Value of Stalingrad
Malcom "Mal" Reynolds
capturing Stalingrad, but once it became
evident that it was a meat grinder, why
not withdraw and pound it with long rand
artillery or bombers?
For that matter, why didn't the Soviets
allow the Germans to capture Stalingrad
and then pound the Germans. It's not
like the Germans would have been able to
support any kind of worthwhile activity
there.
Rich Rostrom
bug...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> I understand the political value of capturing Stalingrad, but once
> it became evident that it was a meat grinder, why not withdraw and\
Hitler was obsessed with the symbolic
value of capturing "Stalin City". He
saw the battle as a test of wills. In
his mind, that test was going to be
decisive.
> For that matter, why didn't the Soviets
> allow the Germans to capture Stalingrad
> and then pound the Germans.
Losing Stalingrad would break Soviet
communications along the Volga and
along the area's rail lines.
Also, a city is an intrinsic fortified
position. Buildings provides cover and
concealment for the defenders, and the
attackers pay a price. Why give up that
advantage?
Louis C
> capturing Stalingrad, but once it became
> evident that it was a meat grinder, why
> not withdraw and pound it with long rand
> artillery or bombers?
Because the Germans were winning. The city had received heavy air and
artillery attacks for months, and essentially destroyed. That didn't
root out the defenders. The Germans needed to eliminate that threat so
as to redeploy the large amount of good troops they had there.
So the reason they kept going was their - entirely correct - belief
that they were gaining ground and therefore steadily winning, which
led to the - incorrect - conclusion that just a little additional
effort would give them the whole thing.
> For that matter, why didn't the Soviets
> allow the Germans to capture Stalingrad
> and then pound the Germans.
Because Stalingrad was a better position for them to fight the Germans
from than in the open. In the ruins of Stalingrad, German operational
advantages of mobility were largely negated. The Red Army was no
tactical match for the Heer by a long stretch, at that point in the
war.
> It's not
> like the Germans would have been able to
> support any kind of worthwhile activity
> there.
Stalingrad carried large popular & political significance to both
sides, especially once the battle assumed such proportions. Losing the
city would have carried a serious risk for Soviet morale.
LC
David H Thornley
>
> For that matter, why didn't the Soviets
> allow the Germans to capture Stalingrad
> and then pound the Germans. It's not
> like the Germans would have been able to
> support any kind of worthwhile activity
> there.
>
that they were losing territory in Stalingrad doesn't affect that.
It was a quite effective meatgrinder.
Moreover, Stalingrad had the nice effect of putting Sixth Army
into a position to be encircled. If they'd have just given
it up, Axis forces would likely have assumed a better defensive
deployment.
--
David H. Thornley | If you want my opinion, ask.
da...@thornley.net | If you don't, flee.
http://www.thornley.net/~thornley/david/ | O-
GFH
bug...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> I understand the political value of
> capturing Stalingrad, but once it became
> evident that it was a meat grinder, why
> artillery or bombers?
The Soviets did not have a great excess of
artillery or bombers. They did have a great
excess of soldiers. The Soviets just ground
the Germans down. A very demoralizing
defeat for the Germans. And a clear picture
of what was to come. And the starvation and
capture of a whole German army gave the
Soviets a big boost. IMHO, one cannot fault
the Soviet strategy and tactics from Stalingrad
to Berlin.
GFH
SolomonW
> concealment for the defenders, and the attackers pay a price. Why give up that
> advantage?
More importantly the Volga river would have made a fine defensive position.
To cross it would be a major undertaking. The Germans could have pulled
forces back and reinforced their rear.
Also it would be an idea spot to launch an assault in South Russia.
Greg Schuler
I think one can and should fault Soviet strategy and operational
doctrine post-Stalingrad, specifically the smashing German victories
at Kharkov and Belgorod. The rush forward proved disastrous for the
Red Army and the subsequent German victories post-Stalingrad allowed
the front lines to stabilize. While Stalingrad marks the end of the
strategic mobility and initiative of the Axis powers in the East, the
operational initiative rested with the Axis powers until post-Kursk.
Even then, the progress of the Soviets was not perfect, as you seem to
indicate.
Stalingrad was much closer than I think is generally realized. The
Germans had rolled up the 62 and 64 Armies in the city to a few choke
points and if Zhukov had run into any troubles assembling the counter-
offensives, Stalingrad may not have held past Dec, or become
operationally insignificant to allow for the release of German forces
to push further south. Weather played a role, and the Germans were
aware of the Soviet advantage in winter weather, but if the Germans
had successfully cleared the western bank by Dec or at least reduced
the ability of 62 Army to conduct an active defense, the subsequent
counter-offenses may have been denuded and re-planned. In the end, of
course, Chuikov holds on and the Germans are pinned in the city.
Greg Schuler
bug...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
Look at a map. The German push south to secure the Kavkaz region
needed a stable left flank and acquiring or negating Stalingrad would
secure the Volga and disrupt Soviet communication and logistics to the
southern reaches of the theater. It was never evident that it was a
meat grinder - the Germans enjoyed tactical and operational success
from Aug until Oct 1842 in the Stalingrad region. The Soviets
piecemealed support and reinforcements into the cauldron, but the
Germans rolled up objectives through the fall and seemed, from their
perspective, to have the situation well in hand. What warning signs
existed were dismissed as the Axis powers continued successful
offensive operations and preparations for the winter halt of
operations. As bad as Stalingrad was for the individual soldier, from
a German command perspective, the end was reachable.
As far as siege warfare, the problem would be logistics, for both
sides. The Soviets lacked air power to bombard the front lines (as
well as expertise) and the artillery and rocket reserves were better
suited for operational support rather than dug in siege warfare, which
would have subjected them to severe counter-battery fire. As far as
the Axis powers, the capture of Stalingrad does provide some
logistical relief and reinforcement of the line.
The only reason, though, that counts is the fact that the men calling
the shots at both ends wanted the battle. Stalin would not allow the
biggest city bearing his name to fall and Hitler wanted that prize.
There were sound operational and strategic decisions on both sides
that allowed the battle to develop.
Louis C
> Look at a map. The German push south to secure the Kavkaz region
> needed a stable left flank and acquiring or negating Stalingrad would
> secure the Volga and disrupt Soviet communication and logistics to the
> southern reaches of the theater.
Note that for the purposes of cutting off Soviet communications on the
Volga and neutralizing a potential Soviet attack base, the Germans had
already controlled enough of Stalingrad for over a month by the time
the Soviet counter attack kicked in.
The battle dragged on because they wanted to capture the whole city,
which made them commit to a protracted attritional battle in which
gains were slow and casualties heavy on both sides.
> It was never evident that it was a
> meat grinder - the Germans enjoyed tactical and operational success
> from Aug until Oct 1842 in the Stalingrad region.
The Germans had experienced city fighting before and knew it was
costlier than fighting in the open, especially for armor. By early
October, it was clear the Soviets weren't being removed from
Stalingrad without a big fight, but the Germans refused to reconsider
their initial commitment to capturing all of the city. From a military
point of view, this was prestige overtaking operational
considerations.
> The Soviets
> piecemealed support and reinforcements into the cauldron, but the
> Germans rolled up objectives through the fall and seemed, from their
> perspective, to have the situation well in hand.
The Germans were gaining ground steadily, but were falling
increasingly behind schedule and casualties were heavier than
anticipated. This was exactly the same mindset that had led to Allied
bloodbaths during WWI, and the Germans now repeated the pattern.
> What warning signs
> existed were dismissed as the Axis powers continued successful
> offensive operations and preparations for the winter halt of
> operations. As bad as Stalingrad was for the individual soldier, from
> a German command perspective, the end was reachable.
Exactly.
Note that this point of view also presided over Harris' decision to
continue with his Battle of Berlin or with Stalin's decisions to make
one push too many. See also the numerous WWI examples like the 1915
offensives, Somme, Verdun, Nivelle's 1917 Chemin des Dames offensive
or Paschaendale. In all of these cases, the commanders believed that
just one more push would carry them through, and they're usually
criticized for ignoring evidence pointing the other way.
I suggest the Stalingrad Germans be blamed for just the same thing.
> The only reason, though, that counts is the fact that the men calling
> the shots at both ends wanted the battle.
(snip)
> There were sound operational and strategic decisions on both sides
> that allowed the battle to develop.
Yes, but it wasn't all Hitler and Stalin. At all echelons, once enough
commitment had been made to that battle it acquiered a momentum of its
own. The more you invest in a particular venture, the harder it
becomes to call it off short of success.
LC
Rich Rostrom
> At all echelons, once enough
> commitment had been made to that battle it acquiered a momentum of its
> own. The more you invest in a particular venture, the harder it
> becomes to call it off short of success.
I will throw in an observation
from an entirely unrelated field:
contemporary professional poker,
as played in "tournaments".
Many of the top pros in this game
have been interviewed, and often
are asked "What is the best play
you ever made?"
Almost always, the answer is a
hand that the player _folded_.
The player had a strong hand,
and had put a lot of chips in
the pot - and then, somehow,
deduced or guessed or intuited
that another player had a better
hand. The player then folded,
accepting a substantial loss,
but avoiding the potentially
catastrophic loss that would
come from further bets on that
hand.
This decision is regarded as
one of the hardest to make
correctly. I think it is _highly_
analogous to the military
situations noted above - when
commanders failed to "cut their
losses" and pushed ahead into
disaster. As with poker, the
dangerous situation is partial
success, with the appearance
of a strong position.
The temptation to press ahead,
to commit more resources, is
intense. Very few commanders
(or players) can resist it.
Alan Meyer
> ...
> The temptation to press ahead,
> to commit more resources, is
> intense. Very few commanders
> (or players) can resist it.
That seems to me to be an interesting and insightful way to think
about it.
The question it raises in my mind is: When did pressing on in the
face of failure succeed, and when did it fail?
I can think of numerous examples where pressing on failed,
resulting in large casualties and a failure to achieve
objectives. Succeeding is not as clear.
Failing:
Moscow, on both sides. The Germans pushing and defending
harder than they should have, the Russians attacking harder
than they should have.
Stalingrad.
El Alamein, German continuing attacks.
Tunisia, German reinforcement of a lost position.
Guadalcanal, Japanese reinforcement of a lost position.
Kursk, on both sides. Both the Germans and the Russians
pressed on harder and more aggressively than they probably
should have.
Monte Cassino.
The attack on Caen after the Normandy landing (succeeding
only after Operation Cobra broke through in the West.)
Succeeding:
What should we include here? Were there cases where
unexpectedly high casualties were incurred but the commanders
pressed on and achieved important objectives by dogged
determination and willingness to accept the casualties?
Crete, German air assault that eventually succeeded? But was
it worth the cost?
Omaha beach?
Hurtgen Forest?
The Russian assault on Berlin?
It seems to me that some of the best commanders were very adapt
at avoiding these situations, knowing when to press on and when
to take a different tack, maneuver, and attack somewhere else.
Both Hitler and Stalin seemed to me to be bad at this. Both of
them would have done better to trust their generals more.
Alan
Rich Rostrom
> Rich Rostrom wrote:
>
> > The temptation to press ahead, to commit more resources, is
> > intense. Very few commanders (or players) can resist it.
>
> That seems to me to be an interesting and insightful way to think
> about it.
There are of course structural differences.
In a poker hand, there is no result till the
end, whereas in a battle or campaign, there
are partial results. These partial results
can create the impression or reality of
greater or lesser relative strength as the
action continues.
> The question it raises in my mind is: When did pressing on in the
> face of failure succeed, and when did it fail?
Not so much in the face of failure,
but after partial success and rising
difficulty. The initial German attack
at Stalingrad was a success; indeed
the Germans were succeeding right up to
the moment the Soviets counterattacked.
> Moscow, on both sides.
Moscow in 1941 is a good example: the
Germans had enjoyed enormous success up
to that point, and it seemed as though
one last effort would win the whole war;
but at the same time it was clear that
this effort would be very costly and
could fail disastrously.
On the Soviet side, Stalin's insistence
on pursuing the attack at Izyum in early
1942 is similar.
> Stalingrad.
As noted above, the Germans weren't failing.
> El Alamein, German continuing attacks.
I would say that the Alam Halfa attack
might qualify.
> Kursk, on both sides.
The Kursk initiative (on the German
side) was taken at a very high level.
It was an attempt to succeed in the
war. The alternative, perhaps more
correct decision at that point might
have been to end the war in the east
on whatever terms could be made, i.e.
to fold.
> The attack on Caen ...
I don't see this at all.
I think an obvious case is MARKET-GARDEN.
Another case was the reinforcement of
Singapore in late 1941. Britain raised
heavily, not realizing that Japan had
the "nuts" - in part due to previous
commitments to that "pot".
> Succeeding:
>
> What should we include here? Were there cases where
> unexpectedly high casualties were incurred but the commanders
> pressed on and achieved important objectives by dogged
> determination and willingness to accept the casualties?
I think Gazala is the exemplar here;
though Wavell and O'Connor's decision
to expand COMPASS into an all-out
offensive is comparable.
Another question is 'good folds': occasions
when a commander or strategist backed off
when the current results seemed to suggest
pushing harder - and afterwards, was shown
to be right.
Nagumo's cancelling the third strike against
Pearl Harbor might qualify. (I say "might".)
Likewise, Spruance at the end of Midway.
I guess one might define it as any occasion
where a commander recognized that the situation
was really much worse than it seemed, accepted
a big loss, and by doing so avoided a much
bigger loss. The key here is that the backdown
has to come early, and I can't think of many
examples from WW II. Hitler routinely did the
opposite; so did Stalin, sometimes. The U.S.
was never really in that position. Britain
was but only in France in 1940, and that
battle was obviously lost.
Louis C
> Succeeding:
>
> What should we include here? Were there cases where
> unexpectedly high casualties were incurred but the commanders
> pressed on and achieved important objectives by dogged
> determination and willingness to accept the casualties?
El Alamein, the British offensive. The initial plan was shot to bits
within a couple of days, the British attackers were stalled,
casualties very high, no progress in sight. Montgomery didn't throw in
the towel, instead he continued to attack though focusing on the
northern sector.
Montgomery again when first being blocked by Axis defenses in southern
Tunisia: he didn't give up easily.
> Crete, German air assault that eventually succeeded? But was
> it worth the cost?
I don't think that one counts, because the Germans never were, to my
knowledge, in the position to decide to cut their losses. By the time
they realized how costly Crete had been, they also knew they'd won.
> Omaha beach?
No, the issue was over too soon. No serious consideration could be
given to pulling out before the US attackers eventually broke through.
> Hurtgen Forest?
This to me seems a very good example of a battle that should NOT have
been continued as long as it was.
> The Russian assault on Berlin?
I don't think so, for the same reasons as Crete and Omaha.
But you could argue that German commanders dragging the rest of the
army forward in 1940 rather than obeying orders to stop and
consolidate were instrumental in victory. It doesn't fit the poker
outlook, though, as in that case the "player" (OKW) simply lost
effective control.
LC
Louis C
> There are of course structural differences.
> In a poker hand, there is no result till the
> end, whereas in a battle or campaign, there
> are partial results.
I don't want to turn this into a discussion of poker, but for the
record I disagree. In a poker hand, you do have partial results:
discards and bets, plus some of the drawn cards when you're playing
stud.
In poker, as in war, numerous people have folded too early, based on
an incorrect interpretation of those partial results.
> > Stalingrad.
>
> As noted above, the Germans weren't failing.
They were still technically advancing, but they were failing in that
their casualties and timetable were completely off compared to initial
expectations. The "successful fold" would have involved recognizing
that this did constitute failure. If the Stalingrad Germans weren't
failing, then many WWI slaughters like Verdun, the Chemin des Dames or
3rd Ypres were successes, too.
> I think Gazala is the exemplar here;
> though Wavell and O'Connor's decision
> to expand COMPASS into an all-out
> offensive is comparable.
Crusader offensive - British losses are very heavy, initial attack
plan has gone by the wayside and main attacking forces (British armor)
effectively destroyed. Auchinleck replaces Cunningham and forces
Ritchie to continue with the attack, while the latter - and many
generals - would rather have stopped to consolidate.
Gazala - Rommel's attacking force seems to have been trapped, but he
strikes out to open a path for his resupply through British defenses
and succeeds, thus bringing about his most spectacular victory of the
campaign.
> Another question is 'good folds': occasions
> when a commander or strategist backed off
> when the current results seemed to suggest
> pushing harder - and afterwards, was shown
> to be right.
The decision not to keep going with the attack along the southern
branch of the Kursk salient?
The decision not to reach out too far from the Anzio bridgehead?
Lots of anecdotes in tank or air battles, where veteran troops would
rather break off combat than pursue an engagement under less than
favorable conditions.
In the same vein, maybe the Allied tour of duty system, whereby
successful air crews were rotated out even when they seemed to be at
the peak of their effectiveness, because higher command would rather
have them as live trainers than as dead multi-medalled heroes?
> Nagumo's cancelling the third strike against
> Pearl Harbor might qualify. (I say "might".)
> Likewise, Spruance at the end of Midway.
Spruance in the Marianas?
The USN decision not to linger out at Guadalcanal after the initial
landing, exposing the initial landing forces rather than risking to
lose the precious carriers on which so much depended?
> Britain
> was but only in France in 1940, and that
> battle was obviously lost.
Agreed, the British really couldn't think they were jeopardizing
success by pulling out, the decision to evacuate was taken at the last
possible moment. Churchill was quite adept at reinforcing failure -
witness the "second BEF" of June 1940, some of which was captured at
St Valery en Caux but quite a few more troops had almost as narrow an
escape as the Dunkirk ones.
LC
Haydn
> On Dec 25, 7:52 pm, Alan Meyer <amey...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>> Were there cases where
>> unexpectedly high casualties were incurred but the commanders
>> pressed on and achieved important objectives by dogged
>> determination and willingness to accept the casualties?
>
> I think Gazala is the exemplar here;
> though Wavell and O'Connor's decision
> to expand COMPASS into an all-out
> offensive is comparable.
A bold decision no doubt, but their casualties hadn't been, properly
speaking, high so far (and afterwards - over the whole campaign Commonwealth
losses can be estimated at one man in twenty, thus proportionally higher
than the common wisdom states, but nowhere near an objectively "high" rate).
Tanks had suffered significant, but not crippling, losses, mostly damaged or
broken down tanks to be repaired and not total write-offs, and when it
reached the Libyan border the tank force was far from depleted.
So I would not rate the COMPASS expansion as a result of doggedness in the
face of high casualties.
Haydn