Battle of Normandy 1944
ABM International
Donald Phillipson
> How influential were the South of France Landings in terms of the battle?
None: the southern landings began 15 Aug. 1944, weeks after the
turning points of the Normandy campaign
-- Operation Cobra = Patton's breakout southwards 25 July 1944
-- Goodwood, capture of Caen, Battle of the Falaise Gap etc.
Hitler ordered evacuation of southern France 17 Aug. (says
Martin Gilbert, whose narrative of Normandy is surprisingly bad)
suggesting he knew he had lost France even before the southern landings.
--
| Donald Phillipson, 4180 Boundary Road, Carlsbad Springs, |
| Ontario, Canada, K0A 1K0, tel. 613 822 0734 |
retro70
troops had already been stripped from Southern France and redeployed to
Normandy. However, by widening the front, the ANVIL landings hastened the
withdrawal of German forces from Western and Central France.
It was also significant as it permitted additional US divisions to enter the
ETO. The Normandy beaches and Cherbourg were packed with incoming troops
and supplies. Access to Southern French ports permitted a quicker
debarkation and several incoming US divisions were redirected to enter the
ETO at that point.
Retro
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ABM International <a...@lineone.net> wrote in message
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Joao Luis
was one of the easiest landings in Europe. They even have jokes about it ...
ABM International <a...@lineone.net> wrote in message
Labas
probably it had no effect at all.
labas
ABM International <a...@lineone.net> wrote in message
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Andrew Clark
landings - codename Anvil - to go ahead, the Allied army in Italy under
Alexander was stripped of its best divisions, its landing craft, a great
deal of its air cover and much other resources. Churchill and the British
CoS wanted to keep the Italian army strong in order to force the Po valley
and enter Austria. A amphibious landing in Istria was to be part of this
campaign.
The rationale for the Austrian strike was only partly to open a Third Front
against Germany. More important to Churchill and the British was the need to
project Allied power into central Europe so that the Russians could be
better dissuaded from occupying the Balkans and central Europe countries.
The British had a rather more realistic view of Stalin's post-war aims than
the US, which AFAIK hadn't in 1944 formulated more than a vague idea what it
intended to do after beating Germany. (That vague idea was "go home as
quickly as possible").
However, Eisenhower and Marshall were convinced that the doctrine of
applying maximum force at a single point - France - was a better idea, which
purely from a military point of view may be right. The Anvil landings were
almost entirely US forces and there was little that the British could do to
stop them. After some furious arguments, Churchill accepted the inevitable
and Anvil went ahead. The best the British could do was make a plan to
occupy Istria very quickly on a German surrender (which they did, fighting
Communist-backed forces from Yugoslavia in the process) and make a dash for
Vienna if they possibly could (which they couldn't as the Russians got there
first).
Was the landing necessary? Probably not. It was certainly neater for the
Anvil force to link up with the US Third Army and help close up to the
German border. But Anvil forces did hardly any fighting in France as they
advanced up the Rhone valley as the Resistance had already taken most of
southern France from the retreating Germans. It would seem to have been
perfectly possible (given that the US had surplus forces in Normandy) to
have used Normandy-landed troops to secure a southern flank of the invasion
zone pending the reduction of garrison towns in the South.
Certainly, the good done by Anvil in France was considerably less than the
potential good that would have flowed from an opportunity to occupy Austria
and central European nations and thus exert much greater influence over the
Russians' post war dispositions.
Louis Capdeboscq
They had no influence on the Battle of Normandy; since by the time they took
place that battle was pratically over. The Germans that had not been trapped
in Falaise were unable to stop the Allies, and Patton was exploiting full
speed.
It had marginal influence on the Battle of France, in that it made Hitler
realize that a general withdrawal was in order (something that didn't happen
very often: the only other occurences that I can think of are just after
Stalingrad, and after Kursk). On the other hand, France was pretty much lost
anyway, and if what German troops there remained hadn't pulled back they
would almost certainly have been captured (and those parts of central and
southern France that liberated themselves would probably have witnessed some
rather bloody scenes as partisans and rear-area German troops fought it
out).
It had a signifiant influence on the rest of the Allied campaign, however.
Marseilles was a major port with good communications to the German border,
the railroad system, in particular, hadn't been bombed to bits as it had
been in Northern France. By 1945, 25% of the supplies landed in NW Europe
came from Marseilles.
I would also like to point out that, although there was no Omaha Beach
scenes during Anvil, the US and French troops there accomplished an amazing
feat of arms. There weren't very many of them, and they moved _really_ fast
against German defenders that were staging a fighting withdrawal but were by
no means overwhelmed as they were in Normandy. It is often considered as a
pushover, but it was not.
Scott MacKenzie
>
The Dragoon landings were crucial to Overlord's success. Had Gen.
Devers' 6th Army Group not rushed headlong up the Rhone valley, the German
19th Army would have posed a threat to the AEF in the north. Clearing that
flank helped turn the German retreat into a virtual rout. It also helped
by
opening the port of Marseilles to Allied supplies, though transporting them
north would take some time. It must be remembered that the Allied breakout
from Normandy began in early August with the start of Operation Cobra. The
August 15 landings, the quick consolidation of the South and Truscott's
Rhone valley offensive helped immensely the removal from France of the
Germans.
For further reading, "Riviera to the Rhine", the last in the US
Army's Green Books series, is the standard text and basically the last word
on the subject. For its relationship to Normandy, try "Eisenhower's
Lieutenants" by Russell Weigley.
Have fun.
Scott
Yankees #1!!!
--
Scott MacKenzie
Mississauga, Ontario
(but a New Yorker at heart!)
CRH III
ABM International <a...@lineone.net> wrote in article
<381f4689...@news.usenetserver.com>...
> How influential were the South of France Landings in terms of the battle?
>
Churchill was so against it, he had the code name changed from Anvil to
Dragoon because he said he was "dragooned" into it. Still for 4,000 French
and 2,700 US casualties, 57,000 Germans were captured. Also, the southern
French ports, the real reason for the operation, handled a third of the
1.3MM tons of supplies that reached Europe by October. Without them, the
supply problem that would have been even more critical.
R SVEINSON
> In terms of influencing the Battle in Normandy, not much. Most mobile
> troops had already been stripped from Southern France and redeployed to
> Normandy.
What was the date of the Allied landings in Southern France???
I thought that it was some time after June 6, 1944!!
V-Man
What was the date of the breakout from Normandy? July of 44... The Allies
were stalled in Normady for six weeks.
France was invaded in the south in August...
A Knight is sworn to Valor...
His Heart knows only Virtue...
His Blade defends the Weak...
His Word speaks only Truth...
His *Wrath* undoes the Wicked...
R SVEINSON
> How influential were the South of France Landings in terms of the battle?
When were the landings in the south of France????
Louis Capdeboscq
>CoS wanted to keep the Italian army strong in order to force the Po valley
>and enter Austria. A amphibious landing in Istria was to be part of this
>campaign.
Yes, but the Italian campaign had never been able to go anywhere. It had
achieved its goal in securing air bases against Germany and tying up some
German ground units, but as an invasion route to Germany it was obviously a
poor idea.
>The rationale for the Austrian strike was only partly to open a Third Front
>against Germany.
Rationale being a very big word for such a project. Supplying a whole Allied
army through the Brenner Pass (not to mention breaking through such a strong
position in the first place...) is the sign of an ignorance of basic
logistics that is only matched by Churchill's other pet project in the
Balkans.
>More important to Churchill and the British was the need to
>project Allied power into central Europe so that the Russians could be
>better dissuaded from occupying the Balkans and central Europe countries.
That has been said and repeated postwar, but I don't recall the British
being all that interested in blocking the Soviets at the time. Perhaps I'm
wrong...
On the other hand, there was simply no way to adequately project power into
Central Europe from the Balkans. And Churchill constantly dreamed of a
Balkan army which consistently failed to materialize (check out the exact
date at which Turkey finally joined the war).
>The British had a rather more realistic view of Stalin's post-war aims than
>the US,
Possibly. On the other hand, even with a realistic view of Stalin's
policies, I'd think the Americans were mostly correct: they concentrated on
liberating the most populated, most industrialized, and generally richest
part of Europe. They stayed away from less populated and poorer areas in
which mechanized warfare (the Allies' strong point) was not easy, and air
support would be more difficult. This sounds like a sensible strategy.
>which AFAIK hadn't in 1944 formulated more than a vague idea what it
>intended to do after beating Germany. (That vague idea was "go home as
>quickly as possible").
True. On the other hand, even if their ideas were vague they were moving in
the right direction: to fight Germany required a large army (the British
wanted to avoid such a heavy land committment), and it was generally a good
idea to beat up on the Germans in places where mechanized warfare and air
support were easiest, while seizing the richest parts of Europe in the
process.
>However, Eisenhower and Marshall were convinced that the doctrine of
>applying maximum force at a single point - France - was a better idea,
which
>purely from a military point of view may be right.
...considering that Italy had _never_ achieved anything after the initial
landings, I'd tend to think that Anvil was a better idea.
>The Anvil landings were almost entirely US forces
"Almost entirely" appart from a roughly 50% proportion of French troops...
>and there was little that the British could do to
>stop them.
Indeed ! Not that they didn't try, though...
>After some furious arguments, Churchill accepted the inevitable
>and Anvil went ahead.
...and Italy didn't, which in retrospect shows that Anvil was a better idea.
(snip)
>Was the landing necessary? Probably not.
Even with hindsight, there are good things to say for it. Without hindsight,
and assuming that the Germans had been defeated according to plan (while in
fact the Allies were much ahead of schedule in mid August), plus allowing
for some bad news, planning for an invasion of Southern France was probably
a good idea.
>It was certainly neater for the
>Anvil force to link up with the US Third Army and help close up to the
>German border.
That part wasn't all that important: Third Army would probably have been
able to go all the way to Switzerland by itself. The Allied line would have
been spread very thing, though...
>But Anvil forces did hardly any fighting in France as they
>advanced up the Rhone valley as the Resistance had already taken most of
>southern France from the retreating Germans.
Excuse me ? They did fight. Patton's advance is better documented, but it
was far from the walkover that you describe.
>It would seem to have been
>perfectly possible (given that the US had surplus forces in Normandy) to
>have used Normandy-landed troops to secure a southern flank of the invasion
>zone pending the reduction of garrison towns in the South.
True. Not "perfectly", but certainly possible. On the other hand, given that
the port of Marseilles was a major entry point for US supply and
reinforcements later in the war, it would certainly have made a difference
if the Germans had been given the opportunity to wreck it as they did in
Brest, Lorient, St-Nazaire, etc.
Besides, who would have been doing "the reduction of garrison towns in the
South" ? For your information, "towns" such as Lyons and Marseilles are
major cities.
>Certainly, the good done by Anvil in France was considerably less than the
>potential good that would have flowed from an opportunity to occupy Austria
>and central European nations and thus exert much greater influence over the
>Russians' post war dispositions.
Perhaps. On the other hand, there never was an opportunity to occupy Austria
and Central European nations to begin with. The Italian front certainly
wouldn't have provided such an opportunity...
retro70
Retro
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R SVEINSON <rsve...@escape.ca> wrote in message
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Martin Clements
rsve...@escape.ca wrote:
> ABM International wrote:
>
> > How influential were the South of France Landings in terms of the
battle?
>
> When were the landings in the south of France????
>
armoured division, and an airborne division (mostly american, with the
british 2 para). The build-up consisted of 7 french divisions (2
armoured).
After landing, they attacked Toulon and Marsailles,and pushed the
Germans up the Rhone valley, capturing Lyon and Dijon, and forming a
line with Eisenhower's forces by 15th September.
Regards,
Martin Clements
--
Never argue with an idiot.They drag you down to their level, then beat
you with experience.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Lawrence Dillard
CRH III wrote in message <38412ce6...@news.curie.dialix.com.au>...
>>
>
>Dragoon because he said he was "dragooned" into it. Still for 4,000 French
>and 2,700 US casualties, 57,000 Germans were captured. Also, the southern
>French ports, the real reason for the operation, handled a third of the
>1.3MM tons of supplies that reached Europe by October. Without them, the
>supply problem that would have been even more critical.
>
>
the allies had anticipated. Genl Devers landed with the mission of
engaging and destroying the Germans to his front, breaching the West Wall in
his area, and seizeing crossings over the Rhine. In fact, the allies were
blind to the possibilities offered up by Genl Devers' successes.
His operations were quite successful, including the near-destructon of the
German Nineteenth Army, the taking of Strausborg, and closing to the west
bank of the Rhine near Strauborg and the Belfort Gap. 6th Army Group could
have "bounced the Rhine" at that juncture, the river being virtually
undefended at that time, about Nov. 26, 1944. It then could have attacked
North, flanking and surrounding German forces facing Genl Patton's 3rd USA,
and conquering the Saar, from the South rather than from the East. (An
entire literature has grown up over the issue of when and where the Rhine
should have been crossed, and under whose control. However, Genl Devers'
opportunity to do so, early, and the possible consequences arising
therefrom, have evaded much mention and discusson.)
Eisenhower decided otherwise, directing Devers instead to move North, on
the wrong side of the river, to facilitate Patton in his advance toward
the Saar industrial basin. At this potentially crucial time, Eisenhower
chose a "small solution", as the German generals called it. His decision
was a safe one, but it sacrificed a daring solution with greater operational
and strategic worth, and may have prolonged the war. Oddly enough, only a
few months later, Eisenhower would take a big gamble when his close friend
Bradley's forces captured the bridge at Remagen intact, and swiftly altered
his plans so as to exploit the opportunity presented. It is very likely that
Ike did so in irder to help Bradley rehabilitate his reputation, which had
certainly been tarnished by the onset of the Battle of te Bulge.
Many factors may have been at work here. One was that Eisenhower resented
Genl Devers, who at one point had been head of ETOUSA and a possibe rival to
Ike for the role of Supreme Comander, AEF. Another was the concentration at
SHAEF on operations in northwest Europe, to the detriment of operations
elsewhere.
Strangely enough, although Genl Devers accomplished all his missions with
alacrity, Eisenhower rated him below Bradley in his post-war assessments of
his lieutenants, despite Bradley's undeniable blunder over the Ardennes.
Thanks for the post.
ldil...@EnterAct.com
Chris Manteuffel
<acl...@starcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote:
>This is a highly controversial point. To enable the South of France
>landings - codename Anvil - to go ahead, the Allied army in Italy under
>Alexander was stripped of its best divisions, its landing craft, a great
>deal of its air cover and much other resources. Churchill and the British
>CoS wanted to keep the Italian army strong in order to force the Po valley
>and enter Austria. A amphibious landing in Istria was to be part of this
>campaign.
The British Army's own study showed that the need for this plan was
more than the British had- they wanted more American forces put in
Italy for the plan. (The plan called for 25 divisions - that's more
than the UK army had over the entire world.) The Americans wanted to
get Southern France. If the battle had turned out differently, the
plan might have worked - but Hitler intervened and sent his panzer
armies into a differant trap. If Army Group G was handled more
sensibly Anvil/Dragoon could have played an important role.
>The British had a rather more realistic view of Stalin's post-war aims than
>the US, which AFAIK hadn't in 1944 formulated more than a vague idea what it
>intended to do after beating Germany. (That vague idea was "go home as
>quickly as possible").
A conferance (I think the Bretton Woods one) had decided that after
the war Germany would be split into three (at the time, France was
added later) zones of occupation, to be administered by each force as
military zones.
<snip>
>The Anvil landings were
>almost entirely US forces and there was little that the British could do to
>stop them. After some furious arguments, Churchill accepted the inevitable
Those entirely US forces were what the British wanted for Eastern
Europe. Considering the American feelings towards Italy in general,
I'm not that surprised they didn't want to send more troops into Italy
(Note that merely supplying the Italian citizens once freed took more
shipping than the entire Philippine campaign, + supplying citizens).
The Americans didn't want to be fighting in Italy, and once the "main
show" started, were hardly likely to send more troops to what they
considered to be a secondary theater. H.P. Wilmott in his history of
WW2 says that both the Ameriacns and British were right about Italy-
it tied down German divisions (the Italian theater had the highest
ratio of German mobile divisions to leg divisions) but it was
essentially a waste of time.
<snip>
> It would seem to have been
>perfectly possible (given that the US had surplus forces in Normandy) to
>have used Normandy-landed troops to secure a southern flank of the invasion
>zone pending the reduction of garrison towns in the South.
Marseilles was a handy port, was it not? I can imagine the Germans
doing the same thing to it they did to the Channel ports if not for
the sudden invasion.
Chris Manteuffel
Louis Capdeboscq
>His operations were quite successful,
Yes.
>including the near-destructon of the
>German Nineteenth Army,
... along with the swift capture of vital ports in Southern France...
>the taking of Strausborg,
No. Strasbourg was taken by the French 2nd armored division, which had come
in from Normandy as part of Patton's 3rd Army. Perhaps it was transfered to
the French 1st Army by the time it liberated Strasbourg, and was therefore
under Devers' command (but I doubt it: easy to check, though...), but it
certainly wasn't a part of Devers' advance from the Mediterranean.
>and closing to the west
>bank of the Rhine near Strauborg and the Belfort Gap.
The Belfort Gap is where the Rhine reaches Switzerland, while Strasbourg is
just south of the Saar. The west bank of the Rhine wasn't "closed" until
after the battle of the Bulge, and with very heavy fighting. The Colmar
pocket was a German foothold west of the Rhine that lasted into 1945.
>6th Army Group could
>have "bounced the Rhine" at that juncture, the river being virtually
>undefended at that time, about Nov. 26, 1944.
Correct. 6th Army Group was however in a tenuous supply situation and its
troops were exhausted by that time.
>It then could have attacked
>North, flanking and surrounding German forces facing Genl Patton's 3rd USA,
Woa... No. This may look very good on a strategic map of Europe, but reality
doesn't work that way. As I mentioned, the spearheads of the army group were
exhausted by constant fighting. The troops needed a halt to rest and refit,
and the supply lines were both long and thin (at that stage). Then there's
the fact that crossing the Rhine near Belfort and heading north is moving
through the Black Forest transversally to most of the usual avenues of
advance. Plus this would be a very long and very exposed flank to invite
counterattacks.
>and conquering the Saar, from the South rather than from the East.
Conquering the Saar from the South was what the Siegfried Line, light as it
was, had been designed to prevent. That's one of the reasons why Patton had
more success from the West than Patch had from the South.
Other than that, I heartily agree that Devers and his army group rank above
Bradley.
DBSDESIGN
HREF="mailto:acl...@starcott.freeserve.co.uk">acl...@starcott.freeserve.co
.uk</A> wrote:
>Thirteen Allied divsions including an airborne division assaulted
>3 weak German divisions at the coasts.
Only three US divisions and a few fire support battalions
assaulted Southern France on August 15, plus a partially
equipped US Airborne Task Force. Which other divisions
were involved, and more importantly when did each land?
Chris Manteuffel
<acl...@starcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote:
>In 1944, the UK had 55 fully-equipped mobile field divisions raised from
>within UK. If British Empire forces under Britiish command (excluding
>Commonwealth - S Africa, Canada, Australia and NZ) are added, the total is
>about 100 divisions.
Hmm, I'll have to check the wording on my source for what he actually
said. Its _The Great Crusade_ by H.P. Willmott. He might have used
"British", and actually meant it. The book is a good run down of the
war on a strategic level, but IMO, it needed to be edited a couple of
times. Some of his statistics are politician level word-play, and he
has some ideas which don't stand up to scrutiny (like the Germans
should have somehow grabbed Iceland when they grabbed Norway and
Denmark. Supply chain?)
BTW, why does an amphibious assault to outflank a German defense line
in the mountains of Italy seem familiar? How would this plan do any
better than the two Patton tried on Sicily or the Anzio campaign?
> Thirteen Allied
>divsions including an airborne division assaulted 3 weak German divisions
>at
>the coasts. The LW had about 200 aircraft against 2000 Allied planes.
My source (WW2, by Time Life Books) differs on 13 divisions. It says
94,000 troops total, counting French (who'd be likely not to go
through Italy, and instead routed into France across the Normandy
beachs), airborne (ditto), and rear area troops. At 12,000 men
/division, that's about 7-8 divisions.
Chris Manteuffel
Andrew Clark
Chris Manteuffel <foxb...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:7vq584$a...@gazette.bcm.tmc.edu...
> > The British Army's own study showed that the need for this plan was
> more than the British had- they wanted more American forces put in
> Italy for the plan. (The plan called for 25 divisions - that's more
> than the UK army had over the entire world.)
In 1944, the UK had 55 fully-equipped mobile field divisions raised from
within UK. If British Empire forces under Britiish command (excluding
Commonwealth - S Africa, Canada, Australia and NZ) are added, the total is
about 100 divisions.
The British plan required only that troops, aircraft and landing ships
already assigned to the Italian theatre remain there: the US 5th Army
including a French corp & the Commonwealth/Empire 8th Army. No additional
forces were requested. This force by D-Day in Normandy had already broken
German resistance at Rome and advanced to the edge of the Po Valley. Left
untouched, this force could have executed a 2 or 3 division amphibious
landing in the Adriatic and thus broken through the Gothic line to the
Italian/Austrian border. Eisenhower's insistence on Anvil/Dragoon meant
that
55% of air forces, all the amphibious and naval support, and 5 divisions of
troops, were withdrawn from Italy. The remaining force, while large, did
not
have the ability to project sufficient combat power to break through the
Gothic line in a head-on assault. So stalemate ensued.
> The Americans wanted to get Southern France.
The landings in the Riveria were practically unopposed. Thirteen Allied
divsions including an airborne division assaulted 3 weak German divisions
at
the coasts. The LW had about 200 aircraft against 2000 Allied planes.
Despite this much of the port capacity was destroyed by the Germans. There
was little resistance to the advance up the Rhone valley other than a minor
tank battle at Montelimar. This is hardly surprising as the so-called 19th
German Army amounted in the end to less than 50,000 men, few of combat
quality. Most had been captured by the 50,000 armed French resistance
fighters before Dragoon got there.
Anvil/Dragoon was a sledgehammer to crack a nut. That was the British main
point: why wreck the Italian campaign in order to achieve so little?
History
suggests they were right.
> A conferance (I think the Bretton Woods one) had decided that after
> the war Germany would be split into three (at the time, France was
> added later) zones of occupation, to be administered by each force as
> military zones.
>
The partition of Germany was agreed at Yalta. On 4 January 1945, in the
morning, Churchill, Stalin & Roosevelt decided that Germany should be
divided into three zones, with each power administering a zone, and Berlin
split between them. In the afternoon, after agreeing to give the Soviets
custody of eastern Germany, Roosevelt announced that US forces would leave
Germany completely within 2 years of the end of the war, leaving the
administration of the whole of western, southern and northern Germany to
the
UK. Churchill immediately proposed that the French should share this burden
with the UK and this was agreed. It was not until 1946 under Truman that
the
US became suspicious of the USSR and decided to hold on to its occupation
zone. US policy towards the USSR was frighteningly naive until then.
Lawrence Dillard
The 2d Armored, by the time of the taking of Strabourg, was serving as part
of Genl Devers' 6thAG. Le Clerc's 2d Armored struck, in company with the
USA's 44th and 79th Infantry Divisions, into the Savergne Gap, exploting the
breakthrough there and taking Strasbourg. Simultaneously the 6th AG's XV
Corps pushed into the Vosges Mountains. Eventually, VI Corps overran the
German Winter Line in the high Vosges, virtually destroying the German
708th and 716th Divisions in the process.
Altogether, Devers' 6th AG had by this time beaten six of the eight
divisions of the German 19th Army and had brought his forces to the *banks*
of the Rhine mnear Strausborg and in the Belfort Gap. This accomplished by
Nov. 26, 1944.
As I wrote in my earlier post, Genl Devers now proposed to cross the Rhine
at these locations, to exploit his forces' successes, only to have Ike shift
the direction of 6 AG's advance over his furious objection. Yet is is a
fact that at that location the Rhine was undefended at the time, the force
assigned to defend it, 19th German Army, having been trounced in the
fighting just finished.
As you say, the fighting left a German pocket (Colmar) which lasted far
longer than it need have. Primarily, this is a result of the "small
solution" I wrote of in my earlier post.
Instead of surrounding and cutting off German forces in Colmar, US 7th Div
joined with the French 1st Army in attacking the pocket and in pushing into
the West Wall fortifications in the low Vosges. Hence, the 7th USA attacks
had no impact on German preparations for the Ardennes counteroffensive,
whereas had Devers' plans been sanctioned, ....
In none of the accounts I have read of Devers' 6th AG, have I encountered
mention of tenuous supply lines or exhausted troops at this juncture. I
would appreciate it if you were to relate your sources on this topic.
I contend that at the time, Devers' forces could have moved through the
Black Forest at whichever angle they chose, as organized resistance was
minuscule at the time. A counterattack could only have taken place had the
Germans the forces necessary in proximity to pull one off; at the time, they
had none. Ike's change oforientation of 6th AG gave the Germans breathing
room sufficient to strongly defend against asllied assaults ffrom fixed
fortifications, including portions of the old Maginot Line.
The Siegfried Line fortifications, like any other fortifications, could only
be useful if the men and materiel and the time to man them are all
available. Ike's shifting of Devers' successful and triumphant troops to
support Genl Patton, on the wrong side of the Rhine, was a dreadful blunder
which probably prolonged the war. Thanks for your post.
ldil...@EnterAct.com
DBSDESIGN
HREF="mailto:acl...@starcott.freeserve.co.uk">acl...@starcott.freeserve.co
.uk</A> wrote:
> In 1944, the UK had 55 fully-equipped mobile field divisions
> raised from within UK.
Ehh? "Fully equipped" is an exaggeration. They were running out
of troops and supplies by June 1944, particularly infantrymen
according to the British government. At that stage about the
only time British divisions were fully manned and equipped was
the day they landed, assuming all were at full complement to
begin with. I just read recently that official war strength in
1944 was 18,347 men for Infantry Divisions, and 14,964 for
Armoured Divisions. Only a pipe dream for some units.
>Eisenhower's insistence on Anvil/Dragoon meant that 55% of
>air forces, all the amphibious and naval support, and 5 divisions
>of troops, were withdrawn from Italy.
But Italy was mainly poor country for mobile operations. Ideal for
defense and mountain goats. They didn't need the naval support in
Italy during Aug 44 and they weren't moving much faster with the
extra air support, except in 1945, when air/ground cooperation
had been greatly improved upon.
Moreover, it was discovered after the war that the Wehrmacht
needed less than two percent of the railnet operable in Italy to
keep themselves well supplied there. The extra air power would
not make a difference in that respect either, since the air forces
estimated that at best, they could never bust more than 90
percent of Italy's rail lines. And then only temporarily.
>So stalemate ensued.
No more than previously. Moving up the boot in Italy was not much
more than a distraction, if not a complete waste of of time. I don't
see many attempts to justify it. None are convincing anyway.
> The Americans wanted to get Southern France. The landings
> in the Riveria were practically unopposed.
That in itself was a good reason to land in the Riviera instead
of slogging about in Italy. The concept of hitting them where
they ain't is as old as military strategy. Even self-serving
attempts to justify Churchill's decisions will not change it.
>Thirteen Allied divsions including an airborne division assaulted
>3 weak German divisions at the coasts.
Only three US divisions and a few fire support battalions
assaulted Southern France on August 15, plus a partially
equipped US Airborne Task Force. Which other divisions
were involved, and more importantly when did each land?
>That was the British main point: why wreck the Italian campaign
>in order to achieve so little?
Because they were achieving so little at a high cost in Italy.
>History suggests they were right.
Methinks you, not history, suggests they were right.
>US policy towards the USSR was frighteningly naive until then.
They weren't naive about it, they didn't have a choice. The
possibility of another war, this time with the Soviets,
would never be supported by the American public unless
the Soviets clearly started it. Churchill's interests were
not high on their list of priorities nor was keeping East
Germany free of the Soviets.
Tom Robertson
>At 12,000 men/division, that's about 7-8 divisions.
Did divisions in each army have the same number of soldiers as
divisions in every other army? I would find it strange if that were
standard.
Angus M McLellan
>"Andrew Clark" <A
>HREF="mailto:acl...@starcott.freeserve.co.uk">acl...@starcott.freeserve.co
>.uk</A> wrote:
>
>> In 1944, the UK had 55 fully-equipped mobile field divisions
>> raised from within UK.
>
>Ehh? "Fully equipped" is an exaggeration.
<deleted>
"Had 55 divisions" is a vast exagerration.
British divisions by 1944 were rather few in number. Those that served
outside the UK in 1944 or 1945 were 1, 6, 7, 11, 79 and Guards
Armoured, 1 and 6 Airborne plus the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 15, 36, 43, 46, 49,
50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 59 and 78 Divisions. 1 Armoured, 50 and 59
Divisions were broken up in the course of 1944 for replacements. None
of the units which remained in the UK - 38, 47 &c Divisions - were
field formations. We could stretch the total by including the Chindit
3 Indian Division, which was really a reorganised and reinforced 70
Division. Even if we did, we are nowhere near 55 divisions.
Nor, by the time the year ended, were these units entirely British.
Let's not forget the Canadian officers who served in British infantry
units under the CANLOAN programme. Nor, while we are on the subject,
the Polish ones who served inAfrican units (!), although I don't think
any of these ended up in Burma.
Further, there were hardly even 55 mobile divisions in the British
Army at any point in the war. A total of 50 divisions, excluding the
short-lived County ones and the rather notional RM Division, existed
at one time or other. For some of these, it is rather dubious that
they were ever fully equipped, mobile or field formations, let alone
all three at the same time. Take 2 Armoured, 12 and 23 Divisions for
example. The second pair managed none from three in their short
existences and 2 Armoured could never be said to have been fully
equipped.
Angus
Chris Manteuffel
No, but the French divisions were based on the American model. I was
just estimating (ie guessing).
It is true that US armoured divisions and infantry divisions have
different numbers of troops (and, to confuse people, there were two
types of American armored divisions).
None of this applies to the Germans, who had a bajillion TOE's for
their many differant division types over the years.
Chris Manteuffel
Greg Deych
heared little to nothing about it.
David Thornley
Andrew Clark <acl...@starcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote:
>
>Chris Manteuffel <foxb...@aol.com> wrote in message
>news:7vq584$a...@gazette.bcm.tmc.edu...
>> > The British Army's own study showed that the need for this plan was
>> more than the British had- they wanted more American forces put in
>> Italy for the plan. (The plan called for 25 divisions - that's more
>> than the UK army had over the entire world.)
>
divisions than that into action. On the other hand, they were needed
elsewhere.
>The British plan required only that troops, aircraft and landing ships
>already assigned to the Italian theatre remain there: the US 5th Army
>including a French corp & the Commonwealth/Empire 8th Army. No additional
>forces were requested.
It is extremely naive to think that the French would have continued to
fight in Italy during the liberation of France. The Americans sent
VI Corps only; Patch's Seventh Army was built into a real army by
divisions landed in France.
This force by D-Day in Normandy had already broken
>German resistance at Rome and advanced to the edge of the Po Valley. Left
>untouched, this force could have executed a 2 or 3 division amphibious
>landing in the Adriatic and thus broken through the Gothic line to the
>Italian/Austrian border.
Perhaps. The previous experience with amphibious end runs had not
been successful. Why would this landing work better than Anzio?
While Lucas was certainly more cautious than warranted, I don't
think Truscott was overcautious, and he said the Corps could have
had one night in Rome followed by eighteen months in PoW camps.
Eisenhower's insistence on Anvil/Dragoon meant
>that
>55% of air forces, all the amphibious and naval support, and 5 divisions of
>troops, were withdrawn from Italy.
The French troops were leaving regardless.
The remaining force, while large, did
>not
>have the ability to project sufficient combat power to break through the
>Gothic line in a head-on assault. So stalemate ensued.
>
Well, yes. The problem is that there would, eventually, be another
stalemate. Amphibious assaults might get the Allies to the Alps, but
it would be impossible to go further amphibiously.
>> The Americans wanted to get Southern France.
>
>The landings in the Riveria were practically unopposed. Thirteen Allied
>[Underestimations of German resistance elided.]
>Anvil/Dragoon was a sledgehammer to crack a nut. That was the British main
>point: why wreck the Italian campaign in order to achieve so little?
Now, what was the Italian campaign going to achieve?
Where could the Italian campaign have gone, once it took northern Italy?
The only way to go is through the mountains.
Now, the Italian attacks against Austria-Hungary in WWI have rather
monotonous names: the First through Twelfth Battles of the Isonzo.
In WWI, they really didn't see any other good way into Austria, and
as we can see from the names they didn't get very far.
Further, we can regard Anvil/Dragoon as an end run with respect to
the Italian campaign. It put Allied troops on the Italian border.
If the mountains were not much of an obstacle, this would mean
Allied troops attacking from France into the last German-held areas
of Italy.
The Germans didn't react to this possibility by evacuating Northwest
Italy, which suggests that they were not worried about Allied attacks
over the Alps.
Were the Alps to the East of Switzerland that much less of an obstacle,
so that the Allied forces from Italy could have fought through them to
campaign in Central Europe? The maps I have seen do not tell me that
those Alps were far easier than the more Western Alps.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Louis Capdeboscq
>of Genl Devers' 6thAG.
Ok, I wasn't sure, and too lasy to check...
(snip)
>Altogether, Devers' 6th AG had by this time beaten six of the eight
>divisions of the German 19th Army and had brought his forces to the *banks*
>of the Rhine mnear Strausborg and in the Belfort Gap. This accomplished by
>Nov. 26, 1944.
Yes, but the way your original post went, it sounded as if Devers had
cleared the bank of the Rhine. In fact, 6th Army Group had only reached that
river on two isolated spots. Yes, they had reached the Rhine, but that's far
from securing the bank of the river...
>As I wrote in my earlier post, Genl Devers now proposed to cross the Rhine
>at these locations, to exploit his forces' successes, only to have Ike
shift
>the direction of 6 AG's advance over his furious objection.
Yes.
>Yet is is a
>fact that at that location the Rhine was undefended at the time,
The Rhine itself was almost devoid of defenders at this time, yes. The
attackers had overrun and/or bypassed them. This doesn't mean that the
flanks of the crossers would have been secure.
>As you say, the fighting left a German pocket (Colmar) which lasted far
>longer than it need have.
Certainly. And which spread over a larger part of the banks of the Rhine
than the Allies controlled by late 1944. Hence my doubts about the way I had
read your statement.
(snip)
>Instead of surrounding and cutting off German forces in Colmar, US 7th Div
>joined with the French 1st Army in attacking the pocket and in pushing into
>the West Wall fortifications in the low Vosges.
Yes. This led to a lot of bloody fighting. Weather was poor, terrain was
difficult, French 1st Army was busy integrating lots of new (raw) troops, so
the going was slow.
>Hence, the 7th USA attacks
>had no impact on German preparations for the Ardennes counteroffensive,
>whereas had Devers' plans been sanctioned, ....
... said counteroffensive would either have been diverted to block him, or
to cut him off. In both cases, a more efficient use of German forces than
the Bulge...
>In none of the accounts I have read of Devers' 6th AG, have I encountered
>mention of tenuous supply lines or exhausted troops at this juncture.
Ok. I thought you mentioned crossing the Rhine (at Belfort) on the run after
moving from the south. The move northward was the time when I mentioned
exhausted troops, not the time when Strasbourg was taken.
For the rest, I agree that Devers' troops were underused.
Greg Deych
fighting? I have heard little to nothing about, which is somewhat odd
considering their present status as an elite outfit.
Carl Alex Nielsen
<382ad67e...@news.curie.dialix.com.au>...
> Speaking of Royal Marines.. what was their contribution to the
> fighting? I have heard little to nothing about, which is somewhat odd
> considering their present status as an elite outfit.
There where several Commando battallions taking part in the invasion.
I think the specialized units taking care of the infrastructure of the
Commonwealth beaches were also Royal Marines, but I'm not 100% sure.
--
Carl Alex Friis Nielsen
Love me - Take me as I think I am
Angus M McLellan
>Speaking of...what was the RM contribution to the fighting? I've
>heared little to nothing about it.
Commandos, no ?
There were Royal Marines on Crete in 1941, part of the MNBDO (IIRC -
Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation or something similar). The only
unit I've been able to find listed as being there was the 1 Coast
Regimenta RMA.
A Royal Marine Division definitely existed, apparently until late
1942, probably being formed sometime in 1940. This served wholly in
the UK. It probably included most or all of the dozen or so Royal
Marine Infantry Battalions serving in the UK in 1940-1942. For
whatever reason, the designation Royal Marine Light Infantry of the
First World War had been changed by 1939.
Most of the infantry of the Royal Marine Division - 1-3, 5, 7-10
battalions - were converted to Royal Marine Commandos between February
1942 and March 1944. RM Commandos served with the original Special
Service Brigade in Sicily and Italy (40, 41 Commandos), and with all
four Commando Brigades in NW Europe, the Mediterranean and the Far
East. Commandos 40 to 48 existed. ISTR that the Royal Marines'
association with the Royal Netherlands Marines began at this time.
[As an aside, if you want to see how similar the two seem to want to
be, try and catch the superb Royal Netherlands Marines' band if you
get the chance. Almost the double of the RM one.]
The 1st and 2nd Armoured Support Groups of the Royal Marines took part
in the D-Day landings, serving in NW Europe until August 1944 with
their collection of Centaur Close Support tanks - the only Centaur
guns tanks to see service.
Various surplus RM personnel, plus men from now unneeded Beach
Battalions, were formed into 6 RM Battalions (27, 28, 30-33) which
served in 116 Brigade (February 1945 onwards) and 117 Brigade (May
1945) in NW Europe.
The RM also provided Beach Battalions, AFAIK something vaguely similar
to the US Army's Engineer Special Brigades, at Normandy and elsewhere,
as well as crewing landing craft.
There are plenty of histories of the RM Commandos about, but I have
never seen one of the Royal Marines as a whole in WW II. Suggestions
anyone ?
Angus
Martin Rapier
> There where several Commando battallions taking part in the invasion.
> I think the specialized units taking care of the infrastructure of the
> Commonwealth beaches were also Royal Marines, but I'm not 100% sure.
A regiment of close support Centaurs was also manned by the Royal Marines
and took extremely heavy casualties - I think they may have run some of the
landing craft? At least one Commando battalion fought alongside 6th
Airborne for some time int eairborne bridgehead over the Orne.
My step-grandfather was in the Marines, and he was obviously doing
something as he was at Sicily, Salerno, Anzio and D-Day & had a chestful of
medals, but he died many years ago so I don't know what exactly - he was
also on some of the Murmansk Convoys.
Cheers
Martin.
Gavin Bailey
McLellan) wrote:
>>> In 1944, the UK had 55 fully-equipped mobile field divisions
>>> raised from within UK.
>>
>>Ehh? "Fully equipped" is an exaggeration.
><deleted>
>
>"Had 55 divisions" is a vast exagerration.
>
>British divisions by 1944 were rather few in number.
[snip UK division listing]
It's certainly fair to include 3rd Ind Div (ex-70th Br Div) - did you
get 36 Br Div? It's also worth remembering the UK components of
Indian divisions, which often included up to a third of their infantry
strength, as well as the independant Armoured Brigades (e.g. what
happened to most of 8th Armd Div).
Gavin Bailey
--
Fochinell
"Ancient Scots warcry" painted on the side of a Spitfire Mk XIV in 1944
- presumably without Air Ministry approval.