Early Rome greatest enemy
SolomonW
In this book he makes the following claim that early Rome and the
surrounding Italians greatest enemy was the Gauls. That they were repulsed
by the Gauls and that a war between them was almost genocidal.
I would have said it was the Punic's.
Christopher Ingham
It's a matter of semantics. Early Rome designates the regal period and
the early years of the republic. The Punic wars occurred in mid-
republican times.
Christopher Ingham
Tiglath
wrote:
The Gauls made deep incursions into Italy and captured Rome, which
Hannibal did not.
So the author is right, as far as non-Italian enemies, but since Italy
was not unified in early Rome times, the most frequent enemy if that
counts as being a great enemy, were the neighboring cities. Livy's
list of conflicts, battles, and wars big and small with Veii, and
other neighboring people fills an entire book.
SolomonW
Almost every summer, the Romans matched off to war.
Anyway the Gauls presumably would have warred against these people too!
Are you aware of any deep racial hatred for the Gauls by the Romans?
VtSkier
I'm not sure that racism as it exists today
existed in classical times. For the most part
your enemies "looked like you". The biggest
motivation for war was land. Keeping what you
have (defense) or getting more (offense),
(lebensraum). Land feeds people. Food expands
population. More population requires more
land, etc. It's a spiral.
Then, an "us vs. them" attitude is innate in
the human psyche. Leaders exploit this to make
war more palatable for the participants (e.g.
calling Germans "Huns" in last world wars).
Tiglath
Yes. The Italians later returned the favor.
>
> Are you aware of any deep racial hatred for the Gauls by the Romans?
Xenophobia in those days was the order of the day. Remember that
sudden death was frequently moments away from sighting riders on the
nearby hills. And settlements while growing stronger were only a few
hundred or very few thousand strong, and only the richest had strong
walls.
Christopher Ingham
> On Oct 31, 1:49 pm, Christopher Ingham <christophering...@comcast.net>
> wrote:
> > On Oct 31, 6:22 am, SolomonW <Solom...@nospamMail.com> wrote:
> > > I am partly though a book "War and Peace and War by Peter Turchin".
> > > In this book he makes the following claim that early Rome and the
> > > surrounding Italians greatest enemy was the Gauls. That they were repulsed
> > > by the Gauls and that a war between them was almost genocidal.
> > > I would have said it was the Punic's.
> > It's a matter of semantics. Early Rome designates the regal period and
> > the early years of the republic. The Punic wars occurred in mid-
> > republican times.
> The Gauls made deep incursions into Italy and captured Rome, which
> Hannibal did not.
Hannibal made deep incursions into Italy, too, and his effect on the
Romans was just as devastating, and in terms of absolute numbers of
fatalities was more so. The capture of Rome -- which at one point
Hannibal may have been able to accomplish if he had chosen to -- is
not the only criterion for what constitutes a "greatest enemy."
Neither the Gauls nor the Carthaginians (1) annihilated the Romans,
(2) permanently impaired the Romans' ability to defend themselves and
wage war, or (3) effected a permanent Roman territorial diminishment.
The Gauls and Carthaginians perhaps had the capability or were on the
verge of effectuating one or more of the above, but the fact that they
did not do so, either through choice or circumstance, renders any
debate as to which was the greater enemy more subjective.
> So the author is right, as far as non-Italian enemies,
And, as far as "early Rome" (as per the words of the OP) is concerned,
the Punic wars would never be a subject for discussion, except
tangentially, as they occurred in a later period.
but since Italy
> was not unified in early Rome times, the most frequent enemy if that
> counts as being a great enemy, were the neighboring cities. Livy's
> list of conflicts, battles, and wars big and small with Veii, and
> other neighboring people fills an entire book.
Yes, the history of the inexorable Roman conquest of Italy is a
tiresome litany of struggles with other Italian city-states. But the
sack of Rome by the Gauls was a singularly noteworthy event --
meriting mention by contemporary Greeks, such as Heraclides Ponticus,
Theopompus, and Aristotle, who otherwise ignored Rome -- not to be
repeated for another 800 years.
Apart from this event, little is definitely known about the "Gallic
catastrophe," as accounts of it are obviously embellished. The Senones
were perhaps a band of marauding mercenaries interested primarily in
movable goods to plunder. The number of Romans killed and the extent
of destruction of the city of Rome cannot be determined (by
archaeology or any other means), but has probably been exaggerated,
especially since the Romans within a dozen years after the sack were
again engaged in aggressive military campaigns.
Different orders of magnitude are involved in assessing Roman
conflicts in the early fourth century BCE and the late third century
BCE. The Roman army may have had as many as 6000 troops in 387 BCE. In
the battles of Lake Trasimene and Cannae alone between 65,000 and
85,000 Roman troops perished.
Christopher Ingham
Tiglath
wrote:
> On Oct 31, 6:10 pm, Tiglath <te...@tiglath.net> wrote:
>
> > On Oct 31, 1:49 pm, Christopher Ingham <christophering...@comcast.net>
> > wrote:
> > > On Oct 31, 6:22 am, SolomonW <Solom...@nospamMail.com> wrote:
> > > > I am partly though a book "War and Peace and War by Peter Turchin".
> > > > In this book he makes the following claim that early Rome and the
> > > > surrounding Italians greatest enemy was the Gauls. That they were repulsed
> > > > by the Gauls and that a war between them was almost genocidal.
> > > > I would have said it was the Punic's.
> > > It's a matter of semantics. Early Rome designates the regal period and
> > > the early years of the republic. The Punic wars occurred in mid-
> > > republican times.
> > The Gauls made deep incursions into Italy and captured Rome, which
> > Hannibal did not.
>
> Hannibal made deep incursions into Italy,
"Gauls [...] captured Rome, which Hannibal did not."
> too, and his effect on the
> Romans was just as devastating, and in terms of absolute numbers of
> fatalities was more so. The capture of Rome -- which at one point
> Hannibal may have been able to accomplish if he had chosen to
???????
Without siege engines?
Hannibal at the gates of Rome was such a worry for the Romans that as
Hannibal stood there, the Romans sent OUT an army to Spain through the
back door.
I am a great admirer of Hannibal, but siege warfare was not his forte,
and Rome was no Saguntum.
Tiglath
wrote:
> On Oct 31, 6:10 pm, Tiglath <te...@tiglath.net> wrote:
>
> > On Oct 31, 1:49 pm, Christopher Ingham <christophering...@comcast.net>
> > wrote:
> > > On Oct 31, 6:22 am, SolomonW <Solom...@nospamMail.com> wrote:
> > > > I am partly though a book "War and Peace and War by Peter Turchin".
> > > > In this book he makes the following claim that early Rome and the
> > > > surrounding Italians greatest enemy was the Gauls. That they were repulsed
> > > > by the Gauls and that a war between them was almost genocidal.
> > > > I would have said it was the Punic's.
> > > It's a matter of semantics. Early Rome designates the regal period and
> > > the early years of the republic. The Punic wars occurred in mid-
> > > republican times.
> > The Gauls made deep incursions into Italy and captured Rome, which
> > Hannibal did not.
>
> Hannibal made deep incursions into Italy, too, and his effect on the
> Romans was just as devastating, and in terms of absolute numbers of
> fatalities was more so. The capture of Rome -- which at one point
> Hannibal may have been able to accomplish if he had chosen to -- is
> not the only criterion for what constitutes a "greatest enemy."
If the capture of one's capital is not such a criterion what might
be?
The Gauls reportedly were bribed out of Rome and as they were
plunderers and not occupiers they left to plunder elsewhere. But
that is luck, they well could have settled at Rome and nobody could
have stopped them, and then consolidate their new conquest attracting
more Gaulish settlers. History might have been very different if
so. And none of it was up to the Romans but the Gauls.
> Neither the Gauls nor the Carthaginians (1) annihilated the Romans,
> (2) permanently impaired the Romans' ability to defend themselves and
> wage war, or (3) effected a permanent Roman territorial diminishment.
The Carthaginians couldn't and the Gauls wouldn't.
> The Gauls and Carthaginians perhaps had the capability or were on the
> verge of effectuating one or more of the above, but the fact that they
> did not do so, either through choice or circumstance, renders any
> debate as to which was the greater enemy more subjective.
Both were great enemies, but as you said, "early Rome" leaves the
Gauls as only choice. The Carthaginians of the First Punic War were
never a serious threat to Rome.
Again, "early Rome" limits those times out of the question.
J Antero
"SolomonW" <Solo...@nospamMail.com> wrote in message
news:AdUGm.3940$tF5....@newsfe25.ams2...
The Gauls actually sacked the city of Rome around 390 BC and the romans
never forgot it, and worried about what might come out of the large lands to
the north. Caesar *claimed* that his campaigns in Gaul were of a pre-emptive
nature in the long term defense of Rome. However, about 350 years had passed
between the sack of rome, and the destruction of the Gallic tribes by
Caesar.
As far as genocide goes, I've read estimates that Caesar's campaigns led to
the death of as many as 2 million gauls - probably mostly due to wrecking
their food supplies. I think the massive loss of life was more a side effect
of conquering them versus deliberate extermination.
As far as being repulsed by tthe Gauls - they were probably more repulsed by
their Druid religion with its human sacrifices. Romans respected most
religions, but not the Druids. I think Tacitus mentions some Roman troops
vomiting at the sight of children being sacrificed by Boudica's army before
their defeat at the Battle of Watling street.
Christopher Ingham
> On Nov 1, 3:04 pm, Christopher Ingham <christophering...@comcast.net>
> wrote:
> > On Oct 31, 6:10 pm, Tiglath <te...@tiglath.net> wrote:
> > > On Oct 31, 1:49 pm, Christopher Ingham <christophering...@comcast.net>
> > > wrote:
> > > > On Oct 31, 6:22 am, SolomonW <Solom...@nospamMail.com> wrote:
> > > > > I am partly though a book "War and Peace and War by Peter Turchin".
> > > > > In this book he makes the following claim that early Rome and the
> > > > > surrounding Italians greatest enemy was the Gauls. That they were repulsed
> > > > > by the Gauls and that a war between them was almost genocidal.
> > > > > I would have said it was the Punic's.
> > > > It's a matter of semantics. Early Rome designates the regal period and
> > > > the early years of the republic. The Punic wars occurred in mid-
> > > > republican times.
> > > The Gauls made deep incursions into Italy and captured Rome, which
> > > Hannibal did not.
> > Hannibal made deep incursions into Italy, too, and his effect on the
> > Romans was just as devastating, and in terms of absolute numbers of
> > fatalities was more so. The capture of Rome -- which at one point
> > Hannibal may have been able to accomplish if he had chosen to -- is
> > not the only criterion for what constitutes a "greatest enemy."
>
> If the capture of one's capital is not such a criterion what might
> be?
For starters, the three points I made (reproduced 2 paragraphs below).
Who is the greatest enemy of the USA? The British, who occupied
Washington, D.C. in 1814? Of the Papal States? The Germans, who sacked
Rome in 1527? In considering questions from a historical perspective,
occupation of a capital does not always automatically confer greatest
enemy status on the offending state.
> The Gauls reportedly were bribed out of Rome and as they were
> plunderers and not occupiers they left to plunder elsewhere. But
> that is luck, they well could have settled at Rome and nobody could
> have stopped them, and then consolidate their new conquest attracting
> more Gaulish settlers. History might have been very different if
> so.
"What ifs" to me are unconstructive lines of discourse.
And none of it was up to the Romans but the Gauls.
We don't know this to be a fact. The sack of Rome occurred, but
otherwise nothing of the Gallic episode can be definitively
reconstructed.
> > Neither the Gauls nor the Carthaginians (1) annihilated the Romans,
> > (2) permanently impaired the Romans' ability to defend themselves and
> > wage war, or (3) effected a permanent Roman territorial diminishment.
>
> The Carthaginians couldn't and the Gauls wouldn't.
Neither assertion is a fact.
Christopher Ingham
> Again, "early Rome" limits those times out of the question.- Hide quoted text -
Christopher Ingham
> On Nov 1, 3:04 pm, Christopher Ingham <christophering...@comcast.net>
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Oct 31, 6:10 pm, Tiglath <te...@tiglath.net> wrote:
>
> > > On Oct 31, 1:49 pm, Christopher Ingham <christophering...@comcast.net>
> > > wrote:
> > > > On Oct 31, 6:22 am, SolomonW <Solom...@nospamMail.com> wrote:
> > > > > I am partly though a book "War and Peace and War by Peter Turchin".
> > > > > In this book he makes the following claim that early Rome and the
> > > > > surrounding Italians greatest enemy was the Gauls. That they were repulsed
> > > > > by the Gauls and that a war between them was almost genocidal.
> > > > > I would have said it was the Punic's.
> > > > It's a matter of semantics. Early Rome designates the regal period and
> > > > the early years of the republic. The Punic wars occurred in mid-
> > > > republican times.
> > > The Gauls made deep incursions into Italy and captured Rome, which
> > > Hannibal did not.
>
> > Hannibal made deep incursions into Italy,
>
> "Gauls [...] captured Rome, which Hannibal did not."
>
> > too, and his effect on the
> > Romans was just as devastating, and in terms of absolute numbers of
> > fatalities was more so. The capture of Rome -- which at one point
> > Hannibal may have been able to accomplish if he had chosen to
>
> ???????
Just a suggestion: trim the punctuation. This form of netiquette style
gives a histrionic tone to the post.
>
> Without siege engines?
>
> Hannibal at the gates of Rome was such a worry for the Romans that as
> Hannibal stood there, the Romans sent OUT an army to Spain through the
> back door.
>
> I am a great admirer of Hannibal, but siege warfare was not his forte,
> and Rome was no Saguntum.
Whether Hannibal would have succeeded (another "what if") cannot be
known. He could possibly have had a favorable outcome in 216 if he had
implemented a siege strategy; probably not in 211. Most but not all
modern commentators on the subject don't think an attempt on Rome was
ever a goal of Hannibal, though.
Christopher Ingham
> > Christopher Ingham- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Tiglath
wrote:
>
> > If the capture of one's capital is not such a criterion what might
> > be?
>
> For starters, the three points I made (reproduced 2 paragraphs below).
>
> Who is the greatest enemy of the USA? The British, who occupied
> Washington, D.C. in 1814? Of the Papal States? The Germans, who sacked
> Rome in 1527? In considering questions from a historical perspective,
> occupation of a capital does not always automatically confer greatest
> enemy status on the offending state.
>
> > The Gauls reportedly were bribed out of Rome and as they were
> > plunderers and not occupiers they left to plunder elsewhere. But
> > that is luck, they well could have settled at Rome and nobody could
> > have stopped them, and then consolidate their new conquest attracting
> > more Gaulish settlers. History might have been very different if
> > so.
>
> "What ifs" to me are unconstructive lines of discourse.
>
I can't see why. It's perfectly valid to say that the Gauls had the
option to accept Roman bribes and leave or settled in Rome, and it's
the Gaul's choice, not the Roman's, which determined subsequent
history. That alone gives anyone in that position considerable
standing as an enemy. Again, Hannibal was never in such position of
absolute power, and much as Hannibal put much fear into the Roman
mind, the memory of the Gaul's sack of Rome made quite a dent to it.
> And none of it was up to the Romans but the Gauls.
>
> We don't know this to be a fact. The sack of Rome occurred, but
> otherwise nothing of the Gallic episode can be definitively
> reconstructed.
We are at the mercy of our sources, and unless sources contradict each
other, or we can disprove the account otherwise, what the sources say
is as much fact as history gets.
I invite to find evidence that tells against Livy's account of the
Gallic invasion.
Even if you remove all the romantic fiction you still have an Gallic
incursion in Roman territory important enough to be confirmed by
several sources.
>
> > > Neither the Gauls nor the Carthaginians (1) annihilated the Romans,
> > > (2) permanently impaired the Romans' ability to defend themselves and
> > > wage war, or (3) effected a permanent Roman territorial diminishment.
>
> > The Carthaginians couldn't and the Gauls wouldn't.
>
> Neither assertion is a fact.
Silly comeback, it is a historical FACT that the Carthaginians could
not do any of those things after three all-out attempts.
As to the Gauls, as best we know they could have, but Romans were
lucky that they were sacked by Gallic marauders not migrants.
Tiglath
wrote:
> The capture of Rome -- which at one point
> > > Hannibal may have been able to accomplish if he had chosen to
>
> > ???????
>
> Just a suggestion: trim the punctuation. This form of netiquette style
> gives a histrionic tone to the post.
>
Extraordinary claims deserve extraordinary punctuation.
I know of no historian who would claim that Hannibal at one point may
have been able to capture Rome if ha had chosen to do so.
Which point is that?
it is most extraordinary to claim that a large well fortified city
could have been taken at will, by an invader without siege engines,
which he would have had to build while on unfriendly territory, of
which he controlled a small swath, which did not include any port or
coast near Rome. That this relatively small army of ~40,000 would
engage in a long siege and thus offer a fixed position to Rome's
enormous manpower, estimated at 700,000, to converge on his back, and
so raise the question of who would be besieging who.
For such a claim I believe I replied with much too few question
marks.
Hannibal did march on Rome in 211, not really hoping to take the city
but to raise the siege of Capua, which was being invested by the two
consuls, but soon realized that the city was more than adequately
defended without the consular armies, and turned back south. He
could not even take Tarentum from the Roman garrison and with the help
of the Punic fleet, or prevent the fall of Capua.
>
>
> > Without siege engines?
>
> > Hannibal at the gates of Rome was such a worry for the Romans that as
> > Hannibal stood there, the Romans sent OUT an army to Spain through the
> > back door.
>
> > I am a great admirer of Hannibal, but siege warfare was not his forte,
> > and Rome was no Saguntum.
>
> Whether Hannibal would have succeeded (another "what if") cannot be
> known.
But it can be estimated pretty well. How do you take Rome without
siege engines?
How do you find the peace to build or import such engines if you
control no port nearby and are surrounded by an enemy that will not
give you such peace?
Obviously Hannibal did not think he could at his best point in the war
in Italy, right after Cannae; after that it was all downhill.
Think again.
> He could possibly have had a favorable outcome in 216 if he had
> implemented a siege strategy;
Hannibal was there then and he did not think so. A siege strategy is
only possible when you control large resources and you don't have to
watch your back. Cannae won Hannibal a few defections of Rome's
allies but by no means enough; those traitor cities were mostly in the
south and far from Rome. At Rome Hannibal was not like Alexander who
invested cities after conquering all nearby states. Hannibal, even
after Cannae, was sitting in a Roman sea with enemy forces avoiding
battle but harassing him at every chance.
> probably not in 211. Most but not all
> modern commentators on the subject don't think an attempt on Rome was
> ever a goal of Hannibal, though.
True.
It was probably a goal, but realistically only wishful thinking until
he could turn the Italian tide against Rome, which did not happen.
Hannibal had an excellent fighting force but was too small an army for
the tall order, and Rome did an excellent job depriving Hannibal of
reinforcements.
Christopher Ingham
> On Nov 1, 5:52 pm, Christopher Ingham <christophering...@comcast.net>
> wrote:
> > The capture of Rome -- which at one point
> > > > Hannibal may have been able to accomplish if he had chosen to
> > > ???????
> > Just a suggestion: trim the punctuation. This form of netiquette style
> > gives a histrionic tone to the post.
> Extraordinary claims deserve extraordinary punctuation.
>
> I know of no historian who would claim that Hannibal at one point may
> have been able to capture Rome if ha had chosen to do so.
"The question whether Hannibal could have won the war [after Cannae]
by marching on Rome is unanswerable, like all hypothetical questions
in history."
-- John F. Lazenby,_Hannibal's War: A Military History of the Second
Punic War_(Norman, OK, 1998), 85
"Whether or not Hannibal should have led his army on Rome immediately
after Cannae became a commonplace of Roman oratory[....] Modern
commentators have continued to debate the matter and some, notably
Field Marshal Montgomery [_A History of Warfare_, 1968, 97], agreed
with Maharbal's verdict [see Livy 22.51.1-4]. However, most now take
the opposite view and argue that an advance on Rome was both
impracticable and unlikely to succeed[....] It is probably correct
that Hannibal would have been unable to capture Rome if its defenders
had put up any sort of resistance. The crucial but unanswerable
question is whether the Romans would indeed have fought, or felt
forced to sue for peace with the invader who had arrived outside their
walls in the wake of his massive triumph. Any other contemporary state
would certainly have done so, as Carthage did with Regulus in 255 and
would do again with Scipio in 204 and 202. Hannibal now posed a
greater threat to the Roman republic than any other foreign power
would ever do throughout its entire history. That on other occasions
the Romans endured greater defeats without ever losing their belief in
ultimate victory does not prove that they would have done so in 216
[....] Certainly, if any state could have coped with such pressure,
then it was Rome, but it is impossible to know that they would have
done so."
-- Adrian Goldsworthy,_The Punic Wars_(London, 2000), 215-6
"Modern as opposed to ancient historians mostly commend Hannibal's
decision [not to march on Rome after Cannae]. Various justifications
are mentioned [...] yet all such points, impressive at first glance,
fail to convince[....] [Maharbal's] idea clearly was was to reach Rome
ahead of or along with friendlier messengers, and seize the city as
disbelief and panic boiled up inside as well as outside[....] If it
seemed safer to keep the cavalry with the rest of the army,
nevertheless the army could have reached the city in three weeks [...]
or even sooner by forced marches[....] Siege equipment could have been
manufactured from the woods of Latium and Etruria, the extensive city
walls could not have been strongly manned, the legion at Teanum was
perilously isolated over 90 miles to the south-east, and the advance
of 40,000-odd enemy troops would have driven refugees from all around
its path into Rome---cramming extra mouths to feed into a besieged
city was a standard method of war[....] [With a blockade] in place,
efforts by magistrates to organize fresh resistance would have been
hampered by the sealing-off of the political centre. Nor is it certain
that Rome would have been immune to treachery[....] Hannibal encamped
around Rome and paralysing the Romann war-effort would scarcely
discourage wavering southern Italian allies from defecting[....] The
result of a march on Rome would very probably have been a monumental
change to the history of the Mediterranean."
-- Dexter Hoyos,_Hannibal's Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western
Mediterranean, 247-183 BC_(New York, 2005), 119-21
>
> Which point is that?
After Cannae in 216 (see above).
> it is most extraordinary to claim that a large well fortified city
> could have been taken at will <snip>
>
> For such a claim I believe I replied with much too few question
> marks.
> > > <snip>
> > > Without siege engines?
"[Hannibal] has also been criticized for his failure to press home
attacks on towns, and it is true, if Livy is to be trusted, that very
few towns were taken by the Carthaginians by assault or longer siege.
But this has nothing to do with his lack of a 'siege-train': there is
plenty of evidence that he could construct all that was necessary to
take a fortified place, if and when he wanted to -- after all, only a
supply of timber was really necessary. Livy, for example, mentions
'mantlets (_vineae_) in his account of the attack on Casilinum in 216
(23.18.8), a huge wooden tower in the attack on Cumae in 215
(23.37.2), and 'machines' (_machinationes_) in the attack on the
citadel of Tarentum in 213/12 (25.11.10): in his account of the attack
on Locri in 205, he specifically says that although the Carthaginians
had brought no siege-equipment with them, they made it there and then
(29.7.4ff.)."
-- Lazenby, 87
Christopher Ingham
Christopher Ingham
> On Nov 1, 5:31 pm, Christopher Ingham <christophering...@comcast.net>
> wrote:
> > > > Neither the Gauls nor the Carthaginians (1) annihilated the Romans,
> > > > (2) permanently impaired the Romans' ability to defend themselves and
> > > > wage war, or (3) effected a permanent Roman territorial diminishment.
>
> > > The Carthaginians couldn't and the Gauls wouldn't.
>
> > Neither assertion is a fact.
>
> Silly comeback, it is a historical FACT that the Carthaginians could
> not do any of those things after three all-out attempts.
No, the fact is that they did not -- it is impossible to ever know
that they could not. (See the quoted sources in my reply above.)
> As to the Gauls, as best we know they could have, but Romans were
> lucky that they were sacked by Gallic marauders not migrants.
No, the fact is that they did not; we have no solid evidence that they
could have. See, e.g., Tim J. Cornell,_The Beginnings of Rome_(New
York, 1995), 313-20:
http://books.google.com/books?id=EAEOAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA313&lpg=PA313&dq=6+THE+GALLIC+CATASTROPHE&source=bl&ots=Ui1wswBRDv&sig=iquLEQSE6AJgj0wnoqGka2Nes4g&hl=en&ei=14PuSvOwIpD0NdWDwf0B&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CAsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=6%20THE%20GALLIC%20CATASTROPHE&f=false
Christopher Ingham
Matt Giwer
Every greatest anything in texts is an attempt to introduce drama
into the narrative. Maybe the History Channel will option it.
Having introduced my signature cynicism let me point out "greatest
enemy" and "greatest threat" are different things.
With Rome as the pivot of the statement, Carthage, the focus of
Phoenician civilization, could have established a greater empire which could
have limited Rome's expansion. Further as a trading culture Carthage could
have established alliances based upon the prosperity of trade and spread
without conquest. The center of Phoenician culture moved to Carthage from
Tyre -- a place with Greece in the way of direct conflict.
Gaul however was different. Their raids into Italy had been going on
for centuries before Caesar. I presume there were raids in the other
direction but I have come across mention of them.
Thus we have Carthage as a trade competitor and a barrier to
expansion heating up at one point in time and but Gaul and Italy involved in
conflicts every few years over centuries.
--
Holocaust denial is not as bad as the Goldstone Report on Gaza.
Michael Oren, Israeli Ambassador to the US, September 2009
-- The Iron Webmaster, 4195
http://www.haaretz.com What is Israel really like? http://www.jpost.com a7
Mon Nov 2 03:12:00 EST 2009
Matt Giwer
Without changing my previous post there is another way to look at
it. It seems no one really knows why the first war started. There were
several events but nothing substantial. It appears Rome feared Sicily would
be used by Carthage as a bridge to establishing colonies in Italy but there
is no evidence of this being an intention of Carthage. Rome was still run by
the families who would certainly see the first as a preventive war.
The expansion of Carthage only starts after the center of Phoenician
culture moves from Tyre after Alexander. It came to control north Africa
west of Egypt and with colonies in Spain -- guess they had problems with the
Gauls too. But if they did Hanibal moved his elephants through their
territory which does not fit any peaceful scenario.
And when we get to the third was we the famous "delenda est" as
provocation for a necessary war but one without acrimony. Again a war of
either convenience or necessity but not out of any traditional rivalry or
vendetta.
--
It is an open secret that priests are atheists.
They know they are lying.
-- The Iron Webmaster, 4188
http://www.giwersworld.org/holo/ a8
Mon Nov 2 05:35:57 EST 2009
Tiglath
wrote:
> On Nov 1, 10:08 pm, Tiglath <te...@tiglath.net> wrote:
>
> > On Nov 1, 5:52 pm, Christopher Ingham <christophering...@comcast.net>
> > wrote:
> > > The capture of Rome -- which at one point
> > > > > Hannibal may have been able to accomplish if he had chosen to
> > > > ???????
> > > Just a suggestion: trim the punctuation. This form of netiquette style
> > > gives a histrionic tone to the post.
> > Extraordinary claims deserve extraordinary punctuation.
>
> > I know of no historian who would claim that Hannibal at one point may
> > have been able to capture Rome if ha had chosen to do so.
>
> "The question whether Hannibal could have won the war [after Cannae]
> by marching on Rome is unanswerable, like all hypothetical questions
> in history."
> -- John F. Lazenby,_Hannibal's War: A Military History of the Second
> Punic War_(Norman, OK, 1998), 85
>
Please re-read what you wrote and what Lazenby says.
You say, "may have been able ... if he'd chosen to"
Lazenby says we cannot know.
Please learn the difference.
That the question cannot be answered with certitude doesn't mean that
a good analyis of the likelihood of the outcomes can be done.
First and foremost we have the certain fact that Hannibal did not try
to take Rome. And it is a good assumption that if the task had been
feasable he would have done so, for what is there better than he could
do to surpass the victory of Cannae, but take Rome itself?
> The crucial but unanswerable
> question is whether the Romans would indeed have fought, or felt
> forced to sue for peace with the invader who had arrived outside their
> walls in the wake of his massive triumph.
Funny question. I think it's Lazenby, ((I'll check later) who remarks
on how little worry Hannibal may have given the men of Rome, much as
the populace was in a panic, since at the time he could have marched
on Rome, Rome sent an army to Spain.
If that is not a clue as to the perceived thread Hannibal posed, I
don't know what is.
> Siege equipment could have been
> manufactured from the woods of Latium and Etruria,
How so? Hoyos forgets that Rome was beaten but far from
annihilated. Hannibal would have had serious problems manufacturing
siege works in unfriendly territory. His army was not great in
numbers, and mobility was one of its greatest asset, which he would
have to give up for months to make catapults and siege towers from
scratch. He either build his engines close to Rome, inviting
sorties, or far from Rome and then undertake a long march encumbered
with slow moving machines all the way to Rome. Either way Romans and
Roman allies would have the time to converge on his works and army.
> the extensive city
> walls could not have been strongly manned,
Strong enough to afford an army to be sent abroad at the time.
> the legion at Teanum was
> perilously isolated over 90 miles to the south-east, and the advance
> of 40,000-odd enemy troops would have driven refugees from all around
> its path into Rome---cramming extra mouths to feed into a besieged
> city was a standard method of war[....] [With a blockade] in place,
???
What blockade? The encircling army would have been itself encircle
by Latin land and peoples converging on their backs. Hannibal had
NOT conquered Italy at that point, and many were willing to resist
him.
> efforts by magistrates to organize fresh resistance would have been
> hampered by the sealing-off of the political centre. Nor is it certain
> that Rome would have been immune to treachery
We have a very good idea of that. Even after a devastating blow like
Cannae, few Italian folks went over to Hannibal. People forget that
he was a Moor, and that Latin people no only disliked Moors but had
also a certain sense of geographical, linguistic and cultural unity,
which kept defectors well below Hannibal's expectations.
[....] Hannibal encamped
> around Rome and paralysing the Romann war-effort would scarcely
> discourage wavering southern Italian allies from defecting[....]
This is in contrary to fact. Even when Hannibal did not encamp around
Rome and instead personally beseeched the alliance of the Italian
people, he had nothing but trouble accomplishing their defection,
notable exceptions notwithstanding.
> The
> result of a march on Rome would very probably have been a monumental
> change to the history of the Mediterranean."
That completely underestimates everything we know about the Roman
character. He seems not to know what Rome actually did to Hannibal
after Cannae. Even though he did not threatened the capital directly
he continue to threaten the Republic and its allies. To say that
Rome's reaction to Hannibal's attack on the capital would have been
the opposite of what it was to his attacking other cities and lands,
is baseless speculation.
>
>
> > Which point is that?
>
> After Cannae in 216 (see above).
>
I've answered that at length. People who claimed that he would have
been afforded the peace to build the necessary siege works, seem to
forget the sizeable number of allies Rome had at that time. And to
say that Rome would not have been strongly defended, ignores
significant facts of Roman behavior at the time.
>
> "[Hannibal] has also been criticized for his failure to press home
> attacks on towns, and it is true, if Livy is to be trusted, that very
> few towns were taken by the Carthaginians by assault or longer siege.
> But this has nothing to do with his lack of a 'siege-train': there is
> plenty of evidence
Let's see it.
> that he could construct all that was necessary to
> take a fortified place,
What place would that be? Tarentum?
> if and when he wanted to -- after all, only a
> supply of timber was really necessary.
False premise. It would also take months to build the engines
undisturbed. It is beyond reasonable doubt that he woudl have been
seriously disturbed.
Look at Alexander's siege of Tyre. He had the utmost trouble
building the istmus to the island city, and it was not until he told
subjected Cyprus and other Phoenician cities to provide their fleets
and take command of the sea around the works that he made
progress.
Who did Hannibal have to appeal to to provide security for his logging
and works outside his army?
> Livy, for example, mentions 'mantlets (_vineae_) in his
> account of the attack on Casilinum in 216 (23.18.8),
?
Hannibal failed to take Casilinum in 216, which was defended by ~500
men, and in frustration retired to Capua for the winter. How could
he take Rome if he coult not take little Casilinum?
Unlike the authors you quote I prefer to tell the whole truth: The
following year Hannibal was able to take the town when the defenders
had been greatly weakened by hunger, but the year after the Romans
took it back.
> a huge wooden tower in the attack on Cumae in 215 (23.37.2),
??
Hannibal failed to take Cumae.
About the ONE tower. The defenders built a higher tower on the city
wall and *attacked* the attackers. When the tower moved close to the
wall they burned and a sortie turned the tables and according to Livy
the besiegers "ressembled the besieged."
How could Hannibal take Rome if he coult not take Cumae even with some
siege engines.?
> and 'machines' (_machinationes_) in the attack on the
> citadel of Tarentum in 213/12 (25.11.10)
???
Hannibal failed to take Tarentum.
> in his account of the attack on Locri in 205, he specifically says that
> although the Carthaginians brought no siege-equipment with them,
> they made it there and then (29.7.4ff.)."
> -- Lazenby, 87
????
Hannibal failed to take Locri from Scipio in 205.
(Not to mention three attempts on Nola.)
If you are going to cite sieges undertaken by Hannibal to support your
claim that at one point Hannibal may have been able to take Rome if he
had wished to, I suggest you find sieges that ended with Hannibal
actually taking the city under siege, and preferably a city comparable
to Rome in resources and defenses.
Of course you felt no need to quote Lazenby a bit further -- right
after the excerpt you quoted -- where he says exactly the same I have
been telling you.
"But even with siege-engines, Hannibal knew well, if only from his own
experience at Saguntum, that sieges were liable to be protracted, and
any such operations were bound to curtail his freedom of manoeuvre: he
probably calculated that success in the field and his demonstrably
ability to march were more likely to impress Italian communities than
capture a few of their own towns. [...] It is also clear that his
pose as a liberator often fell on stony ground. he and his army were
after all foreigners in a sense the Romans were not, even to Samnites
and Greeks."
Rings a bell?
Christopher Ingham
> On Nov 2, 1:41 am, Christopher Ingham <christophering...@comcast.net>
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Nov 1, 10:08 pm, Tiglath <te...@tiglath.net> wrote:
>
> > > On Nov 1, 5:52 pm, Christopher Ingham <christophering...@comcast.net>
> > > wrote:
> > > > The capture of Rome -- which at one point
> > > > > > Hannibal may have been able to accomplish if he had chosen to
> > > > > ???????
> > > > Just a suggestion: trim the punctuation. This form of netiquette style
> > > > gives a histrionic tone to the post.
> > > Extraordinary claims deserve extraordinary punctuation.
>
> > > I know of no historian who would claim that Hannibal at one point may
> > > have been able to capture Rome if ha had chosen to do so.
>
> > "The question whether Hannibal could have won the war [after Cannae]
> > by marching on Rome is unanswerable, like all hypothetical questions
> > in history."
> > -- John F. Lazenby,_Hannibal's War: A Military History of the Second
> > Punic War_(Norman, OK, 1998), 85
>
> Please re-read what you wrote and what Lazenby says.
>
> You say, "may have been able ... if he'd chosen to"
>
> Lazenby says we cannot know.
>
> Please learn the difference.
Hannibal might have been able to take Rome, which means that maybe he
could have or maybe he couldn't have -- nothing complicated here --
and the fact is you do not know nor will ever know the answer, since
the attempt was never made. This is the assessment of foremost experts
in this subject to whom I must defer. Sure, one can express his or her
opinion as to the probability of the outcome of specific hypothetical
scenarios, but ultimately it's all speculative and the posited
scenario is most often flawed because imaginary reconstructions of
events always fail to take into account all of the extraneous
circumstances and the thought processes of the actors at any moment of
a developing situation which in reality never occurred.
You're trying to draw me out for an extended debate on a "what if"
issue based on the assertion of many scholars I repeated in passing
that Hannibal might have prevailed (notice the verbal auxiliary) had
he attempted an assault on Rome. This was not to say that he would
have. You called this an "extraordinary claim" and further said, "I
know of no historian who would claim that Hannibal at one point may
have been able to capture Rome if had chosen to do so." I then quoted
a couple of historians who did claim that he might have been able to.
But of course we can never know. And this is the point, sorry to say,
at which my interest in this dialogue ends.
Christopher Ingham
> Rings a bell?- Hide quoted text -
J Antero
"Tiglath" <te...@tiglath.net> wrote in message
news:cfc90baa-f55f-42eb...@m20g2000vbp.googlegroups.com...
Exactly.
Nobody was a better expert on the question of whether Hannibal could have
taken Rome, or how the risk to reward factors balanced out, than Mr. Barca
hisveryself.
We know from his history that he was an excellent general, that he didn't
shy away from difficult daring ventures, and that he hated the roman state
and would have been happy to wreck it, if he could.
The fact that the main contemporary expert on the subject didn't try to take
the city of Rome, says a lot about what the probabilites were.
By the way, I heard a lecture from a Prof. Fagan, that after Cannae, appx. 1
out if 4 of the military age males available to Rome, had been killed.
Tiglath
The CAH gives 1 in 5 over the age of seventeen. Calamitous, but
75-80% remaining would give hope to most people.
The usual analysis of the Second Punic War is that even if Hannibal
had won another Cannae, in the end would have lost, because, while
winning battles was a very good thing, to win that war he had to win
towns, and he never did very well at that. Capua and the Southern
towns was not enough. The core of the confederacy around Rome stayed
loyal. So he would have had to win enough battles to annihilate most
of the Roman manpower, reckoned at 700,000. So Rome had a few Cannae
left in them.
Also in those days news did not travel fast, nor were delivered
chronologically.
Tiglath
> "SolomonW" <Solom...@nospamMail.com> wrote in message
Rome used to bury alive a pair of Gauls, one male, one female to
appease the Gods in time of crisis. It was infrequent, but despite
their repulsion for human sacrifice, when push came to shove they did
it too.
Tiglath
wrote:
>
> Hannibal might have been able to take Rome, which means that maybe he
> could have or maybe he couldn't have -- nothing complicated here --
No need to water down your statement now. You even added, "if he had
wished to" to signify that it was a feasible enterprise pretty much
depending on whether he chose to or not go undertake it.
Knowing what we know about his attempts to take other lesser cities,
even with the chance to build siege works during his winter in Capua,
he sieges were resounding failures.
> and the fact is you do not know nor will ever know the answer, since
> the attempt was never made.
I am not after the answer. Yet it is an important data point in
estimating how he would have fared at the siege of Rome, looking at
how he fared at the siege of cities of much less strength.
> This is the assessment of foremost experts
> in this subject to whom I must defer.
The assessment of the foremost experts varies little from non-
committal to firmly saying that Hannibal's odds to take Rome were no
good at all. And vary still more from your suggestion that after
Cannae Hannibal could have taken Rome if he had wanted. See below,
for a sample.
"Many towns in Samnium and Apulia and nearly all Lucania and Brutium
revolted to Hannibal, and worse still in the autumn Capua, the second
city in Italy, and other Campanian towns followed suit. But the whole
of Latium, Umbria, and Etruria remained loyal. And Rome herself was
safe; Hannibal dared not march against her wall."
Scullard, H.H. 1980, A History of the Roman World 753 to 146 BC, p.
211, Fourth Edition, Routledge
In other words the allies further from Rome revolted and the allies
around Rome stayed loyal. And Hannibal would have them on his back
the moment he invested Rome.
--
"Cannae is 400 km from Rome, so that even marching at twenty km a day,
it would have taken Hannibal's army three weeks to get there, ample
time for the Romans to organize the defense of the city. Secondly,
despite the rhetorical exaggerations of Livy, Rome still had some
troops left already under arms, to say nothing of the thousands she
could raise from her own citizens and those of her allies, given
time. Even for the immediate defense of the city, the two city
legions, raised at the beginning of the year would have been
available, as well as 1500 men Marcellus had at Ostia and the legion
of marines he sent to Teanum Sidicinum. Men who live in the city
would very rapidly have been armed and organized into some temporary
home-guard, and a considerable force was in fact raised from the slave
population. Thus Hannibal would certainly not have found the city
defenseless, and it is very doutbful whether he could have taken it by
immediate assault. [...] But if he had settled down to besiege the
city, it is even less likely that he would have ever taken it. He
had, for example, spent eight months on the siege of Saguntum and if
the Romans had been able to hold him off for anything like that length
of time, they would have been able to raise overwhelming relief
forces; the survivors of Cannae constituted a force of more than two
legions in themselves, Postumius and his two legions could have been
recalled from Cisalpine Gaul, and with the aid of continuing
superiority at sea, the legions from Sardinia and Sicily, to say
nothing of those in Spain, could have been brought home. Thus
Hannibal's besieging army would soon have found itself faced by forces
at least as large as those he had fought at Cannae, and he wold have
been in increasing danger of being hemmed in, just the kind of warfare
he was always anxious to avoid.
-- Lazenby J.F. 1998, Hannibal's War, pp 85, 86, University of
Oklahoma.
Please contrast Lazenby's, "it is very doutbful whether he could have
taken it by immediate assault," and, "if he had settled down to
besiege the city, it is even less likely that he would have ever taken
it," with your:
"The capture of Rome -- which at one point Hannibal may have been able
to accomplish if he had chosen to"
--
"Let us see what his chances were. We have no hint of what he himself
thought, of what his reasons were for not doing so; we must content
ourselves with collecting a few guess-work facts and endeavoring to
argue as he did. [...] The chances were, in a military sense, all
against his seizing Rome by a coup de main. If he failed, the game
was lost. It was far wiser for him to still seek to influence the
allies, which he could now do with a record of wonderful victories,
such as the Roman world had not yet seen. [...] If Hannibal marched
on Rome, he must be prepared to besiege the city, and we have already
shown how impossible this was.
"[...]
"The entire male population above seventeen years of age was
enrolled. Four new legions and one thousand horse were thus added to
the city garrison. All mechanics were set to work to make and repair
weapons. Old spoils hung in the temples were taken down for use. The
walls were already in a state of excellent defense. The senate
purchased and armed eight thousand slaves and four thousand debtors or
criminals, with promise of freedom or pardon. Rome could count on
for the immediate defense of the city with a total of 43.200 men.
This was a larger force than Hannibal commanded."
-- Dodge T.A., 1993 (originally 1891), Hannibal, pp. 884-887,
Greenhill.
--
"Hannibal may well have recalled what had happened to Pyrrhus some
fifty years earlier when, having won a victory at Heraclea, he
advanced to within forty miles of Rome only to have to withdraw when
he could not gain popular support. Hannibal then remained determined
to achieve the dissolution of the Roman Confederation by breaking his
opponents' will rather than by attempting a direct assault on their
principal and strongly fortified city. Maybe he was wrong and so
missed a unique opportunity, But even in hindsight, it would be unwise
to pass judgment on such complex decision about which we have only the
most rudimentary knowledge.
-- Bagnall, N, 1990, The Punic Wars, p. 190, Random House
A prudent cop-out, but still not much in the vein that Rome was for
Hannibal's taking.
>
> You're trying to draw me out for an extended debate on a "what if"
Disagree. I am trying to make you realize from the little we know,
what were the REAL, not what-if, difficulties Hannibal faced when he
pondered his next move after Cannae, and came to consider, as he quite
surely did, to march on Rome.
> issue based on the assertion of many scholars I repeated in passing
> that Hannibal might have prevailed (notice the verbal auxiliary) had
> he attempted an assault on Rome.
You are welcome to reconsider and reformulate and refine your
argument. You are my interlocutor not my opponent.
I don't know what scholars are out there who would say that.
You mention one who thinks, apparently, that merely marching on Rome
would have forced Rome to sue for peace. How odd.
I wonder if that "scholar," if he is actually a well-respected one
knows that Polybius wrote his entire Book VI devoted to explaining the
qualities of a constitution of a state that was able to climb out of
such an abyss, for such was the firmness with which the crisis was met
by Rome. Does such a scholar know the military principle by which a
besieging army must be many times the number of the defending force
for a direct assault to have any chance of success? Can he imagine
the relief force that would fall on Hannibal's back if the assault
failed and he undertook a long siege?
>This was not to say that he would
> have.
True. It is to say he had a good chance, though. And that does not
appear to be the scholarly consensus.
> You called this an "extraordinary claim" and further said, "I
> know of no historian who would claim that Hannibal at one point may
> have been able to capture Rome if had chosen to do so." I then quoted
> a couple of historians who did claim that he might have been able to.
You did, thank you. Though they did not give it quite the same odds
as you, with "If he had wanted to" -- a key clause of the idea.
> But of course we can never know.
A great pity. I am quite content, as I have to be, with a good
analysis of Hannibal's possible outlook at that point, which is not
quite the same as a what-if.
> And this is the point, sorry to say,
> at which my interest in this dialogue ends.
Vaya con Dios.
SolomonW
> Cannae is 400 km from Rome, so that even marching at twenty km a day,
> it would have taken Hannibal's army three weeks to get there, ample
> time for the Romans to organize the defense of the city.
The Romans would not have that much warning. I am not sure if the Romans
would have a pony express if so they would get the message in two to three
days.
If they depend on a runner, doing a net search
http://3100.srichinmoyraces.org/3100_05/abouttherunners
These champions could do it in three to four days. The Roman runners
probably you can double it say a week.
> Secondly,
> despite the rhetorical exaggerations of Livy, Rome still had some
> troops left already under arms, to say nothing of the thousands she
> could raise from her own citizens and those of her allies, given
> time. Even for the immediate defense of the city, the two city
> legions, raised at the beginning of the year would have been
> available, as well as 1500 men Marcellus had at Ostia and the legion
> of marines he sent to Teanum Sidicinum. Men who live in the city
> would very rapidly have been armed and organized into some temporary
> home-guard, and a considerable force was in fact raised from the slave
> population. Thus Hannibal would certainly not have found the city
> defenseless, and it is very doutbful whether he could have taken it by
> immediate assault.
The other problem is I doubt the Tomans would have continuous guards
watching Hannibal's army with runners to communicate with Rome. So I doubt
Rome would know where Hannibal's army was.
It is possible Rome would not be prepared and could be entered in a
surprise operation.
> [...] But if he had settled down to besiege the
> city, it is even less likely that he would have ever taken it. He
> had, for example, spent eight months on the siege of Saguntum and if
> the Romans had been able to hold him off for anything like that length
> of time, they would have been able to raise overwhelming relief
> forces; the survivors of Cannae constituted a force of more than two
> legions in themselves, Postumius and his two legions could have been
> recalled from Cisalpine Gaul, and with the aid of continuing
> superiority at sea, the legions from Sardinia and Sicily, to say
> nothing of those in Spain, could have been brought home. Thus
> Hannibal's besieging army would soon have found itself faced by forces
> at least as large as those he had fought at Cannae, and he wold have
> been in increasing danger of being hemmed in, just the kind of warfare
> he was always anxious to avoid.
>
This I disagree with as Hannibal was always trying to bring the Roman army
in the field against him. His main problem was the Romans kept refusing
battle.
Tiglath
> On Tue, 3 Nov 2009 22:16:50 -0800 (PST), Tiglath wrote:
> > Cannae is 400 km from Rome, so that even marching at twenty km a day,
> > it would have taken Hannibal's army three weeks to get there, ample
> > time for the Romans to organize the defense of the city.
>
> The Romans would not have that much warning. I am not sure if the Romans
> would have a pony express if so they would get the message in two to three
> days.
>
> If they depend on a runner, doing a net search
Surely there were horses in Italy in the third century B.C.
At a mere canter would have taken sixteen hours to reach Rome, and
only ten at a gallop of relays, which surely the event warranted.
>
> The other problem is I doubt the Tomans would have continuous guards
> watching Hannibal's army with runners to communicate with Rome. So I doubt
> Rome would know where Hannibal's army was.
>
Why such doubts? You have a Punic Band from Hell bearing down on your
capital and you would not have a decent army of scouts to watch them?
> It is possible Rome would not be prepared and could be entered in a
> surprise operation.
>
Oh boy!
Yep. I can just imagine the whole Roman Senate on crosses looking down
at Hannibal's warriors madly raping the Vestal Virgins in the Forum
Romanum, as senators yell to each other, "who the fuck left the
kitchen door unlocked."
And "The Roman Times" front page:
"OOPS! HANNIBAL'S FORTY THOUSAND AFRICANS SNEAK UP ON ROME AS THE
ETERNAL CITY SNOOZES"
> > at least as large as those he had fought at Cannae, and he wold have
> > been in increasing danger of being hemmed in, just the kind of warfare
> > he was always anxious to avoid.
>
> This I disagree with as Hannibal was always trying to bring the Roman army
> in the field against him.
Lazenby doesn't say he avoided battle, he says he avoided being hemmed
in, as he would have been between Rome's wall and a large relief force
on his back.
> His main problem was the Romans kept refusing
> battle.
His main problem is that he wasn't welcome and had ten times fewer men
than he needed for the job.
J Antero
==
Rome used to bury alive a pair of Gauls, one male, one female to
appease the Gods in time of crisis. It was infrequent, but despite
their repulsion for human sacrifice, when push came to shove they did
it too.
==
Interesting.
Wiki: Roman human sacrifice: The Romans themselves only definitively banned
human sacrifice, by senatorial decree, in 97 BC.[231] But it was by then
very rare, only practiced in times of extreme national emergency. e.g. after
their disastrous defeat at the Battle of Cannae (216 BC), the Romans had,
after consulting the Sibylline Books, buried alive in the Forum Boarium
(Cattle Market), a pair of Gauls and a pair of Greeks.[232]
The thing is, it seem to have worked....
At a moderate stretch, the gladiator games invovlved what were essentially
human sacrifices. I think some historians say they evolved out of Etruscan
funerary traditions / rites.
igor
AFAIK,The earliest mention resembling gladiatorial event is by
Herodotus where when Cimmerians were expelled by Skythians, their
noblemen fought each other to death so they could be buried in the
land of their ancestors.
Tiglath
Damn recession, let's go get Sarkozy...
And Aggie?
SolomonW
> On Nov 4, 3:44�am, SolomonW <Solom...@nospamMail.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, 3 Nov 2009 22:16:50 -0800 (PST), Tiglath wrote:
>>> Cannae is 400 km from Rome, so that even marching at twenty km a day,
>>> it would have taken Hannibal's army three weeks to get there, ample
>>> time for the Romans to organize the defense of the city. �
>>
>> The Romans would not have that much warning. I am not sure if the Romans
>> would have a pony express if so they would get the message in two to three
>> days.
>>
>> If they depend on a runner, doing a net search
>
> Surely there were horses in Italy in the third century B.C.
Indeed
>
> At a mere canter would have taken sixteen hours to reach Rome, and
> only ten at a gallop of relays, which surely the event warranted.
>
Horses are not that good at long distances. See this website for what a
horse can do.
http://www.ehow.com/facts_5122724_average-horse-can-travel-day.html
Early Racing
# Prussia and Austro-Hungarian soldiers raced 350 miles from Berlin to
Vienna in 1892. The winner made the trip in 72 hours but, unfortunately,
his horse died after the race.
Pony Express
In the 1860s, the United States Pony Express transported and delivered mail
via horseback. The mail service averaged speeds of 9 miles per hour.
Unless the Romans used birds, they would need a few days to find out.
>>
>> The other problem is I doubt the Tomans would have continuous guards
>> watching Hannibal's army with runners to communicate with Rome. So I doubt
>> Rome would know where Hannibal's army was.
>>
>
> Why such doubts? You have a Punic Band from Hell bearing down on your
> capital and you would not have a decent army of scouts to watch them?
>
Depends my army is shattered and needs time to regroup. I would probably be
able to send a messenger but I doubt I would have scouts and messengers to
monitor Hannibal's army.
>
>> It is possible Rome would not be prepared and could be entered in a
>> surprise operation.
>>
>
> Oh boy!
>
> Yep. I can just imagine the whole Roman Senate on crosses looking down
> at Hannibal's warriors madly raping the Vestal Virgins in the Forum
> Romanum, as senators yell to each other, "who the fuck left the
> kitchen door unlocked."
>
This did happen. Constantinople was taken by the Greeks because one gate
was left open.
> And "The Roman Times" front page:
>
> "OOPS! HANNIBAL'S FORTY THOUSAND AFRICANS SNEAK UP ON ROME AS THE
> ETERNAL CITY SNOOZES"
>
Again it did happen but it is unlikely.
>
>
>
>
>>> at least as large as those he had fought at Cannae, and he wold have
>>> been in increasing danger of being hemmed in, just the kind of warfare
>>> he was always anxious to avoid.
>>
>> This I disagree with as Hannibal was always trying to bring the Roman army
>> in the field against him.
>
> Lazenby doesn't say he avoided battle, he says he avoided being hemmed
> in, as he would have been between Rome's wall and a large relief force
> on his back.
>
>
I doubt that the Romans would dare to allow such a relief force after
Cannae, to attempt such a task.
>
>
>
(a)
>> His main problem was the Romans kept refusing
>> battle.
>
> His main problem is that he wasn't welcome and had ten times fewer men
> than he needed for the job.
This is true too but my point at (a) is valid too.
igor
>
> - Show quoted text -
LOL, Why not, you never know, it may work. I would offer god a package
deal and include Matt, JTEM and couple of others from this group also.
And right before burial forcefully circumcise and convert morons to
Judaism.
Tiglath
That's a sure way to piss off any god, even Baal. Isis and Osiris
would give JTEM right back. "No, Big Thanks. You keep stinko."
Tiglath
wrote:
> On Nov 1, 8:58 pm, Tiglath <te...@tiglath.net> wrote:
>
> > On Nov 1, 5:31 pm, Christopher Ingham <christophering...@comcast.net>
> > wrote:
> > <snip>
> > > > > Neither the Gauls nor the Carthaginians (1) annihilated the Romans,
> > > > > (2) permanently impaired the Romans' ability to defend themselves and
> > > > > wage war, or (3) effected a permanent Roman territorial diminishment.
>
> > > > The Carthaginians couldn't and the Gauls wouldn't.
>
> > > Neither assertion is a fact.
>
> > Silly comeback, it is a historical FACT that the Carthaginians could
> > not do any of those things after three all-out attempts.
>
> No, the fact is that they did not -- it is impossible to ever know
> that they could not. (See the quoted sources in my reply above.)
Semantic games?
In this context:
"could" = were able to.
"could" != could have if.
How is the ability to do something measured other than by putting it
to the test? Three Punic Wars = three tests.
You test and then you know. They did now we know.
The only other consideration your "could" may refer to, is if
circumstances had been different, but that would be a dreaded "what-
if,," would it not?
>
> > As to the Gauls, as best we know they could have, but Romans were
> > lucky that they were sacked by Gallic marauders not migrants.
>
> No, the fact is that they did not;
Never disputed.
> we have no solid evidence that they
> could have.
"Could have" admits an "if."
As I said, the point was not up to the Romans whether the Gauls could
have or not. Once occupied and the Romans at their weakest
circumstances were favorable to follow up their victory forming
permanent settlements. They had the numbers of it, but not the
desire. Absence of desire on the part of the Gauls, is not a Roman
merit, it's Roman luck.
See, e.g., Tim J. Cornell,_The Beginnings of Rome_(New
> York, 1995), 313-20:http://books.google.com/books?id=EAEOAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA313&lpg=PA313&dq=6...
>
A quote would be nice. Where in that book does it say that the Gauls
could not have... ?
> Christopher Ingham
Tiglath
> On Wed, 4 Nov 2009 07:53:50 -0800 (PST), Tiglath wrote:
> > On Nov 4, 3:44 am, SolomonW <Solom...@nospamMail.com> wrote:
> >> On Tue, 3 Nov 2009 22:16:50 -0800 (PST), Tiglath wrote:
> >>> Cannae is 400 km from Rome, so that even marching at twenty km a day,
> >>> it would have taken Hannibal's army three weeks to get there, ample
> >>> time for the Romans to organize the defense of the city.
>
> >> The Romans would not have that much warning. I am not sure if the Romans
> >> would have a pony express if so they would get the message in two to three
> >> days.
>
> >> If they depend on a runner, doing a net search
>
> > Surely there were horses in Italy in the third century B.C.
>
> Indeed
>
>
>
> > At a mere canter would have taken sixteen hours to reach Rome, and
> > only ten at a gallop of relays, which surely the event warranted.
>
> Horses are not that good at long distances. See this website for what a
> horse can do.
That's why you have horse relays, as I said above.
>
> Pony Express
> In the 1860s, the United States Pony Express transported and delivered mail
> via horseback. The mail service averaged speeds of 9 miles per hour.
>
That's because it was imperative not to overwork the horsed for
economic reasons that didn't exist during Rome's national urgent
emergency.
> Unless the Romans used birds, they would need a few days to find out.
>
Ten hours, using three or four horse relays. Same messenger four
horses.
>
>
> >> The other problem is I doubt the Tomans would have continuous guards
> >> watching Hannibal's army with runners to communicate with Rome. So I doubt
> >> Rome would know where Hannibal's army was.
>
> > Why such doubts? You have a Punic Band from Hell bearing down on your
> > capital and you would not have a decent army of scouts to watch them?
>
> Depends my army is shattered and needs time to regroup. I would probably be
> able to send a messenger but I doubt I would have scouts and messengers to
> monitor Hannibal's army.
What is to doubt? The very scouts of the consular armies were more
than capable to run to Rome along a route prepared for fast
communications. It was a BIG DEAL putting 80,000 men at arms on the
field, and not a big deal to communicate with Rome through territory
friendly territory.
>
>
>
> >> It is possible Rome would not be prepared and could be entered in a
> >> surprise operation.
>
> > Oh boy!
>
> > Yep. I can just imagine the whole Roman Senate on crosses looking down
> > at Hannibal's warriors madly raping the Vestal Virgins in the Forum
> > Romanum, as senators yell to each other, "who the fuck left the
> > kitchen door unlocked."
>
> This did happen. Constantinople was taken by the Greeks because one gate
> was left open.
>
That seem to have been a recurrent problem in that city. There is no
telling that such a lapse can't occur especially if treachery is
involved, but what you suggest that Rome could be entered by a
surprise operation, is pushing it a bit. During a long siege a gate
may be left open, but that is not the same as an army of 40,000
surprising a city which expects its arrival.
>
>
>
>
> I doubt that the Romans would dare to allow such a relief force after
> Cannae, to attempt such a task.
>
>
Why not, what was the alternative? Hannibal would be hemmed between
two fronts, the sorties from the city and the relief force from all
other sides. A besieging army is not in the same position as an army
in he field in battle order on its chosen ground.
>
>
>
> (a)
> >> His main problem was the Romans kept refusing
> >> battle.
>
> > His main problem is that he wasn't welcome and had ten times fewer men
> > than he needed for the job.
>
> This is true too but my point at (a) is valid too. It is certainly true.
Italo
igor <inbel...@gmail.com>
> right before burial forcefully circumcise and convert morons to Judaism.
says the zionist scumbag.
--
Boycott American products
igor
> igor <inbellt...@gmail.com>
How do you know I am a Zionist, I have not interest in politics, this
is a history group? Moron.
Folks, buy American products, they are great!!!!!!!!
SolomonW
> On Nov 5, 4:08�am, SolomonW <Solom...@nospamMail.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, 4 Nov 2009 07:53:50 -0800 (PST), Tiglath wrote:
>>> On Nov 4, 3:44�am, SolomonW <Solom...@nospamMail.com> wrote:
>>>> On Tue, 3 Nov 2009 22:16:50 -0800 (PST), Tiglath wrote:
>>>>> Cannae is 400 km from Rome, so that even marching at twenty km a day,
>>>>> it would have taken Hannibal's army three weeks to get there, ample
>>>>> time for the Romans to organize the defense of the city. �
>>
>>>> The Romans would not have that much warning. I am not sure if the Romans
>>>> would have a pony express if so they would get the message in two to three
>>>> days.
>>
>>>> If they depend on a runner, doing a net search
>>
>>> Surely there were horses in Italy in the third century B.C.
>>
>> Indeed
>>
>>
>>
>>> At a mere canter would have taken sixteen hours to reach Rome, and
>>> only ten at a gallop of relays, which surely the event warranted.
>>
>> Horses are not that good at long distances. See this website for what a
>> horse can do.
>
> That's why you have horse relays, as I said above.
>
I am not sure if Rome was set up with such a system but even if it was see
(a) below
>
>
>>
>> Pony Express
>> In the 1860s, the United States Pony Express transported and delivered mail
>> via horseback. The mail service averaged speeds of 9 miles per hour.
>>
>
> That's because it was imperative not to overwork the horsed for
> economic reasons that didn't exist during Rome's national urgent
> emergency.
(a) Disagree because this is about the max a horse can go over distance.
You may want to checkout the Tevis cup
http://www.teviscup.org/the_ride/the_ride_inline.html
The Mongols had a pony express system too and a riders did about 60 miles a
day.
>
>
>> Unless the Romans used birds, they would need a few days to find out.
>>
>
> Ten hours, using three or four horse relays. Same messenger four
> horses.
>
Except they cannot go at night.
Now see (a) above.
>
>
>>
>>
>>>> The other problem is I doubt the Tomans would have continuous guards
>>>> watching Hannibal's army with runners to communicate with Rome. So I doubt
>>>> Rome would know where Hannibal's army was.
>>
>>> Why such doubts? �You have a Punic Band from Hell bearing down on your
>>> capital and you would not have a decent army of scouts to watch them?
>>
>> Depends my army is shattered and needs time to regroup. I would probably be
>> able to send a messenger but I doubt I would have scouts and messengers to
>> monitor Hannibal's army.
>
> What is to doubt? The very scouts of the consular armies were more
> than capable to run to Rome along a route prepared for fast
> communications. It was a BIG DEAL putting 80,000 men at arms on the
> field, and not a big deal to communicate with Rome through territory
> friendly territory.
>
The organization required after such a defeat.
Hannibal did a few times manage to lose these Roman scouts such as in
Campania.
>
>>
>>
>>
>>>> It is possible Rome would not be prepared and could be entered in a
>>>> surprise operation.
>>
>>> Oh boy!
>>
>>> Yep. I can just imagine the whole Roman Senate on crosses looking down
>>> at Hannibal's warriors madly raping the Vestal Virgins in the Forum
>>> Romanum, as senators yell to each other, "who the fuck left the
>>> kitchen door unlocked."
>>
>> This did happen. Constantinople was taken by the Greeks because one gate
>> was left open.
>>
>
> That seem to have been a recurrent problem in that city. There is no
> telling that such a lapse can't occur especially if treachery is
> involved, but what you suggest that Rome could be entered by a
> surprise operation, is pushing it a bit. During a long siege a gate
> may be left open, but that is not the same as an army of 40,000
> surprising a city which expects its arrival.
>
>
An army comes suddenly out of the blue. The defenders madly try to organize
a defence, a door is left open. It happened. Not very often I confess.
>
>>
>>
>
>>
>> I doubt that the Romans would dare to allow such a relief force after
>> Cannae, to attempt such a task.
>>
>>
>
> Why not, what was the alternative? Hannibal would be hemmed between
> two fronts, the sorties from the city and the relief force from all
> other sides. A besieging army is not in the same position as an army
> in he field in battle order on its chosen ground.
>
Fear of Hannibal. I would suggest the Romans would wait him out which is
what they did in the OTL a bit later on.
Tiglath
> On Thu, 5 Nov 2009 11:48:38 -0800 (PST), Tiglath wrote:
>
> >> Horses are not that good at long distances. See this website for what a
> >> horse can do.
>
> > That's why you have horse relays, as I said above.
>
> I am not sure if Rome was set up with such a system but even if it was see
> (a) below
>
You can be. The literature mentions them. For example, in the First
Punic Wars, Roman scouts reported the arrival of a Punic fleet at tha
Aegates Islands off the coast of Sicily. During the Second Punic
War, who do you think spotted the Punic relief forces arriving in
Italy the few times Carthage sent them?
The Romans were generally cautious. On the march the set up a
fortified camp with ditch and rampart every night.
>
>
> >> Pony Express
> >> In the 1860s, the United States Pony Express transported and delivered mail
> >> via horseback. The mail service averaged speeds of 9 miles per hour.
>
> > That's because it was imperative not to overwork the horsed for
> > economic reasons that didn't exist during Rome's national urgent
> > emergency.
>
> (a) Disagree because this is about the max a horse can go over distance.
>
Why do you keep ignoring the fact that a rider can change horses as
many times as necessary during a long distance run, if so disposed?
Surely the utter importance of the event warranted that Rome left
fresh horse at several points between Cannae and Rome for the purpose
of hasten communications. That being the case a rider could maintain
a gallop for the entire 250 miles and cover the distance in less than
half a day.
> You may want to checkout the Tevis
> cuphttp://www.teviscup.org/the_ride/the_ride_inline.html
More of the same. That race involves only ONE horse.
>
> The Mongols had a pony express system too and a riders did about 60 miles a
> day.
>
A mail system does not necessarily carry the sense of urgency of a
national emergency, why can't you see this salient difference?
>
>
> >> Unless the Romans used birds, they would need a few days to find out.
>
> > Ten hours, using three or four horse relays. Same messenger four
> > horses.
>
> Except they cannot go at night.
Irrelevant. They could set out at first light the day after the
battle and be at Rome's gates before evening. Or ride after the
battle until dark (August 2) and go half the way and do the rest at
first light and be at Rome before noon.
>
> > What is to doubt? The very scouts of the consular armies were more
> > than capable to run to Rome along a route prepared for fast
> > communications. It was a BIG DEAL putting 80,000 men at arms on the
> > field, and not a big deal to communicate with Rome through territory
> > friendly territory.
>
> The organization required after such a defeat.
>
The defeat involved the main army not the scouts who obviously were
not in the melee but on the sidelines ready to report the battle's
outcome. Despite the defeat the Roman survivors at Cannae filled two
legions.
> Hannibal did a few times manage to lose these Roman scouts such as in
> Campania.
True. They were not infallible, or covered all grounds, but there
were only so many ways a large army could approach Rome, so scouts did
not have to follow an elusive enemy, just sit and wait. As to the
scouts at Cannae, it's very hard to lose the dust cloud of an army of
40,000 on the move, or its night fires.
>
> An army comes suddenly out of the blue.
Actually it does not in the case of Hannibal after Cannae. The
Romans were extremely familiar with Rome's surrounding country and
Hannibal's march on Rome would not have been at all difficult to
detect from start to finish.
How can an army you know it's 250 miles near and maybe approaching
within three weeks, surprise you?
>
> > Why not, what was the alternative? Hannibal would be hemmed between
> > two fronts, the sorties from the city and the relief force from all
> > other sides. A besieging army is not in the same position as an army
> > in he field in battle order on its chosen ground.
>
> Fear of Hannibal.
There is a vast difference between Fabius' tactics where he would give
Hannibal the round around and nothing was lost by the avoidance. And
Hannibal attacking Rome, when avoiding to engage Hannibal's could lose
the city.
Don't you think the Romans knew that difference?
SolomonW
> On Nov 6, 4:48 am, SolomonW <Solom...@nospamMail.com> wrote:
>> On Thu, 5 Nov 2009 11:48:38 -0800 (PST), Tiglath wrote:
>
>>
>>>> Horses are not that good at long distances. See this website for what a
>>>> horse can do.
>>
>>> That's why you have horse relays, as I said above.
>>
>> I am not sure if Rome was set up with such a system but even if it was see
>> (a) below
>>
>
> You can be. The literature mentions them. For example, in the First
> Punic Wars, Roman scouts reported the arrival of a Punic fleet at tha
> Aegates Islands off the coast of Sicily. During the Second Punic
> War, who do you think spotted the Punic relief forces arriving in
> Italy the few times Carthage sent them?
But how long did they take to bring the message? I doubt Republican Rome
had such a pony express system although they may have had an informal type
arrangement.
Herodotus talks about the Persians having such a pony express system. Using
it a messenger could go from Susa to Sardis (1,677 miles) in ten days. So
that is about 167 miles a day.
If the Romans then had something similar they are looking at 2 days.
Later I know Augustus developed such a pony express based on the Persian
model in Rome. Using it when Nero died, Galba got the news in Spain a
distance of 332 miles in 36 hours.
I think we can assume that two days would be the fastest.
>
> The Romans were generally cautious. On the march the set up a
> fortified camp with ditch and rampart every night.
>
So what?
>
>>
>>
>>>> Pony Express
>>>> In the 1860s, the United States Pony Express transported and delivered mail
>>>> via horseback. The mail service averaged speeds of 9 miles per hour.
>>
>>> That's because it was imperative not to overwork the horsed for
>>> economic reasons that didn't exist during Rome's national urgent
>>> emergency.
>>
>> (a) Disagree because this is about the max a horse can go over distance.
>>
>
> Why do you keep ignoring the fact that a rider can change horses as
> many times as necessary during a long distance run, if so disposed?
> Surely the utter importance of the event warranted that Rome left
> fresh horse at several points between Cannae and Rome for the purpose
> of hasten communications. That being the case a rider could maintain
> a gallop for the entire 250 miles and cover the distance in less than
> half a day.
>
>
(b)
It would have to be 60 times changing their horse to maintain a canter much
less a gallop.
http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_long_can_a_horse_run_at_a_canter_or_gallop
a horse in good shape can go about a mile or two before having to stop. It
can go much further at a canter about a 3 or 4 miles. This all depends on
how fast the pace is, the weight of the rider, the smoothness of the
terrain, etc.
>
>> You may want to checkout the Tevis
>> cuphttp://www.teviscup.org/the_ride/the_ride_inline.html
>
> More of the same. That race involves only ONE horse.
>
see (b) above
>>
>> The Mongols had a pony express system too and a riders did about 60 miles a
>> day.
>>
>
> A mail system does not necessarily carry the sense of urgency of a
> national emergency, why can't you see this salient difference?
>
Actually I can. I just doubt that anything faster is possible with horses.
Now if the Roman used carrier pigeons, it would have taken a few hours.
>
>
>>
>>
>>>> Unless the Romans used birds, they would need a few days to find out.
>>
>>> Ten hours, using three or four horse relays. Same messenger four
>>> horses.
>>
>> Except they cannot go at night.
>
> Irrelevant. They could set out at first light the day after the
> battle and be at Rome's gates before evening. Or ride after the
> battle until dark (August 2) and go half the way and do the rest at
> first light and be at Rome before noon.
>
That is already then day three, in which case we agree.
>
>>
>>> What is to doubt? The very scouts of the consular armies were more
>>> than capable to run to Rome along a route prepared for fast
>>> communications. It was a BIG DEAL putting 80,000 men at arms on the
>>> field, and not a big deal to communicate with Rome through territory
>>> friendly territory.
>>
>> The organization required after such a defeat.
>>
>
> The defeat involved the main army not the scouts who obviously were
> not in the melee but on the sidelines ready to report the battle's
> outcome. Despite the defeat the Roman survivors at Cannae filled two
> legions.
>
>
Two legions are pulling themselves together and in no state to start such
an operation.
>> Hannibal did a few times manage to lose these Roman scouts such as in
>> Campania.
>
> True. They were not infallible, or covered all grounds, but there
> were only so many ways a large army could approach Rome, so scouts did
> not have to follow an elusive enemy, just sit and wait. As to the
> scouts at Cannae, it's very hard to lose the dust cloud of an army of
> 40,000 on the move, or its night fires.
>
>
Well at Campania, the Romans lost track of where Hannibal's armies were.
>>
>> An army comes suddenly out of the blue.
>
> Actually it does not in the case of Hannibal after Cannae. The
> Romans were extremely familiar with Rome's surrounding country and
> Hannibal's march on Rome would not have been at all difficult to
> detect from start to finish.
>
> How can an army you know it's 250 miles near and maybe approaching
> within three weeks, surprise you?
>
>
It happens. Also I expect if Hannibal's armies are marching false signals
are being sent by panicking people everywhere in the area. He going here
and he is going here.
>
>
>
>>
>>> Why not, what was the alternative? Hannibal would be hemmed between
>>> two fronts, the sorties from the city and the relief force from all
>>> other sides. A besieging army is not in the same position as an army
>>> in he field in battle order on its chosen ground.
>>
>> Fear of Hannibal.
>
> There is a vast difference between Fabius' tactics where he would give
> Hannibal the round around and nothing was lost by the avoidance. And
> Hannibal attacking Rome, when avoiding to engage Hannibal's could lose
> the city.
>
> Don't you think the Romans knew that difference?
Well in the OTL, when Hannibal marched on Rome, they just waited.
J Antero
"SolomonW" <Solo...@nospamMail.com> wrote in message
news:J1cJm.109396$ei3....@newsfe22.ams2...
>> The Romans were generally cautious. On the march the set up a
>> fortified camp with ditch and rampart every night.
>>
>
> So what?
I think the implication is obvious.
Despite being militarily aggressive, they valued defense, preparation and
not allowing themselves to surprised and caught defenseless.
At the time of Cannae, they had already lost two major battles on the
peninsula to Hannibal, and were likely to be taking things seriously.
One possible reason Hannibal didn't attack the City, could be that he knew
they were making preparations.
SolomonW
> "SolomonW" <Solo...@nospamMail.com> wrote in message
> news:J1cJm.109396$ei3....@newsfe22.ams2...
>
>>> The Romans were generally cautious. On the march the set up a
>>> fortified camp with ditch and rampart every night.
>>>
>>
>> So what?
>
> I think the implication is obvious.
>
> Despite being militarily aggressive, they valued defense, preparation and
> not allowing themselves to surprised and caught defenseless.
>
> At the time of Cannae, they had already lost two major battles on the
> peninsula to Hannibal, and were likely to be taking things seriously.
Indeed after Cannae, the Romans never dared to fight Hannibal in Italy.
>
> One possible reason Hannibal didn't attack the City, could be that he knew
> they were making preparations.
Maybe
Matt Giwer
> On Nov 5, 2:55�pm, Italo <ola...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>> �igor <inbellt...@gmail.com>
>>> right before burial forcefully circumcise and convert morons to Judaism.
>> says the zionist scumbag.
>> --
>> Boycott American products
> How do you know I am a Zionist, I have not interest in politics, this is a
> history group? Moron.
http://www.giwersworld.org/antisem/
> Folks, buy American products, they are great!!!!!!!!
Both of them. Derivatives are best.
--
Government is a necessary evil. Religion is an unnecessary evil.
-- The Iron Webmaster, 4187
http://www.giwersworld.org/holo2/ a11
Sun Nov 8 07:23:52 EST 2009