A science of History I
lao...@mx3.redestb.es
What would be then the content of such science of History, we said it
was factible to build in our previous aritcle?
The analysis of human events with the same linguistic precision of
science. Does such precision exists? Can we aply the same terminology
to History?
Let's try. And to that use we will take terms from biology and
complexity, two sciences whose models of study -bodies and temporal
complexity - can be applied to history.
We will then define History as the study of the extended 'body' of
human social evolution, as the study of all the events displaced in
time and space taken place among 'clonic forms of humanity'. As the
history of a body is the study of all the events dispplaced in time
and space among clonic cells of a certain specie.
Here then it appears the first problem: we are inside the body of
History, and so we cannot 'experiment' with it.
But that problem is also proper of astronomical sciences, and
economical sciences, and so it can be overuled.
The next step is to find what regulates and organizes the body of
history. ANd as in the body or any other ecosystem we find that
communicative languages organize both. OF which we can systematically
find in all 'bodies' regardless of its perception as 'particles' or
'waves' a 'codifying system' [i.e.: nervous system], a communicative
system [i.e. endocrine system] and a energizer system [i.e blood
system]. A wave system would be an ant-hill of warriors, drones,
workers and queens. In chemical perception though would be probably a
body-particle. This 'sensorial perception is indifferent. History is a
wave system also. In history the codifying system will be made of
wor[l]ds, ideologies that change and evolve huamn cells into more
extended societies from tribes to nations to the Wor[l]d itself; the
communicative sytem will be made of trade, or o-metal forms, that
catalyzes the production of objects among human 'enzymen' and the
energizer and d=evoluitive system of wars that erase human societies
and impose 'tehbnologial d=evolutio'. And we can talk of d=evolutive
radiations of wars, trade forms and ideologies-religions that d=evolve
socially the body of history towards certain outcome, as the
blood-endocrine-nervous systems evolve the human cells... ANd so the
next step is to find in thed= evolution of those systems, cycles, and
parallel events displpaced in times and space, yet responding to the
similar wave-causes. IF those cycles exist, and I think they do, there
is hence the possibility of a science of history...
[for more about this check: http://www.redestb.es/personal/laosan
Nigel & Nancy Sellars
lao...@mx3.redestb.es wrote:
>
> What would be then the content of such science of History, we said it
> was factible to build in our previous aritcle?
> The analysis of human events with the same linguistic precision of
> science. Does such precision exists? Can we aply the same terminology
> to History?
> Let's try. And to that use we will take terms from biology and
> complexity, two sciences whose models of study -bodies and temporal
> complexity - can be applied to history.
<much snipped>
As a professional historian, I'm not sure that such a science can be
derived, even though that has been the hope of many since von Rahnke
helped create the modern historical profession in the 19th century.
Historians themselves have longed debated if such objectivity and
precision can be achieved, but given the complexity of historical events
and the often unique nature of such events precision becomes highly
unlikely. A major stumbling block is determining motivation. Human
thought is hidden from us and so we must use indirect methods, such as
pyschohistory, to even get a hint of what is going on. Only when a
person writes down precisely what they're up -- unless they're lying ,
of course -- can we determine something of motivation.
As for the use of scientific terminology and jargon and linguistic
approaches, I find they tend to obfuscate and not illuminate.
Postmodernist historians have tried to use "precision", esp. linguistic
theory, and have contributed precious littlee, if anything, to our
understanding. Even cliometrics, the use of mathemtical analysis, can
be incredibly useless. See Fogel and Engerman's _Time on the Cross_
regarding the economic viability of slavery. Many of their assumptions
look good statistically, but fall apart in the realm of psychological
and sociological perspectives. Labor historian Herbert Gutman total
devastated Fogel and Engerman in a book long critique. Yet Fogel won a
Nobel prize in economic for this research (for his research on railroads
versus canals), which was often counterfactual. For a discussion of the
linguistic approach, read Bryan Palmer's _Descent into Discourse_ or E.
P. Thompson's _The Poverty of Theory_. To be sure, both men are leftist
historians (as am I) working in a theoretical framework, but we
countenance facts above all else, even our ideological biases. To
paraphrase Palmer, language and statistics are not life.
What can achieve is precision, of a sort, in specific events through the
use of archaeological evidence, documents, etc. And that's all an
historian can use. As Will and Ariel Durant once wrote, "History is
mostly guesswork. The rest is prejudice."
Nigel Sellars
William L Pratt
Nigel & Nancy Sellars wrote:
> lao...@mx3.redestb.es wrote:
> > What would be then the content of such science of History, we said it
> > was factible to build in our previous aritcle?
<snip>
Acording to the hypothetico-deductive model put forward by Karl Popper
(1959, _The logic of scientific discovery_, Hutchinson, London; 1972,
_Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach_, Clarendon Press,
Oxford), "science" should probably regarded as a verb. That is, it is a
perspective which we apply to the testing of knowledge. According to
the Popperian paradigm, which is widely (by no means universally)
accepted in the sciences, science is a process which operates by the
proposal and testing of hypotheses. That is, one erects an hypothesis
which makes certain factual predictions (the deductive part of the
process) which will be true if the hypothesis is true. Note, I did not
say if, and only if: such certainty is possible only within a set of
postulates, themselves stipulated. Thus proof is possible within a set
of mathematical or logical postulates, but there is no contraint that
the postulates themselves have any connection to objective reality.
An hypothesis is erected. We then proceed to test the predictions which
it makes. If they are found to be false, then the hypothesis is
disproven and can be rejected. It does not follow, however, that the
converse is true. If the hypothesis survives testing, it is not proven
true, because there may be other, unsuspected factors which are actually
responsible for the factual findings. How than can we scientifically
prove the truth of a proposition? We can't. An hypothesis can never be
proven, only disproven. When an hypothesis survives repeated tests, our
confidence in it increases, but it is never actually immune to disproof.
This model is actually applied in an auxiliary discipline of history,
genealogy. There we propose an hypothesis of relationship, based upon
some preliminary findings. It follows from this hypothesis that certain
records should be found which make statements in agreement with the
hypothesis. We are searching for the parents of an individual. We find
a will in the appropriate county in which a man mentions his wife and a
son bearing the same name as our subject, at a time which would fit. We
then have an hypothesis of relationship between our subject, the
testator and the wife mentioned by the testator. This may be tested,
e.g. by locating the subject's death certificate, if the time period is
right. If in this certificate we find that the informant, the subject's
wife of fifty years, states his parents to have been entirely different,
we have a weak disproof of the hypothesis. Weak because the death
certificate evidence is secondary, offered long after the event by
someone who wasn't there, although in this case by someone who is likely
to have known. If we find additional records supporting this second
parentage, then the hypothesis may be considered disproven and is
replaced by a second hypothesis that the subject's parents were those
given on the birth certicate. Like the first, this hypothesis can never
be proven, but is subject to disproof.
To the extent that mainline historic research operates like this example
from an auxiliary field, the claim can be made that it is a science
folowing the hypothetico-deductive model, or in short-hand, that it is a
Popperian science. Whether anyone would wish to do so is another
question.
Will
--
Dr. William L. Pratt, Curator of Invertebrates
Marjorie Barrick Museum of Natural History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas Box 4012
Las Vegas, NV 89154-4012
(702)895-1403, fax (702)895-3094 e-mail pra...@nevada.edu
Joseph C Wang
In article <64scoh$grv$1...@shell3.ba.best.com>,
Nigel & Nancy Sellars <nsel...@telepath.com> wrote:
>As a professional historian, I'm not sure that such a science can be
>derived, even though that has been the hope of many since von Rahnke
>helped create the modern historical profession in the 19th century.
As a professional astrophysicist, I tend to agree. I see a lot of
what seems to be "cargo cult science" in the social sciences. Social
scientists seem to want to "look like the natural sciences" and so
tend to add equations and obscure terminology solely for the sake of
looking and sounding like what they think the natural sciences look
like. Ironically, this is very little to do with what the natural
sciences actually are really like. Physicists tend to dislike using
equations and jargon when not necessary, and are aware of the
limitations of using equations to describe complex systems in a way
that people in the social sciences don't seem to be.
It would be horrible if this "physics envy" were extended to history.
>As for the use of scientific terminology and jargon and linguistic
>approaches, I find they tend to obfuscate and not illuminate.
I tend to agree.
>Postmodernist historians have tried to use "precision", esp. linguistic
>theory, and have contributed precious littlee, if anything, to our
>understanding.
Actually, I've found postmodernist thinking to be quite insightful
sometimes. The trouble with postmodernist literature is that they
seem to have a need to be deliberately confusing which sometimes
obscures the insights that it brings. As to why post-modernists are
so obscure my guess is as follows.....
Much of post-modernist thinking is influenced by critical thinking and
deconstructionism. The notion behind these two ideologies is that
there are unequal power relationships which should be equalized. Many
of those power relationships are expressed through symbols and
constructions with a certain meaning. If you make non-sense of those
symbols and constructions then you tend to equalize power. For
example, right now people who understand English have more power in
this conversation. However, if you start talking nonsense then the
power relationships are fdskfjdsklf dsfkjdskjfv dfjsahkdscxur.......
The trouble with this ideology is that it encourages people to talk in
gdis ofdsana kdshn dkjaskfj. Because too do otherwise would support
the power structures which the post-modernists intend to subvert.
>What can achieve is precision, of a sort, in specific events through the
>use of archaeological evidence, documents, etc. And that's all an
>historian can use. As Will and Ariel Durant once wrote, "History is
>mostly guesswork. The rest is prejudice."
One of the interesting insights of post-modernist thinking is the
notion that a large part of history is "constructed." One then can
analyze how and why history is constructed in different ways, and then
can get a great deal of insight into things. For example, using this
perspective, you can figure out why people have flame wars over
certain topics.
--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Wang Globewide Network Academy
j...@mit.edu FREE Distance Education catalog database
http://www.gnacademy.org Thousands of Courses and Programs
Todd Michel McComb
In article <64tj68$eff$1...@shell3.ba.best.com>,
Joseph C Wang <j...@athena.mit.edu> wrote:
>As a professional astrophysicist, I tend to agree. I see a lot
>of what seems to be "cargo cult science" in the social sciences.
>Social scientists seem to want to "look like the natural sciences"
>and so tend to add equations and obscure terminology solely for
>the sake of looking and sounding like what they think the natural
>sciences look like. Ironically, this is very little to do with
>what the natural sciences actually are really like. Physicists
>tend to dislike using equations and jargon when not necessary, and
>are aware of the limitations of using equations to describe complex
>systems in a way that people in the social sciences don't seem to
>be. It would be horrible if this "physics envy" were extended to
>history.
As someone in the somewhat peculiar position of having worked
professionally in both physics & history, I couldn't agree more.
Physics has adopted some of its techniques & jargon for specific
reasons, and often reluctantly. That history sometimes seeks to
do likewise for no reason other than affectation is a sad commentary
on our times, IMO.
Perhaps the alternate explanation is that, although spinning a
narrative and making things REAL to people is a crucial part of
history, people today have been so conditioned that they only grant
credibility to jargon and grand theories. Hence the "modern
historian" (and the beast portrayed here is rather hypothetical)
is creating a narrative of some sort, one to which his audience
can more easily relate in a perverse sort of way.
I believe the latter is the main operative criteria for an endeavor
of this sort. The problem is that it is too seldom wholly educational,
but merely impressive.
Todd McComb
mcc...@best.com
Joseph C Wang
In article <prattw-1811...@cpsidfw.flash.net>,
William L Pratt <pra...@nevada.edu> wrote:
|>To the extent that mainline historic research operates like this example
|>from an auxiliary field, the claim can be made that it is a science
|>folowing the hypothetico-deductive model, or in short-hand, that it is a
|>Popperian science. Whether anyone would wish to do so is another
|>question.
Certainly some areas of history are subject to hypothesis and
deduction, but in other areas, the practice of history is more akin to
writing literature than it is to the natural sciences.
tomb...@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu
In article <64tj68$eff$1...@shell3.ba.best.com> j...@athena.mit.edu (Joseph C
Wang) writes:
>As a professional astrophysicist, I tend to agree. I see a lot of
>what seems to be "cargo cult science" in the social sciences. Social
>scientists seem to want to "look like the natural sciences" and so
>tend to add equations and obscure terminology solely for the sake of
>looking and sounding like what they think the natural sciences look
>like.
This is a rather empty criticism, devoid of evidence. Social science,
when done well, looks like any other science done well. It follows
the hypothetic-deductive model. Many social scientists devise
experiments using these forms of logic. When the experimental
method is not possible, they use the same logic employing
statistical controls rather than actual controls.
I'm not sure I understand why you would object to anyone expressing
their ideas in equations. Mathematics is simply another language
one can employ to communicate. It's better for some purposes than
others, certainly, but to condemn its use altogether strikes me
as ridiculous.
And if terminology is obscure to you, it's probably because
you aren't familiar with the literature. Articles in professional
journals are written for people with some background in the
discipline, and often in the subspecialty as well. New ideas
often require new words to express them.
>Physicists tend to dislike using
>equations and jargon when not necessary, and are aware of the
>limitations of using equations to describe complex systems in a way
>that people in the social sciences don't seem to be.
This is a rather sweeping conclusion. You are saying that physicists
do science well, and social scientists do it poorly. I go by the
rule of thumb that says 90% of everything is garbage.
When social scientists use simplifying equations--the good social
scientists--they know full well that they are doing so, and it
is purposeful. The social world is far too messy to be able to
develop controlled experiments.
When we make simplifying assumptions, we are *not* describing
complex systems--we are describing models that we then use
as tools to analyze reality. Anyone who confuses neoclassical
economic models with reality is a fool. But anyone who thinks
that those models are of no use at all in understanding reality
is just as big a fool.
Donald Phillipson
Joseph C Wang <j...@athena.mit.edu> wrote:
>> . . . I see a lot
>>of what seems to be "cargo cult science" in the social sciences.
>>Social scientists seem to want to "look like the natural sciences"
>>and so tend to add equations and obscure terminology solely for
>>the sake of looking and sounding like what they think the natural
>>sciences look like. Ironically, this is very little to do with
>>what the natural sciences actually are really like. . . .
mcc...@medieval.org (Todd Michel McComb) wrote Nov. 18:
>As someone in the somewhat peculiar position of having worked
>professionally in both physics & history, I couldn't agree more.
>Physics has adopted some of its techniques & jargon for specific
>reasons, and often reluctantly. That history sometimes seeks to do
>likewise for no reason other than affectation is a sad commentary on
>our times, IMO.
"For no reason other than affectation" is not good enough. The main
general drive was Newtonian universalism, and the specific occasion
was late 19th century educational reform, influenced by a new
appreciation of the quality of American universities. (This is not
original, cf. Joseph Ben-David's book The Scientist's Role in Society)
"Newtonian universalism" identifies ideas associated with 18th century
interpretations of Newtonian physics, chiefly that he had successfully
created a comprehensive "theory of everything" and indicated "the
single correct scientific method" to develop any branch of scientific
knowledge. This method was mechanistic so far as it derived from
Newton's mechanistic physics (considering objects like planets as
point-sources of mass and momentum, expecting single causes of single
effects etc.)
Generalized faith in this method invited anyone to create new sciences by
simply applying "scientific method" to a new topic. Thus botany turned
from the descriptive inventory of the natural world into an experimental
science (genetics etc.) and wholly new sciences were devised (e.g.
sociology, psychology, economics) by applying mechanistic methods,
experimental where possible, to topics of public business.
In the 19th century, the other far-reaching influence was the German
university, which for its own reasons (shortage of faculty posts and
competition for those posts) created new incentives for making "the
advance of knowledge" a career qualification rather than an optional
extra.
When Newton was alive, average men of learning supposed knowledge was
advanced mainly by men of genius, whose appearance could not be
forecast or their existence planned on an industrial scale. By 1875
this had reversed. Lifelong research became (first at German
universities) the prerequisite for an academic career; correlatively,
German universities first offered systematic training research in
research, crowned with certification (the PhD) which became adopted as
the international credential for any academic posts anywhere. German
graduate schools grew fast because the "information explosion" of the
Victorian era was ripe for the rapid discovery of new chemistry and
geology, both pure and applied, but success in science was naturally
emulated by all the other departments in German universities.
So when new universities were founded (e.g. Johns Hopkins c. 1880,
Chicago 1900) or old ones reformed (Yale 1860s, Oxford and Cambridge
1870 ff and 1905 ff) two new phenomena emerged: (1) the sciences
gained in status at the cost of the classic curriculum; and (2)
research gradually became the career norm for all academics, rather
than a personal option for the minority with a taste or gift for it.
Another aspect of reform was the conversion of recognized activities
and bodies of information, e.g. history and geography, into academic
disciplines. What "academicized" them was the application of
"scientific method" traceable more or less directly back to Newtonian
mechanism. Another manifestation was the foundation of psychology,
sociology, and other brand-new disciplines, as previously mentioned.
Another was the legitimation of scientific methods to ancient
disciplines e.g. philology and theology (cf. Middle East archaeology.)
In all these manifestations, the public badge of modernity was the PhD
i.e. the German professional degree. Americans adopted this early
(say 1870) and the British rather late (formally not until 1920,
because of the different social functions and social organization of
Oxford and Cambridge, their "flagship" institutions.)
By 1900 any avowedly modern university made the PhD its threshhold for
faculty membership in any discipline, e.g. history or English
literature no less than chemistry or economics. In detail, this was
always mediated by local traditions. Canadian universities
demonstrate this in an interesting way, because they were of such
varied types (cf. Robin Harris's history.) By 1900 there were
Canadian universities modeled on:
-- French Catholic religious colleges
-- Scottish civic universities
-- Oxford and Cambridge
-- American state universities for regional development
-- Professional schools for engineers, doctors, lawyers etc.
Whether pooling experience or trying to make sense of "Canadian higher
education," the new German/American institution of the PhD was
uniquely useful. If you hired accredited PhDs you were immune from
charges of nepotism, low standards, being old-fashioned etc.
Another reinforcing influence was that anyone could see by 1900 the
huge scientific and technical achievements of "research" e.g. the
electric light, germ theory of disease, gasoline engine, synthetic
chemicals, and so on. This had been rewarded (everywhere except at
Oxford and Cambridge!) by relatively generous endowment of research in
the natural sciences. Envy and enthusiasm combined so that reformers
of old disciplines like literature and founders of new ones like
sociology could agree that, if only they were allowed similar
resources, using similar methods would produce similar results, with
similar social and economic "spin-off."
This transformed disciplines like history and theology. Professors
were no longer to embody personal wisdom and personal knowledge: they
were instead to become volcanoes of information, shoving it out into
the disciplinary world as fast as it could be generated. Naturally
some people were skeptical about this, cf. William James's criticism
of "the PhD octopus," but the general change did in fact take place,
i.e. disciplines from languages to theology remodeled themselves to
emulate the successful prototype of mid-Victorian chemistry.
This entailed several amusing paradoxes. As I have previously
written, one of these is the survival in the social sciences of the
model of Newtonian mechanism long after 1905-1915 when the natural
sciences recognized its limits and began to incorporate relativistic
ideas into the inmost philosophy of knowledge. The natural sciences
have galloped ahead in the 20th century, most obviously in biology
since 1953, when mechanistic philosophy was initially applied, soon
found inadequate, and rapidly replaced (where appropriate, we hope) by
non-linear concepts.
Two of the greatest social science schools built on mechanistic
foundations were Marxism and Freudianism. Both seem to be crumbling
now, as unworkable, but they lasted a century because they seemed
to offer researchers in mental or social disciplines the shelter and
the drive natural scientists gained from Newton and Einstein.
The familiar ideology of modernism in knowledge is: "If it is
scientific, it must be OK." Early dissidents failed to sustain the
argument that some domains of knowledge were essentially
non-scientific. Current dissidents point out "scientific" is by no
means a single coherent thing, so there is room for much more variety
than Newtonian assumptions allow.
--
| Donald Phillipson, 4180 Boundary Road, Carlsbad Springs, |
| Ontario, Canada, K0A 1K0, tel. 613 822 0734 |
Daniel Hugh Nexon
In article <tombrown-211...@ipm8-232.flash.net>,
tomb...@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu <tomb...@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu> wrote:
>In article <64tj68$eff$1...@shell3.ba.best.com> j...@athena.mit.edu (Joseph C
>Wang) writes:
>
>>As a professional astrophysicist, I tend to agree. I see a lot of
>>what seems to be "cargo cult science" in the social sciences. Social
>>scientists seem to want to "look like the natural sciences" and so
>>tend to add equations and obscure terminology solely for the sake of
>>looking and sounding like what they think the natural sciences look
>>like.
>
>This is a rather empty criticism, devoid of evidence. Social science,
>when done well, looks like any other science done well. It follows
>the hypothetic-deductive model. Many social scientists devise
>experiments using these forms of logic. When the experimental
>method is not possible, they use the same logic employing
>statistical controls rather than actual controls.
I would dispute both the contention that many social sciences *actually*
follow the H-D method (sure, they think they do) and that the H-D method
is the "proper" way of doing science. To put it another way, do you
really think Humean causality is still viable, and that statistical
methods really establish causality? I submit, following the critical
realists, that repeating conjuctions are neither necessary nor sufficient
for causality.
Moreover, the closed/open distinction here is important. Social scientists
deal with open systems, which makes attempts at statistical control illusary.
But, hey, I think King, Keohane and Verba is the worst thing to happen
to social science, so I'm ready to get beaten up ;)
>I'm not sure I understand why you would object to anyone expressing
>their ideas in equations. Mathematics is simply another language
>one can employ to communicate. It's better for some purposes than
>others, certainly, but to condemn its use altogether strikes me
>as ridiculous.
This makes sense to me; but I do wonder if mathematical language sometimes
obscures more than it shows (I've seem mathematical equations for alliance
behavior that were completely superfluous). They also, IMO, tend to create
an illusion of rigor or completion where it may not exist; but I recognize
that's simply a preference.
>When social scientists use simplifying equations--the good social
>scientists--they know full well that they are doing so, and it
>is purposeful. The social world is far too messy to be able to
>develop controlled experiments.
Exactly; doesn't that call into question the point of *trying*?
Regards, Dan | Columbia Political Science | www.columbia.edu/~dhn2
"Surely here is an opportunity to get rid of that great stick of a
character _Homo economicus_ and to replace him with someone real, like
Madame Bovary." -Donald McCloskey, _The Rhetoric of Economics_
Todd Michel McComb
In article <6584du$j...@gazette.bcm.tmc.edu>,
Donald Phillipson <ad...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA> wrote:
>"For no reason other than affectation" is not good enough. The
>main general drive was Newtonian universalism, and the specific
>occasion was late 19th century educational reform, influenced by
>a new appreciation of the quality of American universities.
...
>The familiar ideology of modernism in knowledge is: "If it is
>scientific, it must be OK." Early dissidents failed to sustain
>the argument that some domains of knowledge were essentially
>non-scientific. Current dissidents point out "scientific" is by
>no means a single coherent thing, so there is room for much more
>variety than Newtonian assumptions allow.
The explicit relationship between academic certification in all
disciplines and the transformation of universities in the wake of
major scientific advances is well worth making. Also, the fact
that some humanistic institutions felt a need to compete with
science for funding is important to note. However, while your
chronicle was essentially factual, I sense an air of fatalistic
necessity about it when applied to this thread (as I recall, you
wrote most of it for another long ago).
For one thing, competing with science by becoming more science-like
is a flawed idea. I do not dispute that such thoughts have occurred,
although I do question any explicit dominance, but that doesn't
make them any less misguided. Perhaps it is a philosophical issue
not worth mentioning, but one can hardly compete by adopting the
nature of something else. Rather one must intensify one's own
nature, as the former leads all-too-often to permanent subservience.
We are talking about intellectual processes, not tanks and missiles.
In short I find your last sentence quite defeatist, and do not
agree that one must adopt a scientific paradigm, whether modified
or otherwise, in order to do history or even in order to be funded
for it. What you say makes that easier, I'm sure, but ease is not
the end-all of scholarship, IMO. History needs its own paradigms
and its own ideas. I tend to believe paradoxically that the current
trend of nonsense-history (various counter-factual assertions put
forward by various political groups, which I don't want to dredge
up here) might just take us there. Certainly we are in an era of
unprecedented clash between "histories" of various sorts intermingled
with each other even within the same neighborhood, and that friction
creates energy, energy which can be harnessed for the discipline
itself. So I have my own sense of optimism.
Todd McComb
mcc...@best.com
Daniel Hugh Nexon
Joseph C Wang <j...@athena.mit.edu> wrote:
>As a professional astrophysicist, I tend to agree. I see a lot of
>what seems to be "cargo cult science" in the social sciences. Social
>scientists seem to want to "look like the natural sciences" and so
>tend to add equations and obscure terminology solely for the sake of
>looking and sounding like what they think the natural sciences look
>like. Ironically, this is very little to do with what the natural
>sciences actually are really like. Physicists tend to dislike using
>equations and jargon when not necessary, and are aware of the
>limitations of using equations to describe complex systems in a way
>that people in the social sciences don't seem to be.
>It would be horrible if this "physics envy" were extended to history.
This (and the rest of the post), IMHO, is incredibly insightful. In political
"science," for example, people who want desperately to earn the label have
latched onto any philosophy of science which seems convenient for the
discipline. We went through Popper and Kuhn (the latter seemed appropriate
because he implied that the wars between behavioralists and traditionalists
didn't have to be fought) and much of the discipline has now settled on
Imre Lakatos without paying much attention to the implications of adopting
a 'platonic' approach to science for the study of politics; i.e. a platonic,
normative theory of science doesn't give you much room to stand on when
attacking critical theory for being "normative." Interestingly, most
political scientsts are closer to certain types of realists in their
epistemological positions (e.g. Hilary Putnam) than Lakatos.....
Wow, that was a lot of jargon. Hope it was coherent.
>Actually, I've found postmodernist thinking to be quite insightful
>sometimes. The trouble with postmodernist literature is that they
>seem to have a need to be deliberately confusing which sometimes
>obscures the insights that it brings. As to why post-modernists are
>so obscure my guess is as follows.....
An additional problem is that postmodernism has always been an empty term,
and has become increasingly obsolete. Postmodernism made sense as a category
when there really were a constellation of people arguing together against
"modernism" or "enlightenment thought." But that category included
post-structuralists, post-marxists, deconstructivists, certain types of
social constructivsts, neo-Habermassians, and a whole host of others who
have since fragmented. For example, your description below captures
Anglo-American deconstructivists quite well, but I'm not sure it applies
to post-positivists who more closely follow the Frankfurt school tradition
of critical theory; nor, for that matter, does it capture Foucauldians
all that well (beyond the point that power relations are critically important
to their analysis). This isn't really a criticism, just a point.
As to "obscurity," some are, and some aren't. We tend to see the worst examples
get popularized, and there is a large-amount of jargon (which isn't a problem
confined to post-modernism at all :), but Hunt and Wickam's _Foucault and
Law_ is a perfectly clear work, as is Cris Weedon's _Feminist Theory and Post-
Structuralism_. Ernesto Laclau's _Emancipation(s)_ is pretty comprehensible,
as is Trevor Barnes' _Logics of Dislocation_ (post-modern economic geography).
Now, someone like Jacques Derrida or Luce Irrigary does destabilize language
for the reasons you suggest (which is why they're a bitch to read), but it
isn't necessary for post-prefixed theory to do that (I borrow the term from
Barnes). Nor is it any worse for the layman, I imagine, than having to push
through some thoroughly modernist academic work--especially once one has
grasped the "code."
>Much of post-modernist thinking is influenced by critical thinking and
>deconstructionism. The notion behind these two ideologies is that
>there are unequal power relationships which should be equalized. Many
>of those power relationships are expressed through symbols and
>constructions with a certain meaning. If you make non-sense of those
>symbols and constructions then you tend to equalize power. For
>example, right now people who understand English have more power in
>this conversation. However, if you start talking nonsense then the
>power relationships are fdskfjdsklf dsfkjdskjfv dfjsahkdscxur.......
>The trouble with this ideology is that it encourages people to talk in
>gdis ofdsana kdshn dkjaskfj. Because too do otherwise would support
>the power structures which the post-modernists intend to subvert.
Some people do believe this; I, for one, find the enterprise pointless.
But that's a pretty good explanation, at least IMHO.
>One of the interesting insights of post-modernist thinking is the
>notion that a large part of history is "constructed." One then can
>analyze how and why history is constructed in different ways, and then
>can get a great deal of insight into things. For example, using this
>perspective, you can figure out why people have flame wars over
>certain topics.
Or why people think that nationalism is primordial (that 'nations' have
always existed). But social constructivism doesn't require an anti-positivist
outlook, either. Many constructivists are firmly in the Enlightenment
tradition.
tomb...@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu
In article <65ch5q$8...@gazette.bcm.tmc.edu> dh...@columbia.edu (Daniel Hugh Nexon) writes:
>
>I would dispute both the contention that many social sciences *actually*
>follow the H-D method (sure, they think they do) and that the H-D method
>is the "proper" way of doing science. To put it another way, do you
>really think Humean causality is still viable, and that statistical
>methods really establish causality? I submit, following the critical
>realists, that repeating conjuctions are neither necessary nor sufficient
>for causality.
There are statistical methods for analyzing reciprocal effects.
Sophisticated social scientists will use them whenever possible,
unless it is logical to rule out reciprocal causation entirely.
When the good social scientists do not use reciprocal effects
models, it is usually because they lack longitudinal data.
>Moreover, the closed/open distinction here is important. Social scientists
>deal with open systems, which makes attempts at statistical control illusary.
That's why we include error terms.
>>When social scientists use simplifying equations--the good social
>>scientists--they know full well that they are doing so, and it
>>is purposeful. The social world is far too messy to be able to
>>develop controlled experiments.
>
>Exactly; doesn't that call into question the point of *trying*?
I explained that. The goal is to construct a tool that will be
useful in expanding understanding. The alternative is to follow
hunches and superstitions.