The "80% of tariffs from the South" claim: totally unsupported
josep...@hotmail.com
Civil War, at least 80% of federal tariff revenue (or, in some
versions, 80% of all federal revenue) was coming from the south.
However, the source behind the claim says the exact opposite--that over
85% of tariff revenue (for 1833-37, as it turns out) was collected in
the free states. The only evidence cited for the supposed financial
exploitation of the south is a speech made in 1860, which claims to
quote a Treasury report but is completely wrong about the report's
conclusions.
Thomas DiLorenzo may serve as one example. In his book _The Real
Lincoln_, he states that "Since they were so dependent on trade, by
1860 the Southern states were paying in excess of 80 percent of all
tariffs" (p. 125).
When this claim is sourced at all, it is generally referenced to
Charles Adams's book _When in the Course of Human Events: Arguing the
Case for Southern Secession_. This is the citation given by DiLorenzo
in his book. In later interviews, DiLorenzo has sometimes ascribed the
statement to Frank Taussig's _Tariff History of the United States_, but
he has never named a page number and Taussig makes no such claim.
Adams's exact words are as follows:
"[W]hen some of the compromise tariffs of the 1830s and 1840s are
analyzed, the total revenue was around $107.5 million, with the South
paying about $90 million and the North $17.5 million." [p.27]
Dividing 90 and 17.5 by 107.5 gives 83% from the South, 17% from the
North. Adams goes on to conflate these figures (which are supposed to
be for tariffs only) with all federal revenue: Fishing bounties, Adams
writes, were "paid from the national Treasury, hence 83 percent from
the South." [p. 27]
A comparison of Adams's claims with the total tariff revenues from the
1830s and 1840s reveals that the $107.5 million he speaks of must be
from a small selection of these years: total tariff collections from
1833 to 1849 total around $350 million, according to _Historical
Statistics of the United States_ (Like all the numbers I present here,
these figures are not adjusted for inflation).
Following up Adams's footnotes yields his source: "Jabez L. M. Curry,
"The Perils and Duty of the South, November 26, 1860", in _Southern
Pamphlets on Secession_, 35-54". This book is edited by Jon L.
Wakelyn. Adams gives the page numbers for the whole pamphlet, which
reproduces a speech Curry gave; Curry's claim about tariffs appears on
p. 50.
Curry states that "[a] report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1838
shows that, in the five years 1833-37, out of $102,000,000 of
expenditure, only $37,000,000 were in the slave States; yet, during the
same years, they paid $90,000,000 of duties to $17,500,000 paid by the
free States." [p. 50]
Since Curry's claim only covers 1833 through 1837, it is hard to see
why Adams thinks it describes tariffs in the 1840s. More importantly,
though, Curry's numbers on "duties" (whatever exactly he means by that)
are simply incorrect. They bear no relation to the report he cites,
and I doubt Curry ever looked at the report himself.
(Curry's claims about spending are misleading at best, but I will not
be addressing them in this post).
Curry's source may be found by looking at the list of items from the
Treasury in Poore's _Descriptive Catalog of the Government Publications
of the United States_, which covers 1774 through 1881. The only report
which matches his description is the "Report on Public Receipts and
Expenditures", July 9, 1838, Ex. Docs., No. 460, 25th Congress, 2nd
Session, Vol. XI pt. 1. I copied this document at the West Virginia
University library.
Annex A of the report (pp. 1-8) is a list of the amount collected by
the federal government in each state and territory, in each year 1833
through 1837. Each state has listings as needed for customs, land
sales, and miscellaneous. There are also some items which appear in
only one state (like the awards under convention in New York and the
Chickasaw lands in Mississippi). The report lists treasury note sales
in 1837 as revenue, but other than that its revenue totals agree with
the numbers later printed in _Historical Statistics of the United
States_
In totaling up the report's numbers, I have included the territories of
Florida and Wisconsin with the slave and free states, respectively.
Since New Jersey had only recently passed its gradual emancipation law
at this time, and still had over a thousand slaves, it is conceivable
that Curry counted New Jersey as a slave state. To avoid any possible
undercounting of collections from slave states, my totals count New
Jersey among the slave states.
The overall totals are as follows (millions of unadjusted dollars):
Federal revenue sources, 1833-37
Free states (-NJ): Customs $86.04
Free states (-NJ): Misc $0.27
Free states (-NJ): Lands $30.78
NY: Awards under convention $5.26
PA: Cents coined at the Mint $0.10
PA: Dividends Bank U.S. $1.51
PA: Sales bank stock and bonds $1.96
Slave states (+NJ): Customs $13.03
Slave states (+NJ): Misc $0.19
Slave states (+NJ): Lands $24.22
KY: Dividend on canal stock $0.08
MS: Chickasaw lands $2.42
DC: customs $0.14
Received into the Treasury at Washington for lands $0.24
Miscellaneous items not applicable to any State $0.71
Treasury notes $2.99
Overall total: $169.94
The overall revenue breakdown for these years is around 59% customs,
35% land sales, and 6% all other. So taking tariff revenue as a proxy
for all federal revenues is a serious error.
Assuming "duties" to be customs and miscellaneous (leaving out land
sales and single-state items), we get the following totals:
Free states (-NJ): $86.31
Slave states (+NJ): $13.22
This totals just under $100 million, leaving $8 million of Curry's
claimed "duties" unaccounted for. If anyone can find a way to get a
total of $107.5 million in "duties" from these figures, I would be
interested in hearing about it.
However, no matter what adjustments are made, the idea that the slave
states paid $90 million in "duties" between 1833 and 1837 is clearly
wrong. Even totaling all federal revenues including land sales and
treasury notes, from all slave areas including DC, gives a total of
only $44 million. The idea that the free states paid only $17.5
million is just as ludicrous: tariff collections from New York alone
were over $57 million in 1833-37. The New England states by themselves
collected $16.8 million in customs revenue, almost as much as Curry
says all the free states paid in all duties.
As with my previous post on late 1850s tariffs, I should have the
numbers available online soon.
There is no reason to take the 80% claim seriously, and those who cite
it only hurt their own credibility.
---
Joseph Eros
"Scientists want to know the dirt on Eros" --Boston Globe
l...@panix.com
: It is a standard neo-Confederate claim that, at the outbreak of the
: Civil War, at least 80% of federal tariff revenue (or, in some
: versions, 80% of all federal revenue) was coming from the south.
: However, the source behind the claim says the exact opposite--that over
: 85% of tariff revenue (for 1833-37, as it turns out) was collected in
: the free states.
There is confusion here about who paid for goods protected by the
tariff. No one would argue that merchants at the ports of entry paid the
tariff, which was then passed on to the individuals or wholesalers or
retailers who purchased the goods. The port of entry is irrelevant in
determining who paid the tariff ultimately.
: Thomas DiLorenzo may serve as one example. In his book _The Real
: Lincoln_, he states that "Since they were so dependent on trade, by
: 1860 the Southern states were paying in excess of 80 percent of all
: tariffs" (p. 125).
The point here is that Southerners bought almost all their manufactured
goods. If they bought goods in the U.S., they were buying goods protected
by the tariff on imports reflected in the price of those goods. If they
bought imported goods, or traded cotton for finished manufactured cloth,
they also paid a tariff.
[snip]
: However, no matter what adjustments are made, the idea that the slave
: states paid $90 million in "duties" between 1833 and 1837 is clearly
: wrong. Even totaling all federal revenues including land sales and
: treasury notes, from all slave areas including DC, gives a total of
: only $44 million. The idea that the free states paid only $17.5
: million is just as ludicrous: tariff collections from New York alone
: were over $57 million in 1833-37. The New England states by themselves
: collected $16.8 million in customs revenue, almost as much as Curry
: says all the free states paid in all duties.
Again, those figures reflect the tariff paid at the ports of entry.
Linda T.
--
You will take possession by military force, of the printing establishments
of the New York World and Journal of Commerce . . and prohibit any
further publication thereof . . you are therefore commanded forthwith to
arrest and imprison . . the editors, proprietors and publishers . .
Lincoln to General Dix -- 18 May 1864
Scribe7716
wrote:
>The point here is that Southerners bought almost all their manufactured
>goods.
And how exactly did northerners get their manufactured goods?
Pbwalther
>>goods.
>
>And how exactly did northerners get their manufactured goods?
>
I think Linda's idea really does not hold water. She is right that consumers
ultimately paid the tariff. However, she forgets that the north had a whole
bunch more consumers then the south did. So one would think that the northern
consumers ended up paying way more in the way of tariffs then the southern
consumers paid just because there were more northern consumers.
I suppose you could get a result of the southern consumers paying most of the
tariffs if southern consumers bought imported goods and very few domestic
manufacturers and northern consumers had the opposite inclination. However,
for that to work, one has to assume radically different behavior on the parts
of consumers on a regional basis in the antebellum USA. I would guess that is
possible but it is something that I have never seen any comment on either from
a contemporary source or a historian. One would think that if consumers north
and south varied that radically in their preferences that the fact would have
been noticed, commented on and become a political football.
bdsim...@yahoo.com
affected as consumers by the tariff; as there were more consumers in
the North, that would point to who bore the burden. However, one could
also point out that northerners dispportionately benefitted from
tariffs in that the items protected tended to be made in the North (not
true in all cases, but it's true in most). That said, there were other
government expenditures that disproportionately benefitted the South,
especially territorial expansion in the 1840s and 1850s. It's true
that reducing everything to tariffs distorts if we are talking about
expenditures and benefits.
Scribe7716
wrote:
>I think Linda's idea really does not hold water.
Agreed.
> She is right that consumers
>ultimately paid the tariff. However, she forgets that the north had a whole
>bunch more consumers then the south did. So one would think that the
>northern
>consumers ended up paying way more in the way of tariffs then the southern
>consumers paid just because there were more northern consumers.
>
>I suppose you could get a result of the southern consumers paying most of the
>tariffs if southern consumers bought imported goods and very few domestic
>manufacturers and northern consumers had the opposite inclination.
But even had been this been true the "cost" of the tariff would have been the
same for the northerner and the southerner.
Suppose that circa 1860 the free market price of an imported British copper
teakettle would have been $1.00. And suppose a tariff was placed on imported
copper teakettles bringing their price up to $1.25 -- matching the price of a
domestically manufactured copper teakettle.
Now everyone who buys a copper teakettle-- foreign or domestic -- is going to
pay $1.25. Massachusetts copper teakettle buyers will pay $1.25 and South
Carolina copper teakettle buyers
will pay $1.25. And since, as you point out, there were far more people in the
north than in the south it would seem that more teakettles would be purchased
in the north. Therefore, the tariff protected price
of copper teakettles would impact the north more than the south.
Steven Witmer
<snip>
>The point here is that Southerners bought almost all their manufactured
>goods.
Hate to point this out, but unless every northern household had a foundry, a
textile mill, and a sawmill in their back parlor, most northerners were buying
manufactured goods, too.
If they bought goods in the U.S., they were buying goods protected
>by the tariff on imports reflected in the price of those goods.
A fact which would equally apply to any northern banker, farmer, lawyer or shop
owner. And there were many more of them than there were southern ones, simply
by fact of substantially greater population in the north.
If they
>bought imported goods, or traded cotton for finished manufactured cloth,
>they also paid a tariff.
Again, as it would also be for the northern consumer. Can you provide any
evidence whatsoever that northern purchase patterns were much more restricted
to domestically produced goods, while southern purchasing patterns tended
substantially toward imported goods? In the lack of such information, it
should probably be assumed that the purchasing patterns were roughly similar.
And even if southerners purchased twice as many imported goods per household
than their northern counterparts, the north would still have accounted for more
tariff payment than the south, again simply by dint of a much larger
population.
Steven Witmer
"We are all born ignorant, but one must work hard to remain stupid."
- Benjamin Franklin
HankC
If free people in the slave states (8,263,000) paid *all* of the
tariff, this amounts to $6.30 apiece.
If the tariff is spread over every free person in the country
(27,489,561) the tariff bill comes to less than $2 each.
HankC
l...@panix.com
: wrote:
From retailers, paid for with the wages they earned from the protected
industries. The ordinary consumer, of course, probably didn't like it,
but consumers have zero political clout, and the politicians they elect to
office have tons. They are often taken to lunch by the manufacturers who
like tariff protection.
Most regions have a great deal of pride in their local industries, which
is still true today. Those industries provide jobs, i.e., money. Their
political representatives are keenly aware of that.
Steven Witmer
>
>Scribe7716 <scrib...@aol.com> wrote:
>
>: wrote:
>
>: >The point here is that Southerners bought almost all their manufactured
>: >goods.
>
>: And how exactly did northerners get their manufactured goods?
>
> From retailers, paid for with the wages they earned from the protected
>industries.
Except for those who farmed (which constituted the vast majority of the
northern population), who were not among those paid with wages "earned from
protected industries", any more than the southern planter or farmer was. Or
for those who worked as hired farmhands, or private small tradesmen and
shopkeepers - how many northern small-town blacksmiths, carpenters, druggists,
milliners, and such were earning wages from "protected industries", and can you
provide any proof that such tradesmen, farmers, and shopkeeps in the north
benefitted more than their southern counterparts did?
The ordinary consumer, of course, probably didn't like it,
>but consumers have zero political clout,
Consumers are not also voters? And are not politicians themselves consumers?
Politicians had their own needs and families to see to.
and the politicians they elect to
>office have tons. They are often taken to lunch by the manufacturers who
>like tariff protection.
No southern planters ever took a senator to lunch? No southern planters *were*
senators? Was this not a counterweight to the alleged political clout of these
"manufacturers"?
>
> Most regions have a great deal of pride in their local industries, which
>is still true today. Those industries provide jobs, i.e., money. Their
>political representatives are keenly aware of that.
>
>Linda T.
I think we need to be careful not to put a 21st century face on mid-19th
century manufacturing & industry. The industry and manufacturing in 1850 does
not equate to industry and manufacturing at the beginning of the 21st century.
Most "factories" in the mid 19th century employed perhaps a few dozen employees
- they weren't GM or Ford by any means.
Scribe7716
wrote:
>: >The point here is that Southerners bought almost all their manufactured
>: >goods.
>
>: And how exactly did northerners get their manufactured goods?
>
> From retailers, paid for with the wages they earned from the protected
>industries.
Other than the fact that this was patently not the case for western farmers,
New England farm workers, and any and all northern butchers, bakers, barbers,
bootblacks, bartenders, brewers and maltsters, doctor, lawyers, et al....
Other than the fact, that it, that this was patently not the case for the vast
majority of all northerners, are you now saying that traiffs did not "cost"
northerners more than southerners?
> The ordinary consumer, of course, probably didn't like it,
>but consumers have zero political clout, and the politicians they elect to
>office have tons. They are often taken to lunch by the manufacturers who
>like tariff protection.
Tariff lobbyists, such as they were circa 1860, were obviously doing a terrible
job of it. Tariffs were at their lowest point in decades, and the loudest
complaints about tariffs in 1860 came not from southern plkanters but from
Pennsylvania iron makers who were being priced out of the market by British
imports.
>
> Most regions have a great deal of pride in their local industries, which
>is still true today.
Apparently not in the slave south where, according to Sen. Louis T. Wigfall of
Texas, "We want no manufactures: we desire no trading, no mechanical or
manufacturing classes. As long as we have our rice, our sugar, our tobacco,
and our cotton, we can command wealth to purchase all we want...."
l...@panix.com
: >"" Linda Teasley ""
: > The ordinary consumer, of course, probably didn't like it,
: >but consumers have zero political clout, and the politicians they elect to
: >office have tons. They are often taken to lunch by the manufacturers who
: >like tariff protection.
: Tariff lobbyists, such as they were circa 1860, were obviously doing a terrible
: job of it.
You've forgotten about the Morrill tariff, put into the Republican
platform in the summer of 1860.
Tariffs were at their lowest point in decades,
Let's say that tariffs were only fairly high -- as a result of the
tariff acts of 1846 and 1857. See Taussig's history for the specific
rates on protected goods.
and the loudest
: complaints about tariffs in 1860 came not from southern plkanters but from
: Pennsylvania iron makers who were being priced out of the market by British
: imports.
Pennsylvania iron makers wanted a high tariff, which they got in 1860 in
the Republican platform.
: > Most regions have a great deal of pride in their local industries, which
: >is still true today.
: Apparently not in the slave south
The south was an agricultural region.
where, according to Sen. Louis T. Wigfall of
: Texas, "We want no manufactures: we desire no trading, no mechanical or
: manufacturing classes. As long as we have our rice, our sugar, our tobacco,
: and our cotton, we can command wealth to purchase all we want...."
Wigfall seems proud of the agricultural interests of the South, as the
northeast was of its growing industrial base. The interests of the two
regions were in conflict about the tariff.
Howard G
Manufacture means to make by hand.
The word then caused visualization different than today. Antebellum, the
word probably brought to mind the local blacksmith, cooper, or the woman at
the loom all of whom manufactured goods for sale. Now the word means
automobiles, airplanes, computers, Brooks Brother suits, and other mass
produced and/or complex items.
manufacture (n.)
1567, "something made by hand," from M.Fr. manufacture, from M.L.
*manufactura, from L. manu, abl. of manus "hand" (see manual) + factura "a
working," from pp. stem of facere "to perform" (see factitious). Sense of
"process of manufacturing" first recorded 1605. The verb is attested from
1683
Etymology on line
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?l=m&p=5
Howard G
> Scribe7716 <scrib...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> : wrote:
>
> : >The point here is that Southerners bought almost all their manufactured
> : >goods.
>
> : And how exactly did northerners get their manufactured goods?
>
> From retailers, paid for with the wages they earned from the protected
> industries. The ordinary consumer, of course, probably didn't like it,
> but consumers have zero political clout, and the politicians they elect to
> office have tons. They are often taken to lunch by the manufacturers who
> like tariff protection.
>
> Most regions have a great deal of pride in their local industries, which
> is still true today. Those industries provide jobs, i.e., money. Their
> political representatives are keenly aware of that.
Just what were these local industries, and how many jobs did they provide?
What percentage of the total labor force - excluding slaves, did the the wage
earners represent? If it exceeded 1% I'd be surprised,
Demographics have change since antebellum. The "ordinary consumer" were
subistence farmers who conducted trade in many areas by barter as hard money
was scarce and paper money was valued inversely according to it's disatance
from the issuer, and the "ordinary consumer" were little effected by tarriffs.
In
1860 80.2% of the population
1840 89.2 % of the population
1820 92.5% of the population
were rural inhabitants.
l...@panix.com
: Linda Teasley wrote:
: > Scribe7716 <scrib...@aol.com> wrote:
: >
: > : wrote:
: >
: > : >The point here is that Southerners bought almost all their manufactured
: > : >goods.
: >
: > : And how exactly did northerners get their manufactured goods?
: >
: > From retailers, paid for with the wages they earned from the protected
: > industries. The ordinary consumer, of course, probably didn't like it,
: > but consumers have zero political clout, and the politicians they elect to
: > office have tons. They are often taken to lunch by the manufacturers who
: > like tariff protection.
: >
: > Most regions have a great deal of pride in their local industries, which
: > is still true today. Those industries provide jobs, i.e., money. Their
: > political representatives are keenly aware of that.
: Just what were these local industries, and how many jobs did they provide?
: What percentage of the total labor force - excluding slaves, did the the wage
: earners represent? If it exceeded 1% I'd be surprised,
The South was not an industrial area; the northeast was. The census of
1840 reported that about 30 per cent of the working age population in the
northeast were employed in manufacturing related jobs. The middle states
had about 28 per cent manufacturing workers. This is the reason that
politicians from those areas often supported high tariffs.
: Demographics have change since antebellum. The "ordinary consumer" were
: subistence farmers who conducted trade in many areas by barter as hard money
: was scarce and paper money was valued inversely according to it's disatance
: from the issuer, and the "ordinary consumer" were little effected by tarriffs.
The buyers who were most affected by tariffs were southern planters who
traded raw cotton for finished cotton goods. They were strongly affected
by high tariffs, but the related complaint to tariffs was that federal
revenue collected by customs was spent on infrastructure in the north and
northwest.
Scribe7716
wrote:
> The buyers who were most affected by tariffs were southern planters who
>traded raw cotton for finished cotton goods.
Please provide some documentation for this barter system that you posit for
southern planters. Southern planters sold their cotton for cash and used that
cash to buy whatever they would, just as Iowa corn farmers sold their crops for
cash and used that cash to buy whatever they would.
>They were strongly affected
>by high tariffs...
Please document the existance of "high tariffs" circa 1860.
Howard G
Linda Teasley wrote:
> Howard G <Rambl...@xyz.net> wrote:
> : Linda Teasley wrote:
>
> : > Scribe7716 <scrib...@aol.com> wrote:
> : >
> : > : wrote:
> : >
> : > : >The point here is that Southerners bought almost all their manufactured
> : > : >goods.
> : >
> : > : And how exactly did northerners get their manufactured goods?
> : >
> : > From retailers, paid for with the wages they earned from the protected
> : > industries. The ordinary consumer, of course, probably didn't like it,
> : > but consumers have zero political clout, and the politicians they elect to
> : > office have tons. They are often taken to lunch by the manufacturers who
> : > like tariff protection.
> : >
> : > Most regions have a great deal of pride in their local industries, which
> : > is still true today. Those industries provide jobs, i.e., money. Their
> : > political representatives are keenly aware of that.
>
> : Just what were these local industries, and how many jobs did they provide?
> : What percentage of the total labor force - excluding slaves, did the the wage
> : earners represent? If it exceeded 1% I'd be surprised,
>
> The South was not an industrial area; the northeast was. The census of
> 1840 reported that about 30 per cent of the working age population in the
> northeast were employed in manufacturing related jobs. The middle states
> had about 28 per cent manufacturing workers. This is the reason that
> politicians from those areas often supported high tariffs.
As Samuel Clements [Mark Twain] observed: "There are three types of lies - lies,
damn lies, and statistics."
Do your percentages reflect the proportion of the total population of working age,
employed and at leisure, or the proportion of the persons actually employed?
Your numbers do no square with the census numbers.
1840 89.2 % of the population were rural
Were your employees comunuters? Were they empoyed full time? Working age: Do your
numbers include child labor, boys as young as 10 years? And of the latter, what was
their wages? What was the net of the female cotton mill workers after they paid room
and board? How did the cash they receive influence the economy, did they buy
appliances such as a wringer and scrubboard for mother and accoutrements for
father's horse?
> : Demographics have change since antebellum. The "ordinary consumer" were
> : subistence farmers who conducted trade in many areas by barter as hard money
> : was scarce and paper money was valued inversely according to it's disatance
> : from the issuer, and the "ordinary consumer" were little effected by tarriffs.
>
> The buyers who were most affected by tariffs were southern planters who
> traded raw cotton for finished cotton goods. They were strongly affected
> by high tariffs, but the related complaint to tariffs was that federal
> revenue collected by customs was spent on infrastructure in the north and
> northwest.
>From what yardage and clothing allowances were furnished to slaves, a 100% tarriff
on the articles suppled would not been cause to alarm to the planter. Fancy,
made-to-measure clothes and saddlery for himself and the latest London and Paris
fashions for his family members to wear once a year to a ball in Philadelpha or New
Your City might have been a didfferent matter.
As the South controlled Congress and consequency appropriations, it was their own
inattention to business that deprived them from a fair or more-than-deserved share
of revenue from tariffs. To get their share they could have supported internal
improvements, but they were jealous of of other southern states..
l...@panix.com
: >"" Linda Teasley ""
: wrote:
: > The buyers who were most affected by tariffs were southern planters who
: >traded raw cotton for finished cotton goods.
: Please provide some documentation for this barter system that you posit for
: southern planters. Southern planters sold their cotton for cash and used that
: cash to buy whatever they would, just as Iowa corn farmers sold their crops for
: cash and used that cash to buy whatever they would.
It's a commonplace acknowledgement that Southern planters used a fairly
elaborate barter system, including trading raw cotton for manufactured
European cloth. Even Freehling in his Prelude to Civil War, while
outlining some features of their strategies, acknowledges this. "In fact,
raw cotton not onoly paid for manufactured goods but also helped support
the entire structure of American international finance." p. 195
: >They were strongly affected
: >by high tariffs...
: Please document the existance of "high tariffs" circa 1860.
Since I never made that claim, I don't feel bound to support it. I will
note, however, that the Morrill tariff passed the U.S. House of
Representatives in May, 1860; that would be before Southern congressmen
left the House, before the election, and before secession. The high
tariff train had left the station.
Cash
"Linda Teasley" <l...@panix.com> wrote
the Morrill tariff passed the U.S. House of
> Representatives in May, 1860; that would be before Southern congressmen
> left the House, before the election, and before secession.
Yet because of the rules of the Senate, it would never pass the Senate
without the southern senators allowing it to do so. It couldn't pass the
Senate until AFTER secession.
The high
> tariff train had left the station.
------------------------------------------
Not so. It was boarding, but the brake was on. As their last act in
leaving, the southern senators took the brake off.
Regards,
Cash
Howard G
Linda Teasley wrote:
> Howard G <Rambl...@xyz.net> wrote:
> : Linda Teasley wrote:
>
> : > Scribe7716 <scrib...@aol.com> wrote:
> : >
> : > : wrote:
> : >
> : > : >The point here is that Southerners bought almost all their manufactured
> : > : >goods.
> : >
> : > : And how exactly did northerners get their manufactured goods?
> : >
> : > From retailers, paid for with the wages they earned from the protected
> : > industries. The ordinary consumer, of course, probably didn't like it,
> : > but consumers have zero political clout, and the politicians they elect to
> : > office have tons. They are often taken to lunch by the manufacturers who
> : > like tariff protection.
> : >
> : > Most regions have a great deal of pride in their local industries, which
> : > is still true today. Those industries provide jobs, i.e., money. Their
> : > political representatives are keenly aware of that.
>
> : Just what were these local industries, and how many jobs did they provide?
> : What percentage of the total labor force - excluding slaves, did the the wage
> : earners represent? If it exceeded 1% I'd be surprised,
>
> The South was not an industrial area; the northeast was. The census of
> 1840 reported that about 30 per cent of the working age population in the
> northeast were employed in manufacturing related jobs. The middle states
> had about 28 per cent manufacturing workers. This is the reason that
> politicians from those areas often supported high tariffs.
If 1,000,000 persons of the population in the northeast were of working age,
300,000 would have been employed in manufacturing
If of the 1,000,000 persons of working age only 300,000 were employed, 90,000 would
have been employed in mauufacturing.
"Lies, damned lies, and statistics."
Howard G
Linda Teasley wrote:
> Scribe7716 <scrib...@aol.com> wrote:
> : >"" Linda Teasley ""
> : wrote:
>
> : > The buyers who were most affected by tariffs were southern planters who
> : >traded raw cotton for finished cotton goods.
>
> : Please provide some documentation for this barter system that you posit for
> : southern planters. Southern planters sold their cotton for cash and used that
> : cash to buy whatever they would, just as Iowa corn farmers sold their crops for
> : cash and used that cash to buy whatever they would.
>
> It's a commonplace acknowledgement that Southern planters used a fairly
> elaborate barter system, including trading raw cotton for manufactured
> European cloth. Even Freehling in his Prelude to Civil War, while
> outlining some features of their strategies, acknowledges this. "In fact,
> raw cotton not only paid for manufactured goods but also helped support
> the entire structure of American international finance." p. 195
It hardly seems reasonable that a planter would undertake the transportation of his
cotton to a port, charter a ship to transport his cotton and himself to Europe, and
undertake the process of bartering with a manufacture of the type of cloth he
desired. What if his cotton was short staple for which he learns has poor a depressed
market because of supply and demand, which eventually results in storage charges in
excess to the value of his cotton? If his bartering was successful he'd have to
undertake the same process in reverse. If unsuccessful, he might end-up in debtor's
prison by being unable pay the ship's captain who demands, "Specie, no cotton."
If a ship called at his plantation pier to load a full or partial cargo, he would
either have to accompany his cotton or have a purser accompany it to assure his prime
cotton was not switched for or sold as something inferior. Then, if not personally
accompanied, he'd need a factor to sell his cotton for a commission, and he'd need an
agent, again for a commission, to barter his cotton for the textiles he desires. "No
specie.Only 20 tread count unbleached cloth, please,"
josep...@hotmail.com
> josep...@hotmail.com wrote:
>: However, the source behind the [80% of federal revenue from the
south]
>: claim says the exact opposite--that over 85% of tariff revenue (for
>: 1833-37, as it turns out) was collected in the free states.
>
> There is confusion here about who paid for goods protected by the
> tariff. No one would argue that merchants at the ports of entry
> paid the tariff. . . [snip] The port of entry is irrelevant in
> determining who paid the tariff ultimately.
Even if that were true (and I think it's overstated), I have still
shown that the "80% of tariffs from the south" claim is unsupported.
By your argument, _no_ tariff numbers can prove or disprove the claim,
and the source cited by Adams and Dilorenzo is simply irrelevant,
whether it's cited correctly or incorrectly and whatever years it
applies to. If it's irrelevant, it doesn't prove them right.
There might theoretically be statistics that show the claim is a
reasonable one (although I doubt it). No such statistics have not been
cited by Adams, Dilorenzo, or anyone else.
Michael Furlan
A minor quibble.
There is also a "deadweight loss" due to any tariff that doesn't show up in the above
calculation.
See the following for a brief discussion of "deadweight loss."
http://spears.okstate.edu/~asavvid/Pdf/Globalization/Exercises/Chapter6-answers.pdf
bdsim...@yahoo.com
Linda Teasley wrote:
> It's a commonplace acknowledgement that Southern planters used a
fairly
> elaborate barter system, including trading raw cotton for
manufactured
> European cloth.
Oh?
> Since I never made that claim, I don't feel bound to support it. I
will
> note, however, that the Morrill tariff passed the U.S. House of
> Representatives in May, 1860; that would be before Southern
congressmen
> left the House, before the election, and before secession. The high
> tariff train had left the station.
But was the Morrill Tariff law in 1860? No. How did it become law?
Who wasn't there in the Senate?
By the same rationale you could blame the war on the Homestead Act or
the Transcontinental RR.
It's important to remember that what put white Southern plantation
owners in this situation in the first place was ... their dependence
upon a form of agribusiness production based upon slavery.
Finally, if we employ your logic, the largest plantation owners should
have been the biggest advocates of secession. Was this always the
case? What about Mississippi and Alabama? Surely if your thesis were
to hold, it would hold there. Does it?
Steven Witmer
<snip>
> Since I never made that claim, I don't feel bound to support it. I will
>note, however, that the Morrill tariff passed the U.S. House of
>Representatives in May, 1860; that would be before Southern congressmen
>left the House, before the election, and before secession. The high
>tariff train had left the station.
>
>Linda T.
>
This would almost be a true statement except for two things - the fact that the
Founding Fathers saw fit to create a *bicameral* system, whch means that the
Senate had a very real opportunity to block the tariff, and the checks and
balances system. Had the south not withdrawn its *Senators*, had they worked
in concert with their northern Democrat counterparts the tariff would have
failed to pass, if the southerners wanted it that way. And had Buchanan (who
was a *Democrat*) vetoed the tariff rather than sign it and had the southern
congressmen been still present, it *definitely* would have died.
Steven Witmer
>
> The South was not an industrial area; the northeast was.
What's this? Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Ohio don't count? Why
conglomerate "The south" into one entity, whilst divvying up the north? If
you're going to do that, should you not also divvy up the south into
"southeast" and other regions?
The census of
>1840 reported that about 30 per cent of the working age population in the
>northeast were employed in manufacturing related jobs. The middle states
>had about 28 per cent manufacturing workers. This is the reason that
>politicians from those areas often supported high tariffs.
>
Which states were considered "middle states", exactly? And do you have the
comparable numbers for the "southern states"? I would be interested in the
comparison.
Also, as (if I recall correctly) Howard G pointed, out, "manufucturing" has
rather broad connotations for the mid-19th century. A person who runs his own
shop with two hired employees making wagons is engaged in "manufacturing", yet
I don't think a shop of that sort is generally going to make thumping big
profits based upon tariffs. A milliner with one employee is engaged in
"manufacturing", yet the same thing applies. What about broom and brush
manufacturers?
So, even if you have numbers that say that 30 percent of the working age
population was employed in "manufacturing", this would seem to work against
your own earlier claims, because it shows that a *maximum* of people drawing "
wages they earned from the protected
industries." would be at 30%, less than 1/3 of the total working population *in
the northeast*. Now given our point that many of this 30% would have been
working in industries that were *not* protected by the tariff, or that would
have seen no noticeable impact from it, it stands to reason that the acutal
number drawing wages "earned from protected industries", would be a non-trivial
number *less* than 30%. *Especially* when adding in the rest of the population
from the western states is added in, which brings that number down even more.
>
> The buyers who were most affected by tariffs were southern planters who
>traded raw cotton for finished cotton goods.
Would you care to explain how the southern planter was more affected by the
tariff because of this mode of trade? And could you elaborate on how this
caused more impact upon the southern planter than the Ohio farmer or the
Minnesota blacksmith?
They were strongly affected
>by high tariffs, but the related complaint to tariffs was that federal
>revenue collected by customs was spent on infrastructure in the north and
>northwest.
IIRC, the south did not push overmuch for such infrastructure as a rule. One
exception being the transcontinental railroad.
j...@ams.org
Linda Teasley wrote:
> There is confusion here about who paid for goods protected by the
> tariff. No one would argue that merchants at the ports of entry paid
the
> tariff, which was then passed on to the individuals or wholesalers or
> retailers who purchased the goods. The port of entry is irrelevant
in
> determining who paid the tariff ultimately.
Not entirely. If there was a significant Southern demand for widgets
imported from England (compared to the Northern demand), don't you
think some of the widget importing would be done directly to, say,
Charleston, rather than to New York? Your basic point is correct,
but I think we are allowed to infer that the Southern share of the
tariff burden was small; otherwise the market would have required
direct importation to the South (to avoid the coastal shipping costs).
JFE
Pbwalther
>pay $1.25. Massachusetts copper teakettle buyers will pay $1.25 and South
>Carolina copper teakettle buyers
>will pay $1.25.
True Scribe, but if northerners bought only local teakettles, they would be
paying no tariff even though the costs of teakettles would be higher as a
result of the tariff. Also, if we assume that southerners bought only foreign
teakettles, then the southern consumers would be the only ones actually paying
a tariff. I suppose that if those trends actually existed then the south could
have paid the lion's share of the tariff but both north and south would have
been IMPACTED by the tariff as you pointed out.
However, from a political standpoint consumers are consumers and they can
figure out that a tariff is costing them in higher prices. So one would think
that norhtern and southern consumers would oppose a tariff unless their jobs
were in protected industries.
I have read that the tariff amounted to a very small tax per individual,
something like a few dollars per annum, so it was not seen as being that
obtrusive. Remember the alternative to a revenue tariff would have been some
other form of tax which the voters would like even less. No one likes paying
taxes mind you, but some are less palatable then others.
bdsim...@yahoo.com
was not able to control the federal government's economic policies as
it once had. While things went the South's way, that was great; when
the North began to exercise clout proportionate to its population
(overcoming the artificial Southern majority insured by the 3/5s rule),
then the game was unfair. However, as others have demonstrated,
secession made possible the passage of an economic agenda more
favorable to northern economic interests.
By restricting her discussion to the tariff, Linda is able to overlook
the ways in which federal policy served southern economic interests,
including slavery. She's not explained why it's okay for the federal
government to service southern economic interests, but a grounds for
secession for the federal government to service northern economic
interests. She also overlooks the way in with the South's primary
economic interest (slavery) was built into southern political power at
the national level through the 3/5s rule.
l...@panix.com
: Linda Teasley wrote:
: >
: > There is confusion here about who paid for goods protected by the
: > tariff. No one would argue that merchants at the ports of entry
: > paid the tariff. . . [snip] The port of entry is irrelevant in
: > determining who paid the tariff ultimately.
: Even if that were true (and I think it's overstated), I have still
: shown that the "80% of tariffs from the south" claim is unsupported.
: By your argument, _no_ tariff numbers can prove or disprove the claim,
: and the source cited by Adams and Dilorenzo is simply irrelevant,
: whether it's cited correctly or incorrectly and whatever years it
: applies to. If it's irrelevant, it doesn't prove them right.
I agree with you that the claims about the South's percentage of the
tariff payments made by Adams and DiLorenzo is not a well demonstrated
point. Your post was a useful beginning in looking at the tariff issue.
I am merely pointing out that looking at the actual collections at ports
of entry is not conclusive either. We would have to track the goods in
some fashion to see who bore the cost and that requires a broader economic
analysis.
: There might theoretically be statistics that show the claim is a
: reasonable one (although I doubt it). No such statistics have not been
: cited by Adams, Dilorenzo, or anyone else.
Jabez Curry's speech in 1860 about the tariff cites figures in Thomas
Prentiss Kettell's published account _Southern Wealth and Northern
Profits_ printed in 1860. I have not seen that publication and don't know
how his numbers are derived.
l...@panix.com
: Linda Teasley wrote:
: >
: > The South was not an industrial area; the northeast was.
: What's this? Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Ohio don't count? Why
: conglomerate "The south" into one entity, whilst divvying up the north? If
: you're going to do that, should you not also divvy up the south into
: "southeast" and other regions?
These are not my divisions, Steve. Taussig reported these figures in
his history of the tariff. The book is available online. He did not give
figures for the South or the midwest.
[snip]
: So, even if you have numbers that say that 30 percent of the working age
: population was employed in "manufacturing", this would seem to work against
: your own earlier claims, because it shows that a *maximum* of people drawing "
: wages they earned from the protected
: industries." would be at 30%, less than 1/3 of the total working population *in
: the northeast*. Now given our point that many of this 30% would have been
: working in industries that were *not* protected by the tariff, or that would
: have seen no noticeable impact from it, it stands to reason that the acutal
: number drawing wages "earned from protected industries", would be a non-trivial
: number *less* than 30%. *Especially* when adding in the rest of the population
: from the western states is added in, which brings that number down even more.
Taussig does not break the manufacturing sector numbers down into
industries which were protected and which were not. I have a real problem
with an argument which says that the manufacturing and industrial sectors
in the 19th century U.S. did not receive political patronage from the
states in which they were located. Louisiana's sugar industry certainly
enjoyed political protection from tariffs and Louisiana liked that just
fine. There are a lot of issues unresolved with respect to the tariff,
but not that one.
: >
: > The buyers who were most affected by tariffs were southern planters who
: >traded raw cotton for finished cotton goods.
: Would you care to explain how the southern planter was more affected by the
: tariff because of this mode of trade? And could you elaborate on how this
: caused more impact upon the southern planter than the Ohio farmer or the
: Minnesota blacksmith?
The Ohio farmer and the Minnesota blacksmith were not importers of
tariff protected goods. Certainly as consumers they would pay more for
some protected imported items, if they bought them, but they had no big
gripe with a system that cost them very little.
: They were strongly affected
: >by high tariffs, but the related complaint to tariffs was that federal
: >revenue collected by customs was spent on infrastructure in the north and
: >northwest.
: IIRC, the south did not push overmuch for such infrastructure as a rule. One
: exception being the transcontinental railroad.
Actually, I don't know what the South advocated about infrastructure.
I'm just aware that they complained a lot about it in the north and
northwest.
--
l...@panix.com
: Linda Teasley wrote:
: > There is confusion here about who paid for goods protected by the
: > tariff. No one would argue that merchants at the ports of entry paid
: the
: > tariff, which was then passed on to the individuals or wholesalers or
: > retailers who purchased the goods. The port of entry is irrelevant
: in
: > determining who paid the tariff ultimately.
: Not entirely. If there was a significant Southern demand for widgets
: imported from England (compared to the Northern demand), don't you
: think some of the widget importing would be done directly to, say,
: Charleston, rather than to New York?
I think you've overlooked the fact that the tariff is a federal tax. It's
collected no matter where dutiable items come into the country. Remember
Lincoln's promise in his 1st inaugural to continue to collect? That has
been used often to try to prove the point that the war was about
economics.
Your basic point is correct,
: but I think we are allowed to infer that the Southern share of the
: tariff burden was small;
Inferences are not a very good substitute for some actual data; Mr.
Eros's importation figures are a pretty good start, but there are other
pieces needed to make a judgment about tariffs.
otherwise the market would have required
: direct importation to the South (to avoid the coastal shipping costs).
The South wanted, you will recall, to establish very low duty trade
zones in southern ports in their secession agenda.
Linda T.
j...@ams.org
>I think you've overlooked the fact that the tariff is a federal tax.
I don't see how I am. My point is that importation to NY puts
three extra costs onto an imported item:
(1) Shipping to NY;
(2) Coastal shipping to consumer;
(3) Tariff.
Now, shipping costs to NY would be comparable to shipping to
Charleston, *if* there was enough of a market to fill a ship with
stuff. Thus, there is substantial savings to direct importation to
Charleston, because the coastal shipping isn't needed. The
fact that there wasn't significant importation to Charleston
tells me there wasn't significant demand for imported goods
compared to NY.
>The South wanted, you will recall, to establish very low duty trade
>zones in southern ports in their secession agenda.
And yet, IIRC, they imposed precisely the same tariff rates as the
United States.
JFE
JFE
Will
Linda Teasley wrote:
> ...
> It's a commonplace acknowledgement that Southern planters used a
fairly
> elaborate barter system, including trading raw cotton for
manufactured
> European cloth. Even Freehling in his Prelude to Civil War, while
> outlining some features of their strategies, acknowledges this. "In
fact,
> raw cotton not onoly paid for manufactured goods but also helped
support
> the entire structure of American international finance." p. 195
Huh? Freehling, in the quote you provided, says nothing about a
barter system. He uses the verb "paid" and refers to a structure of
international finance. Both are currency based concepts.
l...@panix.com
Here's what Freehling said:
"The forty-bale theory was poor economics [referring to McDuffie's
audience-pleasing rhetoric] -- but superb propaganda -- because it grossly
simplified both foreign trade and the domestic market. First,
Anglo-American commerce involved more than a simple bartering of raw
cotton for manufactured goods." (Notice that he acknowledges that this
bartering was part of the issue. lgt)
Freehling then goes on to outline various strategies pursued by planters
who wanted to avoid paying a tariff. Freehling is deconstructing the
free-trade arguments of southerners, but he also accepts that planters
were merchants as well as exporters. "In fact, raw cotton not only paid
for manufactured goods but also helped the entire structure of American
international finance." (p. 195)
He gives a lot of insight into the complicated arrangements initiated by
the exporters of raw cotton in order to show that McDuffie's forty-bale
theory was not supported by actual trade practices.
l...@panix.com
: Linda Teasley said:
: Now, shipping costs to NY would be comparable to shipping to
: Charleston, *if* there was enough of a market to fill a ship with
: stuff. Thus, there is substantial savings to direct importation to
: Charleston, because the coastal shipping isn't needed. The
: fact that there wasn't significant importation to Charleston
: tells me there wasn't significant demand for imported goods
: compared to NY.
New York had begun its ascendancy to the premier harbor in the U.S. in
1817. The ship-building industry, spurred by federal subsidies in order
to get the industry off the ground, and navigation laws with respect to
foreign ships, meant that New England had a way head start on
transportation across the pond, along with *scheduled* packet line
shipping down the coast. They had practically a monopoly on the services,
including interest, commissions, freight, insurance, and they kept freight
rates low. The shipping volume in New York eroded the Charleston shipping
trade. In 1851 Charleston welcomed 92,000 tons of goods, in New York
1,448,000 tons. Ships picked up southern cotton and sailed to Liverpool
and returned to New York with European manufactured goods.
: >The South wanted, you will recall, to establish very low duty trade
: >zones in southern ports in their secession agenda.
: And yet, IIRC, they imposed precisely the same tariff rates as the
: United States.
I don't think that's correct. The highest Confederate tariff was 25 per
cent on some luxury goods, like wine and liqueurs, and the lowest was 5
per cent. That's lower than the 1857 tariff rates in which leading
articles were assessed at about 25 per cent -- but that was an improvement
over the 1846 rate of 30 per cent.
Cash
"Linda Teasley" <l...@panix.com> wrote in message
news:cq7s41$n3l$1...@reader2.panix.com...
> Will <wh_k...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> : Linda Teasley wrote:
> : > ...
> : > It's a commonplace acknowledgement that Southern planters used a
> : fairly
> : > elaborate barter system, including trading raw cotton for
> : manufactured
> : > European cloth. Even Freehling in his Prelude to Civil War, while
> : > outlining some features of their strategies, acknowledges this. "In
> : fact,
> : > raw cotton not onoly paid for manufactured goods but also helped
> : support
> : > the entire structure of American international finance." p. 195
>
Here's what Freehling said:
>
> "The forty-bale theory was poor economics [referring to McDuffie's
> audience-pleasing rhetoric] -- but superb propaganda -- because it grossly
> simplified both foreign trade and the domestic market. First,
> Anglo-American commerce involved more than a simple bartering of raw
> cotton for manufactured goods." (Notice that he acknowledges that this
> bartering was part of the issue. lgt)
>
> Freehling then goes on to outline various strategies pursued by planters
> who wanted to avoid paying a tariff. Freehling is deconstructing the
> free-trade arguments of southerners, but he also accepts that planters
> were merchants as well as exporters. "In fact, raw cotton not only paid
> for manufactured goods but also helped the entire structure of American
> international finance." (p. 195)
>
> He gives a lot of insight into the complicated arrangements initiated by
> the exporters of raw cotton in order to show that McDuffie's forty-bale
> theory was not supported by actual trade practices.
>
------------------------------
The way I read it, it seems to me that Freehling contradicts you on that
page. After saying "Anglo-American commerce involved more than a simple
bartering of raw cotton for manufactured goods," which is essentially what
you claimed, Freehling says, "American merchants could--and did--import
items not subject to American tariffs, or accept bills of exchange, useful
in buying nonprotected goods in the Indies and the Orient, or take cash
credits, needed to pay back debts owed Europeans, or import specie,
desperately needed by American banks." While your original statement did
say the system included barter, your post seemed to stress this aspect,
whereas Freehling appears to minimize it.
Freehling continues, "Second, the price structure of the American domestic
economy was more flexible than the iron law of supply and demand indicated.
To borrow McDuffie's own example, the one hundred dollars chasing the cloth
was not the only money in the economy. Since cloth and other protected
manufactured goods were often necessities or desirable luxuries, consumers
bought them at higher prices, employing dollars they would otherwise have
spent on other items. The notion that manufactured goods were imported at a
40-percent loss, in short, was as absurd as the notion that manufactured
goods alone could be imported." [pp. 195-196]
I question how much he "accepts that planters were merchants as well as
exporters." Freehling says, "American merchants, whether acting as agents
for planters or as independent entrepreneurs, were not importing cloth at a
40-percent loss with many profitable alternatives available." [p. 195] It
seems to me he specifically differentiates between planters and merchants.
Freehling especially contradicts past statements by DiLorenzo and Adams when
he explains McDuffie's "forty-bale theory."
"The forty-bale theory was based on the notion that all the confusion about
protective tariffs stemmed from one misleading fallacy. Southern producers
assumed that the cash they received for their crop was derived from the sale
of cotton in England. But in reality, claimed McDuffie, England shipped
manufactured goods, rather than cash across the Atlantic to pay for cotton.
As a result, the money dispatched to southern cotton planters was the
proceeds of the sale of English manufactured goods in America. To take a
hypothetical example, the planter exchanged his one hundred bales of cotton
for one hundred pieces of cloth in Europe, and exchanged the European cloth
for cash in America. The process was obscured by the intervention of
merchants. But the merchants were merely agents who traded the raw cotton
in Europe, sold the manufactured cloth in America, and forwarded the
proceeds to the planter.
"Since foreign trade essentially involved an exchange of raw cotton for
manufactured cloth, continued McDuffie, a protective tariff cut the
exchangeable value of the southern staple. If no tariff was in effect, the
planter could send his one hundred bales abroad and sell his one hundred
pieces of cloth at home. But if a 40-percent tariff was enacted, the
planter would have to pay forty pieces of cloth at the customhouse and would
have only sixty pieces left to sell.
"The planter could not pass the tax on to consumers by charging higher
prices for the surviving sixty pieces. McDuffie believed that the price of
a commodity was dependent on the iron laws of supply and demand. Prices
went up if the amount of goods available declined or if the amount of money
in the economy increased. Tariffs did not change the domestic price because
they had no effect on either the supply of cloth or the amount of money.
Imagine an economy with one hundred dollars available to purchase cloth and
one hundred pieces imported. A 40-percent tariff would neither augment nor
decrease the one hundred dollars purchasers would use. Since the government
would sell the forty pieces and the planter his sixty pieces, one hundred
pieces of cloth would remain on the market. Thus the planter would receive
sixty dollars for his sixty pieces. The intervention of merchants again
obscured the process. But the merchants remained no more than agents who
sold the one hundred pieces of cloth for one hundred dollars, handed forty
dollars to the customs collector, and passed the loss on to the cotton
planter by dispatching only sixty dollars. Therefore, McDuffie triumphantly
concluded, a 40-percent tariff robbed the planter of forty bales per
hundred!" [pp. 194-195]
Those who have read DiLorenzo's writings about the tariff will recognize
he's bought into McDuffie hook, line, and sinker. Interesting that an
economics professor would buy into what Freehling identifies as "poor
economics." As Freehling writes, "McDuffie tried to establish the absurd
position that the tariff was ultimately paid by southern producers in the
form of plunging cotton prices no matter what happened to foreign tariffs or
American imports." [p. 194]
Regards,
Cash
Steven Witmer
>
>Steven Witmer <witme...@aol.comnospam> wrote:
>: Linda Teasley wrote:
>: >
>: > The South was not an industrial area; the northeast was.
>
>: What's this? Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Ohio don't count?
>Why
>: conglomerate "The south" into one entity, whilst divvying up the north? If
>: you're going to do that, should you not also divvy up the south into
>: "southeast" and other regions?
>
> These are not my divisions, Steve. Taussig reported these figures in
>his history of the tariff. The book is available online. He did not give
>figures for the South or the midwest.
Then really for purposes of this discussion, isn't his data more or less
irrelevent? Since we cannot leaven it with the data from the remaining free
states, and we cannot compare it to the data from the slave states, it's just a
bit of free-floating data - interesting but with no real practical use in the
discussion.
<snip>
>
> Taussig does not break the manufacturing sector numbers down into
>industries which were protected and which were not.
Then his numbers become even less useful for discussion on the tariff - first,
they only provide a look at one limited section, and second, his figures do not
differentiate between sectors affected by the tariff and those that are not.
For all we know, the total working population across the north engaged in
manufacturing was 15%, and 90% of those were not in industries affected by the
tariff.
I have a real problem
>with an argument which says that the manufacturing and industrial sectors
>in the 19th century U.S. did not receive political patronage from the
>states in which they were located. Louisiana's sugar industry certainly
>enjoyed political protection from tariffs and Louisiana liked that just
>fine. There are a lot of issues unresolved with respect to the tariff,
>but not that one.
>
I don't recall saying there may not have been patronage, but I question the
weight it might be given in this thread, given the political counterbalances
available.
>: >
>: > The buyers who were most affected by tariffs were southern planters who
>: >traded raw cotton for finished cotton goods.
>
>: Would you care to explain how the southern planter was more affected by the
>: tariff because of this mode of trade? And could you elaborate on how this
>: caused more impact upon the southern planter than the Ohio farmer or the
>: Minnesota blacksmith?
>
> The Ohio farmer and the Minnesota blacksmith were not importers of
>tariff protected goods. Certainly as consumers they would pay more for
>some protected imported items, if they bought them, but they had no big
>gripe with a system that cost them very little.
Except - is not the cost of the tariff passed on from the manufacturer to the
consumer? Was the southern cotton industry unable to do this for some reason?
Surely they would not be adverse to bumping the cost of a bail of cotton a bit
to cover any inconvenient overhead that the tariff might cause? Remember King
Cotton, and the southern belief that when the southern cotton producers
sneezed, the British textile industry caught cold.
<snip>
j...@ams.org
Linda Teasley wrote:
> New York had begun its ascendancy to the premier harbor in the U.S.
in
> 1817. The ship-building industry, spurred by federal subsidies in
order
> to get the industry off the ground, and navigation laws with respect
to
> foreign ships, meant that New England had a way head start on
> transportation across the pond, along with *scheduled* packet line
> shipping down the coast. They had practically a monopoly on the
services,
> including interest, commissions, freight, insurance, and they kept
freight
> rates low. The shipping volume in New York eroded the Charleston
shipping
> trade. In 1851 Charleston welcomed 92,000 tons of goods, in New York
> 1,448,000 tons. Ships picked up southern cotton and sailed to
Liverpool
> and returned to New York with European manufactured goods.
I'll assume this is all spot-on accurate, and ask: So what? The
essential point is that *if* there was this enormous market for
imported goods which is the basis for the claim that the South
paid so much of the tariff, then there would have been classic
market forces at work encouraging direct importation to Southern
ports, thus increasing the amount of tariff collected at those
ports. Some smart person would have seen that he could make a
killing by directly importing to Charleston and thus saving the
coastal shipping costs. In the absence of these market forces
being at work, I am forced to conclude there was no such demand,
i.e., the claim of Southern payment of a high fraction of the tariff
burden is bogus.
> : >The South wanted, you will recall, to establish very low duty
trade
> : >zones in southern ports in their secession agenda.
>
> : And yet, IIRC, they imposed precisely the same tariff rates as the
> : United States.
>
> I don't think that's correct.
[snips]
I'm posting from memory what I have seen others claim.
JFE
Scribe7716
wrote:
> You've forgotten about the Morrill tariff, put into the Republican
>platform in the summer of 1860.
The "Morrill tariff" was proposed legislation, and it was not enshrined in the
1860 Republican platform. The platform was, in fact, quite mild on tariffs.
Gustave Koerner of Illinois, a member of the platform committee, explained,
"The only trouble was given us by Greeley, who insisted upon a strong
protective plank. We did not consider the tariff question at this particular
time as one of primary importance, and we humored him by declaring that 'while
providing revenue for the support of the general government by duties upon
imports, sound policy requires such an adjustment as to encourage the
development of the industrial interests of the whole country.' This amounted to
no more than the establishment of a revenue tariff bill with incidental
protection, and did not differ essentially from former Democratic declarations
on the same subject."
>> Tariffs were at their lowest point in decades,
> Let's say that tariffs were only fairly high -- as a result of the
>tariff acts of 1846 and 1857.
No, let's say that circa 1860 tariffs were at their lowest level since 1816.
Let's say as CSA VP-to be Alexander Stephens said that the tariff was "just
what her [South Carolina's] own Senators and members of Congress made it."
> and the loudest
>: complaints about tariffs in 1860 came not from southern plkanters but from
>: Pennsylvania iron makers who were being priced out of the market by British
>: imports.
>
> Pennsylvania iron makers wanted a high tariff, which they got in 1860 in
>the Republican platform.
Gustave Koerner, above, and Allan Nevins, _The Emergence of Lincoln_, V2, would
beg to differ: "But the Republican platform in 1856 was silent on the tariff;
in 1860 it carried a milk-and-water statement which Western Republicans took,
mild as it was, with a wry face," Nevins wrote, "the incoming President was
little interested in the tariff,; and any harsh legislation was impossible."
>: > Most regions have a great deal of pride in their local industries, which
>
>: >is still true today.
>
>>: Apparently not in the slave south
>
> The south was an agricultural region.
As was the north. The difference being that agricultre in the south was
defined by the ruling slavocracy as plantation agriculture, and slavery was
seen as essential to maintaining the plantation system. Going back to Alex
Stephens, he said that the only real grievances between north and south were
the antislavery agitation in the north's refusal to give up
fugitive slaves.
>
> where, according to Sen. Louis T. Wigfall of
>: Texas, "We want no manufactures: we desire no trading, no mechanical or
>: manufacturing classes. As long as we have our rice, our sugar, our
>tobacco,
>: and our cotton, we can command wealth to purchase all we want...."
>
> Wigfall seems proud of the agricultural interests of the South, as the
>northeast was of its growing industrial base. The interests of the two
>regions were in conflict about the tariff.
Let's return to Nevins, _Emergence_, V2: "South Carolina's Declaration of
immediate causes of secession ignored economic issues and concentrated upon
slavery," Nevins wrote. "[Robert Barnwell] Rhett's Address to the other
slaveholding states did charge the north with gross injustice in tariff
legislation; but the whole body of South Carolina's Representatives and
Senators had voted for the existing tariff of 1857, and Rhett in defending his
Address declared that to win the sympathy of Britain and France, a protest
against protective tariffs would be more useful than a protest grounded on the
slavery question."
So then, as today, tariff complaints were nothing more than a smokescreen
designed to hide the true issue -- the southern desire to preserve, protect,
and expand slavery.
Scribe7716
wrote:
>: > The buyers who were most affected by tariffs were southern planters who
>: >traded raw cotton for finished cotton goods.
>
>: Please provide some documentation for this barter system that you posit for
>
>: southern planters. Southern planters sold their cotton for cash and used
>that
>: cash to buy whatever they would, just as Iowa corn farmers sold their crops
>for
>: cash and used that cash to buy whatever they would.
>
> It's a commonplace acknowledgement that Southern planters used a fairly
>elaborate barter system, including trading raw cotton for manufactured
>European cloth.
Humor me. If this knowledge is so "commonplace" it should'nt be difficult to
point me to some documentation.
>
>: >They were strongly affected
>: >by high tariffs...
>
>: Please document the existance of "high tariffs" circa 1860.
>
> Since I never made that claim, I don't feel bound to support it.
So if the tariff's weren't high, what was all the commotion.
> I will
>note, however, that the Morrill tariff passed the U.S. House of
>Representatives in May, 1860; that would be before Southern congressmen
>left the House, before the election, and before secession.
But it did not become law and could not have become law with the Senate as
configured in 1860. Mr. Morrill only got his tariff after the southern
Congressmen and Senators had hightailed it.
l...@panix.com
: Those who have read DiLorenzo's writings about the tariff will recognize
: he's bought into McDuffie hook, line, and sinker.
What is your evidence for that? It's also recognized amongst scholars,
even southern ones, that McDuffie's statements are not economically sound.
l...@panix.com
: > Linda Teasley ""
: wrote:
: > You've forgotten about the Morrill tariff, put into the Republican
: >platform in the summer of 1860.
: The "Morrill tariff" was proposed legislation, and it was not enshrined in the
: 1860 Republican platform. The platform was, in fact, quite mild on tariffs.
The Morrill tariff was on its way to becoming law.
: > Let's say that tariffs were only fairly high -- as a result of the
: >tariff acts of 1846 and 1857.
: No, let's say that circa 1860 tariffs were at their lowest level since 1816.
That was going away in 1860.
: > Wigfall seems proud of the agricultural interests of the South, as the
: >northeast was of its growing industrial base. The interests of the two
: >regions were in conflict about the tariff.
: So then, as today, tariff complaints were nothing more than a smokescreen
: designed to hide the true issue -- the southern desire to preserve, protect,
: and expand slavery.
Slavery was a fiery issue, but the tariff issue was not a smokescreen.
We'll just have to agree to disagree.
Scribe7716
wrote:
>>Now everyone who buys a copper teakettle-- foreign or domestic -- is going
>to
>>pay $1.25. Massachusetts copper teakettle buyers will pay $1.25 and South
>>Carolina copper teakettle buyers
>>will pay $1.25.
>
>True Scribe, but if northerners bought only local teakettles, they would be
>paying no tariff even though the costs of teakettles would be higher as a
>result of the tariff.
Northerners would be paying the indirect cost of the tariff, that is, the price
increase of copper teakettles brought by the tariff. The "cost" would be the
same to the northerners and the southerners.
Also, if we assume that southerners bought only
>foreign
>teakettles, then the southern consumers would be the only ones actually
>paying
>a tariff. I suppose that if those trends actually existed then the south
>could
>have paid the lion's share of the tariff but both north and south would have
>been IMPACTED by the tariff as you pointed out.
>
>However, from a political standpoint consumers are consumers and they can
>figure out that a tariff is costing them in higher prices. So one would
>think
>that norhtern and southern consumers would oppose a tariff unless their jobs
>were in protected industries.
>
>I have read that the tariff amounted to a very small tax per individual,
>something like a few dollars per annum, so it was not seen as being that
>obtrusive.
Per Allan Nevins, _Emergence_ V2, "it [the tariff] cost a nation of thirty
million people but sixty million dollars in indirect revenue."
l...@panix.com
: Linda Teasley wrote:
: > These are not my divisions, Steve. Taussig reported these figures in
: >his history of the tariff. The book is available online. He did not give
: >figures for the South or the midwest.
: Then really for purposes of this discussion, isn't his data more or less
: irrelevent? Since we cannot leaven it with the data from the remaining free
: states, and we cannot compare it to the data from the slave states, it's just a
: bit of free-floating data - interesting but with no real practical use in the
: discussion.
I gave Taussig's data to refute the point that manufacturing interests
were nonexistent in the northeast. They were not only existent, they were
politically important.
: > Taussig does not break the manufacturing sector numbers down into
: >industries which were protected and which were not.
: I have a real problem
: >with an argument which says that the manufacturing and industrial sectors
: >in the 19th century U.S. did not receive political patronage from the
: >states in which they were located. Louisiana's sugar industry certainly
: >enjoyed political protection from tariffs and Louisiana liked that just
: >fine. There are a lot of issues unresolved with respect to the tariff,
: >but not that one.
: >
: I don't recall saying there may not have been patronage, but I question the
: weight it might be given in this thread, given the political counterbalances
: available.
What do you mean by political counterbalances?
: Except - is not the cost of the tariff passed on from the manufacturer to the
: consumer? Was the southern cotton industry unable to do this for some reason?
: Surely they would not be adverse to bumping the cost of a bail of cotton a bit
: to cover any inconvenient overhead that the tariff might cause? Remember King
: Cotton, and the southern belief that when the southern cotton producers
: sneezed, the British textile industry caught cold.
The British textile industry was no longer highly dependent on Southern
cotton. They were rapidly developing Indian cotton as a source for raw
cotton for Manchester textile mills. Southern planters were cash poor and
highly leveraged. They hated the tariff costs.
Linda T.
l...@panix.com
: I'll assume this is all spot-on accurate, and ask: So what? The
: essential point is that *if* there was this enormous market for
: imported goods which is the basis for the claim that the South
: paid so much of the tariff, then there would have been classic
: market forces at work encouraging direct importation to Southern
: ports, thus increasing the amount of tariff collected at those
: ports. Some smart person would have seen that he could make a
: killing by directly importing to Charleston and thus saving the
: coastal shipping costs. In the absence of these market forces
: being at work, I am forced to conclude there was no such demand,
: i.e., the claim of Southern payment of a high fraction of the tariff
: burden is bogus.
A very good economic argument; however, the transportation and freight
systems that had developed in New York were highly efficient and had low
rates. Southerners had not developed anything to compete with it. Short
of buying their own ships and paying crews (which a few of them did),
they mostly could not afford the capital outlay from private indidviduals
to get a freight system going in a serious way.
Scribe7716
wrote:
>: The "Morrill tariff" was proposed legislation, and it was not enshrined in
>the
>: 1860 Republican platform. The platform was, in fact, quite mild on
>tariffs.
>
> The Morrill tariff was on its way to becoming law.
Only after their Congressmen and senators withdrew when the slave south seceded
trying to preserve, protect and expand slavery.
>: > Let's say that tariffs were only fairly high -- as a result of the
>: >tariff acts of 1846 and 1857.
>
>: No, let's say that circa 1860 tariffs were at their lowest level since
>1816.
>
> That was going away in 1860.
Not necessarily if the slave south had not seceded. As Alexander Stephens said,
"All other [other than, that is, antislavery agitation and northern refusal to
return fugitive slaves] complaints are founded on threatened dangers that may
never come, and which I feel very sure would be averted if the South would
pursue a judicious and wise course."
>: > Wigfall seems proud of the agricultural interests of the South, as the
>: >northeast was of its growing industrial base. The interests of the two
>: >regions were in conflict about the tariff.
>
>: So then, as today, tariff complaints were nothing more than a smokescreen
>: designed to hide the true issue -- the southern desire to preserve,
>protect,
>: and expand slavery.
>
>Slavery was a fiery issue, but the tariff issue was not a smokescreen.
>We'll just have to agree to disagree.
Since you, in the process, are disagreeing with Robert Barnwell Rhett,
Alexander Stephens, and historians from James Ford Rhodes down to today, I
don't take it badly that you also disagree with me.
Dan D. Cyr
scholar has not just done the research to show what was commonly sold in
the various shops/stores in the southern area, examined the newspapers
for items offered for sale, and done some digging at the business papers
for a number of "plantations" to see what they were buying and from
whom. It seems that it would be fairly simple to demonstrate that
either the southern customers were buying lots of imported goods
(taxed), or not. Would not imported goods have records have final
destination (who bought them...where were they transshipped)? Since the
majority of southerns owned no slaves (leaving aside the percentages by
state for the south as a whole), I'd think that most were small farmers
or trades people in fairly rural areas who did not import much at all
(in general most was local made or grown, or available via rail or wagon
from fairly close regional market areas).
New York was not the major shipping port in the US because Yankee
shipping interests decided that they'd use it, but also because of the
canal systems linking it with the west, the rail systems branching out
from it and the growth of banks to service all of this activity (plus
its proximity to Europe). This all took several decades to build up,
but by the time of the war, New York was the financial center of the US
in terms of business as a result. No southern port could offer the same
attributes or value to buyers and sellers. Why would someone ship to
Charleston EXCEPT to sell for the local market area (limited access to
areas deeper in the country due to lack of rail and canal routes). This
would apply to all ports that could not act as ports of "entry" to the
interior.
Has anyone done any research to show how much of the imported goods
through New York City (or other northern ports) were transshipped via
coastal freight, rail roads and canal barge? Again, this would seem
like a fairly straight forward study (I realize how long it might
take). I'd assume that the vast majority of imported goods were shipped
via train and barge to points further west (look at the transportation
grid of the time). If one wanted to sell products in Cleveland,
Chicago, St. Paul, or even St. Louis, it was easier and cheaper to
import at New York City and ship west than attempt to ship to New
Orleans (I cannot think of any other southern port that could) and
transship north. For that matter, it was most likely cheaper to ship to
New York City and then transship to points south by rail than by ship
(unless large bulk).
It would seem, just to myself, that purely simple physical (geographic)
facts and population numbers would show that the south did not import
all that much, and depended on local and regional markets (like most of
the country) to supply its needs and wants.
Dan
Will
Dan D. Cyr wrote:
> ... For that matter, it was most likely cheaper to ship to
> New York City and then transship to points south by rail than by ship
> (unless large bulk).
I very much doubt that it would be cheaper to do that. In fact I think
the costs would likely be far greater becuase rail connections from
north to south were fragmented at the time. From New York the goods
would have to be ferried to someplace in New Jersey like Jersey City or
Perth Amboy then sdent by rail to Philadelphia. Before the war,
several major cities like Philadelphia did not have pass through rail
service. Lines that came into these cities from the south and from the
north did not meet. Goods would have to be transferred from one
station to the other, and in some cases from one railway company to
another. Same thing would happen in Baltimore. Likewise there was no
rail crossing of the Potomac at Washington, so goods would have to be
ferried to Alexandria. So to even get to the goods to the Potomac
would involve several transfers.
j...@ams.org
Will wrote:
> Dan D. Cyr wrote:
> > ... For that matter, it was most likely cheaper to ship to
> > New York City and then transship to points south by rail than by
ship
> > (unless large bulk).
>
> I very much doubt that it would be cheaper to do that. In fact I
think
> the costs would likely be far greater becuase rail connections from
> north to south were fragmented at the time.
Just to add some hard data to this: The distance from Liverpool to
New York is 3108 miles; from Liverpool to Charleston is 3539 miles,
an increase of only 14%. Given that a ship taking goods directly
from Britain to Charleston could then pick up cotton directly to
take back to Britain, I would think direct importation to the South
would be much more efficient, *IF* (and this is the issue, IMO) there
was enough of a market to justify sending a full ship of widgets to
the South. The tariff data supplied by Mr. Eros implies this was
not happening, which tells me there wasn't the demand, which tells
me the South was not paying such a large share of the tariff.
JFE
j...@ams.org
But what about a New York importer or a British exporter? If the
market
existed, they had the capital to take advantage of it by setting up
an office in, say, Charleston, and avoiding the coastal shipping costs.
This means they will get more business (because they can offer goods
at lower prices). But no one did this. So, I conclude that *the
market didn't exist*, i.e., there was not this great demand (compared
to the Northern market) for imported goods, therefore the South did not
bear 80% of the tariff burden.
JFE
j...@ams.org
Linda Teasley wrote:
> The British textile industry was no longer highly dependent on
Southern
> cotton. They were rapidly developing Indian cotton as a source for
raw
> cotton for Manchester textile mills.
I have read that the American South produced 85% of the raw cotton used
in Europe. That sounds like "heavily dependent" to me, but your
mileage may vary.
JFE
j...@ams.org
> The Morrill tariff was on its way to becoming law.
Not without the absence of Southern Senators. The votes did not
exist to pass it in the Senate if the Southern delegations were
present.
JFE
j...@ams.org
Dan D. Cyr wrote:
> After reading all the arguments, and discussion, I'm puzzled that no
> scholar has not just done the research to show what was commonly sold
in
> the various shops/stores in the southern area, examined the
newspapers
> for items offered for sale, and done some digging at the business
papers
> for a number of "plantations" to see what they were buying and from
> whom.
I share your puzzlement, but to the best of my knowledge no such
study exists.
JFE
j...@ams.org
Linda Teasley wrote:
> The British textile industry was no longer highly dependent on
Southern
> cotton. They were rapidly developing Indian cotton as a source for
raw
> cotton for Manchester textile mills.
I believe I have read that the American South supplied 85% of the
raw cotton used in Europe. Everyone's terminology can vary, of
course, but IMO that is "highly dependent."
JFE
HankC
fairly
> elaborate barter system, including trading raw cotton for
manufactured
> European cloth.
Cotton was 'traded' for money and bank credits.
Some of that money and credit was used to purchase other goods for
shipment south.
Duties on imported foreign goods were payable in gold.
To call this a system of 'barter' is incorrect.
HankC
Steven Witmer
>Steven Witmer <witme...@aol.comnospam> wrote:
>: Linda Teasley wrote:
>
>: > These are not my divisions, Steve. Taussig reported these figures in
>: >his history of the tariff. The book is available online. He did not give
>
>: >figures for the South or the midwest.
>
>: Then really for purposes of this discussion, isn't his data more or less
>: irrelevent? Since we cannot leaven it with the data from the remaining
>free
>: states, and we cannot compare it to the data from the slave states, it's
>just a
>: bit of free-floating data - interesting but with no real practical use in
>the
>: discussion.
>
> I gave Taussig's data to refute the point that manufacturing interests
>were nonexistent in the northeast. They were not only existent, they were
>politically important.
>
I don't recall anyone saying they were nonexistent, but perhaps I misremember.
I do think it is an overstatement to call the north industrialized. By 19th
century standards, yes, it was, but as I've said that has very different
implications than it does for today.
>
>: > Taussig does not break the manufacturing sector numbers down into
>: >industries which were protected and which were not.
>
>: I have a real problem
>: >with an argument which says that the manufacturing and industrial sectors
>: >in the 19th century U.S. did not receive political patronage from the
>: >states in which they were located. Louisiana's sugar industry certainly
>: >enjoyed political protection from tariffs and Louisiana liked that just
>: >fine. There are a lot of issues unresolved with respect to the tariff,
>: >but not that one.
>: >
>
>: I don't recall saying there may not have been patronage, but I question the
>: weight it might be given in this thread, given the political
>counterbalances
>: available.
>
> What do you mean by political counterbalances?
>
Well the desire for tariffs was hardly universal in the north, and the
anti-tariff crowd, and the tariff-indifferent crowd were hardly non-existent.
Even using your figures from Taussig, 70% of the population were in
*non-manufacturing* occupations, and as we've pointed out, not every
manufacturing occupation was going to be affected positively by the tariff.
The tariff impacted the average northern farmer - using the teapot analogy used
elsewhere in the thread, a northern family might end up paying an extra 25 or
50 cents for a teapot than they otherwise might have, assuming the teapot was
tariff-protected. And do I recall correctly that northern shipowners were not
overly thrilled with the tariff? There were reasons for segments of the
northern population not to be wild about tariffs, either.
As for other political counterbalances, we have the Senate, which balances out
the high population advantage the north was exercising in the House, and we
also have for a goodly chunk of pre-war history sitting Presidents who tended
to be southern or pro-southern in their outlook, and those sitting Presidents
had the power of the veto.
>: Except - is not the cost of the tariff passed on from the manufacturer to
>the
>: consumer? Was the southern cotton industry unable to do this for some
>reason?
>: Surely they would not be adverse to bumping the cost of a bail of cotton a
>bit
>: to cover any inconvenient overhead that the tariff might cause? Remember
>King
>: Cotton, and the southern belief that when the southern cotton producers
>: sneezed, the British textile industry caught cold.
>
> The British textile industry was no longer highly dependent on Southern
>cotton. They were rapidly developing Indian cotton as a source for raw
>cotton for Manchester textile mills.
>From the Economic History Services website:
http://www.eh.net/databases/developing/
>From table D-2, "Value of Exports of Raw Cottong, Selected Countries,
1840-1900" - I offer this data in a slightly different format - this is just
for the year 1860 (values are in millions of dollars):
Brazil: 3.2
China: 1.1
Egypt: 5.5
British India: 23.0
Peru: 3.0
United States: 191.8
So at the time of the secession crisis, the total exported raw cotton of all
the rest of the countries above combined including India totalled just 35.8
million dolllars, less than a quarter of that produced by the United States.
The same table shows that in 1880, India produced 55.5 million dollars in
exported cotton, while the US produced 211.5 million dollars.
The Encyclopedian Brittanica notes that post 1865 a famine resulted in India as
a direct result of Britain turning back to the US as its primary source of
cotton, while India struggled to return fields that had been converted to
cotton production during the ACW back to food production.
I further offer following from the "Spinning the Web" website:
http://www.spinningtheweb.org.uk/m_display.php?irn=76&sub=trade&theme=indu
stry&crumb=USA
"In 1803 the USA became the main source for raw cotton. In 1830-31 the USA
supplied 77.8% of the raw cotton to England's cotton manufacturing trade; 77.5%
from 1851-1859; and 80% in 1860, a boom year which saw the USA producing two
thirds of the world's raw cotton and supplied three quarters of the raw cotton
in the world markets.
Liverpool acted as a central clearing house and market for USA raw cotton by
importing all supplies and then re-exporting to other countries that raw cotton
not required by the English market. England also imported raw cotton from India
and South America, and some from Egypt and Turkey, but the bulk of her raw
cotton imports came from the USA. Thus, when raw cotton production in the USA
was severely curtailed by the American Civil War (1861-1865), Lancashire
suffered great hardship for those four years and the English cotton industry
was dealt a blow from which it would never fully recover."
So we can see from all the above that yes, indeed, the British and indeed the
*world* textile market hinged upon the availability of the American cotton.
The development of Indian cotton could not happen rapidly enough to supply the
gap when exports from the seceding states halted. Indeed, it seems India would
have had to increase it's own production something like eightfold in 1861 to
make up for what was lost. Not easy to do in a year's time.
Southern planters were cash poor and
>highly leveraged. They hated the tariff costs.
>
No doubt the same was true for many a farmer, not just the southern planter.
Many a northern farmer had his cash invested in the mechanical reaper, mower,
and other similar equipment, just as much as any southern planter had his money
invested in slaves The same holds true for family farms today (trust me on this
one) - most of the value is in the land and the equipment, not in ready
cash-in-hand. Run an account at the local store and hope that the crop comes
in ok so you can pay off your accounts once your flush.
I can think of several instances in the letters and diaries of northern
farmer-soldiers where I've seen them speak of "paying off notes" and similar
such things, such as advising the wife or father to "pay off part of that note
to X when you sell that calf", or "take a note with X for the balance owed and
pay it off when the harvest comes in", that sort of thing.
So I don't really see the southern planter as being especially extraordinary in
being "cash poor and highly leveraged". So were lots of other families.
So it all comes back around to this question - where southerner more likely to
buy *substantially more* tariff-protected goods than northerners, and if so,
why? If they were not, then it seems Mr. Eros' assertion must likely be valid.
I say *substantially more*, because that is what would be required in order
for southerners to shoulder a disproportionate amount of the tariff cost, given
the population difference. If 10% of northerners on a given day put $1 apiece
into the tariff coffers, for example, that adds up to substantially more than
if 10% of southerners do the same.
Cash
> Cash <cas...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> : Those who have read DiLorenzo's writings about the tariff will recognize
> : he's bought into McDuffie hook, line, and sinker.
>
> What is your evidence for that? It's also recognized amongst scholars,
> even southern ones, that McDuffie's statements are not economically sound.
>
What DiLorenzo has written about tariffs and what he said in an appearance
on CSPAN.
Regards,
Cash
l...@panix.com
: "Linda Teasley" <l...@panix.com> wrote in message
I think DiLorenzo relies on Charles Adams's figures about the tariff,
but I've never heard him mention McDuffie. If he has, I stand corrected.
Pbwalther
>the costs would likely be far greater becuase rail connections from
>north to south were fragmented at the time. From New York the goods
>would have to be ferried to someplace in New Jersey like Jersey City or
>Perth Amboy then sdent by rail to Philadelphia. Before the war,
>several major cities like Philadelphia did not have pass through rail
>service.
Quite right. Union troops going to Washington DC had to get off the train in
Baltimore and walk across town to get on another train. In the Deep South, it
was much worse. Going from Richmond to say Memphis required getting off of one
train and getting on another train at most major southern cities. Southern
rail service was not designed to ship across the south. It was designed to
take cotton (or other products) from the interior to a port and bring back
manufactured goods. Also, it is my understanding that southern rail road
frequently had different gauges. The southern rail system was a major headache
for the CSA during the war. The South did not really have a coastal shipping
service (that was primarily northern) and shipping was shut down by the Union
blockade. However, the southern rail system was so fragmented as to make any
shipment of troops across the south (such as Longstreet's taking 2 divisions of
the ANV to Chattanooga in late 1863) require nearly herculean effort.
l...@panix.com
lgt:: >
: > I gave Taussig's data to refute the point that manufacturing interests
: >politically important.
: >
: I don't recall anyone saying they were nonexistent, but perhaps I misremember.
: I do think it is an overstatement to call the north industrialized. By 19th
: century standards, yes, it was, but as I've said that has very different
: implications than it does for today.
It's true that people often overstate the industrialization in the North
at that time, but I found even a 30 per cent figure surprising. That's
not insignificant.
: >
: >: > Taussig does not break the manufacturing sector numbers down into
: >: >industries which were protected and which were not.
: >
True.
: > What do you mean by political counterbalances?
: >
[snip]
: >From table D-2, "Value of Exports of Raw Cottong, Selected Countries,
: 1840-1900" - I offer this data in a slightly different format - this is just
: for the year 1860 (values are in millions of dollars):
: Brazil: 3.2
: China: 1.1
: Egypt: 5.5
: British India: 23.0
: Peru: 3.0
: United States: 191.8
: So at the time of the secession crisis, the total exported raw cotton of all
: the rest of the countries above combined including India totalled just 35.8
: million dolllars, less than a quarter of that produced by the United States.
: The same table shows that in 1880, India produced 55.5 million dollars in
: exported cotton, while the US produced 211.5 million dollars.
Yes, but the Indian figure is sizable, and it was on the rise. The
vaunting rhetoric about King Cotton from the South was overstated and
overly optimistic. I think that's one reason that Southern politicians
were scapegoating, to some degree at least, the tariff.
: The Encyclopedian Brittanica notes that post 1865 a famine resulted in India as
: a direct result of Britain turning back to the US as its primary source of
: cotton, while India struggled to return fields that had been converted to
: cotton production during the ACW back to food production.
Cotton prices hit the floor at some point during the 1840's, but Britain
was still keen to provide competition for American cotton so that they
would not continue to be held hostage by one market.
: "In 1803 the USA became the main source for raw cotton. In 1830-31 the USA
But your figures about American cotton highlight a very significant
difference between Southern planters and the midwestern farmer. The
tariff was a far more significant cost to the planter than it was to the
farmer who was not competing on the world market.
: So I don't really see the southern planter as being especially extraordinary in
: being "cash poor and highly leveraged". So were lots of other families.
Yes, but the actual costs were significantly different.
: So it all comes back around to this question - where southerner more likely to
: buy *substantially more* tariff-protected goods than northerners, and if so,
: why? If they were not, then it seems Mr. Eros' assertion must likely be valid.
: I say *substantially more*, because that is what would be required in order
: for southerners to shoulder a disproportionate amount of the tariff cost, given
: the population difference. If 10% of northerners on a given day put $1 apiece
: into the tariff coffers, for example, that adds up to substantially more than
: if 10% of southerners do the same.
That's a case of dispersed costs and concentrated benefits. The widely
dispersed costs amongst smaller farmers did not raise the kind of
objection to the tariff that a few big planters would feel. They had a
lot more reason to object to even a small rise in the tariff.
Scribe7716
wrote:
> That's a case of dispersed costs and concentrated benefits. The widely
>dispersed costs amongst smaller farmers did not raise the kind of
>objection to the tariff that a few big planters would feel. They had a
>lot more reason to object to even a small rise in the tariff.
>
So are you saying that it was the big mule planters who led the slave south
into secession? Are you saying that the majority of southerners were so obtuse
as to be brought to rebellion by a tariff that didn't impact them all that
much? Isn't it far more likely that the big mules were far more concerned
about real and/or perceived threats to slavery, and that the southern rank and
file were far more concerned about the perceived horrors of free blacks?
Steven Witmer
>lgt:: >
>: > I gave Taussig's data to refute the point that manufacturing interests
>: >were nonexistent in the northeast. They were not only existent, they were
>
>: >politically important.
>: >
>
>: I don't recall anyone saying they were nonexistent, but perhaps I
>misremember.
>: I do think it is an overstatement to call the north industrialized. By
>19th
>: century standards, yes, it was, but as I've said that has very different
>: implications than it does for today.
>
> It's true that people often overstate the industrialization in the North
>at that time, but I found even a 30 per cent figure surprising. That's
>not insignificant.
I'd be interested in knowing how he arrived at his figures. I have a hunch
that many local one and two man operations are included. You're right in that
30 percent isn't insignificant, but it is counterbalanced by 70 percent *not*
being in manufacturing, so there's a significant political counterweight that
would hold any unreasonable political demands in check.
>The same table shows that in 1880, India produced 55.5 million dollars in
>: exported cotton, while the US produced 211.5 million dollars.
>
> Yes, but the Indian figure is sizable, and it was on the rise.
True, but even by 1880 the production was only slightly over double what it was
in 1860, and was still only a quarter of that exported by the US.
The
>vaunting rhetoric about King Cotton from the South was overstated and
>overly optimistic. I think that's one reason that Southern politicians
>were scapegoating, to some degree at least, the tariff.
You're losing me a bit, here. Are you agreeing that the tariff was not as big
an issue as some make it out to be?
>
>: The Encyclopedian Brittanica notes that post 1865 a famine resulted in
>India as
>: a direct result of Britain turning back to the US as its primary source of
>: cotton, while India struggled to return fields that had been converted to
>: cotton production during the ACW back to food production.
>
> Cotton prices hit the floor at some point during the 1840's, but Britain
>was still keen to provide competition for American cotton so that they
>would not continue to be held hostage by one market.
>
True, but as I noted, there just wasn't any reasonable way that India was going
to take up all the slack when US imports dried up significantly during the war.
A seven or eightfold increase in crop production doesn't happen overnight.
Even if additional crop was planted as soon as word of Sumter reached India,
cotton takes approximately six months from planting to harvest time.
<snip>
>
> But your figures about American cotton highlight a very significant
>difference between Southern planters and the midwestern farmer. The
>tariff was a far more significant cost to the planter than it was to the
>farmer who was not competing on the world market.
>
But as I showed, foreign competition was fairly insignificant - the other
biggest cotton exporters combined exported less than a quarter of the amount of
cotton the US did. Even if Indian and Egyptian cotton were up-and-coming
challenges, in 1860 they still weren't much of a threat.
And northern US farmers *were* on the world market to a degree - using the same
site I used for the cotton figures, I see that the US exported 4.1 million
dollars worth of wheat in 1860. Compare that to 28.0 for France, 10.8 for
France, 5.3 for Italy, and 4.7 for Canada. Competition seemed fiercer for
wheat than for cotton. Admittedly, there was a stronger local demand for wheat
than for cotton in the US, but we were part of the global wheat market.
> So I don't really see the southern planter as being especially extraordinary
>in
>: being "cash poor and highly leveraged". So were lots of other families.
>
> Yes, but the actual costs were significantly different.
>
In what way?
> So it all comes back around to this question - where southerner more likely
>to
>: buy *substantially more* tariff-protected goods than northerners, and if
>so,
>: why? If they were not, then it seems Mr. Eros' assertion must likely be
>valid.
>: I say *substantially more*, because that is what would be required in
>order
>: for southerners to shoulder a disproportionate amount of the tariff cost,
>given
>: the population difference. If 10% of northerners on a given day put $1
>apiece
>: into the tariff coffers, for example, that adds up to substantially more
>than
>: if 10% of southerners do the same.
>
> That's a case of dispersed costs and concentrated benefits.
But surely the costs were dispersed nationwide? It's not as if each region was
supposed to supply a fixed amount of tariff income.
The widely
>dispersed costs amongst smaller farmers did not raise the kind of
>objection to the tariff that a few big planters would feel. They had a
>lot more reason to object to even a small rise in the tariff.
Steven Witmer
l...@panix.com
: wrote:
: > That's a case of dispersed costs and concentrated benefits. The widely
: >dispersed costs amongst smaller farmers did not raise the kind of
: >objection to the tariff that a few big planters would feel. They had a
: >lot more reason to object to even a small rise in the tariff.
: >
: So are you saying that it was the big mule planters who led the slave south
: into secession?
Well, yes. Those are the folks with political clout.
Are you saying that the majority of southerners were so obtuse
: as to be brought to rebellion by a tariff that didn't impact them all that
: much?
I'd say that the obtuse northerner who didn't care much about the tariff
one way or the other, or slavery for that matter, were led into war by the
Republicans.
Isn't it far more likely that the big mules were far more concerned
: about real and/or perceived threats to slavery, and that the southern rank and
: file were far more concerned about the perceived horrors of free blacks?
I'd say that the north played on the slavery issue when their arguments
against free trade were defeated by logic and fairness.
Cash
> Cash <cas...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> : "Linda Teasley" <l...@panix.com> wrote in message
> : news:cq9hjd$9ag$2...@reader2.panix.com...
> : > Cash <cas...@aol.com> wrote:
> : >
> : > : Those who have read DiLorenzo's writings about the tariff will
recognize
> : > : he's bought into McDuffie hook, line, and sinker.
> : >
> : > What is your evidence for that? It's also recognized amongst
scholars,
> : > even southern ones, that McDuffie's statements are not economically
sound.
> : >
> : --------------------------
> : What DiLorenzo has written about tariffs and what he said in an
appearance
> : on CSPAN.
>
> I think DiLorenzo relies on Charles Adams's figures about the tariff,
> but I've never heard him mention McDuffie. If he has, I stand corrected.
He doesn't mention McDuffie. He does, however regurgitate what McDuffie
said in the passage I quoted.
Regards,
Cash
n canfield
josep...@hotmail.com wrote:
> Linda Teasley wrote:
> > josep...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> >: However, the source behind the [80% of federal revenue from the
> south]
> >: claim says the exact opposite--that over 85% of tariff revenue
(for
> >: 1833-37, as it turns out) was collected in the free states.
> >
> > There is confusion here about who paid for goods protected by the
> > tariff. No one would argue that merchants at the ports of entry
> > paid the tariff. . . [snip] The port of entry is irrelevant in
> > determining who paid the tariff ultimately.
>
> Even if that were true (and I think it's overstated), I have still
> shown that the "80% of tariffs from the south" claim is unsupported.
>
> By your argument, _no_ tariff numbers can prove or disprove the
claim,
> and the source cited by Adams and Dilorenzo is simply irrelevant,
> whether it's cited correctly or incorrectly and whatever years it
> applies to. If it's irrelevant, it doesn't prove them right.
>
> There might theoretically be statistics that show the claim is a
> reasonable one (although I doubt it). No such statistics have not
been
> cited by Adams, Dilorenzo, or anyone else.
>
> ---
> Joseph Eros
> "Scientists want to know the dirt on Eros" --Boston Globe
Just out of curiosity, I tried to find out what products were subject
to tariff in the antebellum
U.S. The list varied and was often changed, but I was surprised by the
very long list of goods subject to import duties. Got this list from
www.loc.gov, 34th Congress, 1st Session, pages of "comparative tables"
of U.S. tariffs vs. those of several South American countries, from
1845-1855. Obviously, this isn't a list of ALL U.S. tariffs, only those
comparable to those of S.A. nations, but does provide an idea of what
was taxed. We apparently have to infer who paid the taxes. Here's a
PARTIAL list:
Apples, fresh & dried
Beef, dried, salted, pickled, cured
Books (except in English, Latin, or Greek)
Boots and shoes
Butter
Cables
Ready-made clothing: pantaloons of cloth, "cassamere", or cotton;
sailors' shirts
Flannel, Linen, Irish linen, Bastiste
Coaches & Carriages
Cocoa
Combs
Coffee from Central America
Copper of all kinds, except in sheets used for vessels -- in 1839
S.F.B. Morse got a special dispensation to purchase copper wire without
the duty, so long as he could prove within two years that it went to
construction of the telegraph
Earthen and stoneware/"Imitation porcelain"
Flour
All types of liquor, including wine -- these fetched the highest tariff
rates
Glass -- for window panes as well as bottles
Gunpowder
Hams & Bacon
Hats
Household furniture
Iron of all kinds -- as cooking pots and tools, for rail, cables &
chains for vessels, iron machines, steel, cast and/or scrap iron
Jewelry
Lard
Linseed oil
Whale Oil
Paint
Paper of all kinds
Playing cards
Pitch and Tar
Printing presses
Rice
Rosin
Rye, oats, Indian corn, and other "small grain"
Tobacco
Vinegar
Wax
Manufactured woolens
Tin
Trunks of wood
Soap
Sugar
Tobacco
Brass
Bricks and Tiles
Don't know how it's possible to prove, given the breadth of this list,
that southern planters paid more in tariffs than any other U.S.
citizens. It seems industry everywhere and Yankee households would bear
as great a burden. A large plantation would be well-equipped to produce
some of this stuff itself, or to buy from local (vs. Yankee) producers.
In addition, Southern interests (tobacco, rice, sugar, etc.) were
protected. If more Yankee interests were protected, it's probably
because the economy of the North was much more diverse than the
South's.
Also, Taussig's numbers refer to "the working population engaged in
manufactures and the mechanic arts," so likely this does include
blacksmiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, as well as millhands and
railroad workers. Nationwide, in 1820, 13.7% people were so engaged,
including 21% in New England and 22.6% in the Middle States. By 1840,
the numbers rose to 17.1% of the working population nationwide, with
30.2% in New England, and 28% in the Middle States. He says the figures
come from the 1820 and 1840 censuses (or censi?), which collected the
information.
n. canfield
bdsim...@yahoo.com
Linda Teasley wrote:
> Remember
> Lincoln's promise in his 1st inaugural to continue to collect? That
has
> been used often to try to prove the point that the war was about
> economics.
And I guess one could do that by taking out of context to "prove" a
point. But in context it's clear that Lincoln's avowing that he will
exercise federal power. Look what he says about military
installations.
By reducing federal policy to the tariff and tariff policy merely to
costs (as opposed to costs and benefits), this discussion rests on
increasingly narrow and uncertain grounds. Tariff policy was but one
way in which the federal government distributed costs and benefits;
singling it out is akin to reducing today's budget to infrastructure
expenditures and claiming that they represent all benefits/costs.
Scribe7716
wrote:
> Are you saying that the majority of southerners were so obtuse
>: as to be brought to rebellion by a tariff that didn't impact them all that
>: much?
>
> I'd say that the obtuse northerner who didn't care much about the tariff
>one way or the other, or slavery for that matter, were led into war by the
>Republicans.
But northerners did care very much about the Union and the Old Flag and they
went to war when the slavocracy tried to break the first and fired on the
second.
Scribe7716
Seasoned bread crumbs mixed with
parmesan
romano
salt
pepper
oregano
garlic powder
chopped parsley
Flour
eggwash (eggs and milk)
Peanut oil for frying.
Pound the cutlets.
Dredge in flour, eggs, then the bread crumb mixture.
Fry till golden brown in 350° peanut oil.
In a baking pan, place a layer of gravy,
then one of meat, gravy, and cheese.
Another layer each of meat, gravy, and cheese.
Then bake at 350° for 45 minutes.
Serve on hot pasta with romano cheese.
Southern Fried Small-fry
Tastes like fried chicken, which works just as well.
In fact you may want to practice cutting up whole chickens
for frying before you go for the real thing.
Whole chicken is much more efficient and inexpensive than buying pieces.
1 tiny human, cut into pieces
2 cups flour
Onion, garlic
Salt
pepper
garlic powder
cayenne pepper
hot sauce, etc.
Oil for frying
Mix milk, eggs, hot sauce in a bowl, add chopped onion and garlic.
Season the meat liberally, and marinate for several hours.
Place seasoned flour in a paper or plastic shopping bag,
drop pieces in a few a time, shake to coat thoroughly,
then deep fry in hot oil (350°) for about 15 minutes.
Drain and place on paper towels.
Miscarriage with Mustard Greens
Why waste it? Otherwise, and in general, use ham or salt pork to season greens.
The technique of smothering greens can be used with many vegetables;
green beans work especially well. Meat is not necessary every day, don?t
be afraid to alter any dish to vegetarian tastes.
1 premature baby, born dead
Large bunch of mustard greens
2 white onions, 1 cup chopped celery
Vegetable oil (or hog fat)
Salt, pepper, garlic, etc.
Lightly brown onions, celery, garlic and meat in large heavy p
n canfield
Pie crust (see index)
Whole fresh pre-mie; eviscerated, head, hands and feet removed
Onions, bell pepper, celery
½ cup wine
Root vegetables of choice (turnips, carrots, potatoes, etc) cubed
Make a crust from scratch - or go shamefully to the frozen food section
of your favorite grocery and select 2 high quality pie crusts (you
will need one for the top also).
Boil the prepared delicacy until the meat starts to come off the bones.
Remove, de-bone and cube; continue to reduce the broth.
Brown the onions, peppers and celery.
Add the meat then season, continue browning.
De-glaze with sherry, add the reduced broth.
Finally, put in the root vegetables and simmer for 15 minutes.
Allow to cool slightly.
Place the pie pan in 375 degree oven for a few minutes so bottom crust is not soggy,
reduce oven to 325.
Fill the pie with stew, place top crust and with a fork, seal the crusts together
then poke holes in top.
Return to oven and bake for 30 minutes, or until pie crust is golden brown.
Sudden Infant Death Soup
SIDS: delicious in winter, comparable to old fashioned Beef and Vegetable Soup.
Its free, you can sell the crib, baby clothes, toys, stroller... and so easy to
procure if such a lucky find is at hand (just pick him up from the crib and
he?s good to go)!
SIDS victim, cleaned
½ cup cooking oil
Carrots
onions
broccoli
whole cabbage
fresh green beans
potato
turnip
celery
tomato
½ stick butter
1 cup cooked pasta (macaroni, shells, etc.)
Remove as much meat as possible, cube, and brown in hot oil.
Add a little water, season, then add the carcass.
Simmer for half an hour keeping the stock thick.
Remove the carcass and add the vegetables slowly to the stock,
so that it remains boiling the whole time.
Cover the pot and simmer till vegetables are tender
(2 hours approximately).
Continue seasoning to taste.
Before serving, add butter and pasta,
serve piping with hot bre
Cash
Southern Fried Small-fry
Miscarriage with Mustard Greens
Lightly brown onions, celery, garlic and meat in large heavy pot.
Add a little water and the greens (which should be thoroughly cleaned and washed).
Smother slowly for at least 2 hours, adding small amounts of water
when it starts to stick.
Stir frequently.
When ready - serve with rice, grilled smoked sausage, green salad, and iced tea.
Coffee and apple pie then brandy.
Maternity Ward Pot Luck Dinner
If you can?t get anything fresh from the hospital, nursery, or morgue;
you can at least get rid of all the leftovers in your refrigerator.
1 - 2 lbs. cubed meat (human flesh, chicken, turkey, beef...)
1 -
amonte...@yahoo.com
> >
> >: >The point here is that Southerners bought almost all their
manufactured
> >: >goods.
> >
> >: And how exactly did northerners get their manufactured goods?
> >
> > From retailers, paid for with the wages they earned from the
protected
> >industries.
>
> Except for those who farmed (which constituted the vast majority of
the
> northern population), who were not among those paid with wages
"earned from
> protected industries",
Yes they did if they sold produce to those who worked in protected
industry. A farmer who sells grain or milk to a cotton mill town, or
iron mill town will know which side of the bread is buttered.
> any more than the southern planter or farmer was.
The southern farmer is not dependent on local industry the way that
many northern farmers were. He can sell to the north, or to merchants
from Europe. His cash crops normally must travel a long way to market
anyway, so he is not dependent on local customers the way that many
northern farmers were. This makes a big difference.
> Or
> for those who worked as hired farmhands, or private small tradesmen
and
> shopkeepers - how many northern small-town blacksmiths, carpenters,
druggists,
> milliners, and such were earning wages from "protected industries",
and can you
> provide any proof that such tradesmen, farmers, and shopkeeps in the
north
> benefitted more than their southern counterparts did?
>
>
> The ordinary consumer, of course, probably didn't like it,
> >but consumers have zero political clout,
>
> Consumers are not also voters? And are not politicians themselves
consumers?
> Politicians had their own needs and families to see to.
The typical voter has very little clout. This is a fact.
>
> and the politicians they elect to
> >office have tons. They are often taken to lunch by the
manufacturers who
> >like tariff protection.
>
> No southern planters ever took a senator to lunch? No southern
planters *were*
> senators? Was this not a counterweight to the alleged political
clout of these
> "manufacturers"?
Sure, but few southern planters have a product to sell the government
that can result in a kick-back situation, that is not true of gun
merchants, or other manufacturers. Southern planters mostly wanted
free trade and low tarrifs and would not benifit from protection as
their market was the world. Northern manufacturers, due to high labor
prices, had real problems dealing with cheap British or French goods.
Southern planters thus have not the interest in corruption that
northern manufacturers did.
Now if you count slavery as a special interst, the southern planter by
maintaining it's legality assured his labor supply that would not run
off and farm cheap land or switch jobs at the drop of a hat, which the
northern industrialist had to deal with. The wonder to me is why
manufactureres did not move south and employ slaves. I think the
reason is that manufacturing was not as economical in the south as
planting cash crops.
------snip
amonte...@yahoo.com
Scribe7716 wrote:
> >"" Linda Teasley ""
>
> wrote:
>
> >The point here is that Southerners bought almost all their
manufactured
> >goods.
>
> And how exactly did northerners get their manufactured goods?
Her point being that they were imported from outside the south. Either
from protected manufacturers in the north, or made in Europe and having
paid a tarriff.
The north derives the advantage from that terriff, and the south loses
by it given that the south exports raw materials and imports
manufactured items, while the north has significant industry.
Scribe7716
wrote:
>> And how exactly did northerners get their manufactured goods?
>
>
>Her point being that they were imported from outside the south. Either
>from protected manufacturers in the north, or made in Europe and having
>paid a tarriff.
>
>The north derives the advantage from that terriff, and the south loses
>by it given that the south exports raw materials and imports
>manufactured items, while the north has significant industry.
But that was by the slave south's own choice.
Confederate Senator Louis T. Wigfall of Texas said it: "We want no
manufactures; we desire no trading, no mechanical or manufacturing classes. As
long as we have our rice, our sugar, our tobacco, and our cotton, we can
command wealth to purchase all we want from those nations with which we are in
amity, and lay up money besides."
It was the slave south's choice to devote it's venture capital to buying slaves
and land rather than developing manufactures; it was the slave south's choice
to denigrate skilled labor as "mudsills and greasy mechanics."
Since the slave south had an economy of its own making, an economy that the
"chivalry" fought to protect from change, what were they bitching about?
l...@panix.com
: Since the slave south had an economy of its own making, an economy that the
: "chivalry" fought to protect from change, what were they bitching about?
The South put their chips on an an agriculturally based economy that was
not industrially oriented. That meant that their political interests were
different from the northeast. That meant that they were at odds
politcally. What's hard to figure about that?
lgt
bdsim...@yahoo.com
Linda Teasley wrote:
> Scribe7716 <scrib...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> : Since the slave south had an economy of its own making, an economy
that the
> : "chivalry" fought to protect from change, what were they bitching
about?
>
> The South put their chips on an an agriculturally based economy
that was
> not industrially oriented. That meant that their political interests
were
> different from the northeast. That meant that they were at odds
> politcally. What's hard to figure about that?
Well, as the historian David Potter once pointed out, difference does
not necessarily lead to disagreement. It would have led just as easily
to an interdependent economy featuring regional specialization.
After all, plantation agriculture is agribusiness.
The federal government supported the economic interests of these
regions in different ways; to focus on the tariff is simply to avoid
this question. Yet posters continue to focus on the tariff; nor have I
heard how tariff policy justifies secession.
Scribe7716
wrote:
>: Since the slave south had an economy of its own making, an economy that the
>: "chivalry" fought to protect from change, what were they bitching about?
>
> The South put their chips on an an agriculturally based economy that was
>not industrially oriented.
By their own choice, and no one in the north was trying to force the "chivalry"
to get their hands dirty and take up manufacturing.
> That meant that their political interests were
>different from the northeast. That meant that they were at odds
>politcally.
So why didn't the slave south ally with the west. What was it that made Ohio,
Illinois, Iowa anathema to the slave south?
The truth, of course, was that the political difference was not over economics;
it was over slavery
>What's hard to figure about that?
It was hard for Allan Nevins, _The Emergence of Lincoln_, V2: "North and South
had economies which were largely complementary. It was no misfortune to the
South that Masschusetts cotton mills wanted its staple, and that New York
ironmasters like Hewitt were eager to sell rails dirt-cheap to Southern railway
builders; and sober businessmen on both sides, merchants, bankers, and
manufacturers, were the men most anxious to keep the peace and hold the Union
together."
sparkmaster
ending June 30, 1860.
Total merchandise imported............$279,872,327
Free goods admitted....................$82,291,614
Total duties collected.................$53,979,570.
Of these $54 million of import revenues, $40,378,943 were collected on
just seven different articles:
sugar/molasses..........................$8,711,118
manufactures, wool......................$8,155,578
manufactures, cotton....................$7,120,647
manufactures, silk......................$6,491,822
manufactures, iron, steel...............$4,835,973
wines/spirits...........................$3,421,805
cigars, tobacco.........................$1,742,000
Total..................................$40,378,943
As can be seen by the above articles that raised the majority of tariff
revenues, the idea that 80% of the dutiable articles imported were of
types somehow exclusively bought by the relatively small market of the
South is absurd. Surely, those who wished to blame evil PA steel
manufactures for plundering the South will not be stepping up to the fact
that duties collected on just imported sugar/molasses raised twice the
amount from the US public's pockets as steel. Neither will it matter that
the majority of steel sales would have been to northern economies, nor that
it was Lousiana who benefitted from the protectionism on sugar.
l...@panix.com
: The following figures are from the US Treasury Report for the fiscal year
: ending June 30, 1860.
: Total merchandise imported............$279,872,327
: Free goods admitted....................$82,291,614
: Total duties collected.................$53,979,570.
: Of these $54 million of import revenues, $40,378,943 were collected on
: just seven different articles:
: sugar/molasses..........................$8,711,118
: manufactures, wool......................$8,155,578
: manufactures, cotton....................$7,120,647
: manufactures, silk......................$6,491,822
: manufactures, iron, steel...............$4,835,973
: wines/spirits...........................$3,421,805
: cigars, tobacco.........................$1,742,000
: Total..................................$40,378,943
: As can be seen by the above articles that raised the majority of tariff
: revenues, the idea that 80% of the dutiable articles imported were of
: types somehow exclusively bought by the relatively small market of the
: South is absurd.
There isn't anything in the figures above (interesting though they are)
to indicate who bought the dutiable goods. As has been pointed out ad
nauseum, the agricultural South was punished by duties on imported goods
in economic ways, i.e., Southerners could not pass on the costs as others
could.
Surely, those who wished to blame evil PA steel
: manufactures for plundering the South will not be stepping up to the fact
: that duties collected on just imported sugar/molasses raised twice the
: amount from the US public's pockets as steel. Neither will it matter that
: the majority of steel sales would have been to northern economies, nor that
: it was Lousiana who benefitted from the protectionism on sugar.
Sugar occupies a small percentage of the total. The other manufactured
goods were taxed in order to protect northeastern and western interests.
It's not in the least surprising that the South wanted low tariffs, or
that the South felt aggrieved about high tariffs.
Linda T.
Michael Furlan
> There isn't anything in the figures above (interesting though they are)
>to indicate who bought the dutiable goods. As has been pointed out ad
>nauseum, the agricultural South was punished by duties on imported goods
>in economic ways, i.e., Southerners could not pass on the costs as others
>could.
How could Westerners pass on the costs any better than Southerners could?
Howard G
[snip]
> Sugar occupies a small percentage of the total.
Sugar represents 16.13775 % of the total, a no "small" percentage or fraction -
1/6th.
sparkmaster
: manufactures, wool......................$8,155,578
: manufactures, cotton....................$7,120,647
: manufactures, silk......................$6,491,822
: manufactures, iron, steel...............$4,835,973
: wines/spirits...........................$3,421,805
: cigars, tobacco.........................$1,742,000
: Total..................................$40,378,943
to indicate who bought the dutiable goods.>
Nor have I ever seen anything to indicate that the majority of imported
dutiable goods which cleared customs in New York, Boston and Chicago,
somehow were almost untouched by the marketplace outside the South, and
shipped South for consumption. Such a notion is ridiculous.
<As has been pointed out ad nauseum, the agricultural South was punished
by duties on imported goods
in economic ways, i.e., Southerners could not pass on the costs as others
could.>
Any raise in price caused by duties, directly or indirectly, imported or
domestic, was paid by everyone. I see nothing unique about the
circumstance of Southern planters
l...@panix.com
Early on, 1820 or so, Westerners were desirous of a strong home market and
producers of wool, hemp, flax, even wheat and corn, wanted high tariffs.
The wheat and corn guys wanted a better infrastructure for getting goods
to market. The western state vote was 100 per cent in favor of the tariff
of 1824, while New England was still split on the issue because they had
small industries and a large group of merchants who benefited from lower
tariffs. Taussig outlines this on p. 44 and the tariff vote of 1824 comes
from Jonathan Pincus.
Later on, western states allied themselves more with the South because
agricultural regions do the exporting, and exporters are penalized by high
tariffs. Westerners passed on their costs as producers, if that was the
case, and ate the costs if they were primarily exporters.
l...@panix.com
: Nor have I ever seen anything to indicate that the majority of imported
: dutiable goods which cleared customs in New York, Boston and Chicago,
: somehow were almost untouched by the marketplace outside the South, and
: shipped South for consumption. Such a notion is ridiculous.
Yes, it is. No one would claim that imported goods were "untouched" by
northern markets.
:
: <As has been pointed out ad nauseum, the agricultural South was punished
: by duties on imported goods
: in economic ways, i.e., Southerners could not pass on the costs as others
: could.>
: Any raise in price caused by duties, directly or indirectly, imported or
: domestic, was paid by everyone. I see nothing unique about the
: circumstance of Southern planters
Southern planters were exporters who did not benefit from a tariff but
rather the opposite. Industries, small or large, who benefitted from a
tariff lobbied for adoption of tariff measures.
sparkmaster
Linda wrote:
<Yes, it is. No one would claim that imported goods were "untouched" by
northern markets.>
I wrote "almost untouched," and that's what it would have been if the 3X
size marketplace outside the South had only consumed 20% of dutiable
imports which passed through their fingers, destined for the sparse 1/3
size southern market.
<Southern planters were exporters who did not benefit from a tariff but
rather the opposite. Industries, small or large, who benefitted from a
tariff lobbied for adoption of tariff measures.>
You have referenced Taussig repeatedly, yet, much like Adams and
DiLorenzo, I think you misrepresent his writings.
>From Taussig's Tariff History of the United States:
p. 87. "We now turn to another industry – the manufacture of cotton
goods; by far the largest and most important branch of the textile
industry. Here we are met at the outset by the fact that, at the
beginning of the period we are considering, the cotton manufacture was in
the main independent of protection, and not likely to be much affected,
favorably or unfavorably by change in duties."
p.94. "In 1860, when the beginnings were made in re-imposing higher
protective duties, it was admitted that no demand for such a change came
from manufacturers. The only exception was in the case of the iron makers
of Pennsylvania, who did not share in the benefits of the free list and
who opposed the reduction of 1857."
p. 95 "In the main, the changes in duties have had much less effect on
the protected industries than is generally supposed, Their growth has been
steady and continuous, and seems to have been little stimulated by the high
duties of 1842, and little checked by the more moderate duties of 1846 and
1857. Probably the duties of the last-mentioned years, while on their
face protective duties, did not have in any important degree the effect of
stimulating industries that could not have maintained themselves under free
trade. They did not operate strictly as protective duties, and did not
bring that extra tax on consumers which is the peculiar effect of
protective duties. The only industry that presents a marked exception to
these general conditions is the manufacture of the cruder forms of iron."
I think an honest reading of Taussig reveals that tariffs were not the
engine of plunder that is often charged, and that as Taussig wrote, 'the
agitation over tariffs had almost completely ceased.'
The Senate debates before the vote on the tariff bill of 1861 also are not
the "protectionism vs anti-protectionism" feuds that you'd expect from a
subject being so heavily blamed for secession. There was recognized by
everyone a necessity to increase revenues for a federal government who,
since 1857, had had to borrow six times during times of peace and
widespread prosperity. The 1861 Morrill tariff was not chiefly about
raising protection, it was about raising revenue. It was close to a
return of the Democrat's popular 1846 schedule, with an expanded free
list.
sparkmaster
> New York had begun its ascendancy to the premier harbor in the U.S.
in
> 1817.
JFE wrote:
<I'll assume this is all spot-on accurate, and ask: So what? The
essential point is that *if* there was this enormous market for
imported goods which is the basis for the claim that the South
paid so much of the tariff, then there would have been classic
market forces at work encouraging direct importation to Southern
ports, thus increasing the amount of tariff collected at those
ports. Some smart person would have seen that he could make a
killing by directly importing to Charleston and thus saving the
coastal shipping costs.>
Yes, and there is no reason why that direct shipper would not have been
British, if there had been few Southerners up to the task. If there was
in 1860 some economic value to a pre-existing strength in shipping, then
the British had even New York and Boston shippers beat.
The rapid growth of fleets on the Great Lakes demonstrates that shipping
strength and expertise grows wherever there is demand for it. Only a lack
of concentrated demand for European goods explains the low volumn of direct
imports to the South from Liverpool and LeHavre. And maybe the fact that
there was hardly any shipping at all out of southern ports during the
summer months.
sparkmaster
<She is right that
consumers
ultimately paid the tariff.>
I think this is not always true, and one of the reasons why an external
tax like the tariff was preferred (aside from all the hype)to an internal
tax such as income or property.
Tariffs were paid by the foreign importers before the imported goods could
clear the bonded wharehouses and railcars. As Maynard explained in a speech
to Congress, a tariff was another expense of doing business to the foreign
importer for selling his goods to a foreign market, much as shipping costs
were an added expense of business for getting those goods there. How much
of that cost of doing business is added to the price to the consumer
depends on many other economic factors, such as the level of market demand
vs supply, not to mention domestic competition. To assume a 100%
pass-through of the tariff in all cases I think is wrong.
European exporters griped about the level of US duties more than Americans
did, and American exporters complained when Europeans levied tariffs
against their goods. If the full cost of duties could merely be added to
any price, then they would've been absolutely of no consequence to
importers. British exporters commonly referred to the price they would
receive for their textiles and pig iron - after shipping and duties paid.
Michael Furlan
>Later on, western states allied themselves more with the South because
>agricultural regions do the exporting, and exporters are penalized by high
>tariffs.
So in your timeline, Illinois was the second state to secede after South Carolina?
Clearly concerns centered on slavery overwhelmed those related to tariffs.
What we are discussing isn't history anymore.
Perhaps it is a quest to find that something, _anything_ other than slavery was really the
cause for which the South fought? Unfortunately the historical evidence for this is very
slim. And Linda knows this, as she has had years to acquaint herself with Jim Epperson's
site on the causes of the War.
Maybe it is a modern fetish of libertarians (who believe that taxation is the greatest
crime since original sin) projected back onto CW history?
I don't know. Maybe somebody can explain it to me.
l...@panix.com
: You have referenced Taussig repeatedly, yet, much like Adams and
: DiLorenzo, I think you misrepresent his writings.
How so?
: >From Taussig's Tariff History of the United States:
: p. 87. "We now turn to another industry ? the manufacture of cotton
: goods; by far the largest and most important branch of the textile
: industry. Here we are met at the outset by the fact that, at the
: beginning of the period we are considering, the cotton manufacture was in
: the main independent of protection, and not likely to be much affected,
: favorably or unfavorably by change in duties."
This is all true. Southerners "at the beginning of the period we are
considering," favored a low tariff. They considered it appropriate for
financing the federal government and voted for it.
: p.94. "In 1860, when the beginnings were made in re-imposing higher
: protective duties, it was admitted that no demand for such a change came
: from manufacturers. The only exception was in the case of the iron makers
: of Pennsylvania, who did not share in the benefits of the free list and
: who opposed the reduction of 1857."
Taussig p. 99 "The most direct changes made by the act of 1861 were in
the increased duties on iron and on wool, by which it was hoped to attach to
the Republican party Pennsylvania and some of the Western states. Most of
the manufacturing States at this time still stood aloof from the movement
toward higher rates." This, in effect, was a Republican party interest
move.
: p. 95 "In the main, the changes in duties have had much less effect on
: the protected industries than is generally supposed,
True. Most economists now think that tariffs were unnecessary to
protect infant industries, but it is also true that in the 19th century
they were a volatile issue.
Their growth has been
: steady and continuous, and seems to have been little stimulated by the high
: duties of 1842, and little checked by the more moderate duties of 1846 and
: 1857. Probably the duties of the last-mentioned years, while on their
: face protective duties, did not have in any important degree the effect of
: stimulating industries that could not have maintained themselves under free
: trade.
Exactly so. An important point.
They did not operate strictly as protective duties, and did not
: bring that extra tax on consumers which is the peculiar effect of
: protective duties. The only industry that presents a marked exception to
: these general conditions is the manufacture of the cruder forms of iron."
: I think an honest reading of Taussig reveals that tariffs were not the
: engine of plunder that is often charged, and that as Taussig wrote, 'the
: agitation over tariffs had almost completely ceased.'
The move was on in 1860 to raise the rates, and that was not a matter of
indifference to the South.
: The Senate debates before the vote on the tariff bill of 1861 also are not
: the "protectionism vs anti-protectionism" feuds that you'd expect from a
: subject being so heavily blamed for secession. There was recognized by
: everyone
Who is everyone?
a necessity to increase revenues for a federal government who,
: since 1857, had had to borrow six times during times of peace and
: widespread prosperity. The 1861 Morrill tariff was not chiefly about
: raising protection, it was about raising revenue. It was close to a
: return of the Democrat's popular 1846 schedule, with an expanded free
: list.
I don't know any analysis of the Morrill tariff that considered it a
lowering of tariff rates. "The specific duties which it established were
in many cases considerably above the ad-valorem duties of 1846." Taussig,
p. 99
The actual best way to have raised revenue would have been to eliminate
the tariff altogether.
Michael Furlan
> The actual best way to have raised revenue would have been to eliminate
>the tariff altogether.
How can a tariff rate of 0% raise any revenue?
sparkmaster
considering," favored a low tariff. They considered it appropriate for
financing the federal government and voted for it.>>
While fairly unresponsive to the passage of Taussig's, your remarks do not
even seem to square with the fact that tariff rates were lower in the
second half of the period being considered, and that they were the product
of Democratic Congresses, and signed into law by Democratic presidents
sympathetic to the South. Do you mean to imply that Southereners did not
also favor the tariff acts of 1846 and 1857?
And in a discussion about the weight of tariffs to secession, your claim
that "tariffs were a volatile issue in the 19th century" contradicts
Taussig's claim that in the 14 years before the Civil War, "agitation on
the tariff ceased almost entirely."
<<Taussig p. 99 "The most direct changes made by the act of 1861 were in
the increased duties on iron and on wool, by which it was hoped to attach
to
the Republican party Pennsylvania and some of the Western states. Most
of
the manufacturing States at this time still stood aloof from the movement
toward higher rates." This, in effect, was a Republican party interest
move.>>
I'm not sure that your conclusion is well founded. While higher duties on
wool would have benefitted western and south western states, it invertly
injured textile and clothing industries by raising the price of their raw
wool. And since the individual citizens and industries in states outside
the South were the major consumers of iron and steel, how does the rise in
iron/steel tariffs not also have a detrimental affect on those
constituencies? I think your conclusion is grossly over-simplified.
<<Who is everyone?>>
In both the House and Senate debates prior to their respective votes on
H.R. 338, there may have been debate over the lowering of duties on sugar,
and the creation of duties on coffee and tea, or debate on the duties on
flaxseed, but there was an absense of debate shown in either house, and
either party, that continuing on with mounting debt and revenues too low
to sustain the government was the way to go.
When the tariff act of 1857 went into effect on July 1, 1857, there was a
$17.7 million balance in the Treasury, and $29 million in public debt,
none of which was due at that time. By 1858, the debt had grown to $44.9
million. July of 1859 showed a debt of $58.7 million, and on the last day
of May, 1860, the debt was projected to be $65.6 million, with only $1.9
million in the Treasury. (Congressional Globe, May 7, 1860, p. 1946)
There do not appear to be any party or sectional identity with federal
frugality or expenditures, so the only remedy, which was proposed, debated
and passed, was to raise revenues with the traditional method, the federal
tariff.
<<I don't know any analysis of the Morrill tariff that considered it a
lowering of tariff rates.>>
I don't know where I would have claimed or implied that.
<<The actual best way to have raised revenue would have been to eliminate
the tariff altogether.>>
I too, would like to know how a federal government, whose revenue is
raised through land sales and tariffs, can increase their revenue by
eliminating the tariff.
sparkmaster
<<"After reading all the arguments, and discussion, I'm puzzled that no
scholar has not just done the research to show what was commonly sold in
the various shops/stores in the southern area, examined the newspapers for
items offered for sale, and done some digging at the business papers for a
number of "plantations" to see what they were buying and from whom. It
seems that it would be fairly simple to demonstrate that either the
southern customers were buying lots of imported goods (taxed), or not.">>
Thomas Huertes listed tables in his 'Damnifying Growth in the Antebellum
South' which in 1860 had the South purchasing $37 million in foreign
imports and $200 million in domestic imports. The $37 million in foreign
imports included $10 million in coffee, which before 1861, was on the free
list, further reducing the volume of dutiable imports the South consumed.
<<New York was not the major shipping port in the US because Yankee
shipping interests decided that they'd use it, but also because of the
canal systems linking it with the west>>
I'm not entirely sure how it worked, but because imports entered NY
harbor, and then were transported to the midwest via the Erie Canal and
Great Lakes, it does not mean that duties were collected in New York.
Chicago, for instance, also had a Customs House which collected enormous
amounts of duties.
<< If one wanted to sell products in Cleveland, Chicago, St. Paul, or even
St. Louis, it was easier and cheaper to
import at New York City and ship west than attempt to ship to New
Orleans>>
As far as St Louis was concerned, I think the time of year made a
considerable difference. The fall and winter months were the season for
shipping cotton - October through March. It follows that it would have
been most economical during this time to direct ship cotton to Liverpool,
and return with cargo of manufactures and immigrants headed for St Louis
and points west. Shipping through the Erie Canal and Buffalo would have
been shut down after ice-in. After ice-out though, the situations would
have reversed. Immigrants, from what I can tell, did not attempt to move
to the west during the summer, and shipping through New Orleans about shut
down in the summer due to lack of cargo and low water levels.
Doug Burt
David Wilma
>considerable difference. The fall and winter months were the season for
>shipping cotton - October through March. It follows that it would have
>been most economical during this time to direct ship cotton to Liverpool,
>and return with cargo of manufactures and immigrants headed for St Louis
>and points west.
I don't think shipments of any thing or any one between St. Louis and Liverpool
would be direct. Cargo and passengers would have to be unloaded at New Orleans
and reloaded on different vessels. This would involve different carriers etc.
Water levels affected, but did not close river traffic on the Mississippi
(unlike Columbia which had falls and cataracts). There would, of course, be a
seasonal rush of cotton and other produce to markets.
Customs duties were collected at the port of entry. I don't believe that
ante-bellum there was an in-bond shipping program that would allow collection
of duties inland.
David Wilma
www.HistoryLink.org
The online encyclopedia of Washington state history.
l...@panix.com
: <<This is all true. Southerners "at the beginning of the period we are
: financing the federal government and voted for it.>>
: While fairly unresponsive to the passage of Taussig's, your remarks do not
: even seem to square with the fact that tariff rates were lower in the
: second half of the period being considered, and that they were the product
: of Democratic Congresses, and signed into law by Democratic presidents
: sympathetic to the South. Do you mean to imply that Southereners did not
: also favor the tariff acts of 1846 and 1857?
Tariffs were lowered in 1842 and although they vacillated somewhat in
1844 and 1846, Southerners were not unhappy about the tariff during that
period and the tariff was lowered in 1857 also. I would agree with you
about that. I would point out that they were also very nervous; tariff
uncertainty was a fact of life.
Your statement about Democratic congresses and Democratic presidents is
much too simplistic. The political history of the tariff tells us that
northern Democrats were often protariff and that President Polk, a
Democrat, divided the party by equivocating his position on the tariff to
Democrats from Pennsylvania. This is also true of tariff supporters. The
Whigs, ordinarily fond of a high tariff, betrayed their supporters by
voting for the Walker tariff in 1844. Why? Because they wanted to face
the 1846 elections and they thought a low tariff would give them a
campaign issue. In other words, they wanted to get themselves re-elected
and were willing to sacrifice their supporters in order to do that.
: And in a discussion about the weight of tariffs to secession, your claim
: that "tariffs were a volatile issue in the 19th century" contradicts
: Taussig's claim that in the 14 years before the Civil War, "agitation on
: the tariff ceased almost entirely."
I know what Taussig means, which is that Southerners were not hysterical
about the tariff during the years when it was low. But agitation on the
issue had *not* ceased. For every supporter of a low tariff, there was an
opponent, and the opponents were not at all happy. Hence the platform of
the Republicans in 1860.
: <<Taussig p. 99 "The most direct changes made by the act of 1861 were in
: the increased duties on iron and on wool, by which it was hoped to attach
: to
: the Republican party Pennsylvania and some of the Western states. Most
: of
: the manufacturing States at this time still stood aloof from the movement
: toward higher rates." This, in effect, was a Republican party interest
: move.>>
: I'm not sure that your conclusion is well founded. While higher duties on
: wool would have benefitted western and south western states, it invertly
: injured textile and clothing industries by raising the price of their raw
: wool. And since the individual citizens and industries in states outside
: the South were the major consumers of iron and steel, how does the rise in
: iron/steel tariffs not also have a detrimental affect on those
: constituencies? I think your conclusion is grossly over-simplified.
Your reasoning seems okay to me. I can only say that the political vote
counters must have found more support among the higher duty advocates.
The manufacturers of textiles in this country were in very sound shape by
1857.
: <<The actual best way to have raised revenue would have been to eliminate
: the tariff altogether.>>
: I too, would like to know how a federal government, whose revenue is
: raised through land sales and tariffs, can increase their revenue by
: eliminating the tariff.
You and Mike are entirely correct; that was an absurd statement. I
think that a different kind of tax, one that the congress had not yet
invented (like a sales tax) would have prevented the terrible situation
that existed with tariff legislation. Tariff politics was full of
rent-seeking, log-rolling, anti-consumer advocates and congressment were
tempted by bribery and dishonesty.
Maybe higher postal rates. :)
sparkmaster
between St. Louis and Liverpool would be direct. Cargo and passengers
would have to be unloaded at New Orleans and reloaded on different
vessels. This would involve different carriers etc.>>
Yes. I didn't explain myself very well. I referred to the economy of
directly shipping cotton to Liverpool from New Orleans and the returning
vessels offloading their goods and immigrants there for travel up the
Mississippi, as opposed to a coastal trip via New York or Boston, or any
inland trip via Chicago. During the winter months when cotton was being
shipped, this made perfect sense, whereas travel via the Erie Canal and
Great Lakes would have been impossible.
<<Water levels affected, but did not close river traffic on the
Mississippi (unlike Columbia which had falls and cataracts). There would,
of course, be a seasonal rush of cotton and other produce to markets.>>
I am going from what I have read on the history of New Orleans, which
noted that during the summer months, shipping came to a near standstill
due to a lack of seasonal cargo, low water levels, and the fact that New
Orleans became almost uninhabitable. Produce unloaded on the wharves
would be spoiled in a day, I think I remember reading. Every record I
came across of immigrants entering through New Orleans had the voyage in
the January to March window.
<<Customs duties were collected at the port of entry. I don't believe that
ante-bellum there was an in-bond shipping program that would allow
collection of duties inland.>>
There is debate on Sept. 19, 1850 (Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 1st
session, p. 1348) over resolutions to fund building of custom-houses in St
Louis and Cincinnati. It is stated by several congressman, anyways, that
duties can be collected in not only ports of entry, but also ports of
delivery. By the end of the decade, there are also custom houses in such
places as Nashville and Knoxville, Tenn.; Dubuque, Iowa; Louisville, KY.;
Galena, Ill.; and most every port on the Great Lakes. What would have
been the purpose of inland custom-houses, if not the collection of
duties?
I can't seem to find it now, but I've also read a speech by a US
congressman from Illinois who was rebutting Southern accusations of
federal expenditures on harbor improvement in Chicago. He noted that the
duties collected in Chicago (he gave amounts)far outpaced the money being
spent there by the federal government, and something about how the same
could not be said for the new custom-house then being built in New
Orleans.
Damned if I can remember where in the Globe it was located though.
Doug Burt
sparkmaster
somewhat in
1844 and 1846, Southerners were not unhappy about the tariff during that
period and the tariff was lowered in 1857 also.>>
The tariff act of 1842 interuppted the tariff reductions schedule of the
1833 act and raised tariffs. The period of 1842 -1846 is considered a
high rate period of protectionism.
<<Whigs, ordinarily fond of a high tariff, betrayed their supporters by
voting for the Walker tariff in 1844. Why? Because they wanted to face
the 1846 elections and they thought a low tariff would give them a
campaign issue.>>
The Walker tariff was the tariff of 1846 - Walker was not appointed
Treasury Secretary until 1845 - there was no new tariff act in 1844.
Also, what elections are you referring to in 1846 - the congressional
elections? Are you saying that Whigs "betrayed their supporters" by
voting for the 1844 Walker tariff just before that year's national
elections so that Whigs could have a campaign issue two years later for a
congressional election? Hmmmmm.
<<I know what Taussig means, which is that Southerners were not hysterical
about the tariff during the years when it was low. But agitation on the
issue had *not* ceased. For every supporter of a low tariff, there was an
opponent, and the opponents were not at all happy. Hence the platform of
the Republicans in 1860.>>
The protectionist plank in the Chicago platform is a relatively mild call
for a raise in tariffs. If tariffs were truly any sort of dividing issue,
why do you suppose they did not appear in the debates, or in any of the
other party's platforms? Why did Southerners not refer to the "Tax
republicans" instead of the "Black Republicans"? Why was there a "Free
Soil" party, but no "Free Trade" party? The Democrats certainly weren't
it.