Kissinger had agreed with Communist block to let South Vietnam collapse as early as 1971, even before the Paris Peace Accord was prepared
Hakman Vo
accepted the collapse of South Vietnam after U.S. withdrawal. In a
meeting with Zou Enlai, he told Zou that "Our position is not to
maintain any particular government in South Vietnam,... And if it is
overthrown after we withdraw, we will not intervene."
South Vietnam was sold in 1971.
Full text on New York Times below:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/28/international/asia/28CHIN.html?pagewanted=print&position=bottom
February 28, 2002
Records Dispute Kissinger on His '71 Visit to China
By ELAINE SCIOLINO
ASHINGTON, Feb. 27 — Henry A. Kissinger used his
historic meeting with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai of
China in 1971 to lay out in detail a radical shift in
American policy toward Taiwan in exchange for China's
help in ending the war in Vietnam, previously
classified documents show.
The account of the meeting in the newly released
documents contradicts the one that Mr. Kissinger
published in his memoirs.
The documents also indicate that the Nixon
administration was determined to withdraw from Vietnam
— even unilaterally, and even if it led to the
overthrow of the government of South Vietnam.
The documents, released today by the National Security
Archive, an independent research group, include the
transcript of the meeting on July 9, 1971, in which
Mr. Kissinger, then the national security adviser,
pledged that the United States would not support
independence for Taiwan.
The two documents were among 41 recently declassified
documents released by the private, nonprofit
organization relating to communications between the
United States and China that led to Mr. Nixon's visit
to China 30 years ago this month.
In the first volume of Mr. Kissinger's memoirs, "The
White House Years," published in 1979, he gave the
impression that the purpose of the crucial meeting was
not to allay tension between the two countries on
subjects like Taiwan, which China considers a renegade
province. Rather, he wrote, it was "to discuss
fundamentals."
He added, "Precisely because there was little
practical business to be done, the element of
confidence had to emerge from conceptual discussions."
Taiwan, he said, "was only mentioned briefly" during
the crucial meeting.
The encounter was the first at a high level between
the United States and China in almost 20 years and
established a relationship of trust that paved the way
for President Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972
and the eventual normalization of relations between
the two countries.
"The document proves that what Kissinger writes in his
memoirs about Taiwan being barely discussed is
breathtakingly not true," said James Mann, senior
writer in residence at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, and author of "About Face: A
History of America's Curious Relationship With China
From Nixon to Clinton."
"In the history of U.S.-China relations, it always
flew in the face of logic that Taiwan was not
discussed."
Mr. Kissinger, reached by phone in London,
acknowledged that his memoirs could have been
interpreted as misleading. "The way I expressed it was
very unfortunate and I regret it," he said. "But we
were still recognizing the Taiwan government. We had
to get some statements of principle within which we
could get into other issues. That was the intention."
The first third of the meeting was consumed by Taiwan,
the documents show.
Mr. Zhou clearly stated that in order for relations to
be established between the United States and China,
the United States must recognize that China "is the
sole legitimate government in China" and that Taiwan
is "an inalienable part of Chinese territory that must
be restored to the motherland."
Mr. Kissinger pledged that the United States would
withdraw two- thirds of its troops from Taiwan — all
those involved in the Vietnam War — when the war was
over. "As for the political future of Taiwan," Mr.
Kissinger said, "we are not advocating a `two Chinas'
solution or a `one China, one Taiwan' solution."
Rather, he said that "the political evolution is
likely to be in the direction which Prime Minister
Zhou Enlai indicated."
In another document released today, the transcript of
a conversation on April 27, 1971, between Mr.
Kissinger and Mr. Nixon, Mr. Kissinger made clear that
neither George Bush, then the chief American envoy at
the United Nations, nor Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller
of New York would be an ideal choice to travel
secretly to China to meet Mr. Zhou.
When Mr. Nixon raised the possibility of sending Mr.
Rockefeller, Mr. Kissinger said of his former patron,
"He wouldn't be disciplined enough, although he is a
possibility."
Mr. Nixon agreed, describing Mr. Rockefeller as
erratic.
To that, Secretary Kissinger replied, "I think for one
operation I could keep him under control. To them a
Rockefeller is a tremendous thing."
When Mr. Nixon suggested Mr. Bush, the secretary said,
"Absolutely not, he is too soft and not sophisticated
enough." At another point, he said that Mr. Bush
"would be too weak."
Mr. Nixon replied, "I thought so too, but I was trying
to think of somebody with a title."
Ultimately, Mr. Nixon chose Mr. Kissinger for the
task.
The exchange is revelatory on a number of levels. Mr.
Nixon seemed to be going out of his way to propose
almost anyone except Mr. Kissinger as his secret
messenger with the Chinese, even though it seemed
obvious at the time that as Mr. Nixon's most trusted
and subtle foreign policy adviser, Mr. Kissinger was
the logical choice.
For his part, Mr. Kissinger revealed extraordinary
optimism that opening up the channel with China could
bring the war in Vietnam to an end within months. "Mr.
President, I have not said this before, but I think if
we get this thing working, we will end Vietnam this
year," Mr. Kissinger said.
Mr. Kissinger's meeting with Mr. Zhou in July also
makes clear the secretary's eagerness to bring the
Vietnam War to an end and to enlist China's help in
making it happen. With or without negotiations with
North Vietnam, he said, "we will eventually withdraw —
unilaterally."
Asked about the document, Stanley Karnow, the Vietnam
historian, said: "There is no question that ever since
the primaries of March 1968 the policy was peace with
honor. When Kissinger was in China he said, `Our plan
is to get out.' Unilaterally is the key thing. This is
new to me."
Mr. Kissinger also told Mr. Zhou that the position of
the United States was to work out a military
settlement, but not a specific political outcome.
"Our position is not to maintain any particular
government in South Vietnam," he said, adding that if
the government of South Vietnam "is as unpopular as
you think, then the quicker our forces are withdrawn
the quicker it will be overthrown. And if it is
overthrown after we withdraw, we will not intervene."
In one of two phone conversations today, Mr. Kissinger
insisted that his words did not mean that the Nixon
administration intended to abandon the South
Vietnamese government.
"We were trying to get the Chinese to lean on the
Vietnamese and we were conveying to them what our
position was all along, that if this were to develop
into a political contest we would not prop up a
government," he said. "We had hung in there for three
years through extraordinary differences. Why would we
abandon South Vietnam?"