"Don Phillipson" <
e9...@SPAMBLOCK.ncf.ca> wrote:
> John Masters mentions in his war memoir The Road Past Mandalay
> that Indian Army officers used their regiments' Indian languages
> for immediate battle instructions via telephone or voice radio.
> The practical point was that battle instructions had a short lifetime
> (an hour to a day) and the enemy (Vichy French and Japanese
> for Masters) was unlikely to discover any translation in that time.
That strikes me as exceedingly foolish, as the
Japanese had tens of thousands of Indian defectors in
their service - the "Indian National Army".
It would be trivial for the Japanese to assign some of
these men to radio monitor duty - in which case they
would intercept and read these messages at once.
Gurkhali might be safe, as I doubt that _any_ captured
Gurkhas joined the INA.
In any case, it would be relying on "security through
obscurity", which is almost always a bad idea, and
vulnerable to extremely damaging failure.
The Navajo "code talkers" succeeded in part because
of the extreme obscurity of their base medium, which
was further encrypted by the use of special jargon.
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