WWII AEW!
a425couple
AEW, Airborne Early Warning in WWII.
(posted today in rec.aviation.military
http://steeljawscribe.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html
)
"April-May 1945. Kamikazes are extracting a heavy price during
the invasion of Okinawa. On the 16th of April, a massed-wave of
350 kamikazes hit the fleet; ----- leaders in theater and back in
Washington were growing increasingly concerned over the threat
kamikazes were presenting and what it portended for DOWNFALL.
On the West Coast, USS Ranger was preparing to embark an airwing
with several innovations, including the first operational TBM-3Ws
in order to provide an organic AEW capability."
This was Cadillac I
(some pictures can be seen at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TBF_Avenger
)
"Cadillac II for the shore-based variant, the Navy pressed ahead with
the procurement of PB-1s (Navy designation for the B-17). ---
the conversion to the AEW variant would take place. The modifications
began in late 1945 with the first operations in February 1946."
The version with the radar dome on top, missed WWII,
but certainly portends the developments of much later!
Don Phillipson
news:hbvak...@news1.newsguy.com...
> I just saw something new & interesting,
> AEW, Airborne Early Warning in WWII.
> (posted today in rec.aviation.military
> http://steeljawscribe.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html
> )
> "April-May 1945. Kamikazes are extracting a heavy price during
> the invasion of Okinawa. On the 16th of April, a massed-wave of
> 350 kamikazes hit the fleet; ----- leaders in theater and back in
> Washington were growing increasingly concerned over the threat
> kamikazes were presenting and what it portended for DOWNFALL.
> On the West Coast, USS Ranger was preparing to embark an airwing
> with several innovations, including the first operational TBM-3Ws
> in order to provide an organic AEW capability."
"The Cadillac AMTI-system was described in a 1946 National Defense
Research Committee technical paper as follows . . . "which is only
half the story. The blogger never tells us:
1. Whether the Cadillac AEW system was ever deployed
before VJ Day. (We can understand its probable importance
for the planned invasion of homeland Japan.)
2. How its performance compared with the USN radar
picket (ship) AEW system which we know was deployed
to defend the Okinawa region.
--
Don Phillipson
Carlsbad Springs
(Ottawa, Canada)
a425couple
> "a425couple" <a425c...@hotmail.com> wrote in ...
>> AEW, Airborne Early Warning in WWII.
> half the story. The blogger never tells us:
> 1. Whether the Cadillac AEW system was ever deployed
> before VJ Day. (We can understand its probable importance
> for the planned invasion of homeland Japan.)
> 2. How its performance compared with the USN radar
> picket (ship) AEW system which we know was deployed
> to defend the Okinawa region.
Yes. Hopefully somebody may add more.
(To be realistic, after the atomic bomb was used almost
all military development & building REALLY slowed
down. So things came on line much later than could have.
"Downfall" would have been protracted.
And, if it was delayed, blockaid, really slow.
So - - I'd hope that developments at least things through
1948 will be allowed here.)
Yes, the DDs and DEs were used as radar pickets,
and greatly helped alert the main fleet.
(Figure DD is 375' long, 2,000 tons, crew of 375)
But as almost sitting ducks they paid a pretty high price.
For Okinawa alone I count DDs sunk:
Bush April 6, 1945
Colhoun April 6
Mannert Abele April 12
Pringle April 16
Little May 3, 1945
Luce May 4 (for example on her-126 men died, 57 severly injured)
Morrison May 4
Drexler May 28
William Porter June 10
Twiggs June 16
Callaghan July 29 (13th full DD sunk off Oki)
Certainly even a primitive AWACs ability would have
helped, perhaps got some better CAP out in time
to better protect these pickets and save some.
A airplane moving in 3 dimensions at 200 mph
is harder for Kamikazes to find than a DD at their
fixed posts.
Geoffrey Sinclair
>WWII. (posted today in rec.aviation.military
>http://steeljawscribe.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html
> The version with the radar dome on top, missed WWII, but certainly
> portends the developments of much later!
The RAF side of things. From my posting of 30 May
to rec.aviation.military
The idea of Air Control of Interception was proposed by
Watson-Watt in August 1941, the idea being as a control
for fighters intercepting Fw200 over the Atlantic.
The Telecommunications Research Establishment modified
Wellington R1629 with a rotating Yagi dipole antenna, 9
inch PPI, high powered transmitter and an ASV II radar.
Trials in 1942 and 1943 were quite successful, the system
was dismantled in April 1943.
There is a 3 page article on the system by Lawrence Hayward in
the spring 2004 edition of Aviation World.
With the use of He111s flying over the North Sea at low level
to launch V-1s against the UK the ACI/AWACS was revived
as operation Vapour.
This time ASV VI was the radar, trials and some operational
sorties were done in January 1945. Sea returns provided the
usual low altitude range problem, at higher altitudes aircraft were
detected at 14 miles range. Just as the system was being put
into operation the Luftwaffe effectively ceased He111 V-1
operations. The only interceptions made were of allied
aircraft.
The plan was to convert the Wellingtons of 407 squadron
into airborne control, with the step after that to use B-24s
for round the clock coverage.
It was fun if you were in the Mosquito XXX, to stay with
the Wellington, you flew with flaps and undercarriage down,
at low altitude.
http://www.angelfire.com/trek/rcaf/exag0306.html
See The History of Air Intercept Radar and the British
Nightfighter by Ian White and Diver! Diver! Diver! by Brian
Cull and Bruce Lander
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Alan
> "Downfall" would have been protracted.
> And, if it was delayed, blockaid, really slow.
> So - - I'd hope that developments at least things through
> 1948 will be allowed here.)
An interesting sidebar here.
I'm in the middle of reading Admiral Leahy's book "I Was There". Leahy
states DOWNFALL would most likely never have taken place. FDR and the
majority of the JCS believed Japan would surrender before DOWNFALL
became necessary. He also states he knew very little of MANHATTAN and
thought it unlikely it would be effective as a military weapon.
Assuming he was as well informed as the rest of the JCS, the consensus
was a naval blockade & strategic bombing would be enough to finish off
Japan. MacArthur & Nimitz were authorized to plan DOWNFALL, but no
more. As he puts it "the invasion itself was never authorized."
Alan
Alan
> but no more.
I need to correct this. Logistical preparations were begun.
Alan
Rich Rostrom
> Leahy [says] FDR and the majority of the JCS believed Japan
> would surrender before DOWNFALL became necessary...
> the consensus was a naval blockade & strategic bombing
In his memoir _Eight Bells_, RAdm Dan Gallery said otherwise.
In September 1944, Gallery gave up command of GUADALCANAL
(the escort carrier that had captured U-505), and went to the
Pentagon as "Assistant Director of Plans" in the office of the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.
Then-Captain Gallery "also was the alternate
for RAdm John Cassady on the Joint Logistics Committee of
the [JCS]... [which] had to okay the logistic feasibility of all
operational plans before the [JCS] would give final approval...
So when the plan for invasion of Japan came up before the
[JLC] I naively raised the question, Why invade at all?
I should of stood in bed, The Army and Air Corps members
looked at me as if I had just puked on the table."
I guess they were not aware of the "consensus",
> [ Leahy] also states he knew very little of MANHATTAN and
> thought it unlikely it would be effective as a military weapon.
Leahy told Truman "The atomic bomb will never go off, and
I speak as an expert in explosives." Of course that was before
TRINITY.
Alan
> I guess they were not aware of the "consensus",
I guess Leahy would be in a better position to speak for the JCS, he
was chairman.
Alan
Alan
> 1. Whether the Cadillac AEW system was ever deployed
> before VJ Day. (We can understand its probable importance
> for the planned invasion of homeland Japan.)
No
The following report .....
http://www.history.navy.mil/a-record/ww-ii/loc-ac/1945/aug1945/4-8-45.pdf
"The Location of US Navy Aircraft 08/04/45" shows only 1 TBM-3W which
was assigned to the Aircraft Division ASDEVLANT at Quonset Point, RI
[page 50 of the report]. The same report also shows an AEWTU (Airborne
Early Warning Training Unit) at Ream Field in Imperial Beach, CA, with
no aircraft assigned [page 35 of the report].
The same report for 09/07/45 (unfortunately the last) shows the same
results.
http://www.history.navy.mil/a-record/ww-ii/loc-ac/1945/sep1945/7-9-45.pdf
Alan
Alan
>
> In September 1944, Gallery gave up command of GUADALCANAL
> (the escort carrier that had captured U-505), and went to the
> Pentagon as "Assistant Director of Plans" in the office of the
> Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.
>
> Then-Captain Gallery "also was the alternate
> for RAdm John Cassady on the Joint Logistics Committee of
> the [JCS]... [which] had to okay the logistic feasibility of all
> operational plans before the [JCS] would give final approval...
>
> So when the plan for invasion of Japan came up before the
> [JLC] I naively raised the question, Why invade at all?
>
> I should of stood in bed, The Army and Air Corps members
> looked at me as if I had just puked on the table."
>
> I guess they were not aware of the "consensus",
>
> > [ Leahy] also states he knew very little of MANHATTAN and
> > thought it unlikely it would be effective as a military weapon.
>
> Leahy told Truman "The atomic bomb will never go off, and
> I speak as an expert in explosives." Of course that was before
> TRINITY.
Mr Rostrom,
My apologies. Upon completion of the book, Leahy makes it clear his
conviction that DOWNFALL would not be necessary, later fell out of
favor. Once Truman became president he may have been alone on this.
Though DOWNFALL wasn't ever authorized, he makes it plain it probably
would have been. I suspect by the time Adm Gallery is speaking of the
tide had turned.
Alan Nordin