China and the 1st Indochina War, 1950-1954 (9)
hy tran
leadership and Ho agreed on the grand strategic design that the Viet Minh
would first concentrate their main attention in the north-west (including
north-western Vietnam and upper Laos), then march southward from upper Laos,
and finally compete for the Red River Delta. In terms of the concrete plan
of the campaign, following the suggestions of CCP leaders, (especially Mao
Zedong and Peng Dehuai), the CMAG and Viet Minh high command decided to
concentrate on Nghia Lo. After seizing Nghia Lo, Viet Minh troops would not
attack Son La immediately but focus on establishing revolutionary bases
around Nghia Lo and constructing the highway linking it with Yen Bay.
General Giap may have had different opinions about the narrowing down of the
campaign goals, but as the Chinese emphasized the importance of winning a
steady victory he finally yielded (52). General Wei, after almost a year's
sick leave, returned to his post in mid-October to participate in commanding
the campaign.
It began on l4 October 1952. The Vietnamese Communists concentrated eight
regiments in attacking French strongholds in Nghia Lo. In ten days, they
annihilated most enemy bases. After a short period of readjustment, Viet
Minh troops continued to attack enemies in Son La and Lai Chau. By early
December 1952, Nghia Lo, Son La, southern Lai Chau and western Yen Bay, all
in north-western Vietnam, had been liberated by Vietnamese Communists (53).
After this victory, the VWP Central Committee, having consulted the CCP
several times, decided in February 1953 to develop further to the west by
organizing the Xam Neua campaign in upper Laos. This would connect the
"liberation zone" in north-western Vietnam with Communist-occupied areas in
northern Laos, thus imposing greater pressure on the French (54). On 23
March 1953, Wei Guoqing and Mei Jiasheng led some members of the CMAG to
Laos to organize the campaign. It started in late March and lasted until
early May. The Viet Minh troops annihilated three battalions and 11
companies of the enemy, seizing control of the entire Xam Neua province and
part of Xiang Khoary and Phong Sali provinces. The Viet Minh base in north-
western Vietnam was now linked with these areas and its military position
was further enhanced (55).
By the summer of 1953, the confrontation between Vietnamese Communists and
the French on the Indochina battlefield had reached a point of dramatic
change : the Viet Minh's gains in the past two years put them in a position
to pursue other major campaigns aimed at establishing an overriding
superiority in the war. Meanwhile the end of the Korean conflict in July
1953 meant that the Chinese were able to give more attention to their
southern neighbour. Vietnamese Communists and the CMAG therefore began to
formulate military plans for the autumn and winter of 1953 and spring of
1954.
At this stage there were changes on the French side. In the face of a
series of setbacks under the pressure of the Viet Minh offensives, in May
1953, General Henri Navarre replaced General Raoul Salan (who had succeeded
General de Lattre in 1952) as the commander of the French forces in
Indochina. Supported by the United States, Navarre immediately adopted a
new strategy aimed at winning back the initiative on the battlefield over a
three-year period. He divided Indochina into northern and southern theatres
along the 18th parallel, and aimed to eliminate Viet Minh guerrillas in
southern and south-central Vietnam by spring 1954 and then, by spring 1955,
concentrate the main formation of French forces to fight a decisive battle
with the Communist forces in the Red River Delta (56). To carry out this
plan, the French began to send more troops to Indochina. The United States,
released from its heavy burden in the Korean conflict and worried about the
serious consequences of French losses in Indochina, dramatically increased
its military and financial support (by an additional $400 million) to France
in order to check "Communist expansion" in another key part of East Asia
(57).
The VWP Central Committee asked the CCP Central Committee on 13 August 1953
"to help offer opinions" concerning "the understanding of the current
situation as well as strategies for operations in the future" (58). The VWP
politburo, following the initiative of General Giap, decided on 22 August
that they would transfer the emphasis of their future operations from the
mountainous north-western area to the Red River Delta. The former would be
maintained but not as a priority. Luo Guibo attended the meeting of the VWP
politburo and reported this strategic change to the CCP Central Committee
(59).
The CCP Central Committee sent messages to Luo and the VWP Central Committee
on both 27 and 29 August, opposing the change of strategic emphasis and
insisting that the original plan of focusing on the north-western
battlefield should be continued. In the 29 August telegram the CCP Central
Committee emphasized :
"We should first annihilate enemies in the Lai Chau area, liberating
northern and central Laos, and then extend the battlefield gradually toward
southern Laos and Cambodia, thus putting pressure on Saigon. By adopting
this strategy, we will be able to limit the human and financial resources of
the enemy and separate enemy troops, leaving the enemy in a disadvantageous
position .... The realization of this strategic plan will surely contribute
to the final defeat of the colonial rule of French imperialists in Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia. Of course, we need to overcome a variety of difliculties
and prepare for a prolonged war (60)".
Footnotes :
52. The CMAG in Vietnam, pp. 58—59.
53. Contemporary Chinese Army, p. 529.
54. The CMAG in Vietnam, p. 63.
55. Ibid. pp. 64-65.
56. Davidson, Vietnam at War, pp. 162-67.
57. Hess, Vietnam and the United States, p. 43.
58. The CMAG in Vietnam, p. 87.
59. Ibid. p. 88; see also Contemporary Chinese Army, p. 529.
60. The CMAG in Vietnam,p. 88; see also Li Ke, "Chinese military advisers",
p. 28.
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