Russia has tested a ballistic missile that would render the United
States Star Wars scheme useless, a U.S. expert has said.
The SS-27 Topol-M mobile ballistic missile It is too fast to hit right
after takeoff unless the interceptor is lucky enough to be really
close to the launch pad, former arms inspector in Iraq Scott Ritter
reportedly told Business Week.
Scott Ritter has no credible experience in regards to ballistic missile
defense (evidenced from the below described faux pas), or for that matter
offensive, technology. He *does* have experience dealing with the police in
regards to his (two to date, reportedly) attempts to link up with underage
ladies he met via internet chat rooms (and yes, this is factual info)...why
anybody would use him as a "source", especially in regards the subject of
ballistic missile defense, is beyond me. The fact that he completely misses
the point that defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles is NOT
based upon boost phase interception in the first place is a telling one; the
boost phase interception systems in development are aimed at the *theater*
ballistic missile threat.
Brooks
>Boost phase is not what missile defenses are about. There are at
>least three phase of engagement, boost, re-entry and terminal.
Oh come on ! That's just the sort of simplistic dismissal that you
yourself are complaining of.
Hitting a boost phase target is hard - but it's much easier (slower,
visible) than the other two. There are options for engagement in
later phases, but boost phase is much favoured, and not without
reason.
This is probably much more than anyone wants to know about the SS-27
(Topol M). The important aspect is that is either mobile TEL launched
or silo launched. Both methods are extremely hard to target in boost
phase, especially in a country the size of Russia. The old Soviet ICBM
sites were on railroad lines and the nearest to a Western possible
anti-missile launch site was in the Ukraine, now non-Russian territory.
Saratov Oblast on the Don, Valday near Novgorod, the southern Urals,
and the Altay near Novosibirsk are given as deployment areas where
SS-27s take the place sof SS-18s (RS-20). All of these are well out of
any reasonable range of a boost-phase interceptor unless a coordinated
countdown is conducted.
>http://www.missilethreat.com/missiles/ss-27_russia.html
>
>This is probably much more than anyone wants to know about the SS-27
>(Topol M).
How credible is the scramjet claim?
>http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/02/10/topol.shtml
>
>
>Russia has tested a ballistic missile that would render the United
>States Star Wars scheme useless, a U.S. expert has said.
Anybody who refers to it as "Star Wars scheme" is about twenty years
out of date.
RD 190 or RD 180 ?
Really? Care to enlighten us how we are going to do boost phase intercepts
of ICBM's (which is after all what TOPOL is) within the borders of the
launching nation? You might get away with that against an ICBM (if they
succeed in developing one) launched out of the DPRK, but doing so against
China or Russia (owner of the TOPOL in question) is another matter. The fact
is that the boost phase intercept program as we now know it is directed
almost exclusively at TBM's, not ICBM's. Repeat after me..."Topol is not a
TBM, it is an ICBM, and the DoD has been focusing its boost-phase intercept
capability on the TBM threat..." Which means Ritter is full of horse poopie,
as usual.
Brooks
This was proven in testing.....when, exactly? About the same time Ritter
could spare the time from his court-ordered sex offender treatments to
become a physicist, perhaps?
So what defensive measures can and should other nations take
to defend against the threat posed by the russian Topol M
intercontinental nuclear armed ballistic missiles?
And on the other hand what defensive measures should these
countries and Russia take against the threat posed by the
US anti missile starwars efforts?
--
Rostyk
Exactly what claim are you refering to?
The US scramjet did post the claimed speed record.
There is little doubt of that.
--
Rostyk
Russia can't even field one all-volunteer batallion but they are experts on
beating the missile defense? I don't think so.
Could these these the same "experts" that created the GPS jammers in Yugo?
"S Hole" <bora_pa...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:92569047.05021...@posting.google.com...
Those are liquid fuel rocket engines. The Topol-M is a three
stage solid fuel booster developed during the 1990s.
:So what defensive measures can and should other nations take
:to defend against the threat posed by the russian Topol M
:intercontinental nuclear armed ballistic missiles?
First, make it clear that any use of the missile BY ANYONE will be
considered to be an attack by Russia and handled accordingly.
Secondly, I don't believe the story. If a big missile can accelerate
very quickly to try to get out of range, a smaller missile can
presumably accelerate even more quickly to intercept it.
:And on the other hand what defensive measures should these
:countries and Russia take against the threat posed by the
:US anti missile starwars efforts?
An anti-missile system is only a "threat" to people who want to nuke
the US.
How should we handle the 'threat' of the Galosh system around Moscow?
--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney
Oooooo, you're sooooo scary. The US has a history of trying to
push its nuclear missiles as close to Russian territory as possible.
That's why you got the self-created Cuban missile crisis where you
were forced to withdraw your missiles from Turkey.
> Secondly, I don't believe the story. If a big missile can accelerate
> very quickly to try to get out of range, a smaller missile can
> presumably accelerate even more quickly to intercept it.
Only if the small missile is close enough to the big missile.
By the time the warheads are detached you're out of luck.
>
> :And on the other hand what defensive measures should these
> :countries and Russia take against the threat posed by the
> :US anti missile starwars efforts?
>
> An anti-missile system is only a "threat" to people who want to nuke
> the US.
Anybody with a brain knows that the space weapons component of this
mislabelled "NMD" is an act of aggression.
> How should we handle the 'threat' of the Galosh system around Moscow?
Russia isn't trying to militarize space, you wannabe masters of the universe
are.
But, Star Wars wasn't really about Ronald Reagen
or The USRR. It was our second declaration
of Independence. In that we are not going
to get involved in an endless war with nuclear commies.
No matter if they're in Europe, California,
The Middle East, or Korea.
> The SS-27 Topol-M mobile ballistic missile It is too fast to hit
right
> after takeoff unless the interceptor is lucky enough to be really
> close to the launch pad, former arms inspector in Iraq Scott Ritter
> reportedly told Business Week.
But that's also why we're in Iraq though,
since Buisness Week is owned by UN neo-Nazis.
So we had to get a closer look into
what's really going on in these
Hussein Palaces.
Considering the energies that would be used for such a thing,
is spin really an effective countermeasure ?
----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----
How depressing and I thougfht this was all done
and over with but, I guess it's time for Karma
to pay us back for all the shit the USA has
given out around the world for the past 7 decades.
:(
"Captain!" wrote:
>
> so do submarines and suitcase nukes.
suitcase nukes is an urban myth.
VM.
i was refering to components brought in by "mule", not an actual suticase.
Then why was it reported that some of the ones
in the Russian stockpile had gone missing?
But, like 60 years ago, that's still only true
in Russia though. Where the only thing they know
about nukes, they get from hear-say from China.
Where life itself is an urban myth.
> VM.
Yes,the US has made the world a better,safer place.
We freed Europe from the Nazis,the Pacific from Japan,we KEPT Europe free
during the Cold War,and now we are keeping many other countries free,and
freeing more.
--
Jim Yanik
jyanik
at
kua.net
Here we go again.....Lenin's useful fools claiming that defensive devices
are "aggression".
> > How should we handle the 'threat' of the Galosh system around Moscow?
>
> Russia isn't trying to militarize space, you wannabe masters of the
universe
> are.
Exactly which organization placed the first items into orbit?
> How depressing and I thougfht this was all done
> and over with but, I guess it's time for Karma
> to pay us back for all the shit the USA has
> given out around the world for the past 7 decades.
Right on! Damn America for rebuilding Germany and Japan, and accounting for
40% of all foreign aid since! How dare she!
The proper question would be, "Do you believe all reports no matter what the
source?" Lebed's "stolen 'briefcase' nukes" claims were pretty much
completely discounted years ago. And yes, "suitcase" nukes of the size Lebed
and cohorts were claiming are an urban myth, unless you figure they managed
to somehow leap well beyond US nuclear technology as evidenced by our own
smallest nuclear wepons, the W-54 and W-48, or the partially developed but
never fielded W-82...which is doubtful, to say the least.
Brooks
>
:Fred J. McCall wrote:
:> "Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" <urj...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
:>
:> :So what defensive measures can and should other nations take
:> :to defend against the threat posed by the russian Topol M
:> :intercontinental nuclear armed ballistic missiles?
:>
:> First, make it clear that any use of the missile BY ANYONE will be
:> considered to be an attack by Russia and handled accordingly.
:
:Oooooo, you're sooooo scary. The US has a history of trying to
:push its nuclear missiles as close to Russian territory as possible.
:That's why you got the self-created Cuban missile crisis where you
:were forced to withdraw your missiles from Turkey.
Nope. We didn't need them in Turkey anymore. We were stopping
Russian ships on the high seas. You figure out who 'won' that one,
moron.
:> Secondly, I don't believe the story. If a big missile can accelerate
:> very quickly to try to get out of range, a smaller missile can
:> presumably accelerate even more quickly to intercept it.
:
:Only if the small missile is close enough to the big missile.
:By the time the warheads are detached you're out of luck.
Nope. by the time the warheads are detached, they stop accelerating.
DOH!
:> :And on the other hand what defensive measures should these
:> :countries and Russia take against the threat posed by the
:> :US anti missile starwars efforts?
:>
:> An anti-missile system is only a "threat" to people who want to nuke
:> the US.
:
:Anybody with a brain knows that the space weapons component of this
:mislabelled "NMD" is an act of aggression.
WHAT "space weapons component"?
:> How should we handle the 'threat' of the Galosh system around Moscow?
:
:Russia isn't trying to militarize space, you wannabe masters of the universe
:are.
Time to stop doing the drugs, son. They've obviously rotted your
brain.
--
"Ignorance is preferable to error, and he is less remote from the
truth who believes nothing than he who believes what is wrong."
-- Thomas Jefferson
:Vladimir Makarenko wrote:
:>
:> suitcase nukes is an urban myth.
:
:Then why was it reported that some of the ones
:in the Russian stockpile had gone missing?
It's also been reported that people are having babies with aliens and
Elvis is alive.
--
"Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar
territory."
--G. Behn
:
:"Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" <urj...@bellsouth.net> wrote in message
:news:gabPd.4846$sh....@bignews4.bellsouth.net...
:>
:> Then why was it reported that some of the ones
:> in the Russian stockpile had gone missing?
:
:The proper question would be, "Do you believe all reports no matter what the
:source?" Lebed's "stolen 'briefcase' nukes" claims were pretty much
:completely discounted years ago. And yes, "suitcase" nukes of the size Lebed
:and cohorts were claiming are an urban myth, unless you figure they managed
:to somehow leap well beyond US nuclear technology
As well as the laws of physics.
"The widely used word "suitcase" is misleading since these devices were
quite heavy (no less than 60 lb, probably considerably more), but they could
have been moved by one, but more likely, two people."
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020923.htm
The same source goes on to assess Lebed's claims thusly: "First, the
probability that any portable nuclear devices were lost prior to or after
the breakup of the Soviet Union appears low; the scenarios of loss offered
by the special commission in 1996 are actually the least plausible among
other possible scenarios."
Even your own source wrote another article that pointed out some of the
weaknesses of the Lebed/60 Minutes claims, to include the questionable
motive behind 60 Minutes even doing the story (the producer was coauthor,
with her husband, of a book that was then pending release on the subject of
nuclear terrorism...not something your average 60 Minutes producer would be
involved in).
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/News/Lebedbomb.html
And the source you provided seems at odds with the oft-pictured mock-up of
the "suitcase nuke" used in Weldon's congressional hearings, which
apparently shows a linear implosion device in the 105mm diameter range--your
source notes that neither the US or USSR was ever known to have developed a
weapon of that small a diameter, though it was "possible" to do so and
offering "hypothetical" characteristics.
Finally, and most importantly, the single fact that most points to the
fallacy of Lebed's claims: if these devices (devices significantly smaller
than any ADM we ever fielded by the US, which had itself fielded a pretty
wide range of demolitions munitions, from MADM to SADM in the latest
versions) did exist and were stolen/lost, why have we (a) not recovered one
by now, or (b) not had one *used* against us or another target? It has been
about eight years since all of those puppies allegedly turned up missing
according to Lebed, and not a single indication of them has popped up
since...odd, huh?
Brooks
>
JooYoung Park's larger suitcase when he left here was 62 kilos
and the smaller 51. Joo was extreem because he had two but I've
seen several exchange student's suitcases in the 50+ kilo range.
It's against regulations but the airline seems to charge the
overweight and handle the bags.
ISTR that a 150 mm shell is less than 50 kilos and that there was
serious development work for nukes to fit.
Peter Skelton
Uranium-235 Plutonium-239
Bare sphere: 56 kg 11 kg
Thick Tamper: 15 kg 5 kg
The critical mass of compressed fissile material decreases as the
inverse square of the density achieved. Since critical mass decreases
rapidly as density increases, the implosion technique can make do with
substantially less nuclear material than the gun-assembly method. The
"Fat Man" atomic bomb that destroyed Nagasaki in 1945 used 6.2
kilograms of plutonium and produced an explosive yield of 21-23
kilotons [a 1987 reassessment of the Japanese bombings placed the yield
at 21 Kt]. Until January 1994, the Department of Energy (DOE) estimated
that 8 kilograms would typically be needed to make a small nuclear
weapon. Subsequently, however, DOE reduced the estimate of the amount
of plutonium needed to 4 kilograms. Some US scientists believe that 1
kilogram of plutonium will suffice. "
http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm
A man with a shield and a spear is much more dangerous.
The only reason US isn't "bringing democracy"/stealing Russian resources,
is the lack of good shield.
>> > How should we handle the 'threat' of the Galosh system around Moscow?
>>
>> Russia isn't trying to militarize space, you wannabe masters of the
> universe
>> are.
>
> Exactly which organization placed the first items into orbit?
A Soviet one.
When you add this to:
America is rapidly turning into a Neo-Bolshevik state.
And has invaded an impoverished and demoralized country under false
pretext.
Supplies a Zionist fundamentalist state with technology to produce WMD's.
You might like to rephrase to "Spot on! Damn America. How dare she!"
But the fact is that Lebed's specific claims have not only not been proven,
or corroborated, but that his own description of the alleged devices tends
towards the much-smaller-than-realistic. Did the Soviets develop ADMs
similar to what we had in the US Army? No doubt. But they were most likely
not (to put it mildly) 105mm diameter devices that weighed in at 30 kg and
fit in a briefcase-sized package, as was asserted at the time. One would
think if this story had any legs, we would have seen either the use of
capture of such a weapon by now--his claims dated from 1997!
Brooks
> --
> Rostyk
>
>But the fact is that Lebed's specific claims have not only not been proven,
>or corroborated, but that his own description of the alleged devices tends
>towards the much-smaller-than-realistic. Did the Soviets develop ADMs
>similar to what we had in the US Army? No doubt. But they were most likely
>not (to put it mildly) 105mm diameter devices that weighed in at 30 kg and
>fit in a briefcase-sized package, as was asserted at the time. One would
>think if this story had any legs, we would have seen either the use of
>capture of such a weapon by now--his claims dated from 1997!
>
I've spoken with a combat engineer who was deployed in Germany during
the height of the Cold War. One of his missions was to deploy a ADM to
block one of the chokepoints that the Soviets may have used in case of
an attack. He said the device was man portable, but just barely; it
had to be carried in separate components and assembled on the site by
a team.
I doubt the Soviets every deployed one that was any smaller or easier
to move around.
John Lansford
--
The unofficial I-26 Construction Webpage:
http://users.vnet.net/lansford/a10/
Depends on the type used. I was in the last engineer officer basic course
class required to complete the ADM familiarization training as part of the
training syllabus and got to see the training rounds for both MADM (medium)
and SADM (small), which at that time were more highly classified than now
(you did not find photos of the SADM floating around in those days as you do
now). MADM required a truck and lifting equipment--it was based on the same
warhead used in the Talos shipborn SAM, IIRC. SADM, which used the W-54
warhead of Davey Crockett fame, could be carried by a single man in its
special backpack rig, but it was about all that man could carry (IIRC the
total weight was something like 110-120 pounds). SADM did not require any
onsite assembly, though IIRC one component was required to be inserted as
part of the overall PAL ( Permissive action link) system, but if necessary
that could be done beforehand (getting hazy here, as this was a long time
ago now). The major reason we LT's received the fam training in OBC was that
at the time the corps level combat engineer units still had the mission of
supporting ADM employment, to include planning (though that was usually
conducted by the theater ADM company personnel) and emplacement (usually
wanted a big hole for one of those puppies, as the detonation depth was
critical to crater formation). The ADM companies were deleted from the force
structure a short time later (one of my company commanders on active duty
had come from the ADM Co located in Vincenza, Italy) and the engineers bowed
out of the ADM mission, with the SOF folks retaining it for a couple more
years before the US retired the remainder of its ADM's around 1992, IIRC.
>
> I doubt the Soviets every deployed one that was any smaller or easier
> to move around.
Agreed. And Lebed's claims that some of the "lost" micro-nukes were located
in alleged caches located in western nations (does anybody really think the
Soviets would have been stupid enough to try and cache a *nuke* inside of a
NATO nation's borders during the height of the Cold War?) further points to
the incredulity of his rants.
Brooks
MAJOR SNIPS
> Even your own source wrote another article that pointed out some of the
> weaknesses of the Lebed/60 Minutes claims, to include the questionable
> motive behind 60 Minutes even doing the story (the producer was coauthor,
> with her husband, of a book that was then pending release on the subject
of
> nuclear terrorism...not something your average 60 Minutes producer would
be
> involved in).
>
> http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/News/Lebedbomb.html
>
ROTFL.
CBS and 60 Minutes ethics in action.
Seems Danny Boy's faux pas re: forged documents regarding Bush was not the
first tainted piece 60 Minutes aired.
-- Jim McLaughlin
Please don't just hit the reply key.
Remove the obvious from the address to reply.
***************************************************************************
Balderdash.
> Germany is still paying reparations to a country that never existed during
> and before WWII.
> Russia has seen very little other than intense hostile propaganda, from
the
> US.
Russia has earned it.
> When you add this to:
>
> America is rapidly turning into a Neo-Bolshevik state.
Baldedash.
> And has invaded an impoverished and demoralized country under false
> pretext.
> Supplies a Zionist fundamentalist state with technology to produce WMD's.
And another "Zionist conspiracy" fruitcake pops up. Plonk.
James Hood registered 100 on my Zionist detector.
Typical symptoms:
Uses the term Russia instead of Soviet Union.
Tries to make it look like the Jewish Bolshevik Junta was a Russian affair.
Gets into personal attack as soon as he hears the magic word Zionism.
Has the integrity of a SOF reader (SOF is a publication owned and run by
Zionist Jews in USA).
>One would
>think if this story had any legs, we would have seen either the use of
>capture of such a weapon by now--his claims dated from 1997!
Not necessarily (although I wouldn't disagree). Many credible
sources that do talk about "smaller" (if not suitcase sized) Soviet
ADMs mention a deliberate design that required servicing (tritium
refill ?) at frequent intervals and a deliberate self-defuzing
behaviour if lost for more than a fairly short period.
Snowball and Goldsmith may well be sitting in downtown DC with their
black market suitcase, but they're pressing "fire" and nothing is
happening.
>Fred J. McCall wrote:
>> First, make it clear that any use of the missile BY ANYONE will be
>> considered to be an attack by Russia and handled accordingly.
>
>Oooooo, you're sooooo scary. The US has a history of trying to
>push its nuclear missiles as close to Russian territory as possible.
>That's why you got the self-created Cuban missile crisis where you
>were forced to withdraw your missiles from Turkey.
Here's a clue for you: The Cuban Missile Crisis was 40 years ago.
Anyone who examines the history of the US nuclear weapons inventory
can plainly see that short range systems were phased out (with one
exception) thirty years ago. (The one exception is the Pershing II
*tactical* missile, so it's not really an exception.)
>> :And on the other hand what defensive measures should these
>> :countries and Russia take against the threat posed by the
>> :US anti missile starwars efforts?
>>
>> An anti-missile system is only a "threat" to people who want to nuke
>> the US.
>
>Anybody with a brain knows that the space weapons component of this
>mislabelled "NMD" is an act of aggression.
Care to actually *support* this claim?
D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.
-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL
Doesn't really work that way. Firstly, the absence of tritum to the nuclear
weapon process just means you would get a lesser bang, not an absense of
bang. As to "self-defuzing", you apparently are referring to some sort of
PAL. Which again goes to point against Lebed's claims (which included the
whopper that oodles of thse nifty little thingies were already stockpliled
in caches in western nations, which they had lost control of....). Wouldn't
have been much sense in caching a device that required a periodic PAL
maintenance to make it usable, right? In the end, it is pretty clear that
Lebed's claims were crap, pure and simple. Wonderful for stirring up
publicity and getting the pulse up in the media's typical
blow-things-way-out-of-proportion manner, but crap nonetheless.
Brooks
>
> Here's a clue for you: The Cuban Missile Crisis was 40 years ago.
> Anyone who examines the history of the US nuclear weapons inventory
> can plainly see that short range systems were phased out (with one
> exception) thirty years ago. (The one exception is the Pershing II
> *tactical* missile, so it's not really an exception.)
Um, Pershing II went away under INF; the last were withdrawn nearly 15 years
ago now. There are no deployed tactical nuclear weapons in the US inventory
anymore, only intercontinental missiles (ground and submarine launched),
air-launched cruise missiles, and free-fall bombs.
--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"Our country, right or wrong. When right, to be kept right, when
wrong to be put right." - Senator Carl Schurz, 1872
>Derek Lyons wrote:
>
>> Here's a clue for you: The Cuban Missile Crisis was 40 years ago.
>> Anyone who examines the history of the US nuclear weapons inventory
>> can plainly see that short range systems were phased out (with one
>> exception) thirty years ago. (The one exception is the Pershing II
>> *tactical* missile, so it's not really an exception.)
>
>Um, Pershing II went away under INF; the last were withdrawn nearly 15 years
>ago now. There are no deployed tactical nuclear weapons in the US inventory
>anymore, only intercontinental missiles (ground and submarine launched),
>air-launched cruise missiles, and free-fall bombs.
Um. Pay attention to the historical timeline.
1950's-early 60's: US pushes strategic missiles ever closer to Russia,
provoking the Missile Crisis.
Mid 60's all such weapons are removed from inventory.
> 1950's-early 60's: US pushes strategic missiles ever closer to Russia,
> provoking the Missile Crisis.
>
> Mid 60's all such weapons are removed from inventory.
You missed a time line entry:
Mid 60s Polaris SSBN fleet has been built up sufficiently to make
short range strategic ballistic missiles unnecessary.
Jerry
--
Not to endorse the specific claims Lebed actually made, but this is
confusing Lebed's 1997 claims about sabotage devices being built (and maybe
not all accounted for) with later and more lurid claims by Soviet
ex-colonel and GRU operative Stanislav Lunev at the hearing held by Curt
Weldon in 2000.
See:
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/News/Lebedbomb.html
Carey Sublette
>> How credible is the scramjet claim?
>
>It has been verified by U.S. intelligence.
So the USA and Australia are shouting from the rooftops when they get
a few seconds successful combustion in a miniature test scramjet,
whilst the Russians have deployed a working example to the field,
retro-fitted to an airframe that was never originally intended for
such speeds ? I find such a claim to be completely unbelievable.
There is indeed a reason why lost tritium wouldn't turn the device into a
"dirty bomb at worst". Tritium only plays a role when the fission device has
released enough energy to heat the tritium to millions of degrees and ignite
a fusion reaction. This doesn't happen until about 300 tons of energy have
been released. Any boosted fission weapon would be capable of producing a
bang of this magnitude without the boosting fuel. 300 tons would be a
devastating explosion in any urban area.
Carey Sublette
>As to "self-defuzing", you apparently are referring to some sort of
>PAL.
No, if I'd meant PAL, I'd have said PAL. I mean some fundamental
>Tritium only plays a role when the fission device has
>released enough energy to heat the tritium to millions of degrees and ignite
>a fusion reaction.
Agreed.
>This doesn't happen until about 300 tons of energy have
>been released.
Now this I'm not so sure about. I can accept that "Any device capable
of triggering tritium fusion would have a minimum yield of 300 tons",
but is that the design yield for a functional device, or is it the
amount of energy that must already have _been_ released ?
A tritium-boosted device needs to achieve fusion rapidly, as the
purpose of the tritium is to increase neutron flux and thus fission,
not to add to the yield per se. If this extra reactivity is delayed or
reduced, then you see the sort of fizzle from Upshot-Knothole Ruth
(although that wasn't tritium).
So my hypothesis (comments welcome) is that a tritium-boosted device
that ran to completion might well have a minimum yield of 300 tons,
but that one which fizzles early might well find itself quenched at a
much smaller yield, owing to lack of neutrons. This isn't a viable
device design (so Davy Crockett still can't have been boosted -
discussions passim.), but it's a mechanism to explain a self-expiring
device.
Is it possible to give a hand-waving explanation of where the "300
tons" figure comes from ?
There's also the possibility that the neutron initiator might be the
limited life component (as I said, tritium is merely my assumption).
Even something as simple as a Po/Be urchin could achieve this -
however the claimed storage lifetimes seem excessive for Po.
--
Smert' spamionam
Lebed made lots of claims, apparently, and they did not always agree with
his previous assertions. From a 1998 PBS program featuring Senator Richard
Lugar, and a former NSC staffer (Stern):
"SEN. RICHARD LUGAR: General Lebed raised this question with Congressman
Weldon last year, and it resulted in a flurry of activity trying to
determine just that, but, Jim, there is no way of knowing exactly what these
devices are, how many there are, and how many are unaccounted for. And I
thought it was interesting that General Lebed today did not make allegations
specifically about the accountability."
"JIM LEHRER: Ms. Stern, where do you think these--do you, first of all,
believe that there are 100--what Mr. Lebed said a year ago was that there
were 100 that were missing and then 48 were found, and there's been silence
ever since. How do you--what's your reading of that? JESSICA STERN: Well, in
fact, there hasn't been silence. Gen. Lebed has told a variety of stories;
first, that 100 were perhaps missing. Later, he said that perhaps none were
missing. Later, he seemed to be confused about the difference between atomic
demolition munitions and artillery shells. And now he claims that perhaps,
even if they're missing, they don't pose a threat. So it's really very, very
hard to know what to think, but the very fact that we don't know what to
think is the symptom of this problem."
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/ military/jan-june98/nukes_3-19.html
And Lebed's claims that he made himself to Weldon's committee are plenty
lurid enough:
"In 1997, Weldon brought former Russian security chief Gen. Alexander Lebed
before his committee. Lebed testified that perhaps 100 small nuclear devices
were missing from inventories under his control. Lebed said the devices were
a "perfect terrorist weapon," made to look like suitcases, "and could be
detonated by one person with less than 30 minutes of preparation," according
to committee documents."
www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20122001-044906-9007r
But oddly enough, when he spoke agian later on the subject of nuclear
security in the USSR, Lebed made no mention of his previous claims, as Lugar
noted.
IMO, it all still adds up to a big load of crap being peddled by Lebed.
Brooks
Kind of hard to tell, if the fault was in the test support equipment and not
the interceptor system itself, as early reports indicate was the case. You
might want to wait until they announce the definitive source of the fault.
Brooks
>
> DK
Right. Exactly as I said, and you have just confirmed, all of Lebed's claims
(true or not) were about a limited inventory of sabotage devices being made
(100 or fewer), and that there were problems with accounting for them (but
not that they were stolen, or emplaced in the west, or even that they were
know to be actually missing).
The allegations of these device being emplaced in the West were never made
by Lebed, as you cliamed, but later by Lunev.
Details matter.
A more recent and relevant example might be the advanced Soviet particle
beam and laser based missile defense system, much touted circa 1979-80. Sary
Shagan was said to be an operational laser base for same. Turned out to be a
modest laboratory, the vaunted defense system mere vapor.
The other claims all extended from Lebed's initial accusations.
Final result--Lebed was full of bovine fecal material. The end result is
"what matters".
Brooks
>
>
>
The latter, but economy of mass and plutonium, as well as device safety
generally make it the former as well (you design the device for the smallest
critical mass you can get away with).
> A tritium-boosted device needs to achieve fusion rapidly, as the
> purpose of the tritium is to increase neutron flux and thus fission,
> not to add to the yield per se. If this extra reactivity is delayed or
> reduced, then you see the sort of fizzle from Upshot-Knothole Ruth
> (although that wasn't tritium).
>
> So my hypothesis (comments welcome) is that a tritium-boosted device
> that ran to completion might well have a minimum yield of 300 tons,
> but that one which fizzles early might well find itself quenched at a
> much smaller yield, owing to lack of neutrons. This isn't a viable
> device design (so Davy Crockett still can't have been boosted -
> discussions passim.), but it's a mechanism to explain a self-expiring
> device.
>
> Is it possible to give a hand-waving explanation of where the "300
> tons" figure comes from ?
Yes, it is required to get a fission core hot enough for the
tritium-deuterium fusion to kick off. Relatively modest simulations of
fusion burn can demonstrate this. There is a critical temperature that
allows the D-T burn to go into run-away mode, self-heating and burning up
the fusion fuel very quickly. Even a little below this point, the reaction
plugs along at a not very impressive rate. The rate drops off dramatically
at lower temperatures, so much below this point it contributes nothing of
significance. That this also appears to be the minimum yield of variable
yield weapons is not too surprising.
> There's also the possibility that the neutron initiator might be the
> limited life component (as I said, tritium is merely my assumption).
> Even something as simple as a Po/Be urchin could achieve this -
> however the claimed storage lifetimes seem excessive for Po.
There are radioisotope possibilities that have at least been considered for
initiators.
If you hypotehsize that 'limited life' is a deliberate design feature, not
accidence, then it could be almost anything. Special batteries that need to
be replaced?
Will it matter, if the missiles are perfect, but they can't get them
launched? ;( All the parts need to work!
Gosh, folks, that's why there's a test program.
The administration claims it's already deployed and ready to protect
the US, though. There's a base in Alaska with missiles ready to fire,
and the Vandenberg base will be soon.
But the missiles can't hit anything! I figure if at some point NK
actually did get some ICBM's and actually fired them, every missile in
both bases would be fired at them just to make sure they got hit.
John Lansford
--
The unofficial I-26 Construction Webpage:
http://users.vnet.net/lansford/a10/
>Lots of people had hard time believing Sputnik, too.
No they didn't - every radio amateur around the world was listening in
to it and telling the neighbours.
The genius of Sputnik (and there's some indication that this was
deliberate) was to make it so open and demonstrable to the West.
Wasn't there a later Sputnik that played a couple of bars of the
national anthem ? Give the Soviets their due, they understood
propaganda.
If it was a test equipment issue, all the parts DID work. You only
use test equipment for TESTS.
Doh!
--
"Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar
territory."
--G. Behn
You need test apparatus that is solely used in the testing program to work
during every operational launch? As it stands right now, we have an early
indication that the fault did not rest with the interceptor--and that is all
we have. A bit too early to start making pronouncements about the "system'
failing when we don't even know if the failure occured in any part of the
actual system, or in a peripheral test/control support system.
Brooks
>
Actually, DoD has been careful to NOT claim the system is "operational", and
describes the elements in Alaska and Vandenburg as still being part of the
testing and evaluation. They have acknowledged that in an emergency they
could use them, and if they do they have enough of them in those holes
already to rpvide a significant degree of redundancy, something this test
did not feature, either. Again, we don't know yet what failed in this
case--it is premature to declare the interceptor system failed in this case.
Brooks
> "Kevin Brooks" <broo...@notyahoo.com> wrote:
>
> :
> :"Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" <urj...@bellsouth.net> wrote in message
> :news:gabPd.4846$sh....@bignews4.bellsouth.net...
> :>
> :> Then why was it reported that some of the ones
> :> in the Russian stockpile had gone missing?
> :
> :The proper question would be, "Do you believe all reports no matter what
> :the
> :source?" Lebed's "stolen 'briefcase' nukes" claims were pretty much
> :completely discounted years ago. And yes, "suitcase" nukes of the size
> :Lebed
> :and cohorts were claiming are an urban myth, unless you figure they
> :managed
> :to somehow leap well beyond US nuclear technology
>
> As well as the laws of physics.
>
>
Get the quote right. "Ya canna change the Laws o' Physics, Cap'n."
maybe they should just throw some more money at it :)
Certain;y.... And the SSBN force further proves the OP's assertion
that "the US has a history of moving it's weapons ever closer to
Russia" a falsehood.
Ok. If it was a problem in the additional 'test only' equipment that
scrubbed the test, then I withdraw my reservations.
But would you please tell us (me) what is the present history (record)
of the last 3-5 interception tests.
And please tell us what is the administrations current statement about
the operational readiness/status of the system.
--
Rostyk
I don't know, and I don't care that much, either. Ironing out the kinks in
new, high tech weponry is nothing new, and should be expected. In the end we
get a system that can handle a rogue launch (happily situated where it can
address the primary threat of that nature, the DPRK, which is about the only
such threat we now face), with the added benefit of having a system that
largely emasculates the counter-value targeting potential of the PRC (which
as of now is not exactly fielding a surfeit of ICBM's, so a large number of
interceptors is not required)--and yeah, I know that is not the stated aim
of the program, but it still applies. That means the PRC will have to
reorient some of its finite resources towards trying to field enough ICBM's
to enable it to swamp the nascent intercept capability we are fielding
(which is a bad idea--the Soviets learned the hard way that trying to
outspend/out-tech the US was a recipe for disaster), which is just icing on
the cake (and no, they afre not going to get around it anytime soon by
deploying oodles of SLBM's...they only have one docyard-queen SSBN now, and
it will be a few years before they go operational with another one). We also
gain a system that can be repackaged if necessary to protect other regions
(some Europeans are a bit itchy over the thought of an Iranian cleric with
the keys to an IRBM). All for what...$6 billion or so a year that we fund
the MDA, out of a total defense budget of around $400 billion? Actually,
that is not quite correct...some of that MDA money is also going towards
developing counters to theater ballistic missiles, so the amount is even
less than that...
Brooks
> --
> Rostyk
>
> I don't know, and I don't care that much, either. Ironing
> out the kinks in new, high tech weaponry is nothing new,
> and should be expected. In the end we get a system that
> can handle a rogue launch (happily situated where it can
> address the primary threat of that nature, the DPRK,
> which is about the only such threat we now face), with
> the added benefit of having a system that largely
> emasculates the counter-value targeting potential of the
> PRC (which as of now is not exactly fielding a surfeit
> of ICBM's, so a large number of interceptors is not required)
> --and yeah, I know that is not the stated aim of the program,
> but it still applies. That means the PRC will have to
> reorient some of its finite resources towards trying to
> field enough ICBM's to enable it to swamp the nascent
> intercept capability we are fielding
FWIW:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2005_hr/050216-jacoby.htm
Current and Projected National Security Threats
to the United States
Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Statement For the Record
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
16 February 2005
China is modernizing and expanding its ballistic missile
forces to improve their survivability and war-fighting
capabilities, enhance their coercion and deterrence value
and overcome ballistic missile defense systems. This
effort is commensurate with its growing power and more
assertive policies, especially with respect to Taiwan.
It continues to develop three new solid-propellant
strategic missile systems--the DF-31 and DF-31A road-
mobile ICBMs and the JL-2 SLBM. By 2015, the number of
warheads capable of targeting the continental United
States will increase several fold.
If, as is usually asserted, the number of Chinese warheads
that can reach CONUS is currently in the range of 20 - 25,
then a several-fold increase would mean something in the
neighborhood of 100 - 150 by 2015, no?