The Fall of Byzantium and its Consequences
David Read
<dwe...@deltanet.com> writes
>Curt Emanuel <cema...@accs.net> wrote in message
>news:371E96...@accs.net...
>> Dave Welsh wrote:
>
>> (snippage)
>
>> > It strikes me that Dandolo and the leaders of the Crusader army thus
>> > committed one of the most shortsighted and amoral actions ever recorded.
>> > They destroyed an ancient civilization, doomed millions to conquest by
>an
>> > alien religion, and set the stage for centuries of Turkish domination of
>the
>> > Balkans, which left a legacy of religious and racial conflict that had a
>> > good deal to do with the outbreak of the First World War and, as we all
>> > know, is still causing very serious problems today. If the Byzantine
>Empire
>> > had not been destroyed by this evil conspiracy, the world today would be
>> > very different, but the history of the twentieth century might have been
>> > much less bloody.
>>
>> The Byzantine Empire had been in decline for quite some time before the
>> crusaders arrived. Manzikert in 1071 opened up the Anatolian plain to
>> the Turks and it was never recovered (there were no signs that it ever
>> would be). Even Alexius and Manuel weren't able to do much more than
>> prevent further decline - they didn't gain much back, in spite of what
>> Anna says.
>
>They stabilized the frontier in Asia Minor, retaining the fertile and
>economically valuable western part of the peninsula. Central Asia Minor is a
>mountainous plateau that in ancient times was of relatively little economic
>value, although there were prosperous districts along the coast. The actual
>magnitude of the loss to the Byzantine state was not as impressive as it
>looks on a map.
From a military point of view, the Byzantines were left with a much
longer frontier and the loss of their Anatolian heartlands meant that
the manpower required to defend that frontier was never going to be
adequate.
>
>> The Fourth Crusade did damage Byzantium, but I've never seen any
>> evidence that it did more than hasten its fall, if it even did that.
>
>Obviously the Byzantine Empire was going to fall eventually, so how can your
>comment be challenged? But it made a great deal of difference that the
>Empire fell in 1204 rather than in the 1500s or 1600s, as it very well might
>have survived to without this disaster. Saying that the Fourth Crusade
>damaged Byzantium is like saying that Hiroshima was damaged by the atomic
>bomb. The Fourth Crusade did enormous and fatal damage to an empire that was
>in decline, but if left undisturbed, had a lot of life left to it.
On the other hand earlier Crusades and the establishment of the Crusader
kingdoms played their part in diverting Seljuq attention from Byzantine
territory along the Asia Minor littoral and so defended it. That the
West did not play the game in the way that Byzantium wanted it to be
played is hardly surprising. And yet, one might argue, without the re-
conquest of the lands lost in the aftermath of Manzikert, the survival
of the Crusader states of Outremer was always on a knife-edge.
Is there an argument to be made that not only did the sack of
Constantinople in 1204 mean that the Byzantine Empire became permanently
incapable regaining lost lands in the east, but that the creation of the
Latin Empire, Despotates, etc of the Aegean region helped to seal the
fate of the surviving Crusader states of Outremer ?
<rest snipped, and follow ups set to soc.history.medieval.>
cheers,
--
David Read
David C. Pugh
David Read wrote in message ...
(....)
>On the other hand earlier Crusades and the establishment of the Crusader
>kingdoms played their part in diverting Seljuq attention from Byzantine
>territory along the Asia Minor littoral and so defended it.
Which Seljuks? The Great Seljuks never gave a damn about the Crusader
states, and a decreasing damn about Byzantium, while AFAIK the Konyan ones
didn't interact so much with Outremer. Their natural enemies to the
south-east were surely the Artuquids and the Zangids, so if anything one
would expect a common interest with the Franks. But I'm a bit rusty on all
the to-ing and fro-ing on the upper Euphrates.....
(...)
>Is there an argument to be made that not only did the sack of
>Constantinople in 1204 mean that the Byzantine Empire became permanently
>incapable regaining lost lands in the east, but that the creation of the
>Latin Empire, Despotates, etc of the Aegean region helped to seal the
>fate of the surviving Crusader states of Outremer ?
>
I've certainly heard that argument in terms of the Latin Empire attracting
too many adventurers who might otherwise have gone to the East.
David Pugh
David Read
<davi...@online.no> writes
>
>Which Seljuks? The Great Seljuks never gave a damn about the Crusader
>states, and a decreasing damn about Byzantium, while AFAIK the Konyan ones
>didn't interact so much with Outremer. Their natural enemies to the
>south-east were surely the Artuquids and the Zangids, so if anything one
>would expect a common interest with the Franks. But I'm a bit rusty on all
>the to-ing and fro-ing on the upper Euphrates.....
I meant particularly the Sultanate of Rum, whose initial encounter with
the crusaders ended in defeat at Dorylaeum in 1097.
Of the Crusader states, it was the geographical position of the County
of Edessa that posed the biggest threat to the integrity of the Seljuq
territories. Of course, it was that position that also made Edessa the
most vulnerable of all the Crusader states in the 12th century, until it
finally fell to Zengi in 1144.
In 1176, Manuel I was defeated by Kilij Arslan II at Myriokephalon, but
despite the defeat he was still able to negotiate a settlement better
than he could have perhaps hoped for. But, had he achieved his ambition
of the conquest of Konya, Manuel would have established a land
communication between the Byzantine Empire and the Crusader States.
One can only speculate how far the Seljuqs and the rest of the Islamic
world might have buried their differences in the face of a true united
effort made against them by the forces of Byzantium and the western
Europeans.
cheers,
--
David Read
Paul J Gans
>On the other hand earlier Crusades and the establishment of the Crusader
>kingdoms played their part in diverting Seljuq attention from Byzantine
>territory along the Asia Minor littoral and so defended it. That the
>West did not play the game in the way that Byzantium wanted it to be
>played is hardly surprising. And yet, one might argue, without the re-
>conquest of the lands lost in the aftermath of Manzikert, the survival
>of the Crusader states of Outremer was always on a knife-edge.
>Is there an argument to be made that not only did the sack of
>Constantinople in 1204 mean that the Byzantine Empire became permanently
>incapable regaining lost lands in the east, but that the creation of the
>Latin Empire, Despotates, etc of the Aegean region helped to seal the
>fate of the surviving Crusader states of Outremer ?
><rest snipped, and follow ups set to soc.history.medieval.>
I think that Manizkert and 1204 are inextricably tied up
together. I also think David Read right. It is certainly
arguable that, evenutally, the Crusader States were doomed
because of it. But I'm not sure that it was a certainty.
Had the Crusader states "gone native" things might have
worked out differently. But there are a alot of "what if's"
there.
What I think 1204 guaranteed is the Balkanization of the Balkans.
I think that it allowed the Turks into Europe (Byzantium was
almost irrelvent then) and what followed altered European
history in a major way. Had 1204 not happened, I think
it is possible that the Turks might have been held out
of Europe, at least for a hundred years or more.
Lots of what if's here....
----- Paul J. Gans [ga...@panix.com]
CMacvayia
>Had 1204 not happened, I think
>it is possible that the Turks might have been held out
>of Europe, at least for a hundred years or more.
True, although as you state there's a number of "what-ifs"
here -- not the least of which is that the burgeoning Balkan
states of Bulgaria and Serbia might not have made an alliance
with the Turks against their mutual enemy on the side. Nemanja
was prepared to go along if Barbarosa desided to take on
Constantinople during the 3rd Crusade.
When one looks at Byzantine policy, playing one Jack off an Ace
of Spades and so forth, one has the feeling of staring at a juggler
and wondering how much longer he can keep it up. Yet Byzantium
had renewed itself time and time again...
Then there's Tsar Kalojan in Bulgaria, definitely one of the most
eminent leaders of the age. Controlling the Balkans from Belgrade
to Thrace, might he have not finally succeeded in the obsession of
taking the enormous head on that shrivelled body once and for all?
A diverting speculation, at any rate!
Here's something to tie it back to reality, though. To what extent
was Manuel Comnenus responsible? Manzikert was indeed his tomb,
though the Sultan of Iconium, in a passage that always stood out to
me from Vasiliev, is recalled as saying words to the effect of "Every
time I act rude to Manuel, he showers more and more gifts upon me."
By purchasing unreliable enemies right at his doorstep (rather than
the Cumans or some other group of fierce warriors but somewhat
removed from immediate concern as they had in the past), to what
extent was his attempt to strike his enemies in awe responsible
for whetting their appetites? I see a carrot, but never a stick. I
dare say all the gold gone into bribing local barbarian warlords
could have gone to fielding an army.
I frequently read of his "courtship of the West", though I don't
know about what could be called "the Open Door Theory". I have
the feeling that if Manuel hadn't authored the famous letter calling
for support against Muslim incursions, the West would have kicked
it down anyway. Manuel seems quite a bad leader -- until one reads
of his successors.
Cheers,
--
Cali Ruchala
The DoGHouse Invisible Zine Empire
100 E Walton #31H, Chicago, IL 60611
E-mail: cmac...@aol.com
-----
Paul J Gans
Exactly. Which is why I wonder what might have happened
if the Crusader States had persisted in their tendency
to go "native". United by marriage to their neighbors
they might have been perceived as just another of the
many states in the area. But it's a great what if...
David C. Pugh
David Read wrote in message
> I meant particularly the Sultanate of Rum, whose initial encounter with
>the crusaders ended in defeat at Dorylaeum in 1097.
Ah, I was thinking more of the subsequent century, in which Rum's enmity was
towards DiyarBakr and Mosul.
> Of the Crusader states, it was the geographical position of the County
>of Edessa that posed the biggest threat to the integrity of the Seljuq
>territories.
Hardly a threat to the integrity of the territories of the Seljuks of Rum -
that Konya and Isfahan were both dynastically Seljuk had no practical
importance. Edessa was indeed in a strategic location - at the intersection
of Little Armenia, Rum, Antioch, Aleppo, Mosul and the upper Tigris. Between
all the players, rather than a salient......
> In 1176, Manuel I was defeated by Kilij Arslan II at Myriokephalon, but
>despite the defeat he was still able to negotiate a settlement better
>than he could have perhaps hoped for. But, had he achieved his ambition
>of the conquest of Konya, Manuel would have established a land
>communication between the Byzantine Empire and the Crusader States.
>
John II established such a land bridge, briefly, through Cilicia. He seemed
content to extract oaths of fealty - it was surely too far for direct rule.
>One can only speculate how far the Seljuqs and the rest of the Islamic
>world might have buried their differences in the face of a true united
>effort made against them by the forces of Byzantium and the western
>Europeans.
Like the way Western Europe was united in the face of Suleyman the
Magnificent, I expect... :-)
David Pugh
David C. Pugh
CMacvayia wrote in message
>Here's something to tie it back to reality, though. To what extent
>was Manuel Comnenus responsible? Manzikert was indeed his tomb,
I beg your pardon?
I have
>the feeling that if Manuel hadn't authored the famous letter calling
>for support against Muslim incursions, the West would have kicked
>it down anyway.
I beg your pardon again? Sounds as if you have Alexius in mind.
David
CMacvayia
>>was Manuel Comnenus responsible? Manzikert was indeed his tomb,
>I beg your pardon?
I perhaps should beg yours. You see, a statement such as "I beg your
pardon?" leaves very little to build from, so I'll have to guess as to
what the hell you're talking about. :-)
I was speaking in the figurative sense, not the literal. Manuel
Comnenus was well known for his pro-Western policy and, to
here contemporaries and near-contemporaries such as the brothers
Choniates describe it, reviled for it. Manzikert was the point at
which Byzantine emperors seemed to give up hope of a rebound
in the East, and look increasingly towards the west for assistance.
>I have
>>the feeling that if Manuel hadn't authored the famous letter calling
>>for support against Muslim incursions, the West would have kicked
>>it down anyway.
>I beg your pardon again? Sounds as if you have Alexius in mind.
Actually, I do -- apologies for the slip. Yet, was that miniscule
sentence after "I beg your pardon again?" so difficult to compose? ;-)
David C. Pugh
CMacvayia wrote in message
>
>I was speaking in the figurative sense, not the literal.
It still seems odd to have an event in 1071 described, even figuratively, as
the "tomb" of an emperor who wasn't born until 1118.
Manuel
>Comnenus was well known for his pro-Western policy and, to
>here contemporaries and near-contemporaries such as the brothers
>Choniates describe it, reviled for it. Manzikert was the point at
>which Byzantine emperors seemed to give up hope of a rebound
>in the East, and look increasingly towards the west for assistance.
If they'd given up hope, why ask the West for assistance? Alexius, John and
Manuel definitely had not given up. The death of Byzantine hopes of the
eastwards revanche is more surely marked by Myriocephalon.
>>I beg your pardon again? Sounds as if you have Alexius in mind.
>
>Actually, I do -- apologies for the slip. Yet, was that miniscule
>sentence after "I beg your pardon again?" so difficult to compose? ;-)
No, because I had some idea of what might have gone wrong with your point.
I have no idea what you meant by Manzikert being Manuel's tomb, and I still
haven't. You would have preferred some wild speculation, maybe? I could
oblige if I put my mind to it :-)
David
David Read
<davi...@online.no> writes
>
>Hardly a threat to the integrity of the territories of the Seljuks of Rum -
>that Konya and Isfahan were both dynastically Seljuk had no practical
>importance. Edessa was indeed in a strategic location - at the intersection
>of Little Armenia, Rum, Antioch, Aleppo, Mosul and the upper Tigris. Between
>all the players, rather than a salient......
Well, I did not say a threat merely to the integrity of the territories
of the Seljuqs of Rum, but of all Seljuq lands; that is, a geographic
integrity rather than a political one. However, I take your point about
the relationship between Rum, Konya and Isfahan being of no practical
importance. While the Christian powers were unable or unwilling to unite
in common cause or strategy, the disunity amongst the Seljuqs
themselves, as well as between them and other Islamic nations was not a
potentially fatal problem for the cause of Islam in the region.
You may well be right, that had the Christians made an effective common
cause, then the Islamic states might have failed to have risen to the
challenge, much as Western Europe failed to do against Suleiman the
Magnificent.
>
>John II established such a land bridge, briefly, through Cilicia. He seemed
>content to extract oaths of fealty - it was surely too far for direct rule.
Well, perhaps John II did rather more than that - but he came as an
Emperor intent on regaining Byzantine lands and cities from Armenian and
Western princes, as well as from the Seljuqs.
Isn't one key difference between the foreign policies of John II and
Manuel I, that Manuel was more keen to win the trust of the westerners,
rather than to blatantly re-impose Byzantine suzerainty ? And, if that
was the case, then had Manuel's expedition of 1176 met with the same
sort of military successes as John's campaigns had achieved some forty
odd years earlier, then Manuel's own brand of diplomacy stood a better
chance of winning more co-operation from the West, particularly from the
Crusader states themselves ?
cheers,
--
David Read
Melancthon
in the east, since Turkish losses at the battle were also quite
high, and the same year saw major engagements in the Meander
valley in which the Turks were heavily defeated.
It was only after the death of Manuel, and the short lived reign
of his son under a regency which lead to almost total collapse. The
situation worstened under Andronicos II (1183-1185?) with his wild
reforms and brutal suppressions which broke the will of the Byzantine
people. This was followed the rule of a courtier-emperor, Isaac II,
who's lack of interest in the political and financial affairs of the empire
lead to it's dissolution. Serbia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Trebizond and parts of
the Peleponesus seceded from the empire, due to the lack of central
authority and vision.
Crusader rule of the Constantinople (1204-1261) so devasted the
empire to the extent that a true revival in the east was only a dream.
They looked to the Mongols, not to the west, for help in any plans
to rebuild Byzantine power in Anatolia.
Brant Gibbard
>I was speaking in the figurative sense, not the literal. Manuel
>Comnenus was well known for his pro-Western policy and, to
>here contemporaries and near-contemporaries such as the brothers
>Choniates describe it, reviled for it. Manzikert was the point at
>which Byzantine emperors seemed to give up hope of a rebound
>in the East, and look increasingly towards the west for assistance.
Are you sure you don't mean Myriokephalon rather than Manzikert?
Brant Gibbard
bgib...@inforamp.net
Toronto, Ont.
CMacvayia
>It still seems odd to have an event in 1071 described, even figuratively, as
>the "tomb" of an emperor who wasn't born until 1118.
So Manzikert in no way could be seen as the figurative tomb of
Manuel's policy of appeasement of the Eastern interlopers? I note
that Manuel was still active in the Balkans at the time, attempting
to secure the support of one Serbian dynasty over another and backing
it up with troops when necessary. I can't see how all of "historic
Serbia" could be more important, strategically, then firm possession
of Asia Minor, or worth dividing strength from one frontier to the other.
Myriocephalon was definitely more crushing, but it seems, from
reading Choniates, that Manzikert took on much more of a "Battle
of Kosovo Polje" characterization (without the defeated soldiers
rising to heaven, that is ;-)). Perhaps you could direct me to
places where Myriocephalon is given the same treatment by
contemporaries. What I've read has mostly been focused on the
Balkans, and thus peripherally on Byzantium.
Cheers,
David C. Pugh
Melancthon wrote in message <37209944...@nospamvideotron.ca>...
>Even Myriocephalon doesn't truely mark the end of hopes
>in the east, since Turkish losses at the battle were also quite
>high, and the same year saw major engagements in the Meander
>valley in which the Turks were heavily defeated.
>
Oh yes, I quite agree. I said that the end of the hopes "was more surely
marked" by Myriokephalon than by Manzikert, but if Manuel had lived he might
well have recovered and tried again. Given that he didn't, Myriocephalon is
pretty well the watershed.
David
David C. Pugh
CMacvayia wrote in message <19990423130552...@ng142.aol.com>...
>>>I was speaking in the figurative sense, not the literal.
>
>>It still seems odd to have an event in 1071 described, even figuratively,
as
>>the "tomb" of an emperor who wasn't born until 1118.
>
>So Manzikert in no way could be seen as the figurative tomb of
>Manuel's policy of appeasement of the Eastern interlopers? I note
>that Manuel was still active in the Balkans at the time,
at the time? OK, I give up....
David C. Pugh
David Read wrote in message ...
(...)
>Well, I did not say a threat merely to the integrity of the territories
>of the Seljuqs of Rum, but of all Seljuq lands; that is, a geographic
>integrity rather than a political one. However, I take your point about
>the relationship between Rum, Konya and Isfahan being of no practical
>importance. While the Christian powers were unable or unwilling to unite
>in common cause or strategy, the disunity amongst the Seljuqs
>themselves, as well as between them and other Islamic nations was not a
>potentially fatal problem for the cause of Islam in the region.
>
Well, contemporary Muslim writers lamented that their own disunity had
allowed the Franks in, but there seems to have been considerable
disagreement over the importance of this. Seen from Isfahan, with its vast
perspectives of Turania and even China, the micropolitics of western Syria
must appear of less than absolute significance....?
(....)
>Well, perhaps John II did rather more than that - but he came as an
>Emperor intent on regaining Byzantine lands and cities from Armenian and
>Western princes, as well as from the Seljuqs.
>
Yes, I think you're right to emphasise the conservatism of his policy. I
read something once about the theoretical Byzantine claims not only to Syria
and Palestine but also Egypt, in fact wherever the writ of a Christian
emperor had ever run. The twelfth was the century in which this faded and
disappeared. Think it was Ralph-Johannes Lilie, "Byzantium and the
Crusader States 1096-1204"
>Isn't one key difference between the foreign policies of John II and
>Manuel I, that Manuel was more keen to win the trust of the westerners,
>rather than to blatantly re-impose Byzantine suzerainty ? And, if that
>was the case, then had Manuel's expedition of 1176 met with the same
>sort of military successes as John's campaigns had achieved some forty
>odd years earlier, then Manuel's own brand of diplomacy stood a better
>chance of winning more co-operation from the West, particularly from the
>Crusader states themselves ?
>
Now that's an interesting what-if. OTOH, I'm not convinced that Manuel's
admiration for the West was entirely reciprocated. I think that your
scenario would also demand that he had a more successful Italian policy?
David
David Read
<davi...@online.no> writes
>
>Well, contemporary Muslim writers lamented that their own disunity had
>allowed the Franks in, but there seems to have been considerable
>disagreement over the importance of this. Seen from Isfahan, with its vast
>perspectives of Turania and even China, the micropolitics of western Syria
>must appear of less than absolute significance....?
Indeed, but what would the attitude of the eastern Seljuqs have been if
the Sultanate of Rum had been reconquered by Byzantium resurgent under
Manuel I ? Perhaps then the micropolitics of western Syria would have
appeared rather more significant.
It's worth quoting Michael Angold at this point - first edition only,
I'm afraid...
The importance of the crusader states in Manuel Comnenus's foreign
policy is amply demonstrated by the closeness of the dynastic contacts.
It was quite unprecedented. Members of the nobility of both Antioch and
Jerusalem could expect a warm and generous welcome at the Byzantine
court. Several served Manuel, Baldwin of Antioch rising to be one of his
trusted commanders. The alliance with the crusader states seemed to
offer Manuel several advantages. It helped to check the Seljuqs of
Anatolia, hemming them in to the south. It added to the emperor's
prestige as protector of the Holy Places, but, above all, it gave the
emperor a window to the West. He could show his benevolence towards
western christendom and hope to turn suspicion into friendship, the
better to tap western strength and energy. Manuel was not being totally
unrealistic, but in the interests of this alliance he committed himself
to projects which upset the balance of Byzantine foreign policy. They
suggested that it was being run more for Byzantium's allies than for
Byzantium itself."
_The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204 - A Political History_ pp189-190
What I am suggesting is that should Manuel have won a significant
victory over the Seljuqs in 1176, his stock would have risen not only
with the westerners present with his army, but with the Crusader states
themselves. The re-establishment of the Empire's eastern borders to
approximately what they had been prior to Manzikert in 1071 would have
provided a shorter and more defensible frontier. It would also have
brought back the old recruiting grounds of central Anatolia, etc back
under Byzantine rule to provide the manpower to help defend that
frontier; and to the south would have been the "friendly" states of
Outremer.
But with the defeat at Myriokephalon, and Manuel's death in 1180, the
last best chance for Byzantine recovery in the 12th century came to an
end. Yet, even though Myriokephalon was a defeat for the Byzantines, it
was not on such a scale that all hope was lost for the re-establishment
of former Byzantine power. Only the events of 1204 finally put paid to
that.
>
>Yes, I think you're right to emphasise the conservatism of his policy. I
>read something once about the theoretical Byzantine claims not only to Syria
>and Palestine but also Egypt, in fact wherever the writ of a Christian
>emperor had ever run. The twelfth was the century in which this faded and
>disappeared. Think it was Ralph-Johannes Lilie, "Byzantium and the
>Crusader States 1096-1204"
Thanks.
>
>Now that's an interesting what-if. OTOH, I'm not convinced that Manuel's
>admiration for the West was entirely reciprocated. I think that your
>scenario would also demand that he had a more successful Italian policy?
>
What it hangs upon, in my view, is a Byzantine conquest of the Sultanate
of Rum. Had that succeeded in 1176, then perhaps the Venetians would
have either made their peace with Manuel, or perhaps they would never
have even got the chance to recover their former pre-eminence in
controlling trade with the Empire.
cheers,
--
David Read
David C. Pugh
David Read wrote in message ...
>Indeed, but what would the attitude of the eastern Seljuqs have been if
>the Sultanate of Rum had been reconquered by Byzantium resurgent under
>Manuel I ? Perhaps then the micropolitics of western Syria would have
>appeared rather more significant.
Granted!
>
>It's worth quoting Michael Angold at this point - first edition only,
>I'm afraid...
>
The one I've got, I'm equally afraid......
(snip quote)
>What I am suggesting is that should Manuel have won a significant
>victory over the Seljuqs in 1176, his stock would have risen not only
>with the westerners present with his army, but with the Crusader states
>themselves.
Dunno, don't you think they'd be alarmed? They weren't too pleased to have a
strong Byzantium as a neighbour, in the days when the emperor fancied
himself a crack at Aleppo...... Did a spot of sabotage, if I remember.
The only good neighbour is a weak one, eh?
The re-establishment of the Empire's eastern borders to
>approximately what they had been prior to Manzikert in 1071 would have
>provided a shorter and more defensible frontier. It would also have
>brought back the old recruiting grounds of central Anatolia, etc back
>under Byzantine rule to provide the manpower to help defend that
>frontier; and to the south would have been the "friendly" states of
>Outremer.
Good thing for Byzantium of course, but see above.
(...)
>What it hangs upon, in my view, is a Byzantine conquest of the Sultanate
>of Rum. Had that succeeded in 1176, then perhaps the Venetians would
>have either made their peace with Manuel, or perhaps they would never
>have even got the chance to recover their former pre-eminence in
>controlling trade with the Empire.
>
To be a devil's advocate, what was wrong with having a nice vassal state at
Konya? I reckon the main point was not to get Anatolia back, but to stop
them thar Turcomans raiding over the border, and if Qilij Arlsan could do
that, fine. Wasn't the idea more of a disciplinary expedition anyway, and
like these things do, it got out of hand.......?
David Pugh
Mark D. Lew
In article <7fo7s2$b...@journal.concentric.net>, "Dave Welsh"
<dwe...@deltanet.com> wrote:
> If Ottoman rule was so benign, then why were their Christian subjects so
> anxious to revolt against it when they had the opportunity?
Well, for a long time they didn't -- and even when they did much of the
population was by no means eager. When the Balkan populations did rise up
it was a result not of oppressive government, but negligent government. By
the beginning of the 18th century, the imperial government had declined to
the point where it could not control the landowners and armies which in
theory were its servants. The Balkan revolts were not directed against
Constantinople, they were directed against local injustices of
out-of-control ayans and janissaries. Indeed sometimes, as with the Serbian
revolt of 1804, the revolutionaries were in fact actively cooperating with
the Ottoman government, which had already granted them the autonomy they
asked for but was unable to implement it.
In a reply to someone else you compare peace in the Balkans under the
Ottomans to the peace imposed on Eastern Europe under Nazi and Soviet rule,
the implication being that national rivalries remained strong but were held
in check by a dominant ideology imposed from above. That comparison is
misguided: One of the most salient characteristics of Ottoman rule is
precisely that it did NOT impose any national ideology on its subject
peoples. Indeed, the way in which Ottoman rule most contributed to the
nationalist squabbling that plagued the Balkans in the 19th century and
continues to this day is that the Ottomans did not engage themselves with
local life and for the most part left its subject people alone.
When the empire lost coherence (which happened several decades before the
borders were officially changed) and the Balkan peoples found themselves
needing to create their own government, there was little to base any unity
on. Far from being a land full of proud national identities waiting to
assert themselves, the Balkans were a land where people in one village had
no contact with people in the next. There was no Serb national identity, no
Greek national identity, no Bulgarian national identity. It was this
ignorance of one's neighbors which made it so easy for people, who in many
cases were closely related, to imagine themselves as hated enemies.
It was the (well-intentioned) effort to bring all these isolated peoples
together that resulted in the invention of the nationalisms which we now
consider to be "ancient". Things like religious rites and bardic poetry
were latched upon as the few uniting cultural themes that existed. Issues
like the battle of Kosovo, the autonomous orthodox churches and linguistic
peculiarities became rallying points for the new nationalism, but should
not be confused for causes. A simple examination of competing and
conflicting ideas of nationalism found in the literature and propaganda of
the 19th century makes this clear.
When one reads of actual history of the pre-Ottoman Balkans (as opposed to
the epic poetry), one is struck not by the grand struggles between empires
of Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks and Turks. Instead one is struck by the
bewildering multiplicity of petty princes fighting among themselves with
little regard to any national identity. Even on the eve of the battle of
Kosovo, allegedly the heyday of the Serbian kingdom, one does not find Serb
nobility united against the menacing Turks. Rather, one finds Lazar
conspiring with Balsic to steal the lands of Altmanovic, then Lazar playing
Balsic and Brankovic off one another, and all of them turning against
Vukasin and Ugljesa leaving their principalities to be absorbed by the
Ottomans 18 years before Kosovo. This is the true lesson of medieval Balkan
history: that in spite of all the talk, it's not about grand national
struggles at all, but simply individual leaders struggling for personal
power, using whatever propaganda is convenient to rally the troops. And so
it is with Milosevic today.
But I digress.
> > Attributing Balkan conflicts of the 19th and 20th century to the Ottoman
> > conquest is dubious,
>
> In other words, the Greek War of Independence (just one example) was not a
> consequence of the Turkish conquest?
That's right. Obviously in a literal sense if no Turks had ever come to
Greece then they wouldn't be there to participate in the war, so you could
call it a consequence of their presence. But with the label "Greek War of
Independence", though perhaps it's not your intention, you're suggesting
the notion of the Greek people arising against Turkish overlords. What the
foreign diplomats (who played such a major role in determining the outcome)
at the time knew well, but seems to be forgotten now, is that the Greek war
in the 1820s was more a civil war than a revolution. The Ottoman army was
engaged mostly in trying to subdue Ali Pasha, with various Greek groups on
either side. The Greek forces did indeed at times unite against the Ottoman
forces, but just as often they turned against one another. The atrocities
that were so widely publicized were truly despicable, but they simply
remind us that war is hell, while telling us nothing about the political
nature of this particular war. The bottom line is that some sort of
independence from the Turks was by then no longer in doubt, and the real
issue was what sort of government would arise in its place.
The rest of the wars of independence in the Balkans are similarly civil
wars. This is what I meant when I said "attributing Balkan conflicts of the
19th century to Ottoman conquest is dubious". Yes, obviously the Turks
were there, but the conflicts were not about the Turks.
> > The Serb nationalist whose bullet triggered the First World War was
> > objecting to Austrian domination, not Turkish.
>
> And if the Turks had not conquered the Balkans, shattering the Serbian
> Kingdom of the time, would Serbia have been dominated by Austria in 1914?
What Serbian kingdom? Stefan Dusan died in 1355 and his kingdom was in
pieces by 1356. The Turks didn't shatter anything. They just moved in and
picked up the pieces one by one.
>
> >And anyway, the
> > assassination of Franz Ferdinand was merely the spark that set off the
> war,
> > not the real cause.
>
> That's like saying that the German invasion of Poland, and the Japanese
> attack on Pearl Harbor, were merely the sparks that set off WWII.
No it's not. There's a big difference. The invasion of Poland was a
significant action of the German government, revealing to other nations
aggressive intentions that they could no longer ignore. The attack on Pearl
Harbor was a direct military act against America, which thitherto was not
particularly eager to join the war.
In contrast, the assassination of Franz Ferdinand was the work of a member
of a small radical group which has been firmly established as not in league
with the Serbian government. Although the violent death of the heir must
have been traumatic for the Habsburg kingdoms, it was not a military action
calling for a military response. In an effort to defuse the tension the
Serbian government in fact capitulated to all the demands made by the
Austrian government, but Austria declared war anyway, with Germany's full
support. Ther great powers were looking for an excuse to begin the war, and
for some of them it was important that war be embarked upon sooner rather
than later.
The events leading up to the First World War have been explored in
exhaustive detail in hundreds of books. The assassination was certainly a
key event, but it was not the first in the series, and it certainly wasn't
the cause of the war.
> I didn't mean to imply that Dandolo and his Crusader allies from the Holy
> Roman Empire & its neighbors were shortsighted because of WWI events. I
> meant that they let the genie out of the bottle, and it had a lot of
> consequences within the next few centuries that they didn't think about:
> 1) the fall of the Latin Empire to the Byzantine exile states,
> 2) the fall of the restored Byzantine Empire (which was reduced to
> impotence in its first 100 years) to the Turks,
> 3) the Turks not stopping with the conquest of the Balkans but continuing
> on into Transylvania, Hungary and Austria,
> 4) concurrently Turkish naval domination of the Eastern Mediterranean with
> very unfavorable impact on the interests of Venice, inter alia,
> 5) finally the great struggle that culminated in the battle of Lepanto.
Lepanto wasn't exactly a culmination, since the Ottoman fleet was
completely rebuilt within about a two years....
> The Byzantine state centered on Constantinople was strategically placed to
> control the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, blocking Turkish
> expansion into Europe. Dandolo & his allies were well aware of the strength
> of the Turks and their enmity toward Latin interests. They were shortsighted
> because they destroyed a stable (if slowly declining) state that was not
> inimical to their interests and controlled these important strategic areas,
> in favor of a Latin feudal tyranny that quickly fell apart. Then their
> really dangerous enemies, the Turks, moved into the vacuum and greatly
> increased their power.
You're right that the fall of Constantinople turned out bad for Venice, and
I'll happily concede that it was an ill-advised decision by the Venetians
who engineered it.
mdl
David Read
<davi...@online.no> writes
>
>Dunno, don't you think they'd be alarmed? They weren't too pleased to have a
>strong Byzantium as a neighbour, in the days when the emperor fancied
>himself a crack at Aleppo...... Did a spot of sabotage, if I remember.
>
>The only good neighbour is a weak one, eh?
Well, I do not envisage the creation of some sort of Pax Byzantica, but
any military successes that might have been enjoyed by Manuel against
the Seljuqs in 1176, would have provided the opportunity for the
Crusader states to regain some of the lands they had recently lost to
the Turks themselves; most notably perhaps, Edessa.
>To be a devil's advocate, what was wrong with having a nice vassal state at
>Konya? I reckon the main point was not to get Anatolia back, but to stop
>them thar Turcomans raiding over the border, and if Qilij Arlsan could do
>that, fine. Wasn't the idea more of a disciplinary expedition anyway, and
>like these things do, it got out of hand.......?
>
Certainly the creation of compliant vassal states of whatever flavour
had rarely proved a problem for Byzantium in the past but, to my mind,
the scale of the expedition, as well as the diplomacy that had gone on
before it, suggests that Manuel was after more than that. The capture of
Konya itself, particularly if the capture had involved a significant
field victory for the Byzantines, would have given Manuel the key to the
rest of Anatolia. Perhaps, in the event of such a victory, Manuel would
have acted with the same strange generosity that Kilidj Arslan II did
after his victory at Myriokephalon, in which case any punitive nature of
his campaign would be confirmed.
However, the presence of large numbers of westerners in his army, as
well some hot-headed members of the Byzantine nobility, might indicate
that Manuel would not have been content to stop at Konya if it had
fallen to him. After all, the Sultan had put out peace feelers *before*
Myriokephalon, but Manuel had been persuaded by the arguments of his
more hawkish commanders to continue with the campaign.
cheers,
David Read
David C. Pugh
David Read wrote in message ...
>Well, I do not envisage the creation of some sort of Pax Byzantica, but
>any military successes that might have been enjoyed by Manuel against
>the Seljuqs in 1176, would have provided the opportunity for the
>Crusader states to regain some of the lands they had recently lost to
>the Turks themselves; most notably perhaps, Edessa.
Sorry, but why? Suppose Manuel smashes the Rumi Seljuks in 1180 instead of
dying. Who's got Edessa at that point? A guy called al-Za’farani, holding on
behalf of 'Izz ad-Din of Mosul. There's another Zangid in Aleppo, although
Aleppo is as usual a mess. Then lots of Artuquids north of Edessa. Damascus,
Homs etc. are held by Saladin, from his Egyptian base. I don't see how a
thumping defeat suffered by Qilij Arslan would affect this constellation to
the point where the Crusader states can break out.
>Certainly the creation of compliant vassal states of whatever flavour
>had rarely proved a problem for Byzantium in the past but, to my mind,
>the scale of the expedition, as well as the diplomacy that had gone on
>before it, suggests that Manuel was after more than that. The capture of
>Konya itself, particularly if the capture had involved a significant
>field victory for the Byzantines, would have given Manuel the key to the
>rest of Anatolia. Perhaps, in the event of such a victory, Manuel would
>have acted with the same strange generosity that Kilidj Arslan II did
>after his victory at Myriokephalon, in which case any punitive nature of
>his campaign would be confirmed.
Fair enough. They were both into co-existence.
>However, the presence of large numbers of westerners in his army, as
>well some hot-headed members of the Byzantine nobility, might indicate
>that Manuel would not have been content to stop at Konya if it had
>fallen to him. After all, the Sultan had put out peace feelers *before*
>Myriokephalon, but Manuel had been persuaded by the arguments of his
>more hawkish commanders to continue with the campaign.
Yup, there is always someone who tries to double his money instead of
banking it. Me, I'm a minimaxer, I'd win one victory then stop. :-)
I wonder if enough is known to chart the different strategies being
advocated at that point?
David
David Read
<davi...@online.no> writes
>Sorry, but why? Suppose Manuel smashes the Rumi Seljuks in 1180 instead of
>dying. Who's got Edessa at that point? A guy called al-Za’farani, holding on
>behalf of 'Izz ad-Din of Mosul. There's another Zangid in Aleppo, although
>Aleppo is as usual a mess. Then lots of Artuquids north of Edessa. Damascus,
>Homs etc. are held by Saladin, from his Egyptian base. I don't see how a
>thumping defeat suffered by Qilij Arslan would affect this constellation to
>the point where the Crusader states can break out.
If one accepts your premise, (which as a hypothetical, is perfectly
valid), I would agree with you - the Crusader states could not have
broken out, or at least in all probability they would have failed in the
attempt. However, had there been such a victory as I hypothesised
originally, whereby Manuel reconquered enough territory from the Seljuqs
so that the Empire's borders once again approximated to what they had
been before Manzikert, it would have been the Byzantines who were in
control of the lands north of Edessa and Aleppo.
Now, I don't really want to go into a profitless and extended discussion
of what-ifs, but we can discuss whether such a strategy by Manuel II had
any chance of success. In other words, was his defeat at Myriokephalon a
foregone conclusion and, if not, did Manuel, his allies and his
subordinates have both the will and the means to exploit any crushing
victory they might have won over Kilidj Arslan to the extent of
achieving a reconquest along the lines that I have outlined above ?
>
>Yup, there is always someone who tries to double his money instead of
>banking it. Me, I'm a minimaxer, I'd win one victory then stop. :-)
>
>I wonder if enough is known to chart the different strategies being
>advocated at that point?
Certainly I do not know. Any volunteers ?
cheers,
--
David Read
David C. Pugh
David Read wrote in message ...
><davi...@online.no> writes
>
>>Sorry, but why? Suppose Manuel smashes the Rumi Seljuks in 1180 instead of
>>dying. Who's got Edessa at that point? A guy called al-Za’farani, holding
on
>>behalf of 'Izz ad-Din of Mosul. There's another Zangid in Aleppo, although
>>Aleppo is as usual a mess. Then lots of Artuquids north of Edessa.
Damascus,
>>Homs etc. are held by Saladin, from his Egyptian base. I don't see how a
>>thumping defeat suffered by Qilij Arslan would affect this constellation
to
>>the point where the Crusader states can break out.
>
>If one accepts your premise, (which as a hypothetical, is perfectly
>valid), I would agree with you - the Crusader states could not have
>broken out, or at least in all probability they would have failed in the
>attempt. However, had there been such a victory as I hypothesised
>originally, whereby Manuel reconquered enough territory from the Seljuqs
>so that the Empire's borders once again approximated to what they had
>been before Manzikert, it would have been the Byzantines who were in
>control of the lands north of Edessa and Aleppo.
Right. If Manuel eliminated the Rumi Seljuks, the Danishmends and perhaps
even the Artuquids, and presumably reduced the Armenians to being his
curopalates, this would reduce the number of players somewhat. We'd have
the Byzantines, the Zangids, the Ayyubids, the Great Seljuks, - who as you
say might be taking more of an interest by now - and the Crusaders. I don't
think it's an entirely foregone conclusion that Antioch and Tripoli would be
on the same side as their, er, co-religionists. If they had any sense,
which at this time they didn't much, I would expect them to back the now
harmless Zangids against the Ayyubids, Great Seljuks and Byzantines. Woudl
they want a biopolar or tripolar world?
>Now, I don't really want to go into a profitless and extended discussion
>of what-ifs, but we can discuss whether such a strategy by Manuel II had
>any chance of success. In other words, was his defeat at Myriokephalon a
>foregone conclusion and, if not, did Manuel, his allies and his
>subordinates have both the will and the means to exploit any crushing
>victory they might have won over Kilidj Arslan to the extent of
>achieving a reconquest along the lines that I have outlined above ?
Blessed if I know, but a crucial factor would surely be whether he had the
spare manpower to resettle the interior and bring it back ito agriculture.
The way this was usually done was settling someone you didn't like much from
the other end of the empire, for instance Bulgarians. John Jimenez was
telling me something about the speed of depopulation, Turkification and
pastoralisation of Anatolia, but I don't remember what..... 8-)
PS: might be off the air until Monday, the sun's come out......
David
John Yohalem
--
John Yohalem
ench...@herodotus.com
The real disaster of the sack of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade was
not that the Eastern Roman Empire never entirely recovered and was conquered
by the Turks -- which was perhaps inevitable -- nor that it led to the
subjection of millions of peoples to alien imperial rulers and religions,
because they already had been and would have been by one alien ruler or
religion if not another. People can be replaced; they're self-replicating.
The death of millions long ago can't hurt us now.
The disaster, which could have been averted and could never be made up, was
the destruction of art and literature in the sack. It was the single
greatest crime against civilization in the history of the continent of
Europe, for when Constantinople fell, its libraries and monasteries were the
only ones left that contained, untouched and often recopied, the complete
classical heritage of the Ancient Greek world. We will never know what had
survived that we don't have now -- 12 volumes of Sappho's poetry existed in
Roman Alexandria, and only one complete poem of hers has come down to us.
Only 33 of the tragedies of the three great tragedians of Athens now
survive -- they wrote dozens more, that were lovingly preserved throughout
classical times (we do possess many commentaries on them). Some scientific,
mathematical and philosophical treatises -- yes, and magical ones -- were
translated by the Moslems and so by a commodious vicus of recirculation
through the Moors of Spain to the Jews and to the dawning Humanists of
Europe -- but the poems and plays did not travel that way. Every other
ancient city had been put to the sack, but Constantinople had not been
destroyed since the siege of Septimius Severus in the early 3rd century. The
loss could never be repaired. We are forever bereft. The Knights of God were
more barbarous than any of the tribes that invaded Rome.
Jean Coeur de Lapin
Paul J Gans
>--
>John Yohalem
>ench...@herodotus.com
>Jean Coeur de Lapin
What you write is very true, but it also points up another
tragedy. Copies of these works were not preserved in Rome
either. The status of much Greek writing in Rome has been
debated here and elsewhere, but it seems clear that what
came down to us came from Rome.
This is, in itself, paradoxical. Westerners had access to
Constantinople for many many years prior to 1204. Yet almost
nothing of its literary riches were brought westward. For
that I think we have to thank the mindset of the westerners
who, I suspect, felt that non-religious material wasn't
serious enough to bother transporting.
My statement is, of course, simplistic. But the fact remains
that there was significant western intercourse with Byzantium
long prior to 1204.
David Read
<davi...@online.no> writes
<snip>
>Blessed if I know, but a crucial factor would surely be whether he had the
>spare manpower to resettle the interior and bring it back ito agriculture.
>The way this was usually done was settling someone you didn't like much from
>the other end of the empire, for instance Bulgarians. John Jimenez was
>telling me something about the speed of depopulation, Turkification and
>pastoralisation of Anatolia, but I don't remember what..... 8-)
That's interesting. I hadn't considered that there might have been some
significant depopulation after Manzikert. Where is John when you need
him... ?
cheers,
--
David Read
leigh.s...@eds.com
David Read <da...@dreadful.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> the surviving Crusader states of Outremer ?
What does Outremer mean?
-----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
David Read
writes
>In article <o$0npFAB9...@dreadful.demon.co.uk>,
> David Read <da...@dreadful.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> the surviving Crusader states of Outremer ?
>
>What does Outremer mean?
Literally, "beyond the sea". That is, the name that the Crusaders
sometimes gave collectively to the states that they founded in the Holy
land and Syria.
Someone should be able to improve upon that definition, perhaps, with
added details.
cheers,
--
David Read
David C. Pugh
leigh.s...@eds.com wrote in message <7fvr5a$ma3$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>...
>In article <o$0npFAB9...@dreadful.demon.co.uk>,
> David Read <da...@dreadful.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> the surviving Crusader states of Outremer ?
>
>What does Outremer mean?
Literally, "Across the sea", it was the French term for the Crusader States
of Syria-Palestine. We use it because it's nice and short.
You might also run into the term Oultrejourdain (with an L in it this time,
don't ask me why), which was the Crusader holdings to the east of the
Jordan.
David
bedo...@my-dejanews.com
"David C. Pugh" <davi...@online.no> wrote:
>
> I wrote in message <7fvr5a$ma3$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>...
> >In article <o$0npFAB9...@dreadful.demon.co.uk>,
>
> >What does Outremer mean?
>
> Literally, "Across the sea", it was the French term for the Crusader States
> of Syria-Palestine. We use it because it's nice and short.
>
> You might also run into the term Oultrejourdain (with an L in it this time,
> don't ask me why), which was the Crusader holdings to the east of the
> Jordan.
>
Falk Swoboda
Hi, (it's about 1204, mostly, not 1453)
On Sun, 25 Apr 1999 bedo...@my-dejanews.com wrote:
> In article <7flo5f$t...@chronicle.concentric.net>,
> "Dave Welsh" <dwe...@deltanet.com> wrote:
> > the world today would be
> > very different, but the history of the twentieth century might have been
> > much less bloody.
>
> The East Roman empire was weak and couldn't defend itself. The empire's elite
> troops were the katathractoi who were no match for Latin knights. The East
> Romans would have survived longer by abandoning their empire and devoting
> their resources to one city state, Constantinople.
Just a short remark: Which resources, then? At the very end, i.e. in the
15th century, the Empire was very much reduced to Constantinople and a few
other places. Look what happened. (And, one might add, a city like Cple.
in 1200 *needed* some provinces: just to keep its citizens fed.)
> ... However, as the successor to the Roman
> empire, they could not let go of their empire.
That is true, indeed.
<snip>
regards,
Falk Swoboda
---
"Therefore I have sailed the seas and come
to the holy city of Byzantium."- W.B.Yeats
bedo...@my-dejanews.com
<Pine.A41.3.96.990426...@studserv.uni-leipzig.de>, Falk
Swoboda <phi9...@studserv.uni-leipzig.de> wrote:
> On Sun, 25 Apr 1999 I wrote:
> > In article <7flo5f$t...@chronicle.concentric.net>,
> > The East
> > Romans would have survived longer by abandoning their empire and devoting
> > their resources to one city state, Constantinople.
>
> Just a short remark: Which resources, then?
>
Their defensive/offensive resources, troops and their supplies.
Constaninople's huge walls/large enclosed area led to the East Romans
surviving so long. I'm surprised they endured until 1453.
Falk Swoboda
Hi,
On Thu, 29 Apr 1999 bedo...@my-dejanews.com wrote:
> In article ... Falk Swoboda <phi9...@studserv.uni-leipzig.de> wrote:
>
> > On Sun, 25 Apr 1999 I wrote:
> > > In article <7flo5f$t...@chronicle.concentric.net>,
> > > The East
> > > Romans would have survived longer by abandoning their empire and devoting
> > > their resources to one city state, Constantinople.
> >
> > Just a short remark: Which resources, then?
> >
> Their defensive/offensive resources, troops and their supplies.
> Constaninople's huge walls/large enclosed area led to the East Romans
> surviving so long. I'm surprised they endured until 1453.
Maybe I was a little bit short. I meant, by abandoning their empire, they
would have no resources left to devote to anything. When the Persians and
Avars et al. besieged Constantinople in 626, supplies were brought into
the city, probably from North Africa (Carthage), the Emperor, at this time
in Asia, could send troops to the city and simultaneously beat a Persian
army, etc. Without the provinces, this would hardly have been possible.
When the Arabs besieged Cple. in the 8th century, a fleet was built and
"Greek fire" was (invented and) produced from resources not available in
the city itself. The significance of Byzantium comes not from only being
there, but from controlling, defending and influencing large areas of the
Eastern Mediterranean. I for one seriously doubt that a mere city-state
would have existed so long, and that it would have been so important. And,
as you said in your earlier message, it would have been an entirely
different thing without being an Empire, or more precisely, the Roman
Empire, but not "Byzantium".
Dave Welsh
Joe Bernstein <j...@sfbooks.com> wrote in message
news:7glr65$4vf$1...@gail.ripco.com...
> Um, what on *earth* is this thread doing in sha? Aside from Jean Couer
> de Lapin's articles on the losses of the literature and the art of
> antiquity, I just don't see the connection. Byzantium was sacked in
> 1204, not 1204-less-seven-hundred-years-because-Byzantium-is-ancient-
> not-mediaeval! So this is cross-posted and followups set. Humph.
(snip)
One of the great historical misconceptions is that there was some kind of
definite boundary between the ancient world and the medieval world and that
we can assign a date to it.
The Byzantine Empire prior to 1204 was a mixture between the ancient world
and the medieval world. Both in its physical and economic structure, there
was a great deal of late antiquity preserved, and tremendous conservatism
about adopting the changes that had occurred in the rest of the world. It is
true that historians talk about the "medieval Byzantine Empire" but in many
important ways life in the Byzantine Empire had not changed greatly since
the founding of Constantinople.
My own view is that the ancient world did not entirely end until 1204. It
shrank during the period between the collapse of the Western Roman Empire
and 1204, and its last bastion was Constantinople.
--
Dave Welsh
dwe...@deltanet.com
Joe Bernstein
de Lapin's articles on the losses of the literature and the art of
antiquity, I just don't see the connection. Byzantium was sacked in
1204, not 1204-less-seven-hundred-years-because-Byzantium-is-ancient-
not-mediaeval! So this is cross-posted and followups set. Humph.
In article <Pine.A41.3.96.990429...@studserv.uni-leipzig.de>,
Falk Swoboda <phi9...@studserv.uni-leipzig.de> wrote:
> Please don't mix the two sacks of Cple. After 1204, *very* little if any
> Greek literature (classic or Byzantine) came to the West. After the
> Turkish conquest in 1453, however, Renaissance thought is flourishing in
> Italy, and many Byzantine nobles escaped there and brought parts of their
> libraries with them. They also instigated a new interest in Greek (as
> opposed to Latin) antiquity and its language; one of the most influential
> Greek grammars printed in the West in the 15th century was written by a
> Byzantine noble, Konstantinos Laskaris, who had come to Italy after the
> fall of Constantinople.
Um, but this happened in the 13th century too. Remember that the
Aristotelian obsession in the Western universities was already in
full swing by then. Among the things which *did* come to the West
in the thirteenth century, and largely as a result of revived interest
in things Greek which was spurred by the Fourth Crusade, were the
works of Aristotle.
Much more important, the Greek *language* came to the schools of
Europe at this time thanks to refugees and such.
I'm not going to pretend this was anything like the 15th-century flood,
but I think it's plausible that that flood could only happen because
the trickle in the 13th century prepared the way. That said, in all
of this I'm really just parroting the relevant sections of Reynolds
and Wilson's <Scholars and Scribes>... this is hardly a field I know
well myself.
> But this isn't ancient history any more.
Indeed.
Joe Bernstein
--
Joe Bernstein, writer and accounting clerk, speaking for myself alone, but
proponent for soc.history.early-modern - ask for it now on your news server!
j...@sfbooks.com if you want to be sure it reaches me
jos...@tezcat.com if you want a quick answer, but this address may die soon.
Raymond Spada
anachronism of the ancient world existing in a medieval milleu.
Why would the so-called Byzantines continue to name themselves and their
state-ROMAN? TO them,Little had changed since the days of
CONSTANTINE and THEODOSIUS I.ROMAN techniques of
GOVERNMENT,LAW,TAXATION,MILITARY ORGANIZATION,URBAN LIFE,and even one
could say a ROMAN Mindset.After all they DID have THE EMPIRE to run.
Their EMPERORS could trace their POLITICAL LINIEAGE right back to
AUGUSTUS CAESAR.The GREEK CLASSICS were the basis of a solid
EDUCATION.To Them, GOD had made the ROMAN EMPIRE ETERNAL.Only the LATIN
west called the Byzantines "GREEKS",EVERYONE ELSE called them ROMANS.
rspada@web tv.net
Mark D. Lew
<dwe...@deltanet.com> wrote:
> One of the great historical misconceptions is that there was some kind of
> definite boundary between the ancient world and the medieval world and that
> we can assign a date to it.
Sure, but I thought the charters for s.h.m and s.h.a picked a date as the
cutoff point. Does anyone know what it is?
Myself, I don't mind some overlap, so long as it isn't too extreme.
mdl
John Yohalem
--
John Yohalem
ench...@herodotus.com
>Joe Bernstein <j...@sfbooks.com> wrote
>> Um, what on *earth* is this thread doing in sha? Aside from Jean Couer
>> de Lapin's articles on the losses of the literature and the art of
>> antiquity, I just don't see the connection. Byzantium was sacked in
>> 1204, not 1204-less-seven-hundred-years-because-Byzantium-is-ancient-
>> not-mediaeval! So this is cross-posted and followups set. Humph.
Thanks, Joe! I try.
>Dave Welsh wrote:
>One of the great historical misconceptions is that there was some kind of
>definite boundary between the ancient world and the medieval world and that
>we can assign a date to it.
>
>The Byzantine Empire prior to 1204 was a mixture between the ancient world
>and the medieval world. Both in its physical and economic structure, there
>was a great deal of late antiquity preserved, and tremendous conservatism
>about adopting the changes that had occurred in the rest of the world. It
is
>true that historians talk about the "medieval Byzantine Empire" but in many
>important ways life in the Byzantine Empire had not changed greatly since
>the founding of Constantinople.
>
>My own view is that the ancient world did not entirely end until 1204. It
>shrank during the period between the collapse of the Western Roman Empire
>and 1204, and its last bastion was Constantinople.
In other words, you're assigning a date to it. Not quite as preposterous as
"476", which was dreamed up by 18th-century historians or, more likely,
Gibbons' publisher, trying to find a way to break the volumes up. But still.
All such breaks are historians' shorthand, with an often dubious connection
to reality.
Yes, a great deal of antiquity was preserved in Constantinople, thank
heavens, and we wouldn't have nearly so much of it if it hadn't been. And a
great deal more was destroyed there in 1204 by greedy Crusaders and
Venetians. (When I saw the treasury in San Marco, I wanted to scream: "You
give those things back to the Comneni, RIGHT NOW!" but somehow I restrained
myself.)
But most of that antiquity was not widely known by the inhabitants of the
city. A small cultured class (not unlike the one that preserved Latin
antiquity in the West) copied and recopied the ancient manuscripts. Not as
many as we wish they had, to be sure....
But did life in the city really remain static? Since Roman times? Think of
the population: they had mingled with dozens of races unheard of before
Justinian. They were as much Slav and Albanian and Armenian and Vlach and
Georgian and Petcheneg and Arab and even Western European and Scandinavian
as they were Greek. They traded in different directions and for different
goods. They built in very different styles, and they certainly painted and
carved and mosaic'd in very different ways from the time of Late Antiquity.
Many ancient forms were maintained, but many others were changed. The ways
of fighting were different -- the Crusaders had had an influence on the
landed ruling classes, turning educated gentry like Alexius into heavy
cavalry with a mystical side but little learning like his grandson, Manuel.
It was a city and a state that was alive in great part because it had proved
so very resilient, so eager to swallow new peoples and new ideas whole. The
situation began to stagnate because Manuel was so very incompetent a ruler,
one who squandered all the prestige and wealth and power his father and
grandfather had built, and his successors were worse, and were never able to
command Manuel's authority. Too, the Venetian free trade extracted from
Alexius during Guiscard's attack was slowly undermining imperial prosperity,
and feudalism and the Turks were undermining the peasant army.
But it was changing. If Dandolo had not attacked them (a choice the
Venetians never regretted) they might have evolved into a new avatar of
Rome, as they had done so often. Capable, perhaps, of persuading an
enlightened pope or two to let them lead a united West against the Mongols
or the Turks -- but if they had not lost Anatolia, perhaps there would never
have been an Ottoman threat to face....
Or, more likely, the Serbs, Bulgars, Russians and Hungarians would have
stabbed them in the back if the French and Venetians hadn't done it first.
Jean Coeur de Lapin
CG Luxford
On Tue, 4 May 1999, Mark D. Lew wrote:
> <dwe...@deltanet.com> wrote:
>
> > One of the great historical misconceptions is that there was some kind of
> > definite boundary between the ancient world and the medieval world and that
> > we can assign a date to it.
>
> cutoff point. Does anyone know what it is?
>
Chris,
John Yohalem
--
John Yohalem
ench...@herodotus.com
CG Luxford wrote in message ...
On the other hand, the last Roman Emperor was Franz II, who abdicated in
1806... (but remained Emperor Franz I of Austria till his death in 1835).
There's a statue of him in Roman armor of the time of Marcus Aurelius in
Graz, in the former Kaiser-platz.
Which is now the Freiheits-platz: Freedom Square.
I thought of Franz's opinion of such a name and cracked up.
Jean Coeur de Lapin
Tom D
probably have been Greek and its people steeped in Greek culture and
Christian Orthodoxy.
The child of Greek immigrant parents, Xristoforos Columbos, (as he
signed his own name, a Greek name) made his way to Greece and found the
old Byzantine maps that showed the lands west of the Ocean Sea.
bedo...@my-dejanews.com wrote in article
<7gamkk$b5i$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>...
> In article
> <Pine.A41.3.96.990426...@studserv.uni-leipzig.de>,
Falk
> Swoboda <phi9...@studserv.uni-leipzig.de> wrote:
>
> > On Sun, 25 Apr 1999 I wrote:
> > > In article <7flo5f$t...@chronicle.concentric.net>,
> > > The East
> > > Romans would have survived longer by abandoning their empire and
devoting
> > > their resources to one city state, Constantinople.
> >
> > Just a short remark: Which resources, then?
> >
>
> Their defensive/offensive resources, troops and their supplies.
> Constaninople's huge walls/large enclosed area led to the East Romans
> surviving so long. I'm surprised they endured until 1453.
>
Mark D. Lew
<ench...@herodotus.com> wrote:
> On the other hand, the last Roman Emperor was Franz II, who abdicated in
> 1806... (but remained Emperor Franz I of Austria till his death in 1835).
Last ruler of the Holy Roman Empire, you mean. Hardly a successor to the
real Roman empire. You may as well say that the last Roman Emperor was
Abdülmecid II, who reigned until 1920.
mdl
Raymond Spada
had it's JANISSARIES-All to protect and fight for the ruler.The
continuity of imperial tradition is remarkable.So one could say that
the SULTANS were the logical,if not legitimate successors of ROME and
BYZANTIUM.
rspada@web tv.net
D. Spencer Hines
Yes, and WASHINGTON has its SPINNERS and HORSEHOLDERS.
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas
--
D. Spencer Hines --- "There was a time when reporters wanted
information, their questions directed to an underlying event...They
might not agree with you in the end, but it was a matter of pride that
they could accurately state your view, before rejecting it...."[Now]
reporters came to the story with the lead fixed in their minds; they
saw their job as proving what they already knew. They didn't want
information so much as evidence of villainy." Michael Crichton,
"Airframe" (1996); Alfred A. Knopf, New York, p. 109.
Raymond Spada <rsp...@webtv.net> wrote in message
news:8985-373...@newsd-232.iap.bryant.webtv.net...
Raymond Spada
live.----Theodor Mommsen 1817-1903.In a nutshell.
rspada@web tv.net