Deja Vu: Richard Holbrooke facing the Authoritarian, Corrupt, and Incompetent Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan same as Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam
Julie (English only!)
Astri Suhrke
Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre
13 October 2009
The present controversy over the elections in Afghanistan recalls the
dilemmas Washington faced in Vietnam when Ngo Dinh Diem, whom the
Americans had helped establish as president, no longer appeared as a
reliable and effective partner. They then decided to get rid of Diem,
but this merely led to a period of greater instability and eventual
defeat.
The ghost of Vietnam keeps appearing in the debate over NATO’s role in
Afghanistan. It also haunts the background of Richard Holbrooke,
President Obama’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
for Holbrooke began his career in the State Department as an aid-
worker in South Vietnam in 1963.
As a young, ambitious official, Holbrooke helped develop the ”hearts
and minds” strategy in Vietnam, writes his former boss, Rufus
Phillips, in his recently published book Why Vietnam Matters.
Development in the villages rather than raw military power was to win
the people’s confidence in the battle against the Communists.
Holbrooke was in the Mekong delta when the US ambassador, Henry Cabot
Lodge, decided it was time to remove the South Vietnamese president,
Ngo Dinh Diem.
Diem had become uncooperative and authoritarian, he led a corrupt but
weak state and had started to talk about negotiating with the enemy.
He also had a corrupt and obstinate brother who exerted considerable
influence on him. In October 1963 Cabot Lodge informed the Vietnamese
general Duong Van Minh that Diem was no longer desired as president.
This led to a military coup in which Diem was shot and thrown into the
back of an army vehicle. Later Lodge said the intention was not to
kill Diem. He was only to be deposed because the country needed a new
president.
Rigid fronts
It is hardly necessary to remind Holbrooke of the parallels with
present strife around Hamid Karzai. Also the Afghan president is
accused of corruption and of being uncooperative, and he presided over
the rigged elections in September. Karzai has a problem brother, Ahmed
Wali Karzai, who is said to be deeply involved in the narcotics trade.
Like Diem, Karzai originally had the decisive support of the
Americans, who helped install him after 2001 in the expectation that
he would be a nationally unifying figure.
Relations cool
At that time the UN special representative Lakhdar Brahimi and the
Americans cooperated in making Karzai the leader of the transitional
government, which formally was elected by the traditional Afghan
assembly (loya jirga) in 2002. The US special representative, the
Afghan-American Zalmay Khalilzad, made it clear that neither the king,
Zahir Shah, nor any member of his fraction were acceptable candidates.
With support from Brahimi, Khalilzad announced that the king had
withdrawn his candidacy, even before the king himself had the
opportunity to do so.
Karzai was clearly the Americans’ candidate in the 2004 presidential
election. Washington allocated an extra billion dollars ahead of the
election to show that Karzai could open the aid faucet in the service
of reconstruction and peace-building. In the months prior to the
election school buildings shot up like toadstools, roads were
tarmacked and wells drilled. Much of it was done too fast. School
roofs collapsed and those that were left standing often lacked both
teachers and textbooks.
This was the beginning of the end of the cooperation between Karzai
and Washington. Like Diem, Karzai started to criticise his powerful
benefactors. He disagreed with Washington’s military strategy (too
many civilian casualties) and state-building strategy (too much
interference). Not surprisingly, he began to build another power base
founded on local alliances and tribal politics. This created even
greater distance in the relationship, and when Obama became president,
things went from bad to worse.
Opposing strategies
What lessons does Holbrooke draw from the US experiences with Diem now
that he has a stubborn President Karzai to deal with? The time for
military coups and assassinating unpopular clients has probably
passed. Instead accusations of election rigging are used to eliminate
or at any rate marginalise Karzai. Holbrooke is said to prefer a new
round of elections. His colleague, Peter Galbraith, who has worked
closely with Holbrooke and was placed by him in the UN Kabul office
under Kai Eide, has argued e that all election fraud should be exposed
even if, as expected, this would mean that Karzai’s days in the
presidential palace are numbered.
In the State Department, on the other hand, there is more doubt and
more support for Kai Eide’s line that more and direct intervention can
create bigger problems. The consequence of removing Diem in 1963 was
indeed less stability. Military coup followed military coup to produce
sustained chaos. The idea that direct intervention is difficult, often
has unintended consequences and frequently delegitimises the new
regime, is now gaining ground in established political circles in
Washington.
Abortive efforts
The”minimalists” in Washington, as they are called, note that the
military escalation and foreign-supported statebuilding in Afghanistan
so far have not attained the desired results. On the contrary, the
deepening foreign presence has created a bigger and tougher
insurgency, has cost billions of dollars and many American lives (as
well as the lives of others). It has led to a proliferation of unclear
aims, contributed to widespread corruption and a president the
Americans can no longer control.
The time has therefore come to use “smart power”, the critics say. The
Americans can use rockets and special forces against a smaller group
of international terrorists now on the Pakistani side of the border.
The Taliban insurgency, state-building and “winning hearts and minds”
are matters the Afghans themselves must deal with. International aid
can make a contribution but not govern this process. That is simply
too complicated.
Well-known figures among the minimalists are politicians and
intellectuals whose views were shaped by the Vietnam War. Senator John
Kerry – who is rapidly moving in the minimalist direction – fought
there as a young soldier, afterwards becoming a strong critic of the
war. Leslie Gelb, a well known commentator, advisor, journalist and
for a long time head of the influential Council on Foreign Relations,
worked in the Pentagon under Robert McNamara’s management of the war
in Vietnam and developed a certain scepticism towards intervention as
an instrument of power. An increasing number of Democratic senators
are looking towards the congressional elections next year and realize
that the shadow of Vietnam grows ever longer over the debate on the
war in Afghanistan. Vice-President Joe Biden as made clear he favours
a minimalist role. On the right he has the support from relatively
moderate conservatives such as the columnist George F. Will.
Bad experiences
On the other side are General McChrystal, among others, who argue for
a greater and wider engagement with more foreign troops, a broad
“hearts and minds” strategy and more international support to ensure a
stronger Afghan state and better governance.
Holbrooke himself is not saying much right now. He is known to be an
activist and a directive leader. On the other hand, he has lived
through the experiences of failed attempts to do just that in Vietnam.
When Obama put him in charge of Afghanistan-Pakistan, he e-mailed his
old boss from the Vietnam period: ”Afghanistan is tougher than
Vietnam”.
-----
This article originally appeared as ‘Eide og Holbrooke i skyggen fra
Vietnam’ in Bergens Tidende, 27 09 09.
Translated from Norwegian by John Meyrick.
Um Bala
weak state and had started to talk about negotiating with the enemy. "
ddu*o*.c cha'nh phu? My~ la^.t ddo^? NDD de^?
kho^ng cho Nam thu*o*ng thuye^'t vo*'i CS va` cha'nh phu? My~ no'i
do^'i vo*'i da^n My~ ve^` cuo^.c dda?o cha'nh va` chie^'n tranh, da^n
My~ tu*'c gia^.n buo^.c cha'nh phu? My~ pha?i bo? VN ba(`ng mo.i gia'.
Da^n My~ vo^'n co' da.o ddu*'c cao, ne^'u cha'nh phu? My~la`m ba^,y
thi` ho. sa(~n sa`ng du`ng la' phie^'u dde^? thay ddo^?i ddu*o*`ng
lo^'i cha'nh phu?, cha'nh phu? My~ ca`ng can thie^.p va`o VN thi` ho.
pha?n ddo^`'i ca`ng ma.nh.
Cha'nh phu? My~ nghi~ ra(`ng ho. co' quye^`n lu*.c muo^'n la`m gi`
cu~ng ddu*o*.c,ke^? ca? nga(n ca^'m mie^`n Nam tu*. thu*o*ng
thuye^'t de^? ho. mo*? ro^.ng chie^'n tranh nhu*ng ho. kho^ng bie^'t
tinh tha^`n dda.o ddu*'c va` su*'c ma.nh cu?a ba'o chi' va` la'
phie^'u da^n chu'ng My~ co' the^? ddu*a nu*o*'c My~ dde^'n ba.i
tra^.n. Ne^'u cha'nh phu? My~ ru't co^' va^'n ve^` dde^? mie^`n Nam
tu*. thu*o*ng thuye^'t na(m 1963 thi` 58 nga`n li'nh My~ va` 3 trie^.u
da^n mie^`n Nam dda~ kho^ng che^'t dde^? mie^`n Nam pha?i dda^`u
ha`ng. Chi'nh cha'nh phu? My~ du*a 58 nga`n li'nh My~ va`o cho^?
che^'t.
Co* ho^.i cho mie^`n Nam sinh to^`n vo*'i CS bi. My~ pha' bo? nhie^`u
la^`n. Theo ta`i lie^.u Karnow ta.i HN Geneve 1954 Chu A^n Lai khoa?n
dda~i co' pha'i ddoa`n Quo^'c Gia VN tham du*. va` ngo? y' mo*`i QGVN
la^.p lie^n he^. ngoa.i giao vo*'i TC nhu*ng My~ vi` quye^`n lo*.i
bao va^y CS nga*n ca?n. Sau ddo' khi NDD la`m To^?ng Tho^'ng thi`
Cha^u A^n Lai sang Anh quo^'c la.i khoa?n dda~i tie^.c co' mo*`i VNCH
va` ngo? y' muo^'n bang giao. NDD ho?i y' kie^'n My~ thi` bi. My~ nga
(n ca?n. Ca? TC va dde^`u muo^'n thu*o*ng thuuye^'t bang giao rie^ng
vo*'i cha'nh phu? NDD. Sau khi NDD bi. la^.t ddo^? thi` TC va`
Um Bala
Ca? TC va` Ba('c Vie^.t dde^`u muo^'n thu*o*ng thuye^'t bang giao
vo*'i NDD.
Sau khi NDD bi. la^.t ddo^? thi` TC va` Ba('c Vie^.t coi VNCH la` bu`
nhi`n My~ ne^n ho. chi? ddo`i thu*o*ng thuye^'t tha(?ng vo*'i My~ va`
kho^ng chi.u no'i chuye^.n vo*'i VNCH.
Ba trie^.u ngu*o*`i VN va` 58 nga`n li'nh My~ che^'t vo^ i'ch vi` My~
sai la^`m.
Ta`i lie^.u cu?a N H Due^.:
"Vie^.c thu? tu+o+'ng Trung co^.ng Chu A^n Lai muo^'n co' lie^n la.c
ngoa.i giao
vo+'i VNCH.
O^ng Luye^.n ke^? cho to^i nghe mo^.t bi' ma^.t he^'t su+'c quan
tro.ng ma` to^i
chu+a nghe bao gio+`. Nga`y thu? tu+o+'ng Chu A^n Lai vie^'ng Anh
quo^'c (to^i
que^n kho^ng nho+' na(m na`o), pha'i ddoa`n cu?a Chu A^n Lai ddo^ng la
('m, co'
dde^'n ho+n 100 ngu+o+`i va` ddu+o+.c chi'nh phu? Anh ddo'n tie^'p
ra^'t long
tro.ng. O^ng Luye^.n ddu+o+.c mo^.t tham vu. ngoa.i giao cu?a to`a
dda.i su+'
Ta`u ddem bie^'u hai vo` ru+o+.u "Mao Tha'i", ke`m thie^.p cu?a thu? tu
+o+'ng
Chu A^n Lai mo+`i du+. tie^'p ta^n o+? to`a dda.i su+' Ta`u vo+'i su+.
hie^.n
die^.n cu?a nu+~ hoa`ng Anh.
Khi o^ng ddu+o+.c dda.i su+' Ta`u gio+'i thie^.u vo+'i thu? tu+o+'ng
Chu A^n
Lai, thu? tu+o+'ng ra^'t nie^`m no+?, no'i dda~ bie^'t o^ng la` em cu?
a to^?ng
tho^'ng VN, la` ngu+o+`i o^ng ra^'t ki'nh tro.ng va` ngu+o+~ng mo^.,
xin o^ng
Luye^.n chuye^?n lo+`i tha(m cu?a Mao chu? ti.ch dde^'n Ngo^ to^?ng
tho^'ng.
O^ng Chu no'i o^ng kho^ng co' co+ ho^.i dde^? no'i nhie^`u vo+'i dda.i
su+'
Luye^.n nhu+ng dda~ chi? thi. dda.i su+' Ta`u dde^'n ga(.p dda.i su+'
Luye^.n
tri`nh ba^`y chi tie^'t sau.
Sau ddo', dda.i su+' Ta`u dde^'n tha(m o^ng Luye^.n o+? to`a dda.i su
+' VN.
DDa.i su+' Trung Co^.ng no'i vo+'i o^ng Luye^.n ra(`ng chu? ti.ch Mao
ra^'t ca?m
phu.c lo`ng ye^u nu+o+'c va` nhu+~ng gi` Ngo^ to^?ng tho^'ng dda~ la`m
cho
mie^`n Nam VN ddu+o+.c pho^`n thi.nh nhu+ nga`y nay. Y' chu? ti.ch Mao
muo^'n
co' lie^n la.c ngoa.i giao vo+'i mie^`n Nam VN.
Theo y' Mao Tra.ch DDo^ng, tru+o+'c tie^n hai be^n se~ dda(.t lie^n
la.c tre^n
ca^'p to^?ng la~nh su+., sau ddo' se~ na^ng le^n ca^'p DDa.i su+'
ne^'u ti`nh
the^' cho phe'p. Theo Mao Tra.ch DDo^ng hai be^n se~ co' lie^n la.c cha
(.t che~
ve^` va(n ho'a va` bi`nh thu+o+`ng ho'a vie^.c buo^n ba'n giu+~a hai
quo^'c gia,
Ta`u se~ da`n xe^'p dde^? hai mie^`n Nam Ba('c VN co' dda.i die^.n giu
+~a hai
mie^`n, sau ddo' se~ ddi dde^'n vie^.c lie^n la.c, tie^'p te^' va`
buo^n ba'n
giu+~a hai mie^`n v.v...
O^ng Luye^.n tra? lo+`i la` se~ ve^` tri`nh to^?ng tho^'ng va` se~
tra? lo+`i
o^ng dda.i su+' Trung Co^.ng sau.
O^ng Luye^.n dda~ ddi'ch tha^n ve^` tri`nh to^?ng tho^'ng Die^.m
vie^.c na`y.
Sau ddo' ga^`n hai tha'ng, o^ng ddu+o+.c to^?ng tho^'ng trie^.u ve^`
va` cho
bie^'t la` sau khi dda~ nho+` o^ng dda.i su+' Trung Hoa Quo^'c gia
ve^` tham
kha?o y' kie^'n cu?a to^?ng tho^'ng Tu+o+?ng Gio+'i Tha.ch. To^?ng
tho^'ng cu~ng
tham kha?o y' kie^'n vo+'i dda.i su+' Hoa Ky` thi` ddi dde^'n ke^'t
lua^.n la`
vie^.c na`y chu+a the^? ddo^`ng y' trong giai ddoa.n na`y ddu+o+.c. "
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Um Bala
bi`nh la^'y cho mi`nh dde^? ddu*a dde^'n chinh chie^'n ddie^u li`nh
la` cha'nh sa'ch ba^'t nha^n. Ngu*o*`i VN va` My~ dda~ tra? mo^.t gia'
ra^'t dda('t khi My~ kho^ng chi.u mo*? bang giao vo*'i TC, tru*.c
tie^'p thu*o*ng tuye^'t tho^'ng nha^'t vo*'i CSVN khi ho. chi.u
thu*o*ng thuye^'t. DDe^'n khi My~ la^.t ddo^? NDD thi` BV kho^ng co`n
chi.u thu*o*ng thuye^'t vo*'i mie^`n Nam va` ho. ddo`i VNCH no'i
chuye^.n vo*'i MTGPMN. Qua^n VNCH chi? dda'nh CS khi co' tie^`n vie^.n
tro*., co' co^' va^'n My~ va` B52. Kho^ng tie^`n, co^' va^'n kho^ng
B52 thi` buo^ng su'ng. Co' tie^`n thi` ye^u nu*o*'c kho^ng tie^`n thi`
ye^u CS.
On Nov 11, 5:07 am, Um Bala <pb5...@gmail.com> wrote:
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Um Bala
su*., na(m 1964 Nga va` TC quye^'t ddi.nh trang bi. AK 47 cho VC. Sau
ddo' mo^.t na(m mo^.t ta`u cho*? dda^`y su'ng AK tie^'p te^' cho VC
bi. VNCH ba('n chi`m ta.i Vu~ng Ro^. Tai. Phu*o*'c Tuy, tu*o*'ng
Kha'nh cho hai ti^?u ddoa`n TQLC pho^'i ho*.p vo*'i BDQ ca`n que't VC
nhu*ng kho^ng ngo*` qua^n VC vu*a` mo*'i ddu*o*.c trang bi. AK 47
dda'nh tan ta.i Bi`nh Gia?
Trong khi VC trang bi. ba(ng su'ng AK 47 qua^n VNCH va^~n pha?i xa`i
su'ng carbine va` tie^?u lie^n tho*`i Pha'p dde^? la.i. Sau tra^.n
Bi`nh Gia? VC tie^'n chie^'m 70% la~nh tho^? nam VN ca('t ddu*o*`ng
sa' co^ la^.p ca'c tha`nh pho^' lo*'n, co^ la^.p Saigon. VN tu*` mo^.t
nu*o*c sa?n xua^'t ga.o pha?i nha^.p ca?ng ga.o vie^.n tro*. My~. Thay
vi` trang bi. qua^n VNCH vo*'i vu~ khi' tu*o*ng ddu*o*ng vo*'i VC, My~
ye^u ca^`u cha'nh phu? VNCH cho phe'p My~ ddo^? qua^n va`o VN. DDa'ng
le~ ca^'p la~nh tu. VNCH pha?i nghi ngo*` ta.i sao My~ kho^ng giu'p
trang bi. qua^n VNCH tu*. dda'nh CS ma` la.i dde^? ma(.c cho CS le^n
nu*o*'c chie^'m dda^'t, ca('t ddu*o*`ng co^ la^.p ca'c tha`nh pho^'
ro^`i a'p lu*.c VNCH cho ddem qua^n va`o, nhu*ng kho^ng ai da(.t ca^u
ho?i.
Ca'i ba^'t lo*.i cu?a qua^n My~ chie^'n dda^'u o*? VN go^`m co':
1. Su*. hie^.n die^.n cu?a qua^n My~ tro*? tha`nh qua^n chie^'m
ddo'ng, la`m VNCH ma^'t cha'nh nghi~a, ta.o li' do cho CS quye^'n ru~
ngu*o*`i Vie^.t cho^'ng ngoa.i xa^m.
2. Qua^n My~ qua VN kho^ng bie^'t phong tu.c co' tie^`n uo^'ng ru*o*.u
hu't ca^`n sa say su*a ddi~ ddie^'m ta.o pha' hoa.i ne^`n ta?ng nho
gia'o cu?a mie^`n Nam.
3. Qua^n My~ di ha`nh qua^n va`o la`ng hay bi. VC ba('n tia? no^?i
ddie^n ddo^'t nha` gie^'t tra^u bo` dde^? dduo^?i da^n ddi cho^?
kha'c. Co' khi la`m qua' da'ng ma^'t nha^n ta^m.
4. Qua^n My~ tro.ng to^n gia'o, khi ca'n bo^. cao ca^'p CS thua tra^.n
cha.y tro^'n va`o co* so*? to^n gia'o thi` My~ ba^'t lu*.c.
4. Khi so^' to^n tha^'t cu?a qua^n My~ le^n cao ho*n 20 nga`n thi`
da^n My~ cho ra`ng VN kho^ng dda'ng dde^? hy sinh the^m li'nh My~. Khi
VC chi.u la^'y 10 ddo^?i 1 dde^? ta.o the^m to^?n tha^'t cho My~ ma^'t
kie^n nha^~n pha?i bo? VN thi` CS tha`nh co^ng. Sau khi ru't kho?i Khe
Sanh na(m 1968, tu*o*'ng Gia'p dda(.t ke^' hoa.ch bao va^y Khe Sanh
la^`n thu*' nhi` vo*'i qua^n so^' ga^'p ddo^i. Tha^'y qua^n qua^n CS
dda'nh thi' ma.ng, tu*o*'ng My~ bie^'t kho^ng the^? giu*~ Khe Sanh
ne^n lo ru't lui tru*o*'c.
5. Tha^n nha^n tu` binh My~ la`m a'p lu*.c vo*'i QH ddo`i thu*o*ng
thuye^'t ddem ho. ve^`. Ngay ca? Ross Perot cu~ng dde^` nghi. tra?
tie^`n cho CS dde^? chuo*.c tu` binh.
6. My~ ta(ng gia qua^n su*. o*? VN thi` Nga va` TC ta(ng gia vie^.n
tro*. va` vu~ khi' trang bi. cho CSVN vu~ khi' to^'i ta^n trong kho
cu?a ho. nhu* AK 47, B40, B41, T54, SAM, SA7, AT 3, hoa? tie^?n 122
ly, su'ng 130 ly. Nga^n sa'ch chie^'n tranh cu?a Nga Ta`u va` Do^ng
A^u cho VN vo^ ha.n, nga^n sa'ch chie^'n tranh My~ cho VN do tuy` ta^m
cu?a Quo^'c Ho^.i My~.
6. Khi My~ ddo^? 200 nga`n qua^n va`o VN, na(m 1966 TC tra? ddua~ ddu
(a 160 nga`n qua^n va`o VN, mo^.t so^' la`m co^' va^'n chie^'n
tru*o*`ng cho VC va` cha'nh quy BV ta.i mie^`n Nam nhu* tho*`i dda'nh
Pha'p. DDe^'n 1974 thi` 500 nga`n qua^n TC qua VN giu*~ mie^`n Ba('c
va` du*o*`ng mo`n HCM dde^? CSVN ddu*a he^'t qua^n va`o Nam.
Ta.i Afghanistan cu~ng va^.y. Qua^n Northern Alliance dda'nh ba.i
qua^n Taliban. Taliban ra^'t so*. qua^n Northern Alliance vi` qua^n
na`y du*~ da(`n, gie^'t ngu*o*`i nhu* nghoe', ne^n Nothern Alliance di
dde^'n dda^u Taliban cha.y tru*o*'c (gio^'ng nhu* ho^`i 1975 qua^n
VNCh cha.y tru*o*'c vi` so*. VC du*~ da(`n nhu* ho^`i Ma^.u Tha^n). N
Alliance chi? va^y thu? ddo^ Kabul va`i nga`y la` Taliban bo? cha.y.
Tuy nhie^n khi qua^n My~ ddo^? va`o Afghanistan, ddo^'t pha' ca'c
ruo^.ng tro^`ng thuo^'c phie^.n cu?a da^n thi` da^nAfghanistan coi
qua^n My~ nhu* qua^n chie^'m ddo'ng la~nh tho^?. O*? Afghanistan cu~ng
nhu* La`o da^n tro^`ng thuo^'c phie^.n gio^'ng nhu* o*? VN tro^`ng
lua', ddo' la` ca'i ne^`n kinh te^' pho^? tho^ng cu?a ho. Khi qua^n
My~ ca^'m tro^`ng thuo^'c phie^.n ddo^'t pha' ca'c ruo^.ng vu*o*`n
tro^`ng tp thi` no^ng da^n bo? theo Taliban la`m Taliban ca`ng nga`y
ca`ng ma.nh ho*n.
Ba'o chi' Ta^y Phu*o*ng to^' ca'o ca'c la~nh tu. Afghansitan ve^` nha
phie^'n thi` kho^ng ddu'ng vi` ddo' la` phong tu.c tro^`ng va` hu't
thuo^'c phie^.n cu?a ho. Cu~ng gio^'ng nhu* phe Ho^`i gia'o to^' ca'o
My~ tu*. do sa?n xua^'t ru*o*.u bia, phim a?nh sa'ch ba'o khie^u da^m
chi? vi` phong tu.c Ta^y Phu*o*ng nhu* va^.y.
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