Americans in the Phillipines trapped by Pearl Harbor.

[wjho...@aol.com]

Quoted below are excerpts from a current newsletter published
by BACEPOW [Bay Area Civilian Ex-Prisoners of War]. It tells of
the treatment of U.S.civilian residents in the Philppines who,
unlike dependents of U.S. military and Government personnel
there, were, unable to leave the Phillippines prior to the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor because of odious decisions made in the
U.S. State Department which made it impossible for most of them
to get out.

One can not help but consider how diametrically inconsistent was
the pre-war treatment by their own government of those who thus
became U.S.victims of myriad atrocities as prisoners of the Japanese,
when compared to the treatment four decades later by the U.S.
Government which gave an apology and $20,000 each enemy alien Japanese
living in the U.S. at the time of Pearl Harbor and legally interned
here. The Japanese internees were held under comparative "country
club" conditions to those of Americans interned by Japan, yet no such
largesse has ever been voted by the U.S. for those of its citizens who
survived the Japanese death camps.

(QUOTE)
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a huge surprise
to most Americans; but for some time, those expatriates
living in Asia were aware of the probability that Japan was
about to attack American interests. In 1941, military and diplomatic
dependents were shipped home from the Philippines, and
by the end of that year American businessmen and their families
started an exodus from other Asian countries, though by in
large they remained in the Philippines.....correspondence
between the offices of Philippine High Commissioner Sayre
and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, not declassified until 60
years after the fact, gives a clearer picture of the reasons.

Sayre to Hull, October 9, 1940
"... the State Department has instructed our Far Eastern
consulates to advise Americans living in the Japanese Empire,
China, Hong Kong, and French Indochina to return to the
United States. So far as the Philippines are concerned ... there
is no reason for anxiety ... Manila is one of the safest places in
the Far East today."

Sayre to Hull, January 7, 1941
"I am of the opinion that at the proper time the Department
should consider whether American civilians are to be
evacuated either from Manila area or the Philippines ..."

State Department memo, Brandt, March 17, 1941
"If the Philippines are threatened by an enemy power,
are we going to tell and assist Americans there to depart, and
thus to subject ourselves to the accusation by Filipinos ... that
we are fleeing from our own soil and leaving our wards ... to
face the danger alone? ... we should tell the High Commissioner
that we do not contemplate an evacuation of Americans
from the Philippines ..."

State Department Memorandum of Conversation, Hiss,
April 21, 1941
"The United States Army has moved up to May 15 its
deadline for the removal of dependents of army personnel from
the Philippines. ... American citizens including women and
children ... are not being urged to return to the United States at
this time."

Congressional Legislation, June 21, 1941 (22 U.S.C. 228-
229)
"U.S. citizens in the Philippines were barred from departing
from or entering any territory of the United States without
a valid Passport." (U.S. PASSPORTS FOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES WERE ORDERED TO BE TURNED IN ON
SEPTEMBER 9, 1939) [Emphasis mine--WJH]

Hull to Ambassadors, November 22, 1941
"... American diplomatic and consular officers call to the
attention of American Citizens in the Japanese Empire,
Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and
French Indo China the advice previously given in regard to
withdrawal ..."

Correspondence of Lucia B. Kidder, secretary in High
Commissioner office
"... I recon that 5,000 letters were written denying passports."

Tracing through these declassified records makes it
clear, that while it was U.S. policy to encourage Americans to
evacuate East Asia before the war broke out, the State Department
was equally adamant that Americans were not to leave the
Philippines, thus sealing their fate when the Japanese invaded.
7,300 Americans civilians were in the Philippines in 1941, and
770 of them never returned home because they died of deprivation
in the prison camps, executions, and massacres.

The State Department's anti-civilian program continued
after the liberation of the civilian POW camps when it demanded
that these people must either pay for transportation
back to the U.S. or sign a promissory note to that effect. General
MacArthur flatly refused the order from State. He took the
position that many of the American civilians concerned were
not able to pay their way home because they had lost everything
during the Japanese occupation.

When State repeated its instructions, MacArthur repeated
his position, implying that if necessary, he would advance the
sum for passage from his own funds, and then request Congress
to reimburse him. The State Department realized that if the issue
was taken to Congress there would be widespread sympathy
for the victims of Japanese aggression, and backed down.

And so by 1945 our government had struck twice at its
own citizens, and now started the 20 year battle for those who
lost everything to obtain compensation for their losses out of
the reparations our government received from Japan
(UNQUOTE).

WJH

[Felix Reuthner]

wjho...@aol.com wrote:

> One can not help but consider how diametrically inconsistent was
> the pre-war treatment by their own government of those who thus
> became U.S.victims of myriad atrocities as prisoners of the Japanese,
> when compared to the treatment four decades later by the U.S.
> Government which gave an apology and $20,000 each enemy alien Japanese
> living in the U.S. at the time of Pearl Harbor and legally interned
> here. The Japanese internees were held under comparative "country
> club" conditions to those of Americans interned by Japan, yet no such
> largesse has ever been voted by the U.S. for those of its citizens who
> survived the Japanese death camps.

Actually, the people interned in the US were (for the most part) US
citizens, which makes a whole lot of difference. Interning citizens of
an enemy nation was par for the course, but interning US citizens was
actually illegal or against the constitution.

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 26, 5:40 pm, Felix Reuthner <s...@reuthner.net> wrote:
>
> Actually, the people interned in the US were (for the most
> part) US citizens, which makes a whole lot of difference.
> Interning citizens of an enemy nation was par for the
> course, but interning US citizens was actually illegal or
> against the constitution.

What you say happens NOT to be true, although it seems to
be the conventional view of many as a consequence of the manipulation
of public opinion by those with a vested financial
interest in falsifying the historical record.
.
Let's get a few things straight.

No U.S. citizens were interned in WWII.
Internment was for enemy aliens only and internees were held
in internment camps operated by the Dept. of Justice. Only
enemy aliens with security charges against them who had had individual
hearings before an enemy alien control board were
interned. In some cases U.S. citizen family members of enemy
aliens were allowed to accompany internees but only on a
voluntary basis in a government effort to keep families together.
Suchpersons were not "interned.".

You seem to be confusing "internment" with the evacuation of
persons of Japanese descent from West Coast military zones.
Only persons living in the restricted military zones were so
relocated. Most had no place to go so the government had to
provide housing. This it did in the form of 10 relocation
centers east of the restricted areas. These centers were
operated by the War Relocation Authority and had no
connection with internment camps.

Those of Japanese descent residing in non-sensitive areas
were not evacuated or relocated or disturbed at all unless
individually arrested by the FBI on security charges,

Internment of enemy aliens is standard operating procedure in
wartime and still is under both international and domestic law,.
That doesn't mean all enemy aliens were or had to be interned
but does mean ALL CAN BE as the government sees fit.

The evacuation/relocation was declared to be legal and
constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in a 1944 decision
never reversed.
.
As for the breakdown by citizenship of the evacuees from the
West Coast military areas. Approximately two-thirds of the
ADULT evacuated were NOT U.S.citizens. They were Japanese enemy
aliens who had not been interned because there had been
no security charges brought against them.

A majority of the children evacuated were U.S.
citizens. Their average age was 15 years. Those American-born
over the age of 17 were also Japanese citizens under Japanese
law and thus dual citizens, many having been sent to Japan to be
educated and returned to the U.S. more Japanese than
American. Estimates put that number at over 10,000.

WJH

[Shawn Wilson]

On Sep 26, 2:40 pm, Felix Reuthner <s...@reuthner.net> wrote:

> Actually, the people interned in the US were (for the most part) US
> citizens, which makes a whole lot of difference. Interning citizens of
> an enemy nation was par for the course, but interning US citizens was
> actually illegal or against the constitution.

Ah... it's never that simple. Problem is, most of them held dual US-
Japanese citizenship. The law was ambiguous about their status.
Well, actually it wasn't. Japanese citizenship, regardless or
simultaneous US citizenship, meant internment (or whatever the
technical legal term they called it for them was).

I don't know why people get so upset about it. We drafted 10 million
US citizens to lives infinitely less desireable than mere and rather
comfortable internment. Would people have been happier if those
people had been drafted rather than interned? Then they could have
slept in mud and had total strangers try to kill them, instead of
living rather more comfortable lives than that for a few years.

[Felix Reuthner]

wjho...@aol.com wrote:

> You seem to be confusing "internment" with the evacuation of
> persons of Japanese descent from West Coast military zones.
> Only persons living in the restricted military zones were so
> relocated. Most had no place to go so the government had to
> provide housing. This it did in the form of 10 relocation
> centers east of the restricted areas. These centers were
> operated by the War Relocation Authority and had no
> connection with internment camps.

Thank you for the correction. "Internment camp" might be a fitting
description (after all the people held there were not free to go, were
they?), but to avoid confusion, it might be better to stick to the
official designation.

Felix

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 27, 4:48 pm, Felix Reuthner <s...@reuthner.net> wrote:

During the war I don't recall ever hearing of any confusion
as to terms. Everybody then knew the difference between
"internment" and "relocation." It has only been in later
years that the revisionism took place.

That started in the 70s when young ethnic activists, most of
whom were not yet born or too young to remember the war but
inspired by the civil rights movement, began a push for what
they called "redress and reparations."

This called for cash payments to be made at taxpayer expense
to anyone of Japanese heritage who had been interned or
evacuated and relocated during the war.

Although thousands of Germans and Italians had also been
"interned" and "relocated," the push did not call for their
inclusion in the largesse. They were the wrong race.

Activists seized upon the use of the word "internment" in
place of the word "relocation" because being interned had
been a stricter experience than being relocated and they
wanted to paint a far darker picture than what life in a
relocation center had really been like. Some even latched
on to the term "concentration camp" in an attempt to equate
life in a relocation center with life in a Nazi death camp.

As to the actual restrictions in a relocation center, there were
some, but reasonable under the circumstances.
People had to be accounted for and needed to adhere to certain
rules of order for such large institutions to function at all.
Similar restrictions were known to any GI or Sailor who ever
served at a military or naval base.

Although recreational facilities were numerous within the
centers, residents could temporarily go outside for forays
into the surrounding countryside-- to go on picnics, swim in
nearby streams, take walks--enjoy whatever recreational
opportunity might be available nearby Leave was often
granted for excursions to nearby towns.

And permanent leave could also be obtained for
outside employment or to attend educational institutions
(except in restricted military areas) by those with military
clearances and a place to work or go without becoming a
public charge. To encourage departures from he centers
he wartime government set up employment offices
in eastern cities in an attempt to find work for the evacuees.

As a result, more than 35,000 (approx one-third of the total
number of evacuated people) had departed from the centers
before the war had ended.

WJH

[David H Thornley]

wjho...@aol.com wrote:
> No U.S. citizens were interned in WWII.

Okay, okay, we'll use words more precisely, and stick to words that were
actually used by authorities at the time.

US citizens of Japanese descent were sent to concentration camps. Do
you like that better?

> Those of Japanese descent residing in non-sensitive areas
> were not evacuated or relocated or disturbed at all unless
> individually arrested by the FBI on security charges,
>

Okay, we see that "non-sensitive" areas are those coastal areas
with serious enemy activity, and "sensitive" areas are those
coastal areas that saw two small and ineffective submarine
incursions in over three and a half years. Noted.

--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-

[Alan Nordin]

On Sep 27, 3:56 pm, Shawn Wilson <ikonoql...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Would people have been happier if those
> people had been drafted rather than interned?

Many were happy to serve in the US military. Many more than were
allowed to.

Alan

[wjho...@aol.com]

Who were not allowed to serve in the U.S. military?
Could it have been the some 26% of the 21,000
Japanese-Americans of military age who had refused to
take an unqualified oath of allegiance to the U.S. in a
questionnaire administered to relocation center residents
in February of 1983?

And let's look at some numbers with regard to volunteers
for the U.S. military from among Japanese-Americans
in the relocation centers:

In 1943 the Government attempted to recruit *volunteers*
for military service from among the 21,000
Japanese-American males of military age living in the
relocation centers.

Although the government had estimated a favorable
response from at least half, or 10,000 of the 21,000,
only 1208 volunteered, 6% of the 21,000 of military
age..

It would seem that the degree of "happiness" among
Japanese-Americans with regard to joining the U.S.
military service was considerably less than overwhelming.

WJH

[Stephen Graham]

On 9/27/11 9:57 PM, wjho...@aol.com wrote:
> On Sep 27, 10:13 pm, Alan Nordin<alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On Sep 27, 3:56 pm, Shawn Wilson<ikonoql...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Would people have been happier if those
>>> people had been drafted rather than interned?
>>
>> Many were happy to serve in the US military. Many more than were
>> allowed to.
>
> Who were not allowed to serve in the U.S. military?

As I'm quite certain you're fully aware, Mr Hopwood, between 30 March
1942 and early 1944, Americans of Japanese descent were classified as
"Aliens Ineligible for Service" and were only allowed to enlist in the
US military upon special request by the military. Prior to that date but
after 7 December 1941, they could volunteer or be drafted, but many
local draft boards removed them from the draft pool. Recruitment centers
would frequently turn them away. _Nisei Linguists_ cites several cases
by name in its discussion of this topic.

After being told that they were ineligible and being forcibly evacuated
and placed in camps, it shouldn't surprise us that the rate of
volunteering was lower than you might wish.

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 28, 1:44 am, Stephen Graham <grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:

> On 9/27/11 9:57 PM, wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:
>
> > On Sep 27, 10:13 pm, Alan Nordin<alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> On Sep 27, 3:56 pm, Shawn Wilson<ikonoql...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >>> Would people have been happier if those
> >>> people had been drafted rather than interned?
>
> >> Many were happy to serve in the US military. Many more than were
> >> allowed to.
>
> > Who were not allowed to serve in the U.S. military?
>
> As I'm quite certain you're fully aware, Mr Hopwood, between
> 30 March 1942 and early 1944, Americans of Japanese
> descent were classified as "Aliens Ineligible for Service" and
> were only allowed to enlist in the US military upon special
> request by the military. Prior to that date but after 7 December
> 1941, they could volunteer or be drafted, but many
> local draft boards removed them from the draft pool. Recruitment

> enters would frequently turn them away. _Nisei Linguists_ cites
> several cases by name in its discussion of this topic.

That was true early in the war but I believe the situation began to
change about one year earlier than you indicate. Actually it was as
early as the summer of 1942 that the military began a recruitment
program among JAs in a search for loyal members thereof
who met linguistic requirements needed by the military. Only six
months after that (January 28,1943) the military went full bore by
announcing the formation of a Japanese-American combat team
which later became known as the famous 100/442d which served
admirably in the European theatre.

But the War Relocation Authority in cooperation with the War
Department wanted to go further in determining the loyalty of
Japanese-Americans and relieving tensions in the relocation
centers by establishing a larger role for JAs in the war effort,

In preparation therefore, the War Department organized a loyalty
questionnaire program which began as early as February 1943,
and it was in the execution of that program that over 26% of the
military eligible JAs would not agree to swear an unqualified oath

of allegiance to the U.S.

> After being told that they were ineligible and being forcibly
> evacuated and placed in camps, it shouldn't surprise us that the
> rate of volunteering was lower than you might wish.

That has been used ad infinitum as an excuse to explain the
distaste so many JAs had for U.S. military service. However, under
the circumstances it would seem that such a reason doesn't hold
too much water. After all, among the JAs of military age a very
large
segment consisted of dual citizens who had spent the formative
years of their lives in Japan, many returning to the U.S. having
received military training in Japan, some of whom retained
Reserve positions in the Japanese Imperial armed forces,

Accordingly, i believe it fair to assume that their general
reluctance
to join the U.S. armed forces may have been based to a greater
degree on the aforementioned background of so many of the JAs,
rather than blaming it all the government for having evacuated
them as a group from military areas until (in the immortal words
of General DeWitt) "the sheep could be separated from the goats."

WJH

[Alan Nordin]

On Sep 28, 11:02 am, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> Accordingly, i believe it fair to assume that their general reluctance
> to join the U.S. armed forces may have been based to a greater
> degree on the aforementioned background of so many of the JAs,

"Accordingly, I believe", well there's no surprise there, we're all
well acquainted with your views on this subject.

Of course you don't think the attitude of the government and public
opinion in California, much of which existed before WWII, had anything
to do with it.

"In contrast to the Germans and Italians, the Japanese in the Pacific
states, and especially in California, had been the target of hostility
and restrictive action for several decades, a factor that
unquestionably colored the measures taken against these people after
Pearl Harbor."

" . . . loss of employment and income due to anti-Japanese agitation
by and among Caucasian Americans, continued personal attacks by
Filipinos and other racial groups, denial of relief funds to
desperately needy cases, cancellation of licenses for markets, produce
houses, stores, etc., by California State authorities, discharges from
jobs by the wholesale, [and] unnecessarily harsh restrictions on
travel including discriminatory regulations against all Nisei
preventing them from engaging in commercial fishing." 2/4/42 USN
report on situation in California.

> rather than blaming it all the government for having evacuated
> them as a group from military areas

"In other exchanges on this and succeeding days General DeWitt
explained that what the California authorities proposed to do was to
move both citizen and alien Japanese (voluntarily if possible, and in
collaboration with American-born Japanese leaders from urban areas and
from along the coast to agricultural areas within the state. They
wanted to do this in particular in order to avoid having to replace
the Japanese with Mexican and Negro laborers who might otherwise have
to be brought into California in considerable numbers."

While the Japanese were undesirable for supposed security reasons, the
Mexicans and Negros were still less desirable ... for what reason?
Military exclusion areas were set up that didn't limit access to many
urban and coastal areas.

> until (in the immortal words
> of General DeWitt) "the sheep could be separated from the goats."

General DeWitt can be quoted as saying many things, such as, "An
American citizen, after all, is an American citizen. And while they
all may not be loyal, I think we can weed the disloyal out of the
loyal and lock them up if necessary."

All of the above quotes are from _Guarding the United States and Its
Outposts_ Chapter V _Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast_ a volume
of the officail US Army history of WWII. This was published in 1962,
before the claimed period of "revisionism" you unceasingly talk about.

Alan

PS Since I have spent a certain amount of time researching this
posting, I think I'm entitled to request that you please include a
cite for any quotes or facts you include in your reply.

[Alan Nordin]

On Sep 28, 11:02 am, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:

> Only six
> months after that (January 28,1943) the military went full bore by
> announcing the formation of a Japanese-American combat team
> which later became known as the famous 100/442d which served
> admirably in the European theatre.

You are being disengenuous here, or perhaps you haven't fully
investigated the formation of the 100th Infantry battalion and the
442nd Infantry regiment.

The 100th was formed from Japanese descended members of the Hawaiian
NG. These men belonged to the 298th and 299th Infantry Regiments
which had been federalized in 1940 and were culled out following Pearl
Harbor. In other words, they were in the US Army before 12/7/41 and
were not recruited from the relocation centers. The battalion
numbered over 1,300 men. *From _WWII Order of Battle_ Stanton.

The 442nd was, as you incorrectly point out, activated in 2/1/1943.
the 100th Inf Bat was used as cadre, and recruits were accepted from
the relocation centers and from the Hawaiian Islands. In Hawaii,
12,500 men volunteered. I can find no data on the number of men in
the relocation centers who volunteered. *http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/agency/army/100-442in.htm

The book strength of a US Army Infantry regiment on 7/15/1943 was
3,118 men. And sinse the US Army didn't trust the Japanese enough to
make them officers, you can remove 144 men from that total. *Again,
_WWII OOB_ Stanton.

So, you suggest the entire 442nd was recruited from the relocation
centers. Yet 1,000 of the 3,000 were Hawaiian National Guardsmen who
were in the Army prior to Pearl Harbor. Also, the US Army recruited
in the Hawaiian Islands where 12,500 volunteered. Not counting the
volunteers from the relocation centers at least 10,500 men of Japanese
descent were turned away by the US Army while 2,000 were accepted,
less than 15%, my guess would be less than 10% when the volunteers
from the relocation center are added. Do you still say all those who
wanted to serve were allowed?

Alan

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 28, 5:08 pm, Alan Nordin <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
> Of course you don't think the attitude of the government and public
> opinion in California, much of which existed before WWII, had
> anything to do with it.

As for the general attitude prior to Pearl Harbor, not really. But
I suspect from your remarks that most of what you think you know
about the motivations of the government and public after Pearl Harbor
is not accurate--and that you intend to keep it that way.

> " . . . loss of employment and income due to anti-Japanese agitation
> by and among Caucasian Americans, continued personal attacks by
> Filipinos and other racial groups, denial of relief funds to
> desperately needy cases, cancellation of licenses for markets,
> produce houses, stores, etc., by California State authorities,
> discharges from jobs by the wholesale, [and] unnecessarily harsh
> restrictions on travel including discriminatory regulations against
> all Nisei preventing them from engaging in commercial fishing."
> 2/4/42 USN report on situation in California.

That quote came from an unidentified report in Chapter V of Conn's
"Guarding the United States and its Outposts." It does not properly
identify the report by source, authority or Naval Command in which
the report was written. It is therefore officially meaningless as to
official status or reliability.

This is what a Navy report looks like and how its authenticity should
be established.

"SUBJECT: Japanese Menace on Terminal Island,
San Pedro, California.
REFERENCE: (a) Report on subject prepared by Counter
Intelligence Section, ONI, January 18, 1942.
PREPARED BY: Lieut. Comdr. K. D. RINGLE, USN.
DATE: February 7, 19

(EXERPTS)

.....There does exist in the present population a large element of
what is considered to be the most dangerous class of persons of the
Japanese race in the United States. This class is composed of those
persons born in the United States, sent to Japan in infancy, raised
and trained there, and who have returned to the United States within
the last four or five years as adults, and who have been permitted
entry as American citizens because of their American birth. There are
several hundred of this type of person presently residing on Terminal
Island and engaged either in the taking or processing of fish. It is
felt that these persons constitute the greatest menace of the whole
colony to the security of the United States.

IV Analysis of the Hazard to the Security of the United States due to
this Japanese Colony on Terminal Island.
1. As has been pointed out, it is very evident that a hazard
definitely exists due to the location of this large Japanese colony in
the heart of the Los Angeles harbor district. It is considered that
this hazard can be broken down as follows:
(a) Physical observation and espionage - 75%.
(b) Sabotage - 20%.
(c) Fifth column activity - 5%. By fifth column activity is meant
preparation for and assistance to any attempted attack or invasion
from outside sources.
As long as this colony, which contains known alien sympathizers, even
though of American citizenship, is allowed to exist in the heart of
every activity in the Los Angeles Harbor, it must be assumed that
items such as the above are known, observed, and transmitted to the
enemy quickly and easily.

> While the Japanese were undesirable for supposed security
> reasons, the Mexicans and Negros were still less desirable ... for
> what reason?

Who knows? Conn does't say. Anyway, it's really Irrelevant to the
subject matter of this discussion.

> All of the above quotes are from _Guarding the United States and Its
> Outposts_ Chapter V _Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast_
> a volume of the officail US Army history of WWII. This was
> published in 1962, before the claimed period of "revisionism" you
> unceasingly talk about.

Yes, I have a copy of it. It's an interesting publication and
describes
in detail how the final decision to evacuate was made but it doesn't
reveal why it was made, i.e., top secret intelligence privy only to
those in Washington who made the final decision to evacuate.
Conn didn't have a clue as to what it was at the time.

That final decision to evacuate, approved by FDR, was based
primarily on the content of intercepted Japanese messages between
Tokyo and its U.S. Embassy and West Coast Consulates which,
for over a year prior to the war, U.S. government cryptographers had
been decoding in a program known as MAGIC.

These intercepts were distributed only to FDR and his closest
advisors, and revealed the existence of an extensive Japanese
espionage penetration of the West Coast Japanese community
involving Japanese-Americans and resident Japanese nationals
who were acting as unidentified agents of Japan.

Such agents were working not only within the U.S. Armed Forces
but also in defense establishments on the West Coast. All of this
can ,be confirmed in now declassified documents published in
several sources. I recommend "The MAGIC Background of Pearl Harrbor"
an 8 volume set published by the Dept. of Defense in the 1970s, For a
more recent source, see "MAGIC-The Untold Story of U.S.Intelligence
and the Evacuation of Japanese Residents From
The West Coast During WWii." By David Lowman, Special
Assistant the the Director, National Security Agency--2001.

> PS Since I have spent a certain amount of time researching this
> posting, I think I'm entitled to request that you please include a
> cite for any quotes or facts you include in your reply.

Ok, I've also spent considerable research time looking into this
subject. I am a WWII veteran of the U.S. Navy with a long
memory and have been researching this matter for more than
30 years, beginning around the time the '"redress and reparations"
crowd began their move on the U.S. treasury.

I'm curious, since you say only that you researched
for one posting, how many years (if any) have you researched
the entire subject matter?

As for cites, I have an extensive library of my own on this
matter. I try to cite quotes of mine or material the source of
which may not be common knowledge or which I may not have previously
used in this forum. If I have not properly cited
anything in this thread please let me know what it is and i'll be
happy to try and accommodate.

WJH

[Alan Nordin]

On Sep 29, 11:00 am, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Sep 28, 5:08 pm, Alan Nordin <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> > Of course you don't think the attitude of the government and public
> > opinion in California, much of which existed before WWII, had
> > anything to do with it.
>
> As for the general attitude prior to Pearl Harbor, not really. But
> I suspect from your remarks that most of what you think you know
> about the motivations of the government and public after Pearl Harbor
> is not accurate--and that you intend to keep it that way.

You conveniently fail to reproduce the quote I provided. These are
not my words, they are the words of the author of a volume of the
official history of the US Army in WWII. I will repeat it here ....

"In contrast to the Germans and Italians, the Japanese in the Pacific
states, and especially in California, had been the target of
hostility
and restrictive action for several decades, a factor that
unquestionably colored the measures taken against these people after
Pearl Harbor."

Apparently you have already made up your mind and anything that
doesn't agree with you is to be ignored.

> > " . . . loss of employment and income ..... <snipped>

>
> That quote came from an unidentified report in Chapter V of Conn's
> "Guarding the United States and its Outposts." It does not properly
> identify the report by source, authority or Naval Command in which
> the report was written. It is therefore officially meaningless as to
> official status or reliability.

If you look up the site, you'll see a foot note. I will reproduce it
here for you.

"Rpt, Lt Comdr K.D. Ringle, Eleventh Naval District, through
Commandant to CNO, no date, copy in ASW 014.311 EAWC. From the
contents of this report, the author concludes that it was written
about 1 February 1942, rather than ten days later as indicated in
Grodzins, Japanese Evacuation, p. 146, note 46. The substance of this
report, the most detailed and sympathetic military analysis of the
Japanese problem in early 1942, was anonymously published in Harper's
Magazine, October 1942, PP. 489-97."

Again, apparently you have already made up your mind and anything that
doesn't agree with you is either bogus or to be ignored.

> > While the Japanese were undesirable for supposed security
> > reasons, the Mexicans and Negros were still less desirable ... for
> > what reason?
>
> Who knows? Conn does't say. Anyway, it's really Irrelevant to the
> subject matter of this discussion.

Really? The quote I provided, which again you have failed to reproduce
in full, is telling as to some of the motives that drove the decision
for relocation.

> Yes, I have a copy of it. It's an interesting publication and describes
> in detail how the final decision to evacuate was made but it doesn't
> reveal why it was made,

Only if you chose to ignore some of what it says. It goes into some
detail on the discussions DeWitt had with local, state and federal
politicians and the views these politicians had. Here is a link to an
on-line copy, for others since you already have your own.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Guard-US/ch5.htm

> i.e., top secret intelligence privy only to
> those in Washington who made the final decision to evacuate.
> Conn didn't have a clue as to what it was at the time.

Well, please, feel free to cite the top-secret intelligence. Your
bare assertion that it exists is insufficient. You ask me to read an
8-volume set to find data to support your argument. That's your job,
not mine.

> I am a WWII veteran of the U.S. Navy with a long
> memory and have been researching this matter for more than
> 30 years, beginning around the time the '"redress and reparations"
> crowd began their move on the U.S. treasury.

I honor you for your service. I sense you may scoff at this, but, my
father was a US Marine and was slated to participate in Operation
Olympic. If Olympic had come off, it may have been that I wouldn't be
here to have this discussion with you. Unfortunately my dad died
about ten years ago. I think I remember what he thought about
reparations, he was against them as you are. I don't remember what
his thoughts on relocation were. My mother, who also had two brothers
who served in the same service as you, {again - unfortunately both
dead,} is still alive and feels relocation was one of the worst
decisions ever made by the government of the United States. I don't
think she qualifies as one of the "redress and reparations" crowd you
constantly speak of since she's over 80.

I believe your description of yourself as having "a long memory" is
telling, though you may not think so. I also find telling your
lumping those who disagree with you into one group, the "redress and
reparations" crowd, within which I assume you have put me. If so, it
would be unwarranted, since I haven't made known what my views on that
specific decision are.

> I'm curious, since you say only that you researched
> for one posting, how many years (if any) have you researched
> the entire subject matter?

Not that many, but, my mind is still open to argument, yours was
closed long ago. You make the assumption that I haven't read on this
subject at other times.

If you really are interested in my views, and I doubt you are since I
don't 100% agree with you. I believe that the decision to relocate
was not as cut and dried as you {or for that matter I) in this and
previous posts have been trying to make it look. To you, the entire
decision was based on military necessity. I believe that military
necessity was only part of the picture, and the weakest part. There
was anti-Japanese feeling on the West Coast and particularly in
California before the war and even more so following Pearl Harbor.
This anti-Japanese feeling, both official and public, contributed to
the decision. I have provided two reports, which of course you say
are bogus or chose to ignore. Others have provided many more in other
threads on this topic, all of which you have dismissed in one way or
another. Another factor was the hysteria that was prevalent on the
West Coast and nationally following Pearl Harbor. Conn Chapter V
documents many instances. In my view, ALL of these were material to
the decision to relocate. To you, only military necessity. Not only
do you insist that the other reasons weren't pertinent, you deny they
even existed.

You say that I have only sited one source, while you have a large
library on the subject. Isn't it obvious why I chose this one source
and only this source? Whatever published source that wasn't an
official history would be dismissed by you as being authored by
members of the "redress and reparations" crowd. So why waist my time
going elsewhere when everything I need is in one place?

Alan

[Alan Nordin]

On Sep 29, 10:53 am, Alan Nordin <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> The 100th was formed from Japanese descended members of the Hawaiian
> NG. These men belonged to the 298th and 299th Infantry Regiments
> which had been federalized in 1940 and were culled out following Pearl
> Harbor.

After further thought, I find it interesting the Hawaiian NG had
Japanese-American members while the West Coast NGs didn't to be
telling.

I'm sure Mr. Hopwood will blow this apart, but I see this as an
indication of the difference in attitudes within the two areas. A
difference that may partly explain why relocation was deemed necessary
on the West Coast but not in Hawaii.

Alan

[Stephen Graham]

On 9/28/2011 8:02 AM, wjho...@aol.com wrote:
> On Sep 28, 1:44 am, Stephen Graham<grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:

>> As I'm quite certain you're fully aware, Mr Hopwood, between
>> 30 March 1942 and early 1944, Americans of Japanese
>> descent were classified as "Aliens Ineligible for Service" and
>> were only allowed to enlist in the US military upon special
>> request by the military. Prior to that date but after 7 December
>> 1941, they could volunteer or be drafted, but many
>> local draft boards removed them from the draft pool. Recruitment
>> enters would frequently turn them away. _Nisei Linguists_ cites
>> several cases by name in its discussion of this topic.
>
> That was true early in the war but I believe the situation began to
> change about one year earlier than you indicate.

No. It's precisely as I described it. Japanese-Americans remained
classed as IV-C until 1944.

> Actually it was as
> early as the summer of 1942 that the military began a recruitment
> program among JAs in a search for loyal members thereof
> who met linguistic requirements needed by the military.

Recruitment of Japanese-Americans as linguists had begun before Pearl
Harbor, see discussion of the Fourth Army Language School. While there
was an interruption in early 1942, there was no realistic alternative to
continuing to recruit Japanese-Americans.

> Only six
> months after that (January 28,1943) the military went full bore by
> announcing the formation of a Japanese-American combat team
> which later became known as the famous 100/442d which served
> admirably in the European theatre.

That's a confused rendition of the actual course of events. The 100th
Battalion actually came first as a use for the Japanese-American
National Guardsmen from Hawaii. The 442d was conceived of later, largely
as something to do with the several thousand Japanese-Americans in the
US Army on the mainland. The search for volunteers was to supplement this.

> But the War Relocation Authority in cooperation with the War
> Department wanted to go further in determining the loyalty of
> Japanese-Americans and relieving tensions in the relocation
> centers by establishing a larger role for JAs in the war effort,

The best description of the loyalty questionnaire is in Eric Muller's
_American Inquisition: The Hunt for Japanese American Disloyalty in
World War II_. Essentially, the WRA was looking for a solution regarding
leave clearance at the same time the Army was looking to classify
potential volunteers. The two agencies decided to collaborate.

> In preparation therefore, the War Department organized a loyalty
> questionnaire program which began as early as February 1943,
> and it was in the execution of that program that over 26% of the
> military eligible JAs would not agree to swear an unqualified oath
> of allegiance to the U.S.

Where are you getting your 26% number? The numbers given in _The
Evacuated People_ are 21.7% for the initial questionnaire and 16% for
the revised questionnaire.

>> After being told that they were ineligible and being forcibly
>> evacuated and placed in camps, it shouldn't surprise us that the
>> rate of volunteering was lower than you might wish.
>
> That has been used ad infinitum as an excuse to explain the
> distaste so many JAs had for U.S. military service. However, under
> the circumstances it would seem that such a reason doesn't hold
> too much water.

Actually, it makes perfect sense. Contrast the mainland volunteer rate
with the much higher Hawaiian volunteer rate. While there are a number
of differences between the Japanese American communities on the mainland
and in Hawaii, one thing sticks out: the mainlanders were in camps; the
Hawaiians weren't. Plus, you know, that's what the people involved said
at the time.

[Stephen Graham]

On 9/29/2011 12:55 PM, Alan Nordin wrote:
> On Sep 29, 10:53 am, Alan Nordin<alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> The 100th was formed from Japanese descended members of the Hawaiian
>> NG. These men belonged to the 298th and 299th Infantry Regiments
>> which had been federalized in 1940 and were culled out following Pearl
>> Harbor.
>
> After further thought, I find it interesting the Hawaiian NG had
> Japanese-American members while the West Coast NGs didn't to be
> telling.

Oh, there were Japanese Americans in the West Coast National Guard units
as well. They were mostly stripped out immediately following Pearl
Harbor and sent to army posts inland or discharged.

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 29, 10:53 am, Alan Nordin <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:

> On Sep 28, 11:02 am, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com> >wrote:
>
> > Only six
> > months after that (January 28,1943) the military went full bore by
> > announcing the formation of a Japanese-American combat team
> > which later became known as the famous 100/442d which served
> > admirably in the European theatre.
>
> You are being disengenuous here, or perhaps you haven't fully
> investigated the formation of the 100th Infantry battalion and the
> 442nd Infantry regiment.

You seem to have a talent for not getting things right. My paragraph
above was a paraphrased abbreviation from a legitimate source.
Here is the complete and exact wording from the source, which was
"The Evacuation and Relocation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry
During World War II--A Historical Study of the Manzanar War
Relocation Center"--U.S.Dept. of the Interior NPS--1996.

"On January 28,1943, the Secretary of War Stimson announced
that the Army had decided to form a special Japanese American
combat team and that recruits would be accepted from the
relocation centers, the Hawaiian Islands, and elsewhere on the
mainland of the United States. In the near future, the Secretary
added, a special enlistment program to recruit personnel for the
team would be carried out simultaneously at all relocation centers.
Four days later President Roosevelt wrote to Stimson approving
the combat team and calling it a step toward restoration of the
evacuated people to their normal status in American society.
By February 6, ten recruitment teams were on their way from the
War Department in Washington to the relocation centers, and the
21,000 male citizens of military age in the centers faced one of the
most crucial decisions in their lives."

(Note) From all of the centers the Army came up with only
1208 volunteers.)

Where, pray tell, do you find my abbreviated statement to be
disingenuous? Did this combat team not later become known
as the 100/442d? Did it not serve admirably in the European
theater? Did I say anything which would lead you to believe
that the team would be confined only to recruits from the
relocation centers but not also from Hawaii or elsewhere?

You lead me to ask, which of us is being disingenuous?

>The 442nd was, as you incorrectly point out, activated in
> 2/1/1943.

I didn't say that. I said that on January 28, 1943 the Army
announced the "formation of a combat team" not the activation
of one.

>...the 100th Inf Bat was used as cadre, and recruits were

> accepted from >the relocation centers and from the Hawaiian
> Islands. In Hawaii, 12,500 men volunteered.

We all know that. But there were only 1208 volunteers from
the relocation centers and i don't know if any of those went
to the 100/442d but I do know that some 3000 from the
relocation centers who went to the 100/442d were draftees, not
volunteers.
{Ref: "Amercams--The Story of the 442d Combat Team" Orville
C. Shirrey Infantry Journal Press 1946.)

>I can find no data on the number of men in the relocation centers

> who volunteered....

Had you looked hard enough you would have found that it was only 1208.
You can find it in the Interior Dept. source I referenced
above. There is also reference to the volunteers in "Selective
Service Special Monograph #10" 1953)

>So, you suggest the entire 442nd was recruited from the relocation <UTF16-2028>>centers.

Nope. You got that wrong too. I never said it and never
suggested it. You imagined it.

WJH

[Alan Nordin]

On Sep 29, 4:40 pm, Stephen Graham <grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:
> Oh, there were Japanese Americans in the West Coast National Guard units
> as well. They were mostly stripped out immediately following Pearl
> Harbor and sent to army posts inland or discharged.

I wasn't aware that there were NGs in other units than the 100th
battalion. The number of existing NGs in the 442nd would then be
larger than 1,300 ... do you know how much larger? That would mean
the percentage of those accepted vs those who volunteered was closer
to 5%.

If the percentage of pre-war Japanese-American NGs vs Japanese-
Americans was significantly lower in the West Coast units than the
Hawaiian units, my thought may still have some validity. Though less
than I originally thought.

Alan

[Alan Nordin]

On Sep 29, 6:06 pm, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> Nope. You got that wrong too. I never said it and never
> suggested it. You imagined it.

If taken in the context of your reply to the posting by Mr. Graham it
is obvious that you were using it as an example of the scarcity of
Japanese-American volunteers for service in the US Army. Try reading
your earlier posts in this thread when formulating your replies.

Alan

[Stephen Graham]

On 9/29/2011 3:17 PM, Alan Nordin wrote:

> I wasn't aware that there were NGs in other units than the 100th
> battalion. The number of existing NGs in the 442nd would then be
> larger than 1,300 ... do you know how much larger? That would mean
> the percentage of those accepted vs those who volunteered was closer
> to 5%.
>
> If the percentage of pre-war Japanese-American NGs vs Japanese-
> Americans was significantly lower in the West Coast units than the
> Hawaiian units, my thought may still have some validity. Though less
> than I originally thought.

On a percentage basis, there were always more Japanese-Americans in the
Hawaiian National Guard units, simply because Japanese-Americans were
about one-third of the total population of the territory.

It also gets complicated as all National Guard units were federalized in
1940 or 1941 and were being filled by draftees. But the best guess is
that there were about one thousand Japanese-Americans enlisted in the
National Guard on the mainland before 1940.

By mid-1942, there were around 5,000 mainland Japanese-Americans in the
US Army.

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 29, 1:44 pm, Alan Nordin <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
> You conveniently fail to reproduce the quote I provided. These are
> not my words, they are the words of the author of a volume of the
> official history of the US Army in WWII. I will repeat it here ....
>
> "In contrast to the Germans and Italians, the Japanese in the Pacific
> states, and especially in California, had been the target of
> hostility and restrictive action for several decades, a factor that
> unquestionably colored the measures taken against these people after
> Pearl Harbor."

Sorry, I don't understand. Why would I want to reproduce what you
have
already provided? But if you want my comment on it, here it is:
Conn and numerous others expressed similar views. That was
opinion, not something which could be substantiated. Many, including
myself, didn't agree with those views. Yes, the Japanese had been
discriminated against before Pearl Harbor. So had others of
oriental
ancestry--Filipinos, Chinese. But we didn''t evacuate the Filipinos
and
Chinese, right? Why so the Japanese? Because of Pearl Harbor
and because of pre-war intelligence which linked many of them with
espionage and potential sabotage., because most of the adults of
Japanese ancestry were Japanese nationals (enemy aliens) and
they were considered legitimate security risks as a group until they
could be properly screened for loyalty. And that could not be done
overnight.

> > > " . . . loss of employment and income ..... <snipped>
>
> > That quote came from an unidentified report in Chapter V of Conn's
> > "Guarding the United States and its Outposts." It does not properly
> > identify the report by source, authority or Naval Command in which
> > the report was written. It is therefore officially meaningless as to
> > official status or reliability.
>
> If you look up the site, you'll see a foot note. I will reproduce it
> here for you.
>
> "Rpt, Lt Comdr K.D. Ringle, Eleventh Naval District, through
> Commandant to CNO, no date, copy in ASW 014.311 EAWC. From the
> contents of this report, the author concludes that it was written
> about 1 February 1942, rather than ten days later as indicated in
> Grodzins, Japanese Evacuation, p. 146, note 46. The substance of this
> report, the most detailed and sympathetic military analysis of the
> Japanese problem in early 1942, was anonymously published in Harper's
> Magazine, October 1942, PP. 489-97."

My copy of Conn does not have that footnote. I see that your
footnote indicates that the report was undated and that a copy
appeared in Harpers magazine anonymously. The anonymity
presents some question as to authenticity.
But, be that as it may, LCDR Ringle did
exist.
He was a junior officer in the Naval command in L.A. and had
several opinions vis-a-vis the Japanese evacuation problem, some
contradicting others.
in a previous post I provided you with a report he wrote
with regard to the danger from the Kibei (JAs who had been
educated in Japan and returned to the U.S.). In another report to
CNO dated 26 January 1942 he wrote that Japanese alien residents
on the West Coast, although passively loyal, "would not engage
in active sabotage or insurrection, but might well do surreptitious
observation work for Japanese interests if given a convenient
opportunity."

> ....The quote I provided, which again you have failed to reproduce

> in full, is telling as to some of the motives that drove the decision
> for relocation.

No it doesn't. It gives only the personal view of some that racism
rather than national security was the sole motivation for the
evacuation.
Nonsense.

> > Yes, I have a copy of it. It's an interesting publication and describes
> > in detail how the final decision to evacuate was made but it doesn't
> > reveal why it was made,
>

> Only if you chose to ignore some of what it says....

No. It is you who ignore what it DOESN'T say. It makes no mention
of the MAGIC message intercepts which revealed the connection
between he Empire of Japan and the Japanese community in the
U.S.

> Well, please, feel free to cite the top-secret intelligence. Your
> bare assertion that it exists is insufficient. You ask me to read an
> 8-volume set to find data to support your argument. That's your job,
> not mine.

No, it isn't my job to do your research. If you want to continue
not to know what you are talking about, that's your problem not
mine.

WJH

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Sep 27, 4:48 pm, Felix Reuthner <s...@reuthner.net> wrote:
> > wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:

> > Thank you for the correction. "Internment camp" might be a fitting
> > description (after all the people held there were not free to go, were
> > they?), but to avoid confusion, it might be better to stick to the
> > official designation.

> During the war I don't recall ever hearing of any confusion
> as to terms.

Correct; during the war, they were called "concentration camps".

"Leland Ford of Los Angeles, who demanded that "all Japanese, whether
citizens or not, be placed in [inland] concentration camps."

"Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of the Interior
Harold L. Ickes each referred to the American camps as "concentration
camps," at the time."

"As a member of President Roosevelt's administration, I saw the United
States Army give way to mass hysteria over the Japanese...Crowded into
cars like cattle, these hapless people were hurried away to hastily
constructed and thoroughly inadequate concentration camps, with soldiers
with nervous muskets on guard, in the great American desert. We gave
the fancy name of 'relocation centers' to these dust bowls, but they
were concentration camps nonetheless." -Harold Ickes, Secretary of
the Interior, Washington Evening Star, September 23, 1946"

> Everybody then knew the difference between
> "internment" and "relocation."

Actually, it is doubtful, since they were all treated the same.

> It has only been in later
> years that the revisionism took place.

Yes; revisionists attempt to claim that "internment" was magically
different from "relocation into a specific camp".

Such revisionists are sad little people.

Mike

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Sep 27, 10:13 pm, Alan Nordin <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> > On Sep 27, 3:56 pm, Shawn Wilson <ikonoql...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Would people have been happier if those
> > > people had been drafted rather than interned?
> >
> > Many were happy to serve in the US military. Many more than were
> > allowed to.

> Who were not allowed to serve in the U.S. military?

Why Mr Hopwood; surely YOU, who have often professed to have been
"around at the time" know that US citizens of Japanese descent were
kicked out of the armed forces shortly following Pearl Harbor.

If not, you are now enlightened. Armed with this new information, you
will undoubtedly change your opinion.

Mike

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 29, 3:55 pm, Alan Nordin <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
> After further thought, I find it interesting the Hawaiian NG had
> Japanese-American members while the West Coast NGs didn't

> to be telling. ...I see this as an indication of the difference in

> attitudes within the two areas. A difference that may partly
> explain why relocation was deemed necessary on the West
> Coast but not in Hawaii.

Although the pre-war attitude in Hawaii toward persons of
Japanese ancestry may not have been identical with that
on the Wet Coast, the principal reason for a difference in
treatment of ethnic Japanese was that on Hawaii martial
law was declared immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack.
When this happened, draconian restrictions affecting
everybody were imposed for security reasons an there
was a tight control of every aspect of life.

Martial law was ruled out for the mainland. There were
numerous defense industries on the West Coast and the
imposition of martial law and its many rules and restrictions
would have seriously slowed down production and hapmpered
the war effort.

WJH

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:

> > Interning citizens of an enemy nation was par for the
> > course, but interning US citizens was actually illegal or
> > against the constitution.

> What you say happens NOT to be true, although it seems to

Actually, it is; it is only modern day revisionists who claim a
difference between "internment" and "incarceration".

> be the conventional view of many as a consequence of the manipulation
> of public opinion by those with a vested financial
> interest in falsifying the historical record.

Nobody here has such a vested interest.

> interned. In some cases U.S. citizen family members of enemy
> aliens were allowed to accompany internees but only on a

In all cases, they were forcibly moved from the West Coast, if they
were of Japanese descent, regardless of citizenship.

> Internment of enemy aliens is standard operating procedure in

Incarcerating one's own citizens along racial lines is not.

> A majority of the children evacuated were U.S.
> citizens. Their average age was 15 years. Those American-born
> over the age of 17 were also Japanese citizens under Japanese

Nope; not if they'd renounced such citizenship or were never registered.

Mike

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Sep 29, 1:44 pm, Alan Nordin <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:

> ancestry--Filipinos, Chinese. But we didn''t evacuate the Filipinos
> and
> Chinese, right? Why so the Japanese? Because of Pearl Harbor
> and because of pre-war intelligence which linked many of them with
> espionage and potential sabotage., because most of the adults of

Actually, not much at all, and Ringle, who you claimed earlier to
be a reputable sourse. He states (among a great many other things)

"(c) That, however, there are among the Japanese both alien and
United States citizens, certain individuals, either deliberately
placed by the Japanese government or actuated by a fanatical loyalty
to that country who would act as saboteurs or agents. This number
is estimated to be less than three per cent of the total, or about
300 in the entire United States.

(d) That of the persons mentioned in (c) above, the most dangerous
are either already in custodial detention or are members of such
organizations as the Black Dragon Society, the Kaigun Kyokai (Navy
League) , or the Heimusha Iai (Military Service Men's League) , or
affiliated groups. The membership of these groups is already fairly
well known to the Naval Intelligence service or the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and should immediately be placed in custodial
detention, irrespective of whether they are alien or citizen. (See
references (e) and (f)."

He also goes on to state that American citizens of Japanese ancestry
" should
be officially encouraged in their efforts toward loyalty and
acceptance as bona fide citizens that they be accorded a place in
the national effort through such agencies as the Red Cross, U.S.O.,
civilian defense, and even such activities as ship and aircraft
building or other defense production activities, even though subject
to greater investigative checks as to background and loyalty, etc.,
than Caucasian Americans."

Well, that settles it; a real intelligence officer didn't see the threat
from ALL those of the "Japanese race" that you see.

Of course, now, being open-minded and all, you will reconsider your position,
yes?

Mike

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Sep 29, 3:55 pm, Alan Nordin <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:

> Although the pre-war attitude in Hawaii toward persons of
> Japanese ancestry may not have been identical with that
> on the Wet Coast, the principal reason for a difference in
> treatment of ethnic Japanese was that on Hawaii martial
> law was declared immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack.
> When this happened, draconian restrictions affecting
> everybody were imposed for security reasons an there
> was a tight control of every aspect of life.

Oddly, I had a friend whose father lived in Hawaii at the time; his
memory of the "draconian restrictions" was that they weren't all
that bad, that travel was pretty free, etc.

Of course, he never claimed to have your self-professed "long memory", but
what he recalls seemed to be more in tune with later references than your
attempts at revising the historical record.

Mike

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 29, 4:40 pm, Stephen Graham <grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:

> On 9/28/2011 8:02 AM, wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:
>
> > On Sep 28, 1:44 am, Stephen Graham<grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:
> >> As I'm quite certain you're fully aware, Mr Hopwood, between
> >> 30 March 1942 and early 1944, Americans of Japanese
> >> descent were classified as "Aliens Ineligible for Service" and
> >> were only allowed to enlist in the US military upon special
> >> request by the military. Prior to that date but after 7 December
> >> 1941, they could volunteer or be drafted, but many
> >> local draft boards removed them from the draft pool. Recruitment
> >> enters would frequently turn them away. _Nisei Linguists_ cites
> >> several cases by name in its discussion of this topic.
>
> > That was true early in the war but I believe the situation began to
> > change about one year earlier than you indicate.
>
> No. It's precisely as I described it. Japanese-Americans remained
> classed as IV-C until 1944.

I didn't mean to contest your statement. However, what I thought
you meant was that all JAs were prohibited from serving prior to
1944
when in fact, for volunteers, the restrictions imposed by the IV-C
regulation did not apply. On February 1, 1943, Selective Service
issued Local Board Release #179 which, in effect, negated the IV-C
rule insofar as volunteers were concerned even if in the confusion
(of which there was plenty) some local draft boards had removed
them from pools or didn't get the word right.
Rule#179 said, in part:
"The Army has announced the formation of a combat
team which will be composed entirely of United States citizens
of Japanese extraction or parentage, who have made application
for voluntary induction through the Selective Service System...The
Army will be ready to accept such volunteers on or after February
23, 1943....none should be inducted before that date."

> > Actually it was as
> > early as the summer of 1942 that the military began a recruitment
> > program among JAs in a search for loyal members thereof
> > who met linguistic requirements needed by the military.

Well, that differs from the instructions given to Selective Service
by the War Department. On March 30, 1942, "pursuant to an
informal request from the War Department, a telegram was
sent (from Selective Service headquarters) to all State Directors
(of SS) to the effect that no more registrants of Japanese extraction
would be accepted by the Army for induction." This followed
officially
when the Secretary of War on June 17, 1942, "advised the Director of
Selective Service to take no action regarding the induction of
Japanese
mericans." [Selective Service Special Monograph No. 10--1953--Ch.9
p.117]

> > Only six
> > months after that (January 28,1943) the military went full bore by
> > announcing the formation of a Japanese-American combat team
> > which later became known as the famous 100/442d which served
> > admirably in the European theatre.
>
> That's a confused rendition of the actual course of events. The 100th
> Battalion actually came first as a use for the Japanese-American
> National Guardsmen from Hawaii. The 442d was conceived of later, > largely as something to do with the several thousand Japanese-
> Americans in the US Army on the mainland. The search for
> volunteers was to supplement this.

What's confused about it? The fact that the 100th Battalion already
existed before the Army decided to form a new combat team had nothing
to do with the decision to form the new team. And, as I said,
the new team (ldesignated as the 442d) merged LATER with the 100th
to become known as the 100/442d. Where do you disagree with that?

> > But the War Relocation Authority in cooperation with the War
> > Department wanted to go further in determining the loyalty of
> > Japanese-Americans and relieving tensions in the relocation
> > centers by establishing a larger role for JAs in the war effort,
>
> The best description of the loyalty questionnaire is in Eric Muller's
> _American Inquisition: The Hunt for Japanese American Disloyalty in
> World War II_.

I thoroughly disagree. I have Muller's book which I find
sickening in its lack of fairness and historical accuracy.
Muller is no historian and it shows. IIRC he once wanted to
have Michelle Malkin's book "In Defense of Internment"
banned from the book store at the Manzanar relocation
center historic site but the site refused. If you want a fair and
balanced description of the questionnaire I suggest the Dept.
of Interior's "The Evacuation and Relocation of Persons
of Japanese Ancestry During WWII--A Historical Study
of the Manzanar War Relocation Center"--Volume 2.

>Essentially, the WRA was looking for a solution regarding
> leave clearance at the same time the Army was looking to classify
> potential volunteers. The two agencies decided to collaborate.

So, what's wrong with it? They worked together for better efficiency
and less disruption at the centers. The questions were different for
the Army potentials than they were for the other evacuees.
There was some confusion and resentment on the part of
some of the evacuees but the Army/WRA teams made every
effort to smooth things out and the information sought was
reasonable and was obtained.

> > In preparation therefore, the War Department organized a loyalty
> > questionnaire program which began as early as February 1943,
> > and it was in the execution of that program that over 26% of the
> > military eligible JAs would not agree to swear an unqualified oath
> > of allegiance to the U.S.
>
> Where are you getting your 26% number? The numbers given in _The
> Evacuated People_ are 21.7% for the initial questionnaire and 16%
> for the revised questionnaire.

>From the Dept. of Interior's "The Evacuation and Relocation of
Persons of Japanese Ancestry During WWII--A Historical Study
of the Manzanar War Relocation Center"--Volume 2.
"The great bulk of the non-affirmative answers came from the
citizen group. Approximately 26.3 percent of the male citizens
and 15 percent of the female ciitizens failed to provide unqualified
answers."

You will note that even Muller admits that 22% of the Nisei males
would not give an unqualified answer to the loyalty question.

W JH

[Alan Nordin]

On Sep 29, 8:00 pm, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> And that could not be done
> overnight.

No, but as Conn clearly states the job had been started well before
Pearl Harbor and had progressed to the point that many [831], Germans
and Italians as well as Japanese, whose loyalty was suspect were
arrested within the week. These persons were arrested for specific
reasons, not just because they belonged to a group. The original
relocation plan also included Germans and Italians, all enemy aliens,
not just Japanese. The first security measures taken also included
all enemy aliens, not just Japanese.

> > > > " . . . loss of employment and income ..... <snipped>
>

> > > That quote came from <snipped>

>
> > If you look up the site, you'll see a foot note. I will reproduce it
> > here for you.
>

> > "Rpt, Lt Comdr K.D. Ringle, <snipped>

>
> My copy of Conn does not have that footnote. I see that your
> footnote indicates that the report was undated and that a copy
> appeared in Harpers magazine anonymously. The anonymity
> presents some question as to authenticity.

The footnote clearly shows were the report can be found. Conn clearly
studied it in detail and found no questions as to it's authenticity.
Of course he wasn't prepared to dismiss anything that disagreed with
any preconcieved conclusuions he may have already come to on the
subject.

> But, be that as it may, LCDR Ringle did
> exist.
> He was a junior officer in the Naval command in L.A. and had
> several opinions vis-a-vis the Japanese evacuation problem, some
> contradicting others.

I find no contradiction between the report you reproduced and the one
in Conn I cited. In yours he says he believes the Japanese are a
threat, in mine he says why he believes the Japanese are a threat. In
yours he gives reasons that, frankly, are nothing more than
supposition, in mine he gives reasons that he personally witnessed
while serving on the West Coast. Yes, "supposition". How could he
possibly know of this supposed "training" recieved by the Japanese?
If the Japanese had done something like this, would they be foolish
enough to advertise the fact? If he had actual knowledge of this
training, he would have included the source of his knowledge in the
report.

> in a previous post I provided you with a report he wrote
> with regard to the danger from the Kibei (JAs who had been
> educated in Japan and returned to the U.S.). In another report to
> CNO dated 26 January 1942 he wrote that Japanese alien residents
> on the West Coast, although passively loyal, "would not engage
> in active sabotage or insurrection, but might well do surreptitious
> observation work for Japanese interests if given a convenient
> opportunity."

Conjecture, "might well do", conjecture.

> > ....The quote I provided, which again you have failed to reproduce
> > in full, is telling as to some of the motives that drove the decision
> > for relocation.
>
> No it doesn't. It gives only the personal view of some that racism
> rather than national security was the sole motivation for the
> evacuation.
> Nonsense.

Again, anything that doesn't agree with your views is "nonsense",

"bogus" or to be ignored.

> > > Yes, I have a copy of it. It's an interesting publication and describes
> > > in detail how the final decision to evacuate was made but it doesn't
> > > reveal why it was made,
>
> > Only if you chose to ignore some of what it says....
>
> No. It is you who ignore what it DOESN'T say. It makes no mention
> of the MAGIC message intercepts which revealed the connection
> between he Empire of Japan and the Japanese community in the
> U.S.

Provide them here. Your entire argument rests on this contention of
yours. If you can't reproduce specific intercepts, then you aren't
convincing me that your argument has any validity. If you genuinely
want to change people's minds about this, producing these intercepts
would do it.

Alan

[Alan Nordin]

On Sep 29, 7:45 pm, Stephen Graham <grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:
> By mid-1942, there were around 5,000 mainland Japanese-Americans in the
> US Army.

Really, then the percentage of volunteers accepted must have been
closer to 0%. With 1,300 from Hawaii and 5,000 from the mainland,
that's many more than necessary to staff a regiment.

Alan

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 29, 7:23 pm, Alan Nordin <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> On Sep 29, 6:06 pm, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com>
> wrote:
>
> > Nope. You got that wrong too. I never said it and never
> > suggested it. You imagined it.
>
> If taken in the context of your reply to the posting by Mr. Graham

> is obvious that you were using it as an example of the scarcity of
> Japanese-American volunteers for service in the US Army.

Which posting by Mr. Graham and which reply? There were
a couple of each. For the sake of clarity when you make a charge
against some one it you should make an effort to show what
it is you are talking about.

WJH

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 29, 11:54 pm, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:

>wjhopw...@aol.com <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
>
>> During the war I don't recall ever hearing of any confusion
>> as to terms.

Correct; during the war, they were called "concentration camps"

The term was used by some, but not after the news of
what went on in the German camps became well-known
late in the war and thereafter. By then the phrase had taken
on a different meaning which it has to this day. Only those
intent on painting a picture of the relocation centers to
make them look much worse than they really were, continue
to refer to them as "concentration camps."
In fact, "Personal Justice Denied" the report
of
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians, puts it well:
"There is a continuing controversy over the contention
that the camps were "concentration camps" and that any
other term is a euphemism. The government documents
of the time frequently used the term "concentration camps,"
but after World War II, with full realization of the atrocities
committed by the Nazis in the death camps of Europe, that
phrase came to have a very different meaning, The
American relocation centers were bleak and bare, and life
in them had many hardships, but they were not extermination
camps, nor did the American government embrace a policy
of torture or liquidation of the ethnic Japanese. To use the
phrase "concentration camps" summons up images which
are inaccurate and unfair.. THE COMMISSION HAS USED
'RELOCATION CENTERS' AND 'RELOCATION CAMPS'
THE USUAL TERM USED DURING THE WAR....in an
effort to find an historically fair and accurate phrase."
[Emphasis mine--WJHJ]

> Everybody then knew the difference between
> "internment" and "relocation."

Actually, it is doubtful, since they were all treated the same.

Not really. The principal difference was that those "interned"
were held for the duration and beyond., whereas those only
"relocated" could have temporary leave, indefinite leave,
and permanent leave after meeting loyalty and security
requirements. One-third of the evacuees (35,000i had so
left the centers permanently before war's end.

WJH

[Stephen Graham]

Well, some of those were redirected into the language program. And not
everyone was suitable for service in an infantry regiment.

In any case, the 442d was a Regimental Combat Team, which included an
artillery battalion, engineer company, anti-tank company and a band.

In addition, since the 100th Battalion was originally entirely separate,
it doesn't get counted into the numbers for the RCT initially. The
original 1st Battalion, 442d Infantry Regiment remained in the US as a
training cadre.

So the numbers of volunteers cited for the mainland camps is correct,
though not all were accepted for induction or ultimately destined for
the 442d.

[Alan Nordin]

My post of 9/27:

Many were happy to serve in the US military. Many more than were
allowed to.

Your answer of 9/28:

Who were not allowed to serve in the U.S. military?

Mr. Grahams reply of 9/28:

As I'm quite certain you're fully aware, Mr Hopwood, between 30 March
1942 and early 1944, Americans of Japanese descent were classified as
"Aliens Ineligible for Service" and were only allowed to enlist in
the
US military upon special request by the military. Prior to that date
but
after 7 December 1941, they could volunteer or be drafted, but many
local draft boards removed them from the draft pool. Recruitment

centers

would frequently turn them away. _Nisei Linguists_ cites several
cases
by name in its discussion of this topic.

After being told that they were ineligible and being forcibly
evacuated
and placed in camps, it shouldn't surprise us that the rate of
volunteering was lower than you might wish.

Your reply of 9/28:

That was true early in the war but I believe the situation began to

change about one year earlier than you indicate. Actually it was as

early as the summer of 1942 that the military began a recruitment
program among JAs in a search for loyal members thereof

who met linguistic requirements needed by the military. Only six

months after that (January 28,1943) the military went full bore by
announcing the formation of a Japanese-American combat team
which later became known as the famous 100/442d which served
admirably in the European theatre.

("Full Bore", Really? The creation of one RCT? Given the number of men
already in the Army [6,000+], the number of volunteers [13,000+] and
the additional draftable men of military age, I suspect a division
could have been created.)

Is the sequence clearer in your mind?

Alan

[Alan Nordin]

On Sep 30, 12:12 pm, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:

> Which posting by Mr. Graham and which reply? There were
> a couple of each. For the sake of clarity when you make a charge
> against some one it you should make an effort to show what
> it is you are talking about.

I should also say, the same posting to which Mr. Graham made the reply
containing the words, "That's a confused rendition of the actual
course of events."

Alan

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Sep 29, 11:54 pm, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:

I can see why you occasionally mess up attributions.

Your reader apparently didn't add another beginning ">" to my
post.

> >> During the war I don't recall ever hearing of any confusion
> >> as to terms.

> Correct; during the war, they were called "concentration camps"

> The term was used by some, but not after the news of
> what went on in the German camps became well-known
> late in the war and thereafter.

It is a source of constant amusement to me that you insist on
seeing the situation "as it existed at the time", going so far
as to accuse those who don't agree with you as "revisionists"
only to become squeamish when the full ramifications of your
stance become apparent. You prefer revisionist euphemisms like
"relocation centers" or "internment camps", when in fact they
were, and were intended to be concentration camps.

Oh, and SURELY someone with your self-confessed "long memory"
will recall, the term "concentration camp" was used in 1944
by several members of the government, and even immediately
post-war. If your "long memory" does not include things like that,
perhaps you should avail yourself of some historical references.

> intent on painting a picture of the relocation centers to
> make them look much worse than they really were, continue
> to refer to them as "concentration camps."

In fact, Mr Hopwood, there is still a sign at Manzanaar which
indicates it was a "Concentration Camp".

You have been told this in that past, and as you profess to have a
"long memory", it is difficult to understand how you can seemingly
forget this, though we have reminded you of these things repeatedly
over the years.

> > Everybody then knew the difference between
> > "internment" and "relocation."

> Actually, it is doubtful, since they were all treated the same.

> Not really.

Yeah, really. They were all summarily marched off to concentration
"facilities" with no recourse, for no crime.

> The principal difference was that those "interned"
> were held for the duration and beyond., whereas those only

Some of those "interned" were released prior to the end of the war.

Again, it's not really controversial.

Mike

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 29, 7:45 pm, Stephen Graham wrote:
> .
>........all National Guard units were federalized in

> 1940 or 1941 and were being filled by draftees.
> But the best guess is that there were about one
> thousand Japanese-Americans enlisted in the
> National Guard on the mainland before 1940.
>
> By mid-1942, there were around 5,000 mainland
> Japanese-Americans in the US Army.

I'm curious as to your source, or how you came up with
the figure of 5000 mainland JAs in the Army as/of
mid-1942?

According to Selective Service Special Monograph #10
there were only 3188 JAs inducted between October of
1940 (when the draft was established) and Pearl Habor.
That included Hawaii.

If 1000 mainland JAs were already in the Army before the
draft and that 60% of the 3188 inductees (the ratio of
Haweiian Nisei to mainland Nisei) were inducted in
Hawaii, that would add only approx 1300 (40% of 3188)
to the 1000, for a totalof 2300 mainland JA's in the
Army as/of Pearl Harbor.

Then, according to "Personal Justice Denied," after the
attack "the War Department stopped taking Japanese
Americans into the military, and many already in service
were released."

I haven't found any source telling how many
were released as a result of he PH attack, but let's be
conservative and guess that it was only 25% of JAs
then in the Army.

To summarize:
If 2300 mainland JAs were in the Army at PH but 25%
(approx 600) were released from duty, that would leave
on hand only approx 1700 mainland JAs still on duty.
But, according to PJD the Army bent the rules in June
of 1942 to take in 200 volunteers for the MIS language
school. That raised he total to 1900.

So, according to my calculations, the total of JAs in the Army
as/of mid-1942 appears to be no more than approx 1900.
Where do the other 3100 to make 5,000 come from?

WJH

[Alan Nordin]

On Sep 30, 2:07 pm, Stephen Graham <grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:
> Well, some of those were redirected into the language program. And not
> everyone was suitable for service in an infantry regiment.
>
> In any case, the 442d was a Regimental Combat Team, which included an
> artillery battalion, engineer company, anti-tank company and a band.
>
> In addition, since the 100th Battalion was originally entirely separate,
> it doesn't get counted into the numbers for the RCT initially. The
> original 1st Battalion, 442d Infantry Regiment remained in the US as a
> training cadre.

Still we're talking about less than 5,000 men, probably closer to
4,000 men. The 7/15/43 Infantry Division was roughly 14,000 men and
none of the RCT officers would be of Japanese descent. There would be
non-combat jobs that needed filling, clerks, truck drivers and other
non-combat service unit jobs for those physically unacceptable for
combat. The language program jobs would be ideal for the unfit. I
hadn't thought of the requirement for a training cadre, though this
would be another location for the unfit.

Alan

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 30, 12:19 am, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
>
> .....Ringle, who you claimed earlier to be a reputable sourse.

Ringle was reputable but I believe I said he was necessarukt
"a reputable source." He was ignorant of much of the
intelligence known only to FDR and close associates of
FDR with regard to the pre-war clandestine activities of the
ethnic Japanese on the West Coat.

He states (among a great many other things)

Yes, I see you quoted extensively from the Ringle report
of 26 January 1942 which, in a letter only two weeks later
tp ttje FBI, was disavowed by the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations. The CNO letter, dated February 14.
1942, Subject: "The Japanese Problem," read in part:
"There is transmitted herewith a copy of a
report on the Japanese question which was
prepared by Lieutenant Commander Ringle,
USN...... it does not represent the
final and official position of the Office of
Naval Intelligence...."


(Lengthy copy matter deleted)

> Well, that settles it; a real intelligence officer didn't
> see the threat from ALL those of the "Japanese race"
> that you see.

Nope. All that particular Ringle report does is make
known the personal opinion of a junior officer whose
conclusions were neither consistent with nor accepted
by those in the Naval intelligence command at a higher
level. That command, the Office of Naval Intellgence
(ONI) was privy to more information and of a much
higher degree of importance vis-a-vis "the Japanese
problem" than Ringle had been cleaed for.

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Sep 30, 12:19 am, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> >
> > .....Ringle, who you claimed earlier to be a reputable sourse.

> Ringle was reputable but I believe I said he was necessarukt
> "a reputable source."

Ah, more euphemisms. (I cannot imagine what type of typo gave rise to
"nessarukt", though)

You claim he was reputable when it servers your purposes, but have to
hand-wave and backtrack when exposed to a greater depth of analysis than
you are capable of.

It should be obvious even to you why you have such difficulty persuading
people to your POV after all these years.

> He was ignorant of much of the
> intelligence known only to FDR and close associates of
> FDR with regard to the pre-war clandestine activities of the
> ethnic Japanese on the West Coat.

Well, J Edgar Hoover was privy to a great deal of them, and Ringle
himself does in fact point out many of them.

You have either failed to read the entire memo, or your reading is not
on par with your "long memory".

If, as always, you wish to fall back on the Magic MAGIC Fairy, you
will have no difficulty pointing out the spy rings broken up by
those intercepts. To date, more that a decade after you first graced
us with your presence, you have provided none.

> He states (among a great many other things)

Unlike you, I somehow managed to copy and paste an entire, unedited
version of one of his memos. He is precisely in opposition to you
position. Your attempts to pretend otherwise are dishonest.

> report on the Japanese question which was
> prepared by Lieutenant Commander Ringle,
> USN...... it does not represent the
> final and official position of the Office of
> Naval Intelligence...."

Well, that's a shocker. It means

> (Lengthy copy matter deleted)

You have this distressing tendency to "delete" things which oddly
refute your position.

At some point, it really becomes difficult to take you seriously.

> > Well, that settles it; a real intelligence officer didn't
> > see the threat from ALL those of the "Japanese race"
> > that you see.

> Nope.

Yep. And in fact it agrees with opinions offered by "intelligence
professionals" like Hoover.

Mike

[Alan Nordin]

On Sep 30, 11:56 pm, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> That command, the Office of Naval Intellgence
> (ONI) was privy to more information and of a much
> higher degree of importance vis-a-vis "the Japanese
> problem" than Ringle had been cleaed for.

Produce it. You constantly refer to this supposed higher
intelligence, but you never produce it.

Alan

[Stephen Graham]

On 9/30/11 7:36 PM, Alan Nordin wrote:

> Still we're talking about less than 5,000 men, probably closer to
> 4,000 men. The 7/15/43 Infantry Division was roughly 14,000 men and
> none of the RCT officers would be of Japanese descent.

That's not true. Many of the company grade officers in the 442d were
Japanese Americans.

> The language program jobs would be ideal for the unfit.

You have the priority wrong: the language program had first claim on
those who qualified for it, regardless of any other factor.

> I
> hadn't thought of the requirement for a training cadre, though this
> would be another location for the unfit.

Not really. Your training cadre has to be reasonably fit, otherwise they
can't do the job.

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 29, 8:00 pm, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> >And that could not be done overnight.

In that statement (which you quote out of context) I was
referring, of course, to those Japanese who were evacuated
and relocated, not interned.

>Conn clearly states the job had been started well before

> Pearl Harbor.... persons were arrested for specific

> reasons, not just because they belonged to a group.

You are confusing the internees with the evacuees
again.

Conn was referring to only a relatively small number
of Japanese aliens the FBI had onsidered dangerous
because of specific information developed on them
prior to the war, These individuals were on an arrest
list and slated to be picked up for internment
in the event of hostilities. When the PH attack did occurr
they were quickly rounded up. That operation had nothing
to do with the other group of Japanese who were not
slated for immediate arrest in the event of hostilities but
after hostilities had occurred were evacuated as a group
from military areas for security reasons and to be
screened for loyalty as time and circumstance
allowed.

>.... If you can't reproduce specific intercepts, then you

> ren't convincing me that your argument has any validity.
> If you genuinely want to change people's minds about this,
> producing these intercepts would do it.

It's like asking me to reproduce the Encyclopedia Brittanica
bedause you refuse to admit that it exists. There are hundreds
of MAGIC intercepts, some pages in length/ It would take me
a month to copy only a small portion of them.

But, as a gesture of good faith since you think I'm making
it all up and such intercepts don't exist, here is a sample
consisting of excerpts from two of them.

"January 30,1941 From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
To: Washington (Koshi)

....Establish an intelligence organizaion in the Embassy
which will (involve) utilization of our "second generation"
and our resident nationals......"

"May 9, 1941 From: Los Angeles (Nakauchi
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaliji)

We are doing everything in our power to establish outside
contacts...to gather intelligence material...with regard to
airplane manufacturing plants and other military establishments
...we plan to establish close relationships...and in strict secrecy
keep these military establishments under surveillance.

We have already established contacts with absolutely reliable
Japanese in the San Pedro and San Diego area who will keep
a close watch on all shipments of airplanes and other war
materials and report amounts and destination of such shipments.

We shall maintain contact with our second generations who
are at present in the U.S. Army to keep us informed of various
developments in the Army....We also have connections with
or second generations working in airplane plants for intelligence
purposes...."

WJH

[Stephen Graham]

On 9/30/11 6:18 AM, wjho...@aol.com wrote:

> However, what I thought
> you meant was that all JAs were prohibited from serving prior to
> 1944
> when in fact, for volunteers, the restrictions imposed by the IV-C
> regulation did not apply.

Except that the Japanese-American citizens were still under restrictions
- they had to pass through an additional, involuntary stage than other
citizens. As they said at the time, that made a difference to those men.

> What's confused about it? The fact that the 100th Battalion already
> existed before the Army decided to form a new combat team had nothing
> to do with the decision to form the new team. And, as I said,
> the new team (ldesignated as the 442d) merged LATER with the 100th
> to become known as the 100/442d. Where do you disagree with that?

You didn't say that in the post I responded to. You appeared to be
confusing the modern unit with the historic unit.

>> The best description of the loyalty questionnaire is in Eric Muller's
>> _American Inquisition: The Hunt for Japanese American Disloyalty in
>> World War II_.
>
> I thoroughly disagree. I have Muller's book which I find
> sickening in its lack of fairness and historical accuracy.
> Muller is no historian and it shows.

I didn't expect you to like Muller, as he disagrees with your preferred
line of argument. However, he's closer to being a historian than Malkin,
who you do like, again because of ideological reasons.

Still, _American Inquisition_ is a much fuller treatment of the loyalty
clearance process than the NPS study that you cite. That study is fine
for what it is, but its focus isn't that particular topic.

>> Essentially, the WRA was looking for a solution regarding
>> leave clearance at the same time the Army was looking to classify
>> potential volunteers. The two agencies decided to collaborate.
>
> So, what's wrong with it? They worked together for better efficiency
> and less disruption at the centers. The questions were different for
> the Army potentials than they were for the other evacuees.
> There was some confusion and resentment on the part of
> some of the evacuees but the Army/WRA teams made every
> effort to smooth things out and the information sought was
> reasonable and was obtained.

You know the answer to this as it's spelled out in the very study you
reference. The service and loyalty questions were poorly worded - how
was asking a male enemy alien whether he would be willing to serve in
the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps a reasonable effort?

>> From the Dept. of Interior's "The Evacuation and Relocation of
> Persons of Japanese Ancestry During WWII--A Historical Study
> of the Manzanar War Relocation Center"--Volume 2.
> "The great bulk of the non-affirmative answers came from the
> citizen group. Approximately 26.3 percent of the male citizens
> and 15 percent of the female ciitizens failed to provide unqualified
> answers."
>
> You will note that even Muller admits that 22% of the Nisei males
> would not give an unqualified answer to the loyalty question.

Sure. But I don't attach the meaning to it that you do, because I'm not
looking to prove what you are. Instead, I tend to view it as a
remarkably positive indicator of JA loyalty to the United States, that
even after abuse, they were still willing to attest to their loyalty.

[Stephen Graham]

On 9/30/11 4:31 PM, wjho...@aol.com wrote:
> On Sep 29, 7:45 pm, Stephen Graham wrote:

>> By mid-1942, there were around 5,000 mainland
>> Japanese-Americans in the US Army.
>
> I'm curious as to your source, or how you came up with
> the figure of 5000 mainland JAs in the Army as/of
> mid-1942?

I made an error in recalling the number given in the _Encyclopedia of
Japanese American History_ article on the 442d. That gave a number of
4,000 on the mainland in mid-1942.

> I haven't found any source telling how many
> were released as a result of he PH attack, but let's be
> conservative and guess that it was only 25% of JAs
> then in the Army.

I've also never found any firm number for those released following Pearl
Harbor.

> But, according to PJD the Army bent the rules in June
> of 1942 to take in 200 volunteers for the MIS language
> school. That raised he total to 1900.

_Nisei Linguists_ and _The Evacuated People_ both give a figure of 160
volunteers from the camps in 1942. There were additional volunteers from
the population outside of the camps but I don't find an exact number.
_Nisei Linguists_ gives the number of trainees entering the language
schools in 1942, but doesn't specify the precise breakdown by source -
some were drawn from those Japanese-Americans already in the Army.

[ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk]

In article
<2d1503ed-a59c-4e2e...@b6g2000vbz.googlegroups.com>,

wjho...@aol.com () wrote:

> with full realization of the atrocities
> committed by the Nazis in the death camps of Europe, that
> phrase came to have a very different meaning,

You do seem to realise the term had a bad reputation before WW2. The
Boer War Concentration Camps were notorious.

Ken Young

[David Wilma]

In the discussion of the MAGIC intercepts and possible Issei and Nisei
activity on behalf of the Japanese government we are missing some
important evidence, the work of the FBI and whichever agency (MI?)
debriefed internees (people arrested). Were the analysts able to
compare, for example, a MAGIC report of someone observing a naval
shipyard with the interrogation of the suspected observer? Having been
involved in the field of criminal investigation and the "managing" of
informants I know that they obfuscate and even lie to please the
handler. Could this be the case with those contacted by Japanese
agents? "Sure, I'll keep and eye out for you."

This is not to dismiss the real possibility of U.S. residents actively
cooperating with Japanese handlers, but I want to know more about
these networks.

One apparent failing (or piece of missing evidence) is that the
Japanese spies, who were diplomatic and consular personnel, did not
provide for managing networks after the spies were repatriated. Were
there fallback positions? Or were these networks fiction?

(Disclosure: IMHO evacuation was legally and militarily correct.
Evacuation was even pretty smart; the government didn't round up
people, it told them to leave. Some did. But in hindsight evacuation
was unnecessary, inconsistent with American values, racist, and,
ultimately, a political liability.)

David Wilma
www.DavidWilma.com

[Alan Nordin]

On Oct 1, 2:33 am, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> > >And that could not be done overnight.
>
> In that statement (which you quote out of context) I was
> referring, of course, to those Japanese who were evacuated
> and relocated, not interned.

Yes and I was referring to those who evidence existed to warrant
internment. As opposed to those for whom no evidence existed to
warrant anything.

> >Conn clearly states the job had been started well before
> > Pearl Harbor.... persons were arrested for specific
> > reasons, not just because they belonged to a group.
>
> You are confusing the internees with the evacuees
> again.
>
> Conn was referring to only a relatively small number
> of Japanese aliens the FBI had onsidered dangerous
> because of specific information developed on them
> prior to the war,

Yes the relatively small, when considered against the entire Japanese-
American population, number for whom specific evidence existed.

Yes, I'm aware of them, and you have finally produced some. Bravo!

Here is another one ....

====
From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
30 January 1941
To: Washington (Koshi) #44


(Foreign Office secret).


(1) Establish an intelligence organ in the Embassy which will maintain
liaison with private and semi-official intelligence organs (see my
message to Washington #591 and #732 from New York to Tokyo, both of
last year's series). With regard to this, we are holding discussions
with the various circles involved at the present time.


(2) The focal point of our investigations shall be the determination
of the total strength of the U.S. Our investigations shall be divided
into three general classifications: political, economic, and military,
and definite course of action shall be mapped out.


(3) Make a survey of all persons or organizations which either openly
or secretly oppose participation in the war.


(4) Make investigations of all anti-Semitism, communism, movement of
Negroes, and labor movements.


(5) Utilization of U.S. citizens of foreign extraction (other than
Japanese), aliens (other than Japanese), communist, Negroes, labor
union members, and anti-Semites, in carrying out the investigations
described in the preceding paragraph would undoubtedly bear the best
results.


These men, moreover, should have access to governmental
establishments, (laboratories?) governmental organizations of various
characters, factories, and transportation facilities.


(6) Utilization of our "Second Generation" and our resident nationals.
(In view of the fact that if there is any slip in this phase, our
people in the U.S. will be subjected to considerable persecution, and
the utmost caution must be exercised.)


(7) In the event of U.S. participation in the war, our intelligence
set-up will be moved to Mexico, making that country the nerve center
of our intelligence net. Therefore, will you bear this in mind and in
anticipation of such an eventuality, set up facilities for a
U.S._Mexico international intelligence net. This net which will cover
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru will also be centered in Mexico.


(8) We shall cooperate with the Germans and Italian intelligence
organs in the U.S. This phase has been discussed with the Germans and
the Italians in Tokyo, and it has been approved. Please get the
details from Secretary Terasaki upon his assuming his duties there.
Please send copies to those offices which were on the distribution
list of No. 43.
====

You will notice Paragraphs #4 & #5 where it states what groups the
desired agents will be recruited from. Yet this intercept did not
lead to the relocation of every foreign alien, communist, Negro, labor
union member or anti-semite.

Paragraph #6 which says they were reluctant to use Second Generation
Japanese or resident nationals for fear of reprisals against the
entire Japanese-American community. As it turns out, well founded
fears, very well founded fears.

Paragraph #8 which says they will cooperate with the German and
Italian intelligence organs in the US. Yet German & Italian enemy
aliens were not accorded the same treatment as Japanese-American enemy
aliens & Japanese-American nationals.

You dismiss the efforts of the FBI in the first week of the war, where
do you think those lists came from?

Alan

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Sep 29, 8:00 pm, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:

> >.... If you can't reproduce specific intercepts, then you
> > ren't convincing me that your argument has any validity.
> > If you genuinely want to change people's minds about this,
> > producing these intercepts would do it.

> It's like asking me to reproduce the Encyclopedia Brittanica
> bedause you refuse to admit that it exists.

No, it's more like asking you to cite something specific in a large
body of work that actually supports your fantasy, rather than
claiming that something exists, and if we read every possible thing,
we'll surely find something.

> of MAGIC intercepts, some pages in length/ It would take me
> a month to copy only a small portion of them.

And yet, oddly, over the years we've had these discussions, you've
HAD months, and have produced precisely zero such intercepts. The most
common intercept (for some reason) is the one you produce below.

> But, as a gesture of good faith since you think I'm making
> it all up and such intercepts don't exist,

No, he asked for documentation. *I* say that no intercepts exist which
support your contention that large numbers of Americans of Japanese
descent were engaging in espionage, thus justifying locking ALL of the
into concentration camps.

Glad we cleared that up.

> "January 30,1941 From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
> To: Washington (Koshi)

> ....Establish an intelligence organizaion in the Embassy
> which will (involve) utilization of our "second generation"
> and our resident nationals......"

So, after carefully poring through this (your word) "literally" extensive
literature, you come up with one of your butcherd, out-of-context hatchet
jobs which clearly indicate nothings been done yet. (The clever person will
note the use of "which will", as opposed to something like "done deal")

> "May 9, 1941 From: Los Angeles (Nakauchi
> To: Tokyo (Gaimudaliji)

> We are doing everything in our power to establish outside
> contacts...to gather intelligence material...with regard to

So, again, trying to establish contacs. Hmm, where is this VAST
conspiracy? Still in the nascent stages?

> airplane manufacturing plants and other military establishments
> ...we plan to establish close relationships...and in strict secrecy
> keep these military establishments under surveillance.

> We have already established contacts with absolutely reliable
> Japanese in the San Pedro and San Diego area who will keep
> a close watch on all shipments of airplanes and other war
> materials and report amounts and destination of such shipments.

No doubt relying on such subterfuge as "reading newspapers" which "at the
time" would often report the comings and goings of commercial vessels.

> We shall maintain contact with our second generations who
> are at present in the U.S. Army to keep us informed of various
> developments in the Army....We also have connections with
> or second generations working in airplane plants for intelligence
> purposes...."

So, Mr Hopwood, how many arrests were made as a result of these fabulous
intercepts? 1000? 2000?

Or a number much closer to zero?

Mike

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Sep 30, 5:36 pm, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:

> Oh, and SURELY someone with your self-confessed "long memory"
> will recall, the term "concentration camp" was used in 1944
> by several members of the government, and even immediately
> post-war. If your "long memory" does not include things like that,
> perhaps you should avail yourself of some historical references.

I guess you slept through my reply to your almost identical
diatribe before. So here it is again. Try to stay awake:

"Personal Justice Denied" the report of the Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, puts it well:
"There is a continuing controversy over the contention
that the camps were "concentration camps" and that any
other term is a euphemism. The government documents
of the time frequently used the term "concentration camps,"
but after World War II, with full realization of the atrocities
committed by the Nazis in the death camps of Europe, that
phrase came to have a very different meaning, The
American relocation centers were bleak and bare, and life
in them had many hardships, but they were not extermination
camps, nor did the American government embrace a policy
of torture or liquidation of the ethnic Japanese. To use the
phrase "concentration camps" summons up images which
are inaccurate and unfair.. THE COMMISSION HAS USED
'RELOCATION CENTERS' AND 'RELOCATION CAMPS'
THE USUAL TERM USED DURING THE WAR....in an
effort to find an historically fair and accurate phrase."

[Emphasis mine--WJH]

WJH

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 1, 2:34 am, Stephen Graham <grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:

> On 9/30/11 4:31 PM, wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:
>
> > But, according to PJD the Army bent the rules in June
> > of 1942 to take in 200 volunteers for the MIS language

> > school.....

>
> _Nisei Linguists_ and _The Evacuated People_ both give

> a figure of 160 volunteers from the camps in 1942....some

> were drawn from those Japanese-Americans already in the
> Army.

Your last sentence above may be the answer to the
discrepancy between the 160 figure and he 200 figure.

According to PJD, a language training unit started
classes in San Francisco only 5 weeks before Pearl
Harbor with 4 Nisei instructors and 58 Nisei students.
After Pearl Habor that unit continued at SF until early
1942 when it was moved to Camp Savage, Minnesota
and given the name of Military Intelligence Service
Languge School (MISLS),

It isn't said but from the context of the PJD
summary it appears that all or most of the 62
Nisei at SF moved with the school to Minnesota
where the first class at that new location began
on June 1, 1942. If that class started with 200
students as PJD contends, the figure comes
close to being the 160 from the relocation centers,
plus 62 (or maybe a few less) from San Francisco.

WJH

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

David Wilma <David...@comcast.net> wrote:
> In the discussion of the MAGIC intercepts and possible Issei and Nisei
> activity on behalf of the Japanese government we are missing some
> important evidence, the work of the FBI and whichever agency (MI?)
> debriefed internees (people arrested). Were the analysts able to
> compare, for example, a MAGIC report of someone observing a naval
> shipyard with the interrogation of the suspected observer? Having been
> involved in the field of criminal investigation and the "managing" of
> informants I know that they obfuscate and even lie to please the
> handler. Could this be the case with those contacted by Japanese
> agents? "Sure, I'll keep and eye out for you."

This seems to be the case. Or more accurately, the people operating at the
level of MAGIC were not really trained professionals in the areas of
espionage, and as such were unlikely to be able to organize anything
approaching a viable spy ring (those familiar with Japanese diplomats
at the time might question their ability to organize a company softball
team, but that's another matter.)

> This is not to dismiss the real possibility of U.S. residents actively
> cooperating with Japanese handlers, but I want to know more about
> these networks.

Most of the networks seemed to be related to various Japanese patriotic
groups active in the country at the time. These people were rounded up
very quickly after PH, regardless of actual evidence of wrong-doing, as
a precaution.

> One apparent failing (or piece of missing evidence) is that the
> Japanese spies, who were diplomatic and consular personnel, did not
> provide for managing networks after the spies were repatriated. Were
> there fallback positions? Or were these networks fiction?

The networks were either fictional or not yet in place. The fallback
position was to run these rings out of Mexico, though how this would
have worked in practice is unclear.

There were actual spies for Japan; prior to PH, several Japanese officers
under cover made extensive reports on fleet activities, defenses, etc.,
but these reports never went through MAGIC channels.

Several other people (white) were arrested for espionage as well, but
again, none of their reports were relayed via MAGIC.

> (Disclosure: IMHO evacuation was legally and militarily correct.
> Evacuation was even pretty smart; the government didn't round up
> people, it told them to leave. Some did. But in hindsight evacuation
> was unnecessary, inconsistent with American values, racist, and,
> ultimately, a political liability.)

Given that full-blooded US citizens were "evacuated" I'll disagree
with the "smart" and given that the full roundups didn't begin until
months after PH, and just before Midway, I'll disagree with the "militarily
correct".

The "military correct" actions were all taken days after Pearl Harbor;
suspect members of various organizations, or Americans of Japanese
descent with possible strong ties to Japan were immediately brought
in. After that, no bit of espionage or sabatoge was commited by those
not yet arrested. In a bit of idiocy, DeWitt stated that this very lack
of such action convinced him even more that something was going to
happen.

Mike

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 1, 12:07 am, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:

> wjhopw...@aol.com <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> > On Sep 30, 12:19 am, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
>
> > > .....Ringle, who you claimed earlier to be a reputable sourse.
>
> > Ringle was reputable but I believe I said he was necessarukt
> > "a reputable source."
>
> Ah, more euphemisms. (I cannot imagine what type of typo
> gave rise to "nessarukt", though)

Sorry for the inadvertent typo error and deletions. Here

is what was meant to be said:
Ringle was reputable but I believe I said he was

not alway "a reputable source" on all issues vis-a-vis the
West Coast Japanese. He was ignorant of much of the

intelligence known only to FDR and close associates of
FDR with regard to the pre-war clandestine activities of the
ethnic Japanese on the West Coat.

> Well, J Edgar Hoover was privy to a great deal of them

Not to the existence of the MAGIC intercepts and much of
the intelligence gleaned from therm. Like Ringle, he was
not in that loop, but of course you already know that. Just
won't admit it.

> If, as always, you wish to fall back on the Magic MAGIC Fairy, you
> will have no difficulty pointing out the spy rings broken up by
> those intercepts. To date, more that a decade after you first graced
> us with your presence, you have provided none.

Drivel. The fact that they were known to exist prior to
Pearl Harbor was enough. They didn't need to be broken
up after PH if it then appeared that they had ceased to
exist as a result of the mass evacuation, which was the
case..
Knowledge of the identities of individual participants
was always missing from the intercepts because that's
the way espionage handlers operate. Accordingly,
knowledge of the existence of enemy agents in our
midst without knowing who they were was a major
contributing factor in the decision to evacuate the
whole population from the military zones.

(balance of disjointed post deleted)

WJH

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 1, 2:34 am, Stephen Graham <grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:

> On 9/30/11 6:18 AM, wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:
>
> > I thoroughly disagree. I have Muller's book which I find
> > sickening in its lack of fairness and historical accuracy.
> > Muller is no historian and it shows.
>
> I didn't expect you to like Muller, as he disagrees with your preferred
> line of argument. However, he's closer to being a historian than Malkin,
> who you do like, again because of ideological reasons.

That's a fair statement. But of the two non-historians. I
prefer Malkin because I personally know from friends
of mine whom she interviewed in writing the book, how
thoroughly she researched the project in order to be
historically accurate.

To my knowledge, none of Ms. Malkin's most vociferous
critics have been able to come up with any significant
errors of fact in her book even though busting their guts
trying to do so, particularly Muller and Robinson who
went ape. Malkin was ridiculed, badgered, and threatened,
but no one I know of was able to discover any significant
inaccuracy in her statements--they just didn't like her
conclusions.

> Still, _American Inquisition_ is a much fuller treatment of the loyalty
> clearance process than the NPS study that you cite. That study is fine
> for what it is, but its focus isn't that particular topic.

Not to me. I found it to be superficial in a number of places
and opinionated throughout.
One example, I thought it gave undeserved value to the
information provided by Curtis Munson, a phony who
misrepresented his official status and was pandered to
because of his political connections. But to those in the
know he was considered a pompous ignoramus.

But be that as it may, Muller's book in which he glorifies the
draft dodgers, "Free to Die for Their Country," is, in my view,
even more opinionated and worse.

> > ...... The questions were different for

> > the Army potentials than they were for the other evacuees.
> > There was some confusion and resentment on the part of
> > some of the evacuees but the Army/WRA teams made every
> > effort to smooth things out and the information sought was
> > reasonable and was obtained.
>

>......The service and loyalty questions were poorly worded - how

> was asking a male enemy alien whether he would be willing to serve in
> the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps a reasonable effort?

I agree, that was a silly bureaucratic goof. But by and large I
can't see why the questionnaire as a whole was basically
bad. The intent was to get information from which attitudes
and actions could be evaluated. I think it did that rather
successfully despite the sensitivities it might have aroused.

> > You will note that even Muller admits that 22% of the Nisei males
> > would not give an unqualified answer to the loyalty question.
>
> Sure. But I don't attach the meaning to it that you do, because I'm not
> looking to prove what you are. Instead, I tend to view it as a
> remarkably positive indicator of JA loyalty to the United States, that
> even after abuse, they were still willing to attest to their loyalty.

Well, I guess that just can't be helped. There are built-in basic
differences in our philosophies as a result of age, background,
life experiences, and our expectations as to how people should
respond to certain physical or emotional stimuli. That's why I
think it historically important in matters such as we are
discussing here, that actions taken long ago should not be judged
from the standpoint of current ideological fads, but instead
in the context of the time and conditions in which they occurred.

WJH

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Sep 30, 5:36 pm, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:

> > Oh, and SURELY someone with your self-confessed "long memory"
> > will recall, the term "concentration camp" was used in 1944
> > by several members of the government, and even immediately
> > post-war. If your "long memory" does not include things like that,
> > perhaps you should avail yourself of some historical references.

> I guess you slept through my reply to your almost identical
> diatribe before. So here it is again. Try to stay awake:

Not at all; simply, you cannot deny this. Or more exactly, when you
denied it, you were either wrong or deliberately lying; your choice.

> "Personal Justice Denied" the report of the Commission on
> Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, puts it well:
> "There is a continuing controversy over the contention
> that the camps were "concentration camps" and that any
> other term is a euphemism. The government documents
> of the time frequently used the term "concentration camps,"

Which is, of course, what I (and many, many others) have stated over the
years. We'll give you a moment to re-read that. Your OWN reference is
stating, bluntly, that the term "concentration camp" was in use, at the
time, by the very people who set them up. Now, of course, people like
to use somewhat less harsh terms, so as not to offend those of more
delicate sensibilities.

Surely, Mr Hopwood, you find yourself staunchly opposed to such a blatant
attempt at "revisionism", yes?

Or is it only "revisionist" when it runs against your obvious prejudices?

Mike

[Rich Rostrom]

On Oct 1, 1:33 am, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:

> >.... If you can't reproduce specific intercepts, then you
> > ren't convincing me that your argument has any validity.
> > If you genuinely want to change people's minds about this,
> > producing these intercepts would do it.
>
> It's like asking me to reproduce the Encyclopedia Brittanica
> bedause you refuse to admit that it exists. There are hundreds
> of MAGIC intercepts, some pages in length/ It would take me
> a month to copy only a small portion of them.
>
> But, as a gesture of good faith since you think I'm making
> it all up and such intercepts don't exist, here is a sample
> consisting of excerpts from two of them.
>
> "January 30,1941 From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
> To: Washington (Koshi)
>

> ....Establish an intelligence organization in the Embassy

> which will (involve) utilization of our "second generation"
> and our resident nationals......"

That's what the Japanese wanted to do. Is
there any evidence they actually did it?

> "May 9, 1941 From: Los Angeles (Nakauchi
> To: Tokyo (Gaimudaliji)
>
> We are doing everything in our power to establish outside
> contacts...to gather intelligence material...with regard to
> airplane manufacturing plants and other military establishments
> ...we plan to establish close relationships...and in strict secrecy
> keep these military establishments under surveillance.

Or, to translate into plain language:

"Yes, sir, boss, we're working really really hard
on what you ordered us to do and we're going
to accomplish all those things real soon, sir."

> We have already established contacts with absolutely reliable
> Japanese in the San Pedro and San Diego area who will keep
> a close watch on all shipments of airplanes and other war
> materials and report amounts and destination of such shipments.

So, who were these Japanese agents, and
where are their reports? Surely in those hundreds
of pages of MAGIC decrypts, there are many
messages containing reports from specific
agents in specific places on specific dates,
giving details of war material shipments.

> We shall maintain contact with our second generations who
> are at present in the U.S. Army to keep us informed of various
> developments in the Army....We also have connections with
> or second generations working in airplane plants for intelligence
> purposes...."

Surely, in those hundreds of pages of MAGIC
decrypts, there are many messages identifying
the Japanese agents in the U.S. Army or in aircraft
plants, or containing reports from these agents.

Or maybe not.

The cited messages are excellent "samples" of what
the Japanese intelligence service was reporting from
the U.S. - vague, generalized claims about future intents
and future successes.

There is very little in the MAGIC decrypts of actual
intelligence reported to Japan, or identifying actual
individual agents. An intelligence report is useless
unless it is known to be reliable. That requires knowing
who the source is and how the information came to him.
A spymaster whose information is sourced only to
"our agents in Slobbovia" will be ignored.

The Japanese intelligence agencies were
blowing smoke at their superiors, attempting
to put the best possible spin on their near-
total failure to obtain reliably sourced intelligence
of genuine value.

This sort of scamming is not unusual in the spy
trade. German intelligence was rotten with it.
For instance, there was a German agent in
Lisbon (code named OSTRO by the British)
who claimed to have several agents in Britain.
OSTRO filed many reports originating from
these agents - who did not exist. When OSTRO
began reporting V-weapon impact locations,
this interfered with the British scheme to throw
off the German aim by providing skewed impact
data through controlled Double-Cross agents.
Fortunately, OSTRO's messages were radioed
to Germany, enciphered with Enigma, and so
the British could read them and compenstate.

The Double Cross system also provides
evidence of just how feeble the Japanese
spy effort against the U.S. was. In mid-1941,
the FBI broke up the German spy ring in the
U.S. To restart it, the Abwehr dispatched
their trusted agent Dusko Popov - who was
actually a double agent working for Britain
(code name TRICYCLE). TRICYCLE was
given a "laundry list" of intelligence items
to get if he could.

Over _1/3_ of this "laundry list" is questions
about military and naval installations in Hawaii -
which must have been included at Japanese
request, since the Germans had no interest
in Hawaii.

Some of these questions are remarkably
weak: Is the Pan Am airport the same
as Rodger's airport? Is there a floating
dock in Pearl Harbor? Is there an ammo
dump in Punchbowl Crater? Is there a
railroad line to the naval depot at Lualuelei?

The Japanese had a consulate in Hawaii,
with active intelligence officers assigned
there, and there were maybe 100,000
ethnic Japanese in Hawaii. If they had
even a handful of working agents, these
questions could have been answered
easily without asking the Germans for help.

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Oct 1, 12:07 am, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> > wjhopw...@aol.com <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> > > On Sep 30, 12:19 am, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> >
> > > > .....Ringle, who you claimed earlier to be a reputable sourse.
> >
> > > Ringle was reputable but I believe I said he was necessarukt
> > > "a reputable source."
> >

> Ringle was reputable but I believe I said he was
> not alway "a reputable source"

Ah, so he's reputable, except when you disagree with him.

> West Coast Japanese. He was ignorant of much of the
> intelligence known only to FDR and close associates of

And the person who made the decision to remove all those of Japanese
descent was equally ignorant.

The difference was that Ringle and Hoover were both trained in
intelligence.

> > Well, J Edgar Hoover was privy to a great deal of them

> Not to the existence of the MAGIC intercepts and much of
> the intelligence gleaned from therm. Like Ringle, he was
> not in that loop, but of course you already know that. Just
> won't admit it.

Your long memory does you no great service, Mr Hopwood. We have very often
pointed out that the actual arrests for espionage and possible sabatoge
were made despite not knowing about MAGIC, and that MAGIC resulted in
no spy ring break ups.

Try to keep this in your "long memory", please. It gets tiresome repeating.

> > If, as always, you wish to fall back on the Magic MAGIC Fairy, you
> > will have no difficulty pointing out the spy rings broken up by
> > those intercepts. To date, more that a decade after you first graced
> > us with your presence, you have provided none.

> Drivel.

Not at all; please provide evidence for spy rings broken up my MAGIC
intercepts.

They were, after all, remarkably poor at detecting the spy rings in
Hawaii, were they not? (Perhaps that's because Tokyo didn't trust
their diplomats with actual intelligence ops. Ever think of that?)

> The fact that they were known to exist prior to
> Pearl Harbor was enough.

Cool; so you'll have NO difficulty showing us which of those rings were
known to exist due to MAGIC. How many were arrested, etc.

Else we'll continue to point out that your "evidence" is better classified
as "nonsense".

> They didn't need to be broken
> up after PH if it then appeared that they had ceased to
> exist as a result of the mass evacuation, which was the

So, it is your contention that
1) Spy rings existed, known to MAGIC, but to none of those not in the loop
2) Spy rings that WERE broken up were so broken without the aid of MAGIC (see
above.)
3) The spy rings broken up by non-MAGICal means were broken up within days
of Pearl Harbor (if not before)
4) Spy rings detected solely by MAGIC were not deemed important enough to
break up until MONTHS after Pearl Harbor, when the evacuations became
complete

Seriously, do you have any idea how stupid that sounds?

Mike

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:

> That's a fair statement. But of the two non-historians. I
> prefer Malkin because I personally know from friends
> of mine whom she interviewed in writing the book, how
> thoroughly she researched the project in order to be
> historically accurate.

Then perhaps SHE can provide evidence for spy rings broken up by use of
MAGIC intercepts. I don't recall her actually providing any, but I may have
missed that singular line, if it existed.

Thanks.

Mike

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

And this is the most damning thing against MAGIC of all, as a counter-
intelligence tool.

The Japanese DID in fact run intel ops in Hawaii. However, they consisted
of individual agents (usually of the IJA) on specific missions. They did
not involve any issei/nisei in any active fashion, and the reports were
NOT sent via the diplomatic corps.

Tokyo very likely didn't trust its diplomatic corps to handle things like
that.

Mike

[Stephen Graham]

On 10/1/11 9:23 PM, wjho...@aol.com wrote:

> That's a fair statement. But of the two non-historians. I
> prefer Malkin because I personally know from friends
> of mine whom she interviewed in writing the book, how
> thoroughly she researched the project in order to be
> historically accurate.

Yet Malkin is the one pursuing a modern day political agenda, which is
something you deride in others. She didn't write _In Defense of
Internment_ out of a general interest in the topic. Instead it follows
in line with her earlier work on immigrants.

> But by and large I
> can't see why the questionnaire as a whole was basically
> bad. The intent was to get information from which attitudes
> and actions could be evaluated. I think it did that rather
> successfully despite the sensitivities it might have aroused.

Polling bias has been fairly well known since the 1920s - the questions
you ask in the context of events will affect what responses you get. The
NPS study you cited does note several of the issues with the questions
posed. To use an imprecise analogy, it's as if we asked random men the
famous "have you stopped beating your wife?" question. I'm pretty sure
we'd get a qualified answer more often than a straight yes or no.

> Well, I guess that just can't be helped. There are built-in basic
> differences in our philosophies as a result of age, background,
> life experiences, and our expectations as to how people should
> respond to certain physical or emotional stimuli.

I've made it pretty clear over the years that I think people panicked,
in part due to existing prejudices, and made poor decisions. That's what
the historical record shows. You should spend more time contemplating
whether you could be accused of promulgating your own brand of political
correctness when you charge us with that.

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 2, 12:24 am, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:

> wjhopw...@aol.com <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> > On Sep 30, 5:36 pm, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> > > Oh, and SURELY someone with your self-confessed "long
> > > memory" will recall, the term "concentration camp" was

> > > used in 1944...

> > I guess you slept through my reply to your almost identical
> > diatribe before. So here it is again. Try to stay awake:

> > "Personal Justice Denied" the report of the Commission on
> > Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, puts it well:
> > "There is a continuing controversy over the contention
> > that the camps were "concentration camps" and that any
> > other term is a euphemism. The government documents
> > of the time frequently used the term "concentration camps,"

You are really at your disingenuous best here. But that's no
surprise.
Here's some of what you deleted from my quote from PJD
which you only partially show above:

"To use the phrase "concentration camps" summons
up images which are inaccurate and unfair.. THE COMMISSION
HAS USED 'RELOCATION CENTERS' AND 'RELOCATION CAMPS'
THE USUAL TERM USED DURING THE WAR....in an
effort to find an historically fair and accurate phrase"

Incidentally, I challenge you to find and reproduce where i ever
denied that the term was frequently used during the war by some.
What I have contended right along is, as PJD says above, that it is
"inaccurate and unfair" to NOW use the phrase to describe what
the camps were like then,, as you do. But that doesn't bother you
any more than your penchant for misrepresenting the position of
others whenever it suits your purpose, which is more often than
not. .

WJH

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 2, 5:59 pm, Stephen Graham <grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:

> On 10/1/11 9:23 PM, wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:
>
> > That's a fair statement. But of the two non-historians. I
> > prefer Malkin because I personally know from friends
> > of mine whom she interviewed in writing the book, how
> > thoroughly she researched the project in order to be
> > historically accurate.
>
> Yet Malkin is the one pursuing a modern day political agenda,
> which is something you deride in others. She didn't write _In
> Defense of Internment_ out of a general interest in the topic.

You must certainly acknowledge that Muller and Robinson (since
you admire Muller you must equally admire Robinson) have a
modern day political agenda? They just don't have the audience
Malkin has and it drives them nuts,
And why would you believe that Malkin wouldn't have had
an interest in the topic of WWII internment. There was voluminous
discussion about profiling and internment right after 9/11 when her
book was written. What better topic to explore than the WWII
experience. As Ms Malkin wrote in her introduction:
"Why write this book now? Because the prevailing view
of World War II homeland defense measures has become the
worped yardstick by which all War on Terror measures today are
judged."

> Instead it follows in line with her earlier work on immigrants.

I don't know quite what you mean by that unless she opposed
illegal immigration. As a child of immigrant parents I wouldn't
think she was against legal immigration.

> I've made it pretty clear over the years that I think people
> panicked, in part due to existing prejudices, and made poor
> decisions. That's what the historical record shows.

Some poor decisions, yes. People make poor decisions
now. People are human. But as for the historical record
showing that people panicked and that prejudice was a
contributing factor, maybe you can dig up few from the
WWII days that think so, but most would laugh at you.
It was not generally true of the historical record, only by
those whose more recent socio/political deology has
distorted the historical record.

>You should spend more time contemplating whether you
> could be accused of promulgating your own brand of political
> correctness when you charge us with that.

Perhaps, but aren't you being a bit like the "pot" who called the
"kettle" black?

WJH

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Oct 2, 12:24 am, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> > wjhopw...@aol.com <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> > > On Sep 30, 5:36 pm, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
> > > > Oh, and SURELY someone with your self-confessed "long
> > > > memory" will recall, the term "concentration camp" was
> > > > used in 1944...

> > > I guess you slept through my reply to your almost identical
> > > diatribe before. So here it is again. Try to stay awake:
> > > "Personal Justice Denied" the report of the Commission on
> > > Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, puts it well:
> > > "There is a continuing controversy over the contention
> > > that the camps were "concentration camps" and that any
> > > other term is a euphemism. The government documents
> > > of the time frequently used the term "concentration camps,"

> You are really at your disingenuous best here.

You're responding to yourself here. Perhaps your long memory fails you
again.

> Here's some of what you deleted from my quote from PJD
> which you only partially show above:
> "To use the phrase "concentration camps" summons
> up images which are inaccurate and unfair.. THE COMMISSION

So, you are on board with revising the historical record, yes?

You feel the historical record needs to be examined in light of
new information?

> Incidentally, I challenge you to find and reproduce where i ever
> denied that the term was frequently used during the war by some.

You are confused, as is your wont. We have stated that the term was used
even AFTER nazi death camps were uncovered. YOU are trying to revise
the historical record.

But doesn't that make you "revisionist"?

Mike

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 1, 11:37 am, David Wilma <DavidWi...@comcast.net> wrote:
> In the discussion of the MAGIC intercepts and possible Issei
> and Nisei activity on behalf of the Japanese government we are
> missing some important evidence, the work of the FBI and
> whichever agency (MI?) debriefed internees (people arrested).
> Were the analysts able to compare, for example, a MAGIC report
> of someone observing a naval shipyard with the interrogation of the
> suspected observer?

That's an interesting point. The answer is no. The FBI and
military intelligence (Army MID and Navy ONI) had different
missions which sometimes operationally overlapped, but
as the military's pre-war MAGIC intercept program was of a top
secret nature on a par with the Manhattan A-bomb project, its
existence was known only to a very few top echelon government
officials and J. Edgar Hoover was not one of them.
However, even if the FBI had known of therm and was in a
position to use the MAGIC summaries as an aid during
interrogations, it wouldn't have done much good because the
Japanese messages never revealed the identities of its
clandestine agents.

Prior to Pearl Harbor, international tensions had led the FBI to
carry out investigations of foreign groups and enterprises and
make lists of aliens whose backgrounds might suggest an
allegiance to a foreign power considered a potential threat.
It was anticipated that persons whose names were listed would
be immediately arrested and probably interned in the event of
war. Accordingly, when Pearl Harbor did occur, the FBI moved
in to make arrests and within three days had picked up over
1200 Japanese nationals, more than 800 Germans, and over
150 Italians. On December 10, 1941 J. Edgar Hoover
announced that almost all on the lists had been arrested
although the arrests did continue and by mid-February 1941
approx 4000 enemy aliens had been arrested by the FBI,
with over half being Japanese. .

> This is not to dismiss the real possibility of U.S. residents actively
> cooperating with Japanese handlers, but I want to know more about
> these networks.
>
> One apparent failing (or piece of missing evidence) is that the
> Japanese spies, who were diplomatic and consular personnel,

Not all of them. The diplomats and consular personnel were
primarily the middlemen or handlers. The espionage agents
in the field were a variety of informants including the resident
Issei and Nisei who they recruited, their identities not revealed
in the intercepts.

>One apparent failing (or piece of missing evidence) is that the
> Japanese spies, who were diplomatic and consular personnel,
> did not provide for managing networks after the spies were
> repatriated. Were there fallback positions? Or were these
> networks fiction?

Naturally after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Embassy and its
consulates, which had been the hubs of espionage control,
were shut down, and the messages which had been the
source of much information to U.S. intelligence about
Japanese espionage activities, were no longer available.
Although pre-war intercepts had revealed that in
the event of war Japan planned to move its West Coast
intelligence-gathering control to Mexico, there seems to be little
evidence that that ever happened.
However, only 10 weeks after Pearl Harbor
Executive Order 9066 was signed by FDR and the evacuation
of the ethnic Japanese from the West Coast began. With the
relocation of the entire Japanese community, there was little
opportunity for Japanese espionage activities to regenerate.

> (Disclosure: IMHO evacuation was legally and militarily correct.

I agree, So did the Supreme Court--(Korematsu 1944)

> Evacuation was even pretty smart; the government didn't round up
> people, it told them to leave. Some did. But in hindsight evacuation
> was unnecessary, inconsistent with American values, racist, and,
> ultimately, a political liability.)

I concur with some of that. But under wartime conditions
I think we should be guided more by the needs of national security
than by some vague romantic notion of "American values."
Also the charges of "racism" are an invalid reflection of current
political correctness, not wartime reality. If we had moved the West
Coast Japanese because of their race, why didn't we disturb ther
ethnic Japanese living east of he Rockies? Or move the Chinese,
the Filipinos?

The Japanese on the West Coast were moved because they
were in military operating areas, most of the adults were
japanese nationals (enemy aliens) and we were at war with
Japan. We were not at war with the oriental race.

WJH

[Stephen Graham]

On 10/2/11 5:27 PM, wjho...@aol.com wrote:
> On Oct 2, 5:59 pm, Stephen Graham<grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:

>> Yet Malkin is the one pursuing a modern day political agenda,
>> which is something you deride in others. She didn't write _In
>> Defense of Internment_ out of a general interest in the topic.
>
> You must certainly acknowledge that Muller and Robinson (since
> you admire Muller you must equally admire Robinson) have a
> modern day political agenda?

Admire? Where did I say I admire Muller? I find his work and that of
Robinson more nearly correct on the topic at hand than what you write.

> And why would you believe that Malkin wouldn't have had
> an interest in the topic of WWII internment.

I don't recall her expressing any interest in the subject prior to _In
Defense of Internment_, for instance while she was a columnist for the
_Seattle Times_. But that was fifteen years ago and I haven't gone back
to check the archives.

> It was not generally true of the historical record, only by
> those whose more recent socio/political deology has
> distorted the historical record.

You've confused the historical record with your prejudices.

> Perhaps, but aren't you being a bit like the "pot" who called the
> "kettle" black?

No, I think I'm expressing a reasonable interpretation of the historical
record. You're the one who insists on labeling people as "politically
correct".

[Rich Rostrom]

Which represents gross incompetence on the
part of the Japanese "spymasters".

Intelligence is useful only if it can be sourced
and the source is known to be reliable.

"My uncle Harry says he knows a guy whose
cousin told him..." is not useful.

If the Japanese agents reported "intelligence"
with no information about its sources, they
were incompetent - and Japanese HQ was
equally incompetent for not demanding that
information.

More likely, the Japanese agents were incompetent
_and_ corrupt. They had no useful agents to speak
of (incompetent) and were, in effect, lying to their
superiors by claiming to have various nameless
agents (corrupt). HQ was, again, incompetent for
accepting this material without demanding supporting
information.

The British "Double-cross" made considerable
efforts to provide such information to the German
controllers of double agents. The double agents
themselves were of course known to the Germans,
but several of them had notionally recruited subagents.
These subagents were all carefully identified to the
Germans - one reason why the Germans accepted
the reports coming from Britain.

For instance, the double agent GARBO had recruited
a man living in Liverpool, who provided information
about shipping and convoys. GARBO relayed this
man's reports of a fictional Malta convoy being
readied, which led to major (and costly) Axis
preparations to intercept it. In fall 1942, it became
apparent that this man could not fail to see the
preparations for Operation TORCH - so he fell ill,
and died. GARBO forwarded the obituary notice
from a Liverpool paper, and the Germans sent
their condolences to the widow, who moved to
London and became GARBO's assistant.

That is the kind of detail found in the message
traffic of real intelligence operations.

That not one primary source was ever identified in
internal Japanese messages is pretty conclusive.

> However, only 10 weeks after Pearl Harbor
> Executive Order 9066 was signed by FDR and the evacuation
> of the ethnic Japanese from the West Coast began. With the
> relocation of the entire Japanese community, there was little
> opportunity for Japanese espionage activities to regenerate.

What about all the Japanese who lived in _other_
parts of the country? There were war plants everywhere.
And shipyards - thousands of warships and landing
craft that were used in the Pacific war were built on the
East Coast, or the Gulf, or even the Great Lakes (31
DEs were built by Defoe Shipbuilding in Bay City MI).

If the threat of ethnic-Japanese espionage was so
great, why did it not extend to these areas?

> Also the charges of "racism" are an invalid reflection of current
> political correctness, not wartime reality.

> If we had moved the West
> Coast Japanese because of their race, why didn't we disturb ther
> ethnic Japanese living east of he Rockies?

Because anti-Asian racism was far stronger on
the West Coast than elsewhere

> Or move the Chinese, the Filipinos?

Because there was no military excuse for doing so.

You have repeated this lie

> The Japanese on the West Coast were moved because they

> were in military operating areas...

Only by a ludicrous distortion of that latter term.

The deportation order was issued March 2, 1942.

At that time, there were no Japanese forces, other
than a few submarines, within 6,000 km of the
West Coast. (The nearest would have been Japanese
base forces and patrols in the Kurile Islands.)

We _knew_ this, because we were reading Japanese
naval cipher traffic, and because we had RDF stations
tracking Japanese activity.

In fact, we _knew_ (from these sources) that the _only_
Japanese force (again, excluding submarines) which
had ever ventured east of the 180th meridian was the
Pearl Harbor attack force.

So U.S. military authorities _knew_ there was no
danger of invasion of the West Coast. (Nor of air
attacks (unless Japan had magically invented a new
bomber with an effective range of over 12,000 km).

> most of the adults were japanese nationals (enemy aliens)...

Who had been denied naturalization for racial reasons.

To deny an immigrant naturalization and then treat
him as disloyal because he isn't a citizen is very
much like the man who murdered his parents and
then pled for mercy because he was an orphan.

> and we were at war with Japan. We were not at war with the oriental race.

We were also at war with Germany and Italy. There
were hundreds of thousands of German and Italian
immigrants who were not citizens, and many of them
lived in areas that _were_ "military operating areas".
That is,the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, where dozens of
Axis submarines operated for many months, sinking
numerous ships, and where there were active military
units, both air and naval, engaged in actual combat
against Axis forces.

And yet, there was no suggestion that every German
or Italian immigrant man, woman, or child
should be removed from these areas. Indeed, the
only large scale internment of Italian immigrants
was on the West Coast - where, as it happened,
some of those to be interned happened to own
property that other coveted. _Just_ a coincidence.

[Stephen Graham]

On 10/3/2011 2:42 PM, Rich Rostrom wrote:

> We were also at war with Germany and Italy. There
> were hundreds of thousands of German and Italian
> immigrants who were not citizens, and many of them
> lived in areas that _were_ "military operating areas".

Let's not forget the Duquesne Spy Ring and Operation Pastorius.

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Oct 2, 5:59 pm, Stephen Graham <grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:
> > On 10/1/11 9:23 PM, wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:

> > Yet Malkin is the one pursuing a modern day political agenda,
> > which is something you deride in others. She didn't write _In
> > Defense of Internment_ out of a general interest in the topic.

> And why would you believe that Malkin wouldn't have had
> an interest in the topic of WWII internment. There was voluminous
> discussion about profiling and internment right after 9/11 when her
> book was written.

Good point; she wrote a book in support of a policy which was never
seriously considered, and not considered because of the experiences of
WWII.

> > Instead it follows in line with her earlier work on immigrants.

> I don't know quite what you mean by that unless she opposed
> illegal immigration. As a child of immigrant parents I wouldn't
> think she was against legal immigration.

Well, there are her assertions that Mexicans are in this country as part
of a plot by the Mexican government to take back the American southwest.
(http://mediamatters.org/research/200608240011)

Truly an intellect to be reckoned with.

Mike

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Oct 1, 11:37 am, David Wilma <DavidWi...@comcast.net> wrote:

> However, even if the FBI had known of therm and was in a
> position to use the MAGIC summaries as an aid during
> interrogations, it wouldn't have done much good because the
> Japanese messages never revealed the identities of its
> clandestine agents.

So, this incredibly valuable intel did not
1) Identify agents
2) Identify activities
3) In any way, shape, or form convey any such intel back to Tokyo.

Well, that's what we've been pointing out all along.

> 150 Italians. On December 10, 1941 J. Edgar Hoover
> announced that almost all on the lists had been arrested
> although the arrests did continue and by mid-February 1941
> approx 4000 enemy aliens had been arrested by the FBI,
> with over half being Japanese. .

And, as there were no incidences of sabatoge or espionage from the
remaining population, and as MAGIC did not, as you admit, lead to the
identification of agents or activities, it would seem the FBI had a
solid handle on the situation.

> > One apparent failing (or piece of missing evidence) is that the
> > Japanese spies, who were diplomatic and consular personnel,

> Not all of them. The diplomats and consular personnel were
> primarily the middlemen or handlers. The espionage agents
> in the field were a variety of informants including the resident
> Issei and Nisei who they recruited, their identities not revealed
> in the intercepts.

Nor are their activitites. Nor were their findings revealed in the
intercepts. In fact, their very existence was not revealed, as you
admit.

So, as we al seem to agree, MAGIC did NOT reveal any espionage activity.

Mike

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 4, 12:03 am, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
>
> So, as we al seem to agree, MAGIC did NOT reveal any espionage
> activity.

No, you just agree with yourself.
MAGIC

"May 9, 1941 From: Los Angeles (Nakauchi
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaliji)

....

We have already established contacts with absolutely reliable
Japanese in the San Pedro and San Diego area who will keep
a close watch on all shipments of airplanes and other war
materials and report amounts and destination of such shipments.

We shall maintain contact with our second generations who
are at present in the U.S. Army to keep us informed of various
developments in the Army....We also have connections with
or second generations working in airplane plants for intelligence
purposes...."

WJH

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 3, 9:18 am, Stephen Graham <grah...@speakeasy.net> wrote:

> On 10/2/11 5:27 PM, wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:
>
> > You must certainly acknowledge that Muller and Robinson (since
> > you admire Muller you must equally admire Robinson) have a
> > modern day political agenda?
>
> Admire? Where did I say I admire Muller? I find his work and that of
> Robinson more nearly correct on the topic at hand than what you write.

Sorry for the choice of words. I thought it clear that I was
referring to
our prior discussion in which you expressed approval of Muller's
explanation of the loyalty questionnaire. Not whatever it is in
the word "admire" that you find objectionable.

> > And why would you believe that Malkin wouldn't have had
> > an interest in the topic of WWII internment.
>
> I don't recall her expressing any interest in the subject prior to _In
> Defense of Internment_,

As i pointed out and so did Malkin, the interest arose because
of the issue raised following the 9/11 attack. That was her
motivation, which you call her "political agenda."

> You've confused the historical record with your prejudices.

It appears that you have some prejudices of you own.

> ... I think I'm expressing a reasonable interpretation of the historical
> record.

So do I. We obviously see the historical record through different
lenses. You say it's because I'm prejudiced. I say maybe so in
your view, but on the other hand perhaps you have a chink or
two in your own armor and might make an effort to be a bit less
self-righteous. There are two sides to most stories and
particularly
so in the case of this one.

WJH

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

So, what information was passed, Mr Hopwood? Oh, yeah, there were no
messy "details", like actual activities.

How was it to be passed? Oh, right, there was no real attempt to set up a
way to be passed on.

Who was involved? Oh, sorry, there was no mention of any ACTUAL person by
any sort of code name which might be used by the Tokyo intel officers
to evaluate the reliability of said information.

When was this information passed, or to be passed? Gotcha; no such
time-table for spy ring formation (much less information transfer) was
ever mentioned.

No, I think we all agree that no evidence of a single spy ring was
uncovered via Magic, Mr Hopwood. And given that the US didn't arrest
anybody because of it, it seems the US agrees, too.

Mike

[David Wilma]

Was there any effort to debrief Japanese consular and diplomatic
personnel after the war as to these espionage efforts? Are these
interviews waiting somewhere in the National Archives for some scholar
to make his bones?

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 4, 10:41 am, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:>

>...... I think we all agree that no evidence of a single spy ring was

> uncovered via Magic, Mr Hopwood.

No single spy ring, just evidence of many, right? As the MAGIC
mesage I showed said, and bears repeating for the benefit of
those who appear to suffer from dyslexia:

"We have already established contacts with

...absolutely reliable Japanese in the San Pedro and San Diego

area who will keep a close watch on all shipments of airplanes

and other war materials... and... maintain contact with our second
generations...in the U.S. Army to keep us informed..,We also have
connections with our second generations working in airplane
plants for intelligence purposes...."

> and given that the US didn't arrest

> anybody because of it, it seems the US agrees, too.

Your naivete shows. Given rules of evidence and discovery,
the U.S. would have had to give up the secrecy of its
intelligence-gathering operations in court if individual arrests
been made. This became evident early in the program when
one spy ring run by a Japanese naval attache, Lieutenant
Commander Ituru Tachibana was broken. Tachibana's ring
was later described by one redress and reparation advocate,
Peter Irons, as follows:
"There was no question that Tachibana headed
an espionage ring on the West Coast that enlisted a number
of Japanese Americans both alien and citizens, nor that the
government knew the identities of its members. The FBI
has refused to release its Tachibana file and the names of the
espionage agents remain unknown." ["Justice at War" -1983]
As it turned out, Tachibana was quietly deported and no case
was ever brought to trial for diplomatic and security reasons.

WJH.

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Oct 4, 10:41 am, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:>
> >...... I think we all agree that no evidence of a single spy ring was
> > uncovered via Magic, Mr Hopwood.

> No single spy ring,

Right.

> just evidence of many, right? As the MAGIC

Nope.

In fact, you haven't shown the existence of a single ring. You can
repeat what the Japanese diplomats really wanted to do, but it doesn't
mean they actually did it.

> mesage I showed said, and bears repeating for the benefit of
> those who appear to suffer from dyslexia:

Sorry, which words/letters have we transposed? Or do words take on
only those meanings you wish, in your world?

> "We have already established contacts with
> ...absolutely reliable Japanese in the San Pedro and San Diego
> area who will keep a close watch on all shipments of airplanes
> and other war materials... and... maintain contact with our second

And again, slowly, we ask "What information was actually transmitted?"
"How was this information transmitted?" "Who transmitted it?"

Ya know; the basics.

This has been asked before. More than a decade previously, in fact, as
a search through the archives will attest.

You assiduously avoid answering that, Mr Hopwood.

> generations...in the U.S. Army to keep us informed..,We also have
> connections with our second generations working in airplane
> plants for intelligence purposes...."

Cool. So, again, what information was gathered?

Really, it's not too much to ask that a spy ring actually, you know, do
some spying. Otherwise, what's the point? Just to get the magic decoder
ring?

> > and given that the US didn't arrest
> > anybody because of it, it seems the US agrees, too.

> Your naivete shows.

You misspelled "logic". You're welcome.

> Given rules of evidence and discovery,
> the U.S. would have had to give up the secrecy of its
> intelligence-gathering operations in court if individual arrests
> been made.

Really? So, they couldn't have the FBI "tipped off" and have them tail
these dastards?

After all, the Velvalee case was made public in 1944; surely some of
these other spies could have been indicted around that thim, yes?

So, what "secrecy" would have been spilled? And didn't the US summarily
arrest several hundred people immediately after PH despite no evidence
of actual wrong-doing, just because they fit a profile of potentially
dangerous subversives. What "rules of evidence" were used in those
cases, Mr Hopwood? Couldn't they simply have arrested them without
charge?

Or couldn't they have arrested them after the war? You know, when Magic
was fully public? Do you think they felt the public would be too sympathetic
to these people to bother to try them?

Seriously, Mr Hopwood, you ought not to use words like "naivte" and
"dyslexia" until you can show some evidence that they don't more directly
apply to that which you see in your mirror.

> This became evident early in the program when
> one spy ring run by a Japanese naval attache, Lieutenant
> Commander Ituru Tachibana was broken. Tachibana's ring
> was later described by one redress and reparation advocate,
> Peter Irons, as follows:
> "There was no question that Tachibana headed
> an espionage ring on the West Coast that enlisted a number
> of Japanese Americans both alien and citizens, nor that the
> government knew the identities of its members. The FBI

Let's see, now this was broken up through non-Magic means, yes?

> has refused to release its Tachibana file and the names of the
> espionage agents remain unknown." ["Justice at War" -1983]
> As it turned out, Tachibana was quietly deported and no case
> was ever brought to trial for diplomatic and security reasons.

Which security reason, Mr Hopwood?

And BTW, wasn't Ringle involved in the breakup of that ring? You know, the
guy who was not really an intelligence expert, if you are to be believed?
And yes, Ringle was so involved. He has a better record against Japanese
spy rings than MAGIC, it would appear, though to be honest, that's not a
high bar.

You

[Rich Rostrom]

wjho...@aol.com wrote:
> On Oct 4, 10:41 am, mtfes...@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:>
> >...... I think we all agree that no evidence of a single spy ring was
> > uncovered via Magic, Mr Hopwood.
>
> No single spy ring, just evidence of many, right? As the MAGIC
> mesage I showed said, and bears repeating for the benefit of
> those who appear to suffer from dyslexia:
> "We have already established contacts with

> ...absolutely reliable Japanese i...."

You can repeat this as often as you like.
It is still not evidence that there were any
Japanese-controlled spy rings; only that
the Japanese operatives in the U.S. made
vague claims about recruiting informants
to their superiors.

> > and given that the US didn't arrest
> > anybody because of it, it seems the US agrees, too.
>
> Your naivete shows. Given rules of evidence and discovery,
> the U.S. would have had to give up the secrecy of its
> intelligence-gathering operations in court if individual arrests
> been made.

False. Complelely and utterly false.

There are rules for conducting trials where
information held secret for military or national
security reasons is in evidence.

For instance, the Operation Pastorius agents
were all tried and executed before military
commissions, under strict secrecy.

And even supposing the agents in question
could not be tried, it would still be necessary
to arrest them ASAP. Since hundreds of
suspicious Japanese-Americans _were_
taken into custody in December 1941, the
capture of those who were known as agents
from MAGIC would give the Japanese no
reason to suspect a cipher breach.

But really this is silly.

You yourself have stated, many times,
that _all_ Japanese-Americans were suspect
and had to be interned - because the MAGIC
intercepts did not identify any Japanese-American
agents or even provide clues for the
identification of any.

But not _all_: not those living in Hawaii,
where the most critical military bases
and operations of the time were located.
Not those living on the Atlantic and Gulf
Coast, where the submarines of Japan's
ally were sinking hundreds of merchant
ships.

(It was already known that German and
Japanese intelligence services collaborated.
In early 1941, a Japanese diplomat
delivered working funds to a German agent
in Britain - who was a controlled double
agent, so the payoff was known and observed.
When the Germans sent their crack agent
Popov (also a double agent) to America in
late 1941, a third of his initial tasks were
Japanese requests.)

But a Japanese-American living a few miles
from Pearl Harbor, or in New York City (an
extremely busy port, and site of major war
production facilities) was not considered a
security risk requiring internment.

Only those Japanese-Americans living in
western states were interned - and all of
them were. There is no real security
explanation for this. A Japanese-American
farmer in the Gila River valley of Arizona,
or a shopkeeper in Yakima. Washington,
was a security risk who had to be locked up.

But not right away - these dangerous Japs
were left at liberty to spy and sabotage for
almost five months.

It does not appear, however, that any of
them did. The Japanese-Americans who
were known agents of Japan, and those
were known or reasonably suspected to
be strong Japanese sympathizers (e.g.
Kibei who had Japanese military training),
were all rounded up in December 1941.

Over one hundred thousand other Japanese-
Americans were left at liberty for five more
months, till May 1942. And _then_ they were
found to be a security threat so grave that
_all_ of them had to be interned - at substantial
expense to the nation and considerable hardship
to them.

But this was _necessary_, we are told, because
some of them _might_ have engaged in spying
or sabotage. And yet AFAIK there is no
evidence whatever of any May 1942 internee
perfoming any spying or sabotage in that five
month period.

It seems, therefore, that the May internment
was a complete waste of money and effort, and
a totally unnecessary hardship on those interned.

If it was necessary - if it had actually been seen
as necessary _at_ _the_ _time_ - it would have
been done months earlier. There was no evidence
in the hands of any U.S. authority at the time
indicating such a necessity. None has come to
light since.

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 6, 2:55 pm, Rich Rostrom wrote:

> wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:
>
> > No single spy ring, just evidence of many, right? As the MAGIC
> > mesage I showed said, and bears repeating for the benefit of
> > those who appear to suffer from dyslexia:
> > "We have already established contacts with
> > ...absolutely reliable Japanese i...."
>
> You can repeat this as often as you like.
> It is still not evidence that there were any
> Japanese-controlled spy rings; only that
> the Japanese operatives in the U.S. made
> vague claims about recruiting informants
> to their superiors.

You are in a state of denial. What you are saying
is that U.S. intelligence officials should have thrown
such intercepts into the wastebasket.
If you knew how military intelligence works, you would
know better.
FYI, intelligence officials would have run this
information against what had been collected
by other means from different sources and at different
times to ascertain if it reinforced other information they
had obtained. In so doing they might have come up
with something like the document I excerpt below:

"June 9, 1941--MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF,
Counter Intellgence Branch--Subject Japanese Espionage
This branch has information from a highly reliable
source to the effect that the Japanese intelligence and
espionage unit centering in the Seattle consulate has made
the following 'contacts': (a) Political (names listed). From
these men the Japanese collect information...on the degree
of America's participation in the war (b) Economic-employees
in...companies as to our war effort...ships, airplanes produced,
copper, tin, aluminum production...(and) machinists of German
origin....in the Bremerton Naval Yard and Boeing Aircraft
Factory, (c) Military--One Kaneko is in charge of men sent to
...get information concerning movement of naval craft...
mercantile shipping, airplane manuracture, troop movements,
and maneuvers. These men contact a Major Okada who wires
his reports to Japan, (d) Labor Unions--One Okasaru, a first-
generation Japanese...reports on labor disorders, etc.
A second-generation Japanese lawyer named Ito
collects information on anti-war-participations organizations
(Signed) Col. C. H. Mason, Chief, Intelligence Branch."

> There are rules for conducting trials where
> information held secret for military or national
> security reasons is in evidence.

First of all, the identities of the resident agents were
seldom, if ever, known. Second, if agents had been
arrested and tried it would have been made public
and become immediately known to the Japanese
consuls who had recruited and used them.
Accordingly that particular source of intelligence
would have dried up.

> For instance, the Operation Pastorius agents
> were all tried and executed before military
> commissions, under strict secrecy.

It wasn't as secret as you think. I remember it
well. The trial was covered by the press in headlines
every day and even though the proceedings were
closed to the public, the press was given a briefing
every day.

> And even supposing the agents in question
> could not be tried, it would still be necessary
> to arrest them ASAP. Since hundreds of
> suspicious Japanese-Americans _were_
> taken into custody in December 1941, the
> capture of those who were known as agents
> from MAGIC would give the Japanese no
> reason to suspect a cipher breach.

Maybe that among those PJAs arrested after PH
there were some espionage agents of Japan We
will probably never know. But that aside, how do
you pick up agents whose identity you don't
know? Names were seldom if ever mentioned
in the MAGIC intercepts. As former NSA
intelligence official David Lowman said:
"All intelligence agencies zealously guard
the names and locations of their agents and
Japan was no exception. Secure codes or not,
the policy was to not put the names of agents
in messages sent out by radio, but occasionally
that rule was violated." [MAGIC--The Untold
Story......" Lowman.

> But a Japanese-American living a few miles
> from Pearl Harbor, or in New York City (an
> extremely busy port, and site of major war
> production facilities) was not considered a
> security risk requiring internment.

That's because Hawaii had the PJAs under
control by means of martial law. As for the
Japanese guy in New York, we certainly
did not expect that if Japan were to make
any attacks on our mainland that it would be
on New York.

> Only those Japanese-Americans living in
> western states were interned - and all of
> them were.

But not those living elsewhere. Doesn't
that blow away your theory that "racism" was
the sole cause of the evacuation/internment?

>............The Japanese-Americans who

> were known agents of Japan, and those
> were known or reasonably suspected to
> be strong Japanese sympathizers (e.g.
> Kibei who had Japanese military training),
> were all rounded up in December 1941.

No they weren't. Not by a longshot. There
were somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000
Kibei who were finally relocated but not until
after the Spring of 1942. And who knows how
many clandestine Japanese agents were
among the evacuees who were relocated
after the Spring of 1942. It took several
months to organize the evacuation, build
relocation centers to house those with
no place else to go, etc.

> But this was _necessary_, we are told, because
> some of them _might_ have engaged in spying
> or sabotage. And yet AFAIK there is no
> evidence whatever of any May 1942 internee
> perfoming any spying or sabotage in that five
> month period.

That's a tribute to the security measures taken
by the military. No opportunity, no sabotage.

WJH

[Don Kirkman]

On Fri, 07 Oct 2011 09:07:00 -0400, "wjho...@aol.com"
<wjho...@aol.com> wrote:

>On Oct 6, 2:55 pm, Rich Rostrom wrote:
>> wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:

>> There are rules for conducting trials where
>> information held secret for military or national
>> security reasons is in evidence.

>> For instance, the Operation Pastorius agents
>> were all tried and executed before military
>> commissions, under strict secrecy.
>
>It wasn't as secret as you think. I remember it
>well. The trial was covered by the press in headlines
>every day and even though the proceedings were
>closed to the public, the press was given a briefing
>every day.

I may not remember it (and possibly you don't either, given what we
know about the fallibility of memory), but would a trial in a military
tribunal within the Department of Justice building really be briefed
to the press daily and published openly? If so, why bother with the
military tribunal instead of the civilian courts? Can you offer
something besides memory in evidence? I haven't even found a
reference to press coverage.

[quote]
Fearful that a civilian court would be too lenient, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt ordered that the eight would-be saboteurs be tried by a
military tribunal, the first held since the assassination of President
Abraham Lincoln. Placed before a seven-member commission, the Germans
were accused of:

Violating the law of war
Violating Article 81 of the Articles of War, defining the offense of
corresponding with or giving intelligence to the enemy
Violating Article 82 of the Articles of War, defining the offense of
spying
Conspiracy to commit the offenses alleged in the first three charges

Though their lawyers, including Lauson Stone and Kenneth Royall,
attempted to have the case moved to a civilian court, their efforts
were in vain. The trial moved forward in the Department of Justice
Building in Washington that July. All eight were found guilty and
sentenced to death. For their assistance in foiling the plot, Dasch
and Burger had their sentences commuted by Roosevelt and were given 30
years and life in prison respectively. In 1948, President Harry Truman
showed both men clemency and had them deported to the American Zone of
occupied Germany. The remaining six were electrocuted at the District
Jail in Washington on August 8, 1942.
[end quote[
http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/socialeffectsofwar/p/pastorius.htm

*
--
Don Kirkman
don...@charter.net

[Alan Nordin]

On Oct 7, 9:07 am, "wjhopw...@aol.com" <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> It wasn't as secret as you think. I remember it
> well. The trial was covered by the press in headlines
> every day and even though the proceedings were
> closed to the public, the press was given a briefing
> every day.

Assuming your detailed memory of events of 70 years ago is correct,
even so your rebuttal reinforces Mr Rostrum's point. The press was
briefed every day? Who do you think briefed the press to ensure that
security was maintaned?

Alan

[Rich Rostrom]

On Oct 7, 12:29 pm, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:
> On Fri, 07 Oct 2011 09:07:00 -0400, "wjhopw...@aol.com"

>
> <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> >On Oct 6, 2:55 pm, Rich Rostrom wrote:

> >> ... the Operation Pastorius agents were all tried and executed before military

> >> commissions, under strict secrecy.
>
> >It wasn't as secret as you think. I remember it well. The trial was covered by the press in headlines
> >every day and even though the proceedings were closed to the public, the press was given a briefing
> >every day.
>

> ..I haven't even found a reference to press coverage.

The execution of the six Germans (and the
sentence of the two German-Americans to
prison) was reported in TIME Magazine on
17 August 1942.

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,932756,00.html

However, TIME also reported that

"The U.S. still knew less about the case than about
any one of its daily, tawdry crimes of passion. The
record was sealed until after the war."

So, not complete secrecy - but sufficient secrecy
to protect any sensitive sources, such as decrypted
messages.

[Rich Rostrom]

This document reveals the feeble quality of U.S. Army
counterintelligence work. Three alleged Japanese
agents are alluded by last name only, but apparently
no effort was made to identify the actual individuals.
How hard could it be to locate a lawyer named Ito,
whose parents were Japanese immigrants?

The report says that the consular officials made
"contacts". That doesn't signify much of anything
except that the officials talked to these men, who
agreed to "keep them informed"... about what?

"the degree of America's participation in the war "

Something one could see in the newspaper.

"ships, airplanes produced, copper, tin, aluminum production..."

Nothing very secret there.

"labor disorders"

Reported in the newspapers.

> machinists of German origin... in the Bremerton Nava\
> Yard and Boeing Aircraft Factory

This is potentially 'hot'. Presumably the object was
to approach these machinists and get them to provide
intelligence or perhaps perform sabotage.

One would want to know if the Japanese officials ever
received any such names.

According to this ONI document

("JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE AND PROPAGANDA
IN THE UNITED STATES DURING 1941"
http://home.comcast.net/~eo9066/1941/41-12/IA021.html)

German born Communists at Bremerton and Boeing provided
intelligence to Japanese agents until Germany invaded
the USSR on 6/22/1941.

But this strikes me as complete fantasy. Why would
_German_ Communists be more willing than other
Communists to aid the Japanese? And why would
any Moscow-loyal Communists aid Japan at all?
Moscow's policy was to keep the U.S. out of the war
and prolong it, not to aid the Axis.
.
The ONI report does in fact identify the people mentioned in
the Army document.

"one Kaneko" is Kanji Kaneko, Chancellor of the Japanese
consulate at Seattle.

"second-generation Japanese lawyer named Ito" is Kenji Ito,
"legal representative of the Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers
Union (C.I.O. Local #7) in Seattle" and "Legal Adviser to the
Japanese Consulate in Seattle".

"One Okasaru"... is Shoji ("Welly") Okamaru (note the spelling
error), "Secretary of the Japanese Consulate at Seattle, but was
promoted to Consular Assistant in June, 1940", who "contacts
labor unions in search of Communist Party members."

Their identities and activities were, clearly, well known to the
authorities, so they were not a threat to lead subversive
activities after Pearl Harbor.

> > There are rules for conducting trials where
> > information held secret for military or national
> > security reasons is in evidence.
>
> First of all, the identities of the resident agents were
> seldom, if ever, known.

According to the document you quoted
above, the names of Japanese agents
_were_ known.

> Second, if agents had been
> arrested and tried it would have been made public
> and become immediately known to the Japanese
> consuls who had recruited and used them.
> Accordingly that particular source of intelligence
> would have dried up.

Some one should have told J Edgar Hoover
about that. In 1941, at just about this same
time, the FBI arrested all the members of the
Duquesne spy working for Germany. This was
due to the work of double agent Harry Sebold.

The arrest and trial of the Duquesne ring was
accompanied by lavish headline praise for the
FBI and Hoover, which is exactly what Hoover
wanted.

The Germans sent the double agent TRICYCLE
(Dusko Popov) to the U.S. a few months later
to set up a new ring. The British expected that
the U.S. would follow their pattern, and allow
Popov to set up a controlled ring of fictional
agents, thereby neutralizing future German
spy efforts and providing a useful channel for
deception.

This was thwarted by Hoover's complete incapacity
to see beyond new arrests and headlines.

And, as a matter of fact, when the Tachibana spy
ring was broken up in June 1941, there were headlines
and the consulates knew all about it.

> > And even supposing the agents in question
> > could not be tried, it would still be necessary
> > to arrest them ASAP. Since hundreds of
> > suspicious Japanese-Americans _were_
> > taken into custody in December 1941, the
> > capture of those who were known as agents
> > from MAGIC would give the Japanese no
> > reason to suspect a cipher breach.
>
> Maybe that among those PJAs arrested after PH
> there were some espionage agents of Japan We
> will probably never know. But that aside, how do
> you pick up agents whose identity you don't
> know? Names were seldom if ever mentioned
> in the MAGIC intercepts.

> As former NSA
> intelligence official David Lowman said:
> "All intelligence agencies zealously guard

> the names and locations of their agents...

>From the enemy. But names and locations
_must_ be reported to the agency. Otherwise,
it is impossible to evaluate the reliability of the
intelligence.

No rational intelligence agency would accept
reports from no definite source, and no rational
commander would rely on such reports.

This is not a problem with the SIGINT which
NSA deals with. Nor was it a problem with the
SIGINT which was the source of ULTRA
intelligence. Such messages are what the enemy
are saying to each other, and cannot be false.
(Unless the enemy himself is mistaken, or one
enemy is lying to another. Rommel was known
to exaggerate his supply difficulties, and some
Abwehr agents in Spain lied about their contacts
in Britain.) The exact source is always known.

HUMINT is very different.

> "Japan was no exception. Secure codes or not, the policy was to not
> put the names of agents in messages sent out by radio, but occasionally
> that rule was violated." [MAGIC--The Untold Story......" Lowman.

But identities and backgrounds had to be reported
_somehow_. And it wouldn't really do much good
to conceal identities if detailed information was
being passed, and a general description of the agent
was included. Message 123 says "an Issei at Forbush
Air Force Base will report on operations there". Message
456 says "35 new P-40s arrived at Forbush AFB last
Thursday". It wouldn't take much cleverness by the
counter-intelligence service to figure out who provided
that information.

> > But a Japanese-American living a few miles
> > from Pearl Harbor, or in New York City (an
> > extremely busy port, and site of major war
> > production facilities) was not considered a
> > security risk requiring internment.
>
> That's because Hawaii had the PJAs under
> control by means of martial law. As for the
> Japanese guy in New York, we certainly
> did not expect that if Japan were to make
> any attacks on our mainland that it would be
> on New York.

I see. The only reason for interning Japanese-
Americans in any area was the fear of attack on
that area. So why were Italian-Americans on
the West Coast interned? Was there fear of
an Italian invasion of Califomia?

(Actually, the U.S. military was just as worried
about an Italian invasion of California as about
a Japanese invasion - that is, not at all. They
_knew_ - from MAGIC decrypts, from JN-25
decrypts, from radio D/Fing, and from patrols
that there were no Japanese forces within
thousands of km of the U.S. mainland, and that
no Japanese force had come east of the 180th
Meridian since Pearl Harbor. Except, of course,
a very small number of submerged submarines,
far less dangerous than the much larger number
of German submarines operating off the Atlantic
and Gulf Coast.)

And according to that ONI report an identified
Japanese-American in New York City had
participated in German espionage operations.

> > Only those Japanese-Americans living in
> > western states were interned - and all of
> > them were.
>
> But not those living elsewhere. Doesn't
> that blow away your theory that "racism" was
> the sole cause of the evacuation/internment?

There were Jews who lived openly in Berlin
through the entire period of Nazi rule. Does
this refute the fact, supported by mountains
of evidence, that Nazi Germany's persecution
and murder of Jews was motivated by anti-
Semitism?

> >...The Japanese-Americans who
> > were known agents of Japan, and those
> > were known or reasonably suspected to
> > be strong Japanese sympathizers (e.g.
> > Kibei who had Japanese military training),
> > were all rounded up in December 1941.
>
> No they weren't. Not by a longshot. There
> were somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000

> Kibei...

Of whom only a small fraction were men who
had recently undergone military training in Japan.

> And who knows how many clandestine Japanese agents were
> among the evacuees who were relocated after the Spring of 1942.

My guess is zero. None were ever identified.
No captured documents, no intercepted messages
ever identified one, even indirectly. (I.e. by the
Japanese having intelligence which must have
come from a particular indiividual.) No agent among
them was revealed to U.S. authorities by other
internees - many of whom despite this mistreatment
demonstrated considerable loyalty to the U.S. by
fighting and dying for the U.S.

> > But this was _necessary_, we are told, because some of them _might_ have engaged in spying
> > or sabotage. And yet AFAIK there is no evidence whatever of any May 1942 internee
> > perfoming any spying or sabotage in that five month period.
>
> That's a tribute to the security measures taken by the military. No opportunity, no sabotage.

So what _you_ are saying here is that there was
no reason for the internments.

You have repeatedly stated that the much denser
Japanese-American population in the much more
sensitive region of Hawaii did not need to be interned
because (in your own words above) "Hawaii had the

PJAs under control by means of martial law".

Now you tell us that "security measures taken by the
military" on the mainland absolutely prevented
any spying or sabotage by Japanese-Americans.
Therefore they were "under control" too.

If they were "under control", then there was no need
to intern them. The very substantial expense of the
internments was wasted money, and the hardships
imposed on the internees were completely unnecessary
(besides being a violation of the Constitutional rights
of tens of thousands of loyal American citizens).

Mr. Hopwood, I have a suggestion. Your original post
dealt with the complacent attitude of the U.S. government
to the danger of Japanese conquest to Americans in the
Philippines, and the failure of the U.S. after the war to
take any responsibility for the hardships and injuries to
Americans there that fell into Japanese hands.

This is a new topic and it appeared that you had
something useful to say about it. Perhaps you might
revive that topic, and refrain from irrelevant asides
about other topics, where you have nothing new to say.

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Oct 6, 2:55 pm, Rich Rostrom wrote:
> > wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:
> >
> > > No single spy ring, just evidence of many, right? As the MAGIC
> > > mesage I showed said, and bears repeating for the benefit of
> > > those who appear to suffer from dyslexia:
> > > "We have already established contacts with
> > > ...absolutely reliable Japanese i...."
> >
> > You can repeat this as often as you like.
> > It is still not evidence that there were any
> > Japanese-controlled spy rings; only that
> > the Japanese operatives in the U.S. made
> > vague claims about recruiting informants
> > to their superiors.

> You are in a state of denial. What you are saying
> is that U.S. intelligence officials should have thrown
> such intercepts into the wastebasket.

You are in a state of confusion; he is merely pointing the BLINDINGLY
obvious fact that there wasn't any evidence they'd actually done what
they claimed they wanted to do.

More to the point, despite your self-professed "extensive" study of the
subject, and with over 66 years to go over it, and numerous "declassified
documents", you STILL cannot produce evidence that a single spy was
uncovered due to MAGIC intercepts, though the FBI had no trouble
uncovering such agents without benefit of this information.

> If you knew how military intelligence works, you would
> know better.

Sorry, but frankly you have no idea whatsover how military intelligence
works, as has been obvious. If there really were information passed
via MAGIC about spy rings and such, why aren't there intercepts from
Tokyo specifying which information they required from which agents?

And please, repeating the 3 or 4 examples that get shot down each and
every time does make your case look any better; it weakens it, as
pretty much everyone else seems to agree.

Mike

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 7, 1:29 pm, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:
> On Fri, 07 Oct 2011 09:07:00 -0400, "wjhopw...@aol.com"

>
> >It wasn't as secret as you think. I remember it
> >well. The trial was covered by the press in headlines
> >every day and even though the proceedings were
> >closed to the public, the press was given a briefing
> >every day.
>

>.......Can you offer> something besides memory in evidence?

> I haven't even found a reference to press coverage.

From the Wall Street Journal Dec. 31, 2001--by Lloyd Cutler:
"...I was the youngest lawyer on the 10 man team that
prosecuted the invaders before a military commission....The
trial took place in the FBI offices in Washington, but the
press and public were excluded. The press was given a
daily briefing limited to the names of the witnesses and how
long they had been on the stand. Even so, the press covered
these meager bits in banner page-one headlines."

WJH

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Oct 7, 1:29 pm, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:
> > On Fri, 07 Oct 2011 09:07:00 -0400, "wjhopw...@aol.com"

> >.......Can you offer> something besides memory in evidence?
> > I haven't even found a reference to press coverage.

> From the Wall Street Journal Dec. 31, 2001--by Lloyd Cutler:
> "...I was the youngest lawyer on the 10 man team that
> prosecuted the invaders before a military commission....The
> trial took place in the FBI offices in Washington, but the
> press and public were excluded. The press was given a
> daily briefing limited to the names of the witnesses and how
> long they had been on the stand. Even so, the press covered
> these meager bits in banner page-one headlines."

So, to be clear; you're saying that they could have tried people without
revealing the details involved.

Yet, somehow, nobody implicated in MAGIC intercepts was tried during the
war, and absolutely nobody was tried after the war?

Is THAT what you're saying?

Mike

[Don Kirkman]

Thank you. I welcome any *facts* you care to include in these
interminable discussions and rehashings. It's the reliance on memory
and shaky interpretations that I think interfere with your ability to
sway your audience. I gather from the totality of this sub-thread
that it's the headlines you remember, not the trial itself, which I
assume was in fact secret.
--
Don Kirkman
don...@charter.net

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 8, 11:56 am, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:
> On Fri, 07 Oct 2011 23:33:21 -0400, "wjhopw...@aol.com"

>
> > From the Wall Street Journal Dec. 31, 2001--by Lloyd Cutler:

> > "...I was...on the 10 man team that prosecuted the
> > invaders... The press was given a

> >daily briefing limited to the names of the witnesses and how
> >long they had been on the stand. Even so, the press covered
> >these meager bits in banner page-one headlines."
>

> ... I welcome any *facts* you care to include....

> It's the reliance on memory and shaky interpretations that I think
> interfere with your ability to sway your audience.

Snide remarks such as that are petty and don't really help the
cause of accuracy. Perhaps it's your way of expressing
disappointment at having been shown that press coverage
of the 1942 military tribunal really did exist. .
As for your remarks about memory, I believe I've sourced
my material as much as anyone here, probably more extensively
than many who disagree with me (particularly the trolls), but
if you don't think so please be specific and refrain from
unreasonable charges based on unsupportable generalities.

> I gather from the totality of this sub-thread that it's the headlines

> you remember, not the trial itself, which assume was in fact secret.

I did not say or imply that I was AT the trial? Everybody who
could read a newspaper knew there was a trial going on, that
he public and press were excluded from it. It was also known
that the press was given limited daily briefings from which
they were able to provide their own interpretations. Semi-secrecy
seemed more like it. .

WJH

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Oct 8, 11:56 am, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:

> Snide remarks such as that are petty and don't really help the
> cause of accuracy.

Perhaps you should bear that in mind next time you make references
to "naivete", of calling people "uninformed".

Or, perhaps you can develop a thicker skin.

> disappointment at having been shown that press coverage
> of the 1942 military tribunal really did exist. .

Sorry, how does that make it a public trial?

And more to the point, how does that support your claim that the military
would be reluctant to try people for fear of giving away secret
information?

> As for your remarks about memory, I believe I've sourced
> my material as much as anyone here, probably more extensively

No; you still don't seem to remember the term "concentration camp" being
used in common parlance, don't seem to remember references to a Japanese
"race", etc.

> > I gather from the totality of this sub-thread that it's the headlines
> > you remember, not the trial itself, which assume was in fact secret.

> I did not say or imply that I was AT the trial? Everybody who
> could read a newspaper knew there was a trial going on, that
> he public and press were excluded from it. It was also known
> that the press was given limited daily briefings from which
> they were able to provide their own interpretations. Semi-secrecy
> seemed more like it. .

Wait,so you are now saying that the government WAS able to make
make a case against spies without necessarily revealing all their
sources?

Please make up your mind.

Mike

[Don Kirkman]

On Sat, 08 Oct 2011 17:46:30 -0400, "wjho...@aol.com"
<wjho...@aol.com> wrote:

>On Oct 8, 11:56 am, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:
>> On Fri, 07 Oct 2011 23:33:21 -0400, "wjhopw...@aol.com"

>> ... I welcome any *facts* you care to include....
>> It's the reliance on memory and shaky interpretations that I think
>> interfere with your ability to sway your audience.
>
>Snide remarks such as that are petty and don't really help the
>cause of accuracy. Perhaps it's your way of expressing
>disappointment

No disappointment, just the lack of specificity of your first
response. Yes, I was being a bit snide, because over the years I've
felt that a good portion of your evidence has been successfully
countered by others only to see the same assertions trotted out in
subsequent discussions.

> As for your remarks about memory, I believe I've sourced
>my material as much as anyone here

Memory is seldom a reliable source, especially over a span of 70
years, and IMO always needs to be corroborated. Your sources seem to
me to be drawn consistently from a small number of favorites, some of
them questionable. However, the quality of your material has nothing
to do with memory but with the quality of your sources. You have
sourced material, but reluctantly and sometimes only when asked to do
so, as in this case..

>> I gather from the totality of this sub-thread that it's the headlines
>> you remember, not the trial itself, which assume was in fact secret.

>I did not say or imply that I was AT the trial?

Nor did I imply that you were present. My point was that you did
remember the headlines. The question is what you learned from them
beyond the fact that a trial was going on.

> Everybody who >could read a newspaper knew there was a trial going on, that

>the public and press were excluded from it. It was also known

>that the press was given limited daily briefings from which
>they were able to provide their own interpretations. Semi-secrecy
>seemed more like it. .

Okay, point made and accepted.
--
Don Kirkman
don...@charter.net

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 9, 10:24 am, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:
> On Sat, 08 Oct 2011 17:46:30 -0400, "wjhopw...@aol.com"
>
> >Snide remarks ....are petty and don't really help the
> >cause of accuracy.....
>
>.....Yes, I was being a bit snide, because over the years I've

> felt that a good portion of your evidence has been successfully
> countered by others only to see the same assertions trotted out in
> subsequent discussions.

It's not surprising that you would see my "evidence" in
a dim light inasmuch you start with a different POV
and a built-in reluctance to accept another. But I have
always considered you to be a reasonable intellectual
adversary for whom being snide is out of character.
Of course some of us have had these discussions
for years. But aside from the "regulars," a few of whom treat
WWII like it was a big video game and appear almost
daily on the forum to pontificate on any subject, no matter
how little they know about it, there are, from time to time,
some interested new members for whom the subject
matter of this thread may not be as boring as it is to you.
And the bored can always tune out.

> > As for your remarks about memory, I believe I've sourced
> >my material as much as anyone here
>
> Memory is seldom a reliable source, especially over a span
> of 70 years, and IMO always needs to be corroborated.

I'll buy that. But can you come up with an instance
where I have used my "memory" as a sole source? I
have tried not to do that.

> Your sources seem to me to be drawn consistently from
> a small number of favorites,some of them questionable.

Whom among us does not use sources which we believe
will support our position? As for the questionable part,
could that be perhaps, that anyone with whom you do
not agree, is, in your mind, questionable? If you can
honestly say "no" to that, I'd appreciate learning from you
which of my "small number"of sources you do not believe
to be credible?
P.S. I believe you sell me short. Over
the years I have acquired and have used a lot more
than just a "small number" of sources.

>You have sourced material, but reluctantly and sometimes
> only when asked to do so, as in this case..

I am not reluctant to provide a source when I think it needed,
and appropriate in the context of the material. In matters
which are, or should be, common knowledge to anyone
posting in this group, I may not have thought it necessary
to supply one unless asked.

WJH

[Don Kirkman]

On Fri, 07 Oct 2011 09:07:00 -0400, "wjho...@aol.com"
<wjho...@aol.com> wrote:

>On Oct 6, 2:55 pm, Rich Rostrom wrote:
>> wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:
>> Only those Japanese-Americans living in
>> western states were interned - and all of
>> them were.

>But not those living elsewhere. Doesn't
>that blow away your theory that "racism" was
>the sole cause of the evacuation/internment?

It's more than a theory. I did a study of media and academic writings
covering the Japanese of California from the 1890s up to the war--back
*before* much of the literature mentioned in this group existed. My
material was in draft before Bosworth (1967), Toland (1982), Personal
Justice Denied (1982), Lowman (Testimony 1984, book after 1999), the
movement for redress, and the Supreme Court cases, and was final in
early 1968.

Labor unions, politicians, educators, publishers of the major
California newspapers, the American Legion, and farm associations all
kept up a steady drumbeat of anti-Japanese activity and publicity.

Some examples:
- Anti-Asian land laws
- University professors (e.g., Stanford, Edward A. Rose, 1907, argued
that Japanese were unassimilable, their low wages would undermine
labor standards, they had a low standard of living, and they lacked
"proper political feeling for American democratic institutions."
- Denial of right to citizenship, based on a Supreme Court case
- Accusations of immorality and pimping the "picture brides" who were
coming to join their husbands--married under Japanese law before
coming to the US
- Accusations of leasing land under power lines to provide access when
war came
- Accusations of spying by the Japanese fishing fleets
- Claims that kibei (Japanese-educated US citizens) were trained for
and loyal to the empire
- Required to attend a San Francisco "Oriental" school following the
1906 SF earthquake, entangled with the picture bride controversy,
which forced Theodore Roosevelt to intervene to avoid a direct
confrontation with Japan
- Claims that Japanese banks hired Chinese accountants because the
Japanese were untrustworthy
- The earliest clear evidence, aside from the carryover from the 1882
Chinese Exclusion Laws, seems to have been an 1896 accusation of
lewdness (skibby - sukebei)

I don't know how Mr. Hopwood defines over forty years of this
anti-Japanese agitation, but it fits my definition of racism. And it
was clearly among the factors leading directly to the relocation
orders.
--
Don Kirkman
don...@charter.net

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Oct 9, 10:24 am, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:

> > Your sources seem to me to be drawn consistently from
> > a small number of favorites,some of them questionable.

> Whom among us does not use sources which we believe
> will support our position? As for the questionable part,

Most would not put forth as references works from an individual who
publically claims illegal immigrants are here to take back the US
southwest at the behest of the Mexican government, or who may have
conducted an interview by seance.

Mike

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 9, 3:17 pm, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:
> On Fri, 07 Oct 2011 09:07:00 -0400, "wjhopw...@aol.com"

>
> <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> >On Oct 6, 2:55 pm, Rich Rostrom wrote:
> >> wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:
> >> Only those Japanese-Americans living in
> >> western states were interned - and all of
> >> them were.
> >But not those living elsewhere. Doesn't
> >that blow away your theory that "racism" was
> >the sole cause of the evacuation/internment?
>

> It's more than a theory....

I believe my point there was clear, i.e., that IF the PJAs
were picked up Just because of their race, why didn't the
government pick up all of them?
Why let those living outside of the
military areas alone? Obviously the relocation of only
those in military zones was for military reasons.
The fact that 7 decades later some people, with, as
the SC said in Korematsu, "the calm perspective of
hindsight," now believe that there was not sufficient
military necessity for the relocation, is not relevant.
Those who had the responsibility for security at the
time thought there was a necessity.

> I did a study of media and academic writings

> covering the Japanese of California from the 1890s up to the war.....

> Labor unions, politicians, educators, publishers of the major
> California newspapers, the American Legion, and farm associations all
> kept up a steady drumbeat of anti-Japanese activity and publicity.

The argument here is not that racism didn't exist but that
racism was not the reason for the relocation of the PJAs.
There had been a lot of racism directed against the Chinese
for decades. The Chinese weren't relocated. Neither were
the Filipinos, and as pointed out above, neither were the
Japanese who lived elsewhere than in the military areas.
Again--we were at war with Japan, not with China, not
with the Philippines, not with the Oriental race.

(Considerable material deleted for brevity)

> I don't know how Mr. Hopwood defines over forty years of this
> anti-Japanese agitation, but it fits my definition of racism.

>.And it was clearly among the factors leading directly to the
> relocation orders.

Racism no doubt existed, We have no argument there.
But you have not, and apparently cannot, give a
reasonable justification for your opinion that racism was
"among the factors" leading to the relocation.
I have yet to see you or anyone else explain that,
if PJAs were relocated because of their race, why, then were
only some of the PJAs relocated but not ALL of them relocated?
Or why persons of other nationalities but of the same race
NOT relocated?

WJH

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Oct 9, 3:17 pm, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:
> > On Fri, 07 Oct 2011 09:07:00 -0400, "wjhopw...@aol.com"
> >
> > <wjhopw...@aol.com> wrote:
> > >On Oct 6, 2:55 pm, Rich Rostrom wrote:
> > >> wjhopw...@aol.com wrote:
> > >> Only those Japanese-Americans living in
> > >> western states were interned - and all of
> > >> them were.

> > >But not those living elsewhere. Doesn't
> > >that blow away your theory that "racism" was
> > >the sole cause of the evacuation/internment?

Kinda supports it, since the East Coast was a war zone.

> > It's more than a theory....

> I believe my point there was clear, i.e., that IF the PJAs
> were picked up Just because of their race, why didn't the
> government pick up all of them?

Because DeWitt was only in control of the West Coast.

Not rocket science here.

> Why let those living outside of the
> military areas alone?

They didn't; your "long memory" notwithstanding, the entire West Coast
was not a military area.

Mike

[Don Kirkman]

On Sun, 09 Oct 2011 21:15:23 -0400, "wjho...@aol.com"
<wjho...@aol.com> wrote:

>On Oct 9, 3:17 pm, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:
>> On Fri, 07 Oct 2011 09:07:00 -0400, "wjhopw...@aol.com"

>> It's more than a theory....

>I believe my point there was clear, i.e., that IF the PJAs
>were picked up Just because of their race, why didn't the
>government pick up all of them?
> Why let those living outside of the
>military areas alone? Obviously the relocation of only
>those in military zones was for military reasons.

No more "obviously" than that racism was a strong political and
economic motivator in California during those years. I did not say it
was *only* racism, but you can't plausibly deny that it was involved.

>The fact that 7 decades later some people, with, as
>the SC said in Korematsu, "the calm perspective of
>hindsight," now believe that there was not sufficient
>military necessity for the relocation, is not relevant.
>Those who had the responsibility for security at the
>time thought there was a necessity.

But it did not take 7 decades for that decision to be criticized. It
was already being questioned before the war ended, and the whole
experience was critically examined in the studies done at Berkeley
[Jacobus ten Broek, et. al], and of course it was also in the courts
by 1945-46.

> The argument here is not that racism didn't exist but that
>racism was not the reason for the relocation of the PJAs.

Racism was the mindset of a large part of the power structure of
California between 1900 and 1941. Both state officials and
congressmen argued vigorously that the Japanese should be removed, and
many of the popular stereotypes were used to bolster their cases.

It's also hard to provide a non-racist parsing of "A Jap is always a
Jap."

>There had been a lot of racism directed against the Chinese
>for decades. The Chinese weren't relocated.

You may remember that by 1942 the Chinese were on our side, having
been invaded by the Japanese. Flyers were distributed to help the
citizenry distinguish between Chinese and Japanese, totally useless
stereotypical material for both groups.

> Neither were the Filipinos,

. . . who had already been promised US citizenship before the war
delayed it.

> and as pointed out above, neither were the
>Japanese who lived elsewhere than in the military areas.

And thus were far from the major Japanese American populations and
from the political forces trying to expel them.

>Again--we were at war with Japan, not with China, not
>with the Philippines, not with the Oriental race.

Rather ingenuous to raise that, since as I said above, both Chinese
and Filipinos were on our side even before the start of the war.

>(Considerable material deleted for brevity)
>
>> I don't know how Mr. Hopwood defines over forty years of this
>> anti-Japanese agitation, but it fits my definition of racism.
>>.And it was clearly among the factors leading directly to the
>> relocation orders.
>
>Racism no doubt existed, We have no argument there.
> But you have not, and apparently cannot, give a
>reasonable justification for your opinion that racism was
>"among the factors" leading to the relocation.

> I have yet to see you or anyone else explain that,
>if PJAs were relocated because of their race, why, then were
>only some of the PJAs relocated but not ALL of them relocated?

I have answered that a few lines above, and others have answered in
past discussions.

>Or why persons of other nationalities but of the same race
>NOT relocated?

Asked and answered. But in fact some were. South American Nikkei
were even brought to the US to be transferred to Japan.
--
Don Kirkman
don...@charter.net

[Don Kirkman]

On Mon, 10 Oct 2011 09:18:08 -0400, Don Kirkman <don...@charter.net>
wrote:

>> Neither were the Filipinos,
>
>. . . who had already been promised US citizenship before the war
>delayed it.

I wrote too fast and too late at night. What was promised was
Philippine independence, not citizenship. Pending that, the
Philippines was a commonwealth under US control from 1935. Article
XVIII of the constitution of the Commonwealth defines the
relationship of Filipinos to the United States:

"SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing
Constitution, pending the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines--

" (1) All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the
United States ."

Among other things, Filipinos were serving in the US Navy in
considerable numbers, as well as working in agriculture in the western
US. It's hard to see why they should have been considered for
exclusion.
--
Don Kirkman
don...@charter.net

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 10, 9:18 am, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:
> On Sun, 09 Oct 2011 21:15:23 -0400, "wjhopw...@aol.com"
> .
> >...... IF the PJAs were picked up Just because of their race,

> > why didn't the government pick up all of them?
> > Why let those living outside of the military areas alone?
> > Obviously the relocation of only those in military zones
> > was for military reasons.
>
> No more "obviously" than that racism was a strong political
> and economic motivator in California during those years.

Granted. However, IIRC that political and economic motivator
was no less strong vis-a-vis feelings toward the Chinese
community but they were let alone.

> I did not say it was *only* racism,

Good. We're beginning to make a little progress here.

>but you can't plausibly deny that it was involved.

I think I can. The decision to evacuate was made not
by those "racist" Californians but far away in Washington
by several members of the so-called "eastern establishment"
one of whom, John J. McCloy the Assistant SecWar had
this to say in his testimony before the Congressional
Subcommittee of the Judiciary on June 21, 1984:
"We have now heard from the "revisionists"
and those who would have us believe that it was
racial prejudice which induced the President's action
to institute the relocation process....this grotesque
charge that it was race prejudice and not realistic
security precautions which induced President Roosevelt's
order...His decision was supported and endorsed by his
security advisors....
"It was a fact that the (PH) attack was supplemented
by information giving... clear knowledge of subversive
Japanese agencies...not only admitted by the Japanese
Government...but actually boasted of it in their communications
...through MAGIC ...the KNOWLEDGE OBTAINED BY MAGIC
MORE THAN SUPPLIED ALL THE INFORMATION NEEDED
TO JUSTIFY FULLY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELTS' ACTION"
[Emphasis mine--WJH]

> >The fact that 7 decades later some people..., now believe

> >that there was not sufficient military necessity for the relocation,
> > is not relevant.
> >Those who had the responsibility for security at the
> >time thought there was a necessity.

> But it did not take 7 decades for that decision to be criticized. It
> was already being questioned before the war ended, and the whole
> experience was critically examined in the studies done at Berkeley
> [Jacobus ten Broek, et. al], and of course it was also in the courts
> by 1945-46.

So what? Everything every President does is criticized, Then
and now, in war or peace. And none of the above critics you
list had the Classified information available to those who made
the decision. The Courts in 1945-6, nor ten Broek in the 1950s.
and 60s when the original and subsequent issues of his
book were published. The MAGIC intercepts along with much
other WWII classified information was not de-classified until the
early 1970s.

> > The argument here is not that racism didn't exist but that
> >racism was not the reason for the relocation of the PJAs.

> >There had been a lot of racism directed against the Chinese
> >for decades. The Chinese weren't relocated.
>
> You may remember that by 1942 the Chinese were on our side, having
> been invaded by the Japanese.

You are proving my point. It was for reasons of military security
unrelated to race which formed the basis for evacuation of the
Japanese.

> >Again--we were at war with Japan, not with China, not
> >with the Philippines, not with the Oriental race.
>
> Rather ingenuous to raise that, since as I said above, both Chinese
> and Filipinos were on our side even before the start of the war.

And again, substantiating the fact that although there was a history
or racial prejudice directed against not only the Japanese but also
against other nationalities of the same race, only the Japanese
were selected for relocation. Why? For reasons of WAR--not race
>
> >...why (were) persons of other nationalities but of the same race
> >NOT relocated?
>

> But in fact some were. South American Nikkei
> were even brought to the US to be transferred to Japan.

That would be the approx 2000 Japanese *nationals*, almost all
from Peru but not Peruvian citizens. Approx 500 had already
requested repatriation to Japan at the Spanish embassy in Lima.
Under the terms of the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Hemispheric Defense
Treaty (of which over a dozen Latin American countries as well as
the U.S. were parties), any Axis nationals residing in those Latin
American countries who were considered to be security risks
were to be interned. The agreement provided for those countries
which did not have the means for their detention and repatriation
to send those interned to the United States, and the U.S. was
obliged under the treaty to accept them. [See "Personal Justice
Denied," See also "The Yearbook of German-American Studies,
Vol.32 1997 article by Stephen Fox "The Deportation of Latin
American Germans----". Sources provided without reluctance.

WJH

[wjho...@aol.com]

On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:

> On Mon, 10 Oct 2011 09:18:08 -0400, Don Kirkman wrote:
>
> >> Neither were the Filipinos,
>
> >. . . who had already been promised US citizenship before
> > the war delayed it.
>
> I wrote too fast and too late at night.

Could happen to anybody.

> What was promised was
> Philippine independence, not citizenship....

> Among other things, Filipinos were serving in the US Navy in
> considerable numbers, as well as working in agriculture in the
> western US. It's hard to see why they should have been
> considered for exclusion.

You are right. But you still help to make my point
that it was the WAR, not racism, which was the
cause of the evacuation.
I think we agree that there was pe-war racial
prejudice against not only the Japanese but also
others of the same race but different nationalities.
But it was the war which changed everything.
Statistics show that about two-thirds of the adult
PJAs in the exclusion zones were enemy aliens.
The Chinese and Filipinos, no matter how
prejudiced the feelings against them, were allies.,

The 1944 Supreme Court decision in Korematsu
summed the situation up well:
"There was evidence of disloyalty on the part
of some, the military authorities considered that the
need for action was great, and time was short--We
cannpt--by availing ourselves of the calm perspective
of hindsight---now say that at the time these actions
were unjustified."

WJH

[mtfe...@netmapsonscape.net]

wjho...@aol.com <wjho...@aol.com> wrote:
> On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, Don Kirkman <dons...@charter.net> wrote:
> > On Mon, 10 Oct 2011 09:18:08 -0400, Don Kirkman wrote:
> >
> > >> Neither were the Filipinos,

> > What was promised was

> > Philippine independence, not citizenship....
> > Among other things, Filipinos were serving in the US Navy in
> > considerable numbers, as well as working in agriculture in the
> > western US. It's hard to see why they should have been
> > considered for exclusion.

> You are right. But you still help to make my point

He is. And yet Japanese-Americans were discharged from the military.

> that it was the WAR, not racism, which was the
> cause of the evacuation.

Sorry, but clearly you do not understand the concept of "race".

> I think we agree that there was pe-war racial
> prejudice against not only the Japanese but also
> others of the same race but different nationalities.

And it was agreed that "at the time" people spoke of "race" much
as we speak of ethnicity now.

> But it was the war which changed everything.

If you mean "it changed the US attitude towards its own citizens
depending on race", then you are correct.

This, however, is racism.

Mike