>might have turned out alot different.
Yup, the Panzers could have bogged down almost immediately, giving
Stalin a little time to recover. The Spring mud lasted unusually long
in 1941. If the weather had been cooperative, not to mention Mussolini
and the Yugoslavs (or Hitler's reaction to the Yugoslav coup), things
might have been different.
That would have gave the Germans
>enough time to take Moscow before winter set in and who knows what would
>have happened to the morale of the Russian people if Moscow was lost.
>
Could be, but the war was incredibly badly imagined on the part of the
German high command. They didn't know what sort of peace they wanted
to impose, even. In the meantime, the continuing atrocities the
Germans committed would have encouraged the Soviets to keep on fighting
anyway. It might have been the end of Stalin's power, but as long as
the Germans kept on killing the people would have to continue fighting.
Spiv
news:ddqgqu$hol$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> I have always had the idea or really researching the German strategy
> involved with the attack of the west in 1940.
>
> I get the unsubstantiated idea the Germany did not expect such an easy
> victory over France and was unprepared to take the war across the
> Channel to England at such an early date. The euphoria of taking
> France so easily threw German planners into a quandry of how to best
> procede next.
>
> Anyway, if the Germans had been prepared to keep on going across the
> Channel and did so, in all likelihood they would have conquered England
> too.
If they tried a Channel crossing they would have been slaughtered.
Operation Sealion was generally regarded as a ruse to sue for peace.
As Churchill said in reply to Hitler's comment of strangling the British
chicken by the neck. "some chicken.... some neck".
> With the west in Nazi control, Germany could have taken on the
> Soviets on a more favorable timetable.
That is a massive IF.
> The US would not have been a factor because they would not have the
> English as an ally and England to use as a forward base.
>
> And all of this might have given the Japanese second thoughts about
> attacking Pearl Harbor because they would know that the US could
> concentrate totally on them militarily.
With Hitler is total control of Europe, the US would be quivering. The
Germans did plan to bombard New York from long range U boats.
--
Roman Werpachowski
> If Hitler could have invaded in May instead of June 22, 1941, things
> might have turned out alot different. That would have gave the Germans
> enough time to take Moscow before winter set in and who knows what would
> have happened to the morale of the Russian people if Moscow was lost.
It would only make them fight harder.
Spiv
"brandon" <brando...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:ddqgr4$hop$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
The greatest stroke of luck for the Germans was the Allied military &
strategic leadership.
King of the US Navy whose incompetence allowed about 600 merchantmen to be
sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942. Operation Overlord went to plan,
but not to timescale. Not allowing Bomber Harris to wipe out German city
after German city until they surrendered, which would have shortened the
war. Too cavalier at Market Garden, ignoring resistance reports of panzer
units in the area. Ignoring reprts of troop and tank build ups in Germany
opposite Blegium, leading to a German counter attack called the Battle of
the Bulge. Squabbling about a 30 division thrust or attack on a broad front
to suit the US public due to an election. The war should have been over by
Christmas 1944, as was the prediction.
The allies had far more firepower and men and should have just rolled over
Germany in one swoop.
Corporal Hitler overrode his generals to advance into Belgium and France.
Hitler was alone the man to take German credit for that. The armies in
front of the Germans were bigger, better and heavier armed. The generals
naturally were cautious, ans would never have been so cavalier.
After France, Hitler was the God. When he overrode his generals on the
eastern front and they were defeated (they would have been defeated anyway),
he was regarded as an idiotic corporal. You can't have it both ways.
--
David Thornley
Curly C <KeeponC...@webtv.net> wrote:
>I think the war's fate was sealed when Hitler failed in his peace
>offerings (Hess, Dunkirk, offer of German aid to Britain in India) to
>the west. Hitler did not want a 2 front war but because of Churchill, he
>had no choice.
>
furious. In any case, he wasn't bringing peace proposals.
Dunkirk was hardly a peace offering. It was a military decision not
to press the defenders as hard as possible, in favor of reserving
forces for the second part of the Battle of France. There is no
solid evidence that Hitler wanted the British to get away, or believed
they would.
I don't remember any offer of German aid to Britain in India, but if
Hitler really wanted peace he could have offered to withdraw from
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway (and maybe Denmark).
With those countries under German rule, the British were not in a
good position to make peace. Any sort of peace without German
withdrawal in the West would turn the United Kingdom into something
of a German vassal state.
>It was just a matter of time before the USA got involved in the war,
>because FDR was trying every trick in the book (some illegal) to get the
>other side to fire first, just like in WW1.
Except that, in WWI, President Wilson honestly tried to stay out of
the war, while Roosevelt wanted the US to enter the war against
Germany.
The sanctions against Japan,
Actually, Roosevelt tried to delay these as long as possible. He didn't
want to get into a war with Japan.
>the US destroyer escorts, the Lend/Lease Act, the secret promises to
>Churchill, the movement of the main part of the Navy from San Diego to
>Pearl Harbour, sending US pilots to aid China and Britain, etc were all
>moves by FDR that guaranteed that we would eventually join the conflict.
>The people should have listened to Wilkie.
>
No, the US would have been better off mobilizing for war sooner, and
entering it as soon as feasible.
Rich Rostrom
>I had a discussion recently with a friend and we differed on the
>following issue: was the allied victory in wwii the result of a series
>of lucky breaks, without which the outcome would have been different
>(eg. D-day, battle of Britain, but also 'minor' breaks like the raid on
>Telemark)? Or was the victory the inevitable result of a superior
>fighting force, the lucky breaks cancelling out with just as many
>unlucky breaks and Axis lucky breaks?
Nothing in history is _absolutely_ inevitable, IMHO.
But the outcome of WW II was fairly predetermined.
The Axis powers were substantially inferior to the
Allies in many categories of resources and abilities.
The European Axis tried to fight a modern war with
extremely limited oil resources, for instance.
There was no way for Germany to challenge Britain's
command of the oceans, ever.
Axis leaderships were seriously flawed.
If anything, luck favored the Axis rather than vice versa,
in the first half of the war.
For instance:
Germany was very lucky to succeed in the invasion of
Norway, given Allied naval superiority.
The Mechelen incident, which gave away the German plan
of attack on France - causing Germany to adopt a new
and more dangerous plan, while confirming the Allies'
expectation of the original plan.
Stalin's blind refusal to accept _any_ of the warnings
of German invasion in 1941.
It's hard to find any piece of 'luck' for the
Allies that matches these incidents. The character
of Hitler greatly aided the Allies, but Hitler's
character was a necessary cause of the war - if he
hadn't been like that, there would have been no war.
Some of the 'close-run' things in retrospect were
not so close-run after all.
The RAF was beat to a pulp in the Battle of Britain,
but so was the Luftwaffe.
German troops reached the outskirts of Moscow in
December 1941 - but they were exhausted, freezing,
and about to be attacked by a huge Soviet reserve
army.
D-Day could have failed if the weather had changed,
or if Hitler had woken up early and released the
panzer reserves - but by that time the US/UK armies
were rolling north up Italy, Soviet armies
were about to annihilate Army Group Center and
drive to the outskirts of Warsaw, and 8th AF and
Bomber Command were laying waste to German cities.
The avalanche of men and weapons that went into
northern France would have gone elsewhere - to the
Balkans, to Italy, to southern France - and Germany
would still be crushed. At worst a few months delay.
>One central question was: was the fact that the US got involved in the
>European war something that just almost didn´t happen (ie. Roosevelt
>almost deciding not to go in view of pressure at home), or -again- the
>inevitable result of political/military developement (ie. it would have
>happened anyway, sooner or later)?
ISTM that it was much more likely than not. A large
proportion of US 'movers and shakers' were genuinely
afraid of Nazi Germany, and wanted the US to do as
much as possible to defeat Hitler. Gallup polls showed
that a clear majority of Americans thought it was
necessary to aid the Allies, even at the risk of war.
Had FDR not been re-elected in 1940, it's possible
that US entry into the war might have been delayed
till 1945 by an isolationist President. But IMHO
the out-and-out isolationists were a minority. It's
unlikely that the President would have been such,
and any other President would have found reasons
to aid the Allies.
It's even arguable that the Axis could have been
defeated, eventually, without US forces - though
not without US aid, IMHO.
--
| The shocking lack of a fleet of modern luxury |
| dirigibles is only one of a great many things that |
| are seriously wrong with this here world. |
| -- blogger "Coop" at Positive Ape Index |
--
Spiv
news:ddqgq6$hni$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> """"""""Was Russia economically superior to the Third Reich? I don't
> know. But I do know that the Germans never counted on the literal hoards
> of Russians who confronted them at Stalingrad and Kursk, men and women
> who poorly armed but were nevertheless utterly devoted to killing
> Germans."""""""""
>
> The weather and the size of Russia are what saved her. Stalin moved all
> of his industry by train east of the Urals where no German bomber could
> reach. The lack of a German long-range bomber contributed to their
> defeat, along with the logistics of supplying an army that big that far
> from home.
Collectively the Soviet economy was large. Collectively Soviet industry was
large. Unless you took the USSR on one sweep you were going to lose. Ask
Napoleon.
> If Hitler could have invaded in May instead of June 22, 1941, things
> might have turned out alot different. That would have gave the Germans
> enough time to take Moscow before winter set in and who knows what would
> have happened to the morale of the Russian people if Moscow was lost.
Moscow is not all of the USSR. Large swathes of the USSR fell into German
hands, that did not totally demoralise the Soviets.
--
Spiv
news:ddr1ol$vsj$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>
> ISTM that it was much more likely than not. A large
> proportion of US 'movers and shakers' were genuinely
> afraid of Nazi Germany, and wanted the US to do as
> much as possible to defeat Hitler. Gallup polls showed
> that a clear majority of Americans thought it was
> necessary to aid the Allies, even at the risk of war.
>
> Had FDR not been re-elected in 1940, it's possible
> that US entry into the war might have been delayed
> till 1945 by an isolationist President. But IMHO
> the out-and-out isolationists were a minority.
1945? The Japanese had other ideas.
> It's unlikely that the President would have been such,
> and any other President would have found reasons
> to aid the Allies.
>
> It's even arguable that the Axis could have been
> defeated, eventually, without US forces - though
> not without US aid, IMHO.
I always find the word "aid" amusing. Is this the aid the US "sold"? When
a supermarket sells me some bread I don't regard that as aid by the
supermarket to me.
IMO, the axis would have been defeated by the British and Soviets, however
not by 1945. The UK and the USSR were large industrial countries, able to
produce the tools of war.
--
Don Phillipson
> . . . Germany did not expect such an easy
> victory over France and was unprepared to take the war across the
> Channel to England at such an early date. The euphoria of taking
> France so easily threw German planners into a quandry of how to best
> procede next.
German planners did not decide this. Hitler ordered them
in the summer of 1940 to plan an invasion of England; and
later in 1940 ordered them to drop this topic and plan instead
the invasion of Russia.
> Anyway, if the Germans had been prepared to keep on going across the
> Channel and did so, in all likelihood they would have conquered England
This was debated at length in this NG some months ago.
The consensus is that Germany lacked the naval strength
(1) to execute an invasion fast enough to catch the British
off balance, (2) to protect invasion shipping (cf. tides, cf.
deteriorating weather from September onward into winter.)
> And all of this might have given the Japanese second thoughts about
> attacking Pearl Harbor because they would know that the US could
> concentrate totally on them militarily.
No Japanese source suggests this. We know Pearl
Harbor was only a diversion or warning. The primary Japanese
target was SE Asia (Indonesian oil and Malayan rubber
and tin.) This meant also controlling sea lanes past the
Philippine Islands: and that in turn meant keeping the
US fleet out of those waters, hence the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Japan appeared wholly uninfluenced by events in Europe in
1940, which weakened Dutch and British defences in SE Asia
-- but this did not make Japan accelerate its plans.
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
--
Don Phillipson
> It was just a matter of time before the USA got involved in the war,
> because FDR was trying every trick in the book (some illegal) to get the
> other side to fire first, just like in WW1. The sanctions against Japan,
> the US destroyer escorts, the Lend/Lease Act, the secret promises to
> Churchill, the movement of the main part of the Navy from San Diego to
> Pearl Harbour, sending US pilots to aid China and Britain, etc were all
> moves by FDR that guaranteed that we would eventually join the conflict.
> The people should have listened to Wilkie.
This seems a narrowly conspiratorial point of view, i.e.
tracing everything to FDR alone, e.g.:
1. Embargo on exporting strategic resources to
Japan (the traditional nonbelligerent way of trying
to help China, US policy for decades.)
2. Lend-Lease (passed by Congress, by a tiny
margin which suggested Americans were similarly
divided in opinion.)
3. "Secret promises" are omitted since unspecified.
4. If FDR unilaterally deployed the Pacific Fleet to
Pearl Harbor his orders to reluctant USN commanders
ought to be in the USN archives.
5. Chennault's private air force in China antedated
WW2 and got no government support. No US authority
sent "pilots to aid . . . Britain" -- only army and navy
liaison officers and civilian scientists and intelligence
officers in 1940-41.
There seems no doubt about what FDR wanted,
(1) to keep the USA out of the war, (2) to help Britain
survive, (3) without reinforcing the British overseas empire,
etc. We also know how the US government then worked, by
negotiation between Congress and Administration. Are
these normal negotiations "every trick in the book?"
wer...@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu
>...as the allied victory in wwii the result of a series of lucky
> breaks, without which the outcome would have been different...?
in hindsight it may appear that way, but once one starts reading about matters
in chronological order and in sufficient detail, one can't help but wonder...
what if the BEF would have gotten wiped out on the Belgian beaches?
what if the blame for the failure of the British invasion attempt of Norway
would have stuck to Churchill (the way blame for Galipoli did in ww1)
destroying his chances to be called on to become PM? well, it was close,
he was head of the Admiralty both times...
what if the Luftwaffe had realized the importance of destroying British radar
installations and aerodromes or adapted their doctrine to the way the Brits
fought the defensive air war during the Blitz, reducing the high losses of
German bombers?
what if the Germans had realized what made British radar "tick" in time to
correct their mistaken concepts about it to develop appropriate counter-
measures?
what if Enigma hadn't fallen into British hands? what if the Germans had
developed a few additional twists in time to confound the allies more?
both the battles of the Atlantic and North-Africa would have changed... a lot!
what if France had not been split into a Vichy-France?
What if Spain had joined the axes outright (and blocked Gibraltar)?
What if Japan had attacked only the Europeans colonial empire in South-east
Asia but not any US territories or colonial possessions?
What if Japan had "gotten wise" and changed their crypto methods?
What if Hitler had not declared war on the US after Pearl Harbour?
What if Japan had attacked the Sovietunion in coordination with the Nazis?
I don't even want to speculate how things could have worked out differently
in the invasion of the USSR -- I don't really like playing the what-if game,
especially when it comes to the many ways that Stalin could have "lost it all"
> Or was the victory the inevitable result of a superior fighting force,
> the lucky breaks cancelling out with just as many unlucky breaks and
> Axis lucky breaks?
some of the Nazi submarine and aircraft technology in the pipeline could
have matured a year or two earlier (Me-262, snorkeling subs, nightfighters)
and made a difference, but the constellation of Allies vs Axes powers by
fall of 1943 seemed to make the final outcome a given -- short of the Nazis
developing an atomic bomb... (one thing we now know they DID NOT have in the
development pipeline, lucky us! :)
> One central question was: was the fact that the US got involved in the
> European war something that just almost didn't happen (ie. Roosevelt
> almost deciding not to go in view of pressure at home), or -again- the
> inevitable result of political/military developement (ie. it would have
> happened anyway, sooner or later)?
FDR's policies and actions in support of China and Britain before the attack
on Pearl Harbor may well have crossed the line of "acts of war" against both
Japan and Nazi Germany, in hindsight, at least, but the axes powers were
so blatantly illegal in their actions, that they didn't even realize or
think of making an issue of it. Well, no, they both actually did blame the
US, come to think of it, but that claim simply didn't stick, doesn't sound
very credible or believable in the history books...
However, if Hitler had not declared war on the US after Pearl Harbour, the
US Congress was not likely to have done so, and I've not yet read a scenario
describing how/when that would have ultimately happened...
How that would have played out eventually is too far removed from what
actually happened for me to feel comfortable even thinking much about.
--
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X ANYTHING ELSE /( )\ || nice photos --> www.romanticgermany.com
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--
Michael Emrys
gfaci...@gmail.com wrote on 8/15/05 9:45 AM:
> Anyway, if the Germans had been prepared to keep on going across the Channel
> and did so, in all likelihood they would have conquered England too.
But that's a pretty big "if". If the Germans had invested in the kind of
navy that could move an army across the Channel and make an opposed landing,
they likely wouldn't have had an army sufficient to beat the French and
invade Britain too.
Michael
--
Michael Emrys
KeeponC...@webtv.net wrote on 8/15/05 9:44 AM:
> The weather and the size of Russia are what saved her. Stalin moved all of his
> industry by train east of the Urals where no German bomber could reach. The
> lack of a German long-range bomber contributed to their defeat...
Lack of a long-range escort capable of holding its own against Soviet
interceptors would have hurt too.
> ...along with the logistics of supplying an army that big that far from home.
That was among the major failings of the German army. Logistics is always
hard work and even the Allies with all their resources couldn't always keep
up with demands. The Germans were even further behind.
> If Hitler could have invaded in May instead of June 22, 1941, things might
> have turned out alot different. That would have gave the Germans enough time
> to take Moscow before winter set in and who knows what would have happened to
> the morale of the Russian people if Moscow was lost.
Doubtful that the extra month, even if the weather had been good in May,
would have provided a solution to the problem that by the time the Germans
reached Moscow they had already long outrun their supplies and worn out
their fighting formations. By the time they could have brought up enough
supplies, replacements, and reinforcements to bring their armies up to
strength, you can bet that the Soviets would have done at least as well. And
even the capture of Moscow, while undeniably a serious blow, is not
guaranteed to bring about the collapse of the Soviet regime or military
defeat.
Michael
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
>The greatest stroke of luck for the Germans was the Allied military &
>strategic leadership.
No, the allies largely chose competent people and kept those that
performed well.
>King of the US Navy whose incompetence allowed about 600 merchantmen to be
>sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
Try again and note under these rules Churchill was an incompetent.
>Operation Overlord went to plan, but not to timescale.
And this is supposed to be incompetent? By the way the allies ended
up at the expected D+365 line at around D+90.
>Not allowing Bomber Harris to wipe out German city
>after German city until they surrendered, which would have shortened the
>war.
The straight answer is no, the attacks on oil and transport targets
were much more cost effective. They did help shorten the war.
The area targets were the very long way home. By the way according
to Harris the allies destroyed around 50% of 70 German cities and
towns, containing around 1/3 the population of Germany. So how much
more was the magic number to force a surrender? Harris claimed
the destruction of over 50,000 acres of urban area.
>Too cavalier at Market Garden, ignoring resistance reports of panzer
>units in the area.
This was a tactical battle, and the reality is the approaches to Antwerp
should have been the target.
>Ignoring reprts of troop and tank build ups in Germany
>opposite Blegium, leading to a German counter attack called the Battle of
>the Bulge.
Try the fact the Germans advanced and made it easier to destroy
them, rather than digging them out of the westwall or facing them as
a counter attacking force when the allies broke through the west wall.
>Squabbling about a 30 division thrust or attack on a broad front
>to suit the US public due to an election.
The 30 division attack was every allied unit over the Seine, including
3rd US Army and the decision to say no had nothing to do with the
US election and everything to do with the supply situation.
>The war should have been over by
>Christmas 1944, as was the prediction.
No.
>The allies had far more firepower and men and should have just rolled over
>Germany in one swoop.
No. There was the little thing called supplies, in particular the
bottleneck of port capacity.
>Corporal Hitler overrode his generals to advance into Belgium and France.
>Hitler was alone the man to take German credit for that.
The Germans planned to repeat 1918, the allies captured the plans,
the Germans then went with the Manstein plan, with the advance into
Belgium and Holland as cover.
>The armies in
>front of the Germans were bigger, better and heavier armed. The generals
>naturally were cautious, ans would never have been so cavalier.
So Manstein and those that supported him were cautious? How did
the plan happen then?
>After France, Hitler was the God. When he overrode his generals on the
>eastern front and they were defeated (they would have been defeated anyway),
>he was regarded as an idiotic corporal. You can't have it both ways.
Simply put the German Generals of the high command variety were well
aware of Hitler's limitations as a general before and during the French
campaign. The problem is the public were told a different story. Hitler
believed the story and kept taking more and more power.
Hitler had it both ways, people like Halder knew otherwise.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
--
Louis Capdeboscq
> Doubtful that the extra month, even if the weather had been good in May,
> would have provided a solution to the problem that by the time the Germans
> reached Moscow they had already long outrun their supplies and worn out
> their fighting formations.
The problem with the "extra month" theory is that it wasn't just a case
of the German logistical pipeline breaking down, but of the whole supply
chain e.g. the Germans were running out of fuel in general, not just at
the front.
So with one more month, the amount of stuff still in the pipeline would
keep the front going - barely - but then when winter came - and it would
come - the subsequent logistical crisis would be all the graver. Instead
of the Germans historically falling back on their supply line and
looting that LOC, they would fall back on an empty logistical pipeline.
LC
--
Remove "e" from address to reply
--
ok...@hotmail.com
b.ing...@shaw.ca kirjoitti:
> Was Russia economically superior to the Third Reich? I don't know. But
> I do know that the Germans never counted on the literal hoards of
> Russians who confronted them at Stalingrad and Kursk, men and women who
> poorly armed but were nevertheless utterly devoted to killing Germans.
I would not call Soviets poorly armed. During the war they produced
100 000 tanks. In case of small arms they made over five million
submachine guns compared to 1,5 million by Germans. What Soviets
lacked was the ability to use the weapons effciently. They wasted
their resources and especially men.
Osmo
--
Louis Capdeboscq
>
> The will to fight and win must also have played a major role. The
> Battle of Britain was "won" (the Germans were worn down more than
> beaten) because they underestimated the tenacity of teenage RAF
> Spitfire and Hurrican pilots, who "unreasonably" decided to take on the
> vaunted Luftwaffe.
No, it was won because the Germans set themselves the impossible task of
destroying an air force of almost similar size on its home ground in a
short period.
So it was a hard-fought battle, and the British teenagers that you
mention gave a great account of themselves, but it came down to Germany
biting off more than it could chew. Had British teenagers been replaced
with, say, Italian ones, the outcome would probably still have been a
German failure.
> Political will certainly had a role in this as well. The French should
> have easily withstood the Blitzkrieg if only numbers of soldiers,
> planes, tanks, artillery pieces, etc. are considered. They had
> numerical superiority. However, their leadership, both military and
> political, was in disarray. The German victory was assured before they
> even crossed the border.
Argh, not again...
BTW, the British army did no better than the French one against the
Wehrmacht in 1940-42. Yet I see no blame attached to the British
political leadership...
> Was Russia economically superior to the Third Reich? I don't know.
Russia was more or less economically equal to the Third Reich. Greater
Germany had slightly greater economical potential, and greater
technological potential, but then the USSR only had one front to worry
about and could specialize.
The one thing in which the Soviets were far superior to the Germans in
terms of economy was in resource mobilization. They were far better in
squeezing a huge number of weapons out of a limited amount of economic
resources than the Germans. Mobilization was somthing that the Soviet
system was really, really good at. Unmatched, in fact.
> But
> I do know that the Germans never counted on the literal hoards of
> Russians who confronted them at Stalingrad and Kursk, men and women who
> poorly armed but were nevertheless utterly devoted to killing Germans.
The Hordes of Russians at Stalingrad were largely non-Russian and the
Soviets didn't have a great numerical advantage there.
At Kursk, the Soviets were anything but poorly armed. They had more
tanks, guns, planes, ammunition, everything than the Germans. The only
significant German edge was their better new tanks.
ok...@hotmail.com
> Germany couldn´t possibly wage a naval war far
> away from home like Japan did, without carriers.
They could and they did. Have you not heard about
the U-boat attacks in near the U.S. East coast in 1942?
Osmo
--
Spiv
news:ddt31r$gqb$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> Spiv wrote in message ...
>
> >The greatest stroke of luck for the Germans was the Allied military &
> >strategic leadership.
>
> No, the allies largely chose competent people and kept those that
> performed well.
>
> >King of the US Navy whose incompetence allowed about 600 merchantmen to
be
> >sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
>
> Try again
OK. King of the US Navy whose incompetence allowed about 600 merchantmen to
be sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
> >Operation Overlord went to plan, but not to timescale.
>
> And this is supposed to be incompetent?
Yep. Too slow.
> By the way the allies ended
> up at the expected D+365 line at around D+90.
>
> > Not allowing Bomber Harris to wipe out German city
> > after German city until they surrendered, which
> > would have shortened the war.
>
> The straight answer is no, the attacks on oil and transport targets
> were much more cost effective. They did help shorten the war.
> The area targets were the very long way home. By the way according
> to Harris the allies destroyed around 50% of 70 German cities and
> towns, containing around 1/3 the population of Germany. So how much
> more was the magic number to force a surrender? Harris claimed
> the destruction of over 50,000 acres of urban area.
Harris wanted to take out a city at a time, which gives a big shock. half
destroyed here and there does not send the message.
> >Too cavalier at Market Garden, ignoring resistance reports of panzer
> >units in the area.
>
> This was a tactical battle, and the reality
> is the approaches to Antwerp
> should have been the target.
Still..."Too cavalier at Market Garden, ignoring resistance reports of
panzer units in the area."
> >Ignoring reports of troop and tank build ups in Germany
> >opposite Blegium, leading to a German counter attack called the Battle of
> >the Bulge.
>
> Try the fact the Germans advanced and made it easier to destroy
> them,
The fact is the Germans were building up heavy forces and no troops were
sent to counter the build up. The US sent their troop on R&R to that front.
> >Squabbling about a 30 division thrust or attack on a broad front
> >to suit the US public due to an election.
>
> The 30 division attack was every allied unit over the Seine, including
> 3rd US Army and the decision to say no had nothing to do with the
> US election and everything to do with the supply situation.
The US election had everything to do with it.
> >The war should have been over by
> >Christmas 1944, as was the prediction.
>
> No.
Yep. After Falaise, prediction of it being over by Christmas made.
> >The allies had far more firepower and
> > men and should have just rolled over
> >Germany in one swoop.
>
> No. There was the little thing called supplies, in particular the
> bottleneck of port capacity.
The allies had massive logistics
> >Corporal Hitler overrode his generals to advance into Belgium and France.
> >Hitler was alone the man to take German credit for that.
>
> The Germans planned to repeat 1918, the allies captured the plans,
> the Germans then went with the Manstein plan, with the advance into
> Belgium and Holland as cover.
Hitler still overrode the majority of his generals.
> > The armies in front of the Germans were
> > bigger, better and heavier armed. The generals
> > naturally were cautious, ans would never have
> > been so cavalier.
>
> So Manstein and those that supported him were cautious? How did
> the plan happen then?
A man called Hitler was involved.
> >After France, Hitler was the God. When he overrode his generals on the
> >eastern front and they were defeated (they would have been defeated
anyway),
> >he was regarded as an idiotic corporal. You can't have it both ways.
>
> Simply put the German Generals of the high command variety were well
> aware of Hitler's limitations as a general before and during the French
> campaign. The problem is the public were told a different story. Hitler
> believed the story and kept taking more and more power.
The problem was Hitler was in charge and did some gambles early in the war
that paid off, but never in the latter part.
> Hitler had it both ways, people like Halder knew otherwise.
>
> Geoffrey Sinclair
> Remove the nb for email.
>
> --
>
--
Michele Armellini
news:ddt313$gpt$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>
> what if the BEF would have gotten wiped out on the Belgian beaches?
Not all the BEF evacuated from beaches.
>
> what if the blame for the failure of the British invasion attempt of
Norway
> would have stuck to Churchill (the way blame for Galipoli did in ww1)
> destroying his chances to be called on to become PM? well, it was close,
> he was head of the Admiralty both times...
There is no reason why. Gallipoli was wholly an Allied initiative, Norway
was seen and presented to the public as an attempted defense against a
German initiative.
>
> what if the Luftwaffe had realized the importance of destroying British
radar
> installations and aerodromes or adapted their doctrine to the way the
Brits
> fought the defensive air war during the Blitz, reducing the high losses of
> German bombers?
>
The Germans would have lost less bombers, and Fighter Command would have had
a tougher going, undoubtedly. This does not change the fact that the end of
September 1940 is the end of favorable weather for the reckless Sea Lion
dream, nor the fact that the Royal Navy wins any scenario you can dream of.
> what if the Germans had realized what made British radar "tick" in time to
> correct their mistaken concepts about it to develop appropriate counter-
> measures?
>
The British would have developed new measures and counter-countermeasures?
That's the way it went.
> what if Enigma hadn't fallen into British hands? what if the Germans had
> developed a few additional twists in time to confound the allies more?
> both the battles of the Atlantic and North-Africa would have changed... a
lot!
>
Well, yes. That's the main interesting point. It remains to be seen whether
that lot of changes in those two theaters would have brought significant
overall changes. Operation Bagration and the Manhattan Project did not
depend on Enigma.
> what if France had not been split into a Vichy-France?
yes... what?
> What if Spain had joined the axes outright (and blocked Gibraltar)?
>
The Axis would have been worse off and the British would have used the
Canarias instead of the Rock. Also note that historically their main point
of entry in the Med was Suez.
> What if Japan had attacked only the Europeans colonial empire in
South-east
> Asia but not any US territories or colonial possessions?
>
The second nice question, this one. But it's very hard to say what would
have happened.
> What if Japan had "gotten wise" and changed their crypto methods?
>
They would have been broken again later on?
> What if Hitler had not declared war on the US after Pearl Harbour?
>
He would have declared it later.
> What if Japan had attacked the Sovietunion in coordination with the Nazis?
>
The Soviets would have withdrawn from Vladivostok. the Japanese would have
advanced into Siberian nothingness, achieving... guess that... nothing. It's
easy to use scorched-earth tactics when what you have to do in order to
leave a scorched earth behind is just pick up the rail line as you move
away.
The experienced Far East divisions would have been shifted West earlier,
which would have balanced out the fact that they would be probably in lesser
numbers, and they would still have inflicted on the Germans the December
1941-January 1942 defeats.
> I don't even want to speculate how things could have worked out
differently
> in the invasion of the USSR -- I don't really like playing the what-if
game,
> especially when it comes to the many ways that Stalin could have "lost it
all"
>
Well, you posted a long list of what-ifs for one not liking them.
--
Chris Morton
says...
>What if Hitler had not declared war on the US after Pearl Harbour?
That's the important one. Without a German declaration of war, FDR would NEVER
have gotten a declaration of war out of Congress. Japan might have gotten
effectively knocked out of the war in '43.
David Thornley
phaedrus <gfaci...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>I get the unsubstantiated idea the Germany did not expect such an easy
>victory over France and was unprepared to take the war across the
>Channel to England at such an early date. The euphoria of taking
>France so easily threw German planners into a quandry of how to best
>procede next.
>
>Anyway, if the Germans had been prepared to keep on going across the
>Channel and did so, in all likelihood they would have conquered England
>too.
I disagree with this.
Even at the worst times, there were enough troops in Britain so that
conquering the island was going to take a serious ground attack,
perhaps one German army kept in supply. The Germans would have
been unable to get a full-strength army across the Channel with
any reasonable preparation, and could not have kept it in supply.
If the Germans had built up enough landing capacity and such to
even try this, they would have diverted enough production and
manpower from the Army and Luftwaffe to jeopardize the battle of
France. Without victory in France, there is no invasion of Britain.
David Thornley
Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
>
>"brandon" <brando...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>news:ddqgr4$hop$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>
>> The greatest stroke of luck for the allies was the German military &
>> strategic leadership provided single handedly by Corporal Hitler.
>>
>> Refusal for timely negotiations or strategic withdrawals, slumbering
>> along on D-day with sycophants not daring to wake him up,
That didn't matter; by the time those decisions came around the war
was lost.
suicidal and
>> pointless attacks on Kursk/Bulge,
The war was almost certainly lost by Kursk, certainly by the Ardennes.
interfering even in the design of
>> bullets and gun barrels (not to mention aircrafts), surrounded by a
>> crowd of sycophants who wouldnt dare go against him even in the final
>> stages of the war.....what more luck do you want?
>
How about bad decisions when it really mattered?
Spiv:
>The greatest stroke of luck for the Germans was the Allied military &
>strategic leadership.
>
>King of the US Navy whose incompetence allowed about 600 merchantmen to be
>sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
Okay, you've said that before, and have repeatedly been asked for some
sort of source, or even how this number was arrived at.
At least give us a clue. To find where this number came from, should
we consult a library or a proctologist?
Operation Overlord went to plan,
>but not to timescale.
No, it went much faster than predicted, although not as smoothly.
Not allowing Bomber Harris to wipe out German city
>after German city until they surrendered, which would have shortened the
>war.
Any evidence for that?
Too cavalier at Market Garden, ignoring resistance reports of panzer
>units in the area.
Almost irrelevant.
Ignoring reprts of troop and tank build ups in Germany
>opposite Blegium, leading to a German counter attack called the Battle of
>the Bulge.
Mostly irrelevant, and in any event the attack probably shortened the war.
Squabbling about a 30 division thrust or attack on a broad front
>to suit the US public due to an election.
Due to logistics. I have no idea why Montgomery was claiming that
his plan could possibly work; he was normally much more intelligent
than that.
The war should have been over by
>Christmas 1944, as was the prediction.
>
Woulda been nice. The Germans didn't cooperate.
Not even starving Montgomery's army group and feeding Patton's would have
shortened the war that much.
>The allies had far more firepower and men and should have just rolled over
>Germany in one swoop.
>
It took several swoops, both in the East and the West.
>After France, Hitler was the God. When he overrode his generals on the
>eastern front and they were defeated (they would have been defeated anyway),
>he was regarded as an idiotic corporal. You can't have it both ways.
>
He also understood the grand strategic situation better than any
of his generals late in the war. He knew that there was no hope for
a surrender on any reasonable terms.
Robert Sveinson
news:ddtjsc$u9n$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
snip
> Spiv:
> >The greatest stroke of luck for the Germans was the Allied military &
> >strategic leadership.
> >
> >King of the US Navy whose incompetence allowed about 600 merchantmen to
be
> >sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
>
> Okay, you've said that before, and have repeatedly been asked for some
> sort of source, or even how this number was arrived at.
>
> At least give us a clue. To find where this number came from, should
> we consult a library or a proctologist?
Preiously posted on July 8, 2005.
From:
INTELLIGENCE IN WAR
by John Keegan
*"Doenitz's prospects changed suddenly with the inception of the fourth
period in January, 1942, when he was able to withdraw his U-boats from
the central North Atlantic, break up his packs and patrol lines and
deploy individual boats, under now often highly experienced skippers,
against the coastwise shipping of the United States on its east coast
and the Caribbean. U-boat captains described the next six months as their
'Happy Time.' Targets were numerous, so were sinkings. In January 26
U-boats operating in American waters sank 400,966 tons of shipping, 71
cargo ships or tankers, for no losses at all. February was worse propor-
tionately: 18 U-boats sank 344,494 tons, 57 ships. In April, after a very
bad
March when 406,046 tons were sunk, 31 U-boats sank 133 ships of 641,053
gross tons, and so the awful summer went on. By the end of August,
when the Americans at last instituted proper anti-submarine measures,
609 ships, of 3,122,465 gross tons, had been sunk, for the loss
of 22 U-boats, out of 184 engaged."*
*Paragraph quoted from:
HITLER'S U-BOAT WAR, vol. 1, The Hunters, New York, 1939-1942, 1996,
pp727-732.*
by C. Blair
[Next paragraph]
The extent of Donitz's success was due to the refusal of the United
States Navy to institute convoy at the outset, in a bizarre repetition of
the British Admiralty's policy of 1914-16. Admiral King, Chief of
Naval Operations, formed the view that weakly escorted convoys would
merely provide more plentiful targets than individually sailed ships,
and so left America's traffic to its fate.
--
Richard Macdonald
news:ddtjqi$u87$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
Yes, the BEST the Germans could do was a sea denial
fight, or "Guerre de Course" a war of commerce in the
Atlantic and its environs. Whereas the Japanese went for
a battle of Sea Control and to try and drive the Allied
fleets from the western Pacific and environs. This resulted
in the Americans practicing both sea denial with submarines
deep within Japanese held areas and fighting an eventual
sea control offensive against the Japanese fleet in 1943-45.
The Germans NEVER had the ability to fight a sea control
battle in WWII outside of the Med and there only because
of the Regina Nautica, which never had enough fuel.
--
Spiv
news:ddtjsc$u9n$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> Spiv:
> >The greatest stroke of luck for the Germans was the Allied military &
> >strategic leadership.
> >
> >King of the US Navy whose incompetence allowed about 600 merchantmen to
be
> >sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
>
> Okay, you've said that before, and have repeatedly been asked for some
> sort of source, or even how this number was arrived at.
> At least give us a clue.
Enough clues were there.
> Operation Overlord went to plan,
> >but not to timescale.
>
> No, it went much faster than predicted, although not as smoothly.
Nope. Much slower, the US forces facing less opposition to west were to
swing around and meet the Brits facing stronger opposition at around
Falaise. All went that way, but slow.
> Not allowing Bomber Harris to wipe out German city
> >after German city until they surrendered, which would have shortened the
> >war.
>
> Any evidence for that?
Japan. A few cities raised in one day made them look up. Albert Speer
stated that if a there was a few more Hamburgs, Germany would have had to
have surrendered.
> Too cavalier at Market Garden, ignoring resistance reports of panzer
> >units in the area.
>
> Almost irrelevant.
It was actually in WW2.
> Ignoring reprts of troop and tank build ups in Germany
> >opposite Blegium, leading to a German counter attack called the Battle of
> >the Bulge.
>
> Mostly irrelevant,
Again, it was actually in WW2.
> and in any event the attack probably shortened the war.
Did the high command plan for this German attack to shorten the war?
> Squabbling about a 30 division thrust or attack on a broad front
> >to suit the US public due to an election.
>
> Due to logistics. I have no idea why Montgomery was claiming that
> his plan could possibly work;
Because it would have. He was a superior tactician to any American at the
time.
> The war should have been over by
> >Christmas 1944, as was the prediction.
>
> Woulda been nice. The Germans didn't cooperate.
Neither did the top brass Brits and Yanks.
> Not even starving Montgomery's army group and feeding Patton's would have
> shortened the war that much.
You make out Patton was equal to Monty. They were not equal. Monty was a
far higher rank.
> >The allies had far more firepower and men and should have just rolled
over
> >Germany in one swoop.
>
> It took several swoops, both in the East and the West.
We know that. It should have taken one.
> >After France, Hitler was the God. When he overrode his generals on the
> >eastern front and they were defeated (they would have been defeated
anyway),
> >he was regarded as an idiotic corporal. You can't have it both ways.
>
> He also understood the grand strategic situation better than any
> of his generals late in the war. He knew that there was no hope for
> a surrender on any reasonable terms.
No surrender on any terms at all.
--
Spiv
news:ddtjqm$u8c$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>
> BTW, the British army did no better than the French one against the
> Wehrmacht in 1940-42. Yet I see no blame attached to the British
> political leadership...
I would not say so. The French army just rolled over against the Germans in
1940 - for whatever reason. As did the British. After the fall of France
the only way the British army could get at the German army was in the
desert, and they were more than holding their own - they were not rolling
over.
--
Spiv
There were sinking ships in estuaries.
--
Roman Werpachowski
about and could specialize.
>
> The one thing in which the Soviets were far superior to the Germans in
> terms of economy was in resource mobilization. They were far better in
> squeezing a huge number of weapons out of a limited amount of economic
> resources than the Germans. Mobilization was somthing that the Soviet
> system was really, really good at. Unmatched, in fact.
With 20 million slave workers in gulags? You'd bet.
--
Roman Werpachowski
/--------==============--------\
| http://www.cft.edu.pl/~roman |
\--------==============--------/
--
yaakov_...@hotmail.com
> > Political will certainly had a role in this as well. The French should
> > have easily withstood the Blitzkrieg if only numbers of soldiers,
> > planes, tanks, artillery pieces, etc. are considered. They had
> > numerical superiority. However, their leadership, both military and
> > political, was in disarray. The German victory was assured before they
> > even crossed the border.
>
> Argh, not again...
>
case. According to what I have read, if the French had
been able to deploy against the German advance in the
Ardennes, then the outcome might have been quite different
and the breakthrough at Sedan could have been prevented,
in spite of all the known flaws of the French High Command.
Also, I have read that the French didn't have "superiority",
but rather the French and the British together were about
equal to the Germans on the ground, with the Germans having
superiority in the air. I recall that Churchill said when
the war broke out "Thank Gd for the French Army" so here
was at least one reasonably well informed person who had
a lot of respect for them.
--
asp...@pacific.net.au
wrote:
>quoting "Benjamin" <bcoh...@gmail.com> :
>>...as the allied victory in wwii the result of a series of lucky
>> breaks, without which the outcome would have been different...?
>
>in hindsight it may appear that way, but once one starts reading about matters
>in chronological order and in sufficient detail, one can't help but wonder...
>
>what if the BEF would have gotten wiped out on the Belgian beaches?
This would be impossible.
Hint: Only 55% of the BEF was pocketed at Dunkirk ... the remaining
45% was well and truly elsewhere and was not withdrawn, through
Brittany, after several more weeks of fighting withdrawals.
>what if the Luftwaffe had realized the importance of destroying British radar
>installations and aerodromes or adapted their doctrine to the way the Brits
>fought the defensive air war during the Blitz, reducing the high losses of
>German bombers?
It would have made no difference because, ultimately, the British plan
was to withdraw the 50% of the RAF that was within range of the
Luftwaffe when losses reached 50%, recombine with the 50% that was
*not* within range of the Luftwaffe, rebuild and retrain, and, given
that the Brits were outproducing the Germans in planes all through the
BoB, return in fairly short order.
And, no, the Luftwaffe wasn't going to manage in a few months what
Bomber Command and the USAAF Strategic Bombing campaign took 2-3
*years* to do ... not with fewer and inferior bombers.
>what if the Germans had realized what made British radar "tick" in time to
>correct their mistaken concepts about it to develop appropriate counter-
>measures?
Nothing would happen for the reasons noted above.
>what if Enigma hadn't fallen into British hands? what if the Germans had
>developed a few additional twists in time to confound the allies more?
>both the battles of the Atlantic and North-Africa would have changed... a lot!
Not by all that much. The Kriegsmarine had too few submarines and
lousy operational doctrine regardless. And the British had Operational
Research and Airborne ASW that could easily have been introduced
earlier (the mid-atlantic gap was finally closed, years after it was
known to be a problem, by redeploying 48 Long Range Bombers!)
>what if France had not been split into a Vichy-France?
Not much.
>What if Spain had joined the axes outright (and blocked Gibraltar)?
Explain why Franco would have been that stupid?
Then explain how he would feed the starving millions ... the bulk of
Spain's food was *imported*.
By *sea*.
There's this little problem called the "Royal Navy" and getting a few
blockade runners through the RN won't prevent famine.
And, no, the Axis won't be providing food ... doesn't have any real
excess to start with (the Germans were already forcing semi-starvation
rations on the conquered nations so *they* wouldn't suffer from food
shortages) and they have insufficient merchant ships to move it to the
Mediterranean ports *and* support Italian forces in North Africa, the
Balkans and the Aegean (and they're *Italian* ships, so Hitler can't
tell em what to do).
By rail? Sadly, as the German planners for the possible invasion of
Spain/Attack on Gibraltar found out quite quickly, the Spanish rail
net, already badly damaged/run down from the results of the Civil War
was oriented to move goods from/to the coastal ports and had minimal
capacity to move goods from the Pyrenees across the length of Spain.
>What if Japan had attacked only the Europeans colonial empire in South-east
>Asia but not any US territories or colonial possessions?
The US would have become involved eventually, so little difference.
>What if Japan had "gotten wise" and changed their crypto methods?
Little difference because US subs fucked them over regardless of
crypto.
>What if Hitler had not declared war on the US after Pearl Harbour?
The US would have gone to war eventually.
>What if Japan had attacked the Sovietunion in coordination with the Nazis?
The Japanese economy would have collapsed within 18 months because she
ultimately went to war because of the oil embargo and the Soviet Far
East had no oil.
Talk about cutting one's own throat!
>> Or was the victory the inevitable result of a superior fighting force,
>> the lucky breaks cancelling out with just as many unlucky breaks and
>> Axis lucky breaks?
>
>some of the Nazi submarine and aircraft technology in the pipeline could
>have matured a year or two earlier (Me-262, snorkeling subs, nightfighters)
Actually, no.
The shortage of strategic materials was the limiting factor in the
Me-262 and all jet aircraft ... the Germans simply did not have the
spare raw materials to make reliable engines that lasted more than
about 30 minutes before meltdown or cato. As it was, the engines in
the 262 were good for about 12 hours (total) flight time before they
were junk.
Ditto Submarines. They were poorly designed, poorly executed, and most
of the ones finished before the end of the war had such major design
and construction flaws that they either had to be scrapped, rebuilt,
or, mostly, used even though the limits placed on them by the flaws
actually made them *less* capable than the older designs they were
supposed to replace.
In any case, it wasn't that the problem was with the number of the
subs (it was, but that wasn't the *only* problem) it was that the
Germans found they couldn't train new crews fast enough.
Phil
Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: asp...@pacific.net.au
--
David Thornley
Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
>"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
>news:ddtjsc$u9n$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>
>> Spiv:
>> >
>be
>> >sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
>>
>> Okay, you've said that before, and have repeatedly been asked for some
>> sort of source, or even how this number was arrived at.
>
>> At least give us a clue.
>
>Enough clues were there.
>
even telling us how you got the number. You're simply repeating
one statement time after time.
>> Operation Overlord went to plan,
>> >but not to timescale.
>>
>> No, it went much faster than predicted, although not as smoothly.
>
>Nope. Much slower, the US forces facing less opposition to west were to
>swing around and meet the Brits facing stronger opposition at around
>Falaise. All went that way, but slow.
>
Okay, so why was it that the Allies were fighting in Germany in
early Fall? By that time, if I remember the phase lines right,
they were supposed to be occupying Normandy and Britanny and
getting ready to assault the Seine line. As far as the D+365
line goes, well, the war didn't last that long.
It went slower as expected at first, but then much faster.
>> Not allowing Bomber Harris to wipe out German city
>> >after German city until they surrendered, which would have shortened the
>> >war.
>>
>> Any evidence for that?
>
>Japan. A few cities raised in one day made them look up.
Wrong, as usual.
The fire-bombing, which was more devastating than anything Harris could
do on a regular basis, did not cause a surrender.
What finally got the Japanese to surrender was two atomic bombs
dropped several days apart, not just burning cities down.
Harris did not have nuclear weapons, and if the Allies had waited
for them the Soviets would have been on the Rhine at least.
Albert Speer
>stated that if a there was a few more Hamburgs, Germany would have had to
>have surrendered.
>
I have noted that anybody, on any side of the debate, can find a Speer
quote to support their position.
In this case, we have to ask what would consitute a few more Hamburgs.
It wasn't possible to devastate that much area in one city again, since
Hamburg was the second-largest German city (at least in area) that was
reachable by British bombers. It wasn't possible to get that much
shock value again.
As far as I can tell, Speer's comment was meaningless.
>> Too cavalier at Market Garden, ignoring resistance reports of panzer
>> >units in the area.
>>
>> Almost irrelevant.
>
>It was actually in WW2.
>
Sure it was. How much difference did it make to the outcome of the
war? What those forces should have been doing was trying to clear
the Scheldt estuary.
>> Ignoring reprts of troop and tank build ups in Germany
>> >opposite Blegium, leading to a German counter attack called the Battle of
>> >the Bulge.
>>
>> Mostly irrelevant,
>
>Again, it was actually in WW2.
>
Right. How much did it lengthen or shorten the war?
>> and in any event the attack probably shortened the war.
>
>Did the high command plan for this German attack to shorten the war?
>
The high command (i.e., Eisenhower), was taking a calculated risk,
with confidence that, if the Germans did attack in the Ardennes,
his forces could deal with the attack. This turned out to be
correct, despite the attack being much larger than anticipated.
Patton's suggestion was to let them get to Paris, then cut them
off and destroy them.
The failure of command was specific to Bradley and Hodges.
>> Squabbling about a 30 division thrust or attack on a broad front
>> >to suit the US public due to an election.
>>
>> Due to logistics. I have no idea why Montgomery was claiming that
>> his plan could possibly work;
>
>Because it would have. He was a superior tactician to any American at the
>time.
>
Tactics are irrelevant here. As I said, it was a matter of logistics.
The available supplies weren't enough to support 30 divisions where they
were. Montgomery was proposing to narrow that front, to overload
what supply routes there were, and advance, to stretch out the supply
routes. That, simply, wasn't going to work.
And, again, I have no idea why Montgomery was pushing that plan.
He was smarter than that.
>> The war should have been over by
>> >Christmas 1944, as was the prediction.
>>
>> Woulda been nice. The Germans didn't cooperate.
>
>Neither did the top brass Brits and Yanks.
>
No, it was the Germans. The Christmas 1944 prediction came during the
drive across France, which was the high point of Allied feeling in
1944. What actually happened is that the Germans were much more able
to scratch together armies to defend their border than the Allies
than was anticipated; hence the reference to the "Autumn Miracle".
Given the German ability to create such forces, there was no way
the Western Allies were going to break through and get to Berlin
by Christmas.
>> Not even starving Montgomery's army group and feeding Patton's would have
>> shortened the war that much.
>
>You make out Patton was equal to Monty. They were not equal. Monty was a
>far higher rank.
>
I should of course have said "Patton's army". They were not equal in
force size. Montgomery was of higher rank, but not "far" higher;
Montgomery was outranked Patton by one step most of the time,
and commanded a force one step larger.
In practice, Montgomery kept a far shorter leash on Dempsey and
Crerar than Bradley did on his army commanders, and so Montgomery
and Patton weren't that far off in independence of action.
(Patton was fond of putting things over on Bradley, while Bradley was
usually aware of what Patton was doing, and approved of it.)
>> >The allies had far more firepower and men and should have just rolled
>over
>> >Germany in one swoop.
>>
>> It took several swoops, both in the East and the West.
>
>We know that. It should have taken one.
>
In which case you can doubtless tell us how the Allies were to go
from Normandy to Berlin without a stop to rebuild the logistics.
>> He also understood the grand strategic situation better than any
>> of his generals late in the war. He knew that there was no hope for
>> a surrender on any reasonable terms.
>
>No surrender on any terms at all.
>
Right - the only surrender the Allies would accept was without terms.
The British attitude in September 1939 was almost as strict: restore
all conquests, and remove the Nazi government.
Louis Capdeboscq
> "Louis Capdeboscq" wrote in message
>
>>BTW, the British army did no better than the French one against the
>>Wehrmacht in 1940-42. Yet I see no blame attached to the British
>>political leadership...
>
> I would not say so.
So that's an endorsement. Thanks !
> The French army just rolled over against the Germans in
> 1940 - for whatever reason.
Did you pick that up from the same book in which King had lost 400 ships
in two months through carelessness, and the Swordfish had sunk more
ships than any other aircraft ?
> As did the British. After the fall of France
> the only way the British army could get at the German army was in the
> desert, and they were more than holding their own - they were not rolling
> over.
Hm, lessee...
Rommel arrives in theater, and kicks the British back all the way to the
Egyptian border.
Wavell attacks once, he is beaten.
Wavell attacks twice, he is beaten again.
Auchinleck attacks after months of preparations, nearly loses but
manages to score a narrow victory and liberate Tobruk.
A couple of weeks after the end of the British advance, Rommel kicks 8th
Army back to Gazala.
8th Army subsequently is almost destroyed by an outnumbered Axis force.
Auchinleck then loses various battles, and considers himself lucky to
save El Alamein.
If that's "more than holding their own", then I'm sure glad that the
British didn't roll over, because what would it have looked like !
David Thornley
Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
>"Louis Capdeboscq" <loui...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>news:ddtjqm$u8c$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>>
>> BTW, the British army did no better than the French one against the
>> Wehrmacht in 1940-42. Yet I see no blame attached to the British
>> political leadership...
>
>I would not say so. The French army just rolled over against the Germans in
>1940 - for whatever reason.
Depends on what you mean by "rolled over", I would think. The conquest
of France certainly didn't take long, but that was primarily due to
stupid initial deployment decisions. There was plenty of hard fighting
in that campaign.
As did the British. After the fall of France
>the only way the British army could get at the German army was in the
>desert, and they were more than holding their own - they were not rolling
>over.
>
Since the British were much farther east in November 1942 than when
they encountered the Germans in (IIRC) May 1941, it's hard to see
that they were more than holding their own. They had improved their
strategic situation in some ways, but that was by defeating Italians
in Ethiopia and Vichy French in Syria and oppressing anti-British
forces in Iraq, not by defeating Germans.
The only offensive victory the British managed in this time was Crusader,
and that was nowhere near the sort of victory Rommel got at Gazala.
The big difference between France in 1940 and the Western Desert
(aside of course from the fact that the main German army fought
France, but the British fought only what the Germans could spare
from the main campaign) was that it was hard for the British to
lose in North Africa. The advances were channeled by not wanting
to go too far inland, the logistics were bad, the distances were
long, and there was a nice last-ditch defensive position at El
Alamein.
Allowing for that, it really isn't clear to me that the British did
all that much better in the Desert than the French did in France.
Geoffrey Sinclair
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
>news:ddt31r$gqb$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>> Spiv wrote in message ...
>>
>> >The greatest stroke of luck for the Germans was the Allied military &
>> >strategic leadership.
>>
>> No, the allies largely chose competent people and kept those that
>> performed well.
>>
>> >King of the US Navy whose incompetence allowed about 600 merchantmen
>> >to be sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
>>
>> Try again
The bit that was deleted,
"and note under these rules Churchill was an incompetent."
You see Spiv needs things deleted to be able to write fiction.
>OK. King of the US Navy whose incompetence allowed about 600 merchantmen >to be sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
So now note the large number of allied merchant ships sunk up to and
during 1941 when sailing independently in the Atlantic and substitute
Churchill of the UK government in the above sentence.
Same rules of evidence, same junk conclusion.
>> >Operation Overlord went to plan, but not to timescale.
>>
>> And this is supposed to be incompetent?
>
>Yep. Too slow.
Yes folks, Spiv decides what is the right timescale, sitting around
60 years after the event and simply displays ignorance.
Note by the way a major factor in the allied timetable slowdown was
the storm, it forced the US to shut down one front to ensure it could
take Cherbourg, it dropped the reinforcement rate and caused
2nd army to slow down as well.
The allies reached the Seine 15 days before the timetable.
>> By the way the allies ended
>> up at the expected D+365 line at around D+90.
Ah yes, the "too slow" part clearly applies only to some date in
August, when the allies caught up to the phase lines.
Remarkable that. After that presumably they went "too fast".
>> > Not allowing Bomber Harris to wipe out German city
>> > after German city until they surrendered, which
>> > would have shortened the war.
>>
>> The straight answer is no, the attacks on oil and transport targets
>> were much more cost effective. They did help shorten the war.
>> The area targets were the very long way home. By the way according
>> to Harris the allies destroyed around 50% of 70 German cities and
>> towns, containing around 1/3 the population of Germany. So how much
>> more was the magic number to force a surrender? Harris claimed
>> the destruction of over 50,000 acres of urban area.
>
>Harris wanted to take out a city at a time, which gives a big shock. half
>destroyed here and there does not send the message.
Yes folks, ignorance rules it seems, by the way Dresden was 59%
destroyed, Hamburg 75% according to Harris. Half destroyed is
the total over the 70 targets.
So tell us all when did Harris actually "take out" a city at a time, if
half destroyed does not send the message. Note by the way if
a city is half destroyed there is a good chance much of the later
bomb tonnage will hit the destroyed sections.
Simply put Bomber Command managed to shock the German
political and military leadership once, at Hamburg in 1943
Since you think the area bombing campaign was working how
about listing all the cities "destroyed", if you cannot then it is
clear it was not working. I have Harris' Despatch on War
Operations, with the acreage table, so it easy to check your
list.
So go ahead and post it, provide people facts.
>> >Too cavalier at Market Garden, ignoring resistance reports of panzer
>> >units in the area.
>>
>> This was a tactical battle, and the reality
>> is the approaches to Antwerp
>> should have been the target.
>
>Still..."Too cavalier at Market Garden, ignoring resistance reports of
>panzer units in the area."
This was a tactical battle, and the reality is the approaches to Antwerp
should have been the target.
>> >Ignoring reports of troop and tank build ups in Germany
>> >opposite Blegium, leading to a German counter attack called the Battle of
>> >the Bulge.
>>
>> Try the fact the Germans advanced and made it easier to destroy
>> them,
deleted text,
"rather than digging them out of the westwall or facing them as
a counter attacking force when the allies broke through the west wall."
>The fact is the Germans were building up heavy forces and no troops were
>sent to counter the build up. The US sent their troop on R&R to that front.
The fact is the Germans carefully disguised the build up, made sure
there were no radio communications and had the forces in the
right positions to counter attack allied breakthroughs. The final point
is why the build up the allies noticed was classified as defensive.
Then add the way the German defence was being run more competently,
apparently less interference from Hitler.
Plus the reality the weather and terrain would do a great deal to
choke off a major attack in the area in winter was another reason for
lightly manning the front.
>> >Squabbling about a 30 division thrust or attack on a broad front
>> >to suit the US public due to an election.
>>
>> The 30 division attack was every allied unit over the Seine, including
>> 3rd US Army and the decision to say no had nothing to do with the
>> US election and everything to do with the supply situation.
>
>The US election had everything to do with it.
Ah yes, the usual proof by assertion, no evidence provided at all.
>> >The war should have been over by
>> >Christmas 1944, as was the prediction.
>>
>> No.
>
>Yep. After Falaise, prediction of it being over by Christmas made.
Yes folks, it seems someone somewhere made a prediction about
when the war would be over. Spiv has anointed this as holy writ,
no evidence will be allowed, it is an opinion after all.
>> >The allies had far more firepower and
>> > men and should have just rolled over
>> >Germany in one swoop.
>>
>> No. There was the little thing called supplies, in particular the
>> bottleneck of port capacity.
>
>The allies had massive logistics
As usual we have ignorance substituting for facts, the US army
was using more fuel in the pursuit than it was importing, the UK
armies twice the supplies they were importing. Then add the
way the supply system could not ship what was being imported
to the front line.
Hence the way the pursuit stopped.
>> >Corporal Hitler overrode his generals to advance into Belgium and France.
>> >Hitler was alone the man to take German credit for that.
>>
>> The Germans planned to repeat 1918, the allies captured the plans,
>> the Germans then went with the Manstein plan, with the advance into
>> Belgium and Holland as cover.
>
>Hitler still overrode the majority of his generals.
Why not actually take some time to read about the situation instead
of basically proving your ignorance? The original plan was a repeat
of 1914, with debate about how much force should be put in the southern
forces, the plan had to be revised and Manstein's plan was accepted.
See also the map exercises OKH held in February 1940 that
convinced it the southern (Manstein) attack was the better idea
and indeed they proposed even more force be given to the south.
Transferring another army to Army Group A.
On 17 February Manstein told Hitler of his ideas, on 18 February
OKH came in with their stronger version of the idea. Hitler liked it
and of course took the credit when it worked.
So give us the list of Generals Hitler "over rode" if you are so right.
>> > The armies in front of the Germans were
>> > bigger, better and heavier armed. The generals
>> > naturally were cautious, ans would never have
>> > been so cavalier.
>>
>> So Manstein and those that supported him were cautious? How did
>> the plan happen then?
>
>A man called Hitler was involved.
All Spiv needs to do now is note that OKH, the army high command
went with Manstein's ideas before Hitler was involved.
The little inconvenient facts again.
>> >After France, Hitler was the God. When he overrode his generals on the
>> >eastern front and they were defeated (they would have been defeated
>anyway),
>> >he was regarded as an idiotic corporal. You can't have it both ways.
>>
>> Simply put the German Generals of the high command variety were well
>> aware of Hitler's limitations as a general before and during the French
>> campaign. The problem is the public were told a different story. Hitler
>> believed the story and kept taking more and more power.
>
>The problem was Hitler was in charge and did some gambles early in the war
>that paid off, but never in the latter part.
I see the need to change the subject yet again. Spiv claims the
German generals were having it both ways but cannot back the
statement. The leadership of OKH and OKW were well aware
in 1940 of Hitler's problems as a war leader.
I presume early in the war is pre June 1941.
wer...@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu
>Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
>> After the fall of France the only way the British army could get at the
>> German army was in the desert, and they were more than holding their own
>...the big difference between France in 1940 and the Western Desert
>...was that it was hard for the British to lose in North Africa.
the big difference was that they read the Germans' mail and knew the
schedule of supply transports leaving Italy for the African coast
(both air and naval transport got largely decimated in result) and
that supplies arrived in insufficient quantities and so unreliably
that it was akin to a miracle how well the Afrika-Korps performed
> Allowing for that, it really isn't clear to me that the British did
> all that much better in the Desert than the French did in France.
in the context of the Subject of this thread, consider for a moment
the inverse situation (where the Germans manage to get hold of the
transport schedule of British supply movements in advance)...
Rommel would have reached the Nile and the Suez canal, Churchill
would not have outlasted in office long after that, with consequences
for the situation in the Mediterranean and the whole Middle East (if
not the whole war) -- not a pretty picture full of "inevitabilities"
Robert Sveinson
> Spiv wrote:
> > "Louis Capdeboscq" wrote in message
> >
> >>BTW, the British army did no better than the French one against the
> >>Wehrmacht in 1940-42. Yet I see no blame attached to the British
> >>political leadership...
> >
> > I would not say so.
>
> So that's an endorsement. Thanks !
>
> > The French army just rolled over against the Germans in
> > 1940 - for whatever reason.
>
> Did you pick that up from the same book in which King had lost 400 ships
> in two months through carelessness,
Read Hitler's U-boat War, vol. 1, The Hunters, New York 1939-42, 1996
pp 727-32 by C. Blair for the reference to 609 ships sunk!
--
Michael Emrys
at wer...@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu wrote on 8/17/05 1:44 PM:
> in the context of the Subject of this thread, consider for a moment the
> inverse situation (where the Germans manage to get hold of the transport
> schedule of British supply movements in advance)...
What could they have done with it? The British were in a good position to
interdict Axis supplies as long as Malta was in their hands and operating.
For pretty much all the time that heavy fighting was going on in North
Africa, British supply convoys did not for through the Mediterranean, but
around Africa and up to Suez via the Red Sea. The Germans (and to a lesser
extent the Italians) were already doing their best with U-boats in the
Atlantic, and sometimes in the Indian Ocean, to interfere with that traffic.
Detailed knowledge of convoy schedules might have enabled them to get more
efficient use of their fleet. But given other limits on their boats, one
wonders just how much benefit that would have rendered, since they were
never able to sink that much shipping on that route anyway.
Michael
--
Spiv
> Spiv wrote:
> > "Louis Capdeboscq" wrote in message
> > 1940 - for whatever reason.
>
> Did you pick that up from the same book in which King had lost 400 ships
> in two months through carelessness, and the Swordfish had sunk more
> ships than any other aircraft ?
BTE, about 600 US ships were sunk in 6 months. Find out.
> > As did the British. After the fall of France
> > the only way the British army could get at the German army was in the
> > desert, and they were more than holding their own - they were not
rolling
> > over.
>
> Hm, lessee...
Yes, lessee. The British facing Germans did not roll over. The Germans did
not push them out of North Africa - despite the British having inferior
equipment most of the time. The British eventually pushed the Germans out
of North Africa.
--
Spiv
> Spiv wrote in message ...
> >"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
> >news:ddt31r$gqb$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> >> Spiv wrote in message ...
> >>
> >> >The greatest stroke of luck for the Germans was the Allied military &
> >> >strategic leadership.
> >>
> >> No, the allies largely chose competent people and kept those that
> >> performed well.
> >>
> >> >King of the US Navy whose incompetence allowed about 600 merchantmen
> >> >to be sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
> >>
> >> Try again
>
> The bit that was deleted,
>
> "and note under these rules Churchill was an incompetent."
>
> You see Spiv needs things deleted to be able to write fiction.
>
> >OK. King of the US Navy whose incompetence allowed about 600 merchantmen
>to be sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
>
> So now note the large number of allied merchant ships sunk up to and
> during 1941 when sailing independently in the Atlantic and substitute
> Churchill of the UK government in the above sentence.
>
> Same rules of evidence, same junk conclusion.
Do you mean about 600 ship were not sunk in the first half of 1942?
> >> >Operation Overlord went to plan, but not to timescale.
> >>
> >> And this is supposed to be incompetent?
> >
> >Yep. Too slow.
>
> Yes folks, Spiv decides what is the right timescale,
The Allied cokmand deceided the timescale.
<snip>
> The allies reached the Seine 15 days before the timetable.
Which wasn't Normandy. Please focus.
> >> By the way the allies ended
> >> up at the expected D+365 line at around D+90.
Yep because the Brits crunch the Gemans up in Normandy.
> >> > Not allowing Bomber Harris to wipe out German city
> >> > after German city until they surrendered, which
> >> > would have shortened the war.
> >>
> >> The straight answer is no, the attacks on oil and transport targets
> >> were much more cost effective. They did help shorten the war.
> >> The area targets were the very long way home. By the way according
> >> to Harris the allies destroyed around 50% of 70 German cities and
> >> towns, containing around 1/3 the population of Germany. So how much
> >> more was the magic number to force a surrender? Harris claimed
> >> the destruction of over 50,000 acres of urban area.
> >
> >Harris wanted to take out a city at a time, which gives a big shock.
half
> >destroyed here and there does not send the message.
>
> Yes folks, ignorance rules
It does , and you are in poll position.
> >> > Too cavalier at Market Garden,
> >> > ignoring resistance reports of panzer
> >> > units in the area.
> >>
> >> This was a tactical battle, and the reality
> >> is the approaches to Antwerp
> >> should have been the target.
Tripe. A large obstacle to the allies was the Rhine. When you have an
opportunity to get a foothold over it, you do and consolidate. You don't go
phaffing about clearing an estuary.
The idea to gain a foothold over the Rhine was the correct approach.
> >> >Ignoring reports of troop and tank build ups in Germany
> >> >opposite Blegium, leading to a German counter attack called the Battle
of
> >> >the Bulge.
> >>
> >> Try the fact the Germans advanced and made it easier to destroy
> >> them,
Being silly again. Try the fact that the Germans took the allies by
surprise. The plan was not to lay back and allow then through then destroy
them knwoing they had built uop this large force of heavy armour. Not at
all. If the Germans had enough ammunition and fuel the matter might have
been a little different an dthey may have reached Antwerp.
> >The fact is the Germans were building up heavy forces and no troops were
> >sent to counter the build up. The US sent their troop on R&R to that
front.
>
> The fact is the Germans carefully
> disguised the build up, made sure
> there were no radio communications and had the forces in the
> right positions to counter attack allied breakthroughs. The final point
> is why the build up the allies noticed was classified as defensive.
The word is incompetence.
> >> >Squabbling about a 30 division thrust or attack on a broad front
> >> >to suit the US public due to an election.
> >>
> >> The 30 division attack was every allied unit over the Seine, including
> >> 3rd US Army and the decision to say no had nothing to do with the
> >> US election and everything to do with the supply situation.
> >
> >The US election had everything to do with it.
>
> Ah yes, the usual proof by assertion, no evidence provided at all.
There is enough evidence of that.
> >> >The war should have been over by
> >> >Christmas 1944, as was the prediction.
> >>
> >> No.
> >
> >Yep. After Falaise, prediction of it being over by Christmas made.
>
> Yes folks, it seems someone somewhere made a prediction about
> when the war would be over.
Got it in one.
> >> >The allies had far more firepower and
> >> > men and should have just rolled over
> >> >Germany in one swoop.
> >>
> >> No. There was the little thing called supplies, in particular the
> >> bottleneck of port capacity.
> >
> >The allies had massive logistics
>
> As usual we have ignorance substituting for facts, the US army
> was using more fuel in the pursuit than it was importing, the UK
> armies twice the supplies they were importing. Then add the
> way the supply system could not ship what was being imported
> to the front line.
>
> Hence the way the pursuit stopped.
Once Pluto was fully under way the fuel was there.
> >> >Corporal Hitler overrode his generals to advance into Belgium and
France.
> >> >Hitler was alone the man to take German credit for that.
> >>
> >> The Germans planned to repeat 1918, the allies captured the plans,
> >> the Germans then went with the Manstein plan, with the advance into
> >> Belgium and Holland as cover.
> >
> >Hitler still overrode the majority of his generals.
>
> Why not actually take some time
> to read about the situation instead
> of basically proving your ignorance?
Again...Hitler still overrode the majority of his generals
<snip>
--
Spiv
news:ddvni9$hso$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> >What if Spain had joined the axes outright (and blocked Gibraltar)?
>
> Explain why Franco would have been that stupid?
He was stupid. He wanted to join the war, but demanded territory. Hitler
couldn't stand the man, so ignored him. He said facing Franco again would
be the equivalent of having teeth pulled.
> >some of the Nazi submarine and aircraft technology in the pipeline could
> >have matured a year or two earlier (Me-262, snorkeling subs,
nightfighters)
>
> Actually, no.
>
> The shortage of strategic materials was the limiting factor in the
> Me-262 and all jet aircraft ... the Germans simply did not have the
> spare raw materials to make reliable engines that lasted more than
> about 30 minutes before meltdown or cato. As it was, the engines in
> the 262 were good for about 12 hours (total) flight time before they
> were junk.
The design was poor. If the throttles were opened too quickly the engines
stalled. The 262 killed many of its own pilots.
--
Spiv
>
> Depends on what you mean by "rolled over",
> I would think. The conquest
> of France certainly didn't take long,
I know they were just steamrolled.
> but that was primarily due to
> stupid initial deployment decisions.
I said "for whatever reason".
> There was plenty of hard fighting
> in that campaign.
The Germans still won quite easily.
> As did the British. After the fall of France
> >the only way the British army could get at the German army was in the
> >desert, and they were more than holding their own - they were not rolling
> >over.
>
> Since the British were much farther
> east
It doesn't matter where they were, the British did not get easily defeated
by the Germans, in fact the British eventually beat them. The point made
was "the British army did no better than the French one against the
Wehrmacht in 1940-42.". Which is total nonsense. The French army were
quickly defeated and the British in 40-42 was holding its own. That is a
very differnt performace from being beaten very quickly.
--
mike
> Allowing for that, it really isn't clear to me that the British did
> all that much better in the Desert than the French did in France.
Sure they did. They were mostly fighting on land claimed
by the Italians.
Sure beat fighting back and forth over say, South England.
And even had Rommel broke thru, didn't mean he could take
Alexandria, let alone the rest Egypt to the Canal.
Look at the trouble he had taking Tobruk
**
mike
**
--
Spiv
news:de07jq$5pj$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> quoting thor...@visi.com (David Thornley) :
> >Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
> >> After the fall of France the only way the British army could get at the
> >> German army was in the desert, and they were more than holding their
own
> >> [and] not rolling over.
> >...the big difference between France in 1940 and the Western Desert
> >...was that it was hard for the British to lose in North Africa.
>
> the big difference was that they read the Germans' mail and knew the
> schedule of supply transports leaving Italy for the African coast
> (both air and naval transport got largely decimated in result) and
> that supplies arrived in insufficient quantities and so unreliably
> that it was akin to a miracle how well the Afrika-Korps performed
>
>
> > Allowing for that, it really isn't clear to me that the British did
> > all that much better in the Desert than the French did in France.
>
> in the context of the Subject of this thread,
The current point of this thread is that the British not better than the
French 40-42. That is nonsense.
> consider for a moment
> the inverse situation (where the Germans manage to get hold of the
> transport schedule of British supply movements in advance)...
The British were supplied via Suez. U Boats were stalking the Atlantic to
get ship heading west or south. Even if the Germans did know, there was
nothing much they could do about it.
> Rommel would have reached the Nile and the Suez canal,
On tie basis of his supply alone that was a fantasy.
--
asp...@pacific.net.au
<nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
><asp...@pacific.net.au> wrote in message
>news:ddvni9$hso$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>> On Tue, 16 Aug 2005 16:08:03 +0000 (UTC), wer...@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu ()
>> wrote:
>
>> >What if Spain had joined the axes outright (and blocked Gibraltar)?
>>
>> Explain why Franco would have been that stupid?
>
>He was stupid. He wanted to join the war, but demanded territory. Hitler
Well, actually, neither of the above statements turn out to be true on
even the most cursory examination of the actual facts.
"He was stupid" ... so, he won the SCW by being "stupid?" Right.
And he maintained his power, effectively, till his death, by being
"stupid?" Sure. He actually did it by getting the real fascists to go
off and play at being soldiers on the Russian Front ... pretending to
help Hitler *and* getting rid of the dangerous lunatics of his own
party.
As for demanding territory ... well, rationally one would have to say
that that is far from being "stupid" ... *greedy*, perhaps, but in no
wise *stupid*.
The real demands were, of course, that the Germans supply him with all
the fuel and food he would lose in an allied embargo. Again,
considering his situation, that was an extremely smart move. It kept
him and Spain out of WW2 ... a war that would have been ruinous for
Spain even if the Nazis had had a snowball's of winning.
>couldn't stand the man, so ignored him. He said facing Franco again would
>be the equivalent of having teeth pulled.
Which kept Franco and Spain out of WW2. Hitler died a coward's death,
a failure in 1945, his country in ruins.
Franco died having achieved most everything he had wanted to ... and
with Spain well placed to be an economic power, for its size.
So, tell us again how Franco was "stupid" ...
>> >some of the Nazi submarine and aircraft technology in the pipeline could
>> >have matured a year or two earlier (Me-262, snorkeling subs,
>nightfighters)
>>
>> Actually, no.
>>
>> The shortage of strategic materials was the limiting factor in the
>> Me-262 and all jet aircraft ... the Germans simply did not have the
>> spare raw materials to make reliable engines that lasted more than
>> about 30 minutes before meltdown or cato. As it was, the engines in
>> the 262 were good for about 12 hours (total) flight time before they
>> were junk.
>
>The design was poor. If the throttles were opened too quickly the engines
>stalled. The 262 killed many of its own pilots.
May have been ... but it was the lack of resources for the engines
that delayed its entry into service, not the usual urban myth about
Hitler wanting it redesigned as a Jabo.
David Thornley
Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
>
>It doesn't matter where they were, the British did not get easily defeated
>by the Germans,
Wrong. Consider the two attacks out of the El Agheila area, for
example. Easy wins for the Germans.
in fact the British eventually beat them. The point made
>was "the British army did no better than the French one against the
>Wehrmacht in 1940-42.".
If we leave off the very end of 1942, the point is correct. The
British did better later in the war.
Which is total nonsense. The French army were
>quickly defeated and the British in 40-42 was holding its own. That is a
>very differnt performace from being beaten very quickly.
>
The British were not holding their own, and were soundly thrashed on
multiple occasions. They were in a different, and much more favorable,
strategic situation than the French, and so managed to hang on in the
last defensible position in North Africa.
If we're looking at army performance, we find that the British Army
did no better than the French Army in this period.
David Thornley
Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
><asp...@pacific.net.au> wrote in message
>news:ddvni9$hso$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>> On Tue, 16 Aug 2005 16:08:03 +0000 (UTC), wer...@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu ()
>> wrote:
>
>> >What if Spain had joined the axes outright (and blocked Gibraltar)?
>>
>> Explain why Franco would have been that stupid?
>
>He was stupid. He wanted to join the war, but demanded territory. Hitler
>couldn't stand the man, so ignored him. He said facing Franco again would
>be the equivalent of having teeth pulled.
>
He showed no signs of ever wanting to join the war, and indeed was in
a terrible shape to do so. He did provide one division to fight
the Soviets, which served his own purposes (he wanted to get the
more ardent Fascists out of Spain, preferably where they could get
themselves killed).
It isn't clear whether his demands for supplies, which Germany couldn't
meet, were overstated to keep out of the war or were merely what he
needed, but he wasn't going to war without them. The territorial
demands weren't insignificant, but Hitler could do something about
them, by planning to eventually carve up Vichy French territory.
Hitler didn't ignore him because of dislike, but because he was
getting nowhere in negotiations, and found that painful.
Haydn
> Explain why Franco would have been that stupid?
Franco was far from being stupid, in general, but there was a time in summer
1940 when it seems he was more eager to join the Axis than we usually are
willing to think.
Research has been and is being carried out in this subject, and according to
some evidence (or the interpretation of it) until late autumn 1940 Franco
sounded pretty enthusiastic over the idea. In spite of the disastrous
post-Civil War conditions Spain found herself in. However, and this is a
fact rather than an interpretation, his fellow dictators kept their distance
from him as the war was going not bad for them and they did not need another
vexatious guest at the war booty partition table. Franco would for sure have
requested more territories, but there was no meat left for that dog. Vichy
France had retained the possession of her colonial empire, and Hitler was
supposedly not going to ruin the kind of partnership he had established with
Vichy to satisfy Franco.
Things radically changed when the war started going downhill for the Axis in
the Mediterranean. The Italian failure in Greece, the destruction of the
Italian 10th Army in Egypt and Libya and, to crown it all, the British naval
bombardment of Genoa in February 1941 rapidly put out any intervention fire
in Franco's mind and changed him into a steely procrastinator, just when
Hitler and Mussolini began to pressure him hard to make up his mind and
enter the war. Probably, the US entry into the war in December 1941 - whose
global military and political significance didn't escape Franco - was the
death knell of any, even slim chance the Axis ever had to talk him into
joining their cause.
Haydn
--
lesliem...@netscape.net
(stuff deleted)
(regarding French performance vs. British)
> Yes, lessee. The British facing Germans did not roll over.
Neither did the French for that matter. France's poor performance in
1940 was due far more to its antiquated leadership and horrid command
and communications structure than it was to front-line cowardice, as
the "roll-over" comment implies.
France lost around 160 000 men before it surrendered. If it simply
"rolled over," it would not have lost them in the first place.
> The Germans did
> not push them out of North Africa - despite the British having inferior
> equipment most of the time.
However, the British had the luxury of being able to retreat hundreds
of miles without losing significant production or population sectors.
France could not afford this.
> The British eventually pushed the Germans out
> of North Africa.
...after about two years fighting, and after gaining material
superiority in nearly all categories.
--
Rich Rostrom
>"Rich Rostrom" <rrostrom.2...@rcn.com> wrote:
>>
>> Had FDR not been re-elected in 1940, it's possible
>> that US entry into the war might have been delayed
>> till 1945 by an isolationist President.
>
>1945? The Japanese had other ideas.
Japan never had any interest in initiating a conflict
with the U.S. Not even the most fanatical Japanese
militarists and expansionists thought it was desirable
or useful to Japan.
If the U.S. adopted a strictly hands-off policy in
Asia, and explicitly disclaimed any intent to fight
for the British or Dutch colonies, Japan would never
attack the U.S.
If the U.S. had an isolationist President in 1941-44,
these policies or something similar would have been
followed, and Japan would not have forced a war with
the U.S.
>> It's even arguable that the Axis could have been
>> defeated, eventually, without US forces - though
>> not without US aid, IMHO.
>
>I always find the word "aid" amusing. Is this the
>aid the US "sold"?
ISTR this little program called "Lend-Lease", under
which miniscule, trivial, token amounts of aid
(about $50 billion) were sent to Britain, China,
the USSR, France, and 34 other countries. There
was 'return Lend-Lease' of about $10 billion.
--
| The shocking lack of a fleet of modern luxury |
| dirigibles is only one of a great many things that |
| are seriously wrong with this here world. |
| -- blogger "Coop" at Positive Ape Index |
--
David Thornley
mike <mara...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>David Thornley wrote:
>> Allowing for that, it really isn't clear to me that the British did
>> all that much better in the Desert than the French did in France.
>
>Sure they did. They were mostly fighting on land claimed
>by the Italians.
>
were more fortunate in where they fought the Germans, but that's doesn't
mean their army did any better.
>And even had Rommel broke thru, didn't mean he could take
>Alexandria, let alone the rest Egypt to the Canal.
>
>Look at the trouble he had taking Tobruk
>
I don't see that as really relevant. If he had broken through at El
Alamein, there really wasn't anything to stop him before Alexandria
and the Suez Canal. The big problem he had with Tobruk was that it
could be resupplied and reinforced by sea. Close the Suez Canal and
the British can no longer do this in the Eastern Med.
rdu...@pdq.net
> "Spiv" <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
>
> >"Rich Rostrom" <rrostrom.2...@rcn.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> Had FDR not been re-elected in 1940, it's possible
> >> that US entry into the war might have been delayed
> >> till 1945 by an isolationist President.
> >
> >1945? The Japanese had other ideas.
>
> Japan never had any interest in initiating a conflict
> with the U.S. Not even the most fanatical Japanese
> militarists and expansionists thought it was desirable
> or useful to Japan.
>
> If the U.S. adopted a strictly hands-off policy in
> Asia, and explicitly disclaimed any intent to fight
> for the British or Dutch colonies, Japan would never
> attack the U.S
If Japan had not morphed by this time into a military dictatorship
making common cause with Nazi Germany the US would have had no reason
to oppose them. Of course, if they had been lead by something other
than a scatter-brained military elite, they would never have invaded
China, et al in the first place.
--
Spiv
> In article <de0iq4$eup$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>,
> Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
> ><asp...@pacific.net.au> wrote in message
> >news:ddvni9$hso$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> >> On Tue, 16 Aug 2005 16:08:03 +0000 (UTC), wer...@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu ()
> >> wrote:
> >
> >> >What if Spain had joined the axes outright (and blocked Gibraltar)?
> >>
> >> Explain why Franco would have been that stupid?
> >
> >He was stupid. He wanted to join the war, but demanded territory. Hitler
> >couldn't stand the man, so ignored him. He said facing Franco again
would
> >be the equivalent of having teeth pulled.
> >
> Franco did awfully well for a stupid man.
What did he do well, besides have Spain in poverty for decades?
> He showed no signs of ever
> wanting to join the war,
Read my other post.
--
Spiv
> In article <de0iq7$euq$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>,
> Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
> >
> > It doesn't matter where they were,
> > the British did not get easily defeated
> > by the Germans,
>
> Wrong. Consider the two attacks out of the El Agheila area, for
> example.
Are you really this dumb? The British were not defeated in north Africa.
The Germans did not roll over them in a matter of few weeks and totally
defeat them, as they did to the French army in France. ...and, the Brits
eventually won in north Africa. In case you didn't know.
> If we're looking at army performance, we find that the British Army
> did no better than the French Army in this period.
You are in cloud cuckoo land, unable to grasp something so fundamentally
simple.
--
Spiv
news:de2dkg$r7d$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> Which kept Franco and Spain out
> of WW2. Hitler died a coward's death,
> a failure in 1945, his country in ruins.
If you read what I wrote you would have read that Franco wanted to take
Spain into the war. It is a myth he was hero for keeping Spain out.
> Franco died having achieved most everything he had wanted to ... and
> with Spain well placed to be an economic power, for its size.
What kept fascism in Spain was luck. The allies considered moving down into
Spain and getting rid of fascism for good - which they should have done.
Well just sabre rattling probably would have done it.
After April 1945, the allied were more concerned with the Soviets, so Spain
was left alone, keeping the world's 4th largest mass murderer in power until
his death. It is shameful to the west that he remained in power, and to the
USA for using Spanish naval bases.
"achieved most everything he had wanted to"? Like keeping Spain desperately
poor. What is this economic power you are on about. Are you on about Spain
the country next to Portugal.
> So, tell us again how Franco was "stupid" ...
Please don't tell me you can't figure that out.
> >> >some of the Nazi submarine and aircraft technology in the pipeline
could
> >> >have matured a year or two earlier (Me-262, snorkeling subs,
> >nightfighters)
> >>
> >> Actually, no.
> >>
> >> The shortage of strategic materials was the limiting factor in the
> >> Me-262 and all jet aircraft ... the Germans simply did not have the
> >> spare raw materials to make reliable engines that lasted more than
> >> about 30 minutes before meltdown or cato. As it was, the engines in
> >> the 262 were good for about 12 hours (total) flight time before they
> >> were junk.
> >
> >The design was poor. If the throttles were opened too quickly the engines
> >stalled. The 262 killed many of its own pilots.
>
> May have been ... but it was the lack of resources for the engines
> that delayed its entry into service, not the usual urban myth about
> Hitler wanting it redesigned as a Jabo.
The Germans just were not that good at Jet engines. The British had
perfected it, with the Meteor, with the German engine still a long way to
go.
--
Spiv
news:de2qsm$5v9$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> Spiv wrote:
>
> (stuff deleted)
>
> (regarding French performance vs. British)
>
> > Yes, lessee. The British facing Germans did not roll over.
>
> Neither did the French for that matter.
In WW2 they did, in France in a matter of weeks.
> France lost around 160 000 men before it surrendered. If it simply
> "rolled over," it would not have lost them in the first place.
France fell in a matter of a few weeks. France fell in a matter of a few
weeks.
> > The Germans did
> > not push them out of North Africa - despite the British having inferior
> > equipment most of the time.
<snip>
The Germans did not defeat the British in north Africa. Do you understand
that? It is very simple.
> > The British eventually pushed the Germans out
> > of North Africa.
>
> ...after about two years fighting,
Again....The British eventually pushed the Germans out of North Africa. You
are trying to say the British did not push the Germans out of north Africa.
The British did.
--
Dave Smith
> >> Had FDR not been re-elected in 1940, it's possible
> >> that US entry into the war might have been delayed
> >> till 1945 by an isolationist President.
> >
> >1945? The Japanese had other ideas.
>
> Japan never had any interest in initiating a conflict
> with the U.S. Not even the most fanatical Japanese
> militarists and expansionists thought it was desirable
> or useful to Japan.
That would explain Pearl Harbor and the Japanese moves on US
territories in the western Pacific.
>
> If the U.S. adopted a strictly hands-off policy in
> Asia, and explicitly disclaimed any intent to fight
> for the British or Dutch colonies, Japan would never
> attack the U.S.
And the Philippines, Midway etc.?
> If the U.S. had an isolationist President in 1941-44,
> these policies or something similar would have been
> followed, and Japan would not have forced a war with
> the U.S.
And they would have been free from US pressure to stop their
aggression in China.
--
Spiv
news:ddtu5h$6su$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...> news:ddtjsc$u9n$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> > In article <ddr1nv$vs1$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>,
> > Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
>
> snip
>
> > Spiv:
> > >The greatest stroke of luck for the Germans was the Allied military &
> > >strategic leadership.
> > >
> be
> > >sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
> >
> > sort of source, or even how this number was arrived at.
> >
> > At least give us a clue. To find where this number came from, should
> > we consult a library or a proctologist?
>
> Preiously posted on July 8, 2005.
>
> From:
> INTELLIGENCE IN WAR
> by John Keegan
>
> *"Doenitz's prospects changed suddenly with the inception of the fourth
> period in January, 1942, when he was able to withdraw his U-boats from
> the central North Atlantic, break up his packs and patrol lines and
> deploy individual boats, under now often highly experienced skippers,
> against the coastwise shipping of the United States on its east coast
> and the Caribbean. U-boat captains described the next six months as their
> 'Happy Time.' Targets were numerous, so were sinkings. In January 26
> U-boats operating in American waters sank 400,966 tons of shipping, 71
> cargo ships or tankers, for no losses at all. February was worse propor-
> tionately: 18 U-boats sank 344,494 tons, 57 ships. In April, after a very
> bad
> March when 406,046 tons were sunk, 31 U-boats sank 133 ships of 641,053
> gross tons, and so the awful summer went on. By the end of August,
> when the Americans at last instituted proper anti-submarine measures,
> 609 ships, of 3,122,465 gross tons, had been sunk, for the loss
> of 22 U-boats, out of 184 engaged."*
>
> *Paragraph quoted from:
> HITLER'S U-BOAT WAR, vol. 1, The Hunters, New York, 1939-1942, 1996,
> pp727-732.*
> by C. Blair
>
> [Next paragraph]
> The extent of Donitz's success was due to the refusal of the United
> States Navy to institute convoy at the outset, in a bizarre repetition of
> the British Admiralty's policy of 1914-16. Admiral King, Chief of
> Naval Operations, formed the view that weakly escorted convoys would
> merely provide more plentiful targets than individually sailed ships,
> and so left America's traffic to its fate.
Some here have acute cases of selective amnesia.
--
Briarroot
>
> Yes, lessee. The British facing Germans did not roll over. The Germans did
> not push them out of North Africa - despite the British having inferior
> equipment most of the time.
The British may have had inferior tanks but in many other categories
their equipment was superior.
> The British eventually pushed the Germans out of North Africa.
Sure - *eventually* but North Africa was never anything more than a
sideshow for the German Army, even before the invasion of the Soviet
Union; while for the British Army, it was their main effort. The
British could almost effortlessly replace their losses, while the
Germans had to scrape by with whatever managed to run the gauntlet of
the Med, where the British were gifted with the precise sailing
schedules of German resupply convoys. The British also benefited
enormously from the delivery of hundreds of US tanks, most of which were
superior to their German counterparts of the time. Indeed, had the
Germans been commanded by anyone *other* than a man like Rommel, it's
very likely the British would have pushed them out much sooner.
--
Geoffrey Sinclair
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
>news:ddvnib$hsp$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>> Spiv wrote in message ...
>> >"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
>> >news:ddt31r$gqb$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>> >> Spiv wrote in message ...
>> >>
>> >> >The greatest stroke of luck for the Germans was the Allied military &
>> >> >strategic leadership.
>> >>
>> >> No, the allies largely chose competent people and kept those that
>> >> performed well.
>> >>
>> >> >King of the US Navy whose incompetence allowed about 600
>> >> >merchantmen to be sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
>> >>
>> >> Try again
>>
>> The bit that was deleted,
>>
>> "and note under these rules Churchill was an incompetent."
>>
>> You see Spiv needs things deleted to be able to write fiction.
>>
>> >OK. King of the US Navy whose incompetence allowed about 600
>> >merchantmen to be sunk by U boats in the first half of 1942.
>>
>> So now note the large number of allied merchant ships sunk up to and
>> during 1941 when sailing independently in the Atlantic and substitute
>> Churchill of the UK government in the above sentence.
>>
>> Same rules of evidence, same junk conclusion.
>
>Do you mean about 600 ship were not sunk in the first half of 1942?
Spiv keeps needing to change the subject it seems. The way the
evidence in manipulated to claim King was incompetent means,
under the same rules Churchill was incompetent.
This unwanted conclusion has to be ignored.
Instead, after being given shipping losses of the US coast in previous
replies Spiv simply tries to ask for the information again.
>From May 2005,
"Clay Blair thinks the U-boats sent to US waters sank 610 ships
December 1941 to August 1942, mostly in US waters."
Back to the present. The above figure is of course for 9 months,
and includes losses off Canada and in the Caribbean.
If you have a look at the sinkings for the period January to July
1942 in the phases of the U-boat war map you will realise the
610 ships figure includes a large number outside US coastal
waters, including Canada, the central and eastern Caribbean
and off the north coast of South America, after all they are
American waters.
>> >> >Operation Overlord went to plan, but not to timescale.
>> >>
>> >> And this is supposed to be incompetent?
>> >
>> >Yep. Too slow.
>>
>> Yes folks, Spiv decides what is the right timescale,
>
>The Allied cokmand deceided the timescale.
Yes folks, Spiv decides what is the right time scale, apparently
the planners were so incredibly good that missing their forecast
is proof of incompetence.
><snip>
What was snipped,
"Note by the way a major factor in the allied timetable slowdown was
the storm, it forced the US to shut down one front to ensure it could
take Cherbourg, it dropped the reinforcement rate and caused
2nd army to slow down as well."
>> The allies reached the Seine 15 days before the timetable.
>
>Which wasn't Normandy. Please focus.
Ah yes, Spiv has a new definition in place. Now we judge the allied
commanders on how well they kept the timetable to clear the province
of Normandy. With the planners estimates from months before being
considered perfect.
After all the planner predictions were on the slow side afterwards hence the
need is to define things so the pre decided conclusion can be trotted out.
Much laughter follows.
>> >> By the way the allies ended
>> >> up at the expected D+365 line at around D+90.
deleted text,
"Ah yes, the "too slow" part clearly applies only to some date in
August, when the allies caught up to the phase lines.
Remarkable that. After that presumably they went "too fast"."
>Yep because the Brits crunch the Gemans up in Normandy.
Simple rules for Spiv, right = British. See the detailed German
casualty figures published in this thread to see how far from
reality Spiv is.
Canadians go missing again I see.
>> >> > Not allowing Bomber Harris to wipe out German city
>> >> > after German city until they surrendered, which
>> >> > would have shortened the war.
>> >>
>> >> The straight answer is no, the attacks on oil and transport targets
>> >> were much more cost effective. They did help shorten the war.
>> >> The area targets were the very long way home. By the way according
>> >> to Harris the allies destroyed around 50% of 70 German cities and
>> >> towns, containing around 1/3 the population of Germany. So how much
>> >> more was the magic number to force a surrender? Harris claimed
>> >> the destruction of over 50,000 acres of urban area.
>> >
>> >Harris wanted to take out a city at a time, which gives a big shock half
>> >destroyed here and there does not send the message.
>>
>> Yes folks, ignorance rules
>
>It does , and you are in poll position.
Remarkable then that Spiv never actually supports opinions with
facts, indeed the more certain the opinion the further from the
facts it is.
text deleted, to the next >
Yes folks, ignorance rules it seems, by the way Dresden was 59%
destroyed, Hamburg 75% according to Harris. Half destroyed is
the total over the 70 targets.
So tell us all when did Harris actually "take out" a city at a time, if
half destroyed does not send the message. Note by the way if
a city is half destroyed there is a good chance much of the later
bomb tonnage will hit the destroyed sections.
Simply put Bomber Command managed to shock the German
political and military leadership once, at Hamburg in 1943
Since you think the area bombing campaign was working how
about listing all the cities "destroyed", if you cannot then it is
clear it was not working. I have Harris' Despatch on War
Operations, with the acreage table, so it easy to check your
list.
So go ahead and post it, provide people facts.
>> >> > Too cavalier at Market Garden, ignoring resistance reports of panzer
>> >> > units in the area.
>> >>
>> >> This was a tactical battle, and the reality is the approaches to Antwerp
>> >> should have been the target.
>
>Tripe. A large obstacle to the allies was the Rhine. When you have an
>opportunity to get a foothold over it, you do and consolidate. You don't go
>phaffing about clearing an estuary.
>
>The idea to gain a foothold over the Rhine was the correct approach.
If Antwerp was cleared a month earlier the allies would have been
in a position to attack a month earlier. And so on. No estuary, no port.
In September 1944 any bridge head over the Rhine was going to be a
big ask for the allies, both in capturing it and holding it.
>> >> >Ignoring reports of troop and tank build ups in Germany
>> >> >opposite Blegium, leading to a German counter attack called the
>> >> >Battle of the Bulge.
>> >>
>> >> Try the fact the Germans advanced and made it easier to destroy
>> >> them,
>
>Being silly again.
Yes folks, Spiv has decided the Bulge attack was bad for the allies,
therefore nothing bad must have happened to the Germans.
>Try the fact that the Germans took the allies by surprise.
Which is well known, along with the reasons why it was a surprise
>The plan was not to lay back and allow then through then destroy
>them knwoing they had built uop this large force of heavy armour.
No one says the allies planned it, people point out it had advantages
for the allies.
The Germans had as many Panzer divisions in the west as about
usual, they were refitting them to bring them up to strength hence the
way tank strength was around 1,097 on 15 December, up from 710
on 15 November, down from 1,305 on 31 May.
Also note panzer IVs made up 46% of the tank strength in December
1944, down from 56% in May 1944. So "heavy armour" needs to
include the Panzer IV for the "large force" comment to be correct.
Or large force is 594 tanks, up from 417 a month earlier.
>Not at
>all. If the Germans had enough ammunition and fuel the matter might have
>been a little different an dthey may have reached Antwerp.
You see folks, above Antwerp is not important, go for the Rhine, now of
course it becomes very important.
>> >The fact is the Germans were building up heavy forces and no troops were
>> >sent to counter the build up. The US sent their troop on R&R to that front.
>>
>> The fact is the Germans carefully
>> disguised the build up, made sure
>> there were no radio communications and had the forces in the
>> right positions to counter attack allied breakthroughs. The final point
>> is why the build up the allies noticed was classified as defensive.
>
>The word is incompetence.
Spiv is giving us a complete demonstration of the word. Remember
keep the previous conclusion at any cost, never let facts, especially
new facts, alter the conclusion.
By the way Spiv is never surprised, only proved incompetent, using
the above logic.
>> >> >Squabbling about a 30 division thrust or attack on a broad front
>> >> >to suit the US public due to an election.
>> >>
>> >> The 30 division attack was every allied unit over the Seine, including
>> >> 3rd US Army and the decision to say no had nothing to do with the
>> >> US election and everything to do with the supply situation.
>> >
>> >The US election had everything to do with it.
>>
>> Ah yes, the usual proof by assertion, no evidence provided at all.
>
>There is enough evidence of that.
Ah yes, the usual proof by assertion, no evidence provided at all.
Unless Spiv is providing proof of proof by assertion of course.
>> >> >The war should have been over by
>> >> >Christmas 1944, as was the prediction.
>> >>
>> >> No.
>> >
>> >Yep. After Falaise, prediction of it being over by Christmas made.
>>
>> Yes folks, it seems someone somewhere made a prediction about
>> when the war would be over.
deleted text,
"Spiv has anointed this as holy writ,
no evidence will be allowed, it is an opinion after all."
>Got it in one.
Yes folks, Spiv has decided the opinion of an unnamed person at
an unnamed time is absolutely correct.
>> >> >The allies had far more firepower and
>> >> > men and should have just rolled over
>> >> >Germany in one swoop.
>> >>
>> >> No. There was the little thing called supplies, in particular the
>> >> bottleneck of port capacity.
>> >
>> >The allies had massive logistics
>>
>> As usual we have ignorance substituting for facts, the US army
>> was using more fuel in the pursuit than it was importing, the UK
>> armies twice the supplies they were importing. Then add the
>> way the supply system could not ship what was being imported
>> to the front line.
>>
>> Hence the way the pursuit stopped.
>
>Once Pluto was fully under way the fuel was there.
Thanks Spiv for giving a really great example of your complete ignorance.
Pluto, the pipe line under the sea did not work very well, especially in 1944
and were effectively not around during the pursuit.
"On 18 September, the pipeline from England to Cherbourg is opened, it is
not a success and will only deliver 3,000 tons of POL over the next 17 days
before being shut down. "
"On 1st November there are three pipelines from Dungess to Boulogne,
output is 300 tons/day but rising. "
"On the 1st of December there are 6 pipelines between Dungess and
Boulogne, output is 660 tons/day.
"By March 1945 there are 11 pipelines between Dungess and Boulogne
and during March and April they will deliver an average of 3,100 tons a
day of POL. "
"On 10th May Lorient surrenders. Some 5,200,000 tons of fuel have been
delivered to the north west European ports, 826,000 tons direct from the US,
the rest from England, the undersea pipelines delivered 370,000 tons."
As of November 1944 the US army had a daily fuel consumption allowance
of 217 tons per day per divisional slice. So in December 1944 the pipelines
could have handled the consumption of 3 US divisional slices. The allies had
around 68 divisions present.
>> >> >Corporal Hitler overrode his generals to advance into Belgium and
>France.
>> >> >Hitler was alone the man to take German credit for that.
>> >>
>> >> The Germans planned to repeat 1918, the allies captured the plans,
>> >> the Germans then went with the Manstein plan, with the advance into
>> >> Belgium and Holland as cover.
>> >
>> >Hitler still overrode the majority of his generals.
>>
>> Why not actually take some time to read about the situation instead
>> of basically proving your ignorance?
>
>Again...Hitler still overrode the majority of his generals
You see folks, the original claim is stated without any evidence,
meantime the evidence that shows it to be wrong is deleted.
Clearly proof of incompetence. By the way I have heard a prediction
about what Spiv will produce tomorrow, if Spiv fails the prediction
clear incompetence on the part of Spiv.
><snip>
the rest is all the deleted text,
"See also the map exercises OKH held in February 1940 that
convinced it the southern (Manstein) attack was the better idea
and indeed they proposed even more force be given to the south.
Transferring another army to Army Group A.
On 17 February Manstein told Hitler of his ideas, on 18 February
OKH came in with their stronger version of the idea. Hitler liked it
and of course took the credit when it worked.
So give us the list of Generals Hitler "over rode" if you are so right.
I see the need to change the subject yet again. Spiv claims the
Geoffrey Sinclair
>news:de2dki$r7e$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>> In article <de0iq7$euq$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>,
>> Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > It doesn't matter where they were,
>> > the British did not get easily defeated
>> > by the Germans,
>>
>> Wrong. Consider the two attacks out of the El Agheila area, for
>> example.
>
>Are you really this dumb? The British were not defeated in north Africa.
You see folks Spiv uses strategic defeat and defines it as not being
kicked out of North Africa. The fact the British did suffer a series of
defeats and were driven back large distances, like the French in
1940 is going to be ignored.
Using Spiv's logic the French were not defeated in 1940, look where
1st French Army was in 1945.
>The Germans did not roll over them in a matter of few weeks and totally
>defeat them, as they did to the French army in France. ...and, the Brits
>eventually won in north Africa. In case you didn't know.
German attack starts 10 May 1940, French Armistice 21 June 1940.
British forces all pushed out of France.
In North Africa, first axis offensive, starts 30 March 1941, finishes
around 2 weeks later, on 13 April. Allied defeat.
First allied attack on axis after arrival of Germans, operation Brevity,
in May 1941, defeated in 2 days.
Second allied attack, operation Battleaxe in June 1941, defeated
in 2 days.
Third allied attack, operation Crusader, in November 1941, around
3 weeks of fighting sees an allied victory.
Second axis attack in January 1942, lasts around 2 weeks, recovers
around half the ground just lost.
Third axis attack in May 1942, 4 weeks of fighting sees the capture
of Tobruk. Alamain line reached about a week later
So far 6 weeks in 1940 versus 12 weeks in the period 1941 to
1942.
Simply the performance of the British commanded armies were
no better than those of the French in the time period.
>> If we're looking at army performance, we find that the British Army
>> did no better than the French Army in this period.
>
>You are in cloud cuckoo land, unable to grasp something so fundamentally
>simple.
Simple is being defined as Spiv carefully selecting examples and
definitions to support the pre determined conclusion.
asp...@pacific.net.au
<nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
><asp...@pacific.net.au> wrote in message
>news:de2dkg$r7d$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>
>> Which kept Franco and Spain out
>> of WW2. Hitler died a coward's death,
>> a failure in 1945, his country in ruins.
>
>If you read what I wrote you would have read that Franco wanted to take
>Spain into the war. It is a myth he was hero for keeping Spain out.
Stupid is as stupid does.
If we accept your assertion that Franco wanted into the war, then we
must ask *why* Spain *didn't* enter the war in any meaningful way.
Mussolini certainly entered the war when it damn well suited *him* and
not on Hitler's terms.
Franco?
He was so "stupid" that he waited till he was *asked* ... and, then,
asked for all the market would bear. And more.
That's how "stupid" he was.
Hitler? A failure who took the coward's way out having left his
country in ruins.
Mussolini? A failure who was deposed by his own people and died at the
hand of some rag-tag partisans, having left his country in not quite
as bad a mess as Hitler left Germany.
Franco? Died in bed, if not loved by all, at least respected and
feared.
That's how *stupid* Franco was ... despite your assertions.
>> So, tell us again how Franco was "stupid" ...
>
>Please don't tell me you can't figure that out.
Well, since you *assertions* that he was "stupid" are demonstrably
lacking in anything even vaguely resembling a fact ... it is
unsurprising that *none* of us can "figure out" what only you believe.
>> >The design was poor. If the throttles were opened too quickly the engines
>> >stalled. The 262 killed many of its own pilots.
>>
>> May have been ... but it was the lack of resources for the engines
>> that delayed its entry into service, not the usual urban myth about
>> Hitler wanting it redesigned as a Jabo.
>
>The Germans just were not that good at Jet engines. The British had
>perfected it, with the Meteor, with the German engine still a long way to
>go.
Yes and no. The German theoretical *designs* were better ... but they
couldn't produce them in practise.
Louis Capdeboscq
I wrote:
>>Did you pick that up from the same book in which King had lost 400 ships
>>in two months through carelessness,
>
> Read Hitler's U-boat War, vol. 1, The Hunters, New York 1939-42, 1996
> pp 727-32 by C. Blair for the reference to 609 ships sunk!
I did, and Blair is in fact defending King's decision in his two books.
You're going to have to work harder than that if you want to defend
Spiv's claims.
LC
--
Remove "e" from address to reply
--
Louis Capdeboscq
> France lost around 160 000 men before it surrendered. If it simply
> "rolled over," it would not have lost them in the first place.
French KIA's are usually counted at roughly 95,000. 130,000 is the
figure that includes Vichy and a few other dead. The actual deaths in
the 1940 campaign were more probably in the order of 65,000.
Barring a more precise definition of "rolling over" than "this is
something that non-British armies do and British armies do not do", I'll
point out that British performance in 1940 was every bit as bad as the
French one, for exactly the same reasons. Both armies were good at
static defense and scored a few successes in that role, but both were
totally unsuited to mobile warfare.
Finally, German battlefield deaths were about 2,500 per day in May 1940,
rising to a little above 4,500 in June (after the British had mostly
withdrawn) which is the same level as during Barbarossa but against half
as many defenders.
Louis Capdeboscq
> The Germans did not defeat the British in north Africa. Do you understand
> that? It is very simple.
The Germans defeated the British numerous times in North Africa, look up
the various battles in which Rommel was involved. Do you understand that
? It is very simple.
Additionally, you may want to look up Greece, Crete, and other similar
little mishaps.
Louis Capdeboscq
> Are you really this dumb? The British were not defeated in north Africa.
When Rommel took over, he advanced from El Agheila to the Egyptian
border in a matter of weeks. This is the same distance as going from the
German border with Belgium to Spain. The difference is that the French
had no more land to retreat to, whereas the British still had some
retreat room in Egypt.
But the British army was beaten just as badly and for largely the same
reasons as the French one.
> The Germans did not roll over them in a matter of few weeks and totally
> defeat them, as they did to the French army in France. ...and, the Brits
> eventually won in north Africa. In case you didn't know.
Well, the French eventually captured Berchtesgaden and signed the
armistice in Berlin. In case you didn't know.
Not sure how it proves that the 1940-42 French army was all that good,
but if it works for the British then I suppose it might also work for
the French...
Spiv
news:de37cb$g0f$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> Spiv wrote:
> >
> > Yes, lessee. The British facing Germans
> > did not roll over. The Germans did
> > not push them out of North Africa - despite
> > the British having inferior
> > equipment most of the time.
>
> The British may have had inferior
> tanks but in many other categories
> their equipment was superior.
Not many. As it was tank warfare, they suffered badly in the desert against
the Germans and to add, the Germans took an 88mm anti aircraft gun and as
used it as a field artillery gun, which pounded the British - they clouldn't
get near them. The British had no gun to match it at the time. British
tankies would refer to their guns as "peeshooters".
> > The British eventually pushed
> > the Germans out of North Africa.
>
> Sure - *eventually*
Yep. that means won.
> but North Africa was never anything more than a
> sideshow for the German Army, even before
> the invasion of the Soviet Union; while for
> the British Army, it was their main effort.
For about 18 months, yes. The Germans were taking heavy losses at times on
the eastern front and it was clear they were being bogged down. If it was
such a side show then the Afrika Corps would have been brought back.
Circling the Med was still in their minds. Also the Japanese were doing
well in 1942, even in the Indian Ocean, and there was hopes of German and
Japanese meeting up in The Middle East - vital for oil starved Germany and
Japan. Also if the British have a sea between them and mainland Europe then
this is also a defence of Germany. If the Germans has not entered north
Afrika, the British would have runs the Italians out and made the odd
landing on southern Europe.
The German north Africa campaign was important to them, otherwise they would
not have been there holding up valuable troops.
> The British could almost effortlessly
> replace their losses,
Not so. All supplies had to go around the cape, half way around the world
and back, and still face U boats.
> while the Germans had to scrape by
> with whatever managed to run the gauntlet of
> the Med, where the British were gifted
> with the precise sailing schedules of German
> resupply convoys.
Gifted? The British broke their codes.
> The British also benefited
> enormously from the delivery of hundreds
> of US tanks, most of which were
> superior to their German counterparts
> of the time.
That was only towards the end, and when the British were on equal terms in
equipment the end was inevitable.
> Indeed, had the Germans been commanded
> by anyone *other* than a man like Rommel, it's
> very likely the British would have pushed
> them out much sooner.
That is a valid point. There was three points that made the Germans army
punch above its weight. Their army was based more on merit than what the
British was, also having superior equipment in most cases, from hand guns
to main battle tanks, made a difference too. The Germans army also have
superior accommodate for the troops in most cases. British soldiers
occupying ex German army bases in 1945 were highly impressed at the
facilities.
The internal caste system within the British army was divisive. All too
often an officer was a naive kid and was given the job because he went to a
private school, with the experienced, and in many cases more intelligent,
lower ranks being openly contemptuous of this caste system and the
incompetent officers. Only towards the end of the war, when intelligent men
came in from industry filling the officer ranks, did the British army become
far more professional. These were not the ingrained regular institutional
officers, with a job to do and wanted to end the war ASAP. The look and
feel of the British army in 1945 was very different to 1940.
And all this is off the mark to the point made that the British 40-42 fared
no better against the Germans than the French did in 1940. The British
certainly did fare a lot better indeed, and when you consider the equipment
handicap and poorer internal structure, they did very well indeed.
--
Chris Morton
> If Japan had not morphed by this time into a military dictatorship
>making common cause with Nazi Germany the US would have had no reason
>to oppose them. Of course, if they had been lead by something other
>than a scatter-brained military elite, they would never have invaded
>China, et al in the first place.
This of course is the heart of the matter.
Japanese goals were simply unquantifiable. This is amply demonstrated by the
mission statements of the "patriotic societies" quoted by Hugh Bynum in
"Government by Assassination". In the end, pure greed and desire for hegemony
won out. Oddly, nobody but the Japanese themselves were enthusiastic about the
endeavor.
The problem for the Japanese was that virtually every stated goal was
contradicted by their actual behavior. This of course ensured permanent
resistance to their advance through China. Having blundered into an unwinnable
situation, they then could not admit their mistake, continuing to throw good
after bad, in terms of resources, lives and international relations. Those in
charge of the military were intellectually incapable (except for Yamamoto) of
grasping their situation. Those in the civilian government lacked the fortitude
to rein in the military. The result was a huge politico-military mudslide
toward disaster.
Rather than defeat communism in China, they put the most people under communist
rule in human history.
Rather than preserve the imperial system, they ensured its neutering.
Rather than protect the prerogatives of the military, they caused its
destruction and the adoption of a "peace constitution" with NO "military", only
"Self Defense Forces".
--
--
Gun control, the theory that 110lb. women should have to fistfight with 210lb.
rapists.
--
David Thornley
Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
><lesliem...@netscape.net> wrote in message
>news:de2qsm$5v9$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>
>> "rolled over," it would not have lost them in the first place.
>
>France fell in a matter of a few weeks. France fell in a matter of a few
>weeks.
>
from the French border to the Atlantic, which doomed France.
>The Germans did not defeat the British in north Africa. Do you understand
>that? It is very simple.
>
This was, very specifically, because the small ragtag piece of the German
Army that was in North Africa wasn't able to drive much, much farther,
since it would have been necessary to drive from El Agheila to the
Nile Delta. It came darn close, though.
So, the whole German Army was unable to drive as far against the French
as Panzerarmee Afrika was against the British.
David Thornley
Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
>
>"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
>news:de2dki$r7e$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>> In article <de0iq7$euq$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>,
>> Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > It doesn't matter where they were,
>> > the British did not get easily defeated
>> > by the Germans,
>>
>> Wrong. Consider the two attacks out of the El Agheila area, for
>> example.
>
>Are you really this dumb?
One of us apparently is, and it isn't me.
The British were not defeated in north Africa.
Your classification of the Gazala battle is, well, novel. Most people
consider it a British defeat. There were others.
>The Germans did not roll over them in a matter of few weeks
Yes, the Germans did. The British merely had more retreating space
than the French had.
This is tantamount to saying that the Red Army did better in the first
six weeks of Barbarossa than the Polish or French, since the Soviet
Union wasn't defeated in that time.
and totally
>defeat them, as they did to the French army in France. ...and, the Brits
>eventually won in north Africa. In case you didn't know.
>
The French eventually won in France, for that matter. The First
French Army evicted the Germans from its sector in early 1945.
In case you didn't know.
>> If we're looking at army performance, we find that the British Army
>> did no better than the French Army in this period.
>
>You are in cloud cuckoo land, unable to grasp something so fundamentally
>simple.
>
The British Army was facing an inferior foe, and was saved because it
had farther to retreat. This isn't a real impressive showing.
David Thornley
Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
>"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
>news:de2dkk$r7g$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
>> >
>
>What did he do well, besides have Spain in poverty for decades?
>
economic problems were specifically his fault; Spain never was an
economic powerhouse in the first half of the Twentieth Century,
and the civil war was going to devastate the economy, with or
without Franco.
>> He showed no signs of ever
>> wanting to join the war,
>
>Read my other post.
>
I did. You provided no reasons, just repetition.
Haydn's post is much more relevant.
lesliem...@netscape.net
(stuff deleted)
> > (regarding French performance vs. British)
> >
> > > Yes, lessee. The British facing Germans did not roll over.
> >
> > Neither did the French for that matter.
> In WW2 they did, in France in a matter of weeks.
If they simply "rolled over," it wouldn't have taken weeks, but days.
If France had "rolled over," they wouldn't have declared war in the
first place.
BTW, even if we do define "rolling over" as falling to the German
onslaught, we'd also have to include Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Norway, and Belgium as "rolling over," since they all fell before
France did. Since British forces were involved in Norway and France,
we'll have to include them as rolling over for the Germans.
> > France lost around 160 000 men before it surrendered. If it simply
> > "rolled over," it would not have lost them in the first place.
> France fell in a matter of a few weeks. France fell in a matter of a few
> weeks.
...after losing much of its mobile army (including equipment), as well
as its national capital to the German onslaught.
(stuff deleted)
> > > The British eventually pushed the Germans out
> > > of North Africa.
> > ...after about two years fighting,
> Again....The British eventually pushed the Germans out of North Africa.
Again...after about two years fighting.
During the course of this two years, the British lost a number of
battles and had to retreat hundreds of miles until they could get their
act together and decisively push the Axis out of North Africa. France
couldn't retreat any comparable distance without losing its major
population centers and production, even if their forces could walk on
water.
> You
> are trying to say the British did not push the Germans out of north Africa.
(rest of post deleted)
Nope. I pointed out that it took the British a lot of time to be able
to do it, and even then they had to exploit the luxury of a
long-distance retreat, something the French could not do in Europe.
--
Robert Sveinson
news:de5019$oue$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
Ah! But Spiv said that there were 600 ships sunk in
American waters, and people have been asking for proof
of this and Blair in the book that I cited states that the
losses were 609 ships! With your question above about the "same book
in which King lost 400 ships in 2 months through carelessness,"
suggests that you do not believe Spiv, or C. Blair's claim of 609
ships lost!
C. Blair did state that: "By the end of August,
when the Americans at last instituted proper anti-submarine
measures, 609 ships of 3,122,456 gross tons had been sunk, for
the loss of 22 U-boats out of 184 engaged."
If that is defending King's decision the you are right!
--
Spiv
Not at all.
> The way the evidence in manipulated to
> claim King was incompetent means,
> under the same rules Churchill was incompetent.
No. In the role Churchill was in he was very good. Any lesser role, that a
top military man would do, he would be incompetent.
> This unwanted conclusion has to be ignored.
>
> Instead, after being given shipping losses of the US coast in previous
> replies Spiv simply tries to ask for the information again.
>
> >From May 2005,
>
> "Clay Blair thinks the U-boats sent to US waters sank 610 ships
> December 1941 to August 1942, mostly in US waters."
>
> Back to the present. The above figure is of course for 9 months,
> and includes losses off Canada and in the Caribbean.
OK, a hell of a lot of ships then. Most people don't nit-pick you do.
> >> >> >Operation Overlord went to plan, but not to timescale.
> >> >>
> >> >> And this is supposed to be incompetent?
> >> >
> >> >Yep. Too slow.
> >>
> >> Yes folks, Spiv decides what is the right timescale,
No I never decided that, the planners did.
> >The Allied command decided the timescale.
>
> Yes folks, Spiv decides what is the right time scale,
No. The planners did, it said that.
> "Note by the way a major factor in the allied timetable slowdown was
> the storm, it forced the US to shut down one front to ensure it could
> take Cherbourg, it dropped the reinforcement rate and caused
> 2nd army to slow down as well."
>
> >> The allies reached the Seine 15 days before the timetable.
> >
> >Which wasn't Normandy. Please focus.
>
> Ah yes, Spiv has a new definition in place.
No. The point was Normandy. Please focus.
> Yes folks, ignorance rules it seems, by the way Dresden was 59%
> destroyed, Hamburg 75% according to Harris. Half destroyed is
> the total over the 70 targets.
>
> So tell us all when did Harris actually
> "take out" a city at a time,
He did take some out, but not in succession. If he did they would have
talked about peace. Albert Speer - ask him. Sorry he is now dead.
> Simply put Bomber Command managed to shock the German
> political and military leadership once, at Hamburg in 1943
And Harris wanted to do it once a week, but was overridden. IT shocked the
Germans so much they made V, for vengeance weapons to hit British cities.
They even had a jet plane as a bomber which should have been a fighter.
> Since you think the area bombing campaign was working
It was. What Harris wanted was city after city largely destroyed on one
operation in succession. They then would have changed their minds and
talked, facing such air power that can freely be launched against them.
> >> >> > Too cavalier at Market Garden, ignoring resistance reports of
panzer
> >> >> > units in the area.
> >> >>
> >> >> This was a tactical battle, and the reality is the approaches to
Antwerp
> >> >> should have been the target.
> >
> >Tripe. A large obstacle to the allies was the Rhine. When you have an
> >opportunity to get a foothold over it, you do and consolidate. You don't
go
> >phaffing about clearing an estuary.
> >
> >The idea to gain a foothold over the Rhine was the correct approach.
>
> If Antwerp was cleared a month earlier the allies would have been
> in a position to attack a month earlier. And so on. No estuary, no port.
How silly, as Market Garden was only about a month after the Normandy
breakout. Maybe they could have swept the estuary as they were bogged down
in Normandy.
> In September 1944 any bridge head over the Rhine was going to be a
> big ask for the allies, both in capturing it and holding it.
Good observation, but they didn't think that at the time, as most German
forces were swept aside in the west. The faster they got across the Rhine
the better, as the Germans were reinforcing their west front. All makes
sense.
> >> >> >Ignoring reports of troop and tank build ups in Germany
> >> >> >opposite Blegium, leading to a German counter attack called the
> >> >> >Battle of the Bulge.
> >> >>
> >> >> Try the fact the Germans advanced and made it easier to destroy
> >> >> them,
> >
> >Being silly again.
>
> Yes folks, Spiv has decided the Bulge attack was bad for the allies,
It was, as no one countered it.
> therefore nothing bad must have happened to the Germans.
Only after armies from the south and north closed in the cut them off.
> >Try the fact that the Germans took the allies by surprise.
>
> Which is well known, along with the reasons why it was a surprise
Very good.
> >The plan was not to lay back and allow them through then destroy
> >them knowing they had built up this large force of heavy armour.
>
> No one says the allies planned it,
> people point out it had advantages
> for the allies.
It was still a blunder from the allied view. Not see a massive aemour build
up and not counter it is gross incompetence.
> >Not at
> >all. If the Germans had enough ammunition and fuel the matter might have
> >been a little different an they may have reached Antwerp.
>
> You see folks, above Antwerp is not
> important, go for the Rhine, now of
> course it becomes very important.
You have warped logic and can only read numbers. If they knew the Germans
were building up forces opposite Belgium then the allies would had put large
forces opposite them. Also Sept 44 was never different to pre-Xams 44.
> >> >The fact is the Germans were building up heavy forces and no troops
were
> >> >sent to counter the build up. The US sent their troop on R&R to that
front.
> >>
> >> The fact is the Germans carefully
> >> disguised the build up, made sure
> >> there were no radio communications and had the forces in the
> >> right positions to counter attack allied breakthroughs. The final
point
> >> is why the build up the allies noticed was classified as defensive.
> >
> >The word is incompetence.
>
> Spiv is giving us a complete demonstration of the word.
Thank you. Again, incompetence.
> Remember keep the previous conclusion at any cost, never let facts,
especially
> new facts, alter the conclusion.
Or never allow warped logic to distort events.
> >> >> >Squabbling about a 30 division thrust or attack on a broad front
> >> >> >to suit the US public due to an election.
> >> >>
> >> >> The 30 division attack was every allied unit over the Seine,
including
> >> >> 3rd US Army and the decision to say no had nothing to do with the
> >> >> US election and everything to do with the supply situation.
> >> >
> >> >The US election had everything to do with it.
> >>
> >> Ah yes, the usual proof by assertion, no evidence provided at all.
> >
> >There is enough evidence of that.
>
> Ah yes, the usual proof by assertion, no evidence provided at all.
> Unless Spiv is providing proof of proof by assertion of course.
Google some of my posts.
PLUTO consisted of over 500 miles of pipe delivering over 1 million gallons
of fuel per day. By VE Day PLUTO had delivered over 172 million gallons of
Allied oil to Europe.
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, recognized the enormous
challenge accomplished when he wrote that PLUTO was "second in daring only
to the artificial harbours project."
--
Spiv
news:de5019$oue$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
Is the figure 609 good enough?
--
Spiv
news:de500t$ou6$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> On Thu, 18 Aug 2005 23:58:55 +0000 (UTC), "Spiv"
> <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
>
> ><asp...@pacific.net.au> wrote in message
> >news:de2dkg$r7d$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> >
> >> Which kept Franco and Spain out
> >> of WW2. Hitler died a coward's death,
> >> a failure in 1945, his country in ruins.
> >
> >If you read what I wrote you would have read that Franco wanted to take
> >Spain into the war. It is a myth he was hero for keeping Spain out.
>
> Stupid is as stupid does.
>
> If we accept your assertion that Franco wanted into the war, then we
> must ask *why* Spain *didn't* enter the war in any meaningful way.
Lack of any meaningful modern army, and Hitler couldn't stand the man.
> Mussolini certainly entered the war when it damn well suited *him* and
> not on Hitler's terms.
>
> Franco?
Different people, with one having a half decent military and the other none.
The Germans would have to supply Spain, which they could not effectively do.
What if the British occupied northern Spain? Better for Hitler if Spain
stayed neutral.
> Hitler? A failure who took the coward's way out having left his
> country in ruins.
I went to Spain as a teenager and Franco was in charge. The place had
hardly changed in 50 years. It was desperately poor. What a success!!!
Franco called on a foreign air force to indiscriminately bomb a Spanish
town, full of Spanish civilians. It was a disgrace to the west that he
remained in power for so long.
> Franco? Died in bed, if not loved by all, at least respected and
> feared.
Respected? Feared? Yes. I recall being searched on trains by plain clothes
policemen.
> That's how *stupid* Franco was ... despite your assertions.
A total idiot.
> >> >The design was poor. If the throttles were opened too quickly the
engines
> >> >stalled. The 262 killed many of its own pilots.
> >>
> >> May have been ... but it was the lack of resources for the engines
> >> that delayed its entry into service, not the usual urban myth about
> >> Hitler wanting it redesigned as a Jabo.
> >
> >The Germans just were not that good at Jet engines. The British had
> >perfected it, with the Meteor, with the German engine still a long way to
> >go.
>
> Yes and no. The German theoretical *designs* were better ... but they
> couldn't produce them in practise.
Which means they were just not very good at it.
--
Spiv
> lesliem...@netscape.net wrote:
> > France lost around 160 000 men before it surrendered. If it simply
> > "rolled over," it would not have lost them in the first place.
>
> French KIA's are usually counted at roughly 95,000. 130,000 is the
> figure that includes Vichy and a few other dead. The actual deaths in
> the 1940 campaign were more probably in the order of 65,000.
>
> Barring a more precise definition of "rolling over" than "this is
> something that non-British armies do and British armies do not do", I'll
> point out that British performance in 1940 was every bit as bad as the
> French one, for exactly the same reasons. Both armies were good at
> static defense and scored a few successes in that role, but both were
> totally unsuited to mobile warfare.
Not so.The British were far more mobile than the French. The British were
not used to large land battles, WW1 took them by surprise in the masses of
men involved, being good at mobile encounters, with navy and army working
close together.
Overall you are right in that the Brits didn't do well at all. Although many
top brass wanted a counter attack, and some preparation was being done,
rather than evacuation. Many experts believed it would have stopped the
Germans.
> Finally, German battlefield deaths were about 2,500 per day in May 1940,
> rising to a little above 4,500 in June (after the British had mostly
> withdrawn) which is the same level as during Barbarossa but against half
> as many defenders.
Still the British did a lot better in 490-42 than what the French did in
Spring 1940.
--
Spiv
> Spiv wrote in message ...
> >"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
> >news:de2dki$r7e$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> >> In article <de0iq7$euq$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>,
> >> Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > It doesn't matter where they were,
> >> > the British did not get easily defeated
> >> > by the Germans,
> >>
> >> Wrong. Consider the two attacks out of the El Agheila area, for
> >> example.
> >
> >Are you really this dumb? The British were not defeated in north Africa.
>
> You see folks Spiv uses strategic defeat and defines it as not being
> kicked out of North Africa.
You have an odd idea of defeat. OK, for you, the British kicked the Germans
out of north Africa and were defeated in north Africa.
> Using Spiv's logic the French were not defeated in 1940, look where
> 1st French Army was in 1945.
Do you mean the French won in 1940 and conquered all France until 1945?
> >The Germans did not roll over them in a matter of few weeks and totally
> >defeat them, as they did to the French army in France. ...and, the Brits
> >eventually won in north Africa. In case you didn't know.
>
> German attack starts 10 May 1940, French Armistice 21 June 1940.
> British forces all pushed out of France.
Yep and of French army. Defeated. The British army continued the fight in
north Africa, was not defeated, or pushed out of north Africa and eventually
won. Do a Google, you will find that is 100% correct.
> >> If we're looking at army performance, we find that the British Army
> >> did no better than the French Army in this period.
> >
> >You are in cloud cuckoo land, unable to grasp something so fundamentally
> >simple.
>
> Simple is being defined as Spiv carefully selecting examples and
> definitions to support the pre determined conclusion.
carefully selected fro you:
1. 1940 - French army totally defeated within a few weeks.
2. 1940-42 - British army fight on in the desert, is not defeated and
eventually wins.
Note: No. 2, is very different to No. 1. One is defeated the other is not.
This is fundamental.
--
Spiv
> Spiv wrote:
> > Are you really this dumb? The British were not defeated in north
Africa.
Once again, the British were not defated in north Africa,
> > The Germans did not roll over them in a matter of few weeks and totally
> > defeat them, as they did to the French army in France. ...and, the
Brits
> > eventually won in north Africa. In case you didn't know.
>
> Well, the French eventually captured Berchtesgaden and signed the
> armistice in Berlin. In case you didn't know.
Was that 40-42?
The fact is most of the French troops evacuated to England after Dunkirk,
went back and fought for Vichy. Most French fought on the axis side rather
than the allied side. So these French troops at Berchtesgaden. Which side
were they on?
--
Spiv
> In article <de37br$fvk$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>,
> Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
> >
> >"David Thornley" <thor...@visi.com> wrote in message
> >news:de2dki$r7e$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> >> In article <de0iq7$euq$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu>,
> >> Spiv <nyl...@goawayspam.com> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > It doesn't matter where they were,
> >> > the British did not get easily defeated
> >> > by the Germans,
> >>
> >> Wrong. Consider the two attacks out of the El Agheila area, for
> >> example.
> >
> >Are you really this dumb?
>
> One of us apparently is, and it isn't me.
>
> > The British were not defeated in north Africa.
>
> Your classification of the Gazala battle is, well, novel.
I haven't classified anything.
> Most people
> consider it a British defeat. There were others.
The British were NOT defeated in north Africa, They were not thrown out, or
capitulated. They actually won.
> > The Germans did not roll over
> > them in a matter of few weeks
>
> Yes, the Germans did.
Once again....The British were NOT defeated in north Africa, They were not
thrown out, or capitulated. They actually won.
> The French eventually won in
> France, for that matter.
They never. The Brits and the US won in France with French forces being a
side show.
--
Spiv
news:de5025$out$1...@gnus01.u.washington.edu...
> Spiv wrote:
>
> (stuff deleted)
>
> > > (regarding French performance vs. British)
> > >
> > > > Yes, lessee. The British facing Germans did not roll over.
> > >
> > > Neither did the French for that matter.
>
> > In WW2 they did, in France in a matter of weeks.
>
> If they simply "rolled over," it wouldn't have taken weeks, but days.
> If France had "rolled over," they wouldn't have declared war in the
> first place.
>
> BTW, even if we do define "rolling over" as falling to the German
> onslaught, we'd also have to include Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark,
> Norway, and Belgium as "rolling over," since they all fell before
> France did. Since British forces were involved in Norway and France,
> we'll have to include them as rolling over for the Germans.
Yep. You got that right.
> > > France lost around 160 000 men before it surrendered. If it simply
> > > "rolled over," it would not have lost them in the first place.
>
> > France fell in a matter of a few weeks. France fell in a matter of a
few
> > weeks.
>
> ...after losing much of its mobile army (including equipment), as well
> as its national capital to the German onslaught.
Yep, defeated quite quickly.
> > > > The British eventually pushed the Germans out
> > > > of North Africa.
>
> > > ...after about two years fighting,
>
> > Again....The British eventually pushed the Germans out of North Africa.
>
> Again...after about two years fighting.
Again....The British eventually pushed the Germans out of North Africa.
> > You
> > are trying to say the British did not push the Germans out of north
Africa.
>
> (rest of post deleted)
>
> Nope. I pointed out that it took the British a lot of time to be able
> to do it, and even then they had to exploit the luxury of a
> long-distance retreat, something the French could not do in Europe.
The point was that the British did no better in 40-42 than the French in
1940, that is clearly untrue, as they held their own in north Africa and
eventually beat the Germans. The performed far better than the French.
Now think hard about that.
--
Spiv
> Spiv wrote:
>
> > The Germans did not defeat the British in north Africa. Do you
understand
> > that? It is very simple.
>
> The Germans defeated the British
> numerous times in North Africa,
They did NOT!!!! They won a few battles. The battle is not the war. The
war was the north African war. The British were not defeated, held out, and
eventually won. Which was a hell of lot more than what the French did in
1940.
--