What was Czechoslovakia's status during WW2? ... I'm not sure what the
phrase "protectorate" means in a legal sense.
Was it an occupied country? or an independent country browbeaten into
co-operating with Germany?
It had its own government and cabinet and police forces, so it wasnt
"occupied" in the same way Poland or occupied France was for example.
Were the German army and SS troops occupation forces, or were they
there to "assist" the Czech "government"? And was this government seen
by the allies as collaborationist ... and were there treason trials
later for those who served in this government?
Was it regarded as a sovereign nation? ... did the US for example have
diplomatic relations with Prague prior to entering the war itself, or
did it recognize the Exile government base in London?
Many thanks
>
>
>What was Czechoslovakia's status during WW2? ... I'm not sure what the
>phrase "protectorate" means in a legal sense.
>Was it an occupied country? or an independent country browbeaten into
>co-operating with Germany?
>It had its own government and cabinet and police forces, so it wasnt
>"occupied" in the same way Poland or occupied France was for example.
>
What part of the Czech Republic are we talking about? The rim of
German-majority areas called the "Sudetenland" (an interwar coinage,
contrary to popular belief) was annexed to Germany after the Munich
agreement in 1938. The rest of the Czech Lands (Bohemia, Moravia, and
Czech Silesia--called "Czechy" in Czech) were then occupied
in...er...spring of 1939, I think. It was an invasion, but the Czechs
(who have a pacifist tradition dating to the 1848 revolutions, and in
any case had lost their defense on the mountainous border when Germany
annexed it earlier) decided to put up no resistance. (I refer to the
"Czechs" here because Czechs dominated the Czechoslovak government.)
I don't recall reading about the legal status of the Czech Lands
during the war, but I'll take your word for it that Germany declared a
"protectorate" over them. In international law, a protectorate is one
country exercising governmental authority over a territory outside its
borders. That territory is NOT considered a sovereign country of its
own, but it's not considered part of the protecting country either.
In the interwar period, and after WWII, many former colonies became
"protectorates" of new occupying powers (after WWII, in fact, that was
sanctioned by the UN), with the idea that they would, after a period
of political and economic development, be granted independence
(sovereignty) if they chose it; a few small islands still have this
status.
Mind you, no other countries (except the Axis powers and the Soviet
Union, the latter until 1941) would actually have recognized the
legality of the German protectorate, and treated the Czech lands
(including the Sudetenland--that transfer was retroactively considered
illegitimate) as being a sovereign country under foreign occupation.
The bulk of Slovakia became an independent state under a puppet
Fascist government; it would not have been recognized by any but the
aforementioned countries; the rest of the world recognized the
Czechoslovak government in exile as the legimate government, except
possibly the Soviet Union (I'm not clear on the Soviets' position on
governments in exile--they were clearly planning all along to install
Communist exiles in power, but I suspect they muddled the issue in
talks with the other Allies).
The southwestern part of Slovakia, where the Hungarian population of
that country is concentrated, was annexed by the Fascist aligned
Hungarian government, while the extreme eastern tip of Slovakia was
annexed under the Molotv-von Ribbentrop Pact by the Soviet Union,
becoming a part of Ukraine, at the same time that the Soviets annexed
the Baltic states, eastern Poland, and the region of Rumania (now
"Romania") now known as Moldova.
>Were the German army and SS troops occupation forces, or were they
>there to "assist" the Czech "government"? And was this government seen
>by the allies as collaborationist ... and were there treason trials
>later for those who served in this government?
AFAIK there were no Czech government after this point. This differs
from the puppet Fascist government in Slovakia and Croatia, and the
Fascist-aligned, German-influenced governments in Hungary. (I can't
really remember whether the Rumanian and Bulgarian governments were
puppets or not, but a quick web search would answer that question)
That's not to say that there weren't invidual Czech collaborators
(some of whom were tried later), or that Czech civil servants stopped
doing their jobs (it's awfully hard to run a country if none of the
civil servants knows the language).
>
>Was it regarded as a sovereign nation? ... did the US for example have
>diplomatic relations with Prague prior to entering the war itself, or
>did it recognize the Exile government base in London?
>
As I said above, aside from the countries mentioned, I don't think any
countries recognized the annexations and occupations as legitimate.
I'm not positive, though, that some neutrals, especially Switzerland,
didn't do so, though I don't think the U.S. did. I suspect that most
neutrals tried to fudge the issue by issuing initial protestations and
then trying to avoid having to make definitive pronouncements after
that: as in the case of Taiwan and the West Bank today, there's a
tension between what countries maintain as an official position and
the policies they have to pursue to conduct trade with the territories
in question.
Scott Orr
<snip an otherwise fine post with one nitpick>
> AFAIK there were no Czech government after this point.
Actually the Czech government remained in being after the creation of the
Protectorate, with Hacha (who had taken over after Benes' resignation)
remaining as nominal President. This Prague administration had some minor
administrative responsibilities in Bohemia and Moravia but the Reich
Protector (initially von Neurath, then Heydrich) was the de facto executive
power. After Heydrich's assassination in May 1942 the Germans reshuffled
Hacha's government and removed its last vestiges of authority, although the
hapless President stayed on as a token gesture.
The French and later the British offered Benes' émigré committee a home and
some degree of cooperation in the first years of the war but did not extend
full diplomatic recognition to this would-be government-in-exile until July
1941 (along with the USSR), when it became a formal member of the Allied
coalition.
Alan.
Okay, thanks. I have to confess that what I know about is the
territorial issues resulting from the war more than what happened
during it.
Scott Or
Hi
Just a quick correction here. The region of Upper Hungary, which in 1918 was
arbitrarily given to the newly-invented country of Czechoslovakia is what
you're talking about. Initially, the what is now Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia)
was given to Czechoslovakia. The region of Ruthenia was demanded by Stalin
not at the time you mention, but at Yalta. Needless to say, the western
Allies were happy to parcel it out to him.
Oh, as to your "Fascist-Aligned Hungary". I would call that unnecessarily
emotive. After all, I could talk about "Communist-Aligned Britain/USA etc."
I'd prefer to leave ideology out of history, if you can!
Chris
Leave your attachment to your ancestors out of this. :)
Scott Orr
>Just a quick correction here. The region of Upper Hungary, which in 1918 was
>arbitrarily given to the newly-invented country of Czechoslovakia....
Okay, I didn't say anything at first, but I really have to....
First off, the name "Upper Hungary" does not, as far as I know, have
any historical basis, except that stemming from Hungary's possession
of the area during WWII. For about 1,000 years Hungary (first as an
independent kingdom and then as part of the Hapsburg Empire) ruled
over the area of Slovakia (and quite a bit else in Eastern Europe,
including Romania), all of which appears on 19th-century maps as part
of "Hungary". The region you refer to as "Upper Hungary" is not
distinguished, on these maps or historically, from the rest of
"Slovakia" (neither name appears on the maps). AFAIK, the region was
originally part of Slovakia, but who really cares, since that was 1100
years ago? The population of the region is question includes a large
number of ethnic Hungarians (who in places constitute the majority),
because this was the section of Slovakia most thoroughly "colonized"
during the period of Hungarian and Hapsburg rule (which is not to say
these people don't have a right to be there--their families have lived
there for centuries, after all).
Second, there was nothing "arbitrary" about assigning this region to
the newly-reinvented country of Czechoslovakia in 1918, rather than to
the newly-reinvented country of Hungary. If you want to argue about
who stole if fair and square, technically you lose, because the Czechs
had ruled Slovakia as part of the Great Moravian Empire before the
Kingdom of Hungary took it in 906. In any case, neither the Czechs
nor the Hungarians* had an independent country for several centuries
prior to 1918, and frankly, I don't think having stolen a piece of
land first gives "your people"** any moral right to it in the first
place.
The reason it was assigned to Czechoslovakia is that they drew the
borders along the major rivers in the area (specifically the Danube
and the Ipel'). This certainly screwed over the Hungarians living
north of those rivers (provided you believe that people can't live
happily except with their own kind, which is true by virtue of being a
self-fulfilling prophesy), just as the Slovaks living there would have
been screwed over the other way around, but the Hungarians had just
lost World War I....(The Roma/Gypsies would been screwed over either
way, but they always are.) This may have been a "controversial"
decision, and some would argue that it was "unjust", but it wasn't
"arbitrary".
If this offends your sense of nationalism, I'm sorry--but, honestly, I
don't think members of various diasporas living comfortably in
democratic countries should promote real ethnic conflicts among real
people leading to real harm back in the homeland just so that they can
experience warm fuzzies through finding identity by "reattaching"
themselves to their imagined "roots".
*To speak of either the "Czechs" or the "Hungarians" before the 19th
century is completely ahistorical--neither nation existed before then
as a nation, though, like all nations throughout the world, both have
since the 19th century invented a long existence built around grains
of historical truth.
**The idea that you have a right to some moral or legal status because
of the actions of people 1100 years ago who may or may not be
genetically related to you but with whom you identify, is, to me,
rather farcical.
Scott Orr
Nice post Scott. The world would be a much quieter place if more people
would by similarly objective about the bases of modern micro-nationalism.
--
Jim Voege
Remove nospam for reply
>I
>don't think members of various diasporas living comfortably in
>democratic countries should promote real ethnic conflicts among real
>people leading to real harm back in the homeland just so that they can
>experience warm fuzzies through finding identity by "reattaching"
>themselves to their imagined
>"roots".
>
Is it relevant whether the country they are living in is "democratic" or not?
It the boundaries have been so drawn as to leave then hopelessly outnumbered in
their new "homeland" that means they are denied self-rule just as effectively
as if it were a dictatorship - since whatever community forms the majority on
their side of the arbitrary line will always outvote them. In such a case,
they have every right to seek support from the other side of the border -
which, after all was drawn "over their heads" without their consent, so is
entitled to continue only as long as those who drew it have enough physical
force at their disposal to keep it in place
--
Mike Stone - Peterborough England
Last words of King Edward II.
"I always said that Roger Mortimer was a pain in the - - - AAARGHH!!!"
> It the boundaries have been so drawn as to leave then hopelessly
outnumbered in
> their new "homeland" that means they are denied self-rule just as
effectively
> as if it were a dictatorship - since whatever community forms the majority
on
> their side of the arbitrary line will always outvote them.
This argument assumes that (a) different communities always have opposing
and irresolvable goals that cannot be negotiated through civil society, and
(b) even in a democratic environment individuals always define themselves as
a homogenous ethnic bloc that votes unanimously according to some kind of
Volkish General Will. Both these assumptions strike me as demonstrably
untrue.
Alan.
Along that road lies madness. Where does it stop with people migrating all
over the map and laying claim to not only their new digs but also to all
those places which their personal folklore tells them was, at some point, a
homeland.
It seems to me that if you want to eliminate the problem of ethnic
minorities you have to eliminate ethnic majorities. In Europe this would
mean political unification. In other words, you remove boundary disputes by
removing boundaries.
And then have a war with someone to really fix the new mindset.
Hi there!
It's not a question of ancestors, I'm Hungarian myself. I do try to get a
"fair deal" for Hungary in discussions like this, however. I think that's
reasonable.
The reason I objected to the "fascist" label is that it wasn't the "fascism"
that the Hungarian interwar governments were attracted to, with the
exception of that of Gyula Gombos. Rather, Hungary wanted a fair revision of
the Treaty of Trianon. This treaty, as I'm sure you know, put a third of
Hungarians in successor states and caused one of the biggest shocks to the
Hungarian nation. Many Hungarians today consider the Mongol Invasion
(1241-2), the Turkish Occupation (1541-1699) and the Trianon Treaty (1920)
to have been Hungary's worst misfortunes.
The part that bothers me so much about this is that the Treaty was imposed
by the Western Allies, in the name of democracy, but no plebiscites or any
other democratic instruments were allowed by these same Allies (??!!) As a
result, there has been a great deal of tragedy in the Carpathian Basin.
All of Hungarian society from 1918 worked for some revision of this. Even
the communists counterattacked Czech Legion soldiers to regain
Kassa/Kassau/Kosice, but were forced to withdraw under Allied pressure.
So the interwar government turned to Britain and France for some help, but
got none. Later, Italy indicated it would assist Hungary's case, then
Germany offered to help - but also to help Slovakia and Romania.
Had the Allies been a bit more reasonable, they would have had a staunch
ally in Hungary, which, along with Poland, was the most pro-British/American
country in Europe.
BTW, to answer the original poster's message: Czechoslovakia did not exist
during WWII, except in the minds of Czechoslovak nationalists and their
western Allied followers.
Best,
Chris
>It seems to me that if you want to eliminate the problem of ethnic
>minorities you have to eliminate ethnic majorities. In Europe this would
>mean political unification. In other words, you remove boundary disputes by
>removing boundaries.
>
Only by that logic, of course, there sjhouldn't have been a Czechoslovakia in
the first place. The old Austrian Empire should never have been broken up.
The winners of WW1 had adopted (when it suited them) the principle that each
little language should have a country of its own. Maybe they shouldn't have but
they did. So inevitably, as soon as Germany shook of the disarmament clauses of
Versailles (as it surely would as soon as it acquired a govenrnent willing to
say boo to a goose) it would demand that the same rule be applied reciprocally-
to the Germans in Austria and CZ. 1938 was inherent in 1919
>
>> It the boundaries have been so drawn as to leave then hopelessly
>outnumbered in
>> their new "homeland" that means they are denied self-rule just as
>effectively
>> as if it were a dictatorship - since whatever community forms the majority
>on
>> their side of the arbitrary line will always outvote them.
>
>This argument assumes that (a) different communities always have opposing
>and irresolvable goals that cannot be negotiated through civil society, and
>(b) even in a democratic environment individuals always define themselves as
>a homogenous ethnic bloc that votes unanimously according to some kind of
>Volkish General Will. Both these assumptions strike me as demonstrably
>untrue.
In which case it wasn't very smart of the 1919 "peacemakers" to adopt that
principle - for everyone except the Sudeten Germans and the Magyars in
slovakia.
> In which case it wasn't very smart of the 1919 "peacemakers" to adopt that
> principle - for everyone except the Sudeten Germans and the Magyars in
> slovakia.
But you're using a specific case to try to justify a universal rule, which
falls flat because there are counter-examples (one alone would suffice to
knock down the argument) in which ethnic minorities *didn't* behave like the
Sudetan Germans, et al.
Alan.
>
>> In which case it wasn't very smart of the 1919 "peacemakers" to adopt that
>> principle - for everyone except the Sudeten Germans and the Magyars in
>> slovakia.
>
>But you're using a specific case to try to justify a universal rule, which
>falls flat because there are counter-examples (one alone would suffice to
>knock down the argument) in which ethnic minorities *didn't* behave like the
>Sudetan Germans, et al.
And your point is?
The Sudeten Germans were for the most part living in territory adjoining the
Reich (or Austria which became part of the Reich) and there was nothing to
prevent them uniting with it except that a bunch of other powers, temporaril;y
srtronger than Germany, said "we're not going to let you, and we have the power
to stop you"
Which, of course, is a perfectly valid argument in the world of power politics
- but _only_ as long as those who say no have the firepower and the will power
to make it stick. By 1938 it was becoming pretty obvious that this wasn't the
case - so there was no further reason forthe Sudeten Germans to go along with
being part of CZ - and no reason why Germany shouldn't support them?
> >> In which case it wasn't very smart of the 1919 "peacemakers" to adopt
that
> >> principle - for everyone except the Sudeten Germans and the Magyars in
> >> slovakia.
> >
> >But you're using a specific case to try to justify a universal rule,
which
> >falls flat because there are counter-examples (one alone would suffice to
> >knock down the argument) in which ethnic minorities *didn't* behave like
the
> >Sudetan Germans, et al.
>
> And your point is?
That you can't use a single historical example (that of the Sudeten problem)
to advance a larger proposition (that in democratic societies members of
ethnic minorities are always denied authentic political representation)
because the contingent circumstances of the particular do not apply to the
general.
Alan.
Well, what can I say? You are reflecting the basic modern Slovak nationalist
history, which is opposed by Slovak professional historians. If you want,
I'll give you a name and an e-mail. Simply put, Great Moravia is not some
"ancient Slovakia".
But I am not in the mood for arguing history - based on documents,
archaeology, the histories of surrounding nations - Poland, Byzantium, Rus,
Germany, Austria versus material based on WWI propaganda. Rather, I'll give
you a brief quote from a British historian, who you cannot accuse of being a
"Hungarian nationalist."
Anthony D. Smith, in _National Identities_, (ISBN 0 14 01 2565 5) states:
"In early modern Eastern Europe, for example, we could have found
distinctive _ethnies_ such as Poles, Hungarians and Croats in their
historical states, boasting long and rich histories; submerged ethnic
communities like the Serbs, Romanians, and Bulgarians, whose medieval
histories had to be rediscovered and aligned with their recent memories of
Ottoman oppression; and ethnically mixed areas and categories of Macedonians
and Ruthenians, the major part of whose memories are fairly recent and who,
together with the Slovaks, had to dig deep into the past for geneological
filiation and shadowy ancestor-heroes."
So now, is he an "ethnic war-monger", or whatever???
AFAIK, the Slovaks, as far as can be made out, lived in the
northern Carpathian mountains, and could be akin to the "Mountain Poles."
They, from 1000 onwards and perhaps a bit earlier moved into today's
northern Slovakia, as cities developed and were known and respected as
miners and timbermen.
I am sorry if this pops your bubble, but I suggest you contact the Slovak
historian I know, and get more names from him, etc. Don't take my word on
it, find out for yourself!
You wrote further.
The population of the region is question includes a large
>number of ethnic Hungarians (who in places constitute the majority),
>because this was the section of Slovakia most thoroughly "colonized"
>during the period of Hungarian and Hapsburg rule (which is not to say
>these people don't have a right to be there--their families have lived
>there for centuries, after all).
See above:
>
>Second, there was nothing "arbitrary" about assigning this region to
>the newly-reinvented country of Czechoslovakia in 1918, rather than to
>the newly-reinvented country of Hungary. If you want to argue about
>who stole if fair and square, technically you lose, because the Czechs
>had ruled Slovakia as part of the Great Moravian Empire before the
>Kingdom of Hungary took it in 906.
Sorry, your knowledge of our region is admirable, but not really there. ("A
little bit of knowledge is a dangerous thing.") The Great Moravian Empire
was _Moravian_. In Hungarian territory, it only ruled the region from the
Carpathians down to the River Garam. It never ruled all of what is now
Slovakia by a long shot. The Czechs are not Moravians. Their people, the
Bohemians, became independent of the Moravians in this same period
c.890-950.
In any case, neither the Czechs
>nor the Hungarians* had an independent country for several centuries
>prior to 1918,
Not for any lack of trying. Nor did the Poles, btw.
and frankly, I don't think having stolen a piece of
>land first gives "your people"** any moral right to it in the first
>place.
We didn't steal it, and you can't put 21st C morality onto 10thC actions,
either.
>
>The reason it was assigned to Czechoslovakia is that they drew the
>borders along the major rivers in the area (specifically the Danube
>and the Ipel'). This certainly screwed over the Hungarians living
>north of those rivers (provided you believe that people can't live
>happily except with their own kind, which is true by virtue of being a
>self-fulfilling prophesy), just as the Slovaks living there would have
>been screwed over the other way around, but the Hungarians had just
>lost World War I....(The Roma/Gypsies would been screwed over either
>way, but they always are.) This may have been a "controversial"
>decision, and some would argue that it was "unjust", but it wasn't
>"arbitrary".
It was aribitrary. I invite you to read the minutes of the discussions. It
is frightening how the "Big Four" would say "shall we give this town to, er,
Czechoslovakia, or German-Austria?" For example, Bratislava (Possonium/
Pozsony/ Pressburg) was given to Czechoslovakia as an afterthought, to give
them a port on the Danube... so much for "national self-determination!"
Remember, the old Hungarian kingdom was not ethnically-based, it wasn't our
idea to create "pure nations", but that was Woodrow Wilsons, rather tragic,
dream.
>
>If this offends your sense of nationalism, I'm sorry--but, honestly, I
>don't think members of various diasporas living comfortably in
>democratic countries
are you claiming that Hungary and Slovakia today are not democracies? I am
moving back to Hungary, and I will still be posting much the same material.
You have jumped to conclusions about me. All I wanted to do was inform as to
the historical basis of certain problems, especially related to
Czechoslovakia. That doesn't make me a "nationalist", just like an American
writing about his War of Independence isn't automatically anti-British.
should promote real ethnic conflicts among real
>people leading to real harm back in the homeland just so that they can
>experience warm fuzzies through finding identity by "reattaching"
>themselves to their imagined "roots".
No warm fuzzies, this is my own family we are talking about. (Not in
Slovakia, elsewhere). And I am not in any way "leading to real harm." Last
year in Hungary I discussed this sort of thing a lot, with all sorts of
ethnic groups. There isn't the same "nationalism" there you fear so much.
>
>*To speak of either the "Czechs" or the "Hungarians" before the 19th
>century is completely ahistorical--neither nation existed before then
>as a nation, though, like all nations throughout the world, both have
>since the 19th century invented a long existence built around grains
>of historical truth.
I'm sure the Czechs would be grateful to hear that! Who was Jan Huss? A 19th
C invention??? Or, for what did c. 80 000 Hungarians defend an inverted
U-shape of fortifications for 150 yrs against the Turks. (The figure
includes Slovaks, Ruthenes, Magyars)??
>
>**The idea that you have a right to some moral or legal status because
>of the actions of people 1100 years ago who may or may not be
>genetically related to you but with whom you identify, is, to me,
>rather farcical.
I never said I have a right today because of anything 1 100 years ago. I
merely criticised the Treaty of Trianon, primarily for not using democratic
principles. Apparently, that bothers your sense of "being right" just
because you're a westerner. You guys screwed up Europe at Versailles, as
many wise westerners said *at the time!*
It seems you simply can't face that fact. Nor did you do better at Yalta!
Ciao
Chris
My criticism is, and was, that your Allies claimed to be fighting WWI to
"make the world safe for democracy", but sadly, when it came to carving up
Europe, they failed to use democratic methods.
Why couldn't they have asked the local people what they wanted, for
instance??
Cheers,
Chris
Good post, Mike! Instead of insisting on creating some kind of
ethnically-based states (all Slavs in one state, all Magyars in another....)
they should have asked the local people what they wanted. They were supposed
to be democrats after all.
So inevitably, as soon as Germany shook of the disarmament clauses of
>Versailles (as it surely would as soon as it acquired a govenrnent willing
to
>say boo to a goose) it would demand that the same rule be applied
reciprocally-
>to the Germans in Austria and CZ. 1938 was inherent in 1919
Absolutely right!
Ciao
Chris
Look at me. Swabian-German maternal ancestors, Szekely-Magyar paternal ones.
I'm Hungarian coz I chose to be, and have the citizenship to prove it. Or do
I not have that right??
Which is why I have high hopes for the EU. This will make the borders of
modern "nation states" (ouch, what a concept) less important, and
historical, economic and cultural regions more important.
After Trianon, a Hungarian writer wrote (from memory): "Before the new
borders were imposed, the Slovak sold his timber to the Magyar, who sold him
his grain in return. Now, after Trianon, the Slovak is hungry and the Magyar
is cold."
Chris
Right again! But also, look at Czechoslovakia. It had Czechs, Germans,
Slovaks, Ruthenes, Hungarians/Magyars, Jews and Gypsies as well as some
smaller groups.
So how on earth was it a "national state." If they wanted that, they should
have made a Czech State, a Slovak State, a Ruthene State ....
The important thing now is for us to deal with history calmly, as I have
tried (and Scott has, in my opinion, overreacted, and to deal with current
issues as current issues. To use a current term: "Decouple" history from
modern politics. I'm pleased to say Hungary is doing this admirably well at
the moment, and the Slovaks aren't doing too badly either. Even "backward"
Ukraine has a pretty enlightened minority policy. Romania has a long way to
go, but wants into the EU, so there's hope.
BTW. If I, as a Hungarian, write some points on history, why is it taken as
read that I am some new Milosevic? I don't get it. Enlighten me please!
Cheers
Chris
>To speak of either the "Czechs" or the "Hungarians" before the 19th
>century is completely ahistorical--neither nation existed before then
>as a nation...
Hungary existed as a completely separate nation for several
hundred years.
In 1526, most of Hungary was occupied by the Turks, and
the Hungarian crown with the rump state became a Hapsburg
possession. In 1699-1718 the Turkish zone was reunited
with the rest of Hungary.
But from 1526 through 1806 Hungary retained a separate
existence - its own laws, national assembly, and so on.
In 1806 the Holy Roman Empire was abolished, and in the
associated waves of reform the Habsburg lands were
consolidated into a single state - a condition so unstable
it collapsed in 1867. Hungary then reappeared with its
distinct laws and its own separate government.
As for "the Czechs", they existed, just as "the Italians"
existed - or "the Arabs". The existence of a distinct
"people" is always a subjective one, but this case is
pretty clear.
--
Never consume legumes before transacting whatsoever | Rich Rostrom
even in the outermost courtyard of a descendant of |
Timur the Terrible. | rrostrom@dummy
--- Avram Davidson, _Dr. Bhumbo Singh_ | 21stcentury.net
>This argument assumes that (a) different communities always have opposing
>and irresolvable goals that cannot be negotiated through civil society, and
>(b) even in a democratic environment individuals always define themselves as
>a homogenous ethnic bloc that votes unanimously according to some kind of
>Volkish General Will. Both these assumptions strike me as demonstrably
>untrue.
>
They're true when people think they're true--as I said before, it's a
self-fulfilling prophesy.
This is exactly why I object to a post like Mr. Szabo's, because that
kind of history-as-ethnic-warfare doesn't accomplish anything except
to make the ethnic groups in question more distrustrful of one
another.
Scott Orr
>>From: Scott D. Orr sd...@ix.netcom.com
>
>>I
>>don't think members of various diasporas living comfortably in
>>democratic countries should promote real ethnic conflicts among real
>>people leading to real harm back in the homeland just so that they can
>>experience warm fuzzies through finding identity by "reattaching"
>>themselves to their imagined
>>"roots".
>>
>
>Is it relevant whether the country they are living in is "democratic" or not?
>
Of course. My objection here is to people living in the rich
democracies who unwittlingly deprive their "fellow ethnics" of the
same by fostering ethnic divisions in the homeland (because ethnic
divisions, expressed in the way you express them below, destroy
democarcy--if everyone votes for an ethnic party, you have no
political competition).
>It the boundaries have been so drawn as to leave then hopelessly outnumbered in
>their new "homeland" that means they are denied self-rule just as effectively
>as if it were a dictatorship - since whatever community forms the majority on
>their side of the arbitrary line will always outvote them. In such a case,
>they have every right to seek support from the other side of the border -
>which, after all was drawn "over their heads" without their consent, so is
>entitled to continue only as long as those who drew it have enough physical
>force at their disposal to keep it in place
There's a key assumption you've made which is at the root of the
problem: would you argue that if 5% of the population is farmers,
that farmes "are denied self-rule" in a democracy? So why would an
ethnic group be different? If politicians from major parties seek
their votes, and they're willing to vote for those politicians,
they're just as well represented as anyone else, right? And exactly
why would they even have to vote on "ethnic issues"--isn't the essence
of democracy to vote for any issue or ideology you prefer?
Scott Orr
>In which case it wasn't very smart of the 1919 "peacemakers" to adopt that
>principle - for everyone except the Sudeten Germans and the Magyars in
>slovakia.
As a historical nitpick, the term "Sudeten" didn't exist in 1919. In
any case, neither border could have been drawn in a way so as not to
create a minority--the peoples in question are thororughly
intermingled, even if some are more numerous in some places, and
others in other places. And these two cases are by no means the only
ones--there were substantial minorites in _every_ country in Eastern
Europe after 1919, including Germany.
Scott Orr
>Nice post Scott. The world would be a much quieter place if more people
>would by similarly objective about the bases of modern micro-nationalism.
Yeah, but then I'd be out of business, since the relationships between
democracy and identity is the subject of my dissertation. :) That's
one line of work I'd be happy to make obsolete, though.
Actually, some kind of common identity isn't ALL bad--it's probably a
requisite for having a successful democracy; however, identities that
divide people within a state (unless they're cross-cut by other
identities like class, profession, or ideology) cause problems.
Scott Orr
>>From: "Alan Allport" all...@ee.upenn.edu
>
>>
>>> In which case it wasn't very smart of the 1919 "peacemakers" to adopt that
>>> principle - for everyone except the Sudeten Germans and the Magyars in
>>> slovakia.
>>
>>But you're using a specific case to try to justify a universal rule, which
>>falls flat because there are counter-examples (one alone would suffice to
>>knock down the argument) in which ethnic minorities *didn't* behave like the
>>Sudetan Germans, et al.
>
>And your point is?
>
>The Sudeten Germans were for the most part living in territory adjoining the
>Reich (or Austria which became part of the Reich) and there was nothing to
>prevent them uniting with it except that a bunch of other powers, temporaril;y
>srtronger than Germany, said "we're not going to let you, and we have the power
>to stop you"
There were a number of things to prevent it:
1. A lot of the territory was _not_ really adjacent to Germany or
Austria--it formed a "horseshoe" around all but the eastern edge of
the Czech Lands.
2. These lands had for centries (if not longer) been part of the
Czech Lands (Bohemia, Moravia, and Czech Silesia)--apart from minor
post-war adjustments along the Polish border, that's where the border
had always been. These people and their ancestors had never been
citizens of Germany--they'd been there since about the 13th or 14th
centries, long before a united Germany existed. They had been
citizens of Austria-Hungary, but within Austria-Hungary they were part
of Bohemia, Moravia, or Silesia, not Austria proper.
3. The economy of this area, in an era of protectionist economics,
was integrated in to that of Czechoslovakia and its economic center in
Prague, and indeed had been under Austria-Hungary as well (since the
Czech Lands, and especially the "German" regions thereof, were the
most highly developed part of the Empire.
4. But the big reason is that the Germans were NOT the only people
who lived there--Czechs lived there too, as well as Jews, Gypsies, and
probably a decent number of Slovaks and Poles. By the same token,
"Sudeten" Germans lived in smaller numbers throughout the Czech Lands,
and especially in Prague. Contrary to popular belief, there were no
nice, neat lines that could be drawn so that there were no minorities.
This kind of mistaken belief drives me nuts every time one of my
students does a paper on Quebec separatism--I have yet to have a
single student mention the fact that 1/3 of the population is
English-speaking without my having to hand the paper back to them
first and tell them to rewrite it.
Scott Orr
>Hi there!
>
>It's not a question of ancestors, I'm Hungarian myself. I do try to get a
>"fair deal" for Hungary in discussions like this, however. I think that's
>reasonable.
>
>The reason I objected to the "fascist" label is that it wasn't the "fascism"
>that the Hungarian interwar governments were attracted to, with the
>exception of that of Gyula Gombos. Rather, Hungary wanted a fair revision of
>the Treaty of Trianon.
Regardless of the motives, Hungary was aligned with the Fascist
countries, just as Finland for even better motives, was aligned with
them. The term "fascist-aligned" is merely descriptive.
>This treaty, as I'm sure you know, put a third of
>Hungarians in successor states and caused one of the biggest shocks to the
>Hungarian nation. Many Hungarians today consider the Mongol Invasion
>(1241-2), the Turkish Occupation (1541-1699) and the Trianon Treaty (1920)
>to have been Hungary's worst misfortunes.
>
>The part that bothers me so much about this is that the Treaty was imposed
>by the Western Allies, in the name of democracy, but no plebiscites or any
>other democratic instruments were allowed by these same Allies (??!!) As a
>result, there has been a great deal of tragedy in the Carpathian Basin.
>
There would have been a great deal of tragedy no matter where the
borders were drawn--there was simply no way to avoid creating
minorities.
>All of Hungarian society from 1918 worked for some revision of this. Even
>the communists counterattacked Czech Legion soldiers to regain
>Kassa/Kassau/Kosice, but were forced to withdraw under Allied pressure.
Well, here's an example of the injustice that would have happened if
the Hungarians had gotten their way: Kosice is one of the most
important seats of Slovak culture; I don't even think it's a
majority-Hungarian area. So would it have been been "fair" to take
all these Slovaks and their cultural center and drop them into Hungary
in order to make sure that no Hungarian was outside Hungary's borders?
From the Slovak point of view, the "Hungarians" were simply
oppressors: they invaded in 906, they drove out or assimilated Slovak
nobles and settled their own people (especially in the south) on
Slovak lands, and then took and kept for themselves the best positions
in society, leaving the Slovaks poor and uneducated.
Oh, and that's not all--the Hungarians, while fighting nobly for their
own autonomy with the Hapsburg Empire, brutally suppressed all
national movements by non-Hungarians within Hungary, including the
Slovaks.
Therefore, as the Slovaks (or the Romanians, or whoever) would have
it, getting the territory they got at the end of World War I was not
only justifiable on its face (there ARE a lot of Slovaks on that
territory), but also an important if sadly inadequate payback for a
millenium of oppression.
So if I use the Hungarian story, the Hungarians are the victims, and
if I use the Slovak story, the Slovaks are the victims. But guess
what? I don't subscribe to either one: I don't place any value in
"historical rights" or demand any repayment for "historical crimes".
People live where they live and they ought to find a way to deal with
that happenstance of history in a way that let everyone live a free
and democratic existence.
>So the interwar government turned to Britain and France for some help, but
>got none. Later, Italy indicated it would assist Hungary's case, then
>Germany offered to help - but also to help Slovakia and Romania.
Well of course they got no help--why would the Great Powers want to
run around changing international borders so that one minority can be
oppressed rather than another? That sounds like the Yugoslav Civil
War to me (minus the ethnic cleansing, of course).
>
>Had the Allies been a bit more reasonable, they would have had a staunch
>ally in Hungary, which, along with Poland, was the most pro-British/American
>country in Europe.
"Reasonable" by whose standards?
>
>BTW, to answer the original poster's message: Czechoslovakia did not exist
>during WWII, except in the minds of Czechoslovak nationalists and their
>western Allied followers.
>
I think he was referring more the the Czech Lands, possibly not having
been aware of the existence of an independenet Slovakia.
Scott Orr
His point is that you wrote as if all the rights were on the Hungarian side
and all the wrongs on the other and the Allies. He made the valid point that
one person's (group's) rights are an infringement on another's. And in the
complex map of European ethnicity, there is no such thing as a simple line
of demarcation. He further makes the point that following old grievances and
causes does not make for future harmony. Very valid points, I think.
NL
>
>Scott D. Orr wrote in message ...
>>On Thu, 19 Jul 2001 19:23:34 +0200, "Christopher Szabo"
>><cavs...@netactive.co.za> wrote:
>>
>>>Just a quick correction here. The region of Upper Hungary, which in 1918
>was
>>>arbitrarily given to the newly-invented country of Czechoslovakia....
>>
>>Okay, I didn't say anything at first, but I really have to....
>>
>>First off, the name "Upper Hungary" does not, as far as I know, have
>>any historical basis, except that stemming from Hungary's possession
>>of the area during WWII. For about 1,000 years Hungary (first as an
>>independent kingdom and then as part of the Hapsburg Empire) ruled
>>over the area of Slovakia (and quite a bit else in Eastern Europe,
>>including Romania), all of which appears on 19th-century maps as part
>>of "Hungary". The region you refer to as "Upper Hungary" is not
>>distinguished, on these maps or historically, from the rest of
>>"Slovakia" (neither name appears on the maps). AFAIK, the region was
>>originally part of Slovakia, but who really cares, since that was 1100
>>years ago?
>
>Well, what can I say? You are reflecting the basic modern Slovak nationalist
>history, which is opposed by Slovak professional historians. If you want,
>I'll give you a name and an e-mail.
No, that's simple fact. I actually checked a 19-century Austrian map
just to make sure. In fact, the map I check was labeled "Northern
Hungary", and what the map encompassed was basically the whole of
modern Slovakia. There was NO "Slovakia" in the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, at least not as an administrative unit--there was just
"Hungary". Even when various nationalities obtained some measure of
autonomy in the 19th century, the minorities in the Transcisterian
part of the Empire (that is, Hungary) were denied it. Hungary's
official position all along was that there was no such thing as
Slovakia--like I said, you can see it on the map. The region you
refer to as "Upper Hungary" was not in fact the northernmost part of
Hungary, since other parts of modern-day Slovakia were further north.
It may well be the case that Slovakia as a whole (along with other
territories, perhaps) was often referred to as "Upper Hungary" or
"Northern Hungary", but that's not the same thing as saying that one
little region in the south of modern-day Slovakia is "Upper Hungary"
while the rest of Slovakia is not.
If you really want the Slovak nationalist line, see my last post
(wherein I noted I didn't subscribe to it).
>Simply put, Great Moravia is not some "ancient Slovakia".
Great Moravia encompassed a territory similar to that of
Czechoslovakia--but, really, who cares? It's not any more important,
from a moral standpoint, than the borders of the Kingdom of Hungary.
Each of these medieval kingdoms provided an "imaginary" basis for
constructing a modern nation-state, but trying to trace the path
between the medieval kingdom and the modern state in either case
doesn't really work--there's discontinuity both in the existence of
statehood and in very meaning of statehood: in the medieval period,
nations didn't exist at all,states were far different animals than
they are now (real states don't exist until after the Treaty of
Westphalia), and states weren't associated with "nations" (the latter
is a modern invention), with the consequence that the connection
between, say, the 10th century Kingdom of Hungary and the modern
republic of Hungary is almost entirely a symbolic one.
To be really explicit on this point, the connection between Slovakia
and Great Moravia isn't any less "real" than the connection between
Hungary and the Kingdom of Hungary: both connections are cases of
people digging up one particular symbolic historical fact, out of
many, many potentially applicable facts, in order to provide a basis
for a modern (19-century and later) national identity.
>But I am not in the mood for arguing history - based on documents,
>archaeology, the histories of surrounding nations - Poland, Byzantium, Rus,
>Germany, Austria versus material based on WWI propaganda. Rather, I'll give
>you a brief quote from a British historian, who you cannot accuse of being a
>"Hungarian nationalist."
>
>Anthony D. Smith, in _National Identities_, (ISBN 0 14 01 2565 5) states:
>
>"In early modern Eastern Europe, for example, we could have found
>distinctive _ethnies_ such as Poles, Hungarians and Croats in their
>historical states, boasting long and rich histories; submerged ethnic
>communities like the Serbs, Romanians, and Bulgarians, whose medieval
>histories had to be rediscovered and aligned with their recent memories of
>Ottoman oppression; and ethnically mixed areas and categories of Macedonians
>and Ruthenians, the major part of whose memories are fairly recent and who,
>together with the Slovaks, had to dig deep into the past for geneological
>filiation and shadowy ancestor-heroes."
>
>So now, is he an "ethnic war-monger", or whatever???
In a way, yes, but I'm not positive how ironic he's being here. It
also depends on what he refers to as "early modern", but in the
mid-18th century NONE of these groups existed as groups. Hungary and
Poland, for example, had a history of statehood, and a history of the
use of Hungarian and Polish, respectively, as a language of
government. There was even (arguably) a degree of "national"
consciousness among the nobility, which used that language.
However, the nations themselves were, like those of the Slovaks and
everyone else in Eastern Europe, invented in the 19th century. The
Poles and Hungarians had a definite advantage here, with pre-existing
noble feelings of "nationalism" (a somewhat different feeling from
modern nationalism--it didn't include the common people as a part of
the "nation) as well as literary cultures, and so the Slovaks
underwent the nation formation process more slowly, but if you'd
dropped a sociologist into mid-18th-century North Hungary and asked a
random peasant if he were "Hungarian" or "Slovak" he probably would
have looked at you in incomprehension.
In fact, the peasant (to the extent he thought about anything beyond
the borders of his village) probably would have been aware that he
spoke an Ugric or Slavic language, at least in a location where there
were speakers from the other language group around so that the
difference would be meaningful (and note that the names of both
peoples, Hungarians and Slovaks are derived from those linguistic
terms), but he would have had no idea how many other people spoke
similar languages, or where they lived. Note that I said "similar
languages", because, before the 19th-century language
standardizations, most languages in this part of the world didn't
exist as single languages; in some cases the first grammarians
consciously had to select grammar and words from one region or another
of the putative nation, sometimes even using political considerations,
and in many cases the lines that marked the divisions between one
"language" and another could reasonably have been drawn quite
differnetly.
Granted, Hungarian, as a language, wasn't quite in the same condition
as Czech or Slovak (early Czech and Slovak nationalists, being
educated, didn't speak those "peasant languages", but spoke German),
but it wasn't quite in the same condition as German either, and in in
case, in the villages, before the 19th-century, "Hungarians" (much
like "Germans" and "Czechs" and "Slovaks") spoke whatever local
dialect was native to their village, not a standard Hungarian from a
grammar book (they couldn't read anyway), and they had no
consciousness of being a "nation" called "the Hungarians" (largely
because a] they had no way of communication with other Hungarians to
build a national consciousness and b] they wouldn't have cared anyway,
since such consciousness had no bearing on what was important to them,
which was live within their villages).
(Frankly I can't recall what position Smith takes on the various
theoretical questions surrounding ethnic identity; if I did, I could
give a more coherent answer to his entire point of view, rather than
trying to glean it from this one passage.)
But let's suppose you can demonstrate that one ethnic group is "older"
than antoher one. Exactly what moral claim could you derive from that
fact? Does longer existence make you deserve more political rights or
something? Are older and more "authentic" groups to be more valued?
If so, please give me your _precise_ reasoning.
>AFAIK, the Slovaks, as far as can be made out, lived in the
>northern Carpathian mountains, and could be akin to the "Mountain Poles."
>They, from 1000 onwards and perhaps a bit earlier moved into today's
>northern Slovakia, as cities developed and were known and respected as
>miners and timbermen.
>
>I am sorry if this pops your bubble, but I suggest you contact the Slovak
>historian I know, and get more names from him, etc. Don't take my word on
>it, find out for yourself!
>
Frankly, I don't care where Slovaks lived 1,000 years ago--you may be
right, but it's not even something I find relevant enough to be worth
researching. Why do _you_ care? I really only care about the people
who are around today. People have a right to live where they were
born, as full citizens. Any further claims, based on arguments about
which "people" stole which piece of land first from whomever owned it
before, are silly.
>
>You wrote further.
>The population of the region is question includes a large
>>number of ethnic Hungarians (who in places constitute the majority),
>>because this was the section of Slovakia most thoroughly "colonized"
>>during the period of Hungarian and Hapsburg rule (which is not to say
>>these people don't have a right to be there--their families have lived
>>there for centuries, after all).
>
>See above:
>
The central problem is that both Slovaks and Hungarians live in this
region, with each being the majority in diferent parts. Neither
group, as a group, "deserves" the land more than the other--hence,
they have to live together.
>>
>>Second, there was nothing "arbitrary" about assigning this region to
>>the newly-reinvented country of Czechoslovakia in 1918, rather than to
>>the newly-reinvented country of Hungary. If you want to argue about
>>who stole if fair and square, technically you lose, because the Czechs
>>had ruled Slovakia as part of the Great Moravian Empire before the
>>Kingdom of Hungary took it in 906.
>
>Sorry, your knowledge of our region is admirable, but not really there. ("A
>little bit of knowledge is a dangerous thing.") The Great Moravian Empire
>was _Moravian_.
And the Czechs trace their history to Moravia, it being, with Bohemia,
once of the two primary "Czech Lands". Most modern-day "Moravians"
consider themselves Czechs more than they do Moravians.
>In Hungarian territory, it only ruled the region from the
>Carpathians down to the River Garam. It never ruled all of what is now
>Slovakia by a long shot. The Czechs are not Moravians. Their people, the
>Bohemians, became independent of the Moravians in this same period
>c.890-950.
Only the Moravian Czechs are Moravians; the others are Bohemians or
Silesians; there are different regions of Hungary as well, but people
from then aren't called by different names as often, because Hungary
wasn't split into three different territories under Hapsburg rule.
While I'm not an expert on medieval Hungarian history, I could make an
equally silly arugment that modern Hungarians have no connection with
the earlier Kingdom of Hungary because the center of political power
shifted to Budapest from somewhere else in the 15th century.
In either case, the connection between the modern people and the
historical one is largely imagined, which is why the argument is silly
in the first place: it has NO moral significance and does not provide
valid claims to territory.
>>In any case, neither the Czechs
>>nor the Hungarians* had an independent country for several centuries
>>prior to 1918,
>
>Not for any lack of trying. Nor did the Poles, btw.
Actually, the Poles did until 1795, for whatever it's worth (which is
not much).
>
>>and frankly, I don't think having stolen a piece of
>>land first gives "your people"** any moral right to it in the first
>>place.
>
>We didn't steal it, and you can't put 21st C morality onto 10thC actions,
>either.
To the extent that this "we" exists at all, yes, you did steal it.
There's no place in Europe that's inhabited by the descendants of the
people who inhabited it 1,500 years ago: the groups there now all
drove out, assimilated, or simply killed the earlier inhabitants.
But yes, you'er exactly right, you can't impose 21st century morality
on 10th century actions! By the same token, you can't make claims for
21st century political rights based on 10th century borders. You
can't have it both ways.
>
>>The reason it was assigned to Czechoslovakia is that they drew the
>>borders along the major rivers in the area (specifically the Danube
>>and the Ipel'). This certainly screwed over the Hungarians living
>>north of those rivers (provided you believe that people can't live
>>happily except with their own kind, which is true by virtue of being a
>>self-fulfilling prophesy), just as the Slovaks living there would have
>>been screwed over the other way around, but the Hungarians had just
>>lost World War I....(The Roma/Gypsies would been screwed over either
>>way, but they always are.) This may have been a "controversial"
>>decision, and some would argue that it was "unjust", but it wasn't
>>"arbitrary".
>
>It was aribitrary.
"Arbitrary" means "without basis". There were very real, if
controversial, bases for the decisions. Learning to distinguish
between "arbitrary decisions" and "decisions I don't agree with" is a
big part of reaching politcal maturity.
>I invite you to read the minutes of the discussions. It
>is frightening how the "Big Four" would say "shall we give this town to, er,
>Czechoslovakia, or German-Austria?" For example, Bratislava (Possonium/
>Pozsony/ Pressburg) was given to Czechoslovakia as an afterthought, to give
>them a port on the Danube... so much for "national self-determination!"
>
Giving them a port is hardly "arbitrary". At any rate, Bratislava was
already the primary center of Slovak culture, so this was hardly a
silly decision.
Basically, your argument is that national self-determination only
applies to Hungarians, right? Otherwise, I'm not sure I see your
point: the problem with national self-determination was that for
every country, it created competing claims as to where the border
would be, without providing any way to choose one of those claims or
another, because the actual landscape was ethnically mixed. The only
complete solution would have been what we now call "ethnic cleansing".
>Remember, the old Hungarian kingdom was not ethnically-based, it wasn't our
>idea to create "pure nations", but that was Woodrow Wilsons, rather tragic,
>dream.
The old Hungarian kingdom wasn't ethnically based because there was no
such thing as ethnicity back then. However, the modern Hungarians of
19th-century Hungary did in fact demand an ethnically based state, and
in fact brutally suppressed nationalist movements among
non-Hungarians. They did not do this because the Austrians made them
do it--they were in fact much harsher to minorities in their half of
the Empire (the "Transleithanian" part--sorry for calling it
"Transcisterian" in my earlier post) than the Austrians were in the
western ("Cisleithanian") part.
>>If this offends your sense of nationalism, I'm sorry--but, honestly, I
>>don't think members of various diasporas living comfortably in
>>democratic countries
>
>are you claiming that Hungary and Slovakia today are not democracies?
Actually, I meant the rich democracies--the places where ethnic
divisions aren't so bad. Hungary and Slovakia are both democracies.
>I am
>moving back to Hungary, and I will still be posting much the same material.
>You have jumped to conclusions about me. All I wanted to do was inform as to
>the historical basis of certain problems, especially related to
>Czechoslovakia. That doesn't make me a "nationalist", just like an American
>writing about his War of Independence isn't automatically anti-British.
Yes, I did jump to the wrong conclusion, based on your English given
name (I'm assuming now that you just adopted that). It is, however,
quite easy for Americans to engage in nationalist distortions about
the War of Independence. The difference is that such mythologizing
won't lead to problems within the U.S. or between the U.S. and
Britain, whereas nationalist mythologizing does create very real
problems within Slovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia and between those
countries and Hungary.
>
>>should promote real ethnic conflicts among real
>>people leading to real harm back in the homeland just so that they can
>>experience warm fuzzies through finding identity by "reattaching"
>>themselves to their imagined "roots".
>
>No warm fuzzies, this is my own family we are talking about. (Not in
>Slovakia, elsewhere). And I am not in any way "leading to real harm." Last
>year in Hungary I discussed this sort of thing a lot, with all sorts of
>ethnic groups. There isn't the same "nationalism" there you fear so much.
National pride doesn't create harm. Making historical claims _does_
cause real harm, because for every piece of territory, at least two
different groups have a valid-sounding historical claim to it. Trying
to use these claims in order to resolve present-day problems therefore
is pointless, and leads to nasty zero-sum games and even warfare.
This is, after all, exactly what happened in ex-Yugoslavia. And in
that war, the role of diasporas in the U.S. in promoting and funding
these wars was not insignificant.
>>*To speak of either the "Czechs" or the "Hungarians" before the 19th
>>century is completely ahistorical--neither nation existed before then
>>as a nation, though, like all nations throughout the world, both have
>>since the 19th century invented a long existence built around grains
>>of historical truth.
>
>I'm sure the Czechs would be grateful to hear that! Who was Jan Huss? A 19th
>C invention??? Or, for what did c. 80 000 Hungarians defend an inverted
>U-shape of fortifications for 150 yrs against the Turks. (The figure
>includes Slovaks, Ruthenes, Magyars)??
None of the people involved, except maybe a some nobles, would have
called themselves "Czech" or "Hungarian", at least not in the sense
that we used those terms today. The historicla people are not
inventions, but their connections to the present groups are.
>>
>>**The idea that you have a right to some moral or legal status because
>>of the actions of people 1100 years ago who may or may not be
>>genetically related to you but with whom you identify, is, to me,
>>rather farcical.
>
>I never said I have a right today because of anything 1 100 years ago. I
>merely criticised the Treaty of Trianon, primarily for not using democratic
>principles. Apparently, that bothers your sense of "being right" just
>because you're a westerner. You guys screwed up Europe at Versailles, as
>many wise westerners said *at the time!*
_Any_ borders would have been "screwed up".
Scott Orr
>There's a key assumption you've made which is at the root of the
>problem: would you argue that if 5% of the population is farmers,
>that farmes "are denied self-rule" in a democracy? So why would an
>ethnic group be different?
Because the boundaries were not deliberately drawn to _make_ farmers a
minority. In the case of the ethnic minorities they were.
Otherwise, why bother having a Czechoslovakia at all? Since Austria had had
universal suffrage since 1905, the Czechs ought , on this reasoning, to have
been perfectly content as they were:-)
Czechoslovakia came into being because the Czechs wanted to be top dogs in a
Czech state, raather than a minorioty in an "Austrian" one. Other groups could
have the "Democratic freedom" to take part in elections so long as boundaries
were such that they would always lose. Needless to say, the Sudeten Germans
(and other minorities including the Slovak "partners" ) did not see that as
legitimate and refused to play be these rules as soon as they saw a chance to
get out from under
>. But the big reason is that the Germans were NOT the only people
>who lived there--Czechs lived there too, as well as Jews, Gypsies, and
>probably a decent number of Slovaks and Poles. By the same token,
>"Sudeten" Germans lived in smaller numbers throughout the Czech Lands,
>and especially in Prague. Contrary to popular belief, there were no
>nice, neat lines that could be drawn so that there were no minorities.
>
Agreed, but unfortunately the 1919 "peacemakers" did seek to draw such lines.
If, as you say, no satisfactory ones could be drawn, then they shouldn't have
tried to.
What they did was to set the precedent that it was legitimate to carve up
historic states along ethnic lines - but then tried to make the historic
kingdom of Bohemia (renamed Czechoslovakia) an exception to that, at the
expense of the ethnic Germans. They could get away with this as long as Germany
was flat on its back, but that wouldn't be true forever - and when it ceased to
be true a lot of brown stuff was going to hit the fan
>As a historical nitpick, the term "Sudeten" didn't exist in 1919.
And the term "Czechoslovakia" hadn't existed until the year before. There was a
lot of new terminology being coined just then - much of it spurious. For a
relevant example, the "Czechoslovak" nation was entirely imaginary - the
Slovaks were and are a distinct ethnic group from the Czechs. But it suited
certain politicians in 1918 to pretend otherwise
>In
>any case, neither border could have been drawn in a way so as not to
>create a minority--the peoples in question are thororughly
>intermingled, even if some are more numerous in some places, and
>others in other places. And these two cases are by no means the only
>ones--there were substantial minorites in _every_ country in Eastern
>Europe after 1919, including Germany.
>
Undoubtedly - but when such a minority is geographically concentrated along the
frontier between the nation they _want_ to belong to and the one they have been
_compelled_ to belong to, then you can count on trouble - especially when the
country they are now in is a little one and the one they want to be in is a big
one. In that case "trouble" may easily mean general war
>That you can't use a single historical example (that of the Sudeten problem)
>to advance a larger proposition (that in democratic societies members of
>ethnic minorities are always denied authentic political representation)
>because the contingent circumstances of the particular do not apply to the
>general.
Did I say they were "always" denied it? I merely point out that when 2/3 of a
"nation" thinks of itself as being A and the other third sees itself as B, then
democratic institutions don't really help. They just make the smaller group all
the more frustrated. Freedom to vote isn't a lot of use if you know (or
believe, whether correctly or not) that matters have been "fixed" so that you
have no realistic chance of ever winning a vote
I've been exchanging posts with Scott for some time. You, OTOH, I know not
at all aside from the fact that you are Hungarian. In these circumstances
you'll have to forgive me if I have greater doubts of your objectivity than
his concerning the appropriateness of Hungary's boundaries.
> Anyway, what matters today is that the region should hold to democratic
> principles, which, I am quite happy to say, it is doing rather well.
>
> My criticism is, and was, that your Allies claimed to be fighting WWI to
> "make the world safe for democracy", but sadly, when it came to carving up
> Europe, they failed to use democratic methods.
>
You would, perhaps be happier with the methods used in the former
Yugoslavia. I don't think you have any appreciation of the sheer size of
the task of getting every linear mile of boundary set to everybody's
satisfaction.
> Why couldn't they have asked the local people what they wanted, for
> instance??
>
And how would they vote? Would every 100 people vote in a bloc as to which
side of the boundary they wanted to be on? Or should the voting blocs be
larger, 1,000 or 10,000 or 1,000,000? And who would run, fund and supervise
these thousands of elections? The locals? That would be as problematic as
the causes for the voting in the first place. That would then leave us with
those stupid "Allies" to do the job.
Yet another bang on post.
Where I live in Canada the Province of Ontario has a separate existence, its
own laws, legislature, etc. It is not, however, a nation.
That is exactly the question. Why have a Czechoslovakia at all; or a
Hungary, or a United Kingdom?
>
> Czechoslovakia came into being because the Czechs wanted to be top dogs in
a
> Czech state, raather than a minorioty in an "Austrian" one. Other groups
could
> have the "Democratic freedom" to take part in elections so long as
boundaries
> were such that they would always lose. Needless to say, the Sudeten
Germans
> (and other minorities including the Slovak "partners" ) did not see that
as
> legitimate and refused to play be these rules as soon as they saw a chance
to
> get out from under
> --
This is just incomprehensible to me and, I think, to most North Americans.
In the city in which I live a majority of the population was not born in
this country. Cultural diversity is the norm and we are much healthier for
it. The concept of spinning into successively smaller sovereignties in the
search for boundaries within which there will be ethnic uniformity (or, if
you like, purity) is, to my mind, not only doomed to produce endless misery
but also an attempt to justify and package xenophobia into something legal
and legitimate.
What do you think they should have done? Unless you like anarchy it's
really not on to have two countries between which the planners decide to
have no boundary.
> >That you can't use a single historical example (that of the Sudeten
problem)
> >to advance a larger proposition (that in democratic societies members of
> >ethnic minorities are always denied authentic political representation)
> >because the contingent circumstances of the particular do not apply to
the
> >general.
>
> Did I say they were "always" denied it?
Well ... yes.
To quote: "It the boundaries have been so drawn as to leave then hopelessly
outnumbered in their new "homeland" that means they are denied self-rule
just as effectively as if it were a dictatorship - since whatever community
forms the majority on their side of the arbitrary line will always outvote
them."
"they *are* denied ... will *always* outvote them". Not much qualification
there.
Alan.
>
>What do you think they should have done? Unless you like anarchy it's
>really not on to have two countries between which the planners decide to
>have no boundary.
>
I think they should have tried to be consistent. IOW they should either
a) leave the old Habsburg Empire as was - ie reject the idea of national states
altogether
or
b) if they did break it up, then go the whole way ie no Czechoslovakia (because
the Czechs and Slovaks ar different ethnic groups) and the Austrians are free
to join Germany, along with those districts of Bohemia which had German
majorrities and were contiguous with Germany/Austria
As it was, they tried to have one rule for Austria-Hunngary and a different
rule for Bohemia - which worked about as well as one would expect :-)
b
>This is just incomprehensible to me and, I think, to most North Americans.
>In the city in which I live a majority of the population was not born in
>this country.
That's exactly the point. You are Americans because you or your
parents/grandparents chose to be so.
That's not how it worked in Europe. Those Germans were in Czechoslovakia
because some bunch of foreign diplomats ordained it so - and in 1938 they
believed that they and their friends over in the Reich were strong enough to
get that decision changed
Had they been allowed a glimpse of what would have happened by 1945, some of
them might well have decided different. But so probably would a lot of those
diplomats of 1919
I am having a server problem, specifically with this NG. I will try to sort
it out and continue my part in the discussion,
Ciao
Chris
sa...@canada.com wrote in message ...
>
>
>What was Czechoslovakia's status during WW2? ... I'm not sure what the
>phrase "protectorate" means in a legal sense.
>Was it an occupied country? or an independent country browbeaten into
>co-operating with Germany?
>It had its own government and cabinet and police forces, so it wasnt
>"occupied" in the same way Poland or occupied France was for example.
>
>Were the German army and SS troops occupation forces, or were they
>there to "assist" the Czech "government"? And was this government seen
>by the allies as collaborationist ... and were there treason trials
>later for those who served in this government?
>
>Was it regarded as a sovereign nation? ... did the US for example have
>diplomatic relations with Prague prior to entering the war itself, or
>did it recognize the Exile government base in London?
>
>Many thanks
>
Would you say that the U.S. was Communist aligned?
Osmo
>"Rich Rostrom" <rros...@21stcentury.net>:
>
>Where I live in Canada the Province of Ontario has a separate existence,
>its own laws, legislature, etc. It is not, however, a nation.
But the Province of Ontario has been _explicitly_
subordinated to the Dominion of Canada since its
founding.
Ontario makes laws - but only in areas where the
authority has been devolved from the sovereign.
Whereas Hungary was sovereign, making its own laws
in all respects, and subordinated to Austria only
through the union of crowns.
During the final period of the "dual monarchy" the
"Ausgleich" which governed the relationship of
Austria to Hungary had to be negotiated between the
two states, and if either side did not accept it
the relationship would end.
Ontario has no such agreement with Canada. I don't
know, but I suspect that the Canadian Act of Union
and successor documents alll contain a 'supremacy'
clause like that in the U.S. Constitution - that
laws made by the national government are binding on
all persons regardless of anything the provinces do.
But no outside regime had power to legislate for
Hungary, except in the areas governed by the Ausgleich
and with the consent of the Hungarian parliament.
> That's not how it worked in Europe. Those Germans were in Czechoslovakia
> because some bunch of foreign diplomats ordained it so - and in 1938 they
> believed that they and their friends over in the Reich were strong enough
to
> get that decision changed
>
Well, who am I to believe? Someone else here, Scott I think, stated that
the majority of those folks in the Sudetenland were there because their
German ancestors chose to live in an area (Bohemia) both largely populated
by non-Germans and ruled by non-Germans.
> Had they been allowed a glimpse of what would have happened by 1945, some
of
> them might well have decided different. But so probably would a lot of
those
> diplomats of 1919
> --
Unless the ethnicity of those border people properly belongs in the same
class of pretext as the 1939 Polish invasion of Germany.
In general probably not, because most of our allies weren't Communist,
whereas the Axis was self-consciously a Fascist alliance. However, in
specific contexts it might be accurate to use that turn.
Scott Orr
> During the final period of the "dual monarchy" the
> "Ausgleich" which governed the relationship of
> Austria to Hungary had to be negotiated between the
> two states, and if either side did not accept it
> the relationship would end.
>
Not with you here. Two independant parliaments were established with
jurisdiction only over internal matters and with the Emperor as the monarch
of both. The empire retained jurisdiction over foreign policy and the armed
forces. Sounds like a fairly basic federal system to me.
> Ontario has no such agreement with Canada. I don't
> know, but I suspect that the Canadian Act of Union
> and successor documents alll contain a 'supremacy'
> clause like that in the U.S. Constitution - that
> laws made by the national government are binding on
> all persons regardless of anything the provinces do.
>
No. The provinces have areas in which they have jurisdictional primacy as
does the federal government. Conflicts between the laws of the two
jurisdictional levels are settled on the basis of whose area the laws fall
inside. In other words, it is no more unusual for a federal law to be
struck down than a provincial law in such circumstances.
> But no outside regime had power to legislate for
> Hungary, except in the areas governed by the Ausgleich
> and with the consent of the Hungarian parliament.
> --
Sounds like Canada's Confederation to me.
It's always a nuisance when the descriptive is mistaken for the pejorative.
>>From: Scott D. Orr sd...@ix.netcom.com
>
>>. But the big reason is that the Germans were NOT the only people
>>who lived there--Czechs lived there too, as well as Jews, Gypsies, and
>>probably a decent number of Slovaks and Poles. By the same token,
>>"Sudeten" Germans lived in smaller numbers throughout the Czech Lands,
>>and especially in Prague. Contrary to popular belief, there were no
>>nice, neat lines that could be drawn so that there were no minorities.
>>
>
>Agreed, but unfortunately the 1919 "peacemakers" did seek to draw such lines.
>If, as you say, no satisfactory ones could be drawn, then they shouldn't have
>tried to.
>
>What they did was to set the precedent that it was legitimate to carve up
>historic states along ethnic lines - but then tried to make the historic
>kingdom of Bohemia (renamed Czechoslovakia) an exception to that, at the
>expense of the ethnic Germans. They could get away with this as long as Germany
>was flat on its back, but that wouldn't be true forever - and when it ceased to
>be true a lot of brown stuff was going to hit the fan
I think that's a complete mischaracterization of the process: in most
cases, borders were drawn along historical lines.
In addition, adding those areas to Germany would have added an area
with no economic ties to Germany, while destroying Czechoslovakia
economically; it would also leave that country nearly surrounded by
Germany, and without defensible borders (since the regions in question
contain virtually _all_ of the country's mountains). No sane person
would even have proposed such a thing.
Basically, your argument is like saying that southern California
should be reassigned to Mexico because it's got a large ethnic-Mexican
population--but that would be insanity in the administrative and
economic senses (even though it's actually got a lot more historical
justification than assigning parts of the Czech Lands to Germany).
Scott Orr
>Good post, Mike! Instead of insisting on creating some kind of
>ethnically-based states (all Slavs in one state, all Magyars in another....)
>they should have asked the local people what they wanted. They were supposed
>to be democrats after all.
>
At what level should these plebiscites have been held? For entire
countries? Regions? Districts? Towns? Villages? If they were held
at a local level, much of what you refer to as "Uppery Hungary" would
have voted to be part of Czechoslovakia, leaving the Hungarian
minorities in those areas in that that state.
Furthermore, you would almost certainly have had areas that wanted to
be part of Hungary surrounded by Slovak territories, and vice versa.
What do you do in this case?
(Both of these situations actually occurred in other parts of Eastern
Europe when plebiscites were held.)
Scott Orr
>
>b) if they did break it up, then go the whole way ie no Czechoslovakia (because
>the Czechs and Slovaks ar different ethnic groups)....
The Czech and Slovak leaders wanted one country (Slovakia wouldn't
have been very viable by itself, due to the lack of an educated
leadership class).
Scott Orr
>>From: Scott D. Orr sd...@ix.netcom.com
>
>>As a historical nitpick, the term "Sudeten" didn't exist in 1919.
>
>And the term "Czechoslovakia" hadn't existed until the year before. There was a
>lot of new terminology being coined just then - much of it spurious.
However, after that point Czechoslovakia was the name of an actual
state, which gave the name considerable validity. The difference here
is that the term Sudetenland is often presented as if it were a
historical truth, as if these areas has always had a separate identity
from the rest of the Czech Lands and (as implied by the name itself)
identified themselves as the southern part of Germany--simply put,
none of this is at all true.
>For a
>relevant example, the "Czechoslovak" nation was entirely imaginary - the
>Slovaks were and are a distinct ethnic group from the Czechs. But it suited
>certain politicians in 1918 to pretend otherwise
All nations are imaginary. One of the best books on nationality, by
Benedict Anderson, is actualy entitled _Imagined_Communities_.
>
>>In
>>any case, neither border could have been drawn in a way so as not to
>>create a minority--the peoples in question are thororughly
>>intermingled, even if some are more numerous in some places, and
>>others in other places. And these two cases are by no means the only
>>ones--there were substantial minorites in _every_ country in Eastern
>>Europe after 1919, including Germany.
>
>Undoubtedly - but when such a minority is geographically concentrated along the
>frontier between the nation they _want_ to belong to and the one they have been
>_compelled_ to belong to, then you can count on trouble - especially when the
>country they are now in is a little one and the one they want to be in is a big
>one. In that case "trouble" may easily mean general war
You're not getting the point here: the minority may have been
geographically concentrated, but geographically concentrated doesn't
mean the same as located in ethnically pure areas--in fact, many areas
of what Mr. Szabo calls "Upper Hungary" were majority-Slovak.
Scott Orr
>>From: Scott D. Orr sd...@ix.netcom.com
>
>>There's a key assumption you've made which is at the root of the
>>problem: would you argue that if 5% of the population is farmers,
>>that farmes "are denied self-rule" in a democracy? So why would an
>>ethnic group be different?
>
>Because the boundaries were not deliberately drawn to _make_ farmers a
>minority. In the case of the ethnic minorities they were.
That doesn't actually answer the question--why the borders were drawn
isn't directly relevant to how voting works inside the country.
Please answer the question directly.
>
> Otherwise, why bother having a Czechoslovakia at all? Since Austria had had
>universal suffrage since 1905, the Czechs ought , on this reasoning, to have
>been perfectly content as they were:-)
>
>Czechoslovakia came into being because the Czechs wanted to be top dogs in a
>Czech state, raather than a minorioty in an "Austrian" one. Other groups could
>have the "Democratic freedom" to take part in elections so long as boundaries
>were such that they would always lose. Needless to say, the Sudeten Germans
>(and other minorities including the Slovak "partners" ) did not see that as
>legitimate and refused to play be these rules as soon as they saw a chance to
>get out from under
Yes, there's something to be said for nationalism as a way of bringing
people together and instilling the trust needed to make democracy
work.
However, that being said, you're still going to end up with
minorities. The only solution, short of ethnic cleansing, is to
encourage a national identity that focuses on citizenship in the
state, and isn't construed as mutually exclusive with also holding
ethnic identities. Drawing borders "correctly" is _not_ one of the
possible solutions, because it's not something that can be done.
Scott Orr
>"Christopher Szabo" <cavs...@netactive.co.za> wrote in message
>news:3b58b...@news1.mweb.co.za...
>> Why couldn't they have asked the local people what they wanted, for
>> instance??
>>
>And how would they vote? Would every 100 people vote in a bloc as to which
>side of the boundary they wanted to be on? Or should the voting blocs be
>larger, 1,000 or 10,000 or 1,000,000? And who would run, fund and supervise
> these thousands of elections? The locals? That would be as problematic as
>the causes for the voting in the first place. That would then leave us with
>those stupid "Allies" to do the job.
This reminds me of a story from the Yugoslav Civil War.
When Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia (which it had a constitutional
right to do), the Krajina region of Croatia, largely Serb-populated,
decided to secede from Croatia. At that, a majority-Croat town in the
Krajina seceded from the Krajina. Finally, a Serb baker in that town,
unhappy with the outcome, seceded from the town.
Now, this is how national self-determination works taken to its
democratic extreme.
Scott Orr
>BTW. If I, as a Hungarian, write some points on history, why is it taken as
>read that I am some new Milosevic? I don't get it. Enlighten me please!
>
Sorry, I didn't realize I was responding to your post--I wouldn't have
referred to you in the third person.
Scott Orr
>The important thing now is for us to deal with history calmly, as I have
>tried (and Scott has, in my opinion, overreacted, and to deal with current
>issues as current issues. To use a current term: "Decouple" history from
>modern politics.
Yeah, good luck. Mr. Szabo was implicitly making an argument about
current history--note his attempts to portray the Slovaks as less than
a real nationality, going so far as calling them "Mountain Poles",
which implies that they're only part of the Polish nationality, and
hence not worthy of their own country.
His views are actually rather extreme, though typical of Hungarian
nationalists, and doubtless what he was taught in school.
Such view are in fact part of the daily political discussion in
Hungary--the Trianon Treaty comes up constantly, and every mention of
it causes tension with Slovakia and Romania.
So no, I'm not overreacting at all--I simply know the current
political context within which Mr. Szabo's seemingly calm remarks were
made.
>I'm pleased to say Hungary is doing this admirably well at
>the moment, and the Slovaks aren't doing too badly either. Even "backward"
>Ukraine has a pretty enlightened minority policy. Romania has a long way to
>go, but wants into the EU, so there's hope.
>
While relations among Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania are decent,
extreme nationalists in all three countries are doing their best to
wreck them, and often even the moderates do their part: in Hungary,
the "Status Law" that would give rights in Hungary to ethnic
Hungarians in other countries, in Slovakia, the regoinal
administration reform that would leave a lot of Hungarians districts
in larger Slovak-majority regions, and in Romania all kinds of stuff,
such as refusing to allow a Hungarian-language university.
The arguments used by extreme Hungarian nationalists are essentially
those presented by Mr. Szabo. However, the moderates make essentialy
the same statements--the difference is how they recommend acting on
them.
>BTW. If I, as a Hungarian, write some points on history, why is it taken as
>read that I am some new Milosevic? I don't get it. Enlighten me please!
>
See above. It takes some experience with dealing with ethnic
conflicts to understand what's implied by sometimes innocuous-sounding
statements.
Scott Orr
>Scott D. Orr <sd...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>>To speak of either the "Czechs" or the "Hungarians" before the 19th
>>century is completely ahistorical--neither nation existed before then
>>as a nation...
>
>Hungary existed as a completely separate nation for several
>hundred years.
No, it existed as a _state_. The term "nation", technically, refers
to a group of people who have a national consciousness---which
Hungarians (and almost everyone else) lacked before the 19th century.
Czech states had also existed for several hundred years, altogether,
before Austrian rule.
>
>In 1526, most of Hungary was occupied by the Turks, and
>the Hungarian crown with the rump state became a Hapsburg
>possession. In 1699-1718 the Turkish zone was reunited
>with the rest of Hungary.
>
>But from 1526 through 1806 Hungary retained a separate
>existence - its own laws, national assembly, and so on.
>
As did the Czech Lands. However, neither was idependent.
>In 1806 the Holy Roman Empire was abolished, and in the
>associated waves of reform the Habsburg lands were
>consolidated into a single state - a condition so unstable
>it collapsed in 1867. Hungary then reappeared with its
>distinct laws and its own separate government.
>
This may express the legality, but in practice all the Hapsburg lands
were ruled as a single state before that point.
>As for "the Czechs", they existed, just as "the Italians"
>existed - or "the Arabs". The existence of a distinct
>"people" is always a subjective one, but this case is
>pretty clear.
Yes, it is indeed pretty clear that neither Czechs nor Hungarians
existed before the 19th century. You can argue with me, but you're
gonna lose, because this is what I do for a living, and I've got an
overwhelming amount of evidence on this at my disposal.
Scott Orr
> Is that right? You leave the impression that Austria and Hungary were
equal
> states within the Empire. I always understood that regardless of the de
> jure situation, Austria was firmly in the de facto driver's seat.
Hapsburg
> is a Germanic, not a Magyar name is it not?
I think on balance Rich's characterization is the more accurate of the two.
The Dual Monarchy's administrative structure was so bipolar that Hungary
possessed many characteristics of a nation in its own right, not merely an
imperial province - indeed, Hungary had quasi-colonial possessions of its
own, such as Slovakia, Croatia, etc. Both Austria and Hungary maintained
separate parliaments with independent law-making powers, and little overlap
between the two. Even the Hapsburg army was three-tiered, with a 'federal'
professional body supported by distinct Austrian and Hungarian militias (the
Landwehr and the Honved, IIRC). These arrangements fatally handicapped the
Empire's ability to prosecute its war against the Entente in 1914-1918; both
Austria and Hungary bickered endlessly over supposed inequities in their
contribution to the struggle, and even went so far as to refuse help to the
other in times of need eg. Hungary prohibited transimperial exports of grain
despite Austria's desperate food shortages. The 1867 Ausgleich which Rich
mentioned was up for renewal in 1917 and the rancorous debate over the
revision of its terms went on right until the dissolution of the empire the
following year.
Alan.
> While there are, of course, significant differences, this still sounds a
lot
> like Canada. :-)
The key difference is that Canada, unlike the Dual Monarchy, has a federal
Prime Minister and Cabinet. No such positions existed in Austria-Hungary;
the federal government, such as it was, consisted of the Hapburg Court, the
Foreign Minister, and the War Minister. There was no comprehensive
understanding of citizenship beyond separate dynastic loyalties to the
Kaiser (Austria) and Konig (Hungary), and all decisions affecting the empire
as a whole had to be negotiated by representatives of the twin parliaments -
a neverending source of domestic acrimony. I think it's vital for an
understanding of the post-1867 Austro-Hungarian Empire to appreciate that
the Dual Monarchy went way beyond a simple matter of devolved provincial
responsibility - Franz-Josef really ruled over two distinct countries held
together by a thin sheen of federal institutions and an inceasingly frayed
sense of feudal obligation to the Crown.
Alan.
>"Jim Voege" <jfv...@sprint.ca> wrote in message
>news:0iE67.1193$Ma.3...@newscontent-01.sprint.ca...
>
>> While there are, of course, significant differences, this still sounds a
>lot
>> like Canada. :-)
>
>The key difference is that Canada, unlike the Dual Monarchy, has a federal
>Prime Minister and Cabinet. No such positions existed in Austria-Hungary;
>the federal government, such as it was, consisted of the Hapburg Court, the
>Foreign Minister, and the War Minister. There was no comprehensive
>understanding of citizenship beyond separate dynastic loyalties to the
>Kaiser (Austria) and Konig (Hungary), and all decisions affecting the empire
>as a whole had to be negotiated by representatives of the twin parliaments -
>a neverending source of domestic acrimony.
The idea of a "comprehensive understanding of citizenship" is, like
similar things such as nationalism, a product of the modern era, and
as such probably not present in the Hapsburg Empire before the early
19th century--it's a completely meaningless concept before the
development of the state system in 1630 with the Treaty of Westphalia,
and even after real states were created, it took awhile for people to
think of themselves as citizens of states.
Scott Orr
>
>"mike stone" <mws...@aol.com> wrote in message
>news:20010721133502...@ng-fs1.aol.com...
>> That's not how it worked in Europe. Those Germans were in Czechoslovakia
>> because some bunch of foreign diplomats ordained it so - and in 1938 they
>> believed that they and their friends over in the Reich were strong enough
>to
>> get that decision changed
>>
>Well, who am I to believe? Someone else here, Scott I think, stated that
>the majority of those folks in the Sudetenland were there because their
>German ancestors chose to live in an area (Bohemia) both largely populated
>by non-Germans and ruled by non-Germans.
>
When their ancestors moved to that place there was not even any such
thing as "Germans"--nations hadn't been invented yet (heck, real
states hadn't been ivnented at that point yet either--it was still the
feudal era).
Scott Orr
>I think on balance Rich's characterization is the more accurate of the two.
>The Dual Monarchy's administrative structure was so bipolar that Hungary
>possessed many characteristics of a nation in its own right, not merely an
>imperial province - indeed, Hungary had quasi-colonial possessions of its
>own, such as Slovakia, Croatia, etc. Both Austria and Hungary maintained
>separate parliaments with independent law-making powers, and little overlap
>between the two. Even the Hapsburg army was three-tiered, with a 'federal'
>professional body supported by distinct Austrian and Hungarian militias (the
>Landwehr and the Honved, IIRC).
The arragenments you're talking about are I think really only true (at
least in a practical sense) of the later 19th century. Heck, before
the 19th century, the legistlative bodies in the Empire were almost
entirely symbolic.
Scott Orr
> The idea of a "comprehensive understanding of citizenship" is, like
> similar things such as nationalism, a product of the modern era, and
> as such probably not present in the Hapsburg Empire before the early
> 19th century--it's a completely meaningless concept before the
> development of the state system in 1630 with the Treaty of Westphalia,
> and even after real states were created, it took awhile for people to
> think of themselves as citizens of states.
Right, but as I think I pointed out elsewhere, I'm talking about the
post-1867 period. Prior to that the constitutional arrangements of the
Hapburg domains were different anyway.
Alan.
That seems to be a lot of weight to be giving to a mere 50 year
constitutional experiment that was largely unsuccessful.
>On Fri, 20 Jul 2001 18:00:16 -0500, Rich Rostrom
><rros...@21stcentury.net> wrote:
>
>>Scott D. Orr <sd...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>
>>>To speak of either the "Czechs" or the "Hungarians" before the 19th
>>>century is completely ahistorical--neither nation existed before then
>>>as a nation...
>>
>>Hungary existed as a completely separate nation for several
>>hundred years.
>
>No, it existed as a _state_. The term "nation"...
>Czech states had also existed for several hundred years, altogether,
>before Austrian rule.
>>
>>In 1526, most of Hungary was occupied by the Turks, and
>>the Hungarian crown with the rump state became a Hapsburg
>>possession. In 1699-1718 the Turkish zone was reunited
>>with the rest of Hungary.
>>
>>But from 1526 through 1806 Hungary retained a separate
>>existence - its own laws, national assembly, and so on.
>>
>As did the Czech Lands. However, neither was independent.
Bohemia, Moravia, Austria, Tyrol, Styria, etc, were
all components of the HRE under a common ruler, thus
subordinate to a higher authority. After about 1300,
the HRE had not real authority, so the Czech lands
became de facto sovereign, their local institutions
asserting quasi-sovereign power on occasion (notably
at the start of the Thirty Years War).
Hungary was in a different condition, being outside
of the HRE.
>>As for "the Czechs", they existed, just as "the Italians"
>>existed - or "the Arabs". The existence of a distinct
>>"people" is always a subjective one, but this case is
>>pretty clear.
>
>Yes, it is indeed pretty clear that neither Czechs nor Hungarians
>existed before the 19th century. You can argue with me, but you're
>gonna lose, because this is what I do for a living
What, chop definitions?
Perhaps you have the advantage of me there.
But when you claim to speak with such authority on
the subjective "sense of nationhood" of people
300 years ago, I question whether _anyone_ can
speak with "authority".
>"Rich Rostrom" <rros...@21stcentury.net> wrote
>No. The provinces have areas in which they have
>jurisdictional primacy as does the federal government.
In the Dual Monarchy there was no 'federal' government.
The Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministry were operated by
Austria by negotiated arrangement with Hungary.
> Conflicts between the laws of the two
>jurisdictional levels are settled on the basis of whose area the laws fall
>inside. In other words, it is no more unusual for a federal law to be
>struck down than a provincial law in such circumstances.
This is true in the US as well. But in the case
of the Dual Monarchy, there was _no_ power with
the right to legislate for Hungary in any particular.
If the Canadian federal parliament enacts a tariff,
it is binding on Ontario, and there is absolutely
nothing Ontario can do about it. Nor does Canada
need to consult with Ontario beforehand.
But there was no "federal parliament" in Austria-
Hungary - no 'federal' laws of any kind.
>Well, who am I to believe? Someone else here, Scott I think, stated that
>the majority of those folks in the Sudetenland were there because their
>German ancestors chose to live in an area (Bohemia) both largely populated
>by non-Germans and ruled by non-Germans.
If so, it was way back in the Middle Ages - before nationalism as we know it
really existed most places.
By the time "modern" nationalism _did_ reach the area (a bit after the French
Revoluttion?) German-speakers had been running the show as long as anyone could
remember
>> Had they been allowed a glimpse of what would have happened by 1945, some
>of
>> them might well have decided different. But so probably would a lot of
>those
>> diplomats of 1919
>> --
>
>Unless the ethnicity of those border people properly belongs in the same
>class of pretext as the 1939 Polish invasion of Germany.
>
Not quite sure what you mean by that
The "pretext" for Hitler's invasion of Poland was a "Polish attack" on German
border posts - in fact conducted by Germans in Polish uniforms
There was nothing imaginary about the existence of a German minority in Poland.
That existed all right. However, unlike their compatriots in the Sudetenland,
they were mostly scattered hither and yon in tiny enclaves, so that there was
no practical way of joining them to the Reich without transferring an even
larger number of Poles
--
Mike Stone - Peterborough England
Last words of King Edward II.
"I always said that Roger Mortimer was a pain in the - - - AAARGHH!!!"
That was how it was done when the 'Slesvig-Holsten question' was solved in 1920.
The area was split in zones based on the existing administrative borders; parishes
a.s.o.. Each zone then held a referendum and was given to either Germany or Denmark
based on the result.. The remaining minorities was secured representation in the country
they lived in. This solution worked so well that not even the nazis bothered to make
territorial claims in Denmark.
This question had been the cause of two wars between Danes and Germans since 1848.
Personally I think the smartest decision by Danish politicians in the 20th c. was not to take
the offer from the Allies to annex the old territories in Germany but instead to go for the
referendum option. Maybe some grief could have been avoided if the same option had
been take elsewhere after WWI.
Cheers
Soren Larsen
>in most
>cases, borders were drawn along historical lines.
Come again? None of the borders created in Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon
corresponded to any histrouical boundary. Nor did Austria's borders with Italy
and Yugoslavia correspond with any thta had existed before.
>In addition, adding those areas to Germany would have added an area
>with no economic ties to Germany, while destroying Czechoslovakia
>economically;
What of it? They were perfectly prepared to break up the economic ties with
other parts of the old Habsburg Empire. Why should ties between different parts
of "Bohemia" be given any greater consideration?
> it would also leave that country nearly surrounded by
>Germany, and without defensible borders (since the regions in question
>contain virtually _all_ of the country's mountains).
And what good did those mountains do in 1938?. CZ was just as indefensible with
or without the mountains, unless foreign powers were prepared to step in to
prop her up - which they weren't when it cvme to the point.
>No sane person
>would even have proposed such a thing.
Would any sane person have tried to create "Czechoslovakia" in the first place?
>even though it's actually got a lot more historical
>justification than assigning parts of the Czech Lands to Germany
What "Czech lands"? The districts we are talking about had been majority-German
since the Middle Ages. And the last ruler they'd had who could by any
reasonable definition be called "Czech" reigned about1300 iirc
>The Czech and Slovak leaders wanted one country (Slovakia wouldn't
>have been very viable by itself, due to the lack of an educated
>leadership class).
The Slovak leaders at Paris were those who favoured a Czecho-Slovak state -
they were chosen at a time when Slovakia was under military occupation by units
of the Czech legion who were allowed in by the Allies under cover of the
Armistice
Other Slovak leaders who did _not_ desire union with the Czechs attempted to
present their case, but were prevented from attending the Peace Conference by
the French authorities, who (desiring a Czecho-slovak state for their own
geopolitical reasons) declared that their passports were not in order and
denied them entry into France
>The only solution, short of ethnic cleansing, is to
>encourage a national identity that focuses on citizenship in the
>state, and isn't construed as mutually exclusive with also holding
>ethnic identities. Drawing borders "correctly" is _not_ one of the
>possible solutions, because it's not something that can be done.
Not 100%, no, but you could have done better than the Czecho-Slovak situation.
CZ consisted, iirc, of approx 6 million Czechs, 3 million Germans (most but not
all in the "Sudetenland") 2 million Slovaks, a bit over 0.5 million Magyars,
and a few hundred thousand others. It was, in short, a racial hotch-potch
similar to the pre-war Habsburg Empire - which the Allies had decided was
unworkable and dissolved.
They may have been right, but if so what possible reason had they to expect CZ
to be any _more_ workable? They replaced one "ramshackle empire" by another and
then reacted with hurt surprise when the minorities in the new one were just as
discontented as those in the old - and just as insistent on getting their own
way, however inconvenient that might be for the peace of Europe
I was questioning the extent to which Hitler's occupation of the Sudetenland
really had anything to do with the ethnic breakdown of the people in it. A
purely strategic rationale is quite sufficient as an explanation.
The situation certainly is more confused in the Balkans _now_.
But as I wrote in my earlier post the 'Slesvig-Holsten question'
caused two wars from it arose in 1848 until it was solved in 1920.
The area was split between 3 national identities Danes,Germans and
Frisians.
I think it was Lord Palmerston who said:
" Only three people understand the
Slesvig-Holstein question, myself and two others. One of those is
dead the other mad and I have forgotten anything I knew about it
anyway." ( The quotation is from a poster on Germanic-L but this
is the way I remember it too)
Here is something I wrote yesterday in that thread:
"Yup. In his time it was inconceivable to solve the question by actually
asking the people were they felt they belonged, which was the way
the question finally was solved in the 1920 referendum.
The 'Slesvig-Holstein question'(Are you being salomonic by using
a Danish/German hybrid?) was indeed messy. It came to the surface
in 1848; the year of revolutions in Europe and was mixed up with
pangermanism, panscandinavism,nationalism and the formation of
German and Danish national myths.
It involved Danish and German historians going into the archives
and invoking testaments, redeemed and forfeited pledges,treaties
going back to the first negotiations between the Carolingians and the
emerging Danish state in the 8th c and so on.
France and Britain could not make up their mind on which side they
were going to support. France had just proclaimed a republic and was
sympathetic towards people rebelling against monarchs but had this
uneasy feeling that perhaps a united Germany wasn't in their best
interest. Britain was able to live with a united continental Germany
behind France but was not keen on the most extreme plans for a
united Germany which included Denmark and Holland complete
with navies and colonies.Britain was also sympathetic towards
'democratic' movements in Europe ( Irish needed not apply) but
understood the problems the united Danish kingdom had with
nationalism and was aware that Denmark was in the process of
making the monarchy constitutional."
Back then the SH question was as complicated as any 'national
question today'.
Cheers
Soren Larsen
OK Soren. :-)
Calculate the length of all borders in the Balkans. Measure the length of
the rather short Denmark/Germany border. Divide the former by the latter
and multiply the result by the number of years it took to sort out the SH
problem.
I predict peace in the Balkans in 4 millennia.
The Romans tried for six hundred years, and were no better at the end than
when they started out. Things have just got worse, if anything, since then
as religion added extra dimensions of troubles.
NL
> If I could just reverse course on this thread just a bit, the real
question
> is whether, in the 1867 agreement, Hungary achieved a status sufficient to
> justify their having primacy over the Slovaks. IIRC someone tossed in the
> this question of Hungary's history of "nationhood" (to be taken in the
> broadest sense possible) as a factor that ought to be taken into account
in
> this question.
I don't think I'd ever use that dangerous word 'justify' in a context like
this.
Alan.
snippage
> >
>
> OK Soren. :-)
>
> Calculate the length of all borders in the Balkans. Measure the length of
> the rather short Denmark/Germany border. Divide the former by the latter
> and multiply the result by the number of years it took to sort out the SH
> problem.
>
> I predict peace in the Balkans in 4 millennia.
>
Well the SH problem was solved in the period from deciding the referendum
to actually holding it; about a year AFAIR
Before that there had been fighting over the area right back to the emergence of the
first sources and probably before that if the weapon sacrifices are interpreted
correctly.
Of course referendums are no wonder cure, but it is striking that where they were
applied the problems seemed to fizzle away.
Cheers
Soren Larsen
Hi Osmo,
I certainly would. In those days, it was fashionable for American
intellectuals to play with communism, and to claim it was a "more just
society". Roosevelt was certainly very communist-leaning. (He called the
butcher Stalin "Uncle Joe" for instance!)
The Americans gave the Soviets *incredible* amounts of material under
Lend-Lease, including warplanes, tanks etc., but more importantly, they gave
them incredible amounts of oil, rubber and especially - transportation.
So, unlike the Soviet army that attacked Finland in the Winter War, by 1943
January, the Soviets were a fully modernised, motorised mobile army, riding
on American Studebaker trucks and Jeeps.
The Soviets had another use for the Studebakers. They would put politically
"unreliable" elements on the tailgates, put a noose around their necks, and
drive away.
It turns out the American "free gift" was excellent material for Soviet
atrocities against their own citizens.
Ciao
Chris
Chris
HAH!!! If this isn't the non plus ultra of arrogance, what is????
(ROFL!!! :)))
Chris
Voege wrote:
. I don't think you have any appreciation of the sheer size of
>the task of getting every linear mile of boundary set to everybody's
>satisfaction.
Who cares a flip how much it cost??? We either have principles we believe
in - such as the Sovereignty of the People and democracy, or we don't. My
major problem with you north Americans and your western EUropean allies is
that you declaim loudly about democracy when it suits you, then act like the
worst crooks when it doesn't.
I can't think like that!! Either I'm for democracy, or I'm not. End of
story!!
>
>> Why couldn't they have asked the local people what they wanted, for
>> instance??
>>
>And how would they vote? Would every 100 people vote in a bloc as to which
>side of the boundary they wanted to be on? Or should the voting blocs be
>larger, 1,000 or 10,000 or 1,000,000? And who would run, fund and
supervise
> these thousands of elections? The locals? That would be as problematic
as
>the causes for the voting in the first place. That would then leave us
with
>those stupid "Allies" to do the job.
The way they could easily have done it was to use the local existing
election machinery (after all, Hungary had transformed itself into a modern
Constitutional Monarchy in 1848, been stripped of that by the
Habsburg-Prussian-Russian Absolutists in '49, and got it all back in 1867 in
the "Ausgleich" with Austria.
So it would have been quite possible to use the votes of local communities
(villages) small towns and cities. It was done once in 1921 anyway.
Had there been a vote/plebiscite/referendum, involving all the peoples,
there would have been no tensions after the war, as the common sense of it
would have been accepted.
Look at the only case where the Allies -grudgingly - allowed a plebiscite.
Between Hungary and Austria. Hungary got back a strip of territory from
Austria - given to her by the Allies!! - and the city of Sopron. NOTE: Many
of those who voted for return to Hungary were ethnic Germans. You see, the
concept of voluntary association triumphed over the idea the Allies were
using, namely "ethnically-based" so-called "nation-states".
Morally and practically, it was bankrupt. US President Woodrow Wilson called
Trianon "absurd." South African General Jan Smuts said: "It was not Wilson
who failed at Versailles, but humanity."
Well put, General!!
Chris
I don't see the problem. Why does popular sovereignty and democracy scare
you. No, don't bother to answer, what's the point.
Chris
Which is why you are unsuitable to discuss matters on this thread. You have
too much of a vested interest in your point of view - a priori - to be open
to different views. So, you have closed your mind and already made it up as
to what is "right and wrong" exclusively from a study of books, without
discussing this and researching it with people on the ground.
I am not impressed, nor would Europeans in general, and specially Central
Europeans, be impressed with your airy-fairy world of dreams.
Chris
Your trouble is you assume - without proving - that people of different
cultures CANNOT live together, so the only solution is the American one.
Namely to wipe out the old cultures, destroy the old identity, and create a
new "kitsch" identity, called "American" which swallows everything up.
This worked on the Europeans because they wanted to get rich, and so gave up
old identities for better economic conditions. It has failed to impress the
Native Americans, and the Black Americans are also refusing to join the
"melting pot", instead, they are creating their own version of
"Afro-Americanism."
But there's more. The Spanish-speaking Chicanos are becoming numerous in the
USA. They have own language, own culture and even historical claims to much
US land. I predict that if you do not - very soon - begin to accommodate
their aspirations, you will have more fun on your hands than you did with
the AmerIndians and the Afro-Americans.
Your one-dimensional thinking will fail in this challenge. Don't blame me
when it does!!
Chris
I had to do that to try and balance the Seton-Watson/Benes-Masaryk based
propaganda he was pushing as "history". Also, as the Allies had most of the
power, they get to carry most of the responsibility.
He made the valid point that
>one person's (group's) rights are an infringement on another's.
It appears that this is a commonly held view. I don't agree and the facts
can prove it either way. However, if what you say is true, then there is no
hope for the world, because we are in the biggest human migration wave in
history, and ethnic groups, with different languages, cultures and religions
will very simply HAVE to find a modus vivendi, or else all we face in the
21st C is more genocide. And that is an unacceptable alternative!
And in the
>complex map of European ethnicity, there is no such thing as a simple line
>of demarcation.
I agree, of course not. I was talking about a past wrong, not the present.
He further makes the point that following old grievances and
>causes does not make for future harmony. Very valid points, I think.
True. But you and he fail to realise something. A grievance to someone is
still a grievance, and he/they have to deal with it somehow. The examples of
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, inter alia, have proved that shutting up about it and
hoping it will go away are not the way to go.
Look at the comparison. Near the end of communism, Hungarian and Slovak
intellectuals were able to discuss in scholarly fora their respective
grievances. The same among Czechs and Slovaks. As a result, when communism
fell, there was no war or violence between either Hungarians and Slovaks, or
between Czechs and Slovaks. Instead, the two had the "Velvet Divorce" while
Slovakia and Hungary are forging ahead - despite some serious economic and
ethnic differences - in working together, enriching one another with trade,
rebuilding bridges (Maria Valeria Bridge, blown up by the Jerries in 1944,
is now being jointly rebuilt between Esztergom in Hungary and Sturovo across
the Danube in Slovakia).
By way of contrast, in Yugoslavia, national feelings of grievance, linked to
WWII especially, as well as ecomomics (the Slovenes and Croats were tired of
carrying the Serbs and other Balkan territories economically) were not
discussed, and were not allowed to be. Instead, a Serb-friendly set of lies
was pushed as "history".
So the result was a careful move to loosen the State on the part of Slovenia
and Croatia. These moves were answered by American and British blindness -
one not unlike that of Scott D. Orr - who pronounced they would not like to
see Yugoslavia "divided." The Serbs immediately understood the implications,
and attacked Slovenia, knowning the Western powers would do nothing because
they preferred massacres to even a slight concept of adjustment of the
Status Quo.
Vide the result. Same as Versailles, same as the earlier Treaty of Berlin
which carved up Africa, same as Trianon..... (it's time y'all learned
something!)
Chris
Ooops. I thought you were doing it on purpose, as part of what I perceive as
your talking down to me as a "benighted Balkanoid". Okay, I'll start using
"you" again.
However, instead of showing me why you feel seperate ethnic groups cannot
coexist in a democracy (poor Africa, poor Asia!!!) you have merely gone on
about my alleged "nationalism" and "extremism." Pity, that.
Cheers
Chris
However, no matter how stupid our policies might have been in 1867-1914 (for
which we have payed in massive amounts of blood - so you can feel really
happy - doesn't justify the idea that Slovakia today, in the world of the
EU, can gerrymander elections and oppress or disadvantage the Hungarian -
and other - minorities! Nor does any, real or imagined grievance on our
part, justify our demanding back former Hungarian territories, like say,
Transylvania. However, protecting our own minorities, and teaching ourselves
to work effectively for the common good with our neighbours, whether
Romanians or Yugoslavs or whatever, DO lie within our rights, and our/my
attempts to get that right should not be the subject of attack and
pontification by those who have no direct interest in the matter, save an
airy-fairy academic set of theories that have no relevance to actual people
on the ground!
views are actually rather extreme, though typical of Hungarian
>nationalists, and doubtless what he was taught in school.
Oh, of course. To disagree with the great Mr. Scott "D" Orr, (I wonder if he
is "Scott D. Orr The First, "Junior" or "The Third." Tell me, Mr. Orr, do
you use the Royal Plural, too??? (hehehe unbelievable.) So of course I am
"extreme" just because I am familiar with the archaeology, for instance, and
have handled much of the material. Clearly, accoding to Scott D. Orr and Mr.
Allandale, this disqualifies me from any political discussion, after all,
how dare I express my opinion? I'm too local, it seems, to comment. Let's
try this the other way. Mr Allandale may NOT comment on matters Canadian,
because he is Canadian, and Mr Orr is American, and cannot therefore comment
on matters in the US, as, of course, he is "too biased."
Okay, I better rush off and set up a committee of Hungarians, Yugoslavs,
Papuans, Japanese and other "objective people" and begin to give advice to
Canada and the USA!!! (Might do some good, even...)
Mr Orr, the "extremist" label is a very, very cheap shot! Shame on you, a
supposed "academic" doing a dissertation. I fear to imagine what it will
look like. Also, let me challenge you. Give your students the opportunity to
read the Hungarian side - as writer James Michener suggested to Americans -
by referring them to http://www.net.hu/corvinus/ I know you will answer by
saying "It is probably a nationalist website." Still, in the interests of
objective research, your students, who are no doubt paying good money in
tuition, deserve to hear both sides of the story!!! (Or do you not believe
in allowing such freedom of thought?)
I'm the guy who knows the situation on the ground. You just know some
(inaccurate) books. I have researched the history of Hungary and the region
for 20 years and I speak two of the regional languages fluently. The last
thing I need is some Yank junior lecture lecturing me based
on what the Crewe House, the British secret service and Seton-Watson worked
out as lies to convince the British and US public to destory Austria
Hungary, which was in the process of turning into Austria-Hungary-Slavia
before your precious allies the Serbs began intensive terrorist actions,
actions which you might have noticed they are really good at!
Had the Austro-Hungarian-Slav (and eventually Romanian) further "Ausgleichs"
worked out, we would have been the model for a "European Union". That our
liberal politicians were right, and the race-based, Colonialist allies were
objectively wrong, is proved by what Versailles directly caused - WWII, and
the final realisation by the square headed Frogs and Limeys that the only
way forward in Europe is to accept each other's differences and work
together.
And we WILL succeed, despite the likes of Georges Clemancau, Adolph Hitler
and Scott D. Orr and his little sidekick Allandale on this NG!!
>
>Such view are in fact part of the daily political discussion in
>Hungary--the Trianon Treaty comes up constantly, and every mention of
>it causes tension with Slovakia and Romania.
And the only way it will be resolved is for Slovakia, Romania and Hungary to
discuss, discuss, discuss until we have reached a real, honest modus vivendi
with each other. Don't try to shut us up, Yank, and STAY OUT OF IT!!!
>
>So no, I'm not overreacting at all--I simply know the current
>political context within which Mr. Szabo's seemingly calm remarks were
>made.
You do? Hah, that's a joke. The politics is all about getting our region
back to what it was before WWI, a prosperous region that cannot be
manipulated by all sorts of adventurers, whether Nazis, Commies, or
"democrats". A region where it didn't matter what language you spoke, or
what your favourite songs were. We'll get back to it, with or without your
kind permission!
>
>>I'm pleased to say Hungary is doing this admirably well at
>>the moment, and the Slovaks aren't doing too badly either. Even
"backward"
>>Ukraine has a pretty enlightened minority policy. Romania has a long way
to
>>go, but wants into the EU, so there's hope.
>>
>While relations among Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania are decent,
>extreme nationalists in all three countries are doing their best to
>wreck them, and often even the moderates do their part: in Hungary,
>the "Status Law" that would give rights in Hungary to ethnic
>Hungarians in other countries,
You and I - and the EU - which has commented the matter and stated that the
Status Law does not violate EU principles, know that is nonsense!! All it is
doing is legalising what is already happening. I know you would prefer if
Hungarians in neighbouring countries were ethnically cleansed - like the
Allied-sponsored cleansings in 1918-20, which threw 350 000 Hungarians, Jews
and Armenians out of their homes, and the 80 000Hungarians turfed out of
Czechoslovakia with tacit Allied approval, and the
forcable relocation of tens of thousands of Hungarians by the Romanians of
Ceacescu to the Old Kingdom, so that they could be assimilated, while their
homes were given to real Romanains from the Regat. Not a word about this
Apartheid from the West. Funny, isn't it?
I know you prefer what you call "neat" countries, with no minorities. We,
however, including remnants of my family in Romania and possibly in Ukraine
(can't find any yet)
are staying in villages and towns were our actual families lived for at
least 800 years that we can prove with documents. Sorry bub, no luck there,
we will survive your ideological intrusions.
in Slovakia, the regoinal
>administration reform that would leave a lot of Hungarians districts
>in larger Slovak-majority regions,
That's a mistake on their part, but I am sure the Slovaks will be brought to
see things in a more fair perspective once they get close to joining the EU.
(The EU has
protested this move)
and in Romania all kinds of stuff,
>such as refusing to allow a Hungarian-language university.
To be specific, to give it back.
>
>The arguments used by extreme Hungarian nationalists are essentially
>those presented by Mr. Szabo. However, the moderates make essentialy
>the same statements--the difference is how they recommend acting on
>them.
Oh dear, here we go.... It seems you Lefties have nothing in your arsenal
but the old, timeworn insults of "nationalism". Apparently, to you,
"nationalism" is the greatest danger in the world. What hypocrisy from an
American!!! I spent four years over there, and nowhere in my many travels
have I seen so many flags. Flags in schools, flags in churches, flags in
supermarkets, not to mention government buildings!
(If you haven't been to America, it's like this: You stop at an Exxon petrol
pump. There is a huge US flag in the middle, flanked by the State Flag
(lower) and the flag of the Exxon company), And these people dare call "US"
nationalists. Hah!
Aside from the insulting terminology, what Mr. Orr says is right, I'm a
moderate. Now, I am sorry that you wish us to commit genocide to fit some
sort of model
theory of yours. But we are real people, we have as much right to
existence - as ourselves - as you do, despite what your "teacher"
Seton-Watson called us, namely "Mongoloid Magyars who should not rule white
people."
>
>>BTW. If I, as a Hungarian, write some points on history, why is it taken
as
>>read that I am some new Milosevic? I don't get it. Enlighten me please!
>>
>See above. It takes some experience with dealing with ethnic
>conflicts to understand what's implied by sometimes innocuous-sounding
>statements.
I'm the one dealing with Slovaks, Romanians, Gypsies, Germans. They prefer
my approach to yours. No-one today is happy with western "intellectuals" and
the trouble they have caused in Central Europe. So stay off it, and go
trouble someone else (try the South Americans, f'r instance.)
Chris
Well said, there! Tragically, Benes and Masaryk had too much of an influence
on western politicians at the Postwar conference, and as a result, Europe
was destablised and prepared for Hitler and later, Stalin.
British PM Lloyd George stated candidly that he'd been lied to at the
conference in the 1920s.
BTW, the liberal Czech daily, Mlada Fronta Dnes, published an article the
other day where the writer (sorry can't remember) calls on the Czechs to
help out with Hungarian minorities, as the sufferings they underwent - as
well as the Balkan peoples - were largely influenced by Czech politics and
sothe problem "is a Czech one, too" (from memory.)
Put that in yer pipe an' smoke it!
>
>All nations are imaginary. One of the best books on nationality, by
>Benedict Anderson, is actualy entitled _Imagined_Communities_.
Here's my problem with you, Mr. Orr. You see, you are influenced by
academics who live in ivory towers. How do you or Mr. Anderson know that the
English archer at Agincourt - who, according to English historians and
records quoting archers (free peasants, not nobles) claim they felt
themselves to be "English", this in 14/15th C.
Was he there, were you there. Course not, nor was I. So I prefer to believe
the actual words of the peoples involved.
In Hungary, for instance, as early as the 1500's, "soldier-poets" were
weeping about the destruction of the "Magyar haza" or Hungarian Home, by the
Ozman Turks.
Now, of course, no doubt you will say these are the words of a "Hungarian
nationalist"
which I gather is a crime. Okay, let's try another European country,
England:
On the approach of the Spanish armada, Queen Elizabeth I (r. 1533-1603)
said this to her assembled troops (not nearly all nobles!!!!):
"I know I have the body of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the heart and
stomach of a King, and a King of England, too!"
That's talk that would appeal to people who felt an identity with the word
"English!!"
So, lemme see. She was imagining it, so were the troops, and so were the
Spaniards when the non-existent "English" attacked and defeated their navy?
Man, where do these people come from, spaceships???
Oh, I just received a book in the post from Budapest. It is by a really
well-respected liberal historian, Prof. Gyula Kristo'. He actually calls on
readers NOT to judge him as a good or bad Hungarian, but to refer to facts
if they disagree with him.
The book is titled _A Magyar Nemzet Megszuletese_, or the Birth of the
Hungarian Nations. He places this in the 13th C, arguing that it came to
exist as a result of Hungarians going to the new French universities, and
the currents of thought they brought back.
I haven't read the whole thing, but it seems quite reasonable. So, is he
"imagining" all the documents he has referred to??
Robert Fawtier, in his old (1940s) classic _The Capetian Kings of France_
where he puts the period 987-1328 as the time of the formation of the French
nation.
Now clearly, the "nation-concept" changed a great deal. But ideas of
"patrie", "natio", and similar cognate words have been around in Europe, at
least, for c.1 000 yrs. English historians tend to put the birth of the
English nation at between 1066-1200 roughly, with variations.
So, sure there was discontinuity. But there was also continuity, both in
thought and in actual people staying in the same communities for centuries.
I realise that as Canadians and Americans, this concept is too hard for you
to grasp. Your history is shorter than that of my village in Hungary. So you
fail to develop a "feel" for continuity.
But to say that, for instance, the Englishman of today and the Englishmen of
Queen Elizabeth I's day have NO connection, except in imagination, is going
far too far. IT is the extremist view. It may be fashionable in academe, but
it applies not at all to real people on the ground.
Chris
Precisely Mike. And, again, at the risk of sounding boring, compelling
people to live here or there is NOT democratic. It could have been solved
with plebiscites etc, as I've written elsewhere.
rr writes:
>You're not getting the point here: the minority may have been
>geographically concentrated, but geographically concentrated doesn't
>mean the same as located in ethnically pure areas--in fact, many areas
>of what Mr. Szabo calls "Upper Hungary" were majority-Slovak.
I challenge you to show me where I called Upper Hungary "ethnically pure". I
know the situation well. Please don't put words in my mouth. Don't presume
to speak for me, OK?
What "Upper Hungary" referred to was the period from 1541-1699, and then
after, when the Turks occupied central Hungary, Transylvania was autonomous
under the Turks, and western and northern Hungary were still under the Crown
(albeit the House of Hapsburg).
The Term Upper Hungary to refer to the bulk of the region came into general
use then. At this time, records show clearly that the Slovak population was
growing, they were largely in northern Slovakia, but also migrated to the
towns, such as Kassa/Kaschau and, for instance, Pressburg/Pozsony). They
remained a minority in the towns for various reasons, mainly because town
occupations were more the province of Germans, Jews, and some Hungarians.
I don't object to them having these towns now. I object to them, and their
propagandists, like Scott Orr, claiming Hungarian, Jews and Germans NEVER
lived there. THat is going too far.
Chris
I object to you misrepresenting what I wrote and presuming to know my
motives. I wrote what I did/do because I don't believe a fair future can be
built on nationalist myths and wartime propaganda.
You appear really terrified of my discussing history with other peoples of
the Carpathian basin. WHY? Are you scared we will work it all out, become
prosperous again, and then the US can't push us around anymore? IS that it?
Chris
Thanks Rich, you saved me wading through lots of refs. Just be careful you
aren't accused of being a "Collaborator of the Hungarian Nationalists" (Oh
lord!!) :))
>
>But from 1526 through 1806 Hungary retained a separate
>existence - its own laws, national assembly, and so on.
>
>In 1806 the Holy Roman Empire was abolished, and in the
>associated waves of reform the Habsburg lands were
>consolidated into a single state - a condition so unstable
>it collapsed in 1867. Hungary then reappeared with its
>distinct laws and its own separate government.
>
May I just make a quick point? In 1806, nothing constitutional took place
in Hungary, because the kingdom was not part of the HRE. The Hapsburgs ruled
Hungary, not in their capacity as Emperors of the HRE, but as legitimate
hereditary kings of Hungary. EG., when Maria Theresa was under attack in the
1740-50s, she appealed to the Hungarian Parliament or Assembly of Estates,
who crowned her "king", under the Pragmatica Sanctio which allowed her as a
woman to be the ruler. Fred the Great often denounced "that woman, the Queen
of the Hungarians..."
Also, in 1848, the medieval parliament transformed itself into a close model
of the English parliament. Sadly, this first succesful national
representative gov't on the Continent was crushed by the Absolutist powers,
but only after a year and ahalf of war.
It was this parliament that abolished feudalism in the Kingdom of Hungary.
It made no references to "ethnic groups", so all Slovaks, Romanians etc were
better off in Hungary as citizens, rather than serfs, in comparison to say,
the Old Kingdom of Romania, where both serfdom and slavery (of Gypsies) was
still the norm.
The Austrians, on crushing the Hungarian independence war in 1849 (with 200
000 Tsarist troops - a war conspicuously missing from English history
books) were unable to replace the institution of serfdom.
This contradicts the usual propaganda of Hungary being a "feudal state" up
till 1945. This was fine to hear from teh communists, but today, 11 yrs
after its fall, there is no excuse to continue to push old lies, as Mr. Orr
has done on this NG.
I find the fact that an academic is so closed minded really disappointing
and even tragic.
Ah well.
Chris
Precisely. And then to be told that my referring to this inconsistency as
such makes me an "extreme nationalist", is, to put it mildly, irksome.
Chris
I am glad my server acted up on the weekend. Gave me time to think. I have
realised that, despite my solid knowledge of history, languages, thousands
of kilometres of travel in the region, I cannot expect to engage in a fair
discussion with Messrs Orr, Allandale and Voege.
This is very unfortunate, because it highlights the problems faced by small
countries, such as today in Macedonia and Bosnia, as well as Albania.
I see that Prof. Alan Bloom's warning of 1987 in _The Closing of the
American Mind_ has, more than a decade later, come true. This accounts for
the three gents unwillingness, or perhaps inability, to even consider
another point of view.
The entire point of debates is to compare different POV;s. If we all agree
anyway, that's no debate.
I will therefore no longer bother continuing discussion on this thread, as
there is no purpose to it. I have too much to do in the real world, than to
expose myself to insults like "extreme nationalist" and "a threat to the
region."
I will leave you three with a thought:
They say: "Ignorance is Bliss".
I wish you a blissful life!!
Chris
>The Americans gave the Soviets *incredible* amounts of material under
>Lend-Lease, including warplanes, tanks etc., but more importantly, they gave
>them incredible amounts of oil, rubber and especially - transportation.
>
>So, unlike the Soviet army that attacked Finland in the Winter War, by 1943
>January, the Soviets were a fully modernised, motorised mobile army, riding
>on American Studebaker trucks and Jeeps.
>
>The Soviets had another use for the Studebakers. They would put politically
>"unreliable" elements on the tailgates, put a noose around their necks, and
>drive away.
>
>It turns out the American "free gift" was excellent material for Soviet
>atrocities against their own citizens.
I'd like to see verifiable documentation on that assertion. It sounds
like anti-communist propaganda, to me. Did they also use the
Studebaker trucks to run over children, or did they just bayonet them
before roasting and eating them?
One may put whichever spin one wants on what happened during World War
II, of course. The United States had a lot of intellectuals who
played with theoretical Communism, and a few industrialists who went
so far as to do business there, build factories, etc.
Please remember, however, that it didn't take long for the American
attitude toward the Soviets to make a great change, based purely on
the activities of the Soviets. Those were the same people in the
American government that had been there ten years earler, too.
The provision of lend-lease to the Soviets made it possible to win the
war agains Germany all the faster, as well, which may have been
foremost in the minds of American policymakers during the early 1940s.
--
Regards, PHG
To reply by mail, send to PGranzeau at the same site)
Indeed. I have a mental picture of FDR holding his nose whilst shaking the
hand of "Uncle Joe".