d-day plan b
cpmac
answer to no avail. Was there a plan B if d-day had failed?
ThePro
> I've read many books on d-day and have searched this forum for the
> answer to no avail. Was there a plan B if d-day had failed?
This hand written note was supposedly found by Ike's aide weeks after
the landing. It meant to be his speech if the landings had failed:
"Our landings have failed and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision
to attack at this time and place was based on the best information
available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery could
do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone."
Pierrot Robert
Chicoutimi, Canada
Musicman59
In regards to a Plan B, would there have been another attempt on the
coast of France, or would the Allies just push up to the continent
through Italy?
Craig
Rich Rostrom
>
> In regards to a Plan B, would there have been another attempt on the
> coast of France, or would the Allies just push up to the continent
> through Italy?
It would not have been a deliberately
chosen alternative, but:
After D-Day, several veteran divisions
were withdrawn from combat in Italy,
and designated for Operation DRAGOON,
the amphibious invasion of southern
France. These units included the U.S.
45th Division and the French Expeditionary
Corps. The latter especially wanted to
be transferred to participate in the
liberation of their homeland.
The withdrawn units were replaced by
other divisions, mostly "green" troops.
While there was no outright halt in
operations in Italy, the Allied advance
north from Rome was naturally disrupted
and the lull allowed the retreating
Germans to regroup along the "Gothic
Line" at the northern end of the "boot"
of Italy. The dug-in Germans thus were
able to hold off Allied thrusts in late
1944 and prevent a breakout into the
Po Valley.
If D-Day had failed, DRAGOON would
have been cancelled. The Allied drive
in Italy would have been carried on
at full effort. Though it is probable
that the Germans, without the Normandy
campaign to fight, would have reinforced
their Italian army, it seems likely that
the Allies could have pressed ahead much
faster, taken the Gothic Line "in stride",
and pressed the Germans back to the Alps.
Michele
news:96fac527-7d80-4204...@l13g2000yqb.googlegroups.com...
>
> If D-Day had failed, DRAGOON would
> have been cancelled.
I would like to know if that is from factual information or your own
assessment.
The Allied drive
> in Italy would have been carried on
> at full effort. Though it is probable
> that the Germans, without the Normandy
> campaign to fight, would have reinforced
> their Italian army, it seems likely that
> the Allies could have pressed ahead much
> faster, taken the Gothic Line "in stride",
> and pressed the Germans back to the Alps.
>
That is possible. It still means that by the end of 1944, the Western Allies
have an immensely worse toehold in Europe. In the spring of 1945, they have
the Alps to cross and another landing to make (Trying to work only through
the Alps wouldn't be a good idea), instead of the comparatively easier
endgame of actual history.
One also wonders whether the Soviets, by the summer of 1945, won't demand a
re-negotiation of the agreements.
GFH
> I've read many books on d-day and have searched this forum for the
> answer to no avail. Was there a plan B if d-day had failed?
I would suggest that "plan B" was a basic part of plan A. Five
beaches;
five virtually independent landings. Surely not all could be
failures. In
the event, only Omaha Beach came close to failure. And even there, a
withdrawal attempt would have cost more lives than pressing on, which
is what was done.
GFH
pbrom...@aol.com
> Rich Rostrom wrote:
> > in Italy would have been carried on
> > at full effort. Though it is probable
> > that the Germans, without the Normandy
> > campaign to fight, would have reinforced
> > their Italian army, it seems likely that
> > the Allies could have pressed ahead much
> > faster, taken the Gothic Line "in stride",
> > and pressed the Germans back to the Alps.
>
> That is possible. It still means that by the end of 1944, the Western Allies
> have an immensely worse toehold in Europe. In the spring of 1945, they have
> the Alps to cross and another landing to make (Trying to work only through
> the Alps wouldn't be a good idea), instead of the comparatively easier
> endgame of actual history.
Anyone who thinks the allies would push into Germany from italy should
go to maps.google.com, zoom in on the border area of Austria, Germany,
Italy and Slovenia and click on "terrain". Get a good look and then
zoom out to see the rest of Europe.
It ain't gonna happen.
Rich Rostrom
> "Rich Rostrom" <rrostrom.21stcent...@rcn.com> ha scritto:
>
>
> > If D-Day had failed, DRAGOON would
> > have been cancelled.
>
> I would like to know if that is from factual information or your own
> assessment.
My own assessment: but _everything_
I have read describes DRAGOON as
subordinate part of OVERLORD; if
NEPTUNE fails, there is no point to
DRAGOON. Furthermore, Churchill had
been strongly opposed to DRAGOON,
even as late as August 1944, when he
argued that the success of NEPTUNE
made DRAGOON unnecessary.
See _Crusade in Europe_, pp 281-284.
"Our new situation brought up one of
the longest-sustained arguments that
I had with Prime Minister Churchill
throughout the period of the war. The
argument, beginning coincidentally
with the break-through in late July,
lasted throughout the first ten days
of August. One session lasted several
hours."
One of Eisenhower's (and Montgomery's,
BTW) strongest reasons for going ahead
with DRAGOON was to capture Marseille,
which he thought would be required to
bring the additional troops and supplies
required by the OVERLORD campaign. If
OVERLORD has failed, there is no
requirement.
Another point was that while Churchill
suggested that the DRAGOON force would be
bogged down for weeks breaking through the
German coastal defenses, Eisenhower was
confident that the Germans had reduced
their forces in the area to a minimum, and
that resistance would collapse quickly.
He was right.
But if there was no on-going battle of
Normandy, then the Germans would not draw
forces from southern France, they would
reinforce southern France, and dispatch
large reserves to counter an invasion,
making a second defeat probable.
The terrain is also unfavorable: the
DRAGOON landings were on the coast west
of Cannes, with mountains just inland.
The geography is difficult too. In place
of the vast resources of Britain, dozens
of air bases and several large ports,
only 150 km away, the invasion would be
based entirely on Corsica, over 200 km
away.
In short, it seems highly unpractical
to go ahead with DRAGOON after NEPTUNE
fails, and I am pretty sure that if Ike
thought about it, he saw it that way too.
> > the Allies could have pressed ahead much
> > faster, taken the Gothic Line "in stride",
> > and pressed the Germans back to the Alps.
>
> That is possible. It still means that by the end of 1944, the Western Allies
> have an immensely worse toehold in Europe.
Their position is much worse, but they would
IMHO make up for the failure in France with
other operations. Clearing Italy, as noted,
and very probably a modest amphibious attack
into the Balkans, against Corfu or Albania.
Also, the forces massed in Britain could not
easily be transferred elsewhere. It would
take some months to rebuild the airborne
forces and replace the losses of landing
craft and other specialized materiel. But
by September the Allies could launch a
second cross-Channel assault. If as suggested
they have cleared Italy and invaded the
Balkans, and the Soviets have smashed
Army Group Center and invaded Romania, then
the Atlantic defenses will be neglected, and
the second attack probably gets ashore and
stays. This gives the Western Allies three
months to push into France. So at the end
of 1944, the Western Allies would not be
on the western border of Germany, but would
be at the Alps, in the Balkans, and well
into France. Substantially worse than the
historical position, but not I think
_immensely_ worse.
> One also wonders whether the Soviets, by the summer of 1945, won't demand a
> re-negotiation of the agreements.
Which agreements? I would note that if
NEPTUNE fails, then a lot of the German
forces consumed in the Battle of Normandy
or used to hold the western front would
instead be in the east, diminishing Soviet
progress.
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
<4ad83646$0$828$4faf...@reader5.news.ti
n.it>,
"Michele" <don'tspamm...@tln.it>
wrote:
I think the obvious Plan B has been
overlooked. Continue strategic bombing
reducing Germany even further. At some
point civil chaos occurs, which could
actually be stimulated by bombing
civilian centers with food packages.
And then start dropping A-Bombs as they
become available
Bay Man
news:atlas-bugged-B370...@aries.ka.weretis.net...
>
> I think the obvious Plan B has been
> overlooked. Continue strategic bombing
> reducing Germany even further. At some
> point civil chaos occurs, which could
> actually be stimulated by bombing
> civilian centers with food packages.
>
> And then start dropping A-Bombs as they
> become available
The most probable outcome indeed. The RAF & USAAF could the reduce a German
city to rubble each week. They would have had no option but to surrender.
Bomber Harris' campaign was curtailed by resources diverted to the Normandy
invasion. Bombing beach, etc. Given back and the air assault upped The end
of the war may have been in April 1945 anyhow.
David H Thornley
>
> If D-Day had failed, DRAGOON would
> have been cancelled. The Allied drive
> in Italy would have been carried on
> at full effort.
Through really lousy terrain, against reinforced
Germans, and with Clark and Leese as the army
commanders. I don't have much hope for it.
Though it is probable
> that the Germans, without the Normandy
> campaign to fight, would have reinforced
> their Italian army, it seems likely that
> the Allies could have pressed ahead much
> faster, taken the Gothic Line "in stride",
> and pressed the Germans back to the Alps.
>
Possibly, although I doubt it. In any case,
Italy and the Balkans were dead ends. From there,
the lines of communication were bad, and so was
the terrain.
A German victory against the Normandy invasions,
along with the Soviet offensive following shortly,
would have reduced the number of troops in France
to the point that a more hasty invasion might have
worked. Indeed, Dragoon might well have worked
under the circumstances. Concentrating on another
attack in France might have been the best bet
for the West.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
Alan
> I would suggest that "plan B" was a basic part of plan A. Five
> beaches;
> five virtually independent landings. Surely not all could be
> failures. In
> the event, only Omaha Beach came close to failure. And even there, a
> withdrawal attempt would have cost more lives than pressing on, which
> is what was done.
>
> GFH
I agree. I think the only beach that was essential was Utah. Clearly
the planners put the most emphasis on this beech. Both US airborne
divisions were landed behind it. I think the landing would have been
considered a success with the capture of Cherbourg. Even bottled up in
the Cotentin peninsula, the Allies would have been in a position to
make subsidiary landings in place(s) like Quiberon Bay*. The BIG
problem would have been the loss of the planned beeches for the
Mulberries, perhaps one or both could have been set up on the beeches
around St Vaast.
Put Patton ashore somewhere in Britanny, there would have been very
little to oppose him with the Germans occupied containing Montgomery &
Bradley and waiting idly around Calais. You can be sure Patton
wouldn't have waited around for the Germans to bring up reserves to
contain him like Lucas did.
*Initially a large port had been planned for Quiberon Bay, codenamed
CHASTITY.
Alan
Dave
nuclear weapons into the mix.
David H Thornley
> A three or four month delay in the fall of Germany could have brought
> nuclear weapons into the mix.
>
It probably wouldn't have seriously affected the ending lines, either.
Germany was not an amorphous defensive mass, through which Allied
offensive forces would advance proportional to their strength. Hitler
could and did move forces around to counter the worst threats, resulting
in Germany being overrun from both sides, despite the greater Soviet
strength and Western mobility.
The postwar demarcation line might have been changed, but it was set
as west as it was partly due to the Ardennes offensive. If the Germans
had managed to endanger the Red Army for the Yalta conference, and
Roosevelt had been healthy, the line might have been farther east.
It's interesting speculation, but it isn't obvious to me that the
historical result wouldn't have happened, likely a few months
later, and perhaps with some German cities nuked.
cpmac
> A three or four month delay in the fall of Germany could have brought
> nuclear weapons into the mix.
Some interesting replies to my original posting.
But a precis of the replies could be summed up as "there was no plan
B" or no body here knows of it.
I don't think just one beach being succesfull could have led to an
overall success. The allies had a difficult enough job of pushing back
the germans with complete air superiority and continued supplies
through Arromanches and the other four beaches.
( an interesting book on the german effort is 'they're coming' by Paul
Carel. His real name was different and he was an SS officer, but it's
still a very interesting read)
Many now believe that if d-day hadn't taken place or had failed, the
Russians would have continued their push across Europe and the whole
of Europe would have been communist. Would it still have taken 50
years to go bankrupt.
I can't see the allies nuking western Europe to stop them.
Don Phillipson
news:e3d05ffe-a68a-4fb2...@e8g2000yqo.googlegroups.com...
> I think the only beach that was essential was Utah. Clearly
> the planners put the most emphasis on this beech. Both US airborne
> divisions were landed behind it. I think the landing would have been
> considered a success with the capture of Cherbourg.
We should not allow two contrafactuals in the same speculation,
because it gets people muddled: (here #1 = failure of other beach
landings, #2 = capture of the port of Cherbourg.) AN seems to have
overlooked the importance of supply (landing more troops,
ammunition, food and fuel) which D-Day planners thought so
urgent that they designed two "portable" harbours for the purpose.
They lasted only two weeks before catastrophic weather damage,
but failure of the Mulberry harbours in those early weeks would
have fatally weakened the invasion.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Alan
> AN seems to have
> overlooked the importance of supply (landing more troops,
> ammunition, food and fuel) which D-Day planners thought so
> urgent that they designed two "portable" harbours for the purpose.
> They lasted only two weeks before catastrophic weather damage,
> but failure of the Mulberry harbours in those early weeks would
> have fatally weakened the invasion.
DP,
You didn't read the entire entry, as I already said, "The BIG
problem would have been the loss of the planned beeches for the
Mulberries, perhaps one or both could have been set up on the beeches
around St Vaast."
Alan
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
<a26a057e-c21a-4d95-aa0e-701111f5a257@k3
3g2000yqa.googlegroups.com>,
cpmac <webm...@cpmac.com> wrote:
It would have happened sooner. The
Russians would have been incapable of
effectively managing/optimizing all of
Europe. No European country would have
prospered, I imagine that rebuilding the
various cities would have been pretty
low on the list of priorities and the
Allies would have ramped up the Cold War
Alan
> Some interesting replies to my original posting.
> But a precis of the replies could be summed up as "there was no plan
> B" or no body here knows of it.
Considering the huge amount of preparation that had gone into D-Day,
perhaps a better question would be, "What was the least the Allies
would have considered a success?"
------
A "Plan B" would require knowledge of the situation after a failed D-
Day. Did it fail in part or in full? If in full, the Allies wouldn't
have been able to mount another try for some time.*
If in part, with the planning that occurred over the prior two and a
half years, nearly every beech and port on the Atlantic and Channel
coasts of France was considered, they had enough information for later
alternatives. However, as you, Don & I all pointed out, the disruption
of the logistical plan would have been the BIG problem, would it have
been flexible enough?
Would the beeches south of St Vaast have been enough to support a
bridgehead on the Cotentin? In the event, the Allies did move more
than 100,000 tons over those beeches before the weather closed them
down.* Could they have supported more? Would there have been enough
landing craft to mount another landing while also supporting the
Cotentin bridgehead?
Alan
*US Army in WWII - ETO - Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol I
cpmac
They lasted only two weeks before catastrophic weather damage,
but failure of the Mulberry harbours in those early weeks would
have fatally weakened the invasion."
The Omaha mullbery didn't last at all. It was destoyed by a storm on the
19th just as it was completed. The Mullbery B at Arromanches was
repaired in a few day and was used up till November when it phased out
as many ports further east had come into use.
--
Audio Tour Guide d day Normandy. Self Guiding.
http://normandy-tour-guide.cpmac.com.audio-guide.php3
Driver guide Normandy
David H Thornley
>
> The Omaha mullbery didn't last at all. It was destoyed by a storm on the
> 19th just as it was completed. The Mullbery B at Arromanches was
> repaired in a few day and was used up till November when it phased out
> as many ports further east had come into use.
>
on the beaches. Presumably they could have improvised something on
any beach suitable for landing that wasn't too far from Britain.
Alan
LSTs were discharging over the beeches the entire time, usually
"drying out", that is being stranded at low tide. They even went so
far as to strand cargo ships and unload directly to trucks instead of
lightering supplies ashore, in some cases cutting holes in the side of
the ships in order to facilitate unloading.
The abandonment of the beeches in November was also due to the
weather.
Alan
Joe Osman
> answer to no avail. Was there a plan B if d-day had failed?
There was a plan A.5 called Operation Swordhilt to be used in case of
partial failure or specific German defenses.
Here's a quote from "Campaign 100: D-Day 1944 (1) Omaha Beach
by Authors: Howard Gerrard , Ramiro Bujeiro , Steven J. Zaloga
Released: July, 2003 Osprey Books ISBN: 1841763675
"in fact, the US Army had shipped over 300 amtracs to Europe in 1944,
but
the lack of demand for their use in the Overlord plan meant that they
were
reserved for Operation Swordhilt, a contingency operation in which
Patton's
uncommitted Third Army was intended to reinforce Overlord in the event
of
failure at one of the beaches."
This is from United States Army in World War II- European Theater
of Operations-The Supreme Command CHAPTER XI-The Breakout and Pursuit
to the Seine by Forrest C. Pogue (http://tinyurl.com/6n3vy)
"As an alternative, in case the enemy stripped the area south of Caen
and tried to set up a line from Caen to Avranches south of Vire,
Montgomery was to thrust forward in the lower Seine Valley. Operation
SWORDHILT, a combined amphibious-airborne operation to seize the area
east of Brest, was also to be launched."
Joe
Geoffrey Sinclair
> LSTs were discharging over the beeches the entire time, usually
> "drying out", that is being stranded at low tide.
Actually no. The first LSTs were dried out on 8 June, during the
pre invasion planning the navies had opposed the idea, for the
possible hull damage and the vulnerability of the stranded ships.
The chaos as the planned unloading system was found to be
too cumbersome meant something had to be tried, already by
8 June there was a backlog of shipping awaiting unloading.
The system was failing to forward manifests and even ship
names in a timely manner to the supply people in Normandy.
On 10th June LCTs and LSTs began to be unloaded in arrival order,
on 11th June this was extended to all ships. On 12th June blackout
restrictions were eased and by 15th June the shipping backlog had
been cleared.
On 12th June the confusion on the English side of the channel,
caused by the slow return of ships reached its height. The
situation is not helped by units failing to strip out items to be
sent as cargo, instead taking all the equipment into the
marshalling areas. Units are shipped in whatever shipping
is available and not in the planned order.
> They even went so
> far as to strand cargo ships and unload directly to trucks instead of
> lightering supplies ashore, in some cases cutting holes in the side of
> the ships in order to facilitate unloading.
Which reference claims holes were cut and for what cargo?
Is this the MTV conversion to ship vehicles across the channel?
> The abandonment of the beeches in November was also due to the
> weather.
The pre invasion planning assumed the Mulberries and associated
beach unloading would be abandoned during the Autumn. As it
turned out the system worked better than expected and the time
to bring captured ports into service was longer than expected.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Geoffrey Sinclair
news:cb6f00ea-29a0-473d...@a7g2000yqo.googlegroups.com...
> I've read many books on d-day and have searched this forum for the
> answer to no avail. Was there a plan B if d-day had failed?
Assuming failed means total defeat of the invaders.
No plan B as such, Italy remained an option, the invasion of
Southern France another one. There was no plan B for another
invasion on the French Atlantic Coast in anything other than an
outline form. Similar for say attacking Norway.
Think of the various where to invade studies that were carried out,
which covered the area from North Cape to the Spanish border.
What happened next would really depend on why the Normandy
invasion had failed.
If failure means say the defeat at one or more of the beaches there
were some plans to hit beaches nearby.
Alan
wrote:
> "Alan" <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote in message
> > LSTs were discharging over the beeches the entire time, usually
> > "drying out", that is being stranded at low tide.
>
> Actually no.
For the period that Mr. Thornley's post was discussing, actually yes.
My fault, I assumed since I was replying directly to that post,
everyone would realize when I was talking about.
> > They even went so
> > far as to strand cargo ships and unload directly to trucks instead of
> > lightering supplies ashore, in some cases cutting holes in the side of
> > the ships in order to facilitate unloading.
>
> Which reference claims holes were cut and for what cargo?
US Army in WWII - ETO - Logistical Support of the Armies - Vol II
>
> Is this the MTV conversion to ship vehicles across the channel?
>
Didn't specify.
> > The abandonment of the beeches in November was also due to the
> > weather.
>
I should have said "mainly due to the weather". The same source as
above chronicles the continuing and escalating effect of bad weather
on beach operations until finally on 11/13 Utah shut down and then on
11/19 Omaha shut down.
Alan
cpmac
> On Oct 15, 10:18 am, cpmac <webmas...@cpmac.com> wrote:
>> I've read many books on d-day and have searched this forum for the
>> answer to no avail. Was there a plan B if d-day had failed?
>
> There was a plan A.5 called Operation Swordhilt to be used in case of
> partial failure or specific German defenses.
I'd never heard of operation Swordhilt.
I found the following at
http://www.britannica.com/dday/article-9400222
12. Alternative Plan.
It may develop that the First U.S. Army, after having cut off the
BRITANNY PENINSULA, will, with a part of the Third Army, be contained
and be unable to secure either BREST or the QUIBERON BAY area without
undue delay. If maintenance of additional troops through ports and
beaches already secured is impossible, one or more additional major
ports will have to be taken to permit further development of the
lodgement area. A plan to expedite this phase of the operations is being
considered under the code name of SWORDHILT. Further instructions on
this subject will be issued. . . .
This seems to imply that the plan was in case of "difficulty in
supplying beaches allready secured" rather than an intitial failure of
d-day.
Michele
> On Oct 16, 9:55 am, "Michele" <don'tspammeat...@tln.it> wrote:
>> "Rich Rostrom" <rrostrom.21stcent...@rcn.com> ha scritto:
>>
>>
>> > If D-Day had failed, DRAGOON would
>> > have been cancelled.
>>
>> I would like to know if that is from factual information or your own
>> assessment.
>
> My own assessment: but _everything_
> I have read describes DRAGOON as
> subordinate part of OVERLORD; if
> NEPTUNE fails, there is no point to
> DRAGOON.
Thanks for the explanations.
> In short, it seems highly unpractical
> to go ahead with DRAGOON after NEPTUNE
> fails, and I am pretty sure that if Ike
> thought about it, he saw it that way too.
I wonder, however, how much strenght the German would have expended in
having Neptune fail. If they had succeeded Rommel's way, right there on the
beaches, it would be one thing. Otherwise, the Germans might have been
exhausted by their own victory.
>
>> One also wonders whether the Soviets, by the summer of 1945, won't demand
>> a
>> re-negotiation of the agreements.
>
> Which agreements? I would note that if
> NEPTUNE fails, then a lot of the German
> forces consumed in the Battle of Normandy
> or used to hold the western front would
> instead be in the east, diminishing Soviet
> progress.
>
Right. I did not say the Soviets would be better off. The very fact that
they are _still_ bearing most of the brunt might mean they become more
demanding.
Michele
messaggio news:atlas-bugged-B370...@aries.ka.weretis.net...
>
> I think the obvious Plan B has been
> overlooked. Continue strategic bombing
> reducing Germany even further. At some
> point civil chaos occurs,
Since this did not happen historically, while the enemy was already entering
German territory, I doubt it would with the enemy more or les sheld at bay.
which could
> actually be stimulated by bombing
> civilian centers with food packages.
>
Could you elaborate on this?
Note that if there is no advance into France, Holland and Belgium, the
Germans still have V-Waffen going at London. I doubt the British would agree
to using bombers to donate food, instead of having them attacking the
V-Waffen launch locations.
> And then start dropping A-Bombs as they
> become available
>
That's another story.
Bay Man
news:x5KdnV3A1_5QZkbX...@westnet.com.au...
> "cpmac" <webm...@cpmac.com> wrote in message
> news:cb6f00ea-29a0-473d...@a7g2000yqo.googlegroups.com...
>> I've read many books on d-day and have searched this forum for the
>> answer to no avail. Was there a plan B if d-day had failed?
>
> Assuming failed means total defeat of the invaders.
>
> No plan B as such,
Initially Montgomery had an alternative British plan in case the US pulled
out if matters in the Far East got worse. The plan was in outline and was
for a 100% Commonwealth invasion. As time went on and matters improved in
the Far East it was clear the US was 100% in. I think AJP Taylor mentioned
it.
Stephen Graham
> The postwar demarcation line might have been changed, but it was set
> as west as it was partly due to the Ardennes offensive. If the Germans
> had managed to endanger the Red Army for the Yalta conference, and
> Roosevelt had been healthy, the line might have been farther east.
Not really. The zonal divisions were set in September 1944, well before
the Ardennes Offensive, based on discussions carried out over the
summer. The zones presumed that Soviet troops would take more of Germany
than they did historically and would then evacuate to the zonal
boundaries. It was unlikely that the zones would change regardless of
circumstances.
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
<4adc29b6$1$1094$4faf...@reader3.news.t
in.it>,
"Michele" <don'tspamm...@tln.it>
wrote:
> "Malcom "Mal" Reynolds" <atlas-...@invalid.invalid> ha scritto nel
> messaggio news:atlas-bugged-B370...@aries.ka.weretis.net...
>
> >
> > I think the obvious Plan B has been
> > overlooked. Continue strategic bombing
> > reducing Germany even further. At some
> > point civil chaos occurs,
>
> Since this did not happen historically, while the enemy was already entering
> German territory, I doubt it would with the enemy more or les sheld at bay.
It happened in Germany before the end of
WW1
>
>
> which could
> > actually be stimulated by bombing
> > civilian centers with food packages.
> >
>
> Could you elaborate on this?
Dropping food would cause turmoil. Would
hungry civilians/members of the military
share food? Would they start attacking
each other to get needed food. I believe
it would cause plenty of disruption
>
> Note that if there is no advance into France, Holland and Belgium, the
> Germans still have V-Waffen going at London. I doubt the British would agree
> to using bombers to donate food, instead of having them attacking the
> V-Waffen launch locations.
That is probably likely, but it's two
seperate issues.
1) Can Germany continue to produce these
weapons in substantial numbers? Will
they be effective (I seem to recall that
the V1's were made mostly ineffective by
subterfuge)
This doesn't include the increasing lack
of strategic materials and the
dependency on slave labor (that was
sabotaging everything they could).
2) Would dropping food packages cause
sufficient disruption that it would be
seen to be a useful tactic.
Stephen Graham
> In article
> <4adc29b6$1$1094$4faf...@reader3.news.t
> in.it>,
> "Michele" <don'tspamm...@tln.it>
> wrote:
>> Since this did not happen historically, while the enemy was already entering
>> German territory, I doubt it would with the enemy more or les sheld at bay.
>
> It happened in Germany before the end of
> WW1
What happened in World War One was that the military realized (or
decided) it had been defeated with various consequences. One set of
consequences was the mutiny of various military units, which led to
chaos; another set was the effective government (Hindenburg and
Ludendorff) abdicating their power and the ensuing governmental
instability. Civilian conditions then allowed for greater turmoil.
In the situation you posit, there is no reason for the military to be
unstable and thus less scope for civilian reaction.
> Dropping food would cause turmoil. Would
> hungry civilians/members of the military
> share food? Would they start attacking
> each other to get needed food. I believe
> it would cause plenty of disruption
Germany in 1944 wasn't particularly short of food - it had less than it
might like but there were still non-German civilians to starve, so
things weren't as bad as they might have been. Food drops would have
minimal effect.
> 1) Can Germany continue to produce these
> weapons in substantial numbers? Will
> they be effective (I seem to recall that
> the V1's were made mostly ineffective by
> subterfuge)
>
> This doesn't include the increasing lack
> of strategic materials and the
> dependency on slave labor (that was
> sabotaging everything they could).
As long as the Germans control the West, they likely have all the
materials they need to carry on the V-weapon campaign.
> 2) Would dropping food packages cause
> sufficient disruption that it would be
> seen to be a useful tactic.
One additional problem is whether the Allies can tell what effect the
food drops have within Germany. Allied agents tended to last a very
short time in Germany proper.
Rich Rostrom
> "Rich Rostrom" <rrostrom.21stcent...@rcn.com> ha scritto:
> > In short, it seems highly unpractical
> > to go ahead with DRAGOON after NEPTUNE fails...
>
> I wonder, however, how much strength the Germans would have
> expended in having Neptune fail....the Germans might have
> been exhausted by their own victory.
I can't imagine the Germans losing more,
or even comparably as much, in any sort
of victory, compared to what they lost in
a catastrophic defeat.
The DRAGOON landings were on August 15.
By that time, the Allies had broken out
at St. Lo, repulsed the Mortain counterattack,
and were closing in on the Falaise pocket
while U.S. Third Army fanned out to the west,
south, and east.
In any scenario where NEPTUNE fails, the
Germans have to be much better off than _that_.
Rich Rostrom
bug...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> 1) Can Germany continue to produce these weapons in substantial numbers?
Yes.
> Will they be effective (I seem to recall that
> the V1's were made mostly ineffective by subterfuge)?
The V-weapons were never cost-effective,
even at their worst.
What you may have heard about the V-1s
was that the British were able to "throw
off" the German aim by feeding the Germans
misleading impact data. This also applied
to the V-2, though the details were different.
This was possible because of the work
of the brilliant double agent Juan Pujol
(code named GARBO). GARBO was one of the
major channels for the FORTITUDE deception.
But GARBO so completely convinced the
admittedly gullible Germans of his reliability
and loyalty that the Germans continued to
use him even after D-Day.
When the V-weapon barrage began in mid-
June, the Abwehr asked GARBO to have his
(imaginary) sub-agents collect impact
data, which was to be forwarded directly
to the launch control centers.
After a certain period of debate on the
British side, GARBO accepted the job. He
supplied the Germans with carefully tweaked
impact data that caused them to shift the
"mean point of impact" out of central London
and well to the east.
Geoffrey Sinclair
> On Oct 19, 1:45 am, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@froggy.com.au>
> wrote:
>> "Alan" <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote in message
>> > They even went so
>> > far as to strand cargo ships and unload directly to trucks instead of
>> > lightering supplies ashore, in some cases cutting holes in the side of
>> > the ships in order to facilitate unloading.
>>
>> Which reference claims holes were cut and for what cargo?
>
> US Army in WWII - ETO - Logistical Support of the Armies - Vol II
Try volume I page 407, is there anything more than this? An
emergency measure to handle the effects of the channel storm,
from 19 to 23 June.
"The situation at the beaches prompted First Army to direct
that expenditures be cut to one-third unit of fire per day.
Shortages in critical calibers were met chiefly by specially
arranged air shipment, 500 tons being flown in daily over a
period of three days. Meanwhile, First Army also ordered
eight ammunition coasters to be beached, and directed the
brigades on both beaches to give first priority to ammunition
discharge and second priority to gasoline. To fortify the
ammunition position further, five prestowed Liberty ships
lying in U.K. waters were also called forward. (26) Normal
discharge was impossible, but several small coasters were
beached and unloaded at low tide. These were worked only
with great difficulty, and, where necessary, holes were cut into
the sides of the craft in order to reach cargo. (27)
26 FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. V, p. 142.
27 ADSEC Operations History, p. 32."
Alan
volume it was. Thanks for tracking it down.
-----
Yes, I did find some more elsewhere. In "From America to United
States, The History of the Long-range Merchant Shipbuilding Program of
the US Maritime Commission" - Part IV by Sawyer & Mitchell there is a
picture of Normandy sometime in June 1944 showing four N3 coast wise
freighters dried out discharging their cargo into DUKWs, apparently
this type was what the Army called "small coasters". The N3s were ~
2,800 dwt and 258' oa, not that small. It doesn't say how many total
were used in this way, but 36 of the 70 N3s built were chartered by
the BMoWT {British Ministry of War Transportation}, I think the BMoWT
N3s were used.
I also remember seeing a picture of an EC2 {Liberty ship} dried out,
but I can't find it now, perhaps I'm mistaken.
For comparison the EC2s were ~ 10,000 dwt and 441' oa, and the LSTs
were ~ 2,800 dwt and 328' oa.
---------------------------------
dwt = Deadweight Tons
This is a ship's maximum carrying capacity, including the ship's gear,
in long tons. A long ton is 2,240 pounds.
oa=Overall Length
Alan
Geoffrey Sinclair
> Yes, I did find some more elsewhere. In "From America to United
> States, The History of the Long-range Merchant Shipbuilding Program of
> the US Maritime Commission" - Part IV by Sawyer & Mitchell there is a
> picture of Normandy sometime in June 1944 showing four N3 coast wise
> freighters dried out discharging their cargo into DUKWs, apparently
> this type was what the Army called "small coasters".
Which in fact could be the ones reported in the other official history
as the emergency measures.
> The N3s were ~
> 2,800 dwt and 258' oa, not that small. It doesn't say how many total
> were used in this way, but 36 of the 70 N3s built were chartered by
> the BMoWT {British Ministry of War Transportation}, I think the BMoWT
> N3s were used.
The UK coaster fleet was very much raided, with consequences
for the UK economy and other transport systems, especially as
the ships were kept for much longer than the original plans.
The N3 came in two versions, the A1, 2,817 DWT or 1,700 GRT
and A2, 2,760 DWT or 1,810 GRT.
By the looks of things, 5 A1 delivered in 1942, 31 in 1943, then
33 A2 delivered in 1944, 27 in 1945. Total 98. But that is
working off the yearly tonnage built, rounded to nearest thousand
GRT, divided by the GRT given above.
>From the Maritime Commission Summary Report.
> I also remember seeing a picture of an EC2 {Liberty ship} dried out,
> but I can't find it now, perhaps I'm mistaken.
Or driven ashore by a (the) storm.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Michele
> In article
> <4adc29b6$1$1094$4faf...@reader3.news.t
> in.it>,
> "Michele" <don'tspamm...@tln.it>
> wrote:
>
>> "Malcom "Mal" Reynolds" <atlas-...@invalid.invalid> ha scritto nel
>> messaggio news:atlas-bugged-B370...@aries.ka.weretis.net...
>>
>> >
>> > I think the obvious Plan B has been
>> > overlooked. Continue strategic bombing
>> > reducing Germany even further. At some
>> > point civil chaos occurs,
>>
>> Since this did not happen historically, while the enemy was already
>> entering
>> German territory, I doubt it would with the enemy more or les sheld at
>> bay.
>
> It happened in Germany before the end of
> WW1
>
Things were a tad more complicated than that in 1918, and anyway, the
conditions were way too different in 1945.
>
>
>>
>>
>> which could
>> > actually be stimulated by bombing
>> > civilian centers with food packages.
>> >
>>
>> Could you elaborate on this?
>
> Dropping food would cause turmoil. Would
> hungry civilians/members of the military
> share food? Would they start attacking
> each other to get needed food. I believe
> it would cause plenty of disruption
>
Localised events that would not cause more "disruption" than dropping what
the Allied bombers did drop, then. Nor were German civilians really
starving, not even in 1945.
>
>
>
>>
>> Note that if there is no advance into France, Holland and Belgium, the
>> Germans still have V-Waffen going at London. I doubt the British would
>> agree
>> to using bombers to donate food, instead of having them attacking the
>> V-Waffen launch locations.
>
> That is probably likely, but it's two
> seperate issues.
>
> 1) Can Germany continue to produce these
> weapons in substantial numbers? Will
> they be effective (I seem to recall that
> the V1's were made mostly ineffective by
> subterfuge)
>
> This doesn't include the increasing lack
> of strategic materials and the
> dependency on slave labor (that was
> sabotaging everything they could).
>
The point is not how effective or how numerouse they were. The point is that
the British public would want everything done to stop them, even if they
dropped in numbers and only one in five caused casualties in Greater London.
> 2) Would dropping food packages cause
> sufficient disruption that it would be
> seen to be a useful tactic.
>
is that a question? No, it wouldn't. Regardless of the possibility that they
did indeed cause significant disruption, which is highly unlikely, the
Allies wouldn't want to do that and anyway they would not be able to assess
the disruption level after just a few tries. So no, it wouldn't happen.
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
<LsudnYEUGtUASEHXnZ2dnUVZ_tSdnZ2d@speake
asy.net>,
Stephen Graham <gra...@speakeasy.net>
wrote:
> Malcom "Mal" Reynolds wrote:
> > In article
> > <4adc29b6$1$1094$4faf...@reader3.news.t
> > in.it>,
> > "Michele" <don'tspamm...@tln.it>
> > wrote:
>
> >> Since this did not happen historically, while the enemy was already
> >> entering
> >> German territory, I doubt it would with the enemy more or les sheld at
> >> bay.
> >
> > It happened in Germany before the end of
> > WW1
>
> What happened in World War One was that the military realized (or
> decided) it had been defeated with various consequences.
When being pushed back to Germany
consistently they might have had an
inkling that they weren't winning.
> One set of
> consequences was the mutiny of various military units, which led to
> chaos; another set was the effective government (Hindenburg and
> Ludendorff) abdicating their power and the ensuing governmental
> instability. Civilian conditions then allowed for greater turmoil.
It's a stretch, but even the civilians
must have felt there was very little in
the way of effective government.
>
> In the situation you posit, there is no reason for the military to be
> unstable and thus less scope for civilian reaction.
I should think that years of advancing
to the rear and seeing their fellow
soldiers dying or being captured might
have pushed them to some instability
>
>
> > Dropping food would cause turmoil. Would
> > hungry civilians/members of the military
> > share food? Would they start attacking
> > each other to get needed food. I believe
> > it would cause plenty of disruption
>
> Germany in 1944 wasn't particularly short of food - it had less than it
> might like but there were still non-German civilians to starve, so
> things weren't as bad as they might have been. Food drops would have
> minimal effect.
l imagine that supplies of real flower,
sugar, coffee and maybe even chocolate
might make more than the occassional
person decide there was something better
to be had.
>
> > 1) Can Germany continue to produce these
> > weapons in substantial numbers? Will
> > they be effective (I seem to recall that
> > the V1's were made mostly ineffective by
> > subterfuge)
> >
> > This doesn't include the increasing lack
> > of strategic materials and the
> > dependency on slave labor (that was
> > sabotaging everything they could).
>
> As long as the Germans control the West, they likely have all the
> materials they need to carry on the V-weapon campaign.
They were already extremely short or out
of the metals to make effective turbine
blades for the ME-262s, I believe they
might also have been near out of
industrial diamonds. They weren't going
to get them from the west...that had
already been stripped of everything
useful.
And I would be remiss in discounting
their labor problems. The prisoners
assembling V2s in the Mittelwerk were
overworked, underfed and abused. Thus
they were always training new workers
and concentration camp assets were
getting harder and harder to get.
>
> > 2) Would dropping food packages cause
> > sufficient disruption that it would be
> > seen to be a useful tactic.
>
> One additional problem is whether the Allies can tell what effect the
> food drops have within Germany. Allied agents tended to last a very
> short time in Germany proper.
As an experiment, they could try the
same thing somewhere in Britain. Cruel
but they might get some modeling info. I
doubt it would have been hard to
discover the disruptions.
Stephen Graham
>> In the situation you posit, there is no reason for the military to be
>> unstable and thus less scope for civilian reaction.
>
> I should think that years of advancing
> to the rear and seeing their fellow
> soldiers dying or being captured might
> have pushed them to some instability
Historically in World War Two it was the approach of the Soviets that
caused the major civilian issues. In this scenario, you're removing any
pressure of land operations in Northwest Europe, i.e., there's less
pressure on Germany. There's really no reason to suspect any substantial
diversion from history: things will break down when the Soviets enter
Germany proper. Bombing will continue to be a nuisance.
>> Germany in 1944 wasn't particularly short of food - it had less than it
>> might like but there were still non-German civilians to starve, so
>> things weren't as bad as they might have been. Food drops would have
>> minimal effect.
>
> l imagine that supplies of real flower,
> sugar, coffee and maybe even chocolate
> might make more than the occassional
> person decide there was something better
> to be had.
There's also the entire issue of trust. Why do you trust materials
dropped by the Western Allies? They're the enemy, they've probably
poisoned the food. How long do you expect it to take for that line of
propaganda to emerge?
>> As long as the Germans control the West, they likely have all the
>> materials they need to carry on the V-weapon campaign.
>
> They were already extremely short or out
> of the metals to make effective turbine
> blades for the ME-262s, I believe they
> might also have been near out of
> industrial diamonds. They weren't going
> to get them from the west...that had
> already been stripped of everything
> useful.
The V2 was a simpler beast than the Me262, with one major difference:
its parts only needed to work for the period of a relatively short flight.
> And I would be remiss in discounting
> their labor problems. The prisoners
> assembling V2s in the Mittelwerk were
> overworked, underfed and abused. Thus
> they were always training new workers
> and concentration camp assets were
> getting harder and harder to get.
The main issue was that the labor source went away because the source
was occupied by the Allies. In this scenario, they still have the West
for labor.
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
<4add8364$0$823$4faf...@reader5.news.ti
> "Malcom "Mal" Reynolds" <atlas-...@invalid.invalid> ha scritto nel
> messaggio news:atlas-bugged-6EA3...@aries.ka.weretis.net...
> > In article
> > <4adc29b6$1$1094$4faf...@reader3.news.t
> > in.it>,
> > "Michele" <don'tspamm...@tln.it>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> "Malcom "Mal" Reynolds" <atlas-...@invalid.invalid> ha scritto nel
> >> messaggio news:atlas-bugged-B370...@aries.ka.weretis.net...
> >>
> >> >
> >> > I think the obvious Plan B has been
> >> > overlooked. Continue strategic bombing
> >> > reducing Germany even further. At some
> >> > point civil chaos occurs,
> >>
> >> Since this did not happen historically, while the enemy was already
> >> entering
> >> German territory, I doubt it would with the enemy more or les sheld at
> >> bay.
> >
> > It happened in Germany before the end of
> > WW1
> >
>
> Things were a tad more complicated than that in 1918, and anyway, the
> conditions were way too different in 1945.
I seek to learn. Please explain
I believe that was the purpose of
strategic bombing
>
> > 2) Would dropping food packages cause
> > sufficient disruption that it would be
> > seen to be a useful tactic.
> >
>
> is that a question? No, it wouldn't. Regardless of the possibility that they
> did indeed cause significant disruption, which is highly unlikely, the
> Allies wouldn't want to do that
Why?
> and anyway they would not be able to assess
> the disruption level after just a few tries. So no, it wouldn't happen.
I'm not sure they wouldn't be able to
assess the disruption level. Doesn't it
stand to reason that civil disturbances
might cause Germany to move troops for
control to these areas and weren't we
reading Enigma?
Don Phillipson
news:atlas-bugged-865E...@aries.ka.weretis.net...
>> and anyway they would not be able to assess
>> the disruption level after just a few tries. So no, it wouldn't happen.
>
> I'm not sure they wouldn't be able to
> assess the disruption level. Doesn't it
> stand to reason that civil disturbances
> might cause Germany to move troops for
> control to these areas and weren't we
> reading Enigma?
We must remind ourselves that Enigma was deciphered
intercepted radio messages. When considering internal
disorder within Germany it is reasonable to expect local
authorities to call Berlin by telephone or teleprinter, i.e. via
copper lines that could not be intercepted. (This explains
in part Allied intelligence's failure to forecast the Battle of
the Bulge. All the preparations took place on German soil,
i.e. where German planners could use the domestic phone
and teleprinter circuits for military purposes, leaving little
or nothing to radio (that the Allies might intercept and decode.))
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
<Se6dncSaw9vJmkPXnZ2dnUVZ_oqdnZ2d@speake
> Malcom "Mal" Reynolds wrote:
Seems to me that it doesn't matter. Some
brave soul will try the food due to
their personal nutritional level or the
desire for real sugar, coffee or sugar.
Or they'll feed it to a goat, pig or
sheep. If the propaganda emerges that
the food is poisoned, it shouldn't be
hard enough to do counter-propaganda
that the food parcels, being dropped as
a sign of the allies good will toward
the civilian population, are being
confiscated by the authorities for their
own use or to be sold on the black
market.
>
>
> >> As long as the Germans control the West, they likely have all the
> >> materials they need to carry on the V-weapon campaign.
> >
> > They were already extremely short or out
> > of the metals to make effective turbine
> > blades for the ME-262s, I believe they
> > might also have been near out of
> > industrial diamonds. They weren't going
> > to get them from the west...that had
> > already been stripped of everything
> > useful.
>
> The V2 was a simpler beast than the Me262, with one major difference:
> its parts only needed to work for the period of a relatively short flight.
That may be, but the production of
Hydrogen Peroxide was complicated and
used lots of resources useful for other
things. The production of the fuel for
one V-2 required 30 tons of explosives.
Sometimes as Germany lacked enough
explosives to put in the V-2, concrete
was used and sometimes they put in V-2s
photographic propaganda of German
citizens who had died in allied bombing.
Furthermore its guidance systems were
too primitive to hit specific targets,
and its costs were approximately
equivalent to four-engined bombers,
which were more accurate (though only in
a relative sense), had longer ranges,
carried many more warheads, and were
reusable.
>
> > And I would be remiss in discounting
> > their labor problems. The prisoners
> > assembling V2s in the Mittelwerk were
> > overworked, underfed and abused. Thus
> > they were always training new workers
> > and concentration camp assets were
> > getting harder and harder to get.
>
> The main issue was that the labor source went away because the source
> was occupied by the Allies. In this scenario, they still have the West
> for labor.
Since the Labor source was the KZs and
consisted mainly of Jews and Soviet
POWs, I don't see where they are going
to get more labor from...unless they
want to start scooping up French
citizens who are likely to be unhappy
about this.
More civil unrest
Stephen Graham
> In article
> <Se6dncSaw9vJmkPXnZ2dnUVZ_oqdnZ2d@speake
> asy.net>,
> Stephen Graham <gra...@speakeasy.net>
> wrote:
>> There's also the entire issue of trust. Why do you trust materials
>> dropped by the Western Allies? They're the enemy, they've probably
>> poisoned the food. How long do you expect it to take for that line of
>> propaganda to emerge?
>
> Seems to me that it doesn't matter. Some
> brave soul will try the food due to
> their personal nutritional level or the
> desire for real sugar, coffee or sugar.
> Or they'll feed it to a goat, pig or
> sheep. If the propaganda emerges that
> the food is poisoned, it shouldn't be
> hard enough to do counter-propaganda
> that the food parcels, being dropped as
> a sign of the allies good will toward
> the civilian population, are being
> confiscated by the authorities for their
> own use or to be sold on the black
> market.
I think you don't understand the dynamics of the situation in Germany,
particularly when it comes to regime propaganda and the Allied air
campaigns. There had been years of propaganda depicting the air campaign
as a deliberate attempt to exterminate German civilians and the German
nation. Allied air crews were _hated_ - there were numerous cases of
shot-down aircrew being lynched by civilians.
This isn't a friendly GI handing out a candybar; this is those anonymous
killers dropping something on you. Yesterday it was high explosives and
incendiaries; tomorrow it'll be high explosives and incendiaries; what
possible reason do you have to trust what they're dropping today?
Especially if trusting them today will get you in trouble with the regime.
>> The V2 was a simpler beast than the Me262, with one major difference:
>> its parts only needed to work for the period of a relatively short flight.
>
> That may be, but the production of
> Hydrogen Peroxide was complicated and
> used lots of resources useful for other
> things. The production of the fuel for
> one V-2 required 30 tons of explosives.
> Sometimes as Germany lacked enough
> explosives to put in the V-2, concrete
> was used and sometimes they put in V-2s
> photographic propaganda of German
> citizens who had died in allied bombing.
OK, that's the Wikipedia article on V-2s.
> Furthermore its guidance systems were
> too primitive to hit specific targets,
> and its costs were approximately
> equivalent to four-engined bombers,
> which were more accurate (though only in
> a relative sense), had longer ranges,
> carried many more warheads, and were
> reusable.
If you read further down in that self-same Wikipedia article, you'd see
information on accuracy.
But accuracy really isn't the point. Hitting the UK suffices for most
purposes. And that's pretty simple. Furthermore, it doesn't really
matter if half your missiles miss the UK entirely. What counts is that
anything is hitting the UK.
>> The main issue was that the labor source went away because the source
>> was occupied by the Allies. In this scenario, they still have the West
>> for labor.
>
> Since the Labor source was the KZs and
> consisted mainly of Jews and Soviet
> POWs, I don't see where they are going
> to get more labor from...unless they
> want to start scooping up French
> citizens who are likely to be unhappy
> about this.
Why do you think the regime fundamentally cared about the French
citizens? They had higher status than others under Nazi rule. But that
only went so far. There were hundreds of thousands of French forced
laborers, some of who wound up in the Mittelwerk.
David H Thornley
The German population was a lot worse off for food in 1918, and seemed
to be suffering. This didn't provoke anything. The suffering was
much less in 1945, as the Germans were better able to loot more of
Europe. The area was diminishing, and of course with transportation
bombing the ability to transport loot was diminishing, but it would
be a long time before the German civilians starved to the extent of
1918.
What really happened is that the German Army thought itself defeated.
German soldiers started hoping for surrender, and some started jeering
at new troops coming to the front to continue the war.
In 1945, German morale seemed to hold until something like March
1945, after which Western armies started taking a lot more prisoners.
I'm not aware of any general collapse until May 1945, at which time
there seemed to be a lot of eagerness to find a GI to surrender to.
(About that time, after being liberated on what Dad described as
a death march from Stalag XVII - I think B - one of Dad's fellow
ex-prisoners walked off from the main group a little, and "captured"
a large number of Germans. The Red Army was close, and they weren't
picky about which American they surrendered to.)
Of course, what really triggered the 1918 collapse was Ludendorff's
morale. At one point in the 1918 offensives, he suddenly decided all
was lost, and called on the civilian government to immediately make
peace based on the 14 points (which he had apparently not read, and
which he apparently thought were more favorable to Germany than they
really were). He was noted for increasing instability in the postwar
years, and became something of a liability for right-wing groups
then, even with his war record. This might have been the same problem,
but I'm neither a doctor nor a Ludendorff specialist.
After the war, the top German commanders wanted to save the reputation
of the army, and therefore blamed everything on the civilian population.
Don't be fooled by that: what caused the collapse was the defeat
of the German Army, including a morale failure at the very top.
In 1945, the German government never lost control in the 1918
sense. Hitler was coming up with increasingly desperate schemes
and hopes, and he had enough loyal followers in high places to
make sure nothing went too wrong. With a failed Normandy invasion,
things are better. Besides, Hitler had Goebbels, and the bombing
efforts were good fodder for him to spread fears of genocide.
So, I don't see any reason to think that continued conventional
bombing would end the war. The nukes might well, of course.
Geoffrey Sinclair
> In article
> <4adc29b6$1$1094$4faf...@reader3.news.tin.it>,
> "Michele" <don'tspamm...@tln.it> wrote:
>> "Malcom "Mal" Reynolds" <atlas-...@invalid.invalid> ha scritto nel
>> messaggio news:atlas-bugged-B370...@aries.ka.weretis.net...
>>
>> >
>> > I think the obvious Plan B has been
>> > overlooked. Continue strategic bombing
>> > reducing Germany even further. At some
>> > point civil chaos occurs,
>>
>> Since this did not happen historically, while the enemy was already
>> entering
>> German territory, I doubt it would with the enemy more or les sheld at
>> bay.
>
> It happened in Germany before the end of WW1
The food situation in Germany was far worse in 1918, the Nazis were
simply stripping other countries of food.
The 1918 revolts included large movements in southern Germany.
With Austria Hungary surrendering there was nothing between
south Germany and the allied armies in Italy and the Balkans.
More importantly there were revolts in the navy and army.
>> which could
>> > actually be stimulated by bombing
>> > civilian centers with food packages.
>> >
>>
>> Could you elaborate on this?
>
> Dropping food would cause turmoil. Would
> hungry civilians/members of the military
> share food? Would they start attacking
> each other to get needed food. I believe
> it would cause plenty of disruption
Germany was not short of food in 1944, it would be even less
short if it could still take food from France.
Furthermore assuming 1 kg per person per day of food, Greater
Germany was going through 70 to 80,000 tons of food per day.
The British Bombing Survey Unit says allied heavy bomber bomb
lift peaked at 20,000 tons in November 1944, it was around
10,000 tons in January 1944.
Take off a considerable amount for drop proof packaging and
awkward fits into the bomb bays. The B-17s carried almost
exactly 4,000 pounds of packaged food when they did food
drops on Holland in May 1945.
Next comes were does the food come from, the world was
running out, in 1945 the US army made ration cuts for example.
Liberated Italy remained a food importer until post war.
>> Note that if there is no advance into France, Holland and Belgium, the
>> Germans still have V-Waffen going at London. I doubt the British would
>> agree
>> to using bombers to donate food, instead of having them attacking the
>> V-Waffen launch locations.
>
> That is probably likely, but it's two seperate issues.
>
> 1) Can Germany continue to produce these weapons in substantial
> numbers?
Yes, much cheaper than conventional aircraft.
> Will they be effective (I seem to recall that
> the V1's were made mostly ineffective by subterfuge)
In terms of war production not effective, in terms of civilian
casualties, against England, around 10,500 V1s of which 3,531
evaded the defences caused 6,184 KIA and 17,981 seriously
wounded.
V2, around 1,400 launches, around 1,050 landing in the UK,
2,754 killed, 6,523 seriously injured.
Antwerp recorded 2,448 V1 hits versus London's 2,419,
and V1s hit other continental targets.
Some 1,675 V2s were recorded as hitting continental targets.
So multiply the V weapons hitting England by a minimum of 3.
> This doesn't include the increasing lack of strategic materials and the
> dependency on slave labor (that was sabotaging everything they could).
The loss of raw materials is directly related to the loss of territory,
plus better interdiction of the routes to Norway, and Sweden being
less accommodating of German requirements. The allied advance
from the west helped this situation.
> 2) Would dropping food packages cause sufficient disruption that it
> would be seen to be a useful tactic.
No.
Furthermore the advances in the west enabled more accurate
bombing, thanks to the ground based radio aids and fewer
allied casualties as the Germans had less time to intercept.
The disruption to Germany's transport system required the
medium and fighter bombers as well as the heavies.
Andrew Robert Breen
/chomp/
>Of course, what really triggered the 1918 collapse was Ludendorff's
>morale. At one point in the 1918 offensives, he suddenly decided all
>was lost, and called on the civilian government to immediately make
>peace based on the 14 points (which he had apparently not read, and
>which he apparently thought were more favorable to Germany than they
>really were). He was noted for increasing instability in the postwar
>years, and became something of a liability for right-wing groups
>then, even with his war record. This might have been the same problem,
>but I'm neither a doctor nor a Ludendorff specialist.
Add: the collapse of the southern front in 1918. Bulgaria, then
Austria-Hungary both fell out of the war in very close succession, and
this left no coherent military forces between D'Esparey's advancing
troops and the German border. The Western Front might have been shored up
for a little longer (though by autumn 1918 Haig's bulldozer was rolling
pretty well, now that the problems of re-supply after an advancing move
had been sussed), but the price would have been Spahis advancing into
Bavaria (oh, along with Indian Army troops, and troops from French
Indo-China - just the thing to strike horrors into the mindset of the
time...).
Absent invasions by the Western Allies in 1944, and it looks a bit
different (well, this time the irresistable bulldozer is coming from the
East, and it's a lot less amiable than the 1918 variety..). One front to
shore up (geography will hold up an advance from Italy until the issue is
decided, pretty much as it did in 1918..), but it probably won't stay
shored up much more than a year or so over OTL (hand-waving guess,
there..).
Civilian food shortages aren't going to be nearly the problem that they
were in 1918 (for the very good reasons David has alluded to). OTOH fuel
shortages are likely to be as bad as in OTL (the Soviet drive from the
East is still there, and bombing is likely to be much /more/ intense if
the invasions failed - the western allies need to keep proving to Uncle
Joe that they're serious[1]). That means the Luftwaffe continues to wilt,
so bombing continues to grow more effective. Civilians might have more
food than in 1918, but they are less likely to have homes, at least in the
cities (does this result in a flight to the country - particularly to the
occupied western countries? Hmm..).
Another difference from 1918 is that there isn't a fleet left to mutiny.
No bored, fearful crews left on big ships (no big ships left, pretty
much), and the U-boat crews no longer live long enough to get
disillusioned. That removes one of the 1918 flash-points for collapse
(add: it's far too late in 1945 for the German rank-and-file to discover
they've really been communist revolutionaries all along: the Soviets are
/far/ too pissed off at them for that. Plus the S.U. has its own cadre of
tame German communist leaders - so that's another option available for
get-out-from-under in 1918 which wasn't there in 1945).
Big differences, in other words - the obvious parallel being that Germany
had, once more, got into a situation where it was surely going to lose,
and that realisation was creeping in. "Declare war on the whole world" has
never been a wise policy, nor a lasting one.
[1] Expect Japanese cities to remain unburned a few months longer in this
scenario..
--
Andy Breen ~ Not speaking on behalf of the University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Feng Shui: an ancient oriental art for extracting
money from the gullible (Martin Sinclair)
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
atlas-...@invalid.invalid ( Reynolds) wrote:
> The production of the fuel for
> one V-2 required 30 tons of explosives.
Fuel for the V2 was actually alcohol and liquid oxygen. The HE was
required for warheads. The program did put a strain on the German
chemical industry but there were other factors involved. All German
artillery rockets and some others were solid fuelled. The recoilless gun
program greatly increased propellant demands as well. As a result the
HP/LP gun program was started and the panzerfaust was designed to use
black powder. The only mention of concrete V2 warheads I have come
across was during the development program. If you have a high likelihood
of a launch accident you do not want to add a ton of HE to the mix.
Ken Young
Michele
Then read more carefully. Other posters have already explained why the
situation in 1918 was very different. I read their messages. You can read
them too.
The purpose of strategic bombing was to break the German will to fight. That
was the main purpose, and it was a failure at that. It worked as far as
secondary purposes went (curtailing production, for instance, or wrecking
the rail network).
But you should keep in mind the Allied planners did not know that. As late
as 1945, Harris still believed that area bombing would work. And considering
how hard he fought against any diversion of his bomber force against any
other more specialized target, I think we can very safely rule out that he'd
wish to use bombers to drop food parcels.
>
>>
>> > 2) Would dropping food packages cause
>> > sufficient disruption that it would be
>> > seen to be a useful tactic.
>> >
>>
>> is that a question? No, it wouldn't. Regardless of the possibility that
>> they
>> did indeed cause significant disruption, which is highly unlikely, the
>> Allies wouldn't want to do that
>
> Why?
>
See above. Harris alone would be an insurmountable obstacle to this
proposal.
>
>
>> and anyway they would not be able to assess
>> the disruption level after just a few tries. So no, it wouldn't happen.
>
> I'm not sure they wouldn't be able to
> assess the disruption level. Doesn't it
> stand to reason that civil disturbances
> might cause Germany to move troops
No. They'd use the police. There was no shortage of that. Unfit for
front-line duty, but more than sufficient to keep in line fearful and weary
civilians used to blind obedience.
for
> control to these areas and weren't we
> reading Enigma?
>
"We"? The Allies were reading Enigma, that is radio messages. If the
Gauleiter of Hannover telephones the local SS-and-police commander asking
for a company of police to rein in disorder at a refugee camp and then
reports about it to Berlin by teleprinter or ordinary mail, the Allied
decoders will blissfully ignore all of that.
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
Joe Osman
Two things that might have factored into the slow unloading are:
1. Too much reliance on DUKWs, which were not large enough to carry a
single sling load. If they had used the LVTs already in England
instead or in addition, this would have sped things up considerably.
The US Army ESB (Engineering Special Brigade) in England had not kept
up with the state of the art that had been achieved by the ESBs in the
SWPA, who had engaged in a lot more landings and gotten more efficient
in the process.
Joe
Alan
> Two things that might have factored into the slow unloading are:
> 1. Too much reliance on DUKWs, which were not large enough to carry a
> single sling load. If they had used the LVTs already in England
> instead or in addition, this would have sped things up considerably.
> The US Army ESB (Engineering Special Brigade) in England had not kept
> up with the state of the art that had been achieved by the ESBs in the
> SWPA, who had engaged in a lot more landings and gotten more efficient
> in the process.
>
> Joe
Earlier in the war there was a decision to use LVTs in the Pacific and
DUKWs in the Atlantic. Though there were exceptions, for the most part
this was the rule. The reason being LVTs were the only assault craft
that could negotiate a coral reef, a lesson driven home at Tarawa.
DUKWs weren't the only craft being used as lighters. LCMs, LCVPs,
Rhino Ferries, anything that could function in that capacity and was
available. More and more LCTs were used as lighters instead of being
used in the cross channel shuttle as time went on. Soon maintenance
became a problem, many of the DUKWs and craft assigned as lighters
broke down or were damaged or destroyed by the storms. While the DUKW
was limited to 2.5 tons, a LCVP carried the same load, 4 tons, as a
LVT and a LCM 30+ tons. Obviously, any craft other than a DUKW would
require handling of bulk cargo at the shore line.
One of the problems faced by the D-Day planners was a general lack of
transportation. The initial estimate of truck lift required was much
higher than what was eventually available. This was particularly true
of heavy lift {4-tons and above} and specialty types.
There were three ESBs assigned to the US sectors. The 1st ESB to Utah
and the Provisional ESB Group to Omaha. The Provisional ESB Group
consisted of the 5th and 6th ESBs and the 11th Port. With attachments,
the 1st ESB numbered ~ 15,000 men and the PESBG ~ 30,000 men. Some of
the units came ashore on D-Day, some, much later. These units were
trained quite extensively.
Alan
cpmac
>> ammunition position further, five prestowed Liberty ships
>> lying in U.K. waters were also called forward. (26) Normal
>> discharge was impossible, but several small coasters were
>> beached and unloaded at low tide. These were worked only
>> with great difficulty, and, where necessary, holes were cut into
>> the sides of the craft in order to reach cargo. (27)
Gasoline was first brought through Port en Bessin by tankers. From Port
en Bessin it was carried in a pipeline across land. The terminal was at
Chateau de Chenevi�re which is now a fopur star hotel.
That of course preceded the PLUTO installed to Chebourg on the 12th aug.
> Two things that might have factored into the slow unloading are:
> 1. Too much reliance on DUKWs, which were not large enough to carry a
> single sling load. If they had used the LVTs already in England
> instead or in addition, this would have sped things up considerably.
> The US Army ESB (Engineering Special Brigade) in England had not kept
> up with the state of the art that had been achieved by the ESBs in the
> SWPA, who had engaged in a lot more landings and gotten more efficient
> in the process.
There's a great photo of LSTs unloading on Omaha beach (?) (date not
recorded) at
http://www.archivesnormandie39-45.org/specificPhoto.php?ref=p012623
the numbers of the ships are visible for those that wish to delve into
records of which ships were where.
Many other interesting photos on this site.
Another shows a DUKW coming up the beach and a Rhino ferry unloading.
http://www.archivesnormandie39-45.org/specificPhoto.php?ref=p012704
In the distance (I think) one can see the gooseberry of sunk liberty
ships. The barrage baloons are also visible. These were taken away later
as there was very little danger of german air attacks and the balloons
helped inland artillery to aim at the beaches.
--
Audio Tour Guide d day Normandy. Self Guiding.
http://normandy-tour-guide.cpmac.com.audio-guide.php3
Rhino
> by the Western Allies? They're the enemy, they've probably poisoned the
> food. How long do you expect it to take for that line of propaganda to
> emerge?
>
I've spoken to German woman who was 18 at the time. They started getting air
drops of food, labelled IN ENGLISH as "Gift of the British People". Everyone
was immediately terrified: "gift" is the German word for "poison"! Several
moments of panic ensued as everyone speculated on whether the British meant
to poison them all.
But, luckily, common sense prevailed and someone noticed that the rest of
the label was in English. They asked around and found someone who knew some
English, a schoolteacher. The teacher explained to them that "gift" in
English means a present, not poison. Then someone tried the contents of the
package, survived, and the rest then started eating the contents of the
packages.
In hindsight, I wonder why the British chose to label the packages in
English, since English was not all that widely known in Germany. At the very
least, they might have thought to ask a German speaker if the English label
might present any problems; that person would surely have pointed out that
"gift" means poison in German....
--
Rhino
William Black
> In hindsight, I wonder why the British chose to label the packages in
> English, since English was not all that widely known in Germany. At the very
> least, they might have thought to ask a German speaker if the English label
> might present any problems; that person would surely have pointed out that
> "gift" means poison in German....
That's what makes the story suspect.
Where was the food dropped and why wasn't the local army of occupation
doing the distribution of food?
--
William Black
"Any number under six"
The answer given by Englishman Richard Peeke when asked by the Duke of
Medina Sidonia how many Spanish sword and buckler men he could beat
single handed with a quarterstaff.
Michele
news:hc7vel$1bt$1...@news.datemas.de...
With these tales, one should always consider the possibility that someone
down back the line of re-tellers has just made it all up.