Would it have been better if Germany attempted to invade UK?

[Space Captain Kurt Kosmic]

Hey there,

Something I've been wondering for a while now, is (given 20/20
hindsight) would it have been better for the UK if Germany had
attempted invasion?

I've read a few histories and/or articles that seem to think any
actual attempt to cross the channel would have resulted in a
comprehensive British victory. Inadequate German shipping, a
functioning RN (maybe even RAF if forces were held in reserve)
determined resistance, German over confidence in parachute troops,
post war staff college war gaming etc... have all been used to re-
enforce the claim a German invasion would have failed.

If the above were true, and the destruction of the German invasion
force was certain - might it have been a better result that simply
winning the preparatory air war?

[Don Phillipson]

"Space Captain Kurt Kosmic" <c...@wetafx.co.nz> wrote in message
news:10c1d0d1-db74-4c44...@c16g2000pre.googlegroups.com...

> . . . would it have been better for the UK if Germany had

> attempted invasion?
>
> I've read a few histories and/or articles that seem to think any
> actual attempt to cross the channel would have resulted in a
> comprehensive British victory.

This hypothesis involves judgments in two different domains:
1. German invasion and British defensive victory require
conclusions about morale and tactics as well as about
measurable resources (shipping, air power etc.) and omits
time. We know British morale was very low in May 1940
and higher in October 1940, but no date is suggested for
the invasion. The point matters because army staff
colleges spend much of their time gaming how agile
forces of smaller numbers but higher quality can beat
forces of higher numbers.
2. "Better for the UK" is undefined: we do not know
whether this means Hitler would have offered an armistics
or Britain would have accepted it (leaving German U-boats
capable of blockading Britain) etc. We do not know whether
"better" includes effects on occupied Europe, the overseas
empire, the USA, USSR, etc.

Without developent in detail of at least one of these domains,
there seems no answer to the question about "better."

--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)

[Bay Man]

"Space Captain Kurt Kosmic" <c...@wetafx.co.nz> wrote in message
news:10c1d0d1-db74-4c44...@c16g2000pre.googlegroups.com...

> Hey there,
>
> Something I've been wondering for a while now, is (given 20/20
> hindsight) would it have been better for the UK if Germany had
> attempted invasion?

Churchill was hoping they would to give them "a bloody nose"

> If the above were true, and the destruction of the German invasion
> force was certain - might it have been a better result that simply
> winning the preparatory air war?

Winning a battle in the air or on the beaches is winning a battle. A dailed
invasion attempt would have brought Germany down to size. They may have
thought twice about invading the USSR. They were far too cocky and the USSR
brought them down to size. The Brits could have done that on the beaches.

Sealion was a ruse to get the UK to the peace table. Hitler was obsessed
with the UK wanting them off his back. He continually requested the Japanese
enter the war against the UK, but they refused, until Dec 41.

[Michele]

"Space Captain Kurt Kosmic" <c...@wetafx.co.nz> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:10c1d0d1-db74-4c44...@c16g2000pre.googlegroups.com...

Yes. Not without a price to pay for the British, of course.

But the Germans would have paid more.
- the Kriegsmarine would not have lost its major surface vessels... but it
would have lost most of everything else. Most if not all of the destroyers
in service. Several U-boote. And nearly all the small fry, which would,
throughout the war, do the thankless but necessary jobs of clearing mines,
escorting coastal convoys, occasionally attacking the enemy coastal convoys,
etc.
- the Luftwaffe would have suffered unsustainable losses, especially in its
fighter arm. The fighters were already too few in comparison with the
bombers; the tasks of CAPing the beachheads, escorting the bombers against
land targets, escorting the Ju 52s carrying paratroopers and paradrop
supplies, and escorting the Stukas in the hopeless attempt of countering the
Royal Navy would have been three tasks too many.
- the Heer would have suffered limited losses. Nothing that they couldn't
mend, overall, but they would have been one panzer division short and one
paratrooper division, too. Think Crete and how that's a good place to base
British bombers.
- the German economy would have lost the barges. Having coal is a good thing
to start with, but then you also need to move it around. Also note how the
Reichsbahn was stretched in supplying trains to the Eastern Front furnace;
and that was with barges moving heavy bulky stuff back home. Take away the
barges and...
- Germany would also have lost its winning streak. After Poland, Norway,
France, this would be the first resounding defeat. It matters, when it comes
to the decisions of neutrals.
- And what about the excuses just before Barbarossa? Oh, we're doing
exercises in Poland, out of the range of enemy bombers; we're preparing our
troops for the final battle with our enemy, Britain. Once Seelöwe has been
attempted and failed, that's not going to fly. Stalin will think hard about
all those German troops in Poland.

Of course you can rebuild fighters, barges, destroyers, minesweepers and
paratroop divisions. But the Germans already lost the war with what they did
not waste in the Channel.

Note also that once Seelöwe has come and drowned, the British can shift
reserves from their island. To North Africa or to Singapore, for instance,
changing the balances in those places too.

For more hypotheticals:
http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=103866

[Duwop]

On Dec 8, 9:02 pm, Space Captain Kurt Kosmic <c...@wetafx.co.nz>
wrote:

> Hey there,
>
> Something I've been wondering for a while now, is (given 20/20
> hindsight) would it have been better for the UK if Germany had
> attempted invasion?

Don't know about the UK, but certainly better for the Soviets, Greeks
and Yugoslavians, etc. Anything that delays and weakens the German
moves east after Poland is a good thing for everyone but the Germans.

Doesn't change Britains strategic outlook if that's what you are
asking. They'd still be unable to invade the continent.

[Michele]

"Duwop" <tut...@hotmail.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:04b671a7-c5c7-4c60...@n7g2000prb.googlegroups.com...

As I have already mentioned, if the sea mammal has come and drowned, the
British outlook does change. They haven't lots of equipped divisions,
granted, but they now don't need to keep so many of those few (sorry for the
pun...) in Britain. They can send some more to Africa. To Singapore. The
Germans now are extremely unlikely to get Crete (extremely heavy losses both
on the trained paratroopers and on the Ju 52s), which also skews the Med's
outlook. Etc.

[Rich Rostrom]

On Dec 9, 9:25 am, "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelN...@tln.it> wrote:

> - Germany would also have lost its winning streak. After Poland, Norway,
> France, this would be the first resounding defeat. It matters, when it comes
> to the decisions of neutrals.

As would Hitler. The effect would be the
equivalent of pulling aside the curtain on
"the great and terrible Oz". Or worse:
this isn't just a failure, it's a debacle. Hitler
looks _stupid_, for once.

Assume that SEELOWE was launched on
20 September, and was over in 10 days,
i.e. by the beginning of October.

Then a lot of things change. The Axis
allies start backing off from Germany.
If Hitler embarks on another
_himmelsfahrkommando_, nobody wants
to go along for the ride.

Italy almost certainly cancels the invasion
of Greece, and may turn down German
reinforcements for North Africa. Musso may
well start thinking about getting out of the war.
If he doesn't other Italians will, especially
after Italy is defeated in Libya and East Africa.

Romania, Hungary, and Finland are going to be
much more reluctant to join BARBAROSSA.

Free France will gain influence against
Vichy France.

The anti-Hitler cabal in Germany will gain
influence and credibility. "We told you this
man was leading the country to disaster!
So, he was lucky for a while. But now see
what he has done. Do you want to wait for
him to try some other demented folly?"

BARBAROSSA, if Hitler still wants to do it,
might be seen as that folly.There were
plenty of doubters as it was, despite the
"Victory disease" that understandably arisen
from the record of 1939-1940.

The question is - does Hitler sense that he's
on thin ice, and hold back from BARBAROSSA?
Or just go ahead? If the latter, the possibility of
a coup is IMO very real.

As noted by others, once the invasion is crushed,
Britain may feel more confident about sending
forces to other theaters (such as East Africa and
the Middle East). COMPASS may end with the
complete conquest of Libya. (There's barely time
for materiel dispatched from Britain after the
victory to reach East Africa or the Middle East
by December, but a stream of additional force
arriving from January onward seems likely. That's
around Africa. A few trans-Med shipments were
done at this time (Operation COLLAR). More are
likely.)

But really this should be in soc.history.what-if.

NTTAWT.

[David H Thornley]

Don Phillipson wrote:
> This hypothesis involves judgments in two different domains:
> 1. German invasion and British defensive victory require
> conclusions about morale and tactics as well as about
> measurable resources (shipping, air power etc.) and omits
> time. We know British morale was very low in May 1940

Doesn't matter. Sea Lion would not have succeeded at
any time.

Germany was unable to take control of the air. At best
they could have achieved temporary domination over
southern England, but no more, and they couldn't have
done that in May or June. The Battle of France was
very hard on the Luftwaffe, and it needed recovery
timer.

There was no way Germany would have took control of
the sea. The German Navy was far too weak, especially
after the damage it took over Norway. The RN would
rule the waves, particularly at night. During the
height of the Battle of Britain, the British kept
a battleship and four destroyer flotillas handy
in the main battle area.

Home Fleet could have showed up regardless of German
aircraft. The Germans had about as many Ju 87s as
the US threw at Kurita's force in the Subuyan Sea in
1944, and those guys had decent torpedos and actual
training in attacking ships. The Lufwaffe was relatively
ineffective against ships in 1940, their signal success
early on being the sinking of two German destroyers.

The German invasion forces would have been hopeless.
Lacking anything like landing craft, they had to
collect a lot of river barges and the like (and
that took time, preventing an early invasion), and
send them on an extremely dangerous tow, at the end of
which they'd be headed to the beach and the tow lines
dropped. Any sizable British warship steaming by would
have swamped them.

Assuming that the Germans actually made it to England,
the British had worked hard preparing their ports for
demolition. By the time the Germans could actually have
launched the invasion, the British Army was actually
in fairly good shape to defend. It was very low on
heavy weapons, but there was a lot of reasonably well-
trained manpower with personal weapons (only the Home Guard
practiced with pikes), and it would have taken a serious
assault to defeat them. That meant supplies, which weren't
coming through demolished ports and weren't coming over
the beach from nonexistent landing craft.

Had the Germans something comparable to the Allied force
of June 1944, and some way of seriously disputing control
of the sea, they would have had a good chance. Failing
that, no way.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

[Bay Man]

"David H Thornley" <da...@thornley.net> wrote in message
news:yoydndh_7PQmGn7T...@posted.visi...

> Had the Germans something comparable to the Allied force
> of June 1944, and some way of seriously disputing control
> of the sea, they would have had a good chance. Failing
> that, no way.

If you look at the D-Day landing and what went into it in specialised
equipment, then look at the ramshackle fleet of German river barges, anyone
thinking the Germans had a remote chance of a successful invasion needs
therapy. The only troops they would have got ashore would be airborne who
would have been mopped up quickly with no reinforcements from the beaches -
which would not come.

Also, there were few suitable invasion beaches on the south England coast
with it being mainly cliffs. The only suitable were around the Thames
Estuary, the same beaches the Spanish Armada targeted. There were a long
sail by barge from Holland and Belgium. Although the Germans did target
Channel beaches

[Les]

On Dec 9, 11:25 am, Phil McGregor <asp...@pacific.net.au> wrote:

(stuff deleted)

> >If the above were true, and the destruction of the German invasion
> >force was certain - might it have been a better result that simply
> >winning the preparatory air war?

> Depending on how much the Germans committed to the invasion and for
> how long they throw good money after bad.

Also remember, the Battle of Britain was not a "clear" German defeat.
It continued for months until the Luftwaffe started dwindling in
frequency and intensity.

A botched Sealion Operation is most likely to be over in a matter of
weeks, and over decisively. British propaganda is going to have a
field day showing beaches with bored British army troops clearing away
German equipment, the Channel littered with the flotsam from sunken
ships, etc.. Joe Kennedy gets completely discredited sooner and more
decisively, so US Lend-Lease efforts become more politically
attractive, since the UK looks likely to last long enough receive and
use the aid.

The plan for the Kriegsmarine was to try to engage in a running battle
(more running than battle) against the Home Fleet, leading it to the
North Atlantic, while some subs and light craft would try to hold the
narrow parts of the Channel against any RN presence. Should the RN
destroy those U-boats (highly likely), then Germany is even worse off
for fighting the Battle of the Atlantic.

Now, the Kriegsmarine had to strip all "excessive" navy crew in order
to man the invasion barges. Even then, they were able to place less
than one man per barge. Should the Home Fleet manage to catch the
Kriegsmarine (Coastal Command air strikes, Swordfish strikes, lucky RN
subs) then the German High Seas Fleet goes underwater.

(stuff deleted)

> The loss of further Luftwaffe
> aircraft, however, *would* be rather more important ... the reason the
> Germans ended the BoB was because their loss rate was unsustainable if
> they wanted the Luftwaffe in shape for the invasion of Russia.

Side note: the Luftwaffe was assigned to do most of the heavy lifting
of the operation, including daylight protection of the invasion from
RAF strikes. Given how the fighter arm of the Luftwaffe had trouble
adequately protecting their own bombers in airstrikes of far shorter
duration, this does not bode well.

> Ergo, further damage to the Luftwaffe has a direct impact on that
> invasion.

> Also, there would be the morale implications.

> Hitler, and the Wehrmacht, would have been defeated ... decisively so
> ... and no amount of spin would change that. Knowing that a victorious
> and undefeated UK was in their rear, any German with the slightest
> knowledge of history would be quite concerned about the problematic
> nature of a two front war as they invade the USSR.

Paradoxically, Hitler may be prompted to invade the USSR regardless,
since he still thinks a "kick in the door" approach will quickly
defeat Stalin. His army is still intact, and he needs a victory as
soon as possible to convince the people of his infallibility. Goering
is going to need all his political acumen to avoid becoming the
scapegoat, as will Raeder, but I'm betting Raeder is going to be the
one who ends up taking the blame. Hitler is going to need the
Luftwaffe far more than whatever remains of the German Navy. Who
knows, he may scrap U-boat development in favor of rebuilding the
Luftwaffe.

With the Kriegsmarine reduced (if not eliminated), the RN has more
assets for other theaters. If Mussolini decides to "reach an
accomodation," and become neutral, even more RN resources become
freed, although now the UK will be tempted to devote more to strategic
bombing, since that is the only quick way of hitting Germany in any
meaningful way.

Japan will still go to war against the US, UK, etc. by the end of
1941, given their schitzophrenic style of government, but the RN may
not fare as badly as originally, assuming more forces.

[Bay Man]

"Les" <lesliem...@netscape.net> wrote in message
news:2092e3b7-edee-4494...@q16g2000yqn.googlegroups.com...

> Also remember, the Battle of Britain was not a "clear" German defeat.
> It continued for months until the Luftwaffe started dwindling in
> frequency and intensity.

It was clearly a defeat, the exact time of the end of the battle was not
clear that is all.

>> The loss of further Luftwaffe
>> aircraft, however, *would* be rather more important ... the reason the
>> Germans ended the BoB was because their loss rate was unsustainable if
>> they wanted the Luftwaffe in shape for the invasion of Russia.

Germany invaded the USSR because it wanted their resources for the coming
air battle with the UK, and 90% certain USA. The USA had promised 50,000
planes a year in May 1940. They could either:

1. Defeat the USSR quickly, and gain the European empire they wanted as a
bonus, and gain the resources of the east to fight the UK in the air and
release demands on its army.

Or,

2. Invade the UK directly and have them out of the way that way.

No.2 was unachievable. No. 1 They thought was.

In reality none were achievable.

[Michele]

"Les" <lesliem...@netscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:2092e3b7-edee-4494...@q16g2000yqn.googlegroups.com...

> On Dec 9, 11:25 am, Phil McGregor <asp...@pacific.net.au> wrote:
>
> (stuff deleted)
>
>> >If the above were true, and the destruction of the German invasion
>> >force was certain - might it have been a better result that simply
>> >winning the preparatory air war?
>
>> Depending on how much the Germans committed to the invasion and for
>> how long they throw good money after bad.
>
> Also remember, the Battle of Britain was not a "clear" German defeat.

It was quite clear, actually. When one side quits the battlefield, it's not
the winner.

> It continued for months until the Luftwaffe started dwindling in
> frequency and intensity.
>

No. The Battle of Britain - if by that we mean the attempt to establish air
superiority in daylight over Southern England, with a view to either allow
operation Seelöwe or to force the British government to ask for terms by the
loss of that air superiority over their own soil and the threat of that
operation - was over by September 15, and it had begun at most in July, if
not in August 1940.

What went on was the Blitz. This was sustained night-time bombing. It might
have convinced the British government to ask for terms, especially when
coupled with the naval blockade strategy. But it didn't. In any case, it
could not achieve daylight air superiority and thus it could neither make
Seelöwe possible nor the threat of Seelöwe credible.

> A botched Sealion Operation is most likely to be over in a matter of
> weeks, and over decisively. British propaganda is going to have a
> field day showing beaches with bored British army troops clearing away
> German equipment, the Channel littered with the flotsam from sunken
> ships, etc.. Joe Kennedy gets completely discredited sooner and more
> decisively, so US Lend-Lease efforts become more politically
> attractive, since the UK looks likely to last long enough receive and
> use the aid.
>
> The plan for the Kriegsmarine was to try to engage in a running battle
> (more running than battle) against the Home Fleet, leading it to the
> North Atlantic,

Not at all. Have you read the German plans? The Herbstreise operation, which
would include all the operational German warships above destroyers, was a
short move in the North Sea, not the North Atlantic, and it would have been
considered a success if _no_ engagement had taken place.

while some subs and light craft would try to hold the
> narrow parts of the Channel against any RN presence. Should the RN
> destroy those U-boats (highly likely), then Germany is even worse off
> for fighting the Battle of the Atlantic.
>
> Now, the Kriegsmarine had to strip all "excessive" navy crew in order
> to man the invasion barges. Even then, they were able to place less
> than one man per barge. Should the Home Fleet manage to catch the
> Kriegsmarine (Coastal Command air strikes, Swordfish strikes, lucky RN
> subs) then the German High Seas Fleet goes underwater.
>

Which is quite a high-sounding name for the stuff the Germans actually would
(and could!) field for Herbstreise.

[Les]

On Dec 13, 11:06 am, "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelN...@tln.it> wrote:

(stuff deleted)

> > Also remember, the Battle of Britain was not a "clear" German defeat.

> It was quite clear, actually. When one side quits the battlefield, it's not
> the winner.

The Luftwaffe didn't "quit" the battlefield for several months. They
changed objectives, but their air raids continued.

This is the difference between a campaign of air raids and an invasion
attempt. Germany could and did launch hundreds of air raids over a
period of months, but could only muster enough force for one invasion
attempt. Defeating air raids is a time-consuming process,
particularly when the UK was mainly on the defensive during this
time. Crushing the invasion (and Sealion was doomed to failure) would
be far more decisive by comparison. Sandhurst has run exercises where
the Germans launch Sealion after completely obliterating the RAF and
RN, and the British Army still contains the invasion in a matter of
weeks.

So on one hand we have continued Luftwaffe air attacks on a variety of
UK targets over a period of months, petering out as

> > It continued for months until the Luftwaffe started dwindling in
> > frequency and intensity.

> No. The Battle of Britain - if by that we mean the attempt to establish air
> superiority in daylight over Southern England, with a view to either allow
> operation Seelöwe

The Luftwaffe didn't attend the Sealion planning sessions. Goering
believed they could force Britain to surrender all by themselves. The
Luftwaffe's role in Sealion was mainly dictated by the German Army and
Navy planners.

>or to force the British government to ask for terms by the
> loss of that air superiority over their own soil and the threat of that
> operation - was over by September 15,

The Luftwaffe attacks continued past that date. Thus, they "stayed in
the field."

> and it had begun at most in July, if
> not in August 1940.

By the Battle of Britain, I include both the Luftwaffe's attempt to
destroy the RAF and their subsequent target shifts to UK cities, then
their shifts to towns, etc., until the attacks diminished into
nuisance raids.

(stuff deleted, regarding the German HSF plans to distract the Home
Fleet)

> Not at all. Have you read the German plans? The Herbstreise operation, which
> would include all the operational German warships above destroyers, was a
> short move in the North Sea, not the North Atlantic, and it would have been
> considered a success if _no_ engagement had taken place.

(rest of post deleted)

I got the location wrong, my mistake. However, the intent was still
to lead the RN Home fleet on a wild goose chase in order to prevent it
from interfering with the invasion attempt itself. Even then, the RN
had enough forces already in the Channel to deal with the planned
invasion fleet.

[Michele]

"Les" <lesliem...@netscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio

news:2686ec06-7be1-4f27...@n10g2000vbg.googlegroups.com...

> On Dec 13, 11:06 am, "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelN...@tln.it> wrote:
>
> (stuff deleted)
>
>> > Also remember, the Battle of Britain was not a "clear" German defeat.
>
>> It was quite clear, actually. When one side quits the battlefield, it's
>> not
>> the winner.
>
> The Luftwaffe didn't "quit" the battlefield for several months. They
> changed objectives, but their air raids continued.
>

That depends on defining the battlefield.

> This is the difference between a campaign of air raids and an invasion
> attempt. Germany could and did launch hundreds of air raids over a
> period of months, but could only muster enough force for one invasion
> attempt.

That was the Battle of Britain. And the Luftwaffe was defeated.

Defeating air raids is a time-consuming process,
> particularly when the UK was mainly on the defensive during this
> time.

In fact, if you had written that the Luftwaffe's night raids known as the
Blitz had not been defeated outright, I'd agree with you. But that's the
Blitz, not the Battle of Britain.

Crushing the invasion (and Sealion was doomed to failure) would
> be far more decisive by comparison. Sandhurst has run exercises where
> the Germans launch Sealion after completely obliterating the RAF and
> RN, and the British Army still contains the invasion in a matter of
> weeks.
>

Some of the Sandhurst exercises actually had the whole ending in a lot less
than weeks.

> So on one hand we have continued Luftwaffe air attacks on a variety of
> UK targets over a period of months, petering out as
>
>> > It continued for months until the Luftwaffe started dwindling in
>> > frequency and intensity.
>
>> No. The Battle of Britain - if by that we mean the attempt to establish
>> air
>> superiority in daylight over Southern England, with a view to either
>> allow
>> operation Seelöwe
>
> The Luftwaffe didn't attend the Sealion planning sessions. Goering
> believed they could force Britain to surrender all by themselves. The
> Luftwaffe's role in Sealion was mainly dictated by the German Army and
> Navy planners.
>

So you go by option 2 below, fine with me:

>>or to force the British government to ask for terms by the
>> loss of that air superiority over their own soil and the threat of that
>> operation - was over by September 15,
>



> The Luftwaffe attacks continued past that date. Thus, they "stayed in
> the field."

No, the night is a different battlefield. That was the Blitz.

Of course the Luftwaffe also carried out sporadic daytime operations, for
instance hit and run fighter-bomber attacks on London. Those, and occasional
raids on coastal targets, were for the nuisance effect and for face-saving
purposes. It seems they saved the Luftwaffe's face at least with you, if
that's what you had in mind.

But consider this: what could be the practical purpose of those occasional,
low-intensity, low-payload, low-accuracy raids?

- they couldn't make Seelöwe possible,
- they couldn't scare the British into asking for peace, not after the end
of the good season.

So what good were they, if not for some nuisance and mainly propaganda? They
are per se a sign of who's the loser.

>
> By the Battle of Britain, I include both the Luftwaffe's attempt to
> destroy the RAF and their subsequent target shifts to UK cities, then
> their shifts to towns, etc., until the attacks diminished into
> nuisance raids.

That's where we disagree. The Battle of Britain was a campaign for air
superiority over a small area. That air superiority, if achieved by the
Germans, would either make the Germans try with Seelöwe, or make Seelöwe
credible enough to bring the British to peace talks.

The Germans did not acquire air superiority. On the contrary, they gave up
on that attempt. They are the losers of that battle.

They changed objectives after losing that battle, and blended it with other
forms of air warfare - that should not be confused with the above, though.

If you insist that occasional hit-and-run daylight raids mean that the
Luftwaffe had not left the daylight arena, and that this means they weren't
clearly defeated, ask yourself: what were the two sides' objectives in
August 1940? Who achieved them? The one who achieved them is the winner. The
side that achieved nothing is the loser.
A different approach, same result.

>
> (stuff deleted, regarding the German HSF plans to distract the Home
> Fleet)
>

The HSF is a WWI term.

>> Not at all. Have you read the German plans? The Herbstreise operation,
>> which
>> would include all the operational German warships above destroyers, was a
>> short move in the North Sea, not the North Atlantic, and it would have
>> been
>> considered a success if _no_ engagement had taken place.
>
> (rest of post deleted)
>
> I got the location wrong, my mistake. However, the intent was still
> to lead the RN Home fleet on a wild goose chase in order to prevent it
> from interfering with the invasion attempt itself. Even then, the RN
> had enough forces already in the Channel to deal with the planned
> invasion fleet.
>

Yes. Would you like me to post a list of the Royal Navy forces already in
the Channel, port by port? With estimated times of arrival to the middle of
the planned German landing zones?

[Bay Man]

"Michele" <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote in message
news:4eef6834$0$1386$4faf...@reader2.news.tin.it...

>> Crushing the invasion (and Sealion was doomed to failure) would
>> be far more decisive by comparison. Sandhurst has run exercises where
>> the Germans launch Sealion after completely obliterating the RAF and
>> RN, and the British Army still contains the invasion in a matter of
>> weeks.
>
> Some of the Sandhurst exercises actually had the whole ending in a lot
> less than weeks.

One had a few getting to the beaches and no further.

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

Michele <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote:
> "Les" <lesliem...@netscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio
> news:2686ec06-7be1-4f27...@n10g2000vbg.googlegroups.com...

> > This is the difference between a campaign of air raids and an invasion
> > attempt. Germany could and did launch hundreds of air raids over a
> > period of months, but could only muster enough force for one invasion
> > attempt.

> That was the Battle of Britain. And the Luftwaffe was defeated.

> Defeating air raids is a time-consuming process,
> > particularly when the UK was mainly on the defensive during this
> > time.

> In fact, if you had written that the Luftwaffe's night raids known as the
> Blitz had not been defeated outright, I'd agree with you. But that's the
> Blitz, not the Battle of Britain.

Surely this is splitting hairs; from the German POV (and likely the
British as well), these were simply different sides of the same battle;
the battle for air supremecy over Britain. That others have given
catchy names to different stages of the battle doesn't really change that
the combatants and battle ground were essentially the same.

As were, ultimately, the German goals.

Mike

[Michele]

<mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:jcp50l$1en$1...@haven.eyrie.org...

> Michele <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote:
>> "Les" <lesliem...@netscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio
>> news:2686ec06-7be1-4f27...@n10g2000vbg.googlegroups.com...
>
>
>> > This is the difference between a campaign of air raids and an invasion
>> > attempt. Germany could and did launch hundreds of air raids over a
>> > period of months, but could only muster enough force for one invasion
>> > attempt.
>
>> That was the Battle of Britain. And the Luftwaffe was defeated.
>
>> Defeating air raids is a time-consuming process,
>> > particularly when the UK was mainly on the defensive during this
>> > time.
>
>> In fact, if you had written that the Luftwaffe's night raids known as the
>> Blitz had not been defeated outright, I'd agree with you. But that's the
>> Blitz, not the Battle of Britain.
>
> Surely this is splitting hairs; from the German POV (and likely the
> British as well), these were simply different sides of the same battle;
> the battle for air supremecy over Britain.

No.

Think about what is the purpose of air superiority (supremacy was out of the
question) over Britain.

If it is achieved quickly and before the end of the season when a barge
would have half a chance of crossing the Channel, the purpose is to either
make that barge's voyage possible; or to frighten the British enough with
that possibility, that they come to terms.

But if air superiority is achieved in December, what is its purpose? Sure,
the Germans should be better able to bomb British factories - those
factories that are within the range of escorted bombers, though. It's not a
war-winning proposition, at least not in a matter of few months.

So it's not splitting hairs, it's the difference between a credible
immediate threat and a long war of attrition.

That the German POV gradually changed - to the contrary of what you
believe - is made clear by a series of factual decisions. They withdrew
Stukas from combat on August 19. On September 3, Kesselring presented the
case for attacking London in mass as the last attempt at forcing the British
to the decisive air-to-air engagement; the Luftwaffe's last chance for air
superiority in a short time. On September 16, Goering still wanted to
believe that Fighter Command could not sustain the effort; but on September
23, Speidel's report to the OKW, albeit absurdly optimistic, could not avoid
acknowledging that the Germans would be using fighters during the day and
bombers only at night. Fighters during the day had no chance of achieving
air superiority, because the British would not scramble for fighter sweeps.
They would scramble for fighter bomber attacks, but these by definition
would not cause mass combat, and thus would do little to establish daylight
air superiority. On October 12, orders by Hitler made it clear that the
preparations for a landing would only be carried on as a means to exercise
pressure, but without damaging the German economy. In short, this order
acknowledges that assuming Seelöwe had not always been a bluff, it was from
then on.

By October 27, Enigma intercepts, aerial photos of the barge fleet being
sent back to the German economy, the season, and the unquestionable winding
down of the Luftwaffe's daylight air activity convinced Churchill that
Seelöwe wasn't coming and that the Luftwaffe was shifting to the siege
strategy of night bombing, dropping sea mines etc.

That others have given
> catchy names to different stages of the battle doesn't really change that
> the combatants and battle ground were essentially the same.
>

The names are catchy but there is reason for them.

> As were, ultimately, the German goals.
>

No. Until September 15, they were trying to do one thing. After that,
another thing.

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

Michele <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote:
> <mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio
> news:jcp50l$1en$1...@haven.eyrie.org...
> > Michele <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote:
> >> "Les" <lesliem...@netscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio

> >

> > British as well), these were simply different sides of the same battle;
> > the battle for air supremecy over Britain.

> No.

Sorry, but yes.

> But if air superiority is achieved in December, what is its purpose? Sure,
> the Germans should be better able to bomb British factories - those
> factories that are within the range of escorted bombers, though. It's not a
> war-winning proposition, at least not in a matter of few months.

Sorry, did that change in the switch to night-bombing? Did the factories
move?

> So it's not splitting hairs, it's the difference between a credible
> immediate threat and a long war of attrition.

No, not really.

In either case, Britain is forced to terms with the Germans.

It's essentially the same fight.

Otherwise, any battle in, say the Pacific that consisted first of an
aerial assualt, followed by a naval bombardment, then followed by
an invasion could be considered "3 seperate battles." Indeed, with a
better case to be made for it.

Mike

[Les]

On Dec 19, 1:04 pm, "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelN...@tln.it> wrote:


(stuff deleted)

> >> > Also remember, the Battle of Britain was not a "clear" German defeat.
>
> >> It was quite clear, actually. When one side quits the battlefield, it's
> >> not
> >> the winner.
>
> > The Luftwaffe didn't "quit" the battlefield for several months. They
> > changed objectives, but their air raids continued.

> That depends on defining the battlefield.

Correct, which is why the Battle of Britain was not a "clear" German
defeat.

> > This is the difference between a campaign of air raids and an invasion
> > attempt. Germany could and did launch hundreds of air raids over a
> > period of months, but could only muster enough force for one invasion
> > attempt.

> That was the Battle of Britain.

So you agree that the Luftwaffe campaign against the Battle of Britain
took months.

> And the Luftwaffe was defeated.

Not clearly. Luftwaffe raids continued, then diminished, then
diminished further into

> Defeating air raids is a time-consuming process,

I agree.

> > particularly when the UK was mainly on the defensive during this
> > time.

> In fact, if you had written that the Luftwaffe's night raids known as the
> Blitz had not been defeated outright, I'd agree with you. But that's the
> Blitz, not the Battle of Britain.

> Crushing the invasion (and Sealion was doomed to failure) would
>
> > be far more decisive by comparison. Sandhurst has run exercises where
> > the Germans launch Sealion after completely obliterating the RAF and
> > RN, and the British Army still contains the invasion in a matter of
> > weeks.

> Some of the Sandhurst exercises actually had the whole ending in a lot less
> than weeks.

Not surprising, as some of the Sandhurst scenarios did not remove the
RN or RAF from the exercise. Whether the British win decisively in
hours or weeks, it is still a far more clear-cut victory than the
Battle of Britain.

(stuff deleted, regarding Sealion's suspension/cancellation by
September 15)

> > The Luftwaffe attacks continued past that date. Thus, they "stayed in
> > the field."

> No, the night is a different battlefield.

No, night is a time period. A battlefield is a place, and in this
case it is southern Britain.

> That was the Blitz.

The night "Blitz" was part of the Battle of Britain.

(stuff deleted)

> - they couldn't make Seelöwe possible,

> > By the Battle of Britain, I include both the Luftwaffe's attempt to
> > destroy the RAF and their subsequent target shifts to UK cities, then
> > their shifts to towns, etc., until the attacks diminished into
> > nuisance raids.

> That's where we disagree. The Battle of Britain was a campaign for air
> superiority over a small area.

No, the Battle of Britain was the Luftwaffe campaign where they tried
to bring the UK into submission. A large part of it consisted of
trying to destroy the RAF.

(stuff deleted)

> The Germans did not acquire air superiority.

So consequently, they switched to night bombing in an attempt to
damage enough of the UK to force it to sue for peace.

> On the contrary, they gave up
> on that attempt. They are the losers of that battle.

It wasn't a clear victory until months after the event. A British
victory against Sealion would be over in a matter of weeks, and that
is assuming the Germans get the best realistic chances possible.

> They changed objectives after losing that battle,

They changed objectives during the battle. Here is one site which
broke the battle down into 4 phases:

http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/phase1ofthebattle.cfm
http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/phase2ofthebattle.cfm
http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/phase3ofthebattle.cfm
http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/phase4ofthebattle.cfm

>and blended it with other
> forms of air warfare - that should not be confused with the above, though.

They aren't. They were all part of the Battle of Britain.

> If you insist that occasional hit-and-run daylight raids mean that the
> Luftwaffe had not left the daylight arena,

There you go again, confusing time periods with areas. Battlefields
are areas. Day and night are time periods.

> and that this means they weren't
> clearly defeated, ask yourself: what were the two sides' objectives in
> August 1940? Who achieved them? The one who achieved them is the winner. The
> side that achieved nothing is the loser.

First off, the Luftwaffe did achieve something by inflicting
casualties on the RAF and the UK in general. They did far from
achieving nothing. So, by your given definition, the RAF won, but the
Luftwaffe did not lose. Consequently, it was not a clear victory.

> A different approach, same result.

(rest of post deleted)

Yes, the Battle of Britain was not a clear victory. Glad you agree.

[Bay Man]

"Les" <lesliem...@netscape.net> wrote in message

news:ce1bb244-a47f-4834...@o9g2000vbc.googlegroups.com...

> Correct, which is why the Battle of Britain was not a "clear" German
> defeat.

The defeat was as clerar as daylight.

> So you agree that the Luftwaffe campaign against the Battle of Britain
> took months.

"against". The Luftwaffe was a part of the battle.

>> And the Luftwaffe was defeated.
>
> Not clearly.

How clear do you want a defeat to be? They tried and failed. How clear is
that?

>> Some of the Sandhurst exercises actually had the whole ending in a lot
>> less
>> than weeks.
>
> Not surprising, as some of the Sandhurst
> scenarios did not remove the
> RN or RAF from the exercise.

One that gave the German "air superiority" came out with a massive defeat.
Eliminating the RN was a no, no. It was MASSIVE. A war game with the RN &
RAF eliminated is bordering on fantasy.

> No, the Battle of Britain was the Luftwaffe campaign where they tried
> to bring the UK into submission.

Total nonsense. The only way to bring the UK into submission was by a land
attack. The BofB was an air war.

> Yes, the Battle of Britain was not a clear victory. Glad you agree.

It is black or white. Either Germany won or Germany lost. Germany lost. How
clear is that?

[Bay Man]

"Michele" <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote in message

news:4ef056ca$0$1385$4faf...@reader2.news.tin.it...

> But if air superiority is achieved in December, what is its purpose? Sure,
> the Germans should be better able to bomb British factories - those
> factories that are within the range of escorted bombers, though. It's not
> a war-winning proposition, at least not in a matter of few months.

People forget that the UK was major manufacturer and about the same as
Germany excluding the empire. By December the army would be totally
re-equipped as industry was working 24/7

Also, the myth that the UK lost all its equipment at Dunkirk still persists.
The UK's massive manufacturing would make it impossible for Germany ever to
gain air superiority as planes would still be turned out. Germany would have
to eliminate all aircraft factories and smash RAF fighter command. It just
would not happen.

OK, all they needed was air superiority at the time the barges were
crossing. That is a massive if. It would just not happen. Aircraft out of
range of German fighters in the English Midlands, could be used en-mass to
saturate the beaches with bombs.

> Fighters during the day had no chance of achieving air superiority,
> because the British would not scramble for fighter sweeps.

The Brits saw them and let them fly around as they could do no damage and
only had a short time over England. It was best to shoot flak at them and
get them to p**s off.

[Malcom "Mal" Reynolds]

In article <jcr5ke$e2i$1...@dont-email.me>,

"Bay Man" <xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:

> Also, the myth that the UK lost all its equipment at Dunkirk still persists.

Define your terms and then provide a cite

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

Bay Man <xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
> "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote in message
> news:4ef056ca$0$1385$4faf...@reader2.news.tin.it...

> > But if air superiority is achieved in December, what is its purpose? Sure,
> > the Germans should be better able to bomb British factories - those
> > factories that are within the range of escorted bombers, though. It's not
> > a war-winning proposition, at least not in a matter of few months.

> People forget that the UK was major manufacturer and about the same as
> Germany excluding the empire.

Really?

Who forgets this?

Mike

[Bill Shatzer]

Phil McGregor wrote:

> On Tue, 20 Dec 2011 18:45:13 -0500, "Bay Man"
> <xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
>> also, the myth that the UK lost all its equipment at Dunkirk still persists.

> Indeed, the myth that the whole of the BEF was "lost" at Dunkirk, or
> evacuated through Dunkirk persists.
>
> About half (45%, more or less, IIRC) of the BEF remained in France
> *after* Dunkirk, not having been caught in that pocket.
>
> They were withdrawn through the Breton ports, most of them, about a
> month later ... though they left behind a chunk of equipment, too.

They also left behind most of the 51st Highland Division which was not
withdrawn and which was eventually forced to surrender on June 12.

[David H Thornley]

mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
>
> Otherwise, any battle in, say the Pacific that consisted first of an
> aerial assualt, followed by a naval bombardment, then followed by
> an invasion could be considered "3 seperate battles." Indeed, with a
> better case to be made for it.
>

No, those would be three actions in support of one goal: to occupy
the island and destroy the Japanese defenders. The change from
the Battle of Britain to the Blitz was a change of goals: from
an attempt at a quick win to an attempt at long-term pressure.

If the US had attacked an island intending to neutralize it and
then invaded, that could well be two different battles, even though
some of the actions would be very much the same (in either case,
the US attacks would be intended to destroy Japanese air power on
the island, for example).

[Duwop]

On Dec 20, 10:03 pm, Bill Shatzer <ww...@NOcornell.edu> wrote:

> They also left behind most of the 51st Highland Division which was not
> withdrawn and which was eventually forced to surrender on June 12.

Oh my, and at the end of the war were forced to endure "the long
march" that killed so many.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/51st_(Highland)_Infantry_Division#France_1940

Suspect there were few POW survivors from this division after being
captive for so long.

Some interesting stories from survivors here.

http://www.51hd.co.uk/pow

[Les]

On Dec 20, 7:45 pm, "Bay Man"
<xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:

(stuff deleted)

> How clear do you want a defeat to be?

In terms of completely stopping the Luftwaffe air raids, it wasn't
clear. The Luftwaffe kept attacking in various means and ways until
it gradually dwindled to more of an irritation.

(stuff deleted)

> > Not surprising, as some of the Sandhurst
> > scenarios did not remove the
> > RN or RAF from the exercise.

> One that gave the German "air superiority" came out with a massive defeat.

Nearly *all* the Sanhurst exercises end with a massive German defeat
(and more than once the judges decided to handwave away the RAF and
RN). The only instance that I have heard where the Germans didn't get
crushed was when the judges decided to remove *all* UK forces opposing
the invasion, and even then, they ran into serious difficulties with
weather, logistics, and friendly fire.

> Eliminating the RN was a no, no. It was MASSIVE. A war game with the RN &
> RAF eliminated is bordering on fantasy.

I agree. I was just pointing out how clear a British victory an
attempted Sealion would be. We have Germany trying and spectacularly
failing an invasion which (if the Germans were very lucky) would be
decided in weeks, contrasted against an air campaign that lasted
months until it began to peter out.

> > No, the Battle of Britain was the Luftwaffe campaign where they tried
> > to bring the UK into submission.

> Total nonsense.

You are denying the Luftwaffe tried to bomb the UK into submission?
What cite do you have for that?

If you mean there was no real way for the Lufwaffe to win the Battle
of Britain, I agree, but they didn't know it at the time, and even
after the war a few of their military officers still thought they
should have invaded when they had the chance, or at least continued
the air strikes when the weather improved in 1941. Granted, at least
one (Galland, IIRC) changed his mind when Sandhurst invited him to
referee one of their Sealion wargames.

> The only way to bring the UK into submission was by a land
> attack. The BofB was an air war.

(rest of post deleted)

Well, there was also the possibility of blockade and starving the UK
into submission, which the Germans also tried (and yes, they failed,
but that is drifting away from the topic at hand).

[Michele]

"Les" <lesliem...@netscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio

news:ce1bb244-a47f-4834...@o9g2000vbc.googlegroups.com...

> On Dec 19, 1:04 pm, "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelN...@tln.it> wrote:
>

>> > This is the difference between a campaign of air raids and an invasion
>> > attempt. Germany could and did launch hundreds of air raids over a
>> > period of months, but could only muster enough force for one invasion
>> > attempt.
>
>> That was the Battle of Britain.
>
> So you agree that the Luftwaffe campaign against the Battle of Britain
> took months.

Yes, only not the months you seem to be thinking about. It begun in July
1940 and by mid-September it was over.

>
>> And the Luftwaffe was defeated.
>
> Not clearly. Luftwaffe raids continued, then diminished, then
> diminished further

Well yes. By the same reasoning, since in 1945 the Luftwaffe still downed a
few enemy bombers, it was not clearly defeated.

>
> (stuff deleted, regarding Sealion's suspension/cancellation by
> September 15)

Well, of course if you delete the key point, your understanding of the issue
will be limited.

>
>> > The Luftwaffe attacks continued past that date. Thus, they "stayed in
>> > the field."
>
>> No, the night is a different battlefield.
>
> No, night is a time period. A battlefield is a place, and in this
> case it is southern Britain.
>

That betrays a lack of understanding of air operations during WWII.

>> That was the Blitz.
>
> The night "Blitz" was part of the Battle of Britain.
>
> (stuff deleted)
>
>> - they couldn't make Seelöwe possible,
>
>> > By the Battle of Britain, I include both the Luftwaffe's attempt to
>> > destroy the RAF and their subsequent target shifts to UK cities, then
>> > their shifts to towns, etc., until the attacks diminished into
>> > nuisance raids.
>
>> That's where we disagree. The Battle of Britain was a campaign for air
>> superiority over a small area.
>
> No, the Battle of Britain was the Luftwaffe campaign where they tried
> to bring the UK into submission. A large part of it consisted of
> trying to destroy the RAF.
>

The Battle of Britain was aimed at trying to bring the British into
submission - by the end of 1940. Most of it consisted in trying to destroy
Fighter Command.

The British weren't brought into submission by the useful deadline. Fighter
Command was not destroyed. The side not achieving its objective, nor the key
requisite for its objective, is the clear loser.

[Michele]

<mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio

news:jcq5ng$hk1$1...@haven.eyrie.org...

> Michele <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote:
>> <mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio
>> news:jcp50l$1en$1...@haven.eyrie.org...
>> > Michele <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote:
>> >> "Les" <lesliem...@netscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio
>
>> >
>> > British as well), these were simply different sides of the same battle;
>> > the battle for air supremecy over Britain.
>
>> No.
>
> Sorry, but yes.

I have explained why not.

>
>> But if air superiority is achieved in December, what is its purpose?
>> Sure,
>> the Germans should be better able to bomb British factories - those
>> factories that are within the range of escorted bombers, though. It's not
>> a
>> war-winning proposition, at least not in a matter of few months.
>
> Sorry, did that change in the switch to night-bombing? Did the factories
> move?
>

Well, yes. They moved from easily targetable objectives to very hard to find
objectives. It's a hell of a move.

>> So it's not splitting hairs, it's the difference between a credible
>> immediate threat and a long war of attrition.
>
> No, not really.
>
> In either case, Britain is forced to terms with the Germans.
>
> It's essentially the same fight.

Of course not, when you are out to end that fight within the spring of 1941.

>
> Otherwise, any battle in, say the Pacific that consisted first of an
> aerial assualt, followed by a naval bombardment, then followed by
> an invasion could be considered "3 seperate battles." Indeed, with a
> better case to be made for it.
>

That's a very bad mistake, is the kind of thing over which not just battles
but also wars are lost. It's a confusion in the objectives.

In the example you made, all three phases have the same objective: physical
occupation of the island. They are intermediate stages to the same end.
Hence, they are very different stages among themselves - but of the same
battle.

In the case of the Battle of Britain, the objective was to force the British
to come to terms, or to make Sealion feasible _within October 1940_.

In the case of the night Blitz coupled with U-Boot siege, the objective was
to force the British come to terms, as above - with no deadline fixed,
however.

Two very different objectives, two different battles.

The night Blitz has much more in common with the Battle of the Atlantic than
with the Battle of Britain.

If you can't grasp the difference, try to put yourself in Hitler's boots and
look East.

[Roman W]

On Tuesday, December 20, 2011 11:45:13 PM UTC, Bay Man wrote:
> "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote in message

> > Fighters during the day had no chance of achieving air superiority,
> > because the British would not scramble for fighter sweeps.
>
> The Brits saw them and let them fly around as they could do no damage and
> only had a short time over England. It was best to shoot flak at them and
> get them to p**s off.

What if the German fighters started attacking the airfields? They could still shoot up planes sitting on the ground.

RW

[Michele]

"Roman W" <bloody...@gazeta.pl> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:G6O1g.A.L...@sol01.ashbva.gweep.ca...

Fighters cannot at the same time fight for air superiority, and carry out
fighter-bomber strafing missions attacking ground targets. You either fly as
high as you can because you are looking forward to an air-to-air battle (and
flying higher than the opponent is a great advantage there), or you fly low
enough that you can attack ground targets - and you will be damn vulnerable
to any fighter higher than you.

You can also go from one to the other, and it will be a highly dangerous and
fuel-ineffective choice.

Even so, the trick may work once or twice. After that, chances are that the
British will have Squadrons airborne, but with their mastery of the battle
space (due to their radars) they might well keep them in reserve until an
enemy fighter unit has attempted its attack (maybe against an empty air
base; maybe against an air base with artistic decoys) and is therefore as
vulnerable to radar-directed attack from above as an ant on a white-tiled
floor in your bathroom.

Permutations may be thrown in (with German high-flyers attempting to protect
the ground attackers, etc.); but the basic fact remains that the Germans
anyway lost the air-to-air battle when the bombers were there. Remove the
bombers and, a German fighter pilot of the era will tell you, the German
fighters are much more effective! Yes, and the British fighters will have no
other target but fighters, and in this scenario, at least some of those
fighters are easy prey, initiating the fight from a lower altitude. While
the British still know where the enemy is, and the Germans don't.

The above, without counting AA in. It's ineffective, as long as the targets
remain high. Once they come down to 300 meters, things change a lot.
.

[Roman W]

On Wednesday, December 21, 2011 3:30:06 PM UTC, Les wrote:
> Nearly *all* the Sanhurst exercises end with a massive German defeat
> (and more than once the judges decided to handwave away the RAF and
> RN). The only instance that I have heard where the Germans didn't get
> crushed was when the judges decided to remove *all* UK forces opposing
> the invasion, and even then, they ran into serious difficulties with
> weather, logistics, and friendly fire.

How reliable are Sandhurst exercises as an indication of what would *really* happen?

RW

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

Michele <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote:
> <mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio

> news:jcq5ng$hk1$1...@haven.eyrie.org...

> > Michele <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote:

> >> > British as well), these were simply different sides of the same battle;
> >> > the battle for air supremecy over Britain.
> >
> >> No.
> >
> > Sorry, but yes.

> I have explained why not.

You have given an opinion; this is not the same as explaining why it
is the correct one.

> >> war-winning proposition, at least not in a matter of few months.
> >
> > Sorry, did that change in the switch to night-bombing? Did the factories
> > move?

> Well, yes. They moved from easily targetable objectives to very hard to find
> objectives. It's a hell of a move.

So, hitting the same target first with air attacks, then with artillery
would also be "different battles", not different tactics, as artillery
is usually better aimed, yes?

And both sides were to make the mistake of believing their bombings,
night or day, were hitting targets, else why bother with attacking?

> >> So it's not splitting hairs, it's the difference between a credible
> >> immediate threat and a long war of attrition.
> >
> > No, not really.
> >
> > In either case, Britain is forced to terms with the Germans.
> >
> > It's essentially the same fight.

> Of course not, when you are out to end that fight within the spring of 1941.

In that case, any "battle" which doesn't end on the initial projected time
scale is really two (or more) different battles, especially if the tactics
change?

Mike

[Les]

On Dec 21, 12:48 pm, Roman W <bloody_rab...@gazeta.pl> wrote:

(stuff deleted)

> How reliable are Sandhurst exercises as an indication of what would *really* happen?

Sandhurst has more than a few military historians. They know from
historical records what one side thought they inflicted on the enemy,
and what the enemy actually suffered. They knew the Luftwaffe's
record against enemy warships, under various circumstances. They knew
the doctrines and technologies of the all the military branches
involved. From all of that, they calculate the probabilities of
certain actions, their perceived consequences, and their real
consequences.

Officers in training at Sandhurst have considerable motive to find a
way to make Sealion work, as it would really impress those who have a
role in determining their prospects for promotion. The fact that the
referees frequently put a variety of unlikely handicaps on the British
side just to let the Germans make a successful landing, and they still
can't make a German invasion work indicate the plan was simply not
workable.

[Roman W]

On Wednesday, December 21, 2011 11:58:12 PM UTC, Phil McGregor wrote:
> On Wed, 21 Dec 2011 11:48:10 -0500, Roman W <bloody...@gazeta.pl>

> >How reliable are Sandhurst exercises as an indication of what would *really* happen?
>

> Well, no way of knowing, of course. Not for sure. However, the
> instructors there, the ones running the exercises, had (and still
> have) a hell of a lot of institutional experience, and that is the
> key, most people agree, to a good Kriegspiel exercise ... not tables
> of figures, but the knowledge behind them representing an
> understanding of the human and chance factors involved.

How objective would they were? The exercises were, also, evaluating their own competence.

RW

[Michele]

<mtfe...@netMAPSONscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio

news:jcuf0u$vb3$1...@haven.eyrie.org...

> Michele <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote:

>> >
>> > Sorry, did that change in the switch to night-bombing? Did the
>> > factories
>> > move?
>
>> Well, yes. They moved from easily targetable objectives to very hard to
>> find
>> objectives. It's a hell of a move.
>
> So, hitting the same target first with air attacks, then with artillery
> would also be "different battles", not different tactics, as artillery
> is usually better aimed, yes?

No, of course. The fact that they were so much harder to find forced the
Germans to keep bombing them - but with a different objective. It's the
change in objectives that makes it a different fight.

I really don't see why it should be so hard to understand.

Consider this. In actual history, the Germans stormed and took control of
the Belgian Eben-Emael fort in a matter of hours. Control of that fort was
an absolute requisite for the German strategic plan. The German strategic
plan relied on speed.

Now imagine that the airborne fails to capture the fort in a matter of
hours. So the Germans switch to traditional tactics, and capture the fort in
a week, after sustained artillery bombardment, the move up of land forces,
and a traditional assault.

By the time they have captured the fort, their strategic plan is in the
dustbin.

If you insist, you can claim that the geographic location was the same, the
intent (capturing the fort) was the same, and therefore, the battle was the
same.

But you'd be wrong.

[Michele]

"Phil McGregor" <asp...@pacific.net.au> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:0ir4f758vlcdumpds...@4ax.com...

> On Wed, 21 Dec 2011 11:48:10 -0500, Roman W <bloody...@gazeta.pl>

> wrote:

>>
>>How reliable are Sandhurst exercises as an indication of what would
>>*really* happen?
>

> Well, no way of knowing, of course. Not for sure. However, the
> instructors there, the ones running the exercises, had (and still
> have) a hell of a lot of institutional experience, and that is the
> key, most people agree, to a good Kriegspiel exercise ... not tables
> of figures, but the knowledge behind them representing an
> understanding of the human and chance factors involved.
>

> Still, I guess you want more than that.

Well, one of the exercises was the "all-star", "celebrities" version, with
actual top former German commanders handling the German troops. They had the
usual (usual for these games, I mean) grace period during which the Royal
Navy was asleep. They failed anyway.

[Les]

On Dec 21, 11:31 am, "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelN...@tln.it> wrote:

(stuff deleted)

> > So you agree that the Luftwaffe campaign against the Battle of Britain
> > took months.

> Yes, only not the months you seem to be thinking about. It begun in July
> 1940 and by mid-September it was over.

According to:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/phase4ofthebattle.cfm

The end was around October 31, 1940. Even then, it added this caveat:

"Strangely, for such a ground breaking Battle, the first to be decided
purely in the air and the first real test of air power as a defensive
and offensive weapon, it did not really end, so much as petered out"

> >> And the Luftwaffe was defeated.

> > Not clearly. Luftwaffe raids continued, then diminished, then
> > diminished further
>
> Well yes. By the same reasoning, since in 1945 the Luftwaffe still downed a
> few enemy bombers, it was not clearly defeated.

Correct, once the airfields were

> > (stuff deleted, regarding Sealion's suspension/cancellation by
> > September 15)

> Well, of course if you delete the key point, your understanding of the issue
> will be limited.

Your key point was your repeated assertion that the Battle of Britain
ended September 15, and that the Blitz was not part of that. I have
provided a cite that claims the Blitz was part of the Battle of
Britain. I admit my understanding of the issue is limited to the
accounts I've read, and I have yet to read any historical account that
tried to claim the Blitz was not part of the Battle of Britain.

> >> > The Luftwaffe attacks continued past that date. Thus, they "stayed in
> >> > the field."

> >> No, the night is a different battlefield.

> > No, night is a time period. A battlefield is a place, and in this
> > case it is southern Britain.

> That betrays a lack of understanding of air operations during WWII.

No, it shows the difference between a battlefield and a time period.
Claiming that daytime and nighttimes are different battlefields is
silly. Continuing to claim it is delusional.

> >> That was the Blitz.

> > The night "Blitz" was part of the Battle of Britain.

(stuff deleted)

> > No, the Battle of Britain was the Luftwaffe campaign where they tried
> > to bring the UK into submission. A large part of it consisted of
> > trying to destroy the RAF.

> The Battle of Britain was aimed at trying to bring the British into
> submission - by the end of 1940.

Goering thought he could continue it in 1941 once the weather
improved, but was sidelined by Hitler's plan to invade the USSR.
IMHO, the Germans didn't stand a chance to do it in 1941 either, but
that is beside the point.

> Most of it consisted in trying to destroy
> Fighter Command.

> The British weren't brought into submission by the useful deadline.

That is why the Germans altered the deadline. Goering initially
thought Fighter Command would be eradicated in two weeks, and
consistently overrated the Luftwaffe's effectiveness throughout the
campaign.

> Fighter
> Command was not destroyed.

Correct, which eventually prompted the Luftwaffe to switch targets.
That happens during a campaign.

>The side not achieving its objective, nor the key
> requisite for its objective, is the clear loser.

So, by that definition, the Allies were clearly losing in 1944, since
they had failed to achieve their strategic objective of neutralizing
Germany?

[Michele]

"Les" <lesliem...@netscape.net> ha scritto nel messaggio

news:f8bc4ab0-9085-41a2...@v14g2000yqh.googlegroups.com...

> On Dec 21, 11:31 am, "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelN...@tln.it> wrote:
>
> (stuff deleted)
>
>> > So you agree that the Luftwaffe campaign against the Battle of Britain
>> > took months.
>
>> Yes, only not the months you seem to be thinking about. It begun in July
>> 1940 and by mid-September it was over.
>
> According to:
> http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/phase4ofthebattle.cfm
>
> The end was around October 31, 1940.

Everybody is entitled to their opinion, of course.

Even then, it added this caveat:
>
> "Strangely, for such a ground breaking Battle, the first to be decided
> purely in the air and the first real test of air power as a defensive
> and offensive weapon, it did not really end, so much as petered out"
>

Yes. It means that the battle was decisively over by the time that the
Germans gave up Seelöwe, i.e. by mid-september. Then it petered out into
october. Again, if you are of the opinion that the Luftwaffe in 1945 had not
been decisively defeated yet, you can consider this "petering out" as a
_decisive_ part of the battle. Me, I do not. I'm under the impression that
when a fire begins petering out, the outcome is already clear, i.e., it has
been _decided_.

As a side note, you quote a RAF analysis. And it says that the battle was
"decided purely in the air".
Of course, that's an institutional slant that shouldn't be bought as it is.
The Royal Navy today still firmly believes that they had a thing or tweo to
do with the fact that the Germans did not decide to launch Seelöwe, and with
the fact that the threat to Britain was never credible enough to force the
government to seek peace terms.

Ignoring the link between the Battle of Britain and the part of the German
intentions that was not "purely decided in the air" of course will be
misleading, and you have evidently been misled.

Actually, there has been a remarkable controversy in recent years, which you
probably have not heard of. You could start by reading the Royal Navy's
point of view here:
http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4538DAE3AB61C/

As a second side note, the Battle of Britain was so iconic in the British
and particularly in the RAF narrative and mystique that there is a "me-too"
phenomenon. The official pages will list as participating in the Battle of
Britain Squadrons that actually were ready only in October. Are they
listed - in the RAF official site, not by a neutral source - because the
battle did last until october, or is the battle said to have lasted so that
they can be listed?

>
>> >> And the Luftwaffe was defeated.
>
>> > Not clearly. Luftwaffe raids continued, then diminished, then
>> > diminished further
>>
>> Well yes. By the same reasoning, since in 1945 the Luftwaffe still downed
>> a
>> few enemy bombers, it was not clearly defeated.
>
> Correct, once the airfields were
>

Are you saying that in 1945 the Luftwaffe was not clearly defeated yet?
Well, you are entitled to your opinion, too, of course.

>
>> > (stuff deleted, regarding Sealion's suspension/cancellation by
>> > September 15)
>
>> Well, of course if you delete the key point, your understanding of the
>> issue
>> will be limited.
>
> Your key point was your repeated assertion that the Battle of Britain
> ended September 15, and that the Blitz was not part of that. I have
> provided a cite that claims the Blitz was part of the Battle of
> Britain. I admit my understanding of the issue is limited to the
> accounts I've read, and I have yet to read any historical account that
> tried to claim the Blitz was not part of the Battle of Britain.
>

I would suggest you to distinguish between cites that provide factual data
and cites that provide interpretation. The former are very important; the
other might not necessarily be better than your interpretation or mine. I
never claimed that the Luftwaffe completely, entirely and immediately
stopped daylight operations on September 16. I.e., I don't question the
factual data.
But the factual data is that up to mid September or so, the daylight
operations by the Luftwaffe were meant to achieve air superiority. After
that, the factual data show that that was no longer the objective; the point
was face-saving and nuisance. Then the few daylight raids remaining took the
same objective as the intensive night bombing and of the U-Boot operations:
long-term siege - as opposed to quick air superiority and immediate
resolution.

In short, the battle whose objective was to either be able to launch Seelöwe
or, more likely, make that so credible a threat that the British would ask
for terms, was... over.

Then, if you want a cite for interpretation, you can read S. Bungay, The
Most Dangerous Enemy, pp. 383-384 of the Aurum paperback. Nobody less than
Kesselring admits that the Luftwaffe had to shift to a longer-term strategy.
Kesselring also claims that this happened just when the Luftwaffe's
short-term strategy was winning - which Bungay, understandably, gives the
lie to.

Liddell Hart, in his classic treatment, devotes a chapter to the Battle and
his POV is that one should count the second half of september, too, as a
last-gasp attempt with the previous strategy, and that the shift is dated
September 27. But the use of fighter-bombers in daylight, level nombers at
night over London, and mainly night raids for mine-laying and against ports,
which took place in October and November, are called by him a clear change.
The objective is no longer the same. So Liddell Hart disagrees with me by a
matter of less than 15 days as to the timing, while agreeing with me as to
the objective shift.

Dr. Price, in his Britain's Air Defences 1939-45, agrees with the MOD and
the RAF (no surprise there) as to the timing of the end of the Battle of
Britain: it "petered out from the end of October".
This, however, tells us another thing - that he doesn't think that it
continued with the Blitz. The Blitz, in fact, continued until May 1941.
Additionally, while Price weants to count October as part of the true Battle
of Britain, he says: "in truth, these raids served merely to provide a token
Luftwaffe presence by day in the skies over Southern England".
They did not boast as their objective gaining air superiority; their
objective was nuisance and... a token. If you want to think that a token can
still be "decisive", suit yourself.

>> >> > The Luftwaffe attacks continued past that date. Thus, they "stayed
>> >> > in
>> >> > the field."
>
>> >> No, the night is a different battlefield.
>
>> > No, night is a time period. A battlefield is a place, and in this
>> > case it is southern Britain.
>
>> That betrays a lack of understanding of air operations during WWII.
>
> No, it shows the difference between a battlefield and a time period.
> Claiming that daytime and nighttimes are different battlefields is
> silly. Continuing to claim it is delusional.
>

I'm sorry that you don't understand. Just to give you a hint: why did Bomber
Command, that at the beginning of the war was confident that the bomber
would get through in daylight and caryr out accurate bombing of targets it
could see, shift to night bombing?

Maybe because they discovered, painfully, that the Germans had air
superiority over the battlefield - as long as the battlefield was the
day-lit skies of Germany?

But that there was another battlefield where the German fighters could not
assert their air superiority?

Other stuff snipped; it's useless, I'm afraid.

[Roman W]

On Friday, December 23, 2011 4:56:16 AM UTC, Phil McGregor wrote:

> On Thu, 22 Dec 2011 10:13:26 -0500, Roman W <bloody...@gazeta.pl>
> wrote:
> >How objective would they were? The exercises were, also, evaluating their own competence.
>

> Very.
>
> The Army exercises they were evaluating included such not very
> brilliant ideas as bolting together bridging pontoons to make troop
> carriers ... and, not being designed for use in anything but calm
> (river) water, guess what? They fell to pieces when anyone tried to
> tow them!
>
> Lots of "brilliant" army ideas were like that.

Are you describing the actual ideas tried by the German Army, or the imaginary ideas evaluated during Sandhurst exercises?

RW

[Michele]

"Roman W" <bloody...@gazeta.pl> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:5rj2SB.A....@sol01.ashbva.gweep.ca...

>
> Are you describing the actual ideas tried by the German Army, or the
> imaginary ideas evaluated during Sandhurst exercises?

The Sandhurst exercises did not feature "imaginary" ideas, unless you call
that the prerequisite that the Royal Navy, and sometimes the RAF, wake up
late, sometimes 48 hours late, on the day of Seelöwe.
Apart from that, the Sandhurst ideas were _simulations_, not imaginations.
Simulations of the real ideas.

[Rich]

On Dec 23, 7:42 pm, Phil McGregor <asp...@pacific.net.au> wrote:
> Oh.
>
> Actual ideas.

Yep, the "bolted together ponton" thingie was very similar to the
American-designed Rhino ferry, but was rather more extemporaneous.
However, it wasn't intended as a "troop carrier", rather it was a
means to get troops from vessels in deep water onto the shore without
the problem of beaching them.

> That the German Army actually *tried* (thinking that crossing the
> Channel was like crossing a big river ... pfui ;-)

That's been a bit overplayed in most histories - the Heer was never
much interested in the job, but tried to soldier on as best they could
with very inadequate means. They were never stupid enough to consider
the Channel as just a "big river"; but the limited capability they had
available meant they had to treat the operation as such...they just
didn't have the specialized landing craft then to do it any other way.

> Then there were the tank transporters ... Rhine River barges which the
> tanks were lowered into by crane at the German end ... and at the
> British end?

Er, sorry, but no, I'm afraid that was only an initial concept when
they were being pushed into a hasty operation in late July or early
August, but AFAIK it was never actually attempted. The delay and
recasting of the plans in July allowed much more sensible options to
be undertaken. The actual peniche and kempenaar converted were about
equivalent to LCM and LCT in concept, size, and design, albeit they
were considerably cruder in finish. There was also only enough of the
full conversions - with loading ramps and such - for the small number
of conventional tanks intended for the assault, but even then they
mostly had to make do with hand emplaced ramps. I will grant though
that the design for the Tauchpanzer carriers was more than a bit
bizarre - more or less a sea-going teeter-totter - but it worked well
in trials and wasn't that much odder than the DD ramp extensions used
on the LCT on D-Day.

Nor technically were they all Rhine-river barges - most of them were
vessels that ran the coastal and inland canal trade in northeastern
France and the Lowlands, so not German or Rhenish at all.

> Beach.
>
> Blow the bows off.

Um, no, see Schenk pp. 65-107 for details on the conversions
completed.

> Hopefully water not too deep, wade ashore ... if water too deep, seal
> tank beforehand so escape not possible *until* ashore ... then wade
> ashore. The tank crews, one suspects, were not going to be impressed.

I think you may be confusing the Tauchpanzer and the regular tanks?

> But blowing up the Barges! Really takes the cake!

It would have been if they ever really intended to do that in anything
except for the initial and hasty concept of operations studies.

> The Army really *was* that clewless!

No, not really, but they had been given a mission and were doing their
best to come up with an extemporized way of doing it, since they
***had no other options*** within the timeframe they were given. It
wouldn't have worked of course, but it was pretty much the best job
they could do given the circumstances. I suspect they were in fact
very clued in to what the result would be and all breathed a sigh of
relief when the op was "temporarily" postponed.

Cheers!

[The Horny Goat]

On Fri, 09 Dec 2011 10:24:01 -0500, "Bay Man"
<xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:

>"Space Captain Kurt Kosmic" <c...@wetafx.co.nz> wrote in message
>news:10c1d0d1-db74-4c44...@c16g2000pre.googlegroups.com...
>> Hey there,
>>
>> Something I've been wondering for a while now, is (given 20/20
>> hindsight) would it have been better for the UK if Germany had
>> attempted invasion?
>
>Churchill was hoping they would to give them "a bloody nose"

He was doing more than that - he had decided to use poison gas against
German beachheads if the Germans showed any sign of breaking out from
them.

>Winning a battle in the air or on the beaches is winning a battle. A dailed
>invasion attempt would have brought Germany down to size. They may have
>thought twice about invading the USSR. They were far too cocky and the USSR
>brought them down to size. The Brits could have done that on the beaches.
>
>Sealion was a ruse to get the UK to the peace table. Hitler was obsessed
>with the UK wanting them off his back. He continually requested the Japanese
>enter the war against the UK, but they refused, until Dec 41.

But 'getting the UK to the peace table' is a total non-starter given
an actual attempt at Sealion. There is absolutely no question that
Germany had the ability to deliver a large force to the UK. But simply
doing so by no means guarantees they arrive in condition to fight or
be re-supplied once there.

Prior to an invasion Britain has to defend pretty much the whole shore
of the UK from Lands End to Essex. After an invasion the British navy
has to prevent re-supply missions to the actual beachheads which is an
_infinitely_ easier proposition.

Even with no larger British fleet elements than minesweepers (!),
given the Luftwaffe anti-ship capability available in 1940 Germany is
going to have a tough road to hoe and even with no navy at all,
Britain is still able to blanket the invasion beaches with gas.

[bill]

On Sat, 24 Dec 2011 12:56:55 -0500, The Horny Goat wrote:

> He was doing more than that - he had decided to use poison gas against
> German beachheads if the Germans showed any sign of breaking out from
> them.

Cite please.

--
William Black

Free men have open minds
If you want loyalty, buy a dog...

[Bay Man]

"Michele" <SPAMmiarmelNOT!@tln.it> wrote in message

news:4ef44858$0$1386$4faf...@reader1.news.tin.it...

> This, however, tells us another thing - that he doesn't think that it
> continued with the Blitz. The Blitz, in fact, continued until May 1941.

The Blitz bombed convoy port cities like Liverpool, which had no direct
connection with the Battle of Britain. Emphasis had changed from air
superiority over southern England to destroying industry and transport
connections.

[Bay Man]

"The Horny Goat" <lcr...@home.ca> wrote in message
news:ks2bf7tegmpfab540...@4ax.com...

> But 'getting the UK to the peace table' is a total non-starter given
> an actual attempt at Sealion. There is absolutely no question that
> Germany had the ability to deliver a large force to the UK.

Germany DID NOT have the ability to deliver a large force on English shores.
Any that arrived would be stragglers lucky enough to get there. Then most
probably destroyed soon after.

> Prior to an invasion Britain has to defend pretty much the whole shore
> of the UK from Lands End to Essex. After an invasion the British navy
> has to prevent re-supply missions to the actual beachheads which is an
> _infinitely_ easier proposition.

There are few decent landing beaches on the coast from Southampton to
Gillingham in Kent. The obvious beaches were well covered. The British knew
what sort of craft the Germans were to use and what ports they were in.
Those craft could only do the shortest route.

> Even with no larger British fleet elements than minesweepers (!),
> given the Luftwaffe anti-ship capability available in 1940 Germany is
> going to have a tough road to hoe and even with no navy at all,
> Britain is still able to blanket the invasion beaches with gas.

Some beaches were oiled up off-shore. The oil would be set alight.

[The Horny Goat]

On Tue, 27 Dec 2011 09:22:17 -0500, "Bay Man"
<xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:

>"The Horny Goat" <lcr...@home.ca> wrote in message
>news:ks2bf7tegmpfab540...@4ax.com...
>
>> But 'getting the UK to the peace table' is a total non-starter given
>> an actual attempt at Sealion. There is absolutely no question that
>> Germany had the ability to deliver a large force to the UK.
>
>Germany DID NOT have the ability to deliver a large force on English shores.
>Any that arrived would be stragglers lucky enough to get there. Then most
>probably destroyed soon after.

The whole point of my comment was that the 'large force' would not
arrive as a coherent fighting force. (Landing in as good order - which
was not in fact very good - as the Sicily landing three years later
would have been a major achievement) In September 1940 Britain did not
have a huge army in southern England that could just roll up such a
'force' (and I use the term loosely) with ease but lack of re-supply
would quickly make the point moot.

It was said that the Romans only needed control of the Channel for one
day, Napoleon would have required one week and Hitler would have
required a whole month - that's an over-simplification but fairly
states the increasingly complex nature of re-supply in the modern era.

I may have exaggerated but not by nearly as much as you think.

(Anyone who has read what I've written on soc.history.what-if for more
than 10 years knows my view that if Britain was to have made peace on
German terms during 1938-41 it would have happened either due to a
political crisis or a far more effective U-boat campaign than they in
fact achieved - that a 6 June 1944 type German invasion of southern
England was simply NOT in the cards. I am not at all convinced that a
peace by one of the other two routes was impossible)

I have no doubt that if a German beachhead HAD been achieved Churchill
would have not hesitated to use poison gas against it. He undoubtedly
would have faced a non-confidence motion in the Commons for using
poison gas on British soil but given it would have meant the collapse
of German resistance (if it had not then anything the Commons might
have said would be moot but I don't take that as a serious
possibility) the non-confidence motion would have been won by
Churchill.

[Bay Man]

"The Horny Goat" <lcr...@home.ca> wrote in message

news:l26lf7pkpo37s4b4a...@4ax.com...

> On Tue, 27 Dec 2011 09:22:17 -0500, "Bay Man"
> <xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
>
>>"The Horny Goat" <lcr...@home.ca> wrote in message
>>news:ks2bf7tegmpfab540...@4ax.com...
>>
>>> But 'getting the UK to the peace table' is a total non-starter given
>>> an actual attempt at Sealion. There is absolutely no question that
>>> Germany had the ability to deliver a large force to the UK.
>>
>>Germany DID NOT have the ability to deliver a large force on English
>>shores.
>>Any that arrived would be stragglers lucky enough to get there. Then most
>>probably destroyed soon after.
>
> The whole point of my comment was that the 'large force' would not
> arrive as a coherent fighting force. (Landing in as good order - which
> was not in fact very good - as the Sicily landing three years later
> would have been a major achievement) In September 1940 Britain did not
> have a huge army in southern England that could just roll up such a
> 'force' (and I use the term loosely) with ease but lack of re-supply
> would quickly make the point moot.

Myth again. Only 1/3 of the British Army was in France in the BEF. The
French complained of the luke-warm British response. Most got back and with
quite a bit of equipment as well. Most were not in the Dunkirk pocket where
losses were high. UK industry, similar size in the UK to Germany, was
working 24/7 and replaced all lost materials beside US and Canadian
equipment coming in.. The new equipment was also the latest designs, not the
mainly older stuff used in France. Only the part time Home Guard trained
with pikes because the WW1 US rifles to equip them were in transit. The
newsreels are taken as the norm in the army. The regulars were well
equipped.

The British Army in the UK was large. Large enough to throw the Germans
back for sure.

The British was so depleted that in late 1940 it was poised to take all the
southern Med coast.

> (Anyone who has read what I've written on soc.history.what-if for more
> than 10 years knows my view that if Britain was to have made peace on
> German terms during 1938-41 it would have happened either due to a
> political crisis or a far more effective U-boat campaign than they in
> fact achieved - that a 6 June 1944 type German invasion of southern
> England was simply NOT in the cards. I am not at all convinced that a
> peace by one of the other two routes was impossible)

The UK was preparing for a massive air war, supplied by US and UK planes. I
do belive poison gas would have been used - with caution.

[Stephen Graham]

On 12/28/2011 6:17 AM, Bay Man wrote:

> Myth again. Only 1/3 of the British Army was in France in the BEF.

We discussed this in April 2009, which you apparently didn't pay any
attention to. What deployed to France was what was capable of overseas
deployment, together with a moderate proportion not ready for combat but
potentially useful for line of communications duties.

What remained in the UK wasn't prepared for much of anything.

> Most were not in the Dunkirk
> pocket where losses were high.

Most of the combat troops were in the Dunkirk pocket.

> The regulars were well equipped.

Not in the summer and fall of 1940.

> The British Army in the UK was large. Large enough to throw the Germans
> back for sure.

The defence of the UK in 1940 depended heavily on the inability of the
Germans to get substantial forces across the Channel.

> The British was so depleted that in late 1940 it was poised to take all
> the southern Med coast.

We haven't actually dealt with this in detail yet, but it would be
amusing to see you try to justify this claim.

[The Horny Goat]

On Wed, 28 Dec 2011 09:17:22 -0500, "Bay Man"
<xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:

>Myth again. Only 1/3 of the British Army was in France in the BEF. The
>French complained of the luke-warm British response. Most got back and with
>quite a bit of equipment as well. Most were not in the Dunkirk pocket where
>losses were high. UK industry, similar size in the UK to Germany, was
>working 24/7 and replaced all lost materials beside US and Canadian
>equipment coming in.. The new equipment was also the latest designs, not the
>mainly older stuff used in France. Only the part time Home Guard trained
>with pikes because the WW1 US rifles to equip them were in transit. The
>newsreels are taken as the norm in the army. The regulars were well
>equipped.

Yes they did. You've mentioned the Canadians - as a somewhat
chauvinistic member of same let me point out it wasn't just equipment.
1st Canadian division was arriving in England at that time and was the
largest fully equipped unit in the UK in the immediate aftermath of
Dunkirk. I am well aware the French were less than thrilled with the
level of support they got from the BEF.

>The British Army in the UK was large. Large enough to throw the Germans
>back for sure.

Uh - not so sure about that. Certainly had the Royal Navy not been
there things would have been a bit chancy. Of course the whole defence
of the UK was built around the Royal Navy so it's a moot point!

>> (Anyone who has read what I've written on soc.history.what-if for more
>> than 10 years knows my view that if Britain was to have made peace on
>> German terms during 1938-41 it would have happened either due to a
>> political crisis or a far more effective U-boat campaign than they in
>> fact achieved - that a 6 June 1944 type German invasion of southern
>> England was simply NOT in the cards. I am not at all convinced that a
>> peace by one of the other two routes was impossible)
>
>The UK was preparing for a massive air war, supplied by US and UK planes. I
>do belive poison gas would have been used - with caution.

Churchill said in his 6 volume history that he definitely would have
ordered poison gas against German lodgments on British soil. He also
said that was the ONLY situation where he would countenance first use
of gas by British troops. Nothing I have read elsewhere suggests to me
a contrary policy was ever seriously considered by the British
government.

[Bay Man]

"The Horny Goat" <lcr...@home.ca> wrote in message

news:4r0nf7p9kv5gricpm...@4ax.com...

> On Wed, 28 Dec 2011 09:17:22 -0500, "Bay Man"
> <xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
>
>>Myth again. Only 1/3 of the British Army was in France in the BEF. The
>>French complained of the luke-warm British response. Most got back and
>>with
>>quite a bit of equipment as well. Most were not in the Dunkirk pocket
>>where
>>losses were high. UK industry, similar size in the UK to Germany, was
>>working 24/7 and replaced all lost materials beside US and Canadian
>>equipment coming in.. The new equipment was also the latest designs, not
>>the
>>mainly older stuff used in France. Only the part time Home Guard trained
>>with pikes because the WW1 US rifles to equip them were in transit. The

>>newsreels are taken as the norm re: the army. The regulars were well

>>equipped.
>
> Yes they did. You've mentioned the Canadians - as a somewhat
> chauvinistic member of same let me point out it wasn't just equipment.
> 1st Canadian division was arriving in England at that time and was the
> largest fully equipped unit in the UK in the immediate aftermath of
> Dunkirk. I am well aware the French were less than thrilled with the
> level of support they got from the BEF.

The Canadians left with all of their equipment to fight another day. The
Brits were evacuating equipment way before the Dunkirk evacuation, to the
distain of the French. Brits forces were engaging the Germans to distract
them from Dunkirk.

1/3 of all British casualties were on the anchored liner Lancastria

>>The British Army in the UK was large. Large enough to throw the Germans
>>back for sure.
>
> Uh - not so sure about that.

The Germans could not get enough over to face such a large force. Most of
the 350,000 French had left back to Vichy France.

> Certainly had the Royal Navy not been
> there things would have been a bit chancy.

The Germans would have been annihilated. Their gamble of the Blitzkreig, a
one-shot tactic, was was up.

> Of course the whole defence
> of the UK was built around the
> Royal Navy so it's a moot point!

The point is if the Germans could defeat the British army in an invasion. No
they could not, even with the RN neutralised.

>>The UK was preparing for a massive air war, supplied by US and UK planes.
>>I

>>do believe poison gas would have been used - with caution.

>
> Churchill said in his 6 volume history that he definitely would have
> ordered poison gas against German lodgments on British soil. He also
> said that was the ONLY situation where he would countenance first use
> of gas by British troops. Nothing I have read elsewhere suggests to me
> a contrary policy was ever seriously considered by the British
> government.

The Brits would use anything at hand. TNP was the unofficial order.

[Bay Man]

"Stephen Graham" <gra...@speakeasy.net> wrote in message
news:9m1507...@mid.individual.net...

> On 12/28/2011 6:17 AM, Bay Man wrote:
>
>> Myth again. Only 1/3 of the British Army was in France in the BEF.
>
> We discussed this in April 2009, which you apparently didn't pay any
> attention to. What deployed to France was what was capable of overseas
> deployment, together with a moderate proportion not ready for combat but
> potentially useful for line of communications duties.

That was not so.

> What remained in the UK wasn't prepared for much of anything.

Well it wasn't expecting an invasion for sure.

>> Most were not in the Dunkirk
>> pocket where losses were high.
>
> Most of the combat troops were in the Dunkirk pocket.

They were not. Many got south and many were already south and many came
ashore after the pocket was formed inc a large contingent of Canadians who
left with all their equipment.

>> The regulars were well equipped.
>
> Not in the summer and fall of 1940.

The regulars were well equipped. With heavy tanks and armour. BTW, the
Germans could not destroy the Matilda 2, - well in desperation they levelled
out a flak gun, the 88mm and it worked. Few 88s would be taken ashore off
Kent beaches.

During this period of shaking in their shoes, the Brits sent 55 tanks to the
desert.

>> The British Army in the UK was large. Large enough to throw the Germans
>> back for sure.
>
> The defence of the UK in 1940 depended heavily on the inability of the
> Germans to get substantial forces across the Channel.

The Sandhurst war games with the Germans in the 1970s put the RAF out of the
action and the RN only coming in after 48 hours. Even then the German were
repulsed. The only troops to make it inland in any strength were airborne.

>> The British was so depleted that in late 1940 it was poised to take all
>> the southern Med coast.
>
> We haven't actually dealt with this in detail yet, but it would be amusing
> to see you try to justify this claim.

Look at a simple history book and the timelines. So this army that myth puts
as being destroyed at Dunkirk, which was an "evacuation" not destruction,
six months after was about to take all of the southern Med coast and its air
arm, the RAF had beaten the Germans in an air battle. With the RN blockade
also successfully starving Germany and the occupied countries of food,
animal and human and all resources.

Do not go on myth.

[Bay Man]

"The Horny Goat" <lcr...@home.ca> wrote in message

news:4r0nf7p9kv5gricpm...@4ax.com...

> On Wed, 28 Dec 2011 09:17:22 -0500, "Bay Man"
> <xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
>
>>Myth again. Only 1/3 of the British Army was in France in the BEF. The
>>French complained of the luke-warm British response. Most got back and
>>with
>>quite a bit of equipment as well. Most were not in the Dunkirk pocket
>>where
>>losses were high. UK industry, similar size in the UK to Germany, was
>>working 24/7 and replaced all lost materials beside US and Canadian
>>equipment coming in.. The new equipment was also the latest designs, not
>>the
>>mainly older stuff used in France. Only the part time Home Guard trained
>>with pikes because the WW1 US rifles to equip them were in transit. The

>>newsreels are taken as the norm re: the army. The regulars were well

>>equipped.
>
> Yes they did. You've mentioned the Canadians - as a somewhat
> chauvinistic member of same let me point out it wasn't just equipment.
> 1st Canadian division was arriving in England at that time and was the
> largest fully equipped unit in the UK in the immediate aftermath of
> Dunkirk. I am well aware the French were less than thrilled with the
> level of support they got from the BEF.

The Canadians left with all of their equipment to fight another day. The
Brits were evacuating equipment way before the Dunkirk evacuation, to the
distain of the French.

>>The British Army in the UK was large. Large enough to throw the Germans
>>back for sure.
>
> Uh - not so sure about that.

The Germans could not get enough over to face such a large force. Most of
the 350,000 French had left back to Vichy France.

> Certainly had the Royal Navy not been
> there things would have been a bit chancy.

The Germans would have been annihilated. Their gamble of the Blitzkreig, a
one-shot tactic, was was up.

> Of course the whole defence
> of the UK was built around the
> Royal Navy so it's a moot point!

The point is if the Germans could defeat the British army in an invasion. No
they could not, even with the RN neutralised.

>>The UK was preparing for a massive air war, supplied by US and UK planes.

>>I do believe poison gas would have been used - with caution.

>
> Churchill said in his 6 volume history that he definitely would have
> ordered poison gas against German lodgments on British soil. He also
> said that was the ONLY situation where he would countenance first use
> of gas by British troops. Nothing I have read elsewhere suggests to me
> a contrary policy was ever seriously considered by the British
> government.

[Malcom "Mal" Reynolds]

In article <jdg2ea$22l$1...@dont-email.me>,

"Bay Man" <xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:

> >> The British was so depleted that in late 1940 it was poised to take all
> >> the southern Med coast.
> >
> > We haven't actually dealt with this in detail yet, but it would be amusing
> > to see you try to justify this claim.
>
> Look at a simple history book and the timelines. So this army that myth puts
> as being destroyed at Dunkirk, which was an "evacuation" not destruction,
> six months after was about to take all of the southern Med coast and its air
> arm, the RAF had beaten the Germans in an air battle. With the RN blockade
> also successfully starving Germany and the occupied countries of food,
> animal and human and all resources.
>
> Do not go on myth.

oh bay man you were almost doing well but you conflate opinion with facts and
don't provide facts...shame on you

[Rich]

On Dec 28, 5:02 pm, "Bay Man"

<xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
> The Canadians left with all of their equipment to fight another day. The
> Brits were evacuating equipment way before the Dunkirk evacuation, to the
> distain of the French. Brits forces were engaging the Germans to distract
> them from Dunkirk.

The Canadians "left" Canada with little more than uniforms and small
arms, everything else was supplied to them in England. As far as the
equipment losses of the BEF goes:

Shipped to France (September 1939-May 1940)//Consumed and expended in
action or destroyed or left behind//Brought back to England

Guns 2,794//2,472//322
Vehicles 68,618//63,879//4,739
Motor Cycles 21,081//20,548//533
Ammunitions (tons) 109,000//76,697//32,303
Supplies and Stores (tons) 449,000//415,940//33,060
Petrol (tons) 166,000//164,929//1,071

Only thirteen light tanks and nine cruiser tanks were brought back to
England. (Ellis, The War in France, p. 326)

The BEF lost 216 18-pdr and 704 18/25-pdr in France and the Low
Countries leaving, as of 1 July 1940, 126 18-pdr, 269 18/25-pdr, and
90 25-pdr field pieces in England, so a total of 485. The BEF also
lost 427 obsolete and obsolescent field, medium, and heavy pieces,
leaving 536 in England. In 1940 and average of 113 field and 3 medium
and heavy pieces per month were produced. To equip roughly 26 infantry
and two armoured divisions at then current organization 1,968 field
pieces alone were required. The 29-odd Medium Regiments then extant
required another 464 pieces alone. The 13 Heavy Regiments another 208.

The 35 tank and armoured regiments required about 2,000 infantry,
cruiser, and medium tanks. There were roughly 43 Infantry Mark I, 92
Infantry Mark II, 106 Cruisers of all types, and 640 Light tanks of
all types, so a total of about 881.

As far as manpower goes, British Personnel evacuated from Dunkirk were
224,320; evacuated From "south of the Somme" were 144,171. That
comprised about half the organized manpower available (roughly 15 of
28 divisions) and all of the fully trained, equipped, and organized
units in Britain, the 1st-5th, 42nd, 44th, 48th, 50th, 51st, and 52nd
Divisions and 1st Armoured Division.

> 1/3 of all British casualties were on the anchored liner Lancastria

You do realize that repeating horseshit twice doesn't miraculously
change it into pearls of wisdom; it remains horseshit. Commonwealth
casualties totaled 68,710. Unless they managed to get 22,903.33333333
men on Lancastria and "lost" them all, it is more like 10% of all
British casualties were lost on her...maybe.

> The Germans could not get enough over to face such a large force. Most of
> the 350,000 French had left back to Vichy France.

Sorry, but no, there were 160,088 French evacuated; 141,842 at Dunkirk
and the rest "south of the Somme". Otherwise, 29,543 other Allies were
evacuated.

> The Germans would have been annihilated. Their gamble of the Blitzkreig, a
> one-shot tactic, was was up.

Probably, if they made the attempt at the end of September as they
planned, but if by some miracle they had been prepared to execute that
assault as of 1 July the issue could have been different.

> The point is if the Germans could defeat the British army in an invasion. No
> they could not, even with the RN neutralised.

If the RN is neutralized, then the Germans assault the three nominal
"divisions" of Eastern Command with nine, plus a rump airborne
"division". Whether or not it is 1 July or 1 October then makes little
difference.

Cheers!

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

Bay Man <xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
> "The Horny Goat" <lcr...@home.ca> wrote in message
> news:l26lf7pkpo37s4b4a...@4ax.com...
> > On Tue, 27 Dec 2011 09:22:17 -0500, "Bay Man"

> Myth again. Only 1/3 of the British Army was in France in the BEF. The

Well that was kinda stupid of them, don't you think? What made them
believe they could hold off the Germans with one hand (or 2/3 of their
troops) tied behind their backs?

Mike

[Bay Man]

"Rich" <Rich...@msn.com> wrote in message
news:fd556d46-7f6e-40c4...@j9g2000vby.googlegroups.com...

> On Dec 28, 5:02 pm, "Bay Man"
> <xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:

>> The Canadians left with all of their equipment to fight another day. The
>> Brits were evacuating equipment way before the Dunkirk evacuation, to the
>> distain of the French. Brits forces were engaging the Germans to distract
>> them from Dunkirk.
>
> The Canadians "left" Canada with little more than uniforms and small
> arms, everything else was supplied to them in England. As far as the
> equipment losses of the BEF goes:

> Shipped to France (September 1939-May 1940)//Consumed and expended in
> action or destroyed or left behind//Brought back to England

<snip>

All very nice. The fact remains that equipment was being evacuated in early
June. The time that Germany thought it was ready for an "invasion" was
October. That is approx 4.5 months. 4.5 months of 24/7 UK industrial
production, which was the equiv of Germany, which made up any losses and
even more. Then US and Canadian equipment that came in. Replaced equipment
was newer designs

Do not go on WW2 USA newsreels or subsequent history channel TV prog that
scrape the barrel for an angle to made the prog viewable.

[Bay Man]

"Malcom "Mal" Reynolds" <atlas-...@invalid.invalid> wrote in message
news:atlas-bugged-A501...@news.solani.org...

> In article <jdg2ea$22l$1...@dont-email.me>,
> "Bay Man" <xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
>

>> >> The British were so depleted that in late

>> >> 1940 it was poised to take all
>> >> the southern Med coast.
>> >
>> > We haven't actually dealt with this in detail
>> > yet, but it would be amusing
>> > to see you try to justify this claim.
>>
>> Look at a simple history book and the timelines. So this army that myth
>> puts
>> as being destroyed at Dunkirk, which was an "evacuation" not destruction,
>> six months after was about to take all of the southern Med coast and its
>> air
>> arm, the RAF had beaten the Germans in an air battle. With the RN
>> blockade
>> also successfully starving Germany and the occupied countries of food,
>> animal and human and all resources.
>>
>> Do not go on myth.
>
> oh bay man

I gave NO opinion. "Look at a simple history book and the timelines".

FACT: Dunkirk was highly successful evacuation not a destruction. They
thought they could pull 35,000 off the beach and took off, British & French,
approaching 1/2 million.

FACT: UK Industry was working 24/7 and all lost equipment was replaced by
October 1940.
FACT: USA & Canadian equipment was coming in.
FACT: The RAF defeated the Luftwaffe.
FACT: The RN blockade was highly successful depriving Germany of food and
vital resources like rubber. Germany had to give food to occupied countries.
FACT: Late 1940/early 41, the UK was about to take all the southern Med
coast routing the Italians.

[Rich]

On Dec 29, 9:18 am, "Bay Man"

<xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:

> All very nice. The fact remains that equipment was being evacuated in early
> June. The time that Germany thought it was ready for an "invasion" was
> October. That is approx 4.5 months. 4.5 months of 24/7 UK industrial
> production, which was the equiv of Germany, which made up any losses and
> even more. Then US and Canadian equipment that came in. Replaced equipment
> was newer designs

Sorry, but none of that is true either.

The only significant amounts of equipment evacuated were by Brooks
"2nd BEF", which accounts for most of it. However, even there note
that the two brigades of 1st Armoured Division deployed lost nearly
all their tanks and equipment.

The German planning first envisaged a mid-August invasion, delayed to
mid-September and then late September. Which is irrelevant anyway
given my remark regarding miraculous possibilities, which is the only
way it could have succeeded.

Nor did domestic UK industrial production make up the shortfalls I
remarked upon in the time period specified. Against a shortfall of
1,500 field guns a total of 210 were produced July-September.
Against a shortfall of 240 medium and heavy guns c. 10 were produced.
Against a shortfall of 1,100 tanks 392 were produced.
Against a shortfall of 1,200 2-pdr AT guns 124 were produced.
Against a shortfall of 63,879 B Vehicles 26,847 were produced.

For the Antiaircraft Command alone (i.e., not including Field Forces):
Against a shortfall of 1,200 heavy AA guns 467 were produced.
Against a shortfall of 900 light AA guns 368 were produced.

U.S. equipment did begin arriving in July and August, which made up a
considerable part of the shortfall in field guns alone, but not all of
it. However, given that many of the U.S. 75mm pieces supplied also
perforce had to do double-duty as AT weapons, the combined shortfall
was still significant. They were also unable to supply any tanks.

Canadian military production at this time was essentially non-
existent.

None of the American equipment was "newer design" and the decision was
deliberately made to continue the "old design" 2-pdr rather than the
new 6-pdr domestically.

> Do not go on WW2 USA newsreels or subsequent history channel TV prog that
> scrape the barrel for an angle to made the prog viewable.

Curious, I was unaware that Postan, Ellis, and the Statistical Digest
were "USA newsreels or subsequent history channel TV prog[rams]
[sic]"? Given that I count at least six false or misleading statements
in your paragraph I have to wonder if you must have gotten your
information from a comic book, cereal box, or, most likely, pulled it
out of your ass?

Cheers!

[Rich]

On Dec 29, 9:19 am, "Bay Man"

<xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
> I gave NO opinion. "Look at a simple history book and the timelines".
>
> FACT: Dunkirk was highly successful evacuation not a destruction. They
> thought they could pull 35,000 off the beach and took off, British & French,
> approaching 1/2 million.

Sorry, but THAT is opinion...and silly opinion at that. 366,162
"approaches" 1/2 million by 75%. By that criteria you might as well
have said it "approached" one million.

> FACT: UK Industry was working 24/7 and all lost equipment was replaced by
> October 1940.

No, more opinion. I suggest you consult something other than British

newsreels or subsequent history channel TV prog that scrape the barrel

for an angle to made the prog viewable for your information.

> FACT: USA & Canadian equipment was coming in.

No, more opinion. WRT Canada, as of the Canadian Declaration of War
only one Dominion Arsenal was operational, producing limited
quantities of small arms and ammunition. Aside from that, in 1937 the
John Inglis Company of
Toronto obtained a British order for 5,000 Bren guns concurrently with
a Canadian order for 7,000. Otherwise, talks were ongoing in 1938 with
the British Air Ministry to produce limited numbers of service
aircraft in addition to the small RCAF orders placed in 1936...but no
orders were placed for engines.

The result was that when the 1st Canadian Division deployed in
December 1939 it went with Enfield rifles and Lewis guns from World
War I stocks, a few elderly Stokes mortars, and no artillery (there
were enough 18-pdr in Canada for limited training, but little else).
By 1 June 1940 the Division had received 48 of 72 18-pdrs for its
divisional regiments, 24 of 48 for the two Army Field Regiments, and
16 of 16 4.5" howitzers for its medium regiment. A grand total of 344
Canadian-built B Echelon vehicles were available along with 700 drawn
from British stocks...except that two weeks later the Brigade Group
deployed to France had lost all its vehicles (albeit the field and
medium regiment managed to get away their guns) leaving one-third the
division immobile until early August. However, even as late as then,
the division (and all of VII Corps to which it was assigned) had zero
light AA weapons - no 20mm Oerlikon or 40mm Bofors.

As far as the 2nd Canadian Division went it was possibly worse. It
began arriving circa 1 August 1940, but by 5 November its entire
artillery compliment consisted of 28 US-supplied 75mm guns. It wasn't
until 13 September 1941 - thirteen and a half months later - that the
divisional artillery establishment was completed.

Even the 3rd Division, as of the end of September 1941 after it
completed deployment, had only 48 25-pdr initially assigned.

> FACT: The RAF defeated the Luftwaffe.

No, more opinion. It could as easily be opined that the RAF stalemated
the Luftwaffe. Which would have the advantage of being closer to the
truth.

> FACT: The RN blockade was highly successful depriving Germany of food and
> vital resources like rubber. Germany had to give food to occupied countries.

No, more opinion. The Germans had learned a salient lesson in the
Great War and devoted considerable attention to ensuring that basic
foodstuffs were sufficient. Except for certain luxury goods the
Germans never suffered from food shortages since they simply stripped
occupied countries - especially Poland - for what they needed and made
up whatever shortfalls that still ensued by starving PWs,
concentration camp inmates, impressed foreign workers, and so forth.

> FACT: Late 1940/early 41, the UK was about to take all the southern Med
> coast routing the Italians.

No, more opinion. As of early February Western Desert Force had shot
its bolt well shy of accomplishing such a conquest. Then there was
that pesky intervention by Sperrverband Rommel.

Cheers!

[Bay Man]

"Phil McGregor" <asp...@pacific.net.au> wrote in message
news:786pf7hj3e9h9jk4d...@4ax.com...

> On Thu, 29 Dec 2011 09:19:26 -0500, "Bay Man"
> <xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
>
>>FACT: The RN blockade was highly successful depriving Germany of food and
>>vital resources like rubber. Germany had to give food to occupied
>>countries.
>

> Uh.
>
> No.

Yes. Read Tooze on this. Examples are: Denmark was killing all its livestock
as they had no animal feed from the USA.Germany had to give it feed and also
provided coal to France.

[Stephen Graham]

On 12/28/2011 2:04 PM, Bay Man wrote:
> "Stephen Graham" <gra...@speakeasy.net> wrote in message
> news:9m1507...@mid.individual.net...

>> We discussed this in April 2009, which you apparently didn't pay any
>> attention to. What deployed to France was what was capable of overseas
>> deployment, together with a moderate proportion not ready for combat
>> but potentially useful for line of communications duties.
>
> That was not so.

Very much so. Deployable assets in the UK on May 10th amounted to:

20th Infantry Brigade
147th Infantry Brigade (shipped out to Iceland on May 14th)
1st Armoured Division (sort of)
a hodgepodge of Royal Marine units

Everything else was either newly raised 2d line Territorial units or 1st
line Territorials in divisions that opted for the geographic split
rather than cloning.

If you look at what actually deployed to France during the Battle of
France, it consisted of the 1st Armoured Division, the 52d Infantry
Division less artillery but with the 49th Infantry Division's artillery,
the 20th Infantry Brigade, and 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade.

>> Most of the combat troops were in the Dunkirk pocket.
>
> They were not. Many got south and many were already south and many came
> ashore after the pocket was formed inc a large contingent of Canadians
> who left with all their equipment.

Combat units not in the Dunkirk pocket were elements of the 12th
Infantry Division (from rear area duties), elements of the 23d Motor
Division (from rear area duties), the 51st Infantry Division (though
most elements were captured), parts of the 1st Armoured Division (30th
Infantry Brigade captured at Calais), and the "2d BEF" comprised of the
52d Infantry Division and 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade. Every other
combat unit was in the Dunkirk pocket.

>>> The regulars were well equipped.
>>
>> Not in the summer and fall of 1940.
>
> The regulars were well equipped. With heavy tanks and armour.

Rich Anderson has addressed the equipment shortfalls persisting into
early 1941.

There are reasons why very little shipped out of the UK in late 1940 and
early 1941.

> During this period of shaking in their shoes, the Brits sent 55 tanks to
> the desert.

Well, there was this minor problem of the Italian invasion of Egypt. It
may have been a comedy of errors but the British really didn't have much
of anything in Egypt to start with.

>> The defence of the UK in 1940 depended heavily on the inability of the
>> Germans to get substantial forces across the Channel.
>
> The Sandhurst war games with the Germans in the 1970s put the RAF out of
> the action and the RN only coming in after 48 hours. Even then the
> German were repulsed. The only troops to make it inland in any strength
> were airborne.

And a large part of the reason for that result is the cutting off of
German resupply after 48 hours due to the RN.

We should carefully distinguish between whether the Germans could
successfully invade the UK and whether the British Army in the UK was in
good shape following the Battle of France.

>> We haven't actually dealt with this in detail yet, but it would be
>> amusing to see you try to justify this claim.
>
> Look at a simple history book and the timelines. So this army that myth
> puts as being destroyed at Dunkirk, which was an "evacuation" not
> destruction, six months after was about to take all of the southern Med
> coast

Of course none of the troops involved in the Battle of France were
involved in Operation Compass. And Compass, while astoundingly
successful, really wasn't going to "take all the southern Med coast".
For one thing, there really weren't enough forces present to hold
Cyrenaica, let alone take Tripolitania. Then there's French North
Africa, which the British were in no position to do anything about in 1940.

[Malcom "Mal" Reynolds]

In article <jdhf9r$b0c$1...@dont-email.me>,

"Bay Man" <xyxbay...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:

> FACT: Late 1940/early 41, the UK was about to take all the southern Med
> coast routing the Italians.

oh bay man, once again you mistake your opinion for fact. how about providing
some facts/cites that we can destroy

[Rich]

On Dec 29, 2:07 pm, Stephen Graham <grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:
> Of course none of the troops involved in the Battle of France were
> involved in Operation Compass.

Actually Stephen that is not quite correct either. :) 7th RTR was
engaged at Arras and abandoned its last two Mathildas at Dunkirk
before evacuating to England. Reconstituted in July it was the
regiment equipped with 55 Infantry Tank Mark II Mathildas that was
dispatched from Liverpool on 21 August and arrived in Port Said on 24
September...just in time to prepare for the opening of COMPASS. :)

Cheers!

[Stephen Graham]

You know, I had this niggling memory, but I knew that 4 RTR didn't
arrive until February (less the squadron in Ethiopia) and conflated the
two.

[Mario]

Bay Man, 19:52, giovedì 29 dicembre 2011:

For free?

BTW, coal is not food, according to wikipedia.
:-)



--
H

[Rich]

On Dec 29, 2:38 pm, Stephen Graham <grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:
> You know, I had this niggling memory, but I knew that 4 RTR didn't
> arrive until February (less the squadron in Ethiopia) and conflated the
> two.

I also have a niggling memory that a couple of other former BEF units
went to Africa later too. :) However, I think the only other one that
participated in COMPASS was one of the Field Regiments, but for the
life of me I can't track it down...oh, there it is, 1st RHA. :)

Cheers!

[Stephen Graham]

On 12/29/2011 2:56 PM, Rich wrote:
> On Dec 29, 2:38 pm, Stephen Graham<grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:
>> You know, I had this niggling memory, but I knew that 4 RTR didn't
>> arrive until February (less the squadron in Ethiopia) and conflated the
>> two.
>
> I also have a niggling memory that a couple of other former BEF units
> went to Africa later too. :)

That's because 5th Infantry Division went _everywhere_. And really, 50th
Infantry Division wasn't that far behind.

> However, I think the only other one that
> participated in COMPASS was one of the Field Regiments, but for the
> life of me I can't track it down...oh, there it is, 1st RHA. :)

Not surprising.

[Bay Man]

"Rich" <Rich...@msn.com> wrote in message

news:9a1b1b4e-39e3-470b...@g19g2000pri.googlegroups.com...

> On Dec 29, 9:18 am, "Bay Man"
> <xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
>
>> All very nice. The fact remains that equipment was being evacuated in
>> early
>> June. The time that Germany thought it was ready for an "invasion" was
>> October. That is approx 4.5 months. 4.5 months of 24/7 UK industrial
>> production, which was the equiv of Germany, which made up any losses and
>> even more. Then US and Canadian equipment that came in. Replaced
>> equipment
>> was newer designs
>
> Sorry, but none of that is true either.

That is 100% true!

Back to early 1941. I forgot the RN destroying a part of the French fleet.
Now dismissing the ifs and buts in feeble attempts to justify decades of
indoctrination.

The situation at early 41, a matter of months after a proposed "invasion",
of a country which myth states had no defence was:

1. The Germans were pegged back - their air force defeated in battle.
2. The French fleet near neutralised by the RN at Oran.
3. Equipment shortfalls made up.
4. Much new equipment was of the latest designs.
5. The Italians were routed in North Africa.
6. The highly successful RN blockade was still making an economic impact on
Germany.
7. Germany was being attacked by a bomber force - May 1940 the first raids
on the Rhur at Germany industry. RAF started area bombing attacks on whole
cities.
8. A major part of the Italian feet was sunk at Taranto by the RN.

[ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk]

In article
<9a1b1b4e-39e3-470b...@g19g2000pri.googlegroups.com>,

Rich...@msn.com (Rich) wrote:

> However, given that many of the U.S. 75mm pieces supplied also
> perforce had to do double-duty as AT weapons,

How many of those were issued for anything but Beach Emergency
batteries? Allied Artillery of WW2 indicates that all the 75s ended up
in coast defence roles.

By the way I don't think your figures include RN and Coastal Defence
assets, not all of that equipment was only suited for use afloat or in
fixed positions.

Ken Young

[David H Thornley]

Bay Man wrote:
> Myth again. Only 1/3 of the British Army was in France in the BEF.

Which was pretty much the combat-ready part.

The
> French complained of the luke-warm British response.

Right. British mobilization for WWII was taking a long time, and the
French saw no reason the British couldn't have more well-trained and
well-equipped divisions in May 1940, quite a few months since the
declaration of war.

> pocket where losses were high. UK industry, similar size in the UK to
> Germany, was working 24/7 and replaced all lost materials beside US and
> Canadian equipment coming in.

As Churchill said, you can't just start up an arms industry. IIRC, he
said that the first year you get nothing, the second year a trickle,
the third year a torrent, and the fourth all you can use.

British arms production had not yet hit the torrent stage.

> The British Army in the UK was large.

True. It was also woefully short of heavier weapons, mostly green,
and disorganized. I'd suspect morale was a bit shaky as well. It
was a potentially useful force in the summer of 1940, but had serious
limitations.

Large enough to throw the Germans
> back for sure.
>

Probably more like able to hold the Germans; assaults usually require
heavier weapons. Of course, holding the Germans while the RN cuts off
their communications is going to be a big win for the Brits.

Also, it depends on how many Germans, and how well supplied. The
Germans, if supplied, were much better equipped and cohesive than
the British Army of the time, and had much better doctrine. A
relatively small German force, if relatively well-equipped and
well-supplied, could accomplish a lot. The relevant facts are
that the British army was large, so "relatively small" still wasn't
anything like a trivial force, the Germans had no way of getting
organized formations across the Channel with their equipment, and
the British were making very sure the Germans wouldn't be well
supplied.

> The British was so depleted that in late 1940 it was poised to take all
> the southern Med coast.
>
So why didn't they? It was clearly a good strategic objective.


--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

[Rich]

On Dec 30, 11:10 am, "Bay Man"
<xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam> wrote:
> "Rich" <RichT...@msn.com> wrote in message

> > Sorry, but none of that is true either.
>
> That is 100% true!

Yes it is 100% true that none of what you wrote was true. Thanks for
agreeing with me.

> Back to early 1941.

Really? So the British evacuated from the Continent in early 1941 now?

> The situation at early 41, a matter of months after a proposed "invasion",
> of a country which myth states had no defence was:

What does early 1941 have to do with the claims you made regarding the
state of the British Army in mid-1940?

> 1. The Germans were pegged back - their air force defeated in battle.

Stalemated and then in early 1941 preoccupied with other things.

> 2. The French fleet near neutralised by the RN at Oran.

CATAPULT was 3 July 1940...could you ***please*** decide what year you
would like to make up things about?

> 3. Equipment shortfalls made up.

Some...by early 1941, but not all - see 2nd Canadian Division. And
what that has to do with mid-1940 has escaped me.

> 4. Much new equipment was of the latest designs.

Like the Bates Bottle Thrower? The Blacker Bombard?

> 5. The Italians were routed in North Africa.

In early 1941? Odd, since by April the Italians were besieging Tobruk
and British Forces Middle East had withdrawn to the Egyptian frontier.

> 6. The highly successful RN blockade was still making an economic impact on
> Germany.

Sigh...proof, please?

> 7. Germany was being attacked by a bomber force - May 1940 the first raids
> on the Rhur at Germany industry. RAF started area bombing attacks on whole
> cities.

Ruhr...and RAF studies showed that at least half the bombs dropped
were within 20 kilometers of the cities.

> 8. A major part of the Italian feet was sunk at Taranto by the RN.

Interesting definition of "major"...and I see we've jumped back to
1940 again. Aren't you getting dizzy from all that bouncing about from
one year to another?

So sinking one battleship and damaging two others out of six and doing
no damage at all to the sixteen cruisers and thirteen destroyers based
there constitutes "major"?

Cheers!

[Rich]

On Dec 30, 11:10 am, ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
> In article
> <9a1b1b4e-39e3-470b-9043-bcf0089cb...@g19g2000pri.googlegroups.com>,

>
> RichT...@msn.com (Rich) wrote:
> > However, given that many of the U.S. 75mm pieces supplied also
> > perforce had to do double-duty as AT weapons,
>
> How many of those were issued for anything but Beach Emergency
> batteries? Allied Artillery of WW2 indicates that all the 75s ended up
> in coast defence roles.

Hard to say really, since I've never completed a full survey. From an
old post of mine I have this.

"US War Department sales for cash during 1940 totaled 1,095 75mm guns
broken down as:

200 M1917 to Finland
395 M1917 to the UK
500 M1897 to the UK

The Anglo-Allied request for purchase was made 21 May 1940 and the War
Department acknowledgment declaring the first 500 guns surplus (so
eligible for sale) was on 22 May and another 100 were declared surplus
by 3 June. The full 'bill of sale' was completed 11 June, so they were
available for shipping from that date.

By September I've so far run into mention of at least four 75mm guns
emplaced in beach defenses and as we've seen a number of Commonwealth
field regiments and batteries had already been issued them:

55 Field Regiment (14 - 75mm)
142 Field Regiment (10 - 75 mm)
96 Field Regiment (12 - 75 mm guns)
5th NZ Field Regiment, E and F Battery (8 - 75mm each)"

That is just for units in Eastern Command, so we could extrapolate 4
of 54 were allocated to beach defenses ***at that time***. In
addition, 2nd Canadian Division by 5 November were issued 28 as
artillery. I would also point out that where they "ended up" is
outside the scope of mid-1940, which is what we are concerned with. In
addition to beach defenses as I mentioned quite a few were also
allocated to fill antitank roles replacing the absent 2-pdr -
sometimes as double-duty along with beach defense. And also, some 50-
odd were transshipped to the Western Desert were they also filled a
dual-role. Interestingly enough some may have eventually found their
way back into French hands.

> By the way I don't think your figures include RN and Coastal Defence
> assets, not all of that equipment was only suited for use afloat or in
> fixed positions.

Now you want RN and Coastal Defense assets too? I thought the fact my
post explicitly dealt with field and medium artillery was kind of
obvious? But I'll see what I can do. :)

Cheers!

[Rich Rostrom]

Rich wrote:
> On Dec 30, 11:10 am, "Bay Man"

> > 8. A major part of the Italian feet was sunk at Taranto by the RN.
>

> So sinking one battleship and damaging two others out of six and doing
> no damage at all to the sixteen cruisers and thirteen destroyers based
> there constitutes "major"?

Well, compare it to Pearl Harbor.

5 battleships sunk and 3 damaged out of 17.

two destroyers blown up out of a couple dozen
in the harbor and 150 or so in service IIRC.
Three cruisers damaged of nine in the harbor
and over 50 in service.

Yet everyone agrees that Pearl Harbor was
"major damage" to the US fleet.

Not that the other poster isn't fond of exaggeration
and distortion, but not here.

[Rich]

On Dec 30, 1:16 pm, Rich <RichT...@msn.com> wrote:
>
> Now you want RN and Coastal Defense assets too? I thought the fact my
> post explicitly dealt with field and medium artillery was kind of
> obvious? But I'll see what I can do. :)

Okay...

Coastal Defenses
>From 1 July to 31 December 1940 a total of 153 new coastal batteries
were emplaced in England as part of the emergency battery program,
totaling over 600 pieces, many of them ex-RN 9.2-inch, 6-inch, and 4.7-
inch pieces mounted as two or four-gun batteries. By mid summer 1940 a
total of 40 emergency batteries had been completed at Falmouth,
Plymouth, Portland, Portsmouth, Newhaven, and Dover.

By about mid-September the picture was:

Northern Command
Coastal Batteries -
Hartlepool
Heugh Battery - one Mk VII 6-inch
Lighthouse Battery - one Mk VII 6-inch
Barrier Battery - one Mk II 12-pounder
Plus emergency batteries
Whiby Battery - two 6-inch Mark VII
The Humber
Spurn Fort - ?
Bull Sands Fort - four 6-inch guns
Haile Sands Fort - two twin-6-pdr
Godwin Battery - ?
Beach defense at Sand-le-Mere - one 6-pdr (Hotchkiss) and one 4-inch

Eastern Command- the Wash to the Thames
Coastal Batteries -
Aldeburgh Battery - two Mk XII 6-inch
Felixstowe and Harwich (used as a MTB/MGB base throughout the war)
Bawdsey Battery - two 6-inch RN guns and two 6-inch Army howitzers
Worthing - Emergency Battery (two 6-inch guns from HMS Lion)
Manor House Emergency Battery - two Mk XII 6-inchl guns
Landguard Fort
Right Battery - four Mk VII 6-inch guns (enclosed in spring 1940)
Darrell's Battery - two 12-pounder (3-inch) guns (the original 4.7-
inch guns had been sent to Narvik), these in turn were replaced by the
end of 1940 by two twin-6-pounder mounts.
Brackenbury Fort - two Mk X 9.2-inch guns in barbette
Beacon Hill Battery - two MK VII 6-inch guns, two Mk IVb 4.7-inch, and
one twin-6-pounder
Angel Gate Battery - two 12-pounder 12 cwt guns
Cornwallis Battery
Brightlingsea Battery - two Mk V 4.7-inch
Clacton-on-Sea Battery - two Mk XII 6-inch
Frinton Battery - two Mk XII 6-inch

London District
Coastal Batteries -
Gravesend
Cliffe Fort - two Mk IX 4-inch
Tilbury Fort - four 3.7-inch AA
East Tilbury Battery - one 75mm
Coalhouse Fort - two 5.5-inch Mk I
Spit of Grain Tower Battery - one twin-6-pounder
Slough Fort -
159 Battery/53 HAA Regiment RA - four 4.5-inch AA
166 Battery/53 HAA Regiment RA - four 4.5-inch AA
Whitstable Battery - two 6-inch Mk VII

Eastern Command - Kentish coast from the Thames to Portsmouth
Railroad Batteries -
Super Heavy Artillery on railway mountings under command 12 Corps
September 1940.
(Excluding three 13.5" railway guns of the Royal Marines Siege
Regiment)
Two 12-inch Hows - Shepherds Well.
Two 12-inch Hows - Eythorne.
Two 12-inch Hows - Lyminge.
One 9.2-inch Gun - Bridge (Canadians)
Two 9.2-inch Guns - Hythe and Folkestone
Two 9.2-inch Guns - Littlestone (Canadians)
One 9.2-inch Gun - Golden Wood (Canadians)
Two 12-inch How - Canterbury-Ramsgate railway (operational about 29
September)
Two 12-inch How - Ashford-Hythe Railway (operational about 15 October)
Two 9.2-inch guns waited manning
Coastal Batteries -
Ramsgate
Harbour Battery - two 6-inch, two 12-pounder 12 cwt
Dumpton Point Battery - two Mk I 5.5-inch (completed 2 Apr 41)
Pegwell Bay
Bethlehem Farm Battery - two 6-inch
North Foreland
Joss Bay Battery - four 5.5-inch Mk I (completed 1941?)
Broadstairs
Dupton Point Battery - one 5.5-inch Mk I
Sandwich
Bay Battery - two Mk VII 6-inch
Deal Battery - two Mk VII 6-inch
Dover
Citadel Battery - three Mk X 9.2-inch guns
Royal Marine Battery - three 13.5 Mk V railway guns (Gladiator, Bruce,
and Scene Shifter) and one 18-inch railway howitzer (Boche Buster)
Wanstone Battery (Fan Bay) - (emplaced in open mounts; enclosed
battery completed in Sep 42)
three MK XV 6-inch guns
two Mk I 15-inch guns (Jane and Clem)
(four Mk XV 6-inch were added in 1942)
Pier Extension Battery - two 12-pdr 20 cwt guns
St Martins Battery - three Mk VII 6-inch guns
Pier Turret Battery - two Mk VII 6-inch guns
Lydden Spout Battery - two 6-inch guns
Burgoyne Battery - four 18/25-pounders
Capel Battery - three Mk VIII 8-inch
Other Dover guns
1 14-inch gun (Winnie, arrived early July and was operational 7 Aug
40, Pooh followed in Feb 41)
Folkestone
East Battery - two 6-inch
West Battery - two 6-inch Mk II
Copt Point Battery - two 6-inch Mk II
Ashford Battery - four 4-inch
Hythe
Ardhallow Battery - two 6-inch
Dymchurch
Tower Battery - four Mk II 6-inch
Redoubt Battery - four Mk XII 6-inch
Dungeness
East Battery - three Mk VII 6-inch
West Battery - two Mk V 4.7-inch
Hastings
Hastings Battery - two Mk XIII 4-inch
Bexhill-on-Sea Battery - two Mk XIII 4-inch, replaced by two 6-inch
Cooden Battery - one 5.5-inch replaced by two 6-inch
Normans Bay Battery - two Mk V 4.7-inch
Pevensey Battery - two 4.7-inch and two 75mm as AT defense
Eastbourne
Cooden Battery - one 5.5-inch
Emergency Battery - two 6-inch
Langley Redoubt - one 12-pounder
Wish Tower - two Mk II 6-inch
Brighton Battery - two Mk II 6-inch
Beachy Head
Cuckmere Haven Battery - four 6-pounder (Hotchkiss?)
Seaford Battery - two 6-inch
Newhaven
Newhaven Fort - two 4-inch and two 12-pounder 20 cwt
Littlehampton
Battery No. 1 - one Mk IX 4-inch
Battery No. 2 - two 6-inch
Bognor Regis Battery - two Mk I 5.5-inch
Portsmouth
Saluting Battery - two 12-pounder 20 cwt, one 13-pounder field
Blockhouse Fort - four 12-pounder, one 4-inch, two 3-pounder, one
twin 6-pounder
Breakwater Fort - two 6-inch
Whale Island - two 6-pdr, two 12-pdr, two 6-inch mortars

Southern Command - Isle of Wight to Land's End
Coastal Batteries -
Southampton
Bungalow Battery - two 12-pounder
Calshot Castle - two 12-pounder 12cwt, two 12-pounder 20 cwt
Isle of Wight
Bouldnor Battery - two MkVII 6-inch
Cliff End Battery - two 6-inch, two 4.7-inch
Culver Down Battery - two 9.2-inch
Freshwater Redoubt - two 6-pounder
Yaverland Battery - two 6-inch Mk VII (441 Coast Bty RA)
Poole
Brownsea Island Battery - two Mk XII 6-inch
Portland Bill
Blacknor Battery - two 9.2-inch
Bridport Battery - two 5.5-inch
Abbotsbury
West Battery - two Mk VII 4-inch
Budleigh Salterton
West End Battery - two 4.7-inch Mk V
Exmouth - two Mk V 4.7-inch
Dartmouth
Brixham Battery - two Mk V 4.7-inch
Brownstone Battery (eastern side of the River Dart) - two 6-inch
Dartmouth Castle Battery (western side of the River Dart) - two 4.7-
inch
Britannia Battery - one 6-pounder (Hotchkiss)
Budleigh Battery - one Mk V 4.7-inch
Corbons Battery - two Mk V 4.7-inch
Plymouth
Drakes Island Battery - two 6-inch, five 12-pdr 20 cwt
Bovisand Fort - four 12-pounder 12 cwt
Devils Point Battery - two 12-pounder
Western King Battery - two twin-6-pdr
Falmouth
Half Moon Battery - two Mk XXIV 6-inch
Tony Battery - two 6-inch
Middle Point Battery - one twin 6-pounder
St Mawes battery - one twin 6-pounder
Toll Point Battery - two 75mm
Bastion Battery - two 12-pounders
Coverack Battery - one 13-pounder

Cheers!

[Rich]

On Dec 30, 2:14 pm, Rich Rostrom <rrostrom.21stcent...@rcn.com> wrote:
> Yet everyone agrees that Pearl Harbor was
> "major damage" to the US fleet.

Er, include me out of that "everyone" thank you very much. :)

The "major damage" - both at Taranto and Pearl Harbor, was to the
***battleship force*** not the ***fleet***. The Italians had other
issues to deal with that reduced the effectiveness of their
***fleet*** after Taranto, but that did not occur to the American
***fleet*** which was executing operations against the Japanese two
months later....absent the Battleship Force, Pacific Fleet. And even
that was then being reconstituted on the West Coast. :)

Cheers!

[David H Thornley]

Rich wrote:
> The "major damage" - both at Taranto and Pearl Harbor, was to the
> ***battleship force*** not the ***fleet***. The Italians had other
> issues to deal with that reduced the effectiveness of their
> ***fleet*** after Taranto, but that did not occur to the American
> ***fleet*** which was executing operations against the Japanese two
> months later....absent the Battleship Force, Pacific Fleet. And even
> that was then being reconstituted on the West Coast. :)
>

For the Battle of Midway, Nimitz had a battle line available of
six ships based on the West Coast, and left them there.
That force was much stronger than any individual Japanese group
in surface combat, and IIRC had its own escort carrier so
it had some air cover. Certainly if Nimitz had thought
it worthwhile for a major battle, he could have had the
battleships on hand.

This is in contrast to Kimmel, who seemed perfectly happy to
sacrifice his carriers to set up a good battleship fight.

US reasoning between the wars, supplemented by Fleet Problems,
was tending in the direction of not involving the battleships
in the early part of the war. USN carriers operated
independently in the 1930's Fleet Problems, except when
Bloch was CNO and admirals apparently tried sucking up
to him.

[Alan Nordin]

On Dec 31, 10:37 am, David H Thornley <da...@thornley.net> wrote:
> Certainly if Nimitz had thought
> it worthwhile for a major battle, he could have had the
> battleships on hand.

There was a little more than strategy behind the decision to leave
TF-1 patrolling the West Coast. Since the old BBs hadn't received the
extensive AA upgrades they were soon to get, they were a liability in
any engagement that included Japanese air and Nimitz didn't think he
had enough carrier air to both attack the Japanese and cover TF-1.

I can't find any source to back this up at the moment, but I believe
there was a shortage of fleet oilers at the time and the old BBs were
serious fuel hogs so they stayed on the West Coast were they could
fuel in port.

Alan

[Michele]

"Rich" <Rich...@msn.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:5eaf087b-572b-43d4...@i6g2000vbe.googlegroups.com...

>
>> That the German Army actually *tried* (thinking that crossing the
>> Channel was like crossing a big river ... pfui ;-)
>
> That's been a bit overplayed in most histories - the Heer was never
> much interested in the job, but tried to soldier on as best they could
> with very inadequate means. They were never stupid enough to consider
> the Channel as just a "big river";

However that's exactly how Jodl expressed himself in the July 12 "Löwe"
memo. Halder's memoirs tell us that the concept of a large-scale river
crossing on a broad front was circulated from around July 3.


but the limited capability they had
> available meant they had to treat the operation as such...

Which in the end means that you think that they weren't stupid enough to
think like that, but they'd be stupid enough to behave in practice as if
they thought like that. Is that it? if so, what would be the practical
difference if they actually tried it in practice?

[Rich]

On Jan 2, 10:29 am, "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelN...@tln.it> wrote:
> However that's exactly how Jodl expressed himself in the July 12 "L�we"

> memo. Halder's memoirs tell us that the concept of a large-scale river
> crossing on a broad front was circulated from around July 3.

Sure, senior leadership loves to express themselves in
inanities...witness Donald Rumsfeld's "As you know, you go to war with
the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a
later time," which, curiously enough, seems rather apt to this case.
It's called "putting the best face on things" and deserves the
derision it receives.

> Which in the end means that you think that they weren't stupid enough to
> think like that, but they'd be stupid enough to behave in practice as if
> they thought like that. Is that it? if so, what would be the practical
> difference if they actually tried it in practice?

The actual planning and adaptation of vessels was as well thought out
as was possible under the limitations they were working under. That
has little to do with inanities uttered by senior leadership. That
said, yes, there would have been no practical difference in practice
if the operational staffs had simply treated it as a "large-scale
river crossing"; have I said it would have been? However, that I think
that they still would have been defeated has little or nothing to do
with it.

Anyway, I guess I'm curious in turn as to what parts of the Sealion
planning was like a German doctrinal large-scale river crossing? Or
was so unlike later amphibious doctrine...aside from the
extemporaneous landing vessel assets (although I suppose you could
mention the Maricaibos) and the almost complete dearth of naval
support assets.

Cheers!

[Michele]

"Rich" <Rich...@msn.com> ha scritto nel messaggio

news:465a76f8-5c21-48c1...@n6g2000vbz.googlegroups.com...

> On Jan 2, 10:29 am, "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelN...@tln.it> wrote:
>> However that's exactly how Jodl expressed himself in the July 12 "L�we"
>> memo. Halder's memoirs tell us that the concept of a large-scale river
>> crossing on a broad front was circulated from around July 3.
>
> Sure, senior leadership loves to express themselves in
> inanities...witness Donald Rumsfeld's "As you know, you go to war with
> the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a
> later time," which, curiously enough, seems rather apt to this case.
> It's called "putting the best face on things" and deserves the
> derision it receives.
>
>> Which in the end means that you think that they weren't stupid enough to
>> think like that, but they'd be stupid enough to behave in practice as if
>> they thought like that. Is that it? if so, what would be the practical
>> difference if they actually tried it in practice?
>
> The actual planning and adaptation of vessels was as well thought out
> as was possible under the limitations they were working under. That
> has little to do with inanities uttered by senior leadership. That
> said, yes, there would have been no practical difference in practice
> if the operational staffs had simply treated it as a "large-scale
> river crossing"; have I said it would have been? However, that I think
> that they still would have been defeated has little or nothing to do
> with it.
>

OK, thank you for the explanation.

> Anyway, I guess I'm curious in turn as to what parts of the Sealion
> planning was like a German doctrinal large-scale river crossing? Or
> was so unlike later amphibious doctrine...aside from the
> extemporaneous landing vessel assets (although I suppose you could
> mention the Maricaibos) and the almost complete dearth of naval
> support assets.

The final plans for Seel�we did consider actual seaborne landing factors,
but that's because of the input of the Kriegsmarine, as far as I can tell.
The initial ideas by the Heer - and I'm aware they wouldn't be what would be
implemented in the real event, if any - however, paid little attention, if
any, to factors like currents, tides and weather.
Even the final plans featured some very bad landing zones, especially zone
C. They would have a river dividing one of the beachheads; another under
sheer cliffs; another just in front of extensive fortifications; most with
exits from the beach areas that featured tall seawalls and/or lagoons behind
it.
Now, the Allies in Normandy also had some of these problems and they even
climbed Pointe du Hoc... but... _they had thought about it_. They had
planned ways to solve these problems. The Kriegsmarine, unlike the Heer,
knew about tides and anchoring problems and so forth, so they injected that
as soon as they could, but even they lacked the experience and thus the know
how about actual beach landings.

[Rich]

On Jan 3, 9:26 am, "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelN...@tln.it> wrote:
> OK, thank you for the explanation.

You're welcome, and in turn thank you for yours; I see where you are
coming from now.

> The final plans for Seel we did consider actual seaborne landing factors,
> but that's because of the input of the Kriegsmarine, as far as I can tell.
> The initial ideas by the Heer - and I'm aware they wouldn't be what would be
> implemented in the real event, if any - however, paid little attention, if
> any, to factors like currents, tides and weather.

Sure, but is that any different from any other nation or service?
Certainly in 1940 the U.S. Army had only the haziest notion of the
effects of currents, tides, and weather on amphibious operations.
However, they were lucky enough that they could fall back on the
Marine Corps experimentation of the 1930s that included development of
early types of landing craft. The Heer had some Baltic amphibious
experience, from 1917-1918, but aside from limited experimental
development of the Pioneerlandungsboote and Marinefahrpraeme, not much
else.

I just hesitate to declare lack of experience, development, or funding
to be the same as stupidity.

> Even the final plans featured some very bad landing zones, especially zone
> C. They would have a river dividing one of the beachheads; another under
> sheer cliffs; another just in front of extensive fortifications; most with
> exits from the beach areas that featured tall seawalls and/or lagoons behind
> it.

Yeah, the best indicator that their hearts really weren't into the
plan is the schematic nature of some of their planning. However, that
was also mirrored by the KM; I love all that detailed planning for
laying minefields that required mine laying assets and mines that they
simply didn't possess. :)

> Now, the Allies in Normandy also had some of these problems and they even
> climbed Pointe du Hoc... but... _they had thought about it_. They had
> planned ways to solve these problems. The Kriegsmarine, unlike the Heer,
> knew about tides and anchoring problems and so forth, so they injected that
> as soon as they could, but even they lacked the experience and thus the know
> how about actual beach landings.

Sure, because they had previous amphibious doctrinal development and
experience, along with specialized equipment, to start from, an
outline plan developed six months earlier, and had laid out their
initial operational and tactical planning three to four months ahead
of the projected invasion date...and then got an extra month to modify
things as decisions were made by the higher ups on resource
allocations and actually getting those resources to the troops. For
the Germans the final planning was done one to two months before the
projected invasion date, with little prospect that the resources would
be available.

Cheers!

[Michele]

"Rich" <Rich...@msn.com> ha scritto nel messaggio

news:99b97435-46ec-432a...@o14g2000vbo.googlegroups.com...

Hi,

I think that by replying to the following I'll be replying to the whole
point, or so I hope. Some of the other things I snipped I simply agree with.

>
> I just hesitate to declare lack of experience, development, or funding
> to be the same as stupidity.
>

I'd add "reasonable time", as you mention in the parts I snipped, to the
things that weren't available.

The bottom line, I believe, would be this:

a. if you lack all of that and you go ahead with a plan built upon such
shortcomings, then personally I wouldn't hesitate to call you stupid; or

b. if you lack all of that, but, in the knowledge of that, your plan is
nothing but a bluff, then OK, you are not stupid, but we should be able to
conclude that you were just bluffing.

[Rich]

On Jan 4, 9:23 am, "Michele" <SPAMmiarmelN...@tln.it> wrote:
(snip agreements)

> The bottom line, I believe, would be this:
>
> a. if you lack all of that and you go ahead with a plan built upon such
> shortcomings, then personally I wouldn't hesitate to call you stupid; or

Um, yes...maybe, except that you could also call it "careerist" or
"survivalist". :) After all, if the generals did their best with
inadequate means and were forced by Hitler to go ahead and make the
assault, then suffered the consequences, they could always simply add
it to the litany of things to blame on Hitler when they wrote their
postwar memoirs. These guys simply weren't stupid; after all, quite a
number of them got themselves ensconced as certified military geniuses
by the West postwar despite the rather blatant evidence that in terms
of actually winning wars - or giving their political overseers
sensible council - they were mostly anything but. :)

> b. if you lack all of that, but, in the knowledge of that, your plan is
> nothing but a bluff, then OK, you are not stupid, but we should be able to
> conclude that you were just bluffing.

Too much real effort went into the planning and preparation to call it
a bluff, although I don't doubt that Hitler and company had it in mind
that the Brits would cave in the face of Germany's awesome
power...only their effort at demonstrating shock and awe via the
Luftwaffe fell flat.

Cheers!

[Joe Osman]

Here's an excerpt from a German book on Sea Lion (in English) on
limited German amphibious training in the 1920s and 30s:

http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=9716

It's about the middle of the page. The book is "River Wide, Ocean
Deep".

Joe

[Rich]

On Jan 4, 11:25 am, Joe Osman <Joseph.Os...@verizon.net> wrote:
> Here's an excerpt from a German book on Sea Lion (in English) on
> limited German amphibious training in the 1920s and 30s:

Fred is actually Swedish AFAIK and his book is written in English.
However, after spending some years - or so it felt - and hundreds of
posts discussing Sealion with him, I can only say that I mistrust his
sourcing and conclusions. His general conclusion is that if Sealion
had been launched then it would have succeeded and the British would
have been overwhelmed. To say that I find his research and the
reasoning stemming from it to be underwhelming is possibly the biggest
understatement I have ever made. :)

Cheers!

[Bay Man]

"Rich" <Rich...@msn.com> wrote in message

news:2fd79f24-9c2a-4c04...@o14g2000vbo.googlegroups.com...

Fred does come up with some good facts on Sealion, but as you stated his
conclusions are odd and like you I disagree with them. He appeared to suck
in the myth that the British Army was absent and utterly wiped out at
Dunkirk. His knowledge of the economic/industry side was lacking - British
industry was making up losses very quickly. I got the impression he seemed
to think the barge armada under sail would be largely unmolested by the
massive RN and largish air bomber force.

[Bay Man]

"Joe Osman" <Joseph...@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:c27b45d7-d49c-401c...@u20g2000yqb.googlegroups.com...

Fred's book is quite good.

[Rich]

On Jan 6, 9:19 am, "Bay Man" <xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam>
wrote:

> Fred does come up with some good facts on Sealion, but as you stated his
> conclusions are odd and like you I disagree with them. He appeared to suck
> in the myth that the British Army was absent and utterly wiped out at
> Dunkirk. His knowledge of the economic/industry side was lacking - British
> industry was making up losses very quickly. I got the impression he seemed
> to think the barge armada under sail would be largely unmolested by the
> massive RN and largish air bomber force.

Is that the trump of doom I hear? Is there a fracture in the fabric of
the universe? Is the time-space continuum rent asunder? We actually
***agree*** on something? :)

Oh, no, we don't, you actually like his book. :) I won't touch it with
the proverbial ten-foot pole...I've wasted too much of my life arguing
with him about the rather shaky underpinnings that are the foundation
for his ideas. :) Plus, for what its worth, I think its probably just
a poorly done English-language rehash of Klee and Schenk.

I think he simply is myopic...he ignores anything that doesn't agree
with his preconceived endpoint, which is a successful Sealion. So he
finds a factoid - a favorite is the description of the Kriegsmarine
M35 mine sweeper as a "miniature destroyer" and conflates that into an
unstoppable armada of "highly capable warships"; ignoring that there
were at most a few dozen available and that they were still
outnumbered by real destroyers...and cruisers. The Minesperren plan
becomes an impenetrable barrier...ignoring the simple lack of German
mine laying assets and mines...not to mention the very robust mine
sweeping capability of the RN. Herbstreise becomes a clever ruse
rather than a forlorn show the flag exercise. And so on. It is very
reminiscent of the silliness perpetuated by robdab and others of the
same what-if ilk.

Cheers!

[Bay Man]

"Rich" <Rich...@msn.com> wrote in message

news:efdec68d-aeb8-4f48...@a11g2000vbz.googlegroups.com...

> On Jan 6, 9:19 am, "Bay Man" <xyxbayman...@xyxmailinator.xyxcomnospam>
> wrote:
>> Fred does come up with some good facts on Sealion, but as you stated his
>> conclusions are odd and like you I disagree with them. He appeared to
>> suck
>> in the myth that the British Army was absent and utterly wiped out at
>> Dunkirk. His knowledge of the economic/industry side was lacking -
>> British
>> industry was making up losses very quickly. I got the impression he
>> seemed
>> to think the barge armada under sail would be largely unmolested by the
>> massive RN and largish air bomber force.
>
> Is that the trump of doom I hear? Is there a fracture in the fabric of
> the universe? Is the time-space continuum rent asunder? We actually
> ***agree*** on something? :)
>
> Oh, no, we don't, you actually like his book. :)

It gives a good insight to what the German capability was and some
historical background to it. In that it is OK. I agree with all you wrote.