American Revolution - Fort Cumberland
HUGH MacDONALD
Lately, there has been some discussion of the Canadian Campaign during
the American Revolution. The focus has been on Quebec. A less well known
episode in the American Revolution, in Canada, was the siege of Fort
Cumberland in the, then, provice of Nova Scotia.
I visited the Fort recently … it is a short trip down old country road
just off the trans-Canada Highway as it passes from New Brunswick to
Nova Scotia. All that remains are foundation stones and ancient bricks
surrounded by grass covered earthworks. Despite this, it is one of the
more beautiful historic sites in Atlantic Canada.
In October and November of 1776 the British considered Fort Cumberland
to be the military 'key to the whole province'. Fortress Halifax, a much
more extensive military installation, even when poorly garrisoned was
too strong and too far away to present a viable target to the landlocked
troops of colonial America. Fort Cumberland, however, had been taken
fairly easily from its French and Native defenders a generation earlier
and, of course, was strategically situated on an overland route that
would have to be taken by any invading army.
The early success of the Continental Army on the battlefield caused Nova
Scotia Governor Francis Legge, to overreact and to declare martial law
on December 5th - the day he learned of the capture of Montreal by
General Montgomery. Shortly after, George III himself became 'fed up
with his representative' and recalled Legge on February 24, 1776. He
replaced him with the more conciliatory naval officer Mariott Arbuthnot
During the winter of 1776, however, the chief political zealots in Nova
Scotia - John Allen and Jonathan Eddy - attempted to raise support in
Philadelphia and in George Washington's camp.
On March 27, 1776, the large British force in Boston abandoned the city
and the fleet sailed to Halifax. With the troops from Boston came many
New England loyalists. In June, 1776, elements of the Royal Fencible
Americans took possession of Fort Cumberland - the military move
considered necessary to secure the province. Shortly after, Eddy
returned to Nova Scotia.. His mission had been a bitter failure. With
the death of Montgomery outside of Quebec, and the failure of the
Canadian Invasion, the Congress and Washington had other priorities. The
Nova Scotia patirots were on their own
By the end of the summer, however, the patriots got some limited support
from the Massachusetts Council which on September 2, 1776 gave Eddy,
back in New England, permission to attack Fort Cumberland. This was no
large scale invasion. Eddy was only permitted to "recruit as many men as
he could in the eastern part of the state". He was granted, "two hundred
pounds weight of gunpowder, five hundred weight of musket ball, three
hundred gun flints and twenty barrels of pork".
Meanwhile, John Allen, attempting to negotiate a treaty with the Micmaq
and Maliseet Nations to support the patriot cause, found the best he
could do was to pay them to remain neutral rather than supporting the
British. Fifteen Maliseet natives did join the army on the promise of
receiving, in lieu of pay, a share of the 'plunder'. The patriot's
committee-of-safety agreed to this and, as well, to support the native
soldiers' wives while they were on campaign
Including the Natives, Eddy now had seventy-two soldiers. The mission
was ambitious but not impossible - and not without precedent. Ethan
Allen (and Benedict Arnold), displaying boldness and determination, had
captured Fort Ticonderoga the year before with a similar force.
On Tuesday, October 29, 1776, the invasion of Nova Scotia began. The
first action was an attack on the Shepody outpost. This outpost was
manned by Lieutenant John Walker and fourteen Fencibles. Some fifteen
miles from Fort Cumberland, Shepody was a true 'frontier' outpost at the
edge of the vast wilderness northwest of Nova Scotia. When one soldier
was killed and Walker was wounded the undefensible position was conceded
to Eddy's men.
If Eddy indeed wanted to execute an Ethan Allen type of attack on the
main Fort, speed and surprise were essential. In capturing the Shepody
Outpost, Eddy gave himself a deadline. He had to take the fort before
his presence was known. This was not to be. Two warships were at anchor
in the Cumberland Basin in front of the Fort and there was nothing to be
done until they sailed away. Eddy devoted the time to raising more
troops.
It took a week for the Colonel commanding Fort Cumberland to discover
Eddy's presence. A boat had been sent to the Outpost on Sunday and
returned with news of the attack the previous Tuesday. The intelligence,
however, was poor. Eddy's force was estimated to include 200 soldiers.
The garrison of Fort Cumberland expected an attack at any moment.
Eddy and Colonel Goreham, the commander of Fort Cumberland, exchanged
the polite notes required by 18th century etiquette and the siege began
on Monday, November 11, 1776. The Fencibles kept busy readying the fort
for the expected attack. It had been in a state of decay when they
arrived at the beginning of the summer. It had last seen military
service fifteen years earlier. Nonetheless, the earthworks were still
formidable.
At four o'clock in the morning on Wednesday, November 13, the all-out
attack began. Even with the extra recruits, Eddy could only muster 80 of
his 200 men for the attack. Ernest Clarke, who has written a wonderful
book describing the siege and the attack, noted, that attacking prepared
defenses frontally was dangerous business requiring blind courage, mass
discipline and martial coordination - assets often in short supply among
irregulars.
Clarke suggests that military convention at the time dictated that
attackers outnumber defenders of a prepared fortification by a ratio of
at least three to one. Between the Fencibles, loyalist militia and
others pressed into service there were over 200 men defending Fort
Cumberland.
Eddy's strategy was to fake an attack against the Flag Bastion and, it
was hoped (he thought there were only 100 men in the Fort) divert the
attention of the Fencibles from the main attack, which would take place
against the weakest part of the fort -a run down area between two other
bastions. The veteran Goreham was not fooled and had the fort's
artillery ready at the weak spot. When it came, Goreham's six gun
cannonade, over the heads of the attackers, scattered Eddy's force, who
'threw down their scaling ladders, saws and other implements for cutting
down the pickets' and ran to safety. The subsequent small arms fire
lasted for two hours. The nearest the patriots came to achieving their
aim occurred when one of the Maliseets managed, in the confusion and
darkness, to enter the fort. He was just about to lift the bar securing
the main gate when he was wounded by a sword thrust. Eddy retreated to
his camp at six o'clock. Other than the Maliseet soldier, no one was
wounded on either side.
Over the next few days, Eddy lost influence as a military leader. The
general consensus was that attacking the fort again would be impossible
without artillery. A number of his men returned to their homes -
including some of the New England troops. The troops that remained
carried out a campaign of extortion and plunder. Specific raids were
sanctioned by the committee of safety and prominent loyalists were
placed under house arrest. The committee also sent a petition to Boston
for help and support.
Despite declining morale the siege continued - Fort Cumberland was
blockaded. In the fort, supplies were seriously rationed and would soon
run out.
News of the attack also reached Halifax. As a result, ships and men were
sent to reinforce Colonel Goreham. Although help was on the way it would
take time. Meanwhile, seeing the deterioration of his men and his dream,
Eddy managed to muster another 80 men for a second attack on the Fort.
This one took place on a cold and windy night between three and four in
the morning on Friday, November 22, 1776. This was no frontal assault,
however. This time, under cover of darkness, the patriot force silently
approached the Fort and tossed fiery missiles on the dry wooden shingles
of the buildings. When the guard was turned out to defend the fort and
put out the fires the roofs were ablaze. Goreham had little choice but
to order some of his Fencibles to climb on the roofs to put out the
fires. He expected that they would be cut down by enemy small arms fire.
He was surprised to learn that Eddy did not exploit the chaos. He seemed
to expect that the fire would win the battle for him. Only about ten of
his troops were firing muskets into the fort. This was the moment of
crisis. Eddy, having earlier lost the element of surprise, having relied
on poor intelligence about the number of defenders, having poorly
planned his siege, continued his string of military mistakes by his
failure to concentrate his resources and to exploit his advantage.
The fires were brought under control one by one. Eventually the
Fencibles were able to put out all of the patriot missiles as they
landed. When the wind died down, and the night grew black, Eddy once
again retreated into the darkness. Again, there were no casualties.
On Wednesday, November 27, 1776, his majesty's ship Vulture arrived at
Fort Cumberland with a detachment of Royal Marines under the command of
Captain William Pitcairn. The siege of Fort Cumberland was over. At
five in the morning, two days later, a mixed company of 160 Fencibles
and Royal Marines descended on the patriot camp and routed the remnants
of Eddy's force. One Fencible was killed in the action and several were
wounded. Partriot losses are harder to determine. A small number of men
were killed and the homes of known rebels were burned. Clarke argues
that the troops, and the officers commanding them, acted with
considerable restraint. He notes that a conditional pardon was
immediately offered to all but the 'ringleaders'. It was accepted by 100
local patriots, who surrendered at the Fort the next day.
Jonathan Eddy, Richard Allen and some of their allies left Cumberland
for New England. Eddy and his family settled first in Maine, then in
Ohio. He received land grants totaling 2,500 acres. John Allan became an
Indian Agent for the Congress.
Scott D. Orr
In <33C6E1...@fox.nstn.ca> HUGH MacDONALD <uis...@fox.nstn.ca>
writes:
>Lately, there has been some discussion of the Canadian Campaign during
>the American Revolution. The focus has been on Quebec. A less well
>known episode in the American Revolution, in Canada, was the siege of
>Fort Cumberland in the, then, provice of Nova Scotia.
>
Wow. That was an intersting, detailed post about something I
personally knew nothing about, and lacking nationalist barbs to
boot. Am I in the right newsgroup? Thanks. :)
Scott Orr