>
>> >> "Kris D." <f...@yahoo.com> wrote
>> >>
>> >> > After reading "Other Losses" by James Bacque - where he accuses
>> >> the
>> >> > allies of intentionally killing German POW's through starvation
>> >> > and maltreatment - I'm wondering how accurate his facts are.
>> >
>
>George Hardy answered, and his answer was not allowed to be published on this
>newsgroup:
>
>> >Quite true. I have visited Bretzenheim and Remagen (Sinzig) -- the
>> >site of two of the largest and worst of the camps. Both towns have
>> >public archives devoted to the camps, and in Bretzenheim there is an
>> >even better private collection with over 2,000 diaries and memoirs.
>> >No one else on this group has done anywhere near the research on this
>> >question that I have.
>> >
>> >> In December 1990, Stephen Ambrose chaired a conference of several
>> >> prominent historians to examine Bacque's book.
>> >
>> >No, to attack Bacque's book. Not a single person who supported Bacque
>> >was invited. Ambrose was very interested in protecting Ike's reputation,
>> >as Ambrose's career is very dependent on his pro-Ike position.
>> >
>> >> However, here is the meat of it:
>> >>
>> >> "Our first conclusion was that Mr. Bacque had made a major
>> >> historical discovery (1). There _was_ widespread mistreatment of
>> >> German prisoners in the spring and summer of 1945. Men were
>> >> beaten, denied water, forced to live in open camps without
>> >> shelter, given inadequate food rations and inadequate medical
>> >> care. Their mail was withheld. In some cases prisoners made a
>> >> "soup" of water and grass in order to deal with their hunger. Men
>> >> did die needlessly and inexcusably. This must be confronted, and
>> >> it is to Mr. Bacque's credit that he forces us to do so.
>> >
>> >Quite true. He overlooks German soldiers being turned out of a
>> >field hospital and being thrown into an open field ("cage" was the
>> >US Army term for where they were put) without any cover or aid for
>> >their medical condition. At Bretzenheim the PoWs were denied water
>> >even though there is a river (Nahe)only a few hundred yards away;
>> >the camp gates were then opened and those PoWs who went to get water
>> >were machine-gunned as "escaping".
>> >
>> >> Our second conclusion was that when scholars do the necessary
>> >> research, they will find Mr. Bacque's work to be worse than
>> >> worthless.
>> >
>> >Yes, that was their conclusion. But Bacque wrote "Crimes and Mercies"
>> >in 1997, which clearly showed that Ambrose and his associates were
>> >wrong, not Bacque. He detailed just how the loss was accounted for
>> >(single entry bookkeeping -- transfer out a PoW, but no other camp
>> >has an offsetting "transfer in". Defenders of the Allies actions
>> >say that these PoWs are still "in transit".)
>> >
>> >> (1) I would point out that Ambrose had obviously not read the
>> >> official British history of military government in Germany, which
>> >> makes the US abuse of POWs very clear.
>> >
>> >True, but the British history is very poor on the mistreatment of
>> >German PoWs by the British. Read Krustein, Eva, "Eva's War", ISBN
>> >0-938513-08-7, and Gollancz, Victor, "In Darkest Germany", Henry
>> >Regnery Co., 1947.
>> >
>> >Bacque has revised Other Losses (ISBN: 1-55168-191-9, 1999). Ambrose
>> >has been totally silent since his 1992 "Eisenhower and the German POWs".
>> >Ambrose realizes he cannot win his case, as the proof is there.
>> >
>> >Why is not more made of this attrocity? Because it is not in the
>> >national interest of either Germany or the USA. Keep in mind that
>> >Germany is still occupied by US troops.
>> >
>> >GFH
>>
>>This is discussion of post-war historiography.
>
>Then one of the moderators wrote:
>
>>Rejected. As per the regularly posted (weekly) rules (FAQ) of this
>>moderated newsgroup, we cannot post messages that are not specifically
>>about WW2, its causes, course, and consequences, and specifically limited
>>to the period 1918-1950.
>>
>>Your post falls outside these bounds and is therefore off topic.
>
>Now this is Heinz. I fail to see why George Hardy's post is not sopecifically
>about WWII (it deals with prisoners of war from that conflict), its
>consequences (the PW camps along the Rhine river) and the period 1918-1950 (the
>camps were opened in April 1945 and existed at least until the fall of that
>year).
>
>I very respectfully ask that posts about the post-war treatment of PWs be
>allowed to appear in this newsgroup.
>
>-- Heinz
>
>
>
> HCAl...@aol.com (Heinz Altmann)
>
>"I have no desire to win, only to get things right." A.J.P. Taylor
Rejected. As per the regularly posted (weekly) rules (FAQ) of this moderated newsgroup, we cannot post messages that are not specifically about WW2, its causes, course, and consequences, and specifically limited to the period 1918-1950.
Your post falls outside these bounds and is therefore off topic.
Please note that there is an Appeals procedure, detailed in the FAQ, posted weekly, and that the rejecting moderator plays no part in it. So messaging me with complaints/arguments is pointless. You are, however, encouraged to use the correct appeals procedure which is *not* pointless.
Phil (one of the moderators)
To say the least. They existed until 1947. Yes, they wre upgraded,
but PoW camps existed. When were you released? 1945? No. 1946?
No. 1947.
And, I falied to mention that there was *no* supply problem. Adequate
food was available. The US Army had on hand 1 billion rations at the
end of the war. Tents on hand in Euope exceeded any anticipated need
by a factor of two. And, in addition, the US Army confiscated 2.5M
rations a day from the German population. (Rations were 4,000 C.)
That 2.5M was increased to 3M in August, 1945. By October the US
Army had 1.36B rations on hand and had not room to store them. Ike
ordered that the food be BURNED!!!
The Red Cross had on hand at the end of the war 13M packages. The
Red Cross sent a train load to Augsburg. They arrived but were
returned unopened with the statement that the condition of railroads
in Germany was so bad that the rations could not get to Augsburg. A
good example of US Army thinking at the time.
Around Bretzenheim food was stacked. As were all sorts of other
supplies. When Bretzenheim was turned over to the French in July,
1945, only two field kitchens were in use (one in the women's cage;
one in the hospital cage). The French issued field kitchens, on hand,
at the level of 3 per 1,000 PoWs.
Anyone who doubts that the US Army had the supplies on hand is
doubting
the very factor -- great supplies and good Quartermasters Corps --
which
was the hallmark of the US effort in WWII.
GFH
> And, I falied to mention that there was *no* supply problem.
Adequate
> food was available.
Some facts have to be injected here.
Firstly, there was a very widespread shortage of food in
continental Europe in the autumn and winter of 1945/46. France
was largely able to feed itself with some minor help, but
Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Norway were all in desperate need
of food imports. Germany too was desperately short of food due to
the loss of its food production and distribution networks and the
loss of its main food-producing areas in the East. Faced with the
possibility of widespread starvation across Europe, the Anglo-US
policy was that the populations of the liberated nations should
be fed first and if necessary at the expense of the German
population. This was harsh but probably just given that Germany
had waxed fat on the output of the liberated nations for six
years.
Secondly, the Hague convention requires that POWs receive roughly
the same rations as the capturing army feeds to its own soldiers.
This legal requirement would mean that the millions of captured
Germans in military uniforms in Allied hands would consume a
gigantic amount of food which would thus be lost to the liberated
civilian nations. Eisenhower acting on the wishes of Truman and
the State Department, but against legal advice and against
British wishes, thus decided to reclassify all German military
not captured in the course of military operations as "Disarmed
Enemy Combatants". This, Eisenhower felt, obviated the specific
requirements of the Hague convention and enabled the Allies to
feed such captured people a diet more fitting with that being
provided at the same time to German civilians.
The figures for food and relief supplies available to the US Army
quoted by Mr Hardy have to be read in this light. The first
priority was Allied military and occupation force needs, then
"real POWs", then the civilian needs of the liberated countries,
then the German civil population, and lastly "DECs". While this
policy was unlawful and extraordinarily harsh and carried to
unnecessarily brutal extremes, it was nevertheless in essence
just, given that the German armed forces had lived on the food
supplies of its conquests for five years.
> Ike ordered that the food be BURNED!!!
I have not found any reference to this order or event, and it
seems highly unlikely that Eisenhower would have ordered the
destruction of food which was vitally needed in the liberated
nations. What is your source?
> >> >Yes, that was their conclusion. But Bacque wrote "Crimes and Merci=
es"
> >> >in 1997, which clearly showed that Ambrose and his associates were
> >> >wrong, not Bacque. He detailed just how the loss was accounted for
> >> >Bacque has revised Other Losses (ISBN: 1-55168-191-9, 1999). Ambro=
se
> >> >has been totally silent since his 1992 "Eisenhower and the German P=
OWs".
> >> >Ambrose realizes he cannot win his case, as the proof is there.
The correct interpretation of the lack of published rebuttals to
Bacque's
"Crimes and Mercies" is that Bacque was so thoroughly discredited
after
the critical analysis of the first book that there was neither the
need,
nor the market, to publish a second corrective. Several things go
into
this. One is the idea that it's better not to call attention to
cranks=20
than to give them publicity. It's especially appropriate given
that=20
Bacque's first book achieved wide public visibility, while the
second=20
has been largely ignored by the public and the press. A second
factor=20
is simply that it's tedious and boring to spend one's energy analyzing
and rebutting lousy work. There's nothing more frustrating to
academics
than having to fix someone else's shoddy work or having to cover the
same tired and discredited arguments over and over again. =20
Of course, "Crimes and Mercies" has been subjected to critical
analysis
and found to be no better than "Other Losses". You can find a brief
summation of one such discussion at:=20
http://www.ghi-dc.org/bulletinF98/bulletin_f98.html (search for
Bacque)
The summary of one participant's view seems particularly apropos:
"G=FCnter Bischof (University of New Orleans) viewed Bacque's thesis
as=
=20
part of the trend toward a "paranoid style" in writing recent
history.
This style is characterized by five elements: the image of a huge=20
conspiracy, a self-bestowed duty to save civilization from
apocalypse,=20
a manichean worldview of absolute good versus absolute evil, the=20
conviction that traitors make history, and the amassing of evidence
to
prove a preconceived thesis. Bischof found traces of all these
elements=20
in Bacque's writing, and he bemoaned the publishing industry's
zest=20
for "conspiracy history.""
For the fun of it, I'd suggest that anyone who's interested in this
topic
ought to do a Google search for James Bacque Crimes and Mercies. The
kin=
ds
of sites that come up are quite informative.
Jim Erickson
> Firstly, there was a very widespread shortage of food in
> continental Europe in the autumn and winter of 1945/46.
That is the official line, but not exactly correct. The USA did
not suffer crop failures; Canada supplied large quantities of
food. It flies in the face of logic that in 1944 nations at war
had plenty of food, yet in the second half 1945, with not war and
no crop failure, the world was starving. It is true that the
Germans were unable to harvest their winter wheat crop -- at
Bretzenheim 400 hectars of wheat was a DEF cage. But the loss
of two square miles of wheat does not create starvation.
> Eisenhower acting on the wishes of Truman and the State Department,
Truman? Ike was building the Rhine Meadow camps in early April. FDR
was the President then. And it takes time to put plans into action.
The only reason the DEF actions were not taken earlier (and some were
in France -- USA but German PoWs in France) was fear of retaliation
by the Germans. No, put the blame where it belongs -- Ike and FDR,
and include Marshall.
> but against legal advice and against British wishes, thus decided
> to reclassify all German military not captured in the course of
> military operations as "Disarmed Enemy Combatants".
And what about SEP? Not heard of them -- Separated Enemy Personnel --
the British term for exactly the same status for German PoWs. OK, the
British had less food the provide, and basic shelter was not
deliberately
withheld despite its availability. But the British held German PoWs
in their camps. Why? In Japan, we told the Japanese troops in the
home
islands to 'just go home'. No DEF status. Why? Were the Japanese
"better people"?
> > Ike ordered that the food be BURNED!!!
>
> What is your source?
Littlejohn to Eisenhower, October 10, 1945; Eisenhower to Littlejohn,
October 14, 1945. RG 92, Office of the QMG, General Correspondence,
Subject File 1936 - 1945, Box 587 NARS, Washington, D.C.
GFH
I am fascinated by the claim that Eisenhower was acting on the
wishes of Truman. Do you have any evidence? And reference? I
can quote an Eisenhower letter dated March 10, 1945 -- a full month
prior to FDR's death -- which uses "disarmed enemy forces" and
states that "plans have been prepared on this basis."
It is my understanding that, in large measure, Truman was kept in
the dark by FDR and his administration regarding the conduct of
the war. I point to the a-bomb as an example. But you assert, I
claim you made up, that Truman was in charge of planning for post
war Germany in early March 1945.
As you often post, references please.
GFH
OK, the British did not like the term "Disarmed Enemy Forces" --
to get the term DEF, one should look for an "F" word to substitute
for "Combatants" -- so they used the term Surrendered enemy Personnel,
known as SEP. Still the effects were the same, the reduction of
rations followed. You may argue that the British did not have the
rations to distribute; I would argue that they did, just as the US
did. As Senator Wherry pointed out AT THE TIME: "The truth is that
there are thousands upon thousands of tons of military rations in
our surplus stock piles that have been spoiling right in the midst of
staving populations." I remember eating WWII field rations in the
Boy Scouts in 1949 and 1950. The dates on the packages indicated 1944
and 1945. Yes, surplus!
GFH
There was a widespread, world wide, shortage of food in
1945 and, in Europe, a worse one in 1946. It took some
three years to make the food situation satisfactory. I have
heard some Japanese starved to death in late 1945 and early
1946 due to the food shortage in Japan.
In 1944 one of the hidden strains on the allied logistic system
was feeding Paris.
German food stores had been raided to produce alcohol for
fuel. The German agriculture sector relied on large numbers
of non German labourers, 1 in 5 of the German workforce in late
1944 was a foreign or slave labourer, the spring planting was
interrupted by the fighting not to mention lack of fuel and
fertilizers.
Those synthetic oil plants did more than just produce avgas.
Large numbers of Germans had been displaced from the east
(12 to 14 million?). The economy was in ruins.
In 1945 the British reduced rations to the civilian population.
The French economy, a year after liberation, was still not running
well.
When the allies tried to restart the German economy they ran
into the sort of circular we need coal to generate electricity
and electricity to mine coal loops.
There was still a major shortfall in merchant ships, in 1945 mainly
because of the needs of the projected invasion of Japan.
> It is true that the
>Germans were unable to harvest their winter wheat crop -- at
>Bretzenheim 400 hectars of wheat was a DEF cage. But the loss
>of two square miles of wheat does not create starvation.
The loss of an entire crop, coupled with pre existing shortages,
like in Holland, coupled with misuse of stocks does. Scorched
earth in the east would not have helped. We are talking about
interrupting food supplies for hundreds of millions of people.
Not to mention how starving people raid herds and flocks thereby
increasing the food shortages (fewer eggs and milk sort of thing,
plus raiding seed stores).
>> Eisenhower acting on the wishes of Truman and the State Department,
>
>Truman? Ike was building the Rhine Meadow camps in early April. FDR
>was the President then. And it takes time to put plans into action.
>The only reason the DEF actions were not taken earlier (and some were
>in France -- USA but German PoWs in France) was fear of retaliation
>by the Germans. No, put the blame where it belongs -- Ike and FDR,
>and include Marshall.
DEF and SEP categories came into being on the basis the German
government was abolished. A nice neat legal way, since there was
no more war but no German government to turn the men over to, not
to mention no German government for the red cross to represent.
The allies stopped taking POWs in either April or May 1945. Non
POWs could be held longer, used for more tasks and could be
given lower rations. The last POW shipments to North America
were in April 1945.
It was expected there would be shortages of food and accomodation
in Germany in 1945, the SEP and DEF categories were set up in
1944, the allies did not expect to have the resources to be able to
treat the expected large number of German POWs to the Geneva
convention standards. There were some 13,000,000 men in the
German military in late 1944. The allies ended up with 9,000,000
of them in Italy and Germany. Given the numbers involved it would
have been remarkable if no shortages of food or shelter had occurred.
Add the people pushed west fleeing the Soviets, the 7 to 8 million
foreign workers in Germany wanting to go home and the statement
"German POWs ate hardly at all in the first days of captivity and very
little in the first weeks of May and June, civilians and displaced
persons fared little better" is not surprising.
With all the hatred from the war, then the discovery of the camp
system it was easy to impliment the policy of Germans last if
there were any shortages. At the same time the allies realised
they could not starve Germany to death.
>> but against legal advice and against British wishes, thus decided
>> to reclassify all German military not captured in the course of
>> military operations as "Disarmed Enemy Combatants".
>
>And what about SEP? Not heard of them -- Separated Enemy Personnel --
>the British term for exactly the same status for German PoWs. OK, the
>British had less food the provide, and basic shelter was not
>deliberately withheld despite its availability. But the British held
>German PoWs in their camps. Why? In Japan, we told the Japanese
>troops in the home islands to 'just go home'. No DEF status. Why?
>Were the Japanese "better people"?
It was called denazification, it was because the Japanese did
not have an SS, nor a major extermination program. No masses
of foreign workers to melt into or easy escapes for possible war
criminals, how many non Japanese organisations helped people
migrate to another continent? The Japanese the allies wanted were
relatively easy to identify and small in numbers. As well most of
the people the allies wanted were still outside Japan, since the
deployment of Japanese military forces was almost totally one
way from Japan to the war zones in China and the south.
Sending people from outside Germany into Germany would have
made the situation worse in 1945.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
> That is the official line, but not exactly correct. The USA
did
> not suffer crop failures; Canada supplied large quantities of
> food. It flies in the face of logic that in 1944 nations at
war
> had plenty of food, yet in the second half 1945, with not war
and
> no crop failure, the world was starving.
It certainly does not fly in the face of logic. The population of
continental Europe consumed millions of tons of food every day,
an amount far exceeding the Commonwealth and US production
surplus or indeed the shipping capacity of the Allies. European
food had for this reason to come overwhelmingly from European
sources. These had been gravely disrupted by the war in all sorts
of ways. The acute shortage of POL and coal meant that there was
no transport to move workers and foodstuffs or electricity to run
mills, factories, dairies and milking sheds. Trained agricultural
manpower was scattered across Europe. Mining and munitions
obstructed some land. Communications were destroyed. The finance
to sustain a commercial farming network was not available. There
is no historical data whatsoever to support the fact that there
was an unavoidable acute shortage of food in NW Europe in the
winter of 1945/46.
> It is true that the
> Germans were unable to harvest their winter wheat crop -- at
> Bretzenheim 400 hectars of wheat was a DEF cage. But the loss
> of two square miles of wheat does not create starvation.
This is a silly example. Firstly, Germany had lost its most
fertile and extensive agricultural land to the USSR. Secondly,
the bulk of Germany's agricultural manpower was in the amed
forces or scattered across Europe. And thirdly, as mentioned
above, there was no transport, POL, coal or other essential
elements to enable the harvest to be taken in. In the British
zone, 21 Army Group organised operation Winter Harvest
specifically to enable the German winter harvest to be as fully
gathered as possible. Millions of German servicemen were screened
for agricultural skills and tens of thousands organised into
work battalions which were sent in British Army transport and
with British Army rations to German frams to work on the harvest.
As a result, about 80% of the German winter harvest in the
British zone (which was only about 10% of the total normal winter
harvest) was in fact gathered. Neither the French nor US zone
commanders bothered to copy the British example, while the USSR
ruthlessly collected the far greater eastern harvest and shipped
it away into the USSR.
> Truman? Ike was building the Rhine Meadow camps in early
April. FDR
> was the President then. And it takes time to put plans into
action.
Truman was US President in the winter of 1945, and it was he who,
for example, refused British requests that Allied shipping be
allocated to shipping wheat from Canada to stop mass starvation
in Germany. It was, however, Roosevelt who said his vision of
post-war Germany was a ruin with the people being fed from US
Army soup kitchens.
> Littlejohn to Eisenhower, October 10, 1945; Eisenhower to
Littlejohn,
> October 14, 1945. RG 92, Office of the QMG, General
Correspondence,
> Subject File 1936 - 1945, Box 587 NARS, Washington, D.C.
Could you tell us what this letter says and give details of the
specific incident of ration-destruction to which you refer?
There was a widespread, world wide, shortage of food in
1945 and, in Europe, a worse one in 1946. It took some
three years to make the food situation satisfactory. I have
heard some Japanese starved to death in late 1945 and early
1946 due to the food shortage in Japan.
In 1944 one of the hidden strains on the allied logistic system
was feeding Paris.
German food stores had been raided to produce alcohol for
fuel. The German agriculture sector relied on large numbers
of non German labourers, 1 in 5 of the German workforce in late
1944 was a foreign or slave labourer, the spring planting was
interrupted by the fighting not to mention lack of fuel and
fertilizers.
Those synthetic oil plants did more than just produce avgas.
Large numbers of Germans had been displaced from the east
(12 to 14 million?). The economy was in ruins.
In 1945 the British reduced rations to the civilian population.
The French economy, a year after liberation, was still not running
well.
When the allies tried to restart the German economy they ran
into the sort of circular we need coal to generate electricity
and electricity to mine coal loops.
There was still a major shortfall in merchant ships, in 1945 mainly
because of the needs of the projected invasion of Japan.
> It is true that the
>Germans were unable to harvest their winter wheat crop -- at
>Bretzenheim 400 hectars of wheat was a DEF cage. But the loss
>of two square miles of wheat does not create starvation.
The loss of an entire crop, coupled with pre existing shortages,
like in Holland, coupled with misuse of stocks does. Scorched
earth in the east would not have helped. We are talking about
interrupting food supplies for hundreds of millions of people.
Not to mention how starving people raid herds and flocks thereby
increasing the food shortages (fewer eggs and milk sort of thing,
plus raiding seed stores).
>> Eisenhower acting on the wishes of Truman and the State Department,
>
>Truman? Ike was building the Rhine Meadow camps in early April. FDR
>was the President then. And it takes time to put plans into action.
>The only reason the DEF actions were not taken earlier (and some were
>in France -- USA but German PoWs in France) was fear of retaliation
>by the Germans. No, put the blame where it belongs -- Ike and FDR,
>and include Marshall.
DEF and SEP categories came into being on the basis the German
>> but against legal advice and against British wishes, thus decided
>> to reclassify all German military not captured in the course of
>> military operations as "Disarmed Enemy Combatants".
>
>And what about SEP? Not heard of them -- Separated Enemy Personnel --
>the British term for exactly the same status for German PoWs. OK, the
>British had less food the provide, and basic shelter was not
>deliberately withheld despite its availability. But the British held
>German PoWs in their camps. Why? In Japan, we told the Japanese
>troops in the home islands to 'just go home'. No DEF status. Why?
>Were the Japanese "better people"?
It was called denazification, it was because the Japanese did
> Still the effects were the same, the reduction of
> rations followed.
You persistently ignore the substance of my postings in favour of
marginal points. As I said earlier, and which you ingnored, "The
first priority was Allied military and occupation force needs,
then "real POWs", then the civilian needs of the liberated
countries, then the German civil population, and lastly "DEFs".
While this policy was unlawful and extraordinarily harsh and
carried to unnecessarily brutal extremes, it was nevertheless in
essence just, given that the German armed forces had lived on the
food supplies of its conquests for five years".
What is your views on that statement?
> You may argue that the British did not have the
> rations to distribute; I would argue that they did, just as the
US
> did.
Then you must explain the very considerable contemporary document
and witness evidence to the contrary, such as that contained in
the British official history of military government in Europe and
the official histories of the Control Commission for Germany.
Tell us specifically where the Allies concealed the millions of
tons of food which you allege they had in the winter of 1945, and
say what happened to it. If you can't do this, this debate is
just hot air.
As Senator Wherry pointed out AT THE TIME: "The truth is that
> there are thousands upon thousands of tons of military rations
in
> our surplus stock piles that have been spoiling right in the
midst of
> staving populations."
Ah, Senator Wherry. The right-wing homophobe isolationist,
laughing stock of the Senate and chief McCarthyite. Hardly what
one would call a reliable, balanced witness. And what evidence
did Senator Wherry have for his claims? Again, can you tell us
specifically where the Allies concealed millions of tons of food
in the winter of 1945 and what happened to it?
> I am fascinated by the claim that Eisenhower was acting on the
> wishes of Truman.
The German surrender took place in May 1945, when Truman was
president. That means that it was his responsibility to agree or
countermand the final post-surrender orders to Eisenhower via the
CCoS. Roosevelt certainly confirmed the pre-surrender plans, but
Truman had to confirm the actual orders. Surely that isn't
difficult to understand?
I'd be more interested in your views on the substantive issues
rather than this rather diversionary point .
--
> this debate is just hot air.
Quite true. Nothing I can say will change one thing. The US and
UK will still have operated PoW (concentration) camps. The only
difference between us and the Germans will remain the color of
the uniforms. The Polish-German War was started by the Poles,
British and Germans -- responsibility in that order. That local
war expanded to a world war mostly, indeed almost exclusively,
because of Britain and Lord Halifax. (That wording from David
Hoggan.)
As Heinz pointed out, this quesiton was covered before, as was
the question of whether there was a sudden loss of food in 1945;
whether there was a lack of transport in 1945-48 while we were
eliminating Liberty ships. I looked up all of the numbers. You,
and others, objected because some of my references were not
conveniently at hand for you.
Yes, hot air. I quote a US Senator; you call him a homophobe.
Whether true or not, I do not see the relevance. To mention the
fact that Senator Richard Russel, Jr., also agreed is to invite
another attack. To mention that McCarthy was correct about the
infiltration of USSR/communist sympathizers/spies in the FDR
administration and the entertainment media is not to support
his tactics, but to admit he was correct about the danger to the
US. Thanks to him and Truman, the horrors of the Morgenthau Plan
and JCS-1067 were limited in time and scope. Hoover refused to
head the food relief operation until Ike was relieved. Ike had
the god sense to leave quietly.
Yes, hot air. What happened, happened. The moving finger writes,
and having writ, moves on; nor all your piety nor wit shall lure it
back to cancel half a line; nor all your tears wash out a word of
it. It happened. We did it. If the Germans have to face it;
why not us also?
GFH
> . . . The Polish-German War was started by the Poles,
> British and Germans -- responsibility in that order
(citing an author named David Hoggan.)
Readers still need to know how,
when party C starts the killing by bombing and
invading party A, it is party C that deserves
"prime responsibility" for initiating the war.
If cogent reasons may be provided, readers
might be able to understand how party B
(that was not invaded and did not invade
anyone) could be more responsible than
party C, the one that shot first.
--
Donald Phillipson
dphil...@trytel.com
Carlsbad Springs (Ottawa, Canada)
613 822 0734
> Quite true. Nothing I can say will change one thing.
I wrote:
"Tell us specifically where the Allies concealed the millions of
tons of food which you allege they had in the winter of 1945, and
say what happened to it. If you can't do this, this debate is
just hot air". I'm assuming by your lack of any substantive
response that you can't answer this question. If you can't answer
it, what on earth do you base your certainty upon? Hot air?
> The US and
> UK will still have operated PoW (concentration) camps. The
only
> difference between us and the Germans will remain the color of
> the uniforms. The Polish-German War was started by the Poles,
> British and Germans -- responsibility in that order. That
local
> war expanded to a world war mostly, indeed almost exclusively,
> because of Britain and Lord Halifax. (That wording from David
> Hoggan.)
Nice try at throwing some inflammatory comments into the ring to
distract attention from your failure to produce documentary
evidence for your claims. The real pity is that a historically
important episode clearly exhibiting Allied (mainly American)
incompetence, brutality and failure to observe civilised norms in
WW2 is becoming obscured by your exaggerated and conspiratorial
claims of a policy of deliberate mass starvation and the
deliberate destruction of available food.
> As Heinz pointed out, this quesiton was covered before, as was
> the question of whether there was a sudden loss of food in
1945;
> whether there was a lack of transport in 1945-48 while we were
> eliminating Liberty ships.
The question: "where did the Allies conceal the millions of tons
of food which you allege they had in the winter of 1945, what
happened to it?" has not been answered by anyone. The issue of a
lack of shipping in 1945-48 has not been raised in this thread at
all.
> I looked up all of the numbers. You,
> and others, objected because some of my references were not
> conveniently at hand for you.
Again, it is really insufficient to misrepresent the text in
order to fabricate an reply. You told me of letters in a box in
America. Given that rooting in the said box is not an immediately
available option to most of this NG, I said: "Could you tell us
what this letter says and give details of the specific incident
of ration-destruction to which you refer?". that is not
"objecting", it is an eminently reasonable and sensible request.
You, OTOH, have not yet been able to say what is in the letters
which you quote as your source.
> Yes, hot air. I quote a US Senator; you call him a homophobe.
> Whether true or not, I do not see the relevance.
Then you show a lamentable lack of ability to read my posts. In
full, I said: "Ah, Senator Wherry. The right-wing homophobe
isolationist, laughing stock of the Senate and chief McCarthyite.
Hardly what one would call a reliable, balanced witness". The
credibility of a witness is entirly relevant to his testimony in
every court in the western world.
> To mention the
> fact that Senator Richard Russel, Jr., also agreed is to invite
> another attack.
Now you are displaying predictive telepathy, which is unwise to
say the least. In fact, I'd be quite interested in learning what
Senator Russell (I presume the Senator Russell who served on the
Armed Services Committee) actually said on this issue. I have
never denied that the US treated its prisoners shamefully (I said
in fact: "While this
policy was unlawful and extraordinarily harsh and carried to
unnecessarily brutal extremes..."). There was plenty for Senators
to criticise without those criticisms making your outlandish
claims true. However, the onus is now on you to tell us what
Russell actually said.
> Thanks to him and Truman, the horrors of the Morgenthau Plan
> and JCS-1067 were limited in time and scope.
I have no information about Maccarcty's involvement in this
matter. However, it is no secret that Roosevelt approved
Morgenthau's plan, and that Stimson and others had to work hard
to persuade Roosevelt to formally abandon it.
JCS 1067 was neither an Allied order nor a re-issue of the
Morgenthau plan. It was the US's domestic instructions to
Eisenhower *as commander of US forces in the ETO* for the
military government of the US sector of Germany. The British
refused to accept the principles of JCS 1067, with the
consequence that there was never a formal CCoS directive to SHAEF
on the military government of Germany. SHAEF did issue various
policies and handbooks of practice of its own motion, based
largely on 21 Army Group's pre-Normandy work, but these were
mainly ignored in the US zone in favour of JCS 1067.
On the other hand, much of JCS 1067 was not altogether
objectionable in itself. The requirement that Germany was "not to
be occupied for the purposes of liberation but as a defeated
enemy nation." and that the country was to be disarmed,
decentralized and de - Nazified was entirely proper. So too was
the requirement that occupation administrators would be "just,
but firm and aloof" and that fraternization between occupiers and
occupied would be "strongly discouraged."
Given that the civilian Control Commission was to be responsible
for the regeneration of Germany, and that JCS 1067 only dealt
with the shortlived period of direct military government, it was
also fair - if impractical - to stipulate that *military*
assistance to German political institutions would be limited to
that necessary to prevent civil unrest and disease and to lay the
foundation for eventual democratic rule, that *military*
administrators should do nothing to revive German economic or
financial institutions and that key industries were to be
strictly controlled. In reality, these latter requirements were
quickly abandoned.
> It happened. We did it. If the Germans have to face it;
> why not us also?
I entirely agree that "we" have to face "it". The question is
what that "it" actually consists of.
The difference between US and German concentration camps is
notable, even leaving out the German death camps. There is no good
evidence that more than several thousand German PoWs died due to
Allied neglect (which is shameful enough), and Allied PoW camps
did not come with shower facilities with Zyklon-B.
The Polish-German War was started by the Poles,
>British and Germans -- responsibility in that order.
The Poles were not charming negotiation partners, but they seem
not to have started a war since, perhaps, 1920. They fought for
their national territory. The British supported German expansion
until Germany expanded into a non-German area in violation of
earlier promises. The British were well aware that the Germans
had grievances over Versailles, considered at least some of them
legitimate, and either cooperated in or allowed German defiance.
It is hard for an honest student to study the events of 1933-39
and conclude that Germany was being a victim in these years.
It is, of course, especially hard if the student looks at
internal German sources, which show a steadfast hatred of Poland
and plans to enslave the Poles.
That local
>war expanded to a world war mostly, indeed almost exclusively,
>because of Britain and Lord Halifax. (That wording from David
>Hoggan.)
>
It expanded to a world war because Britain would not make peace
with Nazi Germany, and this is not due to Halifax but to Chamberlain
and Churchill. Nazi Germany had shown itself to be a military
danger to all its neighbors, and unrestrainable by diplomacy.
One of the biggest developments of course, was the unprovoked
attack Germany made without warning on its ally, the Soviet Union.
>As Heinz pointed out, this quesiton was covered before, as was
>the question of whether there was a sudden loss of food in 1945;
There doesn't have to be a sudden loss of food. Food has a tendency
to go away. People eat it. It has to be restored, and that proved
very difficult in 1945-46.
>whether there was a lack of transport in 1945-48 while we were
>eliminating Liberty ships. I looked up all of the numbers. You,
>and others, objected because some of my references were not
>conveniently at hand for you.
>
The Allies always suffered from a shipping shortage during the
war. Always. The Pacific could swallow up vast fleets of
Liberty ships. Even after V-J day, the US had to cope with
famine in Asia and Japan caused by Japanese actions.
It is also important to note that Europe in general produced
its own food. Importing it would require massive amounts of
shipping, since food is bulky and is needed in very large
quantities. The Western Allies were responsible for hundreds
of millions of people in Western Europe after the war, and
that would seem to translate into billions of tons of food.
>head the food relief operation until Ike was relieved. Ike had
>the god sense to leave quietly.
>
Ike left in order to take the one Army assignment senior to what
he had, Marshall's old job. It is not customary to fight such
promotions, particularly when one intends to run for President
(Patton had realized this ambition shortly after the end of
the war).
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
I've been following this thread, and I'm appalled that you believe this
nonsense. Much like Heinz and his romantic and biased views on the SS, this
massive POW death his sheer revisionist garbage (like the recent IBM/Nazi
connection). They had concentration camps in the US, no doubt. Anyone
interested in US treatment of German POWS should checkout how they were
treated here. They paid the German soldiers to work the fields near my house
(my grandmother--a young women then--cooked them apple pies and went to
church with them) while US soldiers died fighting in Europe. We treated them
very well, even provided USO entertainment and turkey christmas dinners.
Quite a few of those Germans stayed here, btw. I've read the professional
historians response to these accusations, and you should too. They stopped
just short of calling the nonsense completely unfounded garbage.
>The only difference between us and the Germans will remain the color of
> the uniforms
If you believe every revisionist book you read, sure. If you see the SS as
the precursor to NATO, and think that the poor German people were just
mislead and only followed orders when they murdered their neighbors, and if
you think that Allied bombing was just another form of Holocaust, then yeah,
you'd probably be ill-informed and think that the US was no different than
the German. You'd be wrong, too, of course. And of course, nothing _I_ can
say will slow the amount of revisionist garbage posted here.
Shawn A. Fisher
safi...@swbell.net
-----------------------------------------------------
"Greater love has no one than this,
that he lay down his life for his friends."
--John 15:13
--
> The Polish-German War was started by the Poles,
> British and Germans -- responsibility in that order.
You might be able to get away with this statement if Germany had
settled for taking Danzig and the Polish Corridor. Britain actually
made a proposal to that effect to Hitler. However you are totally
ignoring the secret part of the German-USSR pact that provided for the
division of Poland. You are also ignoring the fact that the British
ultimatum asked for the removal of German troops from Polish
territory.
I suppose you could make the point that the Poles should have made it
clear they would resist if invaded. You could also argue the point
that Britain should have made it clearer that they would honour
publicly declared treaty obligations. After all they had sold Belgium
out in WW1 had they not?
If you want to argue about how good Allied treatment of Germans was
in 1945 and 1946 I would stick to that. You have a good argument about
food shortages. I believe Heinz. What you Mr. Hardy need to prove is
that was deliberate policy on the part of the Allied governments,
rather than the result of incompetence. Arguments about who started
the war in the first place are irrelevant.
By the way the Morgenthau Plan was intended to destroy German
industry and reduce it to a purely agricultural nation not about mass
starvation of the German population.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Maternity is a matter of fact
Paternity is a matter of opinion
--
>Heinz and his romantic and biased views on the SS
Seeing that you pulled me into this flaming post of yours, please tell me in
which way I am romantic and biased when I defend the individual Waffen-SS men
whom I have known.
>"Greater love has no one than this,
>that he lay down his life for his friends."
>--John 15:13
It can be argued with some justification that many of the Waffen-SS men did
just that. They died protecting guys like me.
I do not deny or excuse excesses committed in battle, after battle and even
well behind the lines. Much of that was criminal and should, and has been,
treated accordingly. I am merely saying that not all Waffen-SS men were
criminals and to treat them as criminals is very unfair. Does that make me a
romantic? I think not. I think I am pleading for realism, not romanticism. Am
I biased? Probably, but I was there. Were you? Did you ever know a Waffen-SS
man?
-- Heinz
HCAl...@aol.com (Heinz Altmann)
"I have no desire to win, only to get things right." A.J.P. Taylor
--
> The only difference between us and the Germans will remain the color of the uniforms.
If you honestly believe this, I pity you. To make such a claim with a
straight face, your moral barometer
would have to be so defective that you would have to be morally
rudderless.
The Allies were not perfect angels or saints. But to say that the
Americans and British were no different
from the Nazis is patently absurd.
Allow me to use a metaphor. If a bully (i.e., Nazi Germany) in a
neighborhood (i.e., Europe) has been
beating up children (i.e., Austria, Czechoslovakia, Memel, Poland) and
stealing their lunch money, it
would in my estimation be totally appropriate for other children in
the neighborhood (i.e., Britain,
France, the U.S.) to do everything in their power to stop the bully
from further terrorizing the
neighborhood. If necessary, the bully might even be turned in to
juvenile authorities and prosecuted as
far as the law allows (i.e., Nuremberg) -- if, that is, nothing else
stops his bullying behavior.
Does it really matter if the bully is a blue-collar Italian-American,
and the other families in the
neighborhood are snooty Bostonians who want to keep Italian-Americans
from infiltrating their block (a
situation analogous to what you have claimed about Britain's attitude
toward Germany before the war)? If
the bully hadn't been bullying the other children, he wouldn't have
given the other families cause to act
against him.
Every bully has one excuse or another for his antisocial behavior.
Maybe his parents were alcoholics.
Maybe his teachers labelled him with a self-fulfilling label. Maybe
he was even punished unjustly for
something that wasn't entirely his fault (i.e., Versailles in the case
of Nazi Germany). Do any of these
excuses really justify the bully's knocking *your* daughter down and
stealing her lunch money day after
day after day?
So, what happens if the other children in the neighborhood take a
little revenge on the bully -- turn him
in and call him names while he's wearing handcuffs on his way to
juvenile court? Good, decent, Christian
folk would say that the children shouldn't do that. Revenge is mine,
saith the Lord.
But would anybody in possession of their reason say that the children
who turned the bully in and yelled
names at him as he was being led off to juvenile court were really no
different from the bully? The other
children didn't terrorize their neighborhood either before or after
the bully's arrest. They wouldn't
even have turned the bully in and yelled names at him when he was
defenseless if the bully hadn't bullied
them first.
The only way that people would begin to side with the bully and call
the other children's actions wrong is
if the other children's actions were all out of proportion to what the
bully had done. If the bully
threatened children and stole their lunch money, the other children
wouldn't be justified in burning down
the bully's house and endangering his entire family (i.e., the
Morgenthau Plan), for example.
So, how does this analogy apply to Nazi Germany? Nazi Germany
committed a great many crimes:
1.) breaking numerous international agreements (including the treaty
of Versailles, the Geneva
conventions, the Munich Agreement, the nonaggression treaty with
Poland, the nonaggression pact with the
Soviet Union, and so on, and so on, and so on),
2.) engaging in genocide on an enormous scale,
3.) plundering art treasures, labor, gold reserves, and raw materials
from occupied countries,
4.) shooting innocent hostages without trial in reprisals for
terrorist acts against the German army,
5.) shooting Soviet Commissars and POWs without trial,
6.) etc., etc., etc.
Given such crimes, what would the Allies have to have done to commit a
reprisal all out of proportion to
Nazi Germany's crimes? What kind of reprisal would be all out of
proportion to the many, many heinous
crimes that Nazi Germany committed?
What happened to German POWs after the war was bad and wrong. But
unlike the genocide committed by Nazi
Germany, it was not a premeditated, cold-blooded program of
extermination. If it had been, I'm afraid
that there would be a *lot* fewer Germans around in the world today.
The Morgenthau plan was bad and wrong. But it was never executed in
its entirety. In fact, not even a
significant part of the plan was executed. If it had been, Germany
wouldn't be the industrial powerhouse
that it is today, and the Marshall Plan certainly wouldn't have been
possible.
How different we'd all feel about Nazi Germany if the Nazi government
had decided after all not to follow
the plans proposed at the Wannsee Conference. It's one thing to plan
something horrible in the heat of
the moment; it's another thing entirely to actually *do* it with
premeditation and unrestrained malice.
You seem to think that things must be black or white. Either the
Allies must be totally clean of any
wrongdoing -- all the way from the leaders at the top down to each and
every man in the trenches -- or
they're just as bad as the Nazis.
Morality doesn't normally work that way. Quantity and proportion are
normally considered relevant in
moral thinking. Intention and premeditation are normally considered
relevant in moral thinking. What one
actually does (as opposed to what one plans to do in the heat of the
moment but never carries out once
emotions have cooled) is normally considered relevant in moral
thinking.
That's why, in normal moral thinking, one would *never* say, "The only
difference between us and the
Germans will remain the color of the uniforms."
Some individual Allied personnel (even at the highest ranks) were
personally evil, and some individual
German personnel (even at the highest ranks) were personally decent.
But the Nazi government was morally
wrong because of its criminal policies and premeditated crimes, while
the British and American governments
were not morally wrong because their policies weren't criminal and
their crimes weren't premeditated. It
doesn't honestly matter that many Germans were decent or that some
individual Brits and Americans
committed heinous crimes. The only difference between the
Anglo-Americans and the Germans was *not* the
color of their uniforms.
This is a fairly astonishing statement.
> The Polish-German War was started by the Poles,
> British and Germans -- responsibility in that order.
Hmm, bizarre.
> That local
> war expanded to a world war mostly, indeed almost exclusively,
> because of Britain and Lord Halifax. (That wording from David
> Hoggan.)
Ahh, it begins to make sense. David Hoggan, the pseudo-academic
revisionist author of works such as _The Myth of the Six Million_ and
_The Forced War_, in which Hitler is portrayed as a peace-loving
patriot
and Germany is the innocent victim in a conspiracy of the British,
Poles
and Americans to destroy her. Hoggan was a supremely dishonest
"interpreter" of history (his works are full of fabricated and
egregiously mis-represented sources) and would rightfully be consigned
to historical oblivion were it not for the tireless efforts of various
revisionist nutcases.
That does help clarify things -- thanks.
Cheers,
Dave
---
To reply, remove NO and SPAM.
There is a major difference between the western allies and
the Germans in WWII, to quote Williamson Murray in Luftwaffe,
"by February 1942 of the 3,900,000 Russian soldiers that the
Germans claimed to have captured only 1,100,000 remained
alive; of these, only 400,000 were capable of being moved to
the Reich to work in industry." This was mainly the work or
lack thereof of the army authorities.
The second was the SS and the concentration camp and
extermination camp system. People staved to death in the
camps when food was plentiful, people were worked to
death.
The Nazi system either directly or tacitly encouraged the
above sort of behaviour.
>The only difference between us and the Germans will
>remain the color of the uniforms.
On an indivdual basis this is correct, but not on the level
of society as a whole in WWII.
>The Polish-German War was started by the Poles,
>British and Germans -- responsibility in that order.
The trouble with this is Hitler chose the military option,
under no pressure to do so, since nothing Poland was
doing threatened German territory.
>That local
>war expanded to a world war mostly, indeed almost exclusively,
>because of Britain and Lord Halifax. (That wording from David
>Hoggan.)
The war expanded in 1939 because countries came to the
conclusion Hitler could only be stopped by force and Hitler
chose to ignore warnings. From then on Hitler did the
invading.
>As Heinz pointed out, this quesiton was covered before, as was
>the question of whether there was a sudden loss of food in 1945;
>whether there was a lack of transport in 1945-48 while we were
>eliminating Liberty ships. I looked up all of the numbers.
The question of the world food situation was covered before,
and the assertion made that there was plenty of food, now
comes the assertion the numbers have been looked up but
none are reported.
>You,
>and others, objected because some of my references were not
>conveniently at hand for you.
People objected because the evidence is there was a
worldwide food shortage in 1945, and simply asserting
there was none does not change this.
In May 1945 the British cut rations, later in 1945 bread
was rationed for the first time. See the People's War
by Calder.
I will concentrate on Wheat, I do not have the US production
figures, but I do have the Australian, and pre war Australia
contributed around one sixth of the world trade in wheat.
The country never equalled it's pre war crop during the war,
dropping to around 66% by 1943/44 after coming close
in 1942/43. (War Economy 1939-42 S J Butlin and War
Economy 1942-45 S J Butlin and C B Schedvin)
The allies faced the needs of food production by automating,
British production of tractors and other agricultural machinery
roughly doubled during the war. In Australia, with US help
and encouragement, factories were switched from weapons
to production of agricultural machinery. The machinery was
allocated a trained operator and farmers could hire the
machine and operator as required (the average size of farms
meant the machinery would be underemployed if each farmer
bought his own equipment). I expect this arrangement is very
similar to what was going on in the US. There were problems
due to fertilizer deliveries, but this was the basic pattern.
Producing food in Australia, and US army farms in the islands,
saved on shipping space and allowed the troops a good
chance of eating the difficult to keep and transport perishable
foods.
Even so the Australian wheat acreage dropped from around
12,000,000 acres in 1941/2 to 8,400,000 in 1944/5, there
was a drought, plus the inevitable manpower shortage. As
the end of the war approached farmers were becoming more
apprehensive about the future, would they end up back in
the situation of the early and mid 1930s.
In North America I understand ration and production controls
were eased in 1945, as the war economy wound down,
along with weapons production cuts.
In the time period 1 July 1944 to 2 September 1945 the
food sent to the USSR under lend lease totalled just over
1,400,000 tons, (to 12 May 1945 the tonnage was 1,157,373).
(The Roads to Russia by Robert Jones)
According to the book The Pacific War by Saburo Ienaga, the
Japanese pushed production in the territories they controlled
from food into cotton and jute. The Japanese would also
seize food and keep allocations to non Japanese low, even
as the food spoiled. There were food shortages in Malaya for
much of the war, and a post war famine in Vietnam that he
claims killed 200,000. According to the book, British Military
Administration in the far east by F S V Donnison, every forced
labourer was malnourished, those that were still alive, the
fighting in Burma threatened famine for the population there
and as the Japanese retreated they burnt crops.
(Burma railway figures, 46,000 POW 1 in 3 died, around
75,000 Burmese and 75,000 Malay labourers, 3 out of 7
Burmese and 1 out of 2 Malays died).
There was also famine in India, but I have been told that may
be to do with transportation rather than lack of food.
After all the Japanese army rice offensives I do not think the
food situation in China was very secure.
With the Japanese merchant fleet decimated the allies had
to do most of the shipping. Including repatriation of the much
hated Japanese Army.
The Germans had some 2.5 million foreign workers in the
agricultural sector in 1944, out of some 8.7 million workers,
(counting farmer's wives as workers) in the sector. The raw
materials for fertilizers came from the chemical industry, the
one the allies nearly shut down in mid/late 1944, in addition
the armaments industry competed for much of the material.
Hitler chose explosives, and in many ways the policies of
the Nazi government came close to doing what Hitler
expressed in his last testament, the German people faced
mass starvation, and therefore extermination.
Up until the end of 1944 the food situation in Germany was
good, better than the rest of Europe thanks to systematic
requisitioning of food from outside Germany, this stopped
as the German armies retreated. It was still the case when
the allies entered Germany in 1945 they found the healthiest
population in Europe and what looked like reasonably
stocked larders. As it turned out the German diet was going
downhill rapidly and stocks were very low. The trouble was
the allied plans had assumed the Geramns could feed
themselves, and it initially looked like they were correct.
The battle for food production in Europe in 1945 onward
is also the battle for coal production, for transport and
electricity. Transport was needed to move all the displaced
persons, the British handled around 2.2 million displaced
persons.
As the Germans retreated in the East the practised scorched
earth, burning crops and killing or driving away livestock.
The fighting, even in France, had its effect on food production,
According to Allied Administration of Italy 1943-45 by C R S
Harris, between July 1943 and September 1945 the allies
imported 2,464,100 tons of food for Italy, plus 3,291,200
tons of coal, in partial return the Italians exported around
2,000,000 pounds sterling of food, about half lemons or
lemon oil. During this period the allied armies bought about
300,000 tons of food from the Italians. A lack of transport
prevented full gathering of the harvest in 1943 and 1944
and distribution of seed in 1945.
Like the rest of Europe the country was awash with weapons,
and revenge attacks included breaking into prisons to kill
the prisoners.
The next figures are from Civil affairs and Military Government
in North West Europe by F S V Donnison.
By the end of 1944 France was running out of food, and
put down a requirement of 1,000,000 tons of foods and fats
over the next 8 months for the civilian population, along with
2,500,000 tons of coal and 800,000 tons of petrolium products.
Belgium was assessed as needing 80,000 tons of food a
month in early 1945, the situation was in Q1/44 the ration
was 1470 calories (versus 2,000 in Germany), it dropped
to 1,200 calories during 1944, in Q4/44, after liberation
the ration was 1450 calories if coupons were honoured,
and they were often not. By June 1945 the ration was
2,000 calories.
Holland, outside of German occupation followed Belgian
rations. Under German occupation the Dutch starved,
and the situation became so bad a truce was organised
so food could be trucked in and air dropped, even so
many died.
Norway, by raiding German Army stocks only needed
around 66,000 tons of food in the first 6 months of
liberation.
Denmark was a food exporter, once the allies could remove
the German army and put a clamp on weapons, provided
it could receive enough coal.
In January 1945 the German ration fell to 1625 calories,
by April it was 1,220 calories and May in the Rhur less
than 1,000 calories. 21st Army group came to the
conclusion the British sector needed 2,000,000 tons
of wheat for the year September 1945 to August 1946.
The British launched operation Barleycorn, releasing
POWs with agricultural experience, and then coal miners,
starting on 5 June 1945, the target was some 494,000
releases and it looks like they did release around this
many POWs. Even with much of the harvest gathered in
rations remained low, only by cutting food reserves in the
UK could the British stabilize rations.
The German harvest in 1946 was reasonable, 1947 it was
bad, and in 1948 it was a bumper crop, finally removing
the food problem. In March 1946 the ration was cut to
1,000 calories, delivery of around 1,000,000 tons of food
by May 1946 helped raise rations again.
The other problem the allies faced, over repairing and
restarting the economy, were the revenge attacks. Many
ex slave labourers took their revenge, and in the end found
themselves in the camps they had been in with admittedly
better conditions, but with the uniforms of the guards changed.
As the allies tried to keep some sort of order. Farmers,
being the custodians of food, were obvious targets.
So the food crisis came about by disruption of agricultural
plantings by battle, disruption of transport, lack of fertilizers,
loss of energy prodcution, deliberate destruction of crops, bad
seasons and the accumulated problems of trying to run
food production with a minimum of investment on the allied
side and using slave labour on the German side.
Add the displaced persons, including the millions of Germans
pushed west or fleeing west, the mood of the times, and you
have all the ingredients of famine.
Food priorities were to Allied military personnel, released
Allied POW (who were quickly moved out of Germany
anyway), England, France, the rest of formerly occupied
Europe, Italy, Displaced Persons, German civilians, and
German military personnel -- in that order.
Needless to say, with something like 3.6 million homes
destroyed there was an accomodation shortage, concentration
camp prisoners found themselves still in the camps, often
wearing the camp clothing months after the end of the war.
Over and above this there were "revenge" attacks by allied
troops, the difference is they were local and not systematic
and condoned by higher authorities, but just as horrific to
those attacked. It shows what happens in wars.
(snip)
Whether or not a surplus of army rations was available in the United
States (or elsewhere) is a moot point. What is more relevant is
whether the existing transportation and distribution network could
move that food from where it existed to those who needed it. The
European transport net, and particularly the German net, had essentially
been destroyed. Had the food been delivered to the ocean ports, there
was no practical means to deliver it elsewhere.
Note that even where local food surpluses existed in Germany, it
proved near impossible to move it from rural areas into towns and
cities, even over a few kilometers.
I found that Gareth Pritchard's The Making of the GDR, 1945-1953
(Manchester University Press, 2000) has an excellent account of
postwar conditions in Saxony and Thuringia. I would recommend it
to anyone interested in the topic.
--
> "by February 1942 of the 3,900,000 Russian soldiers that the
> Germans claimed to have captured only 1,100,000 remained
> alive;
In part, the effect of the USSR not signing the Geneva Convention.
Consider that 99.3% of the USA PoWs held by Germany came back
alive.
> The second was the extermination camp system.
I know of no one who has ever claimed that the Germans had even one
extermination camp for PoWs.
> >The Polish-German War was started by the Poles,
> >British and Germans -- responsibility in that order.
> The trouble with this is Hitler chose the military option,
> under no pressure to do so, since nothing Poland was
> doing threatened German territory.
Poland was spoiling for a war. Poland did everything it could to
incite war with Germany. It landed troops in Danzig (and massed
troops in the Corridor) in 1933 -- as a warning to Hitler. It
offered (publically) to invade Germany in support of the French in
the Rhineland in 1936. It offered to support the Czechs and French
against Hitler in 1938. (OK, it also offered to support Germany
against the Czechs [at the same time] to regain Teschen. But, hey,
we are discussing the Poles.) The British were also spoiling for
a war with Germany -- but they wanted it not in 1938, but a year later
so their air power would be developed.
Poland consistently refused to consider any adjustments in its
territory, except additions. The boundary between Poland and
Germany had been in dispute since 1919. The British told the
Poles one thing and the German another. Hitler was ready to accept
correction of Danzig's status and agreement with the corridor if
a transit route was allowed between the two sections of Germany.
That was what the Poles refused.
> The war expanded in 1939 because countries came to the
> conclusion Hitler could only be stopped by force and Hitler
> chose to ignore warnings.
Stopped? Hitler was devoted to restoring the German nation,
including those territories taken as a result of WWI. He
was willing to compromise -- I point to the agreement on
Alsace and Lorraine as being French, along with the German
city of Strassburg. Hitler never went back on that, not in
1941 and not by 1944, as maps I have in hand show. (see
www.ankerstein.org/images/germany.jpg)
GFH
Not really. As I have pointed out, Littlejohn claimed to have 1.36B
(billion) rations on hand in Germany on October 10, 1945. That
overlooks
the 13M Red Cross packages in Switzerland. It was the policy that
Germans should not eat. Fertilizer production was reduced by 82% from
1944 levels. Why? Because fertilizer can be used as an explosive.
It is incorrect to state that the American policy was to feed the
Germans, or that the Germans should be able to feed themselves. As
Hull poined out, the US policy would lead to the starvation of tens
of millions of Germans. That was the policy.
GFH
Allied airmen called it Buchenwald. See the National Film Board of Canada
documentary: "The Lucky Ones".
There's also a book: Canadian POWs 1939-1945
Chapter 11: Nightmare at Buchenwald.
"When we arrived at Buchenwald, we weren't off the train 5 seconds when the
fellow next to me got hit in the face with a rifle butt. I don't think
people will ever believe what happened to us there. Even today they don't
believe it. When we came back to Canada, we were told by the RCAF not to
say anything about Buchenwald."
There was also the Great Escape where 50 Allied airmen ( none American )
were murdered on Hitler's orders to set an example. Five of my Uncle Jack's
fellow Canadians bailed out safely from a flaming Halifax ( 6 Group RCAF:
415 Sqn ) on a day trip to Munster on 25 Mar 1945. 3 were murdered on the
ground. It was a seven man crew, Jack was the 20 year old pilot with a tail
gunner wounded in a flak attack. They rode it down together.
"When Allied airmen were forced to land in Germany, they were sometimes
killed at once by the civilian population. The police were instructed not to
interfere with these killings, and the Ministry of Justice was informed that
no one should be prosecuted for taking part in them."
Judgement at
Nuremburg.
See the Crucified Canadian Sergeant nailed to a barn door in the Museum
National Capital, Ottawa. The statue is "Canadian Golgatha".
Read "Conduct Unbecoming: The story of the murder of Canadian Prisoners of
War in Normandy" by Howard Margolian.
1998 University of Toronto Press
It details the the murders of many ( over 150 ) Canadian PWs.
After the war their seems to have been a great deal of collective amnesia.
The Cold War had begun.
No, not in part, the German government was bound by the
convention, as has been posted multiple times now. The
convention was about the way you treated POWs you had.
It shows the reality of how the Nazis behaved, ignoring the
reality we are talking about human beings, an extra 3 to
4 million war economy labourers were lost, they would have
been very useful.
>Consider that 99.3% of the USA PoWs held by Germany came back
>alive.
And a similar percentage of German POWs returned from
captivity in western allied hands. The convention works.
> > The second was the extermination camp system.
>
>I know of no one who has ever claimed that the Germans had even one
>extermination camp for PoWs.
I know of no one credible who has ever claimed that the
Allies had even one extermination camp for POWs.
Look at the conditions of the German camps holding non
western POWs. There are numerous memoirs written by
allied POWs mentioning how much worse the conditions of
the nearby camps holding Soviet POWs were.
I will put all my words back in,
"There is a major difference between the western allies and
the Germans in WWII, to quote Williamson Murray in Luftwaffe,
"by February 1942 of the 3,900,000 Russian soldiers that the
Germans claimed to have captured only 1,100,000 remained
alive; of these, only 400,000 were capable of being moved to
the Reich to work in industry." This was mainly the work or
lack thereof of the army authorities.
The second was the SS and the concentration camp and
extermination camp system. People staved to death in the
camps when food was plentiful, people were worked to
death.
The Nazi system either directly or tacitly encouraged the
above sort of behaviour."
> > >The Polish-German War was started by the Poles,
> > >British and Germans -- responsibility in that order.
>
> > The trouble with this is Hitler chose the military option,
> > under no pressure to do so, since nothing Poland was
> > doing threatened German territory.
>
>Poland was spoiling for a war.
Like not mobilising until after the Germans had done so?
>Poland did everything it could to incite war with Germany.
They did not invade, they did not demand German controlled
territory be ceded to Poland. They wanted to keep access
to their only open seaport, loss of which would make them
more dependant on the goodwill of Nazi Germany and
the USSR.
>It landed troops in Danzig (and massed
>troops in the Corridor) in 1933 -- as a warning to Hitler.
There was a book about called Mein Kampf which I have
no doubt the Poles had read.
>It offered (publically) to invade Germany in support of the French in
>the Rhineland in 1936.
In other words it was willing to enforce the treaty system in
place and not allow Hitler to unilaterally alter them.
>It offered to support the Czechs and French against Hitler in 1938.
Oh, yes, this was at the time when Hitler was busy demanding
the borders of Czechoslovakia be redrawn on threat of violence,
using the fact there were German speaking people in the country,
any Polish government could see who would be under pressure
next.
>(OK, it also offered to support Germany
>against the Czechs [at the same time] to regain Teschen. But, hey,
>we are discussing the Poles.)
We are discussing human beings, and we are discussing the
the diplomatic process. Poles are human beings.
I note no reply about what credible military threat Poland
represented to Germany in 1939.
>The British were also spoiling for
>a war with Germany -- but they wanted it not in 1938, but a year later
>so their air power would be developed.
The British were most definitely not spoiling for another war,
after all if everyone was trying for a war with Germany why did
it not break out in 1938, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France
and the UK versus Germany?
In 1938 the British knew their airpower was weak, and this
was still the case in 1939, since they had overstimated both
the size of the Luftwaffe and the damage bombing would do.
See any good history of the Battle of Britain.
I like the retrofit, the war broke out in 1939 followed by
a reason why the British did it. The fact the British waited
before presenting their ultimatum, the fact the untimatum
allowed Hitler the option of withdrawing from Poland, as
opposed to a flat declaration of war, both are ignored in
order to push the blame away from Hitler.
>Poland consistently refused to consider any adjustments in its
>territory, except additions.
Hitler consistently refused to consider any adjustments in
Germany's territory, except additions. Given once you question
one border in Europe you automatically question them all what
obligation did the Polish government have to cede territory?
>The boundary between Poland and
>Germany had been in dispute since 1919.
With the League of nations supposed to be the umpire.
>The British told the
>Poles one thing and the German another.
They were trying to push a peace conference, which is
odd for a power spoiling for a fight.
>Hitler was ready to accept
>correction of Danzig's status and agreement with the corridor if
>a transit route was allowed between the two sections of Germany.
>That was what the Poles refused.
Are you talking about the farce when Hitler demanded a
fully credentialled Polish representative within 24 hours,
with powers to negotiate a full settlement. This demand
was made on 29 August. Then the list of conditions read
to the British ambassador when the representative failed
to arrive which were then declared dead, without the
British ever being given a copy of the terms.
I like the idea changing Danzig's status was a "correction",
with all the implications about who was doing the correct
thing.
> > The war expanded in 1939 because countries came to the
> > conclusion Hitler could only be stopped by force and Hitler
> > chose to ignore warnings.
>
>Stopped? Hitler was devoted to restoring the German nation,
>including those territories taken as a result of WWI.
Austria, Slovakia? The Gestapo and SS? The continued
acceleration of war production?
>He was willing to compromise -- I point to the agreement on
>Alsace and Lorraine as being French,
Check your sources Alsace and Lorraine became German
provinces during WWII, just like after the Franco-Prussian
war, then became French as they were for most of the 19th
century.
Like most diplomatic negotiations there was compromise,
followed by Hitler breaking the agreement to try and force a
more favourable one to him.
>along with the German city of Strassburg.
How nice to be able to declare who owns what in border areas
where the populations speak a mixture of languages.
(Snip)
How about replying to the food statistics?
Let us go with that figure for the moment. Germany had a pre war
population of 78 million, assuming the allies ended up with 2/3
of that we have 52 million. Given the definition of a ration is
enough food for an adult for a day we have 1360/52 = 26 days
of food for Germany, say about a month. While important I doubt
1 months supply of food was going to make that big a difference.
This ignores the needs of the millions of displaced people,
the millions of slave labourers and prisoners that had been
systematically starved over a long period, the rest of western
Europe and the 3 million or so US military personnel.
>That overlooks the 13M Red Cross packages in Switzerland.
And a red cross parcel is how much food for an adult?
>It was the policy that Germans should not eat.
It was the policy that Germany, which had been 95% self
sufficient in food pre war, would feed itself. The knowledge
of the food requisitions from the rest of Europe to Germany,
the knowledge that German rations had been very good
for the entire war, the better fed population and the appearance
of plenty of food stocks in houses all seemed to confirm that
Germany could feed itself.
>Fertilizer production was reduced by 82% from
>1944 levels. Why? Because fertilizer can be used as an explosive.
This is becoming funnier by the moment, the retrofitting of
reasons. The Nazi government determined determined fertilizer
production until May 1945, in other words for the winter and
spring plantings. The fertilizer industry competed with the
explosives industry for raw materials, and the bombing of the
synthetic oil plants cut nitrogen production. The Nazis went
with explosives production. The allies estimated it would take
three months of work to put the main synthetic oil plants back
on line to around 2/3 to 3/4 production. Which means the
earliest this could occurr would be around the end of August.
Having the country over run by invading armies also tends to
cut production. Add the reality of nearly 30% of the agricultural
sector was impressed or slave labour which left as soon as
possible after liberation, and that overall 20% of the workforce
was impressed or slave labour and they all wanted out.
The idea that the allies were worried about truck bombs in
a country that had nearly zero liquid fuel is quite strange.
It wasn't the Nazi government despite being in control for the
first 4 months of the year, it wasn't the disruption in transport
caused by the bombing, it wasn't the disruption caused by
millions of invading troops, it wasn't because 20% of the
workforce quit en masse. It is supposed to be due to the
worry about fertilizer bombs, in a country awash with weapons,
including plenty of explosives, say like all those bombs for the
Luftwaffe, the artillery shells and so on.
>It is incorrect to state that the American policy was to feed the
>Germans, or that the Germans should be able to feed themselves.
Well, tell that to the historians, because they cite documents to
the contrary. The allies were already having to help feed most
of the rest of Europe and assumed the German agricultural
sector could perform well enough.
>As Hull poined out, the US policy would lead to the starvation of tens
>of millions of Germans. That was the policy.
Policy was for the Germans to feed themselves, with the Germans
the last in the queue if there was a shortage. The policy was not
mass starvation, based on the reality there was no large scale
famine in post war Germany or Europe for that matter. When it
was realised Germany needed to be added to the list of food
importers this was done, not very graciously, but it was done.
I like the logic, the Titanic ended up on an iceberg, therefore
that is the policy, to run into icebergs, not because assumptions
were made about having enough warning time and the ability of
the hull to withstand damage.
This building of great conspiracy theories about post war
Germany is doing a great job of trivialising the suffering
and distorting the chances of people learning about what
did happen and why. Coming up with really ridiculess
reasons for things like the fertilizer shortage shows
working backwards from a conclusion trying to fit the
evidence to that rather than examining the evidence to
come to a conclusion.
>I know of no one who has ever claimed that the Germans had even one
>extermination camp for PoWs.
When I was in Sachsenhausen a month ago they had a hole in the ground.
You walked into the little area and there was a pile of wood up
against the far wall. According to the plaque along one side, 13,000
Soviet Prisoners were shot by firing squad in two months in 1941. The
wood piled up along the far wall was supposed to trap the bullets that
had been fired, so that they could be reused.
15,000 Soviet Prisoners of War were in Auschwitz. Almost all died, and
over 3,000 were gassed immediately on arrival. While it wasn't an
extermination camp for PoW's, it was definitely an extermination camp
that had lots of PoW's in it, which fits within what Mr. Sinclair
said.
Chris Manteuffel
"...the war situation has developed not necessarily
to Japan's advantage..."
-Emperor Hirohito, August 14, 1945
Remove something from email address
--
> I know of no one who has ever claimed that the Germans had even
one
> extermination camp for PoWs.
The Wehrmacht camps for Soviet prisoners were of such rudimentary
nature, and the facilities for shelter, feeding and health so
lacking, that several authors have described them as little more
than an system to exterminate unwanted Soviets.
(snip misinterpreted rubbish about Poland)
--
Interesting that you deleted the main substance of my reply. Whether or
not there were spare US Army rations available, the controlling factor
was the lack of transportation. The book I cited documents multiple cases
of there being sufficient food in rural districts which could have
supplied local small urban areas. However, transportation was in
such disarray that it was easier for individuals in the towns to go
to the farms to gather food than bring the food into the towns.
--
--
> >As Hull poined out, the US policy would lead to the starvation of tens
> >of millions of Germans. That was the policy.
>
> Policy was for the Germans to feed themselves, with the Germans
> the last in the queue if there was a shortage.
Right. We are in agreement. The policy was that the Germans should
feed themselves or starve. Since the deindustrialization of Germany
took away their ability to produce fertilizer; since the Germans were
unable to use tractors (because they could be used to pull cannon and
because the synfuel plants were unavailable [largely in what became
Poland and without fuel]); since the pontoon bridges of the western
Allies interrupted transportation of bulk commodities like coal; it
seems that Hull was correct -- starvation of tens of millions was
the expected outcome of the "feed themselves" policy.
Of course, the Germans held in the Rhine Meadow "cages" were even less
able to feed themselves. And Germans who tried to feed them were
shot,
on Ike's orders -- written and available in German and English (I do
not have the Polish language version).
GFH
Interesting that you deleted the main substance of my reply. Whether
Halifax was responsible for escalating the War? Halifax was one of the
main appeasers. In fact he sought ways to end the war by seeking an
armistice with Germany because he believed Britain would go bankrupt
trying to fight (which it did). He had very little influence on
Chamberlain's decision to declare war.
I believe some facts have been distorted out in this debate.
On 3 Jul 2001 17:00:31 -0400, geo...@mail.rlc.net (George Hardy)
wrote:
--
>... the allies did not expect to have the resources to be able to
>treat the expected large number of German POWs to the Geneva
>convention standards.
One of the charges against Axis military leaders was that they
deliberately starved Allied POWs contrary to the standards of Geneva
conventions.
Whp stopped Ambrose from writing the story about American camps for
DEP first? Noone, but he rather wrote yet another euology of Allied
war effort leaving the less known and potentially embarassing topics
about Allied conduct during WW2 to the so called "revisionists".
Had historian establishment had some scientific honesty and began
investigating Allied misconducts including blowing off the fog of
Allied war time propaganda, there would have been less holocaust
deniers and second rate revisionists. But, no, it was easier to repeat
the same old white angels versus black devils story.
Drax
remove NOSPAM for reply
No we are in totally opposite camps on this one. If you think I am
agreeing with you I can clearly see the need to discount any claims
on your part that people support you.
Above all when someone "replies" to around 10% of my words,
breaking out single sentences and ignoring all the other points
refuting their case I know they do not have a case.
>The policy was that the Germans should feed themselves or starve.
Policy was for the Germans to feed themselves, with the Germans
the last in the queue if there was a shortage. The policy was not
mass starvation, based on the reality there was no large scale
famine in post war Germany or Europe for that matter. When it
was realised Germany needed to be added to the list of food
importers this was done, not very graciously, but it was done.
The "or starve" was never a policy, above all they were never
my words, if adding them and then claiming that I agree with
them is the only way the case can be supported then the case
is junk, pure and simple.
Even if the food situation for the average German had been
adequate pre May 1945 (and it was not), there is still the
adjustment needed because a significant percentage of the
population under Nazi control were being underfed and, in
the more extreme cases, as part of a starve/work them to
death policy.
This building of great conspiracy theories about post war
Germany is doing a great job of trivialising the suffering
and distorting the chances of people learning about what
did happen and why. Coming up with really ridiculess
reasons for things like the fertilizer shortage shows
working backwards from a conclusion trying to fit the
evidence to that rather than examining the evidence to
come to a conclusion.
>Since the deindustrialization of Germany
>took away their ability to produce fertilizer;
Ah so now it is deindustrialisation, not the use of fertilizer
for explosives. Not the bombing, not the Nazi control of
fertilizer production for the spring and summer plantings,
not the threat of truck bombs, not the disruption because
of the country being invaded, not the disruption when 20%
of the workforce was allowed to go home, since most of
them had been forced labour or worse.
>since the Germans were unable to use tractors (beause they
>could be used to pull cannon
Ah yes, the idea of a farm tractor towing a 105mm piece down
the road in the middle of an allied occupation army. I suppose
next we will have a ban on trucks because of fertilizer bombs.
Germany did not have the resources to industrialise the farm
sector, it used bulk (much foreign) labour. There were not a lot
of tractors nor production of same, they competed with tank and
military vehicle production. Let alone the fuel.
I like the way as each claim is debunked another, again unsupported,
claim is put in its place. Remember folks the allies were wrong, now
all we have to do is just find what they were doing wrong, and remember
you agree with the claims, whether you do or not.
>and because the synfuel plants were unavailable [largely in what became
>Poland and without fuel]); since the pontoon bridges of the western
>Allies interrupted transportation of bulk commodities like coal;
Coal was transported by rail and water, and yes, the transportation
bombings had ruined the system, and this caused many problems.
The damage done to Germany was so great it would take years
to repair, and the problem was restarting an economy proved
to be of similar difficulty as stopping one. Making sure there
was enough shelter for the coming winter was another major
concern and meant some quite creative solutions were needed
given time and materials available.
>it seems that Hull was correct -- starvation of tens of millions was
>the expected outcome of the "feed themselves" policy.
If the policy was applied there is no doubt mass starvation would
have occurred, the problem with the great conspiracy theory is
that the feed themselves policy was dropped and the evidence is
quite straightforward, many underfed people, few starvation victims.
The logic is really simple, take the feed themselves policy as it
applied pre May 1945, and then spend a great deal of time
ignoring the reality it was changed, come up with reasons why
it was the allies fault German food production and supply was
bad. Ignore the Nazi war economy contribution, ignore the
idea shelter for something of the order of over 20 million people
(homeless, POWs, displaced persons, allied occupation troops)
is a non trivial task, let alone in a ruined country. Add the problem
of food supply for around 60+ million or so people to the mix as well.
Simply keep stating it was an allied conspiracy and how you are
glad for all the support of people who are really, in your eyes
anyway, agreeing with you, that is after some extra words added
by you to their words of course.
>Of course, the Germans held in the Rhine Meadow "cages" were even less
>able to feed themselves.
POWs can rarely feed themselves, so we are back where
we started from, the mass starvation claims put away for another
day, time to move onto another topic.
>And Germans who tried to feed them were shot, on Ike's orders
>-- written and available in German and English (I do
>not have the Polish language version).
Then post the orders with a reference, and then explain why the
US army would issue orders in Polish. I presume the reason
the civilians were kept away was the possibility of weapons
being handed over, since there were still a percentage of the
Germans who were fanatical Nazis I can understand the allies
not wanting them to obtain weapons. I also presume the orders
were in German so the people would know not to approach?
So far we have had claims of no food shortages and massive
stockpiles deliberately withheld debunked with no reply,
claims about the causes of fertilizer production shortfalls
debunked with no reply, claims the Poles bear first responsibility
for the war debunked with no reply, claims about the lack of
the application of the Geneva convention to Soviet POWs in
German hands debunked with no reply. The one good thing
about these debates is they bring forward all the evidence to
easily refute the wild claims when they are raised the next time.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email
--
Nope; JCS 1067 specifically forbid allowing general starvation
unless it was happening in neighboring countries. Eisenhower's
orders were to keep German standards of living down short of
famine, disease, and riots, except that German standards would
not be allowed to be higher than other countries. It was a harsh
document, but explicitly not genocidal.
Since the deindustrialization of Germany
>took away their ability to produce fertilizer;
What was the ability to produce fertilizer at the time of
surrender? Since the ability to produce fertilizer is related
to the ability to produce explosives, the Allied Air Forces
had hit that industry hard.
since the Germans were
>unable to use tractors (because they could be used to pull cannon and
>because the synfuel plants were unavailable [largely in what became
>Poland and without fuel]);
I would imagine that there was a shortage of fuel. As pointed out,
the synthetic fuel plants were largely in Soviet-occupied territory
and had been heavily bombed in addition. I doubt anybody was
worried about the Germans pulling cannon around with tractors, and
would have to see a good reference to change my mind.
since the pontoon bridges of the western
>Allies interrupted transportation of bulk commodities like coal;
The German transportation network had been very thoroughly smashed
by Allied bombing. I don't think the pontoon bridges were all
that important.
it
>seems that Hull was correct -- starvation of tens of millions was
>the expected outcome of the "feed themselves" policy.
>
Now let's consider exactly what that meant.
The US had proposed a policy beforehand, without knowing all the
relevant facts. It has the potential to be genocidal, and one
high-ranking US official objects to it, thinking it would actually
be genocidal.
If the US still maintains that policy, it could be that other
officials did not think it genocidal. It is not evidence that
any US official wanted to commit genocide. Similarly, US government
actions in the late 1920s and early 1930s are not held to be
evidence that the US government was in favor of a severe and
protracted economic collapse.
>able to feed themselves. And Germans who tried to feed them were
>shot,
>on Ike's orders -- written and available in German and English (I do
>not have the Polish language version).
>
If they are written, available, and genuine they must be available
from a reliable source. Please provide the information whereby I
may get a copy of that order from US records.
>George Hardy wrote in message <3b526bc...@news.pacific.net.au>...
>>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote in message
>>news:<9ib4oj$fbh$1...@beast.TCNJ.EDU>...
>>> George Hardy wrote in message <3b53fec...@news.pacific.net.au>...
>Coming up with really ridiculess reasons for things like the fertilizer
>shortage shows >working backwards from a conclusion
John E. Farquharson doesn't seem to think that the details about the
fertilizer shortage are ridiculous. He will tell you what you need
to know (in _The Western Allies and the Politics if Food_, UK: Berg
Publishers, 1985)
>
>>Since the deindustrialization of Germany
>>took away their ability to produce fertilizer;
>
>Ah so now it is deindustrialisation, not the use of fertilizer
>for explosives.
It was both. Nitrogen application in all four zones was:
563.8 thousand tons in 1938/39, and 105.0 in 1945/46.
For phosphate it was:
588.0 thousand tons in 1938/39, and 36.4 in 1945/46.
Now you try to feed your population on that - add millions of
refugees, subtract your best agricultural land in the East, and
subtract most males - who are either DEF's, forced laborers in
France and elsewhere, or crippled, or dead. Good luck.
Problems are seldom as clear-cut as you portray them. Far more
common is a combination of negative factors, which was certainly the
case in the total mess that was Germany in 1945.
>I like the way as each claim is debunked another, again unsupported,
>claim is put in its place. Remember folks the allies were wrong, now
>all we have to do is just find what they were doing wrong, and remember
>you agree with the claims, whether you do or not.
The source mentioned above will help you to conduct reality checks.
Note: as early as June 1944, the War Office submitted a paper to
a Cabinet body - the Supply Question for Liberated and Conquered
Areas Committee (or SLA). Oliver Lyttleton was chairman, and Attlee
and Bevin (future Foreign Minister) belonged to the group.
The predicted postwar deficit for the British Zone in Germany was
1.5 million tons of food per annum. The planning was done, at least
in Britain. That country tried harder, and had less of the means.
Also note: Germany's granary was taken away and given to Poland and
the SU; Russia confiscated as much as 60 percent of food stuffs from
the Soviet Zone (data in Naimark, _The Russians in Germany_);
fifteen million people were expelled into the destroyed rump state
of Germany (2.1 million died in the process); most cities were in
ruins; the industrialized Ruhr was a moonscape, densely populated
and swamped with refugees from the East. Miners in the Ruhr had to
produce coal for reparations. This was often slowed down because the
men fainted from weakness due to hunger. The coal couldn't be sold
at world market prices - which would have enabled the Germans to buy
food.
By June of 1947, TWO YEARS after war's end, the majority of the
German people vegetated on "rations which represent only a third of
the internationally accepted minimum....What we are experiencing is
the destruction of the mental and physical substance of a great
people" (p.235). This comes from a report of a German physicians'
association.
>Coal was transported by rail and water, and yes, the transportation
>bombings had ruined the system, and this caused many problems.
Well, the coal got out nevertheless. Transports even rolled toward
the Soviet Union, where along the way we kids jumped the trains to
liberate an armful of the black gold.
>>it seems that Hull was correct -- starvation of tens of millions was
>The one good thing >about these debates is they bring forward all the evidence to
>easily refute the wild claims when they are raised the next time.
Then please check the evidence. You may also wish to look at the
concept of "agrarian disarmament" - i.e. making a future German
state dependent for its sustenance upon imported grain, and thereby
reducing its war potential." (p.5, citing memo "Agrarian Reform" by
Deputy Chief Food and Agriculture Division of the British Control
Commission, 28 Oct 1946, 7 BA Z6 1/162)
Starving Germany had already practiced during and after WW I. It
probably made some people so bitter, that they came up with the
urge to find Lebensraum.
Regards,
ES
--
> Had historian establishment had some scientific honesty and
began
> investigating Allied misconducts ... there would have been less
holocaust
> deniers and second rate revisionists.
In the specific case of the immediate post-war military
government of Germany and the provision of food for POWs and the
civilian population, the British Official History at least does
not gloss over US reluctance to make adequate provision for
Germans in their care. There are in addition several subsequent,
mainly British and Canadian and German, books which examine the
subject with honesty and clarity. There seems to be a peculiarly
US blindness to the truth in this matter, which is hardly
surprising as they are in fact the culprits.
--
You are reaching back to 1918. Why don't you also remind our readers of the
German siege guns - Big Berthas - used against Paris that year. Or the
German siege of Paris before that which likely killed as many as the RAF
raid on Dresden. Germany tried to starve Britain by U Boat blockade in both
wars. There was also the siege of Leningrad in WW2. These things probably
made some people so bitter that they came up with the urge to curb Germany's
lust for war permanently.
--
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
>>Coming up with really ridiculess reasons for things like the fertilizer
>>shortage shows working backwards from a conclusion
>
>John E. Farquharson doesn't seem to think that the details about the
>fertilizer shortage are ridiculous. He will tell you what you need
>to know (in _The Western Allies and the Politics if Food_, UK: Berg
>Publishers, 1985)
The details of the fertilizer shortage? I did not consider the
shortage ridiculess, only the way the shortage is woven into
a grand conspiracy theory where the food situation in Germany
is entirely the result of conscious allied policy to starve the
population.
Since most people do not have access to the book it would
be helpful to quote some of the conclusions.
>>Ah so now it is deindustrialisation, not the use of fertilizer
>>for explosives.
>
>It was both. Nitrogen application in all four zones was:
>
>563.8 thousand tons in 1938/39, and 105.0 in 1945/46.
>
>For phosphate it was:
>
>588.0 thousand tons in 1938/39, and 36.4 in 1945/46.
It would be best to compare these figures to the 1943
and 1944 figures, since the 1939 figures would include
any pre war imports. After being self sufficient in phosphates
in 1939 the British had over doubled their usage to around
350,000 tons in 1945 but then needed to import 50,000 tons.
>Now you try to feed your population on that - add millions of
>refugees, subtract your best agricultural land in the East, and
>subtract most males - who are either DEF's, forced laborers in
>France and elsewhere, or crippled, or dead. Good luck.
As noted before the British began releasing farm workers
and then coal miners in the summer of 1945.
>Problems are seldom as clear-cut as you portray them.
I can only presume you are not replying to my words but
those of George Hardy or that you are only replying to
the small amount of my text that passed your editing,
my full paragraph read,
"Ah so now it is deindustrialisation, not the use of fertilizer
for explosives. Not the bombing, not the Nazi control of
fertilizer production for the spring and summer plantings,
not the threat of truck bombs, not the disruption because
of the country being invaded, not the disruption when 20%
of the workforce was allowed to go home, since most of
them had been forced labour or worse."
Since my comments were in regard to the German fertilizer
shortages in 1945 (and for that matter shortfall of food
production)
>Far more
>common is a combination of negative factors, which was certainly the
>case in the total mess that was Germany in 1945.
I can only assume you have not read what I have written, I have
noted the mess in Germany was the result of Nazi policy and
control until May 1945, shortage of materials due to the allied
bombing (and I should add inability to loot the rest of Europe
after Q3 1944), shortage of materials due to transport problems,
shortage of material due to production priorities pre May 1945,
20% of the workforce being foreign (30% of agriculture) often
as slave labour and therefore wanting to go home, the fighting,
and the occupation of the country by millions of troops.
Add assumptions of German food supply and production to the
pre occupation planning as well plus a long brewing world wide
food shortage. The knowledge of the food requisitions from the
rest of Europe to Germany, the knowledge that German rations
had been very good for the entire war, the better fed population
and the appearance of plenty of food stocks in houses all
seemed to confirm that Germany could feed itself. Then there
was the need to normalise the diets of many of the people in
the slave labour system.
to quote myself
"The other problem the allies faced, over repairing and
restarting the economy, were the revenge attacks. Many
ex slave labourers took their revenge, and in the end found
themselves in the camps they had been in with admittedly
better conditions, but with the uniforms of the guards changed.
As the allies tried to keep some sort of order. Farmers,
being the custodians of food, were obvious targets.
So the food crisis came about by disruption of agricultural
plantings by battle, disruption of transport, lack of fertilizers,
loss of energy production, deliberate destruction of crops, bad
seasons and the accumulated problems of trying to run
food production with a minimum of investment on the allied
side and using slave labour on the German side.
Add the displaced persons, including the millions of Germans
pushed west or fleeing west, the mood of the times, and you
have all the ingredients of famine".
The above all in regards to 1945.
>>I like the way as each claim is debunked another, again unsupported,
>>claim is put in its place. Remember folks the allies were wrong, now
>>all we have to do is just find what they were doing wrong, and remember
>>you agree with the claims, whether you do or not.
>
>The source mentioned above will help you to conduct reality checks.
You mean like adding extra words to other people's writings to
then claim they agree with me? Or as each "reason" is challenged
how to simply ignore the challenge and put another reason in place,
protecting the conclusion, not reading the evidence or even supplying
the evidence for the reason?
Read the posts, the paragraph above will help you to conduct reality
checks.
Post the excerpts from the reference so others can look at the evidence.
>Note: as early as June 1944, the War Office submitted a paper to
>a Cabinet body - the Supply Question for Liberated and Conquered
>Areas Committee (or SLA). Oliver Lyttleton was chairman, and Attlee
>and Bevin (future Foreign Minister) belonged to the group.
>The predicted postwar deficit for the British Zone in Germany was
>1.5 million tons of food per annum. The planning was done, at least
>in Britain. That country tried harder, and had less of the means.
I have never said the British sector was food sufficient, I said the
allies assumed Germany would be 95% food self sufficient like
pre war.
The British zone included the Rhur, it was well known the region
was not food self sufficient. Indeed when the British and US
zones merged into "bizonia" the US complained about how it
made their zone's food situation worse.
The plans of late 1944 and early 1945 assumed pre war Germany,
food production, population and borders. They also assumed
a reasonable amount of co-operation between allies since there
was still Japan to go for example, and they believed it was in the
Soviet's best interests to keep friendly relations. As early as April
1944 the British were aware the world's projected wheat crop for
1945 was barely sufficient. As it was the UK wheat crop was
down nearly 1.3 million tons in 1945 versus 1944. Rain failures in
Australia and India added to the problems.
To repeat the original British assumption was Germany would
basically feed itself and relatively normal internal trade would
be restored so that it could do so.
>Also note: Germany's granary was taken away and given to Poland and
>the SU; Russia confiscated as much as 60 percent of food stuffs from
>the Soviet Zone (data in Naimark, _The Russians in Germany_);
Given the pushing of the conspiracy theory of German food
production I have avoided the contribution of the USSR to this
point, concentrating on what the western allies thought and
did and how they coped, since "Communist Plot" is the other
favourite Western Conspiracy Theory.
The actions in the east significantly aggravated the problem,
both the fighting and destruction as well as the expulsions.
>fifteen million people were expelled into the destroyed rump state
>of Germany (2.1 million died in the process);
The book The Other Price of Hitler's War by Martin Sorge gives
the figures as 9.7 million expelled and 1,550,000 deaths, this
includes the Dresden deaths. Also 1,000,000 civilian deaths
in the fighting in Pommerania and Silesia.
Statements like modern Germany is a rump state will make
many Europeans nervous.
>most cities were in ruins; the industrialized Ruhr was a moonscape,
Yes, more damaged than the cities in the UK, but in many cases
better than the cities of the east.
>densely populated
>and swamped with refugees from the East. Miners in the Ruhr had to
>produce coal for reparations. This was often slowed down because the
>men fainted from weakness due to hunger. The coal couldn't be sold
>at world market prices - which would have enabled the Germans to buy
>food.
As I have noted there was not much food to go round, the British
introduced bread rationing post VE day and kept it until 1948.
they kept controls on shipments to millers until February 1950.
Coal was needed almost as much as food, as it helped food
production and distribution. For example the need for coal
for Denmark. After 6 years of neglect the British coal mines
in 1945 were down to 182,773,000 tons produced compared
with 231,338,000 tons in 1939, this is after drafting men into
the mines instead of the infantry.
In Australia meat rationing stayed until June 1948, butter until
June 1950. The dairy industry had been hard hit. Fertilizer
shortages are mentioned no less than 13 times in the index
to the Australian history of their 1942-45 war economy.
Wartime neglect of pests would see post war rabbit plagues.
With the partial exception of the US the world's industrial
economies had been seriously distorted for six years, not
to mention those that had been fought over and/or looted.
Not to mention the legacies of the economic depression.
It was going to take years to return the economies to
"normality", with it very clear that the conditions of the
1930's were not normal.
The great backlog of ignored routine maintenance, roads,
bridges, irrigation systems, buildings and so on.
In 1943/4 the Bengal famine and subsequent epidemics killed
around 1,500,000 people. A relatively small food shortage was
made worse by poor quality governance. It would have
been very easy to do this to Germany given the circumstances
of 1945. It is things like this that enable me to refute the starve
Germany theories. The allies were hardly generous, but they
argument is like the current arguments on how much welfare
payments a person should receive, not life and death.
>By June of 1947, TWO YEARS after war's end, the majority of the
>German people vegetated on "rations which represent only a third of
>the internationally accepted minimum....What we are experiencing is
>the destruction of the mental and physical substance of a great
>people" (p.235). This comes from a report of a German physicians'
>association.
To quote myself,
"The German harvest in 1946 was reasonable, 1947 it was
bad, and in 1948 it was a bumper crop, finally removing
the food problem. In March 1946 the ration was cut to
1,000 calories, delivery of around 1,000,000 tons of food
by May 1946 helped raise rations again."
Yes, I have stated this before, it was not until the harvest of 1948
that enough food was present. Given the allies kept the German
rations at 1,000 or more calories as opposed to the preferred
2,000 for adults I presume you are talking about the miners who
did need greater rations for the hard manual labour.
See above for some dates when rationing stopped outside
of Germany. Yes it took years to normalise food production,
you wonder at times how much of the European Union's
agriculture policies are grounded in the experiences of post
war Europe.
The Germans, and I presume the Japanese, were last on the list
but the rest of the world was not luxuriating in food surpluses.
>>Coal was transported by rail and water, and yes, the transportation
>>bombings had ruined the system, and this caused many problems.
>
>Well, the coal got out nevertheless. Transports even rolled toward
>the Soviet Union, where along the way we kids jumped the trains to
>liberate an armful of the black gold.
Yes, children had been doing something similar from 1940 or
so onwards in different parts of Europe.
>>The one good thing about these debates is they bring forward all the
>>evidence to easily refute the wild claims when they are raised the next time.
>
>Then please check the evidence.
I have, many stories of underfed Germans, few of starvation,
many stories of revenge attacks, stories of allied troops
attacking Germans, but no evidence of systematic violence
and starvation.
Japan's parting gift to Indo-China was a famine in 1945 that
killed 700,000 to 2,000,000 people, rice rations in Malaya
in 1945 1/5 that of 1942, if people could obtain them, food
deliveries to people in Manila effectively stopped in June
1944 (Guerrilla warfare played a part in this one) Japan had
so mismanaged the economies it controlled that there were
food shortages almost everywhere in Asia. If the war had not
ended when it did or the allies not liberated parts of South East
Asia in 1945 there would have been more famines.
There was a world wide food shortage.
>You may also wish to look at the
>concept of "agrarian disarmament" - i.e. making a future German
>state dependent for its sustenance upon imported grain, and thereby
>reducing its war potential." (p.5, citing memo "Agrarian Reform" by
>Deputy Chief Food and Agriculture Division of the British Control
>Commission, 28 Oct 1946, 7 BA Z6 1/162)
Yes ideas like this were kicked around, given what the Nazis
had done, given the way the Nazis had totally destroyed the idea
that education would stop such things happening. The idea the
Germans supported the European Union to effectively reapply for
admission to the human race.
>Starving Germany had already practiced during and after WW I. It
>probably made some people so bitter, that they came up with the
>urge to find Lebensraum.
On that basis they way the Nazi government took food from
the east in particular "probably made some people so bitter,
that they came up with the urge to find Lebensraum", otherwise
known as the movement west of the German border and
expulsion of the German people.
The overwhelming majority of people caught up in WWII did
not deserve what happened to them.
The rest of the post is from the book Food Supplies and the
Japanese Occupation of South East Asia. (Indo China
famine figures mentioned earlier are from this). The Bengal
famine figures are from the Report of the Commission of
Inquiry.
Burma was the world's biggest rice exporter but by 1945 the
fighting threatened the population with starvation.
Japan tried to make each province, not country, it occupied
self sufficient, to reduce transport needs. Effectively totally
disrupting trade, so areas with excess food cut back
production but could not obtain, say, cooking oil, areas
without sufficient food production were in trouble.
Then there was the demand to sell a fixed percentage of
each crop to the Japanese at a low price, bad enough
for those with surpluses, worse for those without. Japan
neglected pest control (including mosquitoes) and irrigation
systems which did not help rice production.
A crash program to build wooden hulled ships in Java
used unseasoned wood, which warped of course, thereby
leaving only about 10% of the ships built usable. About
1,200 small craft had been lost in Malaya and Sumatra
during the opening of the war.
Thailand built up a 1,000,000 or so ton rice reserve (the
Thais ran the economy, the Japanese the transport), which
really helped post war. The British wrote into the peace
agreement with Thailand the requirement for the Thais to
deliver 1,500,000 tons of rice at cheap prices (given the
prices then being charged).
"Casual Torture" for minor offences turned the population
even more against the Japanese.
Material for the Thai-Burma railway came from dismantling
railways in Java and Malaya, needless to say the material
was not replaced. (The Thai Burma railway was 415 km long,
meaning one labourer died for roughly each 5 metres of track.)
It is my impression the Japanese Military authorities were
determined to ignore the concept of an economy. They
were equally incompetent at stamping out the black market,
and so enabled more of the local population to survive at times
(and hoarding to happen at other times).
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
--
On 16 Jul 2001, casita wrote:
> You are reaching back to 1918. Why don't you also remind our readers of the
> German siege guns - Big Berthas - used against Paris that year.
Strictly speaking the 240mm "Paris Guns" were distinct from the
"Big Berthas" which were 420mm mortars used against Belgian
fortifications in 1914.
The Big Bertha mortars had a range of about 9 miles while the
Paris gun could lob shells at ranges of up to 75 miles.
Cheers and all,
--