Carolingian army
JohnS426
While I always look forward to obtaining new books on military history, there
is no reason to sit on our thumbs awaiting word from on high. Here are a few of
the references on my shelf already. These deal only with medieval period. I
will post something similar on the Roman army. I have many more references on
it so it will take a while.
Charlemagne - references
Contamine, Philippe. Trans. Michael Jones, War in the Middle Ages, Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 1985.
Has a few pages on Carolingian forces. He notes the multi-ethnic make up of
the army. He lists 1018 references for medieval warfare. He provides citations
from K. F. Werner "Heeresorganization und Friegsfuhrung im deutschen Konigreich
des 10 und 11 Jahrhunderts, im OM, this appeared in Settimane di Studio del
centro Italiano di studi sull'alto Medioevo (2 volumes, Spoleto, 1968) ii
791-843 (rep in idem, Structures politiques du monde franc (Vie-XIIe siecles),
London 1979. on the strength of Carolingian army. Using indirect statistical
methods based on the total size of the empire and numbers of counts and bishops
and others due to provide military servitors Werner came up with 35,000 as the
number of 'well-equipped' horsemen to which Contamine adds that there would be
a vast mass of foot soldiers up to maybe 100,000 total. But this obviously is
the total for the entire empire, not the number that could be assembled in one
place and time. Given the necessity for local defense and multiple fronts on
which warfare went on simultaneously and given the descriptions of actual
Carolingian campaigns my estimate is that to find 30,000 total horse and foot
in one place at one time would be exceptional. Contamine points out that "From
these potential resources (Werner's) only a fraction was actually raised for
particularly important expeditions like that directed in 796 against the Avars
when with all the columns united, Charlemagne's forces may have numbered
between 15,000 and 20,000 horsemen. He doesn't mention at that point in the
text that one of the columns was composed largely of Lombard horseman coming
from Italy.
Contamine also gives the estimates of Delbruck, (see below) Lot and Ganshof,
who thought 5,000 might be a good number for the army (obviously they are
thinking of one army in one place and time also).
He cites J. F. Verbruggen (see below) who gives a top strength of 2500 to 3000
horsemen and 6,000 to 10,000 foot soldiers. Again this is for one army at one
place.
Contamine also discusses the armament and training of this army. It consisted
of household contingents dependent on the emperor and on the numerous bishops,
counts, abbots and others to a possible total of 1000 and each might contribute
20 horsemen..Werner bases his estimate of there being 500 such districts
contributing to the army. He writes that each district might provide 50
horsemen. The military limitations of a force composed of independent
contingents of 20 horsemen each should be obvious. Given the notorious
phenomena - "friction" and "fog of war' 100 such contingents trying to operate
in concert on one field would be chaos.
Verbruggen, J. F. Trans Col Sumner Willard, The Art of Warfare in Western
Europe During the Middle Ages, The Boydell Press, Woodbridge UK, 1997.
This book is organized by topics rather than chronologically or by region. In
the chapter on Knights the author discusses the Frankish scara or band of
household retainers. The author comments about the Frankish conquests of
Saxons, Avars and Slavs, "Those conquests were possible because the army of the
Franks was better and stronger than that of the enemies. (Faint praise - JFS).
The quality was higher due to the development of the heavily armoured horsemen
who had stronger armour and better weapons than the enemy: the brunia, a tunic
covered with metal rings or plates, a metal helmet and leg guards, long swords
of high quality, lances and bows and arrows." (More about this equipment and
armor below).
Verbruggen goes into some specifics on various campaigns noting which scara
were involved. He gives the years and locations where various scarae were.The
point is that these were contingents of maybe 500 men in any one campaign. I
mention in passing here that Charlemagne only fought 3 real battles in his
life, in 775 and 783 against the Saxons. Most of the warfare was raiding and
sieging and destruction of the opponent's homes and families, taking hostages
et cetera..
In another section Verbruggen discusses the recruitment and assembly of the
forces at the "Mayfield". In still another section he provides statistics on
the cost of arms and armor. In summary he notes. "The equipment of an armoured
cavalryman thus cost as much as fifteen mares or nearly twenty-three oxen, an
enormous sum of money." ..."complete equipment could only be expected of the
very rich." Based on my study of early medieval warfare, not only Carolingian,
I would say that if one in five of the total horsemen cited from Werner above
was armored Charlemagne would have been delighted. With the cost of the Brunia
alone equal to four horses, there probably weren't 10,000 of them in the entire
empire, excluding Lombardy.
There is a lot more in Verbruggen and Contamine, but we move on.
Nicolle, David, The Age of Charlemagne, Osprey Men at Arms series number 150.
With illustrations by Angus McBride. Nicolle is the expert's expert on arms and
armor of the early and high middle ages. I recommend this easily accessible
book as the best currently on the Carolingian army. He describes the
multi-ethnic nature of the forces with each contingent employing its own
favorite tactics and armed in its own typical fashion. In passing he also notes
the relative weakness of the various enemies, Slavs, Saxons, Avars. In all his
research and writing Nicolle bases himself mostly on archeology, but also on
contemporary illuminated texts and monuments. And McBride is famous for basing
his illustrations on similar sources. So lets skip the repetition here on the
army itself and look at the illustrations and their descriptions. We find the
Gascon horseman totally without armor. The Austrasian 'scara' mounted
infantryman is wearing a short early style hauberk and simple helmet.These
formed the backbone of the Carolingian army and mostly fought on foot after
riding to battle.The Lombard horseman has a Byzantine style lamellar cuirass
and round helmet. The Lombards were among the best equipped of all the various
contingents. The Carolingian heavy cavalryman is shown with an effective, scale
brunia and small helmet but Nicolle points out that this is based on
contemporary artistic depictions and NO archeological evidence. Even more
interesting the Armorican (Breton) horseman is shown in full cataphract
(clibanarius) style with horse armor. They are given the benefit of the doubt
on this because these men were descendants of the Alans (Sarmatians) who
settled there centuries before. But the author notes that no such armor has
been found. The illustration is based on material from Dura Europus in Syria
and from Crimea. At most there could only have been a few hundred Breton's
armed like this in any one Carolingian force. When we come to the Frankish
infantry levy, the Saxons, and Slavs there is no armor at all. Only the Avar is
equipped with the full complement of eastern nomad armor.
Heath, Ian, Armies of the Dark Ages 600-1066, Wargames Research Group, Sussex
England, 1979. Heath is another experienced student of medieval warfare. Here
is gives a short text description on the evolution of the Carolingian army from
that of the Merovingians to that of the Ottonians. The strength of the book is
the line drawings of many different types of soldier. In discussing the scale
armor of the Carolingian heavy cavalryman he notes. "Men as well-equipped as
this were therefore probably in extremely short supply." He notes also that
archery was not popular, although bows were introduced.
The scale or mail armor of even the best equipped of these troops was nothing
like as effective as the Roman armor. And in comparison with the Roman helmet
these small pots are pitiful.
Hooper, Nicolas, and Matthew Bennett, Cambridge Illustrated Atlas: Warfare The
Middle Ages, 768-1487.
This is the best reference available on the overall aspects of the Carolingian
army. The maps, showing the location and dates of each year's campaigns are
excellent. And the authors note the great importance of fortifications as used
by Charlemagne in contract to limited battles, even though he campaigned
practically every year. In discussing the army they note that only wealthy men
had body armor. And they also remark, "Probably only a fraction of the
available warriors were actually assembled for a single campaign.' Then mention
something also noted by authors above, namely that the Carolingian army was
most successful when on the offensive because the troops were paid largely out
of captured booty. When it came time to go on the defensive then note,
"However, it proved difficult to mobilize large numbers of men for defence
against the Danes and Arabs since there was no profit motive to make defensive
duties attractive." Finally this is their assessment. "Eight-century
Carolingian expansion was not founded on a revolution in tactics which made
Frankish heavy cavalry masters of the battlefield, not least because battles
played a very small role in their success. Charlemagne's armies were able to
grind down their opponents by bringing superior force to bear...."
Oman, Charles, The History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, Burt Franklin,
New York, 1924. Volume 1 covers the period 378-1278.
The 13 pages on Carolingian armies are still worth reading, even though
critics question much of the author's work. Oman tries to base his discussion
on Einhard and Monachus Sangallensis, as well as some capitularies. But he
notes that the information is insufficient. "Of the proportion of infantry to
cavalry and of unarmed to mailed men in the hosts of Charles we are
unfortunately unable to give any statistics. Owing to his continuous
legislation on the topic, the mailed riders must have been a much more numerous
part of the army in 814 than in 770, is all that we can say." Probably so, but
the examples I have seen from Russian history indicate that the more the ruler
is ranting about the necessity for armor the more it indicates the warriors
don't have any.
Delbruck Hans, Trans Walter Renfroe, History of the Art of War, Vol III,
Medieval Warfare, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1982.
There are 70 pages on Charlemagne.This includes extracts from many original
documents. Delbruck begins with the same statistics on the cost of arms and
armor as we found in the references above. He notes, "Consequently, the
equipping of even one such warrior was a very heavy burden." More interesting,
he discusses the motivation of the Carolingian warrior versus his Germanic
ancestors. He notes the earlier folk warriors were just that, nomadic and eager
to equip themselves for battle, while the Frankish soldier was a settled person
called up for onerous duty he got precious little out of. He comments, "The
Carolingian warrior hood was a class that was composed of a small - in fact, a
very small - fraction of the entire population and it was only in the form of
vassalage and the possession of fiefs that this class was able to exist and
maintain itself." We may question just how vassalage and fiefs were involved,
thanks to the fine work by Susan Reynolds. "Fiefs and Vassals". Further on
Delbruck describes the more important source of warriors, the retinue at the
various courts, the scara.
On field army strength Delbruck writes, "We may assume that Charlemagne seldom
had more than 5,000 or 6,000 warriors assembled in one place, since that
number, together with their baggage train, would have covered the length of a
full day's march of 14 miles. We can probably accept 10,000 combatants as the
absolute maximum strength of a Carolingian army." He continues by describing
the ethnic composition of various Carolingian armies in separate campaigns. In
none does he list contingents from more than a few of the component groups,
Bavarians, Saxons, Lombards, Burgundians, Aquitanians, Alamanni, Thuringians,
Friesians, East Franks and et cetera.
He provides an excellent discussion also on why Charlemagne was able finally
after 35 years of warfare to subdue the Saxons while the much better Roman
armies were not.
Bachrach, Bernard, "On Roman Ramparts 300-1300", This is chapter 4 in Parker,
Goeffrey, ed. The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare, Cambridge
University Press, 1995.
Bachrach writes that the above authors except Werner are dated. On the one
page, 72, that he devotes to Charlemagne, he gives his estimate for the
strength of the Carolingian army as 150,000 men of whom 35,000 were heavily
armed mounted troops. This evidently follows Werner but without the description
of Werner's methods. He writes, "Individual armies of 35,000 to 40,000 though
hardly common, were not unknown." According to this estimate then there might
be 10,000 'heavily armed' troops in one army. This seems too large to me, but
of course depends on what one means by 'heavily armed'. He cites only his own
works, Merovingian Military Organization, 481-751 (Minneapolis, 1972) and
Armies and Politics in the Early Medieval West, (London, 1993..
DeVries, Kelly, Medieval military technology, Broadview Press, Peterborough
Ontario, 1992.
The author describes weapons by category. He has sections on Carolingian arms
(lances and swords) and defensive armor, (helmets, shields, body armor). He
notes that the spear was the main weapon, but that Carolingian swords were
famous and highly sought after. He writes that the main defensive armament was
the shield. No doubt using the same statistics quoted above he points out that
a shield and lance together cost six times less than a byrnie. He quotes the
capitularies that required nobles to have body armor and helmets. His brief
description of armor and helmet coincides with Nicolle without the detail. But
he makes a telling remark in pointing out that "no enemy he would meet on the
battlefield would have one" (byrnie). This is not true or is misleading, since
the Avars certainly had even better models of scale or mail armor. DeVries
devotes a while section to rehashing the discussion of the origin of the
stirrup and its 'connection' with feudalism. While Reynolds has demolished the
description of feudalism existent in Carolingian times, it is still worth
reading DeVries for his exposition of the many arguments about stirrups. He
gives great weight to Bachrach's arguments discounting stirrups. Along the way
he quotes from one of Bachrach's many works the following: "From the many
campaigns of Charles, Pepin and Carloman described by contemporaries and near
contemporaries there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that heavily armed
horsemen engaging in mounted shock combat were the decisive element of their
armies." I guess the way this may be squared with the quote immediately above
is that the 35,000 "heavily armed troops" didn't engage in mounted shock
combat.
DeVries has a few words to say also on the role of fortifications in the
Carolingian period, but leaves a final determination of the value placed on
this military technique up in the air.
White, Lynn Jr. Medieval Technology and social change, Oxford Univ Press, New
York, 1966.
Having pointed out that White's thesis on the role of stirrups and feudalism
has been demolished with respect to both elements of the equation, we mention
this work because it is worth reading with the later discussions in mind.
Also, White provides quite a lot of references on the appearance of stirrups in
India, China, central Asia and Islamic lands.
Ganshof .F. L. Feudalism, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1961.
In like manner one still should read this most elaborate theoretical
exposition on the origins of Feudalism during Carolingian times. Just read
Reynolds also.
Mathews, John and Bob Stewart, Warriors of Christendom, Firebird Books, Poole,
UK. 1988.
One of these stalwarts is Charlemagne. This book has the best organized
descriptions of each of Charlemagne's wars of the references listed here. But
it is very weak on details of army organization, strength or tactics.
Jones, Archer, The Art of War in the Western World, Univ of Illinois Press,
Chicago, 1987.
The author devotes several pages to the Carolingian Franks. But is emphasis on
their use of stirrups shows the material is quite dated. Beyond that the
discussion is quite general.
Einhard and Notker the Stammerer, Two lives of Charlemagne, Penguin Classics,
London, 1969.
With all the above modern authors commenting on Charlemagne, we ought not to
leave out the two primary sources for much of the speculation. Einhard served
Charlemagne for 23 years and wrote his Vita Caroli as a tribute to his master.
Notker is also known as the monk of St Gall, the monastery he served. He wrote
De Carolo Magno some 70 years after the emperor's death. In this edition on
page 165 we can read the often quoted description of the 'man of iron', as he
approaches Pavia at the head of his iron-garbed warriors and judge for
ourselves how much poetic license the monk has seen fit to use.
Lot, Ferdinand, The End of the Ancient World and the beginnings of the Middle
Ages, Harper Torchbook, New York, 1961.
Lot ends his fine description and analysis of the subject with the Merovingian
Monarchy, but the book is worth reading also with reference to Charlemagne for
the clear description of the nature of society in Gaul at that time. He shows
that the Franks became overlords over a much larger Gallo-Roman population.
This corroborates Delbruck's point that the potential numbers of Frankish
warriors was small, their being a minority of a small minority of the
population.
Lopez, Robert, The Birth of Europe, M Evans and Company, New York, 1966.
As a follow on to Lot this book gives a useful picture of the nature of
society from which the Carolingian army was drawn.
Koch, H. W. Medieval Warfare, Prentice Hall, New York, 1978.
The author includes the very same statistical table relating the cost of
various components of armor to cows that we found in several of the more
specialized texts above. But he adds an interesting bit of information relative
to Charlemagne's subduing of the Saxons, namely the role of St Boniface during
Pipin's reign. He also points out the rather curious aspect of the lists of
weapons required of the troops called to assemble, something the other writers
pass over, namely the list includes shield, lance, dagger, bow and arrows; and
that the first two are hardly compatible with the last two. But the rest of the
book is devoted to later periods and almost nothing of importance is mentioned
about Charlemagne.
I might mention also my copy of Brassy's International Military and Defense
Encyclopedia in which by coincidence there appears my article on Charlemagne.
very best to all
john sloan
John Sloan
http://members.aol.com/johns426/xenophon.htm
David Read
<john...@aol.com> writes
>HI again
>While I always look forward to obtaining new books on military history, there
>is no reason to sit on our thumbs awaiting word from on high. Here are a few of
>the references on my shelf already. These deal only with medieval period. I
>will post something similar on the Roman army. I have many more references on
>it so it will take a while.
(Synopses snipped)
Thanks very much, John. Several of the works you cite are familiar to
me, although by no means all of them. It is good to see someone who is
able and not afraid to use a wide variety of secondary sources including
lesser-known and, in some quarters, deeply unfashionable studies.
The biggest problem I have with this "Charlemagne vs The Romans" thing
is the historicity of the concept in the first place. Unless careful
parameters are set defining exactly what kind of debate is desired such
discussion would have no more relevance in furthering the understanding
of military history than the latest Asterix adventure.
It *can* be done, of course, but all too often this kind of debate
involves hardened prejudging of both the evidence and the motives of the
people involved.
Still, one lives in hope, eh ?
cheers,
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
David Read
"Shilling for the fellow who brings the sheep in,
Shilling for the fellow who milks the herd,
Shilling for the fellow with a wife for keeping,
How can we feed love on a farmboy's wages ?"
Love on a Farmboy's Wages - XTC
Jason Ehlers
>From: john...@aol.com (JohnS426)
>Date: Wed, 17 November 1999 07:36 PM EST
>Message-id: <19991117193630...@ng-ci1.aol.com>
Thanks for that in-depth
examination of Carolingian
armies, John, that was awesome!
I noticed you mentioned WRG
guidebooks as a source, are you
a wargamer? I got into ancient
and medieval history as a result
of wargaming.
I am painting a "Later Frank"
army of minis, to battle against
a matched "Viking" army. I use
DBA miniatures rules, they are
easy to learn.
You have alot of information
on Frankish armies, you could
make a great contribution to
Chris Brantley's DBA site:
http://users.erols.com/brant/DBA/
If you want to help us, we need
specific info on various historical armies
Chris is on vacation until this weekedn,
but he will put your info into an online
reference so gamers can easily
access it and help increase the realism
and knowledge of the history of the
Carolingian or Frankish armies.
Fine regards:
Jason
to reply, remove "nospam" from mailing address!
ON TO VALHALLA!
JohnS426
>The biggest problem I have with this "Charlemagne vs The Romans" thing
>is the historicity of the concept in the first place
HI
I agree of course. I merely was trying to counter the idea in the original
discussion that somehow the fact that Charlemagne was able to conquer the
Saxons while the Romans did not showed that he had a better army. There were
many reasons that Charlemagne had that better success and Delbruck actually
gives a very clear discussion of why.
So now basically I am trying to describe what Charlemagne's army was all about
in situ so to speak and without reference to the Romans.
But I do have to question some concepts mentioned by others here such as that
the 800 years difference represented "progress'. I would rather say maybe 300
years of progress followed by 400 of serious decline and then 100 of starting
up again. This with respect too all aspects of military practice not to mention
social conditions.
I presume you are familiar with the Wargames research group rules for
conducting table top gaming. And how they try to incorporate some bit of
realism for folks who want to fight Assyrians against Celts or the like. When I
lived in UK I used to attend some of the conventions - also was member of the
Society of Ancients. By theway, Phil and Sue Barker were by here just a few
weeks ago.
best wishes
JohnS426
>guidebooks as a source, are you
>a wargamer? I got into ancient
>and medieval history as a result
>of wargaming.
>
Well I used to be, before this computer took over my life.
I was member of Society of Ancients and did table top gaming while living at
Strawberry Hill - Twickenham. Know quite a few of the older generation, many
passed on now. Used to table top here in the US at Origins and Historicon
games. but no time now.
I have a mostly painted Assyrian army in Flats - plus Ottoman and Imperial
armies in flats that won't ever be painted unfortunately.
Phil and Sue Barker are good friends of mine. Also Pat Condrey over here. Was a
member of Society of Ancients for years also. And I have done board wargames
too. I count as good friends most of the boardgame designers from Jack Radey to
Dana Lombardy to Jim Dunnigan and many more.
I am always glad to help with historical info. Lately I have helped with
computer games such as the nice on on Borodino.
Just send email to john...@aol.com as I don't get time to read this newsgroup
that often.
Have a look at the web site. I am trying to put military history info on that
exactly for wargamers and SCA types. Having studied military history now for
over 50 years I have collected a fair library of references on many aspects -
nothing much on the Far East, however.
very best wishes
David Read
<john...@aol.com> writes
>I agree of course. I merely was trying to counter the idea in the original
>discussion that somehow the fact that Charlemagne was able to conquer the
>Saxons while the Romans did not showed that he had a better army. There were
>many reasons that Charlemagne had that better success and Delbruck actually
>gives a very clear discussion of why.
Fair enough.
>
>So now basically I am trying to describe what Charlemagne's army was all about
>in situ so to speak and without reference to the Romans.
OK
>But I do have to question some concepts mentioned by others here such as that
>the 800 years difference represented "progress'. I would rather say maybe 300
>years of progress followed by 400 of serious decline and then 100 of starting
>up again. This with respect too all aspects of military practice not to mention
>social conditions.
Indeed. A veritable hot potato. I'm not sure whether I would agree with
"300 years of progress followed by 400 of serious decline"; as one
example, there is a good case to be made that mid-4th to mid-5th century
developments in Roman armies had less to do with decline and more to
with successful adaptation to changing circumstances.
>
>I presume you are familiar with the Wargames research group rules for
>conducting table top gaming. And how they try to incorporate some bit of
>realism for folks who want to fight Assyrians against Celts or the like. When I
>lived in UK I used to attend some of the conventions - also was member of the
>Society of Ancients. By theway, Phil and Sue Barker were by here just a few
>weeks ago.
Indeed. I, too, have been a member of the Society of Ancients in the
past. (It is worth mentioning that the Society of Ancients is one of
those organisations whose name poorly reflects the interests of its
members, because the Middle Ages are equally-well represented.)
Phil Barker and his wife are, of course, no strangers to this kind of
controversy. Like the Society for Creative Anachronism, (which is not as
influential amongst re-enactors and living history types in the U.K. as
it is in the U.S. and Australia, and perhaps elsewhere), the Wargames
Research Group attracts a good deal of both constructive and ill-
informed criticism.
cheers,
--
David Read
D. Spencer Hines
controversy. Like the Society for Creative Anachronism, (which is not
as influential amongst re-enactors and living history types in the U.K.
as it is in the U.S. and Australia, and perhaps elsewhere), the Wargames
Research Group attracts a good deal of both constructive and
cheers,
--
David Read
-----------------------
I think we've determined here that the SCA is basically an
American-originated group that began in loon-strewn California and which
has some outposts abroad --- but is not really a serious organisation
when it comes to the study of Medieval History.
They are Fantasists not Historians --- and to pretend otherwise is
ludicrous.
This British, Wargames Research Group sounds to be a somewhat serious
organisation. Please tell us more about it.
--
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas et Libertas
"There're two kinds of people in this life, my friend --- those who have
loaded guns and those who dig. You dig." --- Clint Eastwood as The Man
With No Name "The Good, The Bad and The Ugly" --- Sergio Leone [1966]
David Read
<D._Spence...@aya.yale.edu> writes
>I think we've determined here that the SCA is basically an
>American-originated group that began in loon-strewn California and which
>has some outposts abroad --- but is not really a serious organisation
>when it comes to the study of Medieval History.
>
>They are Fantasists not Historians --- and to pretend otherwise is
>ludicrous.
>
>This British, Wargames Research Group sounds to be a somewhat serious
>organisation. Please tell us more about it.
>--
I'll give you an outsider's personal view of the Wargames Research
Group.
It is nothing to do with re-enactment or living history, but rather
wargaming with table-top miniatures. It is a shadowy organisation (i.e.,
I've no idea how one becomes a member and I've never had any desire to
do so), which produces sets of rules for miniature wargames in many
periods, from ancient to modern. It produces lists showing how you
should organise and build up the army of your choice, as well as guides
to uniforms, organisation, tactics etc. These people come from all walks
of life, and may or may not be trained historians.
The WRG is particularly strong in Ancient and Medieval wargaming, but
much weaker in other areas. It does not produce its own house journal,
but its authors and rule-makers are readily contactable direct, or
through various magazines and subscription journals, where you can
follow up and discuss the research which goes into rule production.
"Slingshot" is one of those journals, in fact, it is the house journal
of the Society of Ancients. In common with others of its type it
contains articles by professional historians, those who will one day
become professional historians, military men, and rank amateurs.
The rules are used in independent wargames clubs throughout the world,
and there is little doubt that in the Ancient and Medieval arena, the
Wargames Research Group is far and away the most important and
influential international producer of tabletop rules, etc.
Consistently over the past 30 years and more, the Wargames Research
Group has aimed to produce a single set of rules that covers the entire
period from c. 3000 B.C. to c. 1485 A.D. This is both their strength and
their weakness. Naturally, these rules have evolved and changed over the
years reflecting and, as often as not, *anticipating* developments in
serious research in military history. What one sometimes reads here on
s.h.m. as being the latest thing in medieval military history research
has often long-since been discussed and incorporated into or rejected
from some wargame rules.
The people who use the rules are diverse - indeed, the diversity is at
least as great, I would suspect, as that of the membership of the S.C.A.
This is because these rules are designed not only to provide historical
accuracy, but to facilitate national and international competitions. In
theory, one might see the spottiest teenager with an army of Caesar's
Romans competing against the stuffiest professor with an army of
Charlemagne's Franks. Again, this reflects both the weaknesses and the
strengths of such generic rules.
Knowing and using the rules is one thing; being familiar with the
arguments and discussion that went into the making of such rules makes
their rationale that much more understandable, even if one does not
always agree with every point.
cheers,
--
David Read
Paul J Gans
>>
>>The biggest problem I have with this "Charlemagne vs The Romans" thing
>>is the historicity of the concept in the first place
>HI
>I agree of course. I merely was trying to counter the idea in the original
>discussion that somehow the fact that Charlemagne was able to conquer the
>Saxons while the Romans did not showed that he had a better army. There were
>many reasons that Charlemagne had that better success and Delbruck actually
>gives a very clear discussion of why.
What if Delbruck is wrong?
>So now basically I am trying to describe what Charlemagne's army was all about
>in situ so to speak and without reference to the Romans.
>But I do have to question some concepts mentioned by others here such as that
>the 800 years difference represented "progress'. I would rather say maybe 300
>years of progress followed by 400 of serious decline and then 100 of starting
>up again. This with respect too all aspects of military practice not to mention
>social conditions.
Well, as you know, this is seriously argued. There is a
very good argument that Carolingian France saw a great
deal of continuity with Rome, especially in civil
administration. As for the army, this too, as you know,
is seriously debated these days.
I'm not going to argue details, as 800 AD is rather before
the period I've most studied. But your view above is not
universally accepted.
Of course, the cross-time issue can not be solved. As I've
pointed out before, the German tribes of 400 AD had no
trouble beating the Romans of 400 AD, at least in the west.
And the ones of 800 AD were better than the ones of 400 AD.
So perhaps the question is: how much did the Roman armies
decline in that first 400 years.
>I presume you are familiar with the Wargames research group rules for
>conducting table top gaming. And how they try to incorporate some bit of
>realism for folks who want to fight Assyrians against Celts or the like. When I
>lived in UK I used to attend some of the conventions - also was member of the
>Society of Ancients. By theway, Phil and Sue Barker were by here just a few
>weeks ago.
----- Paul J. Gans [ga...@panix.com]
David Read
writes
<snip>
>Well, as you know, this is seriously argued. There is a
>very good argument that Carolingian France saw a great
>deal of continuity with Rome, especially in civil
>administration. As for the army, this too, as you know,
>is seriously debated these days.
>
>I'm not going to argue details, as 800 AD is rather before
>the period I've most studied. But your view above is not
>universally accepted.
>
>Of course, the cross-time issue can not be solved. As I've
>pointed out before, the German tribes of 400 AD had no
>trouble beating the Romans of 400 AD, at least in the west.
>And the ones of 800 AD were better than the ones of 400 AD.
>So perhaps the question is: how much did the Roman armies
>decline in that first 400 years.
The above is a perfect example of the condition that I mentioned in my
previous post in this thread. Outdated, oversimplified and, in all
likelihood, just plain wrong.
"There is no evidence that regular recruits of this era [4th and 5th
century A.D. - DR] were less well trained and disciplined than those
of the earlier empire, even when recruited from barbarians. A close
reading of the later histories suggests that the army may in fact have
been markedly more efficient than those of the earlier empire,
especially in relation to the sorts of enemies it now had to meet."
_The Armies and Enemies of Ancient Rome_ by Phil Barker, Wargames
Research Group, 1981, p14.
.................
"The conventional argument runs as follows: there was increasing
barbarian pressure from the third century, while from the time of
Constantine on the army was barbarized, leading to ineffectiveness.
In turn, this led to barbarian settlements and thus the collapse in
the West.
I believe this explanation to be wrong. As we have seen, barbarization
is doubtful in both extent and impact. The effectiveness of armies is
hard to measure, and the simplest means, that of battlefield
performance, is not always the best. Victory is often the product of
numbers, as Leonidas was doubtless aware at Thermopylae, though few
would argue that the quality of his troops was lower than that of the
Persians. Even winning battles does not mean winning wars, and
Hannibal's successes at Cannae and Lake Trasimene did not result in
Carthaginian victory in the Second Punic War.
Here I have argued that there was little perceptible decline in the
effectiveness of the army during the period 350-425. If this is
accepted, then either the cause of collapse must be looked for in
the army after 425, or else it may not lie in the structure of the
army at all. Did the Western Empire fall because there was something
wrong with the late Roman army?...
... Military failure may have been a major cause of the West's
collapse, but this failure was not caused by structural weaknesses
in the army itself. Too much pressure on the frontiers, defeat at
Adrianople, too many civil wars, not enough soldiers - these all
contributed to the fall of the West. We do not need to add structural
failure of the army to the list."
_Warfare in Roman Europe AD 350-425_ by Hugh Elton, Oxford University
Press, 1996 pp265-268
..............
"The typical Roman soldier was no longer the iron legionary, who, with
shield fitted close to his left shoulder and sword-hilt sunk low, cut
his way through the thickest hedge of pikes, turned back the onset of
the mailed horsemen of the East, and stood unmoved before the wildest
rush of Celt or German. The old military organisation of Augustus and
Trajan began to fall to pieces in the third century; in the fourth it
was so weakened and transformed as to be hardly recognizable; by the
end of the fifth it had disappeared."
_A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages- Volume One: 378-1278AD_
by Sir Charles Oman, 1924, pp3-4
One hopes that Bachrach isn't relying too much upon Oman when comparing
Carolingian to Roman armies - if, indeed, he does such a thing.
cheers,
--
David Read
JohnS426
>It is nothing to do with re-enactment or living history, but rather
>wargaming with table-top miniatures. It is a shadowy organisation (i.e.,
>I've no idea how one becomes a member and I've never had any desire to
HI to David and all,
It is not a membership organization but the name of a publications company.
Don't ask me why the name. Was based in Susex when I lived in UK. I visited
them a few times but unfortunately have forgotten the names of the other
principals. I think Neville Dickenson was one. Phil was at one time president
or some other corporate officer. I think they do a lot of research for their
publications. The membership organization that the WRG supports is as mentioned
Society of Ancients - which as David points out also has gradually expanded
into medieval. I have a bunch of back copies of their publication - Slingshot
- They can get really carried away with details like the long running argument
over if spears were used over arm or under arm. They include archeologists who
provide some excellent information on topics like Ancient Assyrian walls etc.
The issues I have I use for reference as the better articles are well
footnoted, often to artifacts in the British Museum. The articles on chariots
for instance were very helpful some years back.
As David notes the influence of WRG is world wide. And membership of SOA is
also. Here in US the several wargame conventions such as Historicon generally
have a special tournament set to WRG rules. Phil or one of the other gurus is
frequently invited over as a kind of celebrity. At one time, I recall, that
some of the same fellows also ran MInifigs one of the early companies that
produced the 25 - 30 mm figures used in table top gaming.
I have the programs for most of the recent Historicons even though I have not
had time to attend in some years. I could elaborate if desired. I have always
felt that these two outfits together have done a lot for real historical study
by holding the line against D& D and other magic fantasy gamers.
very best
Edward John Schoenfeld
>HI David, Paul, Spencer and all,
>
>Please re-read my earlier comment on Roman army - I believe the Roman army of
>ca 400 AD was indeed better over all than that of 100 AD and said so.
OK -- with the provision that we are talking about the Roman army ca 375
instead of 400 -- Adrianople had a profound if temporary effect on troop
quality and unit cohesion.
I wrote
>that the decline came after that and that by ca 700 the quality of military
>force in Gaul was worse, but was then rising again between ca 700 and 800.
Probably correct if one is focussing on the troops, as you seem to be,
although I would put the low point closer to 650 than 700, and provide for
some relative high points 9among the Franks) around 500 and again ca. 625
(temporary recoveries mainly in discipline and morale around those years).
The
>quality is a result of the quality of the arms and armor, the training, the
>organization, the intrinsic quality of the recruit and the experience of the
>officers and more, above all the social basis on which the army is formed.
>I will post of a list of references on the Roman army as soon as I can. But for
>now I might ask if Vegetius was wrong in his assessments?
Heh! -- But Vegetius' prescriptions were ostensibly intended for the Roman
INFANTRY, while 'cavalry' (i.e. armored troopers who could fight either
mounted or on foot) had become the mainstay of the Roman forces by 400. In
short, Vegetius is engaging in the old Roman literary game of worshipping
the past, and improving the present by suggesting that Rome 'restore'
ancient practices (rather than make innovations). So its a bit difficult to
use V as a witness to actual conditions.
>Also, from all I have read the switch to scale or mail armor already in the
>Roman army, let alone later, represented a significant decline in the quality
>of the armor. Certainly the 8th century helmets were much inferior to the Roman
>helmets also. Then we have to think about where the armor came from and how
>many troops actually had decent armor. I recall one estimate that it took a
>good armorer 200 hours to make a byrnie. At that rate his production would be
>about 13 such items a Year. At that rate 100 craftsmen could outfit 1300 troops
>in a year. And production was handcraft spread all over the place, while Roman
>armor was mass produced in government factories.
>
>As for Delbruck - his argument that the Saxons of 800 were inferior as a
>fighting force to the Germans of 50 AD makes sense to me.
See my other post as to why this is incorrect.
And his argument that
>the strategic base from which Charlemagne operated into Saxony was superior to
>that of the Romans in 50 AD seems sound too.
Delbrück is right here, but does not have the whole story.
Nevertheless it took 35 years of
>heavy campaigning using a gradual pacification program more like what the
>Romans did in Spain ca 200 BC - 1 AD, rather than victory in set battles, for
>Charlemagne to pacify the Saxons.
I have about 100 typewritten pages as to why this (albeit traditional, and
following Charlemagne's biography by Einhard) interpretation of the Saxon
war as a prolonged struggle lasting from 772-804 is wrong. Briefly, after
785 there are many more years of peace in Saxony than war (campaigns only in
792-4 and 797). Some Saxons are acting in concert with the Franks (as
trusted and reliable allies) as early as 747 (if not even during the
Merovingian period). After 777 (if not earlier) the only resistance to
Charlemagne is undertaken by the Westphalians and 'Nordluidi' (less than 40%
of the country) and not all of them -- the rest of Saxony was effectively
pacified. The only exception occurs in the years 782-785, when there was a
general uprising throughout Saxony, and that uprising is a direct response
to the massacre at Verden -- its 'psychological effect' was to cause
otherwise friendly Saxons revolt!
Ed
Edward John Schoenfeld
>>>
>>>The biggest problem I have with this "Charlemagne vs The Romans" thing
>>>is the historicity of the concept in the first place
>
>>HI
>>I agree of course. I merely was trying to counter the idea in the original
>>discussion that somehow the fact that Charlemagne was able to conquer the
>>Saxons while the Romans did not showed that he had a better army. There were
>>many reasons that Charlemagne had that better success and Delbruck actually
>>gives a very clear discussion of why.
>
>What if Delbruck is wrong?
>
In fact Delbrück WAS wrong. Delbrück's explanation was based on two
theories -- first, that Charlemagne's armies were extremely small, no more
than 5000 milites in the entire Frankish empire. This was considered wrong
even when Delbrück published, and the 75-odd years since the Delbrück's
second edition have seen every serious re-examination of the question
(Verbruggen, KFWerner, Bachrach) come up with progressively larger and
larger totals for Charlemagne's armies. If (as Paul's earlier post about
Bernie's talk at Princeton indicated) Bachrach is going to claim 60-80,000
total for the entire Empire, even Bachrach will wind up with a figure
smaller than the probable actuality (personally, I think Bernie will wind up
with far bigger numbers than 60-80000 once he takes his focus off full
fledged milites and starts including exclusively infantry forces that
supported the milites in the field).
Delbrück's second theory was that the military effectiveness of an army was
inversely proportional to the level of civilization of the troops that made
it up (i.e. less civilized people are inherently more warlike). So, for
example, uncivilized Germans/Saxons were able to beat larger numbers of
civilized Romans, but not larger numbers of Franks because the Saxons had
become 'more civilized' along with their Frankish neighbors. Aside from the
obvious cultural bias this view represents, things like 'warlike nature' are
completely unprovable assumptions and using such assumptions or 'constructs'
(to use the lit-crit shorthand for this) is the way to make huge errors in
historical interpretation. For instance, following Delbrück's ideas, we
would expect Japan to have easily won WWII, since (by his definitions) they
were much less civilized and more warlike than the indolent,
over-democratized US. Ditto for more recent confrontations in the Balkans.
So Delbrück was wrong about the Saxon wars on two counts. The Carolingians
in 800 not only had a better infrastructure in the Weserraum than the
Romans, they were able to bring to bear substantially greater numbers than
the Romans could project beyond the Rhine. Conversely, the Saxons of 800
were if anything far more effective militarily than their putative ancestors
in AD10 -- the explanation for their defeat is not military but political
and economic.
But there is a larger issue -- The fact is simply that however much Delbrück
deserves his reputation as a pioneer in the field of military history and
political opposition to WWI (a reputation sufficiently famous to earn his
brain a cameo role in Mel Brook's Young Frankenstein), as HISTORY his work
(like Charles Oman's) is sadly out of date and should no longer be part of
serious discussions (That's not entirely possible at present because very
few historians have seen fit to bother with military history in the past 75
years, but some of us are working hard to fix that).
As far as more about the Saxon campaigns, look for a serious exchange of
publications between myself and Bachrach appearing over the next 2 years or
so (Bernie's book on Charlemagne's army, and my articles + possible book on
the continental Saxons). With any luck, we will suck Charles Bowlus into the
discussion and, between the three of us, get some real thinking done.
>>So now basically I am trying to describe what Charlemagne's army was all about
>>in situ so to speak and without reference to the Romans.
Admirable, worthy, and the only way to actually understand what
Charlemagne's armies were all about.
>>But I do have to question some concepts mentioned by others here such as that
>>the 800 years difference represented "progress'. I would rather say maybe 300
>>years of progress followed by 400 of serious decline and then 100 of starting
>>up again. This with respect too all aspects of military practice not to mention
>>social conditions.
Since Paul declines to argue details, I will at least discuss them.
Historians can't afford to rely on 'general trends' such as 'the level of
civilization declined from 1 AD to 800 AD, so the level of military
technology/effectiveness declined also.' Rather, historians need to look at
and explain specific pieces of evidence (and as many of those pieces of
evidence as possible). With regard to military history in the Roman west
from 1AD to 800 AD, these pieces of evidence can be summarized as follows:
1) The increasing amount of military equipment available to armies
outside the Roman frontiers over time. The 'Germanic warrior' of 250 AD was
much better equipped than his great-great-great grandfather ever dreamt of
being.
2) The combat superiority of the heavily armored mounted trooper
(clibanarius/cataphractus/miles armatus) in a stable saddle over traditional
legionary infantry, proven on the field of battle by the Sassanids, Goths,
and others numerous times between 240-270, until the Romans were forced to
adopt the mounted trooper as their own basic combat doctrine (new model army
as established by Gallienus and the Illyrian Soldier-emperors after 260 AD).
3) the STRATEGIC superiority of the armored mounted trooper, who was
able to deploy more rapidly than traditional legionary infantry, especially
when supported by pre-arranged supply depots, as reflected in the 'mobile
field army' doctrine initiated by Diocletian (285-305) and perfected under
Constantine (306-337).
4) Given the change from defense of the frontier to defense in depth by
the mobile field army and the need to establish the aforementioned supply
depots, the increasing importance of defensive fortifications, beginning
with the fortification of Roman civites (especially in Gaul, Italy and the
Balkans) during and after the third century, and extending to the
construction of additional fortified military bases throughout the
countryside. If there is any point on which the Carolingian era had the
advantage over the Romans, it is this one -- they had had 400 additional
years to construct the necessary infrastructure of fortifications and supply
depots, an effort which is reflected in the diversion of ecclesiastical
property to military use by Charles Martel in the 730's, and the extreme
importance placed on keeping all of the royal estates topped off with
supplies seen in Charlemagne's charters and capitularies.
Note first that the construction of fortifications throughout the
countryside was NOT complete in 800 -- it may have been complete by 1100 in
SOME territories. Note ALSO that the idea that the Carolingians had more
and better MILITARY infrastructure than the Romans is controversial. I
happen to think it so, but only because Gaul was, relatively speaking, the
most backward part of the old Empire, so that the level of military
investment in the Frankish realms by 800 might well have exceeded the level
of military investment in Roman Gaul around, say, 200 (Frankish military
infrastructure in 800 was NOT, for example, better than East Roman/Byzantine
military infrastructure in 800, but it MIGHT have been close to as good).
But I freely admit that we are still waiting for the archaeologists as far
as real evidence goes -- some recent excavations and reports indicate that
this might have been so, some suggest even that it was probable, but the
final word is not yet in. Whatever their relative number, or possible
increase over time, the change to individual fortified structures
distributed throughout the countryside (rather than series of frontier
defenses) as a primary part of defense policy is well documented.
The result of trying to make sense of all this evidence is the thesis that
the later Roman empire, and its 'Sub-Roman' successor states in the west,
poured a whole lot more resources and effort into defense than the
'classical' empire ca. Augustus - Marcus Aurelius, AND had to find a more
effective combat doctrine than guys with 6-foot spears (pili) and short
swords (gladii) + plus ordinarily light armored auxiliaries on horseback or
with longer-range missile weapons.
Whether this represents 'progress' in a general sense rather depends on
one's definition of progress. Speaking as an indolent, over-democratized,
and unwarlike 20th century American, I should rather prefer the classical
empire, when war was something that happened far far away, to people who
were well adapted to it by being very unlike me. Speaking as a military
historian, my judgement is that the Carolingians had a superior tactical
system and possibly a superior infrastructure to that available to the Roman
empire in the classical period, or even during the civil wars (at least the
tactical system, that is). But really, as Paul noted, that comparison is
not resolvable, though given enough time, table-top space, and toy soldiers,
it surely would be fun to try ;)
>
>
>>I presume you are familiar with the Wargames research group rules for
>>conducting table top gaming. And how they try to incorporate some bit of
>>realism for folks who want to fight Assyrians against Celts or the like. When I
>>lived in UK I used to attend some of the conventions - also was member of the
>>Society of Ancients. By theway, Phil and Sue Barker were by here just a few
>>weeks ago.
>
I am familiar with the efforts of WRG and think highly of them, as do many
professional MILITARY historians (other kinds of historians have other
opinions, but in my experience if you scratch the professional veneer off a
military historian you are bound to find a gamer underneath). Besides, a
table-top or map board is often the only way to put together a 'thought
experiment' in ancient/medieval military history and, often enough, is used
as such (though professional standards require such thought experiments to
be supported by actual evidence, rather than game results, when put into
print). I would like to point out, however, that as far as recent
developments in the history of late roman and medieval combat doctrine goes,
WRG did NOT anticipate the basic research -- rather, Phil Barker was a
perspicacious 'early adopter' of ideas that research historians were putting
together in the late sixties through early eighties, and made them part of
the gaming consensus long before professional historians with non-military
specialties let them into the general historical consensus. That is, of
course, to Phil's and WRG's credit and servews as an indication of exactly
how historically accurate and useful Phil and the rest of WRG succeed in
being.
Ed
Edward John Schoenfeld
----------
In article <jJMFkHAK...@dreadful.demon.co.uk>, David Read
<da...@dreadful.demon.co.uk> wrote:
Cogent quotes from Phil barker and Hugh Elton snipped
> "The typical Roman soldier was no longer the iron legionary, who, with
> shield fitted close to his left shoulder and sword-hilt sunk low, cut
> his way through the thickest hedge of pikes, turned back the onset of
> the mailed horsemen of the East, and stood unmoved before the wildest
> rush of Celt or German. The old military organisation of Augustus and
> Trajan began to fall to pieces in the third century; in the fourth it
> was so weakened and transformed as to be hardly recognizable; by the
> end of the fifth it had disappeared."
>
>_A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages- Volume One: 378-1278AD_
> by Sir Charles Oman, 1924, pp3-4
>
>One hopes that Bachrach isn't relying too much upon Oman when comparing
>Carolingian to Roman armies - if, indeed, he does such a thing.
>
I can assure you that Bernie does not rely on Oman for anything (except,
perhaps, a rhetorical 'straw man' to demolish).
Ed
JohnS426
Please re-read my earlier comment on Roman army - I believe the Roman army of
ca 400 AD was indeed better over all than that of 100 AD and said so. I wrote
that the decline came after that and that by ca 700 the quality of military
force in Gaul was worse, but was then rising again between ca 700 and 800. The
quality is a result of the quality of the arms and armor, the training, the
organization, the intrinsic quality of the recruit and the experience of the
officers and more, above all the social basis on which the army is formed.
I will post of a list of references on the Roman army as soon as I can. But for
now I might ask if Vegetius was wrong in his assessments?
Also, from all I have read the switch to scale or mail armor already in the
Roman army, let alone later, represented a significant decline in the quality
of the armor. Certainly the 8th century helmets were much inferior to the Roman
helmets also. Then we have to think about where the armor came from and how
many troops actually had decent armor. I recall one estimate that it took a
good armorer 200 hours to make a byrnie. At that rate his production would be
about 13 such items a Year. At that rate 100 craftsmen could outfit 1300 troops
in a year. And production was handcraft spread all over the place, while Roman
armor was mass produced in government factories.
As for Delbruck - his argument that the Saxons of 800 were inferior as a
fighting force to the Germans of 50 AD makes sense to me. And his argument that
the strategic base from which Charlemagne operated into Saxony was superior to
that of the Romans in 50 AD seems sound too. Nevertheless it took 35 years of
heavy campaigning using a gradual pacification program more like what the
Romans did in Spain ca 200 BC - 1 AD, rather than victory in set battles, for
Charlemagne to pacify the Saxons. The beheading of 4500 Saxon prisoners of war
certainly had a psychological effect. For a good look at these campaigns I
refer to Hooper and Bennett - Cambridge Illustrated Atlas - Warfare - that I
mentioned previously.
more later
Paul J Gans
><snip>
> .................
>..............
> "The typical Roman soldier was no longer the iron legionary, who, with
> shield fitted close to his left shoulder and sword-hilt sunk low, cut
> his way through the thickest hedge of pikes, turned back the onset of
> the mailed horsemen of the East, and stood unmoved before the wildest
> rush of Celt or German. The old military organisation of Augustus and
> Trajan began to fall to pieces in the third century; in the fourth it
> was so weakened and transformed as to be hardly recognizable; by the
> end of the fifth it had disappeared."
>
>_A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages- Volume One: 378-1278AD_
> by Sir Charles Oman, 1924, pp3-4
>One hopes that Bachrach isn't relying too much upon Oman when comparing
>Carolingian to Roman armies - if, indeed, he does such a thing.
As far as I know, he does not.
My point, very abbreviated, was that the Germans ended up in
Gaul, Northern Italy, Spain, etc. with the Roman army unable
to withstand or dislodge them (I'm talking about the western
army, of course).
I do not pretend to know enough to lodge the blame on the
army, its generals, or the will of the civil authorities,
but certainly the result can not be used to argue that
the Roman army was superior to the German tribal armies.
It may be true, but the events don't show it.
Paul J Gans
preserved below.
My own particular period of interest is 1066-1347 in the
west which is a long enough period for any one person.
My particular area is the nebulous one of technology
which, by extension, got me involved in military technology
and again, by extension, with military history.
I was seduced early into this by Bert Hall and through
him Kelly DeVries and Bernard Bachrach (who upon hearing
that I was a chemist wanted me to collaborate with him
on re-creating Greek Fire. ;-)
So I can claim no particular expert knowldge on the
Carolingians though I will admit to having listened to
more than my share of talks on the period. These have
given me the notion that this is likely the most
misunderstood period in the western Middle Ages.
So I will venture some comments below, with the
clear understanding that I'm speakng in a very
small voice...
Edward John Schoenfeld <ejscho...@mindspring.com> wrote:
> Paul J Gans <ga...@panix.com> replied to JohnS426 <john...@aol.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>The biggest problem I have with this "Charlemagne vs The Romans" thing
>>>>is the historicity of the concept in the first place
>>
>>>HI
>>>I agree of course. I merely was trying to counter the idea in the original
>>>discussion that somehow the fact that Charlemagne was able to conquer the
>>>Saxons while the Romans did not showed that he had a better army. There were
>>>many reasons that Charlemagne had that better success and Delbruck actually
>>>gives a very clear discussion of why.
>>
>>What if Delbruck is wrong?
>>
>In fact Delbrück WAS wrong. Delbrück's explanation was based on two
>theories -- first, that Charlemagne's armies were extremely small, no more
>than 5000 milites in the entire Frankish empire. This was considered wrong
>even when Delbrück published, and the 75-odd years since the Delbrück's
>second edition have seen every serious re-examination of the question
>(Verbruggen, KFWerner, Bachrach) come up with progressively larger and
>larger totals for Charlemagne's armies. If (as Paul's earlier post about
>Bernie's talk at Princeton indicated) Bachrach is going to claim 60-80,000
>total for the entire Empire, even Bachrach will wind up with a figure
>smaller than the probable actuality (personally, I think Bernie will wind up
>with far bigger numbers than 60-80000 once he takes his focus off full
>fledged milites and starts including exclusively infantry forces that
>supported the milites in the field).
I was working from memory on Bachrach's totals. He worked
from the large to the small, first trying to discover reasonable
population levels for his kingdom and reasonable economic
levels as they affected military affairs. His conclusion
was that if the Carolingians were as effective, percentage-
wise, in recruiting from the pertinant age group, very large
armies were not at all out of the question.
As for Delbruck, we have on this newsgroup several
committed Delbruckians who are unable to give up on
him at all. Same for Oman. The problem, as I see it,
is that they have produced monumental epics with an
enormous amount of information in one place. We are
not likely to see an equivalent modern effort in
my lifetime -- there is just too much new information
available. What is especially hard is to point out
the peculiar biases of Delbruck and Oman, especially
since many of their admirers share the same biases.
>Delbrück's second theory was that the military effectiveness of an army was
>inversely proportional to the level of civilization of the troops that made
>it up (i.e. less civilized people are inherently more warlike). So, for
>example, uncivilized Germans/Saxons were able to beat larger numbers of
>civilized Romans, but not larger numbers of Franks because the Saxons had
>become 'more civilized' along with their Frankish neighbors. Aside from the
>obvious cultural bias this view represents, things like 'warlike nature' are
>completely unprovable assumptions and using such assumptions or 'constructs'
>(to use the lit-crit shorthand for this) is the way to make huge errors in
>historical interpretation. For instance, following Delbrück's ideas, we
>would expect Japan to have easily won WWII, since (by his definitions) they
>were much less civilized and more warlike than the indolent,
>over-democratized US. Ditto for more recent confrontations in the Balkans.
You are, of course, being kind to Delbruck. He also had
a tremendous bias in favor of those natural warriors who
rode horses into combat. Their bravery, fortitude, and
durability made a lasting impression on him. Of course,
his own experience as a cavalry officer had nothing to
do with this... ;-)
>So Delbrück was wrong about the Saxon wars on two counts. The Carolingians
>in 800 not only had a better infrastructure in the Weserraum than the
>Romans, they were able to bring to bear substantially greater numbers than
>the Romans could project beyond the Rhine. Conversely, the Saxons of 800
>were if anything far more effective militarily than their putative ancestors
>in AD10 -- the explanation for their defeat is not military but political
>and economic.
>But there is a larger issue -- The fact is simply that however much Delbrück
>deserves his reputation as a pioneer in the field of military history and
>political opposition to WWI (a reputation sufficiently famous to earn his
>brain a cameo role in Mel Brook's Young Frankenstein), as HISTORY his work
>(like Charles Oman's) is sadly out of date and should no longer be part of
>serious discussions (That's not entirely possible at present because very
>few historians have seen fit to bother with military history in the past 75
>years, but some of us are working hard to fix that).
And more power to you. One of the great frustrations of
my partial life as a medievalist is that many of my close
collegues at NYU are literary types. They have an enormous
knowlege of the literature of say, the 12th century, but almost
no knowledge of the political events of the period, even when
those events clearly influenced the literature.
Further, in my opinion there is much military historians can
learn from literature. They often have read as little of
it as the literature mavens have read of military history.
Just as a passing example, in the endless debate over
"feudalism" it is worth noting that in the 1180's
Chretien de Troyes could use the word "vassal" as a
derogative phrase.
>As far as more about the Saxon campaigns, look for a serious exchange of
>publications between myself and Bachrach appearing over the next 2 years or
>so (Bernie's book on Charlemagne's army, and my articles + possible book on
>the continental Saxons). With any luck, we will suck Charles Bowlus into the
>discussion and, between the three of us, get some real thinking done.
I at least will look forward to them with great interest.
Charlie will, I assume, claim it is all too early for him,
but I think that you will get him involved in spite of that.
Seriously, this has the distinct possibility of revising how
we think of the Carolingian era and changing the perception of
that era drastically.
>>>So now basically I am trying to describe what Charlemagne's army was all about
>>>in situ so to speak and without reference to the Romans.
>Admirable, worthy, and the only way to actually understand what
>Charlemagne's armies were all about.
>>>But I do have to question some concepts mentioned by others here such as that
>>>the 800 years difference represented "progress'. I would rather say maybe 300
>>>years of progress followed by 400 of serious decline and then 100 of starting
>>>up again. This with respect too all aspects of military practice not to mention
>>>social conditions.
>Since Paul declines to argue details, I will at least discuss them.
Yes. I've given my reasons above. I'm not really capable of
arguing details for this period.
There's another point as well. The notion amonst the German
tribes (if I can lump them all together that way) that a
free man was a fighting man is very important. There is
no doubt that the classical Roman armies were well trained and
well equipped. But then, until Charlemagne *every* free Frank
was expected to fight somehow. Charlemagne (I believe) reformed
that as military equipment was getting too expensive for the
poorer free men.
There's a distinct advantage to having a large corpus of fighting
men. Most of these were well-trained as individuals due to
extensive experience. How well trained they were at group
maneuvers I don't know.
>>
>>
>>>I presume you are familiar with the Wargames research group rules for
>>>conducting table top gaming. And how they try to incorporate some bit of
>>>realism for folks who want to fight Assyrians against Celts or the like. When I
>>>lived in UK I used to attend some of the conventions - also was member of the
>>>Society of Ancients. By theway, Phil and Sue Barker were by here just a few
>>>weeks ago.
>>
>I am familiar with the efforts of WRG and think highly of them, as do many
>professional MILITARY historians (other kinds of historians have other
>opinions, but in my experience if you scratch the professional veneer off a
>military historian you are bound to find a gamer underneath). Besides, a
>table-top or map board is often the only way to put together a 'thought
>experiment' in ancient/medieval military history and, often enough, is used
>as such (though professional standards require such thought experiments to
>be supported by actual evidence, rather than game results, when put into
>print). I would like to point out, however, that as far as recent
>developments in the history of late roman and medieval combat doctrine goes,
>WRG did NOT anticipate the basic research -- rather, Phil Barker was a
>perspicacious 'early adopter' of ideas that research historians were putting
>together in the late sixties through early eighties, and made them part of
>the gaming consensus long before professional historians with non-military
>specialties let them into the general historical consensus. That is, of
>course, to Phil's and WRG's credit and servews as an indication of exactly
>how historically accurate and useful Phil and the rest of WRG succeed in
>being.
------ Paul J. Gans [ga...@panix.com]
David Read
Schoenfeld <ejscho...@mindspring.com> writes
<good stuff snipped>
>I am familiar with the efforts of WRG and think highly of them, as do many
>professional MILITARY historians (other kinds of historians have other
>opinions, but in my experience if you scratch the professional veneer off a
>military historian you are bound to find a gamer underneath). Besides, a
>table-top or map board is often the only way to put together a 'thought
>experiment' in ancient/medieval military history and, often enough, is used
>as such (though professional standards require such thought experiments to
>be supported by actual evidence, rather than game results, when put into
>print). I would like to point out, however, that as far as recent
>developments in the history of late roman and medieval combat doctrine goes,
>WRG did NOT anticipate the basic research -- rather, Phil Barker was a
>perspicacious 'early adopter' of ideas that research historians were putting
>together in the late sixties through early eighties, and made them part of
>the gaming consensus long before professional historians with non-military
>specialties let them into the general historical consensus. That is, of
>course, to Phil's and WRG's credit and servews as an indication of exactly
>how historically accurate and useful Phil and the rest of WRG succeed in
>being.
Excellent post.
That's fair enough, your point that WRG was and still is an "adopter"
rather than an "anticipator" of early research. Whether or not some of
the "research historians" in the late sixties through early eighties"
were themselves directly involved the WRG, I have no idea. What I meant
when I said that the WRG anticipated these developments in military
history was that they often discuss, publish and incorporate early
research into their wargame rules, prior to its wider dissemination to
both academia and the general public. Naturally, professional historians
who wish to be taken seriously have to be much more circumspect than
this. This anticipation by the WRG can sometimes misfire, and they can
get things horribly wrong. Nevertheless, it is true to say that WRG,
often through discourse in the pages of journals like "Slingshot", chews
carefully over new research before incorporating it into its wargame
rules, and does not just blindly accept the latest excitement in
military history research without talking it through.
One of the reasons that Bachrach's work is potentially so exciting is
that it gives us a chance not to compare Charlemagne's army with Julius
Caesar's, (an idea which is not terribly interesting in my view), but to
compare it with the recent spate of publications on the Late Roman and
Byzantine armies through to the 11th century.
Very recent scholarly works on this period by the likes of Warren
Treadgold, Hugh Elton, Mark Whittow and John Haldon have particularly
examined the question of numbers raised for the Late Roman and Byzantine
military. Yet, between them, they have managed to reach some wildly
differing analyses and conclusions about how many men the Byzantines
could put into the field for any given campaign. Some of them have been
particularly influenced by the recent study, _Alexander the Great and
the Logistics of the Macedonian Army_ by Engels.
It is not so simple a matter as just consigning the likes of Delbrück
and Oman to the dustbin of history. In my view, a view which is
reflected elsewhere amongst some modern professional historians, the
eagerness with which some would declare these older historians
"obsolete" is tainted with a zealotry designed to appeal to recent
converts.
Because there is profound disagreement amongst modernists about how
large and how effective Byzantine armies were, I see no reason *yet* to
simply accept just one modern viewpoint of how large and effective
Charlemagne's armies were.
cheers,
--
David Read
Edward John Schoenfeld
><good stuff snipped>
>
[my comments on WRG snipped]
>
>Excellent post.
>
> That's fair enough, your point that WRG was and still is an "adopter"
>rather than an "anticipator" of early research. Whether or not some of
>the "research historians" in the late sixties through early eighties"
>were themselves directly involved the WRG, I have no idea. What I meant
>when I said that the WRG anticipated these developments in military
>history was that they often discuss, publish and incorporate early
>research into their wargame rules, prior to its wider dissemination to
>both academia and the general public.
Yes, exactly what I give them great credit for, so we are agreed on this
point.
Naturally, professional historians
>who wish to be taken seriously have to be much more circumspect than
>this. This anticipation by the WRG can sometimes misfire, and they can
>get things horribly wrong.
So do "research historians," from time to time ;) Still, I'd rather have
WRG risk that than be 'old fogies' about things. And as you say, they do
some serious discussion before 'changing the rules'.
>
> One of the reasons that Bachrach's work is potentially so exciting is
>that it gives us a chance not to compare Charlemagne's army with Julius
>Caesar's, (an idea which is not terribly interesting in my view), but to
>compare it with the recent spate of publications on the Late Roman and
>Byzantine armies through to the 11th century.
Absolutely. The Byzantine/Late Roman side has been very exciting recently,
and the arguments about it will certainly influence work being done on
Charlemagne.
> Very recent scholarly works on this period by the likes of Warren
>Treadgold, Hugh Elton, Mark Whittow and John Haldon have particularly
>examined the question of numbers raised for the Late Roman and Byzantine
>military. Yet, between them, they have managed to reach some wildly
>differing analyses and conclusions about how many men the Byzantines
>could put into the field for any given campaign. Some of them have been
>particularly influenced by the recent study, _Alexander the Great and
>the Logistics of the Macedonian Army_ by Engels.
For the record, Bachrach and Bowlus are pretty much 'pro-Engels' in their
approaches. I am moderately pro-Engels -- I think his basic ideas are good
but there is something flawed in his formula, which I haven't quite put my
finger on yet.
In part, the focus on Engels' work is a sign of the increasing maturity of
military history as a field -- 'amateurs study tactics, professionals study
logistics'
> It is not so simple a matter as just consigning the likes of Delbrück
>and Oman to the dustbin of history. In my view, a view which is
>reflected elsewhere amongst some modern professional historians, the
>eagerness with which some would declare these older historians
>"obsolete" is tainted with a zealotry designed to appeal to recent
>converts.
As one of the 'zealots' I suppose I can't very well object to your opinion,
but I would try to rephrase it a bit (and thereby clarify my own) -- there
are huge amounts of specific detail (especially about individual battles)
that we will probably not be able to revise Delbrück and Oman on, because we
haven't got any better tools (meaning extant sources and methods of
analysis) than they did. But as works of interpretation (covering things
like combat doctrine, operational systems, military-social interaction, and
so on) they are old, out of date, and if not mistaken in their conclusions
misleading in the methods by which they get there. So (in my opinion) we
would be better off declaring a moratorium (at least) on going to Delbrück
and Oman first (i.e. using them as reference works) and should rather build
our view of the historical period independently from the sources (as
research historians) and the work of current research historians + source
translations (if gamers/hobbyists/popularizers/general public). One might
say this in regard to many traditional historical ideas (not just Delbrück's
and Oman's)
>
> Because there is profound disagreement amongst modernists about how
>large and how effective Byzantine armies were, I see no reason *yet* to
>simply accept just one modern viewpoint of how large and effective
>Charlemagne's armies were.
Well, of course. Just as long as you buy (or get your local library to buy)
all of our books :)
Ed
Edward John Schoenfeld
>My own particular period of interest is 1066-1347 in the
>west which is a long enough period for any one person.
>My particular area is the nebulous one of technology
>which, by extension, got me involved in military technology
>and again, by extension, with military history.
The two fields are intimately related (since weapons are by definition
technology). We have seen a lot of good work done in military history re.
1066-1347 too.
>
>I was seduced early into this by Bert Hall and through
>him Kelly DeVries and Bernard Bachrach (who upon hearing
>that I was a chemist wanted me to collaborate with him
>on re-creating Greek Fire. ;-)
And being a native of Cleveland you of course advised him to toss a match
into the Cuyahoga ;)
snip
>
>As for Delbruck, we have on this newsgroup several
>committed Delbruckians who are unable to give up on
>him at all. Same for Oman. The problem, as I see it,
>is that they have produced monumental epics with an
>enormous amount of information in one place. We are
>not likely to see an equivalent modern effort in
>my lifetime -- there is just too much new information
>available.
Not by a single individual, anyway. But we will see an equivalent effort
collectively, and then it will be up to a solidly grounded popularizer to
collect the research work and turn it into a survey.
>What is especially hard is to point out
>the peculiar biases of Delbruck and Oman, especially
>since many of their admirers share the same biases.
>
>
>>Delbrück's second theory was that the military effectiveness of an army was
>>inversely proportional to the level of civilization of the troops that made
>>it up (i.e. less civilized people are inherently more warlike). [snip]
>
>You are, of course, being kind to Delbruck. He also had
>a tremendous bias in favor of those natural warriors who
>rode horses into combat. Their bravery, fortitude, and
>durability made a lasting impression on him. Of course,
>his own experience as a cavalry officer had nothing to
>do with this... ;-)
>
Well, come down to it, I've got a bias in favor of milites armati, too (or I
wouldn't make medieval military history my profession) -- but not because
they were 'natural' warriors.
[snip]
>One of the great frustrations of
>my partial life as a medievalist is that many of my close
>collegues at NYU are literary types. They have an enormous
>knowlege of the literature of say, the 12th century, but almost
>no knowledge of the political events of the period, even when
>those events clearly influenced the literature.
>
>Further, in my opinion there is much military historians can
>learn from literature. They often have read as little of
>it as the literature mavens have read of military history.
This is one of the reasons progress in the field is so slow -- you not only
have to be familiar with the 'material realities' of the situation (the
consideration of which being where Delbrück truly deserves credit as a
pioneer), you have to wade through all of the various interpretations and
method of interpretation of the written sources (whether documentary,
narrative, or literary). This is time consuming, especially when some of
the literary interpretations completely ignore things like technology and
(even) practical mechanics! -- I am reminded of a seminar on Middle High
German lit in which I completely baffled the instructor by referring to
Siegfried's bow (in a scene of the Nibelungenlied) as a crossbow -- the poem
said Siegfried was so strong he didn't need a windlass to cock it, and of
course windlasses are use to cock crossbows, not other kinds of bows.
>Just as a passing example, in the endless debate over
>"feudalism" it is worth noting that in the 1180's
>Chretien de Troyes could use the word "vassal" as a
>derogative phrase.
>
And let us not forget that JFVerbruggen based his description of battle
tactics on a deep analysis of battle actions described in the literary
sources (including the chansons and romaunts).
>
>>As far as more about the Saxon campaigns, look for a serious exchange of
>>publications between myself and Bachrach appearing over the next 2 years or
>>so (Bernie's book on Charlemagne's army, and my articles + possible book on
>>the continental Saxons). With any luck, we will suck Charles Bowlus into the
>>discussion and, between the three of us, get some real thinking done.
>
>I at least will look forward to them with great interest.
>Charlie will, I assume, claim it is all too early for him,
>but I think that you will get him involved in spite of that.
I am already arguing with him about the Lechfeld, which will be the topic of
his upcoming book (and from my point of view has to do with Saxons, at least
in their incarnation as a German dynasty).
>
>Seriously, this has the distinct possibility of revising how
>we think of the Carolingian era and changing the perception of
>that era drastically.
>
I certainly hope so.
>
Ed
David Read
Schoenfeld <ejscho...@mindspring.com> writes
>I can assure you that Bernie does not rely on Oman for anything (except,
>perhaps, a rhetorical 'straw man' to demolish).
Indeed. My tongue was firmly in my cheek...
cheers,
--
David Read
David Read
Schoenfeld <ejscho...@mindspring.com> writes
<points of agreement snipped>
>For the record, Bachrach and Bowlus are pretty much 'pro-Engels' in their
>approaches. I am moderately pro-Engels -- I think his basic ideas are good
>but there is something flawed in his formula, which I haven't quite put my
>finger on yet.
Right. I'm not entirely convinced myself, although what I have read,
(secondhand), is certainly interesting. Perhaps you have already seen
John Haldon's use and interpretation of Engels' method in _Warfare State
and Society in the Byzantine World 565-1204_.
>
>In part, the focus on Engels' work is a sign of the increasing maturity of
>military history as a field -- 'amateurs study tactics, professionals study
>logistics'
It's a pat phrase, but it is certainly noticeable that more effort is
being put into the study of logistics. Nevertheless, there are of course
earlier precedents of military historians paying attention to the
importance of logistics, which owe greater or lesser debts to Hans
Delbrück.
What concerns me is the formulaic and statistical approach that modern
military historians are finding increasingly useful these days. It
perhaps has its roots in a post-war fondness for graphs and statistics
used to analyse various forms of combat effectiveness, a trait that has
been perhaps especially popular with the American military. (I have in
mind the kind of analyses done by Colonel Dupuy). I think there might
well be a danger that such statistics will become rubrics ready to be
overused and misinterpreted over the next generation or two.
>
>As one of the 'zealots' I suppose I can't very well object to your opinion,
>but I would try to rephrase it a bit (and thereby clarify my own) -- there
>are huge amounts of specific detail (especially about individual battles)
>that we will probably not be able to revise Delbrück and Oman on, because we
>haven't got any better tools (meaning extant sources and methods of
>analysis) than they did. But as works of interpretation (covering things
>like combat doctrine, operational systems, military-social interaction, and
>so on) they are old, out of date, and if not mistaken in their conclusions
>misleading in the methods by which they get there. So (in my opinion) we
>would be better off declaring a moratorium (at least) on going to Delbrück
>and Oman first (i.e. using them as reference works) and should rather build
>our view of the historical period independently from the sources (as
>research historians) and the work of current research historians + source
>translations (if gamers/hobbyists/popularizers/general public). One might
>say this in regard to many traditional historical ideas (not just Delbrück's
>and Oman's)
There was a big fuss about Sir Charles Oman here on soc.history.medieval
earlier this year, the echoes of which are still to be heard in various
postings, not least, in mine. I have no intention of going over the same
ground again, except to say that while I agree with most of what you say
above, it is also true that Oman has often been traduced, misread and
misunderstood. I would also suggest that some serious wargamers are
again ahead of the field here. Fifteen or twenty years ago it was quite
fashionable to knock the stuffing out of Oman at wargame conventions, in
the wargaming press, etc. I don't keep up with the wargaming world as
much as I used to, but five or ten years ago one could certainly detect
an undercurrent of thought which was again showing an appreciation of
much of the detail of what Oman wrote, and that it was not "all out of
date". And that is beginning to come through again in the works of some
highly respectable military historians who are able to provide their
readership with a balanced view of the Oman, Delbrück et al.
I don't know if you mean it as a strawman when you show concern that
anyone might "go to Delbrück and Oman first." I'm not aware of anyone
doing this anyway, so who exactly should we be worrying about ? What
kind of people go to such old references first and then, worst of all,
stop there ?
>
>>
>> Because there is profound disagreement amongst modernists about how
>>large and how effective Byzantine armies were, I see no reason *yet* to
>>simply accept just one modern viewpoint of how large and effective
>>Charlemagne's armies were.
>
>
>Well, of course. Just as long as you buy (or get your local library to buy)
>all of our books :)
>
How much discount can you arrange ? :)
cheers,
--
David Read
Lblanch001
>
>I don't know if you mean it as a strawman when you show concern that
>anyone might "go to Delbrück and Oman first." I'm not aware of anyone
>doing this anyway, so who exactly should we be worrying about ? What
>kind of people go to such old references first and then, worst of all,
>stop there ?
>>
Ummm. I actually know one, from another community (not internet), and he will
go on at great length about Oman having written the last word on everything and
the work of more recent historians being unmitigated dreck.
I'm no one's expert on military history, and I don't plan to be. I do know,
though, that there's been a lot of good history done in many fields in the past
several decades. I suspect that with Oman and Delbrueck we're in a case similar
to that with Lynn White jr on technology -- instrumental in advancing the
field, even if many of the specifics have been superseded.
Regards,
Laura Blanchard
lblan...@aol.com (or lbla...@pobox.upenn.edu)
http://www.r3.org/
(see http://orb.rhodes.edu/ to reach major medieval gateway sites)
Edward John Schoenfeld
>>For the record, Bachrach and Bowlus are pretty much 'pro-Engels' in their
>>approaches. I am moderately pro-Engels -- I think his basic ideas are good
>>but there is something flawed in his formula, which I haven't quite put my
>>finger on yet.
>
>Right. I'm not entirely convinced myself, although what I have read,
>(secondhand), is certainly interesting. Perhaps you have already seen
>John Haldon's use and interpretation of Engels' method in _Warfare State
>and Society in the Byzantine World 565-1204_.
Haldon's book is very interesting -- I have been able to read through it,
but have not yet had the chance to thoroughly analyze it (I need to bone up
on Byzantine sources before doing so).
>>
>>In part, the focus on Engels' work is a sign of the increasing maturity of
>>military history as a field -- 'amateurs study tactics, professionals study
>>logistics'
>
>It's a pat phrase, but it is certainly noticeable that more effort is
>being put into the study of logistics. Nevertheless, there are of course
>earlier precedents of military historians paying attention to the
>importance of logistics, which owe greater or lesser debts to Hans
>Delbrück.
Agreed, especially the credit to Delbrück for STARTING to think about
logistics.
>
>What concerns me is the formulaic and statistical approach that modern
>military historians are finding increasingly useful these days. It
>perhaps has its roots in a post-war fondness for graphs and statistics
>used to analyse various forms of combat effectiveness, a trait that has
>been perhaps especially popular with the American military. (I have in
>mind the kind of analyses done by Colonel Dupuy). I think there might
>well be a danger that such statistics will become rubrics ready to be
>overused and misinterpreted over the next generation or two.
An entirely reasonable fear on your part, although I would put greater
responsibility (?) for the use of statistical models by historians on the
popularity of statistical approaches in the so-called 'new' social history
over the past 20-30 years.
Discussion of 'present value of Oman and Delbrück snipped. I agree with
your point about Oman being misunderstood -- in part this is the fault of
the way scholarly rhetoric works -- extreme positions are adopted to get
attention (first of all) and also to shake the vast majority of 'I read it
when I was a graduate student 40 years ago so it still must be right' types
out of their intellectual slumber.
>I don't know if you mean it as a strawman when you show concern that
>anyone might "go to Delbrück and Oman first."
Unfortunately, no.
I'm not aware of anyone
>doing this anyway, so who exactly should we be worrying about ? What
>kind of people go to such old references first and then, worst of all,
>stop there ?
Undergraduates who don't read Slingshot (or much of anything else, even when
it is assigned).
[please note that the relative clause in the above is restrictive -- there
are plenty of undergraduates who do read and think, but I am congenitally
committed to trying to get ALL of them to do so]
Ed
Ed
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
da...@dreadful.demon.co.uk (David Read) wrote:
> One hopes that Bachrach isn't relying too much upon Oman when
> comparing
> Carolingian to Roman armies - if, indeed, he does such a thing.
There is no reason why any of the quotes are not correct. The Roman
army of the 5th century was very different than that of the 1st. The
question of effectiveness is not the same as organisation.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Maternity is a matter of fact
Paternity is a matter of opinion
Paul J Gans
[...]
>>
>>I was seduced early into this by Bert Hall and through
>>him Kelly DeVries and Bernard Bachrach (who upon hearing
>>that I was a chemist wanted me to collaborate with him
>>on re-creating Greek Fire. ;-)
>And being a native of Cleveland you of course advised him to toss a match
>into the Cuyahoga ;)
Oh, I'd long left Cleveland by then and was firmly embedded
at NYU. But the burning of the Cuyahoga was a rather dramatic
demonstration of the extent to which water pollution had
progressed at that time. Needless to say, the Cuyahoga won't
burn now, but I'd still not drink the water...
>snip
>>
>>As for Delbruck, we have on this newsgroup several
>>committed Delbruckians who are unable to give up on
>>him at all. Same for Oman. The problem, as I see it,
>>is that they have produced monumental epics with an
>>enormous amount of information in one place. We are
>>not likely to see an equivalent modern effort in
>>my lifetime -- there is just too much new information
>>available.
>Not by a single individual, anyway. But we will see an equivalent effort
>collectively, and then it will be up to a solidly grounded popularizer to
>collect the research work and turn it into a survey.
Yes. There is a rather large interest in military history
of all sorts in colleges and universities these days, and
a seeming barrier to getting courses into the curriculum.
For instance, our history department is not at all interested
in doing so and our Medieval and Renaissance Studies program
has not managed to invite a military historian to speak
here in spite of their easy availability (Cliff Rogers is
right up the river) and constant pressure by me.
Is this political correctness or is it just a general
disdain for this sort of thing. Likely a bit of both.
A modern synthesis (to steal a phrase from biology) in
medieval military history would be very very welcome.
But it won't get that person tenure... ;-(
[...]
>>One of the great frustrations of
>>my partial life as a medievalist is that many of my close
>>collegues at NYU are literary types. They have an enormous
>>knowlege of the literature of say, the 12th century, but almost
>>no knowledge of the political events of the period, even when
>>those events clearly influenced the literature.
>>
>>Further, in my opinion there is much military historians can
>>learn from literature. They often have read as little of
>>it as the literature mavens have read of military history.
>This is one of the reasons progress in the field is so slow -- you not only
>have to be familiar with the 'material realities' of the situation (the
>consideration of which being where Delbrück truly deserves credit as a
>pioneer), you have to wade through all of the various interpretations and
>method of interpretation of the written sources (whether documentary,
>narrative, or literary). This is time consuming, especially when some of
>the literary interpretations completely ignore things like technology and
>(even) practical mechanics! -- I am reminded of a seminar on Middle High
>German lit in which I completely baffled the instructor by referring to
>Siegfried's bow (in a scene of the Nibelungenlied) as a crossbow -- the poem
>said Siegfried was so strong he didn't need a windlass to cock it, and of
>course windlasses are use to cock crossbows, not other kinds of bows.
Oh yes. I found what I think is the first reference to
rat traps in Chretien's _Yvain_ and what I think is the
first reference to magnets (as opposed to compasses) was
found by a collegue of mine in _The Roman d'Enéas_, a mid-
twelfth century Norman romance.
The reference to the crossbow above is also interesting.
Do you have a date for that particular version of the
_ Nibelungenlied_? Early mentions of crossbows are rather
rare, as you know.
[...]
>>>As far as more about the Saxon campaigns, look for a serious exchange of
>>>publications between myself and Bachrach appearing over the next 2 years or
>>>so (Bernie's book on Charlemagne's army, and my articles + possible book on
>>>the continental Saxons). With any luck, we will suck Charles Bowlus into the
>>>discussion and, between the three of us, get some real thinking done.
>>
>>I at least will look forward to them with great interest.
>>Charlie will, I assume, claim it is all too early for him,
>>but I think that you will get him involved in spite of that.
>I am already arguing with him about the Lechfeld, which will be the topic of
>his upcoming book (and from my point of view has to do with Saxons, at least
>in their incarnation as a German dynasty).
Are you (or have you) published some of your comments? They
are certainly of wide interest.
>>
>>Seriously, this has the distinct possibility of revising how
>>we think of the Carolingian era and changing the perception of
>>that era drastically.
>>
>I certainly hope so.
---- Paul J. Gans [ga...@panix.com]
D. Spencer Hines
--
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas et Libertas
Sol Remedium Optimum Est. Peccatoris Justificatio Absque Paenitentia,
Legem Destruit Moralem.
Paul J [sic] Gans <ga...@panix.com> wrote in message
news:819l0v$q69$1...@news.panix.com...
<snip>
| Yes. There is a rather large interest in military history
| of all sorts in colleges and universities these days, and
| a seeming barrier to getting courses into the curriculum.
Not surprising.
| For instance, our history department is not at all interested
| in doing so and our Medieval and Renaissance Studies program
| has not managed to invite a military historian to speak
| here in spite of their easy availability (Cliff Rogers is
| right up the river) and constant pressure by me.
|
| Is this political correctness or is it just a general
| disdain for this sort of thing. Likely a bit of both.
Yes, both of those.
Plus, many conventional [traditional, at this passage] academic
historians are members of the Old Left or New Left and have no use for
anything military or naval. Some of them are outright pacifists. The
New Left academics are probably the worst in this respect. The Old Left
still remembers "The Good War" [World War II], whereas the New Left does
not.
| A modern synthesis (to steal a phrase from biology) in
| medieval military history would be very very welcome.
| But it won't get that person tenure... ;-(
<snip>
No, and it won't get them the respect of their colleagues.
1. Academics rise and fall, live and die, based upon what they KNOW and
can teach and publish.
2. Very few of them know much about military or naval matters.
3. Since they don't know much if anything about these matters, they
CANNOT _ipso facto_ be very IMPORTANT. N'est-ce pas? I mean, if they
were important matters, the academics would know about them.
4. Certainly these military and naval matters are not worth giving
someone tenure at this [my] university.
5. Another potential danger is that these courses would corrupt the
youth and lead them to think that military and naval history, national
security, defense industries and intelligence are important. We can't
have that.
6. Given the obvious danger of #6, the corrupted youth would grow up
and vote the wrong way --- in favor of Wasteful Military Spending and
against Programs That Really Help People. We can't permit that to
happen.
7. Finally, since these courses would be popular [in a childish and
superficial way, of course] many students would gravitate toward them as
"fun" --- particularly the young men --- and then they would not be
taking the serious, required courses of the Old Left and New Left
professors [i.e., us] that knock those wrong ideas out of their heads
and make socially responsible people of them [read Liberal Democrats].
We would lose students, rank, prestige, grants and preferment in the
academic pyramid. No Way!
8. We obviously can't have that sort of thing happening. So, it's best
to marginalize the teaching of military and naval history at the
university level, as well as anyone who is foolish enough to have
specialized in it --- and keep them fenced out.
9. If they want to teach that rubbish they can do it at West Point, the
Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy or one of those silly "War
Colleges" the military has. That's where that sort of thing should be
taught --- and that's the ONLY place it should be taught!
<Groak>
Arma Virumque Cano.
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas et Libertas
Exitus Acta Probat
Edward John Schoenfeld
>>I am reminded of a seminar on Middle High
>>German lit in which I completely baffled the instructor by referring to
>>Siegfried's bow (in a scene of the Nibelungenlied) as a crossbow -- the poem
>>said Siegfried was so strong he didn't need a windlass to cock it, and of
>>course windlasses are use to cock crossbows, not other kinds of bows.
>
>Oh yes. I found what I think is the first reference to
>rat traps in Chretien's _Yvain_ and what I think is the
>first reference to magnets (as opposed to compasses) was
>found by a collegue of mine in _The Roman d'Enéas_, a mid-
>twelfth century Norman romance.
>
>The reference to the crossbow above is also interesting.
>Do you have a date for that particular version of the
>_ Nibelungenlied_? Early mentions of crossbows are rather
>rare, as you know.
>
It was a very low-level seminar -- we were using A. Bachman's
Mittelhochdeutsches Lesebuch, 19th ed (Zürich, 1970).
Ed
Edward John Schoenfeld
----------
In article <819l0v$q69$1...@news.panix.com>, Paul J Gans <ga...@panix.com>
wrote:
Re Saxons, Carolingians, Bachrach, Bowlus, et al:
>
>Are you (or have you) published some of your comments? They
>are certainly of wide interest.
>
I have been able to publish some of the preliminary studies on tenth century
Saxon/German military institutions (Henry the Fowler and Otto the Great
stuff) that got me started on the investigation -- I rapidly discovered that
I had to go back to at least the fifth century to make sense of all the
modern historiography, and then I got interested in the 5th-8th century
stuff in its own right.
If you are interested in the tenth century stuff I have an article on burgen
and burhs in the Haskins Society Journal for 1993, and another on military
service in 1oth century Saxony in a more recent collected papers, The Circle
of War in the Middle Ages, ed. Kagay and Villalon (Boydell: 1998). They are
fairly institutional in orientation -- no big armored galoons beating up on
other big armored galoons in those venues . . .
Ed
D. Spencer Hines
Vide infra.
--
D. Spencer Hines
<snip>
Not surprising.
Yes, both of those.
<snip>
6. Given the obvious danger of #5, the corrupted youth would grow up
and vote the wrong way --- in favor of Wasteful Military Spending and
against Programs That Really Help People. We can't permit that to
happen.
7. Finally, since these courses would be popular [in a childish and
superficial way, of course] many students would gravitate toward them as
"fun" --- particularly the young men --- and then they would not be
taking the serious, required courses of the Old Left and New Left
professors [i.e., us] that knock those wrong ideas out of their heads
and make socially responsible people of them [read Liberal Democrats].
We would lose students, rank, prestige, grants and preferment in the
academic pyramid. No Way!
8. We obviously can't have that sort of thing happening. So, it's best
to marginalize the teaching of military and naval history at the
university level, as well as anyone who is foolish enough to have
specialized in it --- and keep them fenced out.
9. If they want to teach that rubbish they can do it at West Point, the
Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy or one of those silly "War
Colleges" the military has. That's where that sort of thing should be
taught --- and that's the ONLY place it should be taught!
<Groak>
Arma Virumque Cano.
D. Spencer Hines
Lux et Veritas et Libertas
Exitus Acta Probat
Steve Moss
> HI David, Paul, Spencer and all,
>
> Please re-read my earlier comment on Roman army - I believe the Roman army of
> ca 400 AD was indeed better over all than that of 100 AD and said so. I wrote
> that the decline came after that and that by ca 700 the quality of military
> force in Gaul was worse, but was then rising again between ca 700 and 800. The
> quality is a result of the quality of the arms and armor, the training, the
> organization, the intrinsic quality of the recruit and the experience of the
> officers and more, above all the social basis on which the army is formed.
> I will post of a list of references on the Roman army as soon as I can. But for
> now I might ask if Vegetius was wrong in his assessments?
He might have been, but until we have some writings from a contemporary of Vegetius
contradicting him, he's still the best evidence on whether Roman discipline and
training had declined over the years. He maintained it had and gave examples
(legionnaires discarding armor as to heavy, not drilling, etc...). He sound fairly
reliable to me, especially when coupled with the end result, the fall of the
Western Empire within a century of his work.
snip
Steve Moss
Paul J Gans
>----------
>In article <819l0v$q69$1...@news.panix.com>, Paul J Gans <ga...@panix.com>
>wrote:
>Re Saxons, Carolingians, Bachrach, Bowlus, et al:
>>
>>Are you (or have you) published some of your comments? They
>>are certainly of wide interest.
>>
>I have been able to publish some of the preliminary studies on tenth century
>Saxon/German military institutions (Henry the Fowler and Otto the Great
>stuff) that got me started on the investigation -- I rapidly discovered that
>I had to go back to at least the fifth century to make sense of all the
>modern historiography, and then I got interested in the 5th-8th century
>stuff in its own right.
>If you are interested in the tenth century stuff I have an article on burgen
>and burhs in the Haskins Society Journal for 1993, and another on military
>service in 1oth century Saxony in a more recent collected papers, The Circle
>of War in the Middle Ages, ed. Kagay and Villalon (Boydell: 1998). They are
>fairly institutional in orientation -- no big armored galoons beating up on
>other big armored galoons in those venues . . .
Thanks. I'll check them out.
Your comment above mirrors one I heard Bachrach make: when
he first decided to look into Charlemagne's military campaigns
he found that he had to redo the entire previous period in
order to understand Charlemagne.
David Read
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk writes
>
> There is no reason why any of the quotes are not correct. The Roman
>army of the 5th century was very different than that of the 1st. The
>question of effectiveness is not the same as organisation.
Of course "effectiveness is not the same as organisation". The three
quotations are not just about the "Roman army of the 5th century."
Oman is talking about a decline in the effectiveness of the Roman
infantry, in particular the legionary, and that this decline was
responsible for the disaster at Adrianople in 378 AD and all the other
military woes of the Late Roman empire. Barker does not agree that this
was the case and neither does Elton.
cheers,
--
David Read
Jason Ehlers
>> I will post of a list of references on the Roman army as soon as I can. But
>for
>> now I might ask if Vegetius was wrong in his assessments?
>
>He might have been, but until we have some writings from a contemporary of
>Vegetius
>contradicting him, he's still the best evidence on whether Roman discipline
>and
>training had declined over the years. He maintained it had and gave examples
>(legionnaires discarding armor as to heavy, not drilling, etc...). He sound
>fairly
>reliable to me, especially when coupled with the end result, the fall of the
>Western Empire within a century of his work.
>
Well, also some of the result was for reasons
that didn't have to do with the quality of the
army of the western roman empire.
The germanic tribes greatly increased their
power militarily, by learning the roman methods
in their service, and also they began to have
reasonably strong monarchs compared to
roman emperors, and although
there was backstabbing among them, it was
not as severe as that among the romans.
the roman agricultural system had collapsed,
their economy was really going downhill, all
these reasons and more listed by gibbon.
the tribes the western romans faced were
very powerful, and what they lacked in heavy
siege equipment they made up for in morale
and ferocity, and truly great commanders such
as Alaric. the romans system of mass slavery
and corruption had grown intolerable even to
moderately wealthy romans, some of whom even
decided to abandon the roman culture for the
germanic one. the roman administration and public
works are to be admired, but their human rights
record was appalling not only in modern times but
even in its own time. many "romans" did not have
any personal stake in keeping the old system going,
and at times of famine and invasion, when not even the roman state could stop
the disaster, people's
beliefs were shaken to the core.
it would kind of be like in today's world when the
vietnam war wore down the world's most expensive armed force, or when the most
advanced medicine cannot find cures for new
diseases, or when a trillion dollars of social programs cannot stamp out
homelessness, drug
addiction, and so on.
the empires are an artificial construction, an idea
upheld by all means of the state, but this is
administered by humans, and their spirit can be
broken in many ways. and the people are not the
same quality, and the situation changes. bill clinton
is not the same caliber of leader as george washington. and maybe not even
george washington could effectively deal with all the same
decisions that must be made today. so it was with
the romans. their empire's complexity grew with successes, but later the
complexity got to be too much for anyone. temporary fixes along the way
were just that, temporary.
i think it just reflects the cycle of civilization that
always seems to occur in history. there seems
to be no stopping the decline of an empire, just
ways to slow it down, so that the fall comes more
as a slow agony rather than a shock.
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