When Italy capitulated in September 1943, the
German army seized control of northern and
central Italy, and of Italian occupied Greece,
Albania, and Yugoslavia. All Italian troops
outside Italy were disbanded and many became POWs
or were executed. Some of the troops in Italy were
recruited to the service of the RSI puppet government.

However, all these were areas in which the Germans
retained control.

There were also many Italian troops in Corsica and
Sardinia, and there the Germans made no effort to
hold on, evacuating their forces within a week or
two of the capitulation.

What happened to the Italian troops there? Did the
Germans disband them as well? Transport them as
prisoners to mainland Europe? It seems unlikely
that the Germans could do all that while also
evacuating their own men.

OTOH, elsewhere the Germans had little difficulty
in subduing Italian forces.

Does anyone know what happened there?
--
| Nous sommes dans un pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdes. |
| -- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.            |

"Rich Rostrom" <rrostrom.21stcent...@rcn.com> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:rrostrom.21stcentury-6FD57C.23511304042012@news.eternal-september.org...

Sure.

In fact, where the Italian forces were not outnumbered, or disorganized and
demoralized because of a lack of clear orders from above, or spread out in
small garrisons without mobility and heavy weapons, the Germans did have
difficulties.

The reason why most of the Acqui Division was massacred in Cephalonia _after
having surrendered_ was that they had not been "subdued" with little
difficulty; the battle lasted a week and cost the Germans a few hundred
casualties, and the battle did not start before the Germans having tried to
solve the problem by negotiations, sincere and insincere.
Deep in the Balkans, the Germans did not "subdue" the Venezia mountain
infantry division and parts of the Taurinense alpine division. These formed
the Italian Garibaldi Division fighting alongside the Yugoslavian partisans.
Even around Rome, the Germans had to fight.

Coming now to Sardinia, what happened in this region resembles more the
events in Puglia. In both areas, the Germans could not exploit superior
mobility to achieve local numerical superiority; they simply did not have
enough numbers. So, generally speaking, they simply slipped away. From place
to place, they sometimes managed to negotiate a free pass with the local
Italian units, or had to fight small actions. And some of the Italian units,
or some of the Italian servicemen, chose to follow the Germans to keep
fighting against the Allies, while a majority followed orders, if and when
they received them, or simply stayed put.
In the case of Sardinia, the line of withdrawal for the Germans was
obviously to Corsica.

Sardinia and Puglia thus were areas where local actual control did not pass
from the Axis (or later the Germans) to the Allies, and was later handed
over from the Allies to the Italian government of the South. It directly
remained in the hands of troops loyal to the King.

Both Sardinia and Corsica had large Italian garrisons with,
respectively, a German reinforced Panzergrenadier division and a German
SS motorized brigade. On both islands the Germans were heavily outnumbered.

The Italian commander in Sardinia, general Basso, just came to an
agreement with the local Germans, whose only goal was getting back
safely to the mainland via Corsica. They were simply let go without a
fight. A portion of the Italian paratroops regiment deployed there
mutinied, joined the Germans and followed them after killing an officer
sent to quell the rebellion.

By contrast, the Italian commander in Corsica (general Magli) opted for
making a stand. While the Germans suffered losses, they managed to clear
the vital port of Bastia and push the Italians back and into the hills
to the west of the port. In the meantime a Free French force landed on
the opposite side of the island and moved eastwards to join up with the
Italians, with whom they cooperated effectively.

After some quite sharp fighting, on September 29th the French and the
Italians recaptured Bastia, but by that time the bulk of the Germans and
especially the Panzergrenadier division had already safely evacuated to
the Italian mainland. Italian losses turned out to be heavy with 637
dead, over 2,000 missing and about 500 wounded. The French commander
later praised the Italians for their fighting spirit.

By the way, on September 8th off Bastia a daring naval action took place
when the submarine ace Fecia di Cossato, then commanding the escort
vessel Aliseo, completely destroyed a German convoy of two sub chasers,
five landing craft, a Luftwaffe motorboat and two freighters.

Haydn

Is there any information on the German losses in
this campaign? How many troops did the Germans
evacuate, and how many were lost or left behind?

Also, what was done later on with these
Italian troops?

There were probably at least 50,000 Italian troops in
Sardinia. As in Sicily, many would have been local
reservists who just went home (officially or unofficially?)

But there would have been a substantial number of
"regulars". What became of them? Especially those
from the parts of Italy still held by Germany, who
could not go home at all.

Also the troops in Corsica, who would not I think
include any reservists, and whom the French would
want removed from their territory.
--
| Nous sommes dans un pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdes. |
| -- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.            |

Actually, and to correct my previous post, some not entirely negligible
brushes took place between the retreating Germans and the Italians in
Sardinia. As the German evacuation was being completed, the Italians
decided to "speed it up" by exerting some pressure on the German
rearguards, also to put on a show of cooperation with the Allies (an
American military mission landed on the island on September 17th).

The Germans suffered 50 dead, 100 wounded and left 395 prisoners in
Italian hands, in addition to some material. The Italians had 40 dead
and 80 wounded.

In Corsica, where a full scale battle developed with artillery
bombardments and Stuka raids, the Germans may have lost a total of about
1,000 prisoners and over 1,000 dead, perhaps 1,500. After the end of the
operations, the Italians counted 250 German dead in and around the town
of Bastia, and 309 prisoners were taken over the same area.

All Italian troops in Corsica were gradually transferred into Sardinia.
Until their evacuation they cooperated with the French. Most equipment
was (grudgingly) handed over to the French, including artillery pieces,
tanks, armored cars, four fifths of all vehicles and virtually all
horses and mules, and the whole logistical structure.

Later on, the two mobile infantry divisions of the garrison - Friuli and
Cremona - were transformed into Combat Groups, re-equipped and
re-trained along British lines to join 8th Army in the final phase of
the Italian campaign.

The troops in Sardinia basically stayed in place until the end of the
war. The paratroops who had not mutinied later formed a part of the
Folgore Combat Group, and fought in April 1945 as an 8th Army outfit.
The pro-German rebels (one battalion plus some minor units) kept
fighting alongside the Germans in Italy until the bitter end.

Also the Corsica garrison had two coastal (static, "reservists")
divisions. The defense system there was the same as that of all other
Italian and Italian-occupied territories, based on a seaboard "crust" of
static divisions and mobile tactical battlegroups, and a core of mobile,
or supposedly mobile, divisions.

Haydn

Very interesting points. Thanks for the info.

Interesting. One wonders why the Corsica divisions
were made use of, and the Sardinia divisions were
not. Perhaps that the Corsica forces had actually
fought the Germans already made them generally
willing to re-enter combat, and also assured the
Allies that they _would_ fight.

Also I note these were the "Friuli" and "Cremona"
Divisions. Friulia and Cremona are both in NE Italy,
in the area which 8th Army was fighting to liberate
in the last part of the war. If the men of these
divisions were from those areas, they would be
fighting for their homes - perhaps an added motive.

And perhaps none of the Sardinia divisions were from
such areas.

Hmm. My understanding was that the reserve divisions
were deployed in the areas where they lived - which
would obviously not include Corsica.
--
| Nous sommes dans un pot de chambre, et nous y serons emmerdes. |
| -- General Auguste-Alexandre Ducrot at Sedan, 1870.            |

That might be one of the reasons why, but I suspect the main reason why
was that those divisions were two of the few non-coastal, "mobile"
formations left after the post-armistice disintegration of the Army
structure. And unlike some other divisions deployed over the Southern
mainland, they did not immediately come under direct Allied
jurisdiction. Except for a brigade- or division-sized token of Italian
military collaboration, until 1945 the Allies refused to allow more
Italians into active duty and systematically used Italian troops for
rear area or logistical service, even dismembering previously
reorganized units. (The Navy and the Air Force instead were more
extensively employed).

In other words, the newly-born Southern Kingdom's choice was limited.

While many, or most, of those men actually came from the North, the link
between the region or city name of a division and the area of origin of
its recruits, or all of its recruits, was hardly automatic in the
Italian Army. As a for instance, the Friuli regiments had been
established in Milan in the 19th century; then one of them had been
disbanded and later re-established in Tuscany, and before and during the
war the division's "home" was indeed Tuscany, rather than Friuli.

Also, motivation based on Northerners fighting for their Northern homes
is a moot point. Some of them certainly felt motivated by that, but
others just obeyed orders and many simply were hoping their effort
helped bring the war to its end faster. Much has been said about
desertion and draft-dodging in the German-occupied North, but the Allies
in the South weren't much friendlier to the Italian military than the
Germans in the North to Mussolini's military, and not a great many
Italians were super-happy to fight for the Allied cause.

Usually that was the case, but not always. Coastal divisions were also
sent to Southern France (4th Army) to man the shoreline, and those
"reservists" doubtless were not Frenchmen.

Haydn

On 4/13/2012 10:57 AM, Haydn wrote:

While the British were all for rearming Italian combat units the US was
not.  This extended to the use of US to UK Lend-Lease material.  The US
went so far as to pass a law prohibiting the transfer of Lend-Lease to
any third party without the express consent of the US, and, IIRC, the
use of second party {ie UK} manufactured material for the same purpose
if that material was then replaced by Lend-Lease.

I believe this was at least partly to prevent Churchill from using the
Italian Army as the means to accomplish one of his Balkan plans.  The
more obvious reason would be depriving US forces of material in order to
re-arm the Italians, reference the US shortage of M4 tanks in Europe in
late 1944.

Alan

Haydn, 16:57, venerdì 13 aprile 2012:

Newly born was Mussolini's Republic, the Kingdom was still the
old one, although reduced in size and subject to Allied power.

FWIK only Alpini and Granatieri di Sardegna had regional
recruitment.

I have read a novel in which was described that there were
officers in the King's Army, especially the younger ones, that
were still of Fascist sentiment and ideology even if fighting
alongside the Allies.

--
H

Alan Nordin, 18:31, venerdì 13 aprile 2012:

Another question is how much were Italians motivated to combat
anymore. Italian combat groups were formed by those most eager
to fight and I am not so sure whether the bulk of Italian
soldiers were that much willing to go to the front line.

--
H

Apparently this restriction didn't apply to aircraft as the Italian
Co-Belligerent Air Force operated considerable numbers of US-supplied
Bell P-39 Airacobras commencing in the summer of '44.

Of course, by then the P-39 had been withdrawn from front line USAAF
service so providing them to the Italians didn't deprive US forces of
much in the way of material.

A dispute over definitions would make little sense. What you write is of
course correct, but the old kingdom had witnessed some brusque changes,
and the government was also kind of a turn away from the previous one...

I'd take the Grenadiers off the list, despite their name.

That may well be, although those must have been a teeny minority. Many
of them must have been anti-Communist, rather than Fascist.

Haydn

Those planes were already thoroughly second-hand, if not worn out, when
handed over to the Italians. That applies also to British flight
material: a unit was outfitted with Spitfires previously used by
Yugoslav pilots.

Italian pilots reported that P-39 engines showed the worrisome
inclination to fail in action, and their wear and tear probably didn't
help in that department.

Haydn

That the British were all for rearming the Italians is a statement
perhaps a bit tall, at least until summer 1944 when manpower shortage in
the Mediterranean forced the Allies to give green light to setting up a
serious Italian force.

But it is nonetheless true that unlike the British, the Americans
apparently never showed any degree of interest in rearming and
supporting Italian ground forces. Mark Clark's own Italian unit in
winter 1943 was looking and fighting in (bleak) 1940 shape and
conditions - which did nothing to uplift their morale, by the way.

Haydn

Haydn, 21:59, venerdì 13 aprile 2012:

Just a remark for sake of precision. I am very pedantic
sometimes...

Right.  ISTR now that Granatieri, as a Guard unit, had to be
very tall and Sardinians were not tall men, on average.

I mistook them for the Brigata Sassari that had regional
recruitment. They too fought in defense of Rome on the
capitulation days.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sassari_Mechanized_Brigade

Surely most of Italian officers have always been on the right
side as for political position.
The younger ones were raised in the Fascist propaganda and had a
certain type of "sense of honor".
Many officers felt ashamed for Italian capitulation and swap of
alliance even when remaining faithful to the King.

The scene in the novel (I suppose the author didn't invent it)
was at a mess with young officers and an older Major, together
with two journalists (one was the author).
They listen to the radio that says that president Roosevelt has
died. (Apr. 12 1945, last days of the war in Italy)
Many young officers smile or laugh and one says "the old
gangster has gone to meet Baalzebub."
The journalist, anti-fascist, is surprised for that reaction and
starts a warm discussion with a young Leutenant.
They accuse each other for different reasons and at last the
young officer shows the journalist his Fascist Party membership
card he keeps in his wallet.
"I am not of those who tore it!".
Another young officer shows his Party card.
Only then the Major order everybody to stop discussion.

--
H

Eugenio Corti's _Gli ultimi soldati del Re_?

On 4/13/2012 4:10 PM, Haydn wrote:

Well, I did get some of this wrong.

The statute regarding what was called "re-transfers" was part of the
original Lend-Lease law.  The way in which the section was observed
varied from time to time and place to place, eventually authority rested
with the service secretaries {War & Navy} who then delegated it to the
MAB {Munitions Assignment Board}, a joint UK-US committee.

The "similar goods" concept was not a separate law, but came to be
considered part of the "re-transfer" section of the Lend-Lease law after
the British transferred 5,000 .303 UK made rifles to Saudi Arabia while
receiving .303 rifles via Lend-Lease from American production.  Like the
rest of Lend-Lease, "similar goods" eventually came under the authority
of the MAB.

However, I don't doubt that one of the reasons for the US making an
issue of this was worry over what the British may try in the Balkans.

Another issue was the British getting the "good press" of giving US LL
material to 3rd parties.  This was the particular issue with the
transfer of 6 LSTs to Greece.  {Or at least this was the acknowledged
reason, Balkans again?}

As the US Army historian acknowledges, the amount of war material in
question was not worth the amount of time spent arguing.

===

Still, in regard to the British being "all for rearming Italian combat
units", I think my initial statement is nearly correct.  I think the
delay you attribute to a change in British motives was caused by the
problem of finding sufficient Italian equipment {eventually captured
equipment was also used}.  Since the US refused to allocate Lend-Lease
to Italy, it made it very difficult for the British to transfer any
material to the Italians without causing any hard feelings since the
arguments over the issues I outlined above were still warm.  Eventually
the US relaxed this stance and allowed any surplus material to go to the
Italians, but it was too little too late.

While the US was against using Italian troops in combat, they did use
them as service troops in North Africa, Italy & Southern France.  5th
Army also them for internal security in Italy.

Alan

Second hand certainly, but worn out, perhaps not so much.

The 75 P-39Qs delivered to the Co-Belligerent Airforce in July had only
been issued to the USSAF 332nd Fighter Group in February (or March,
sources differ) and were relegated to depot in June when the 332nd
switched to P-47s.

Four month's service seems unlikly to cause an aircraft to be 'worn out'.

Dunno 'bout the 74 P-39Ns transfered to the Co-Belligerent Air Force
about the same time. Presumably those were older and may have been more
shopworn as a couple of sources indicate the P-39Ns were mostly used for
training.

In any case, post war, the Italian Air Force operated its P-39s until
1950.  It hardly seems likely that they would have kept the aircraft
that long if its engines were routinely failing.

After all, with the end of the war, vast numbers of surplus P-51s and
P-47s were available at modest costs. IIRC, the going price of a surplus
P-51 was $3,500.

Stephen Graham, 01:05, sabato 14 aprile 2012:

No, it's an old novel I found years ago in a remainder's
bookshop.

"Il minimo d'ombra", by an unknown (to me) author, journalist
Gino De Sanctis, Rizzoli 1967.

He worked for Messaggero di Roma. He also wrote other novels,
among them "Il Violino della V Armata", but I haven't it.

No Wikipedia page, an IMDB list as screenwriter (not sure):
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0211457/

An old essay in Italian on Gino De Sanctis:
http://www.bpp.it/apulia/html/archivio/1997/III/art/R97III019.html

--
H