On the Fine Art of Buying Time and Frustrating your Great Ally

[HHW]

"The Significance of the disengagement plan (from Gaza) is the
freezing of the peace process. And when you freeze that process, you
prevent the establishment of a palestinians state, and you prevent a
discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem. Effectively,
the whole package called the Palestinian State, with all that it
entails, has been moved indefinitely from our agenda. All with (U.S.)
presidential blessings and the ratification of both houses of
Congress."

[HHW]

On May 24, 12:28 pm, HHW <coaster132...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> "The Significance of the disengagement plan (from Gaza) is the
> freezing of the peace process. And when you freeze that process, you

> prevent the establishment of a Palestinians state, and  you prevent a

> discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem. Effectively,
> the whole package called the Palestinian State, with all that it
> entails, has been moved indefinitely from our agenda. All with (U.S.)
> presidential blessings and the ratification of both houses of
> Congress."

Dov Weinglas, spokesman for Ariel Sharon, Ha'aretz, 6 October, 2004

Re posted to add the citation.

[drahcir]

Nope, I just checked, no one ever said that.

[drahcir]

"reposted" is one word. Why do old people always divide words up? Oh,
by the way, Weinglas never said what you said he said.

[HHW]

On May 24, 1:38 pm, drahcir <s...@sgscc.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 24 May 2013 10:33:10 -0700 (PDT), HHW
>

Ha'aretz did.

[מין הארץ יהודי ישראלי עברית אמריקאי‎]

Then show us the link or give us the date and time of the edition you
are referring too.

[HHW]

On May 24, 4:47 pm, מין הארץ יהודי ישראלי עברית אמריקאי

<Royalty3...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> On May 24, 3:43 pm, HHW <coaster132...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On May 24, 1:38 pm, drahcir <s...@sgscc.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Fri, 24 May 2013 10:33:10 -0700 (PDT), HHW
>
> > > <coaster132...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > >On May 24, 12:28 pm, HHW <coaster132...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > >> "The Significance of the disengagement plan (from Gaza) is the
> > > >> freezing of the peace process. And when you freeze that process, you
> > > >> prevent the establishment of a Palestinians state, and  you prevent a
> > > >> discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem. Effectively,
> > > >> the whole package called the Palestinian State, with all that it
> > > >> entails, has been moved indefinitely from our agenda. All with (U.S.)
> > > >> presidential blessings and the ratification of both houses of
> > > >> Congress."
>
> > > >Dov Weinglas, spokesman for Ariel Sharon, Ha'aretz, 6 October, 2004

> .

> > > >Re posted to add the citation.
>

> > >Oh,
> > > by the way, Weinglas never said what you said he said.
>
> > Ha'aretz did.
>
> Then show us the link or give us the date and time of the edition you
> are referring too.

What you think of it means nothing. There have been 2000 reads this
last week. When you are especially foul the numbers go up. If you had
the wit to make the only respectable arguments available to you, you'd
do better but still get your ass kicked.

[מין הארץ יהודי ישראלי עברית אמריקאי‎]

I usually don't argue with imbeciles.

[HHW]

On May 24, 1:37 pm, drahcir <s...@sgscc.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 24 May 2013 10:28:35 -0700 (PDT), HHW
>

You who never lies.

[HHW]

On May 24, 1:38 pm, drahcir <s...@sgscc.com> wrote:

> On Fri, 24 May 2013 10:33:10 -0700 (PDT), HHW
>

It's what the man who doesn't lie is saying which matters.

[Sam Houston]

> "HHW" wrote in message
> news:12370cdd-7eec-4698...@20g2000yqe.googlegroups.com...

At least you mother didn't lie when Presley O'Bannon tapped dat ho.

[drahcir]

No it didn't. Your turn.

[drahcir]

That is correct.

[HHW]

On May 24, 5:54 pm, מין הארץ יהודי ישראלי עברית אמריקאי

Whatever.

[dsharavi]

Another "quote" from the Electronic Intifada? I rather doubt it's from
the original, which was Ari Shavit's 2004 interview with Dov
Weissglas, in which the latter stated:
“The significance of the ‘disengagement’ plan [from Gaza] is the
freezing of the peace process [trying to be implemented by the Quartet
of the United States, Russia, EU and UN]… when you freeze that [Peace]
process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and you

prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem.

Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with all
that it entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda. And
all this with authority and permission. All with a presidential
blessing and the ratification of both houses of Congress. The
disengagement is actually formaldehyde. It supplies the amount of
formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political
process with the Palestinians.”

Got any breaking news later than 2004?

[dsharavi]

Gonna make a re-re-post to correct the misspelling of the
interviewee's name? Of course you're not. Are you gonna make a re-
repost admitting that you lied, and that the foregoing "quote" is
MOTSS from you. Of course you're not.

Text of the original Haaretz interview with attorney Dov Weissglass,
8th October 2004. It proves Hunter Watson is a piece of crap posting
crap, but we all know that.

Oct. 8, 2004 9:26 AM
Dov Weisglass interview with Haaretz
"The Big Freeze"
By Ari Shavit, Haaretz

In a certain sense, a superficial one, Ariel Sharon and Dov Weisglass
are an odd couple. Sharon is a rancher from the western Negev,
Weisglass a lawyer from Lilienblum Street in Tel Aviv. Sharon is the
son of a Russian agronomist, Weisglass the son of a Polish fur
merchant. Sharon is flesh of the flesh of the fighting rooted land-
settlement movement, Weisglass is the embodiment of the speculator
immigrant bourgeoisie. Sharon is brutal frontier Zionism, Weisglass is
urban real estate Zionism.

However, in another, deeper sense, the source of the soulmates'
alliance between the farmer and the lawyer is perfectly clear. Between
the fighter and the fixer. Between the crass authenticity of Sharon
and the wheeling and dealing of Weisglass, because when Sharon was a
leper, after Sabra and Chatila, Weisglass stood by his side. When
Sharon found himself in new battlefields in which he was at a complete
loss (commission of inquiry, courts, hostile press), Weisglass fought
his battle. When Sharon understood that the world had changed and was
ruled by new mega-authorities (Aharon Barak, Time magazine, Yedioth
Ahronoth), he also understood that Weisglass was the person who would
know how to represent him before those new super-authorities. He
understood that Weisglass supplemented him.

So that over the years the rural commander developed a growing
dependence on his Tel Aviv lawyer who became a personal advocate, a
family advocate, a policy advocate. The advocate who for the past 30
months has represented Ariel Sharon vis-a-vis the American mega-
authority, the advocate who in the past 30 months, in his official
capacity as a senior adviser to the Prime Minister , has almost single-
handedly conducted the delicate relationship between the White House
and Sycamore Ranch. Which is to say, between the United States of
America and the State of Israel.

Is it Dov Weisglass who brought about Sharon's reversal of policy? Is
he the eminence grise who imposed on the emperor of the settlements
the decision to evacuate settlements? The settlers themselves are
convinced that he is. They are certain that Weisglass is a devious
Rasputin who found some dark way to make the czar do things that the
czar himself, by himself, would never do.

However, Weisglass himself shrugs off these contentions. He doesn't
deny that he supported the disengagement from the start. He doesn't
hide the fact that he placed the facts on Sharon's desk. The political
problem, the economic problem, the problem of refusenik soldiers. And
he made it clear to the boss that the international community will
never let up. That the Americans will not be able to support us for
all time. But in the end I wasn't the one who made the decision,
Weisglass says. The prime minister made the decision. While he, the
bureau chief, was simply there at his side. He, the faithful advocate,
simply sat with his client in the room throughout the entire process.

Weisglass was born in October 1946, in Tel Aviv. He grew up and was
educated in 1950s Ramat Gan, in a family that moved quickly from
poverty to affluence. At age 19, draft age, he was already studying
law. At age 24, he was working in the Moritz-Margolis law firm.
Thirteen years later he (along with his partner, Ami Almagor) bought
the practice from its founders and made it one of the country's
leading law firms. In 1980 he represented Yitzhak Rabin against the
French magazine L'Express. In 1983 he represented Sharon against the
Kahan Commission of Inquiry, which investigated the Sabra-Chatila
massacre. In 1985-86 he represented Sharon in his suit against Time
magazine (Sharon sued the magazine over a report implicating him in
the massacre). At first he specialized in representing security
personnel who testified before commissions of inquiry (Yossi Ginossar,
Shaul Mofaz, Hezi Callo, Alik Ron). He then also specialized in
representing ministerial directors-general accused of corruption
(Shimon Sheves, Moshe Leon, Avigdor Lieberman). Also among his
clients: Ehud Yatom, Rafi Eitan and Avigdor Kahalani. And the Shin Bet
security service and the Mossad espionage agency. Not to mention the
kibbutz movement.

Weisglass's critics claim he is not a distinguished lawyer, that he's
messy, superficial, shoots from the hip, lacks an aura of dignity, is
without a moral center of gravity. Others, though, note his common
sense, his humane understanding. And no one doubts his ability to
charm people he considers important. Or his ability to conclude a
deal, tie up loose ends, make the right call to the right person.
Because the lawyer with a thousand hats is not only a very cordial
fellow, he is also very well-connected, across the length and breadth
of the Israeli establishment.

We begin our conversation at a Tel Aviv cafe and then go on to his run-
down office on Lilienblum Street. Dressed in gray trousers and a white
shirt topped by a shiny bald pate, he looks older than his age.
Quickly, though, he floods me with his historical knowledge and
musical education. He is in total control, and one can accept that or
not, but it can't be ignored, because it is now shaping the reality we
are living.

Daily call to Rice

Tell me about Condoleezza Rice. What sort of woman is she?

"She is an amazing woman. Intelligent, smart, very fair. Both educated
and extraordinarily pleasant. But beneath that deep courtesy and
culture, she can also be very firm. She can be decisive."

Does she ever raise her voice at you, yell at you?

"What do you mean, raise her voice? I'm older than she is, you know.
The Americans don't talk like we do here."

Tell me about the dynamics of the relationship between you, and
whether it's an unusual relationship.

"I am in ongoing and continuous contact with Rice. In complex times it
could be every day, by phone. In less complex times it's a phone call
a week. On average, I meet with her once a month. Since May 2002 I
have met with her more than 20 times. And every meeting is a meeting.
The shortest one was an hour and a half."

What does she call you?

"Dubi."

What do you call her?

"Condy."

And how does it work between you?

"The channel between Rice and me has two main purposes. One is to
advance processes that are initiated, to examine our ideas and their
ideas. The road map, for example, or the disengagement plan. But there
is an equally important function, which is troubleshooting. If
something happens - an unusual military operation, a hitch, a targeted
assassination that succeeded or one that didn't succeed - before it
becomes an imbroglio, she calls me and says, `We saw so-and-so on CNN.
What's going on?' And I say, `Condy, the usual 10 minutes?' She laughs
and we hang up. Ten minutes later, after I find out what happened, I
get back to her and tell her the whole truth. The whole truth. I tell
her and she takes it down: this is what we intended, this is how it
came out. She doesn't get worked up. She believes us. The continuation
is damage control."

Rice looks like a tough cookie. Can you really talk to her freely? Can
you tell her the jokes that you like to tell so much?

"We are always joking. Always. Whenever I come to Washington, I tell
her stories about what's going on in Israel. I speak freely. Almost
the way I'm talking to you. There is no awe, no honor. Each of us cuts
into the other. I wouldn't say we are pals, but our working
relationship is very friendly."

Would you say that the Weisglass-Rice channel is a strategic asset?
Has it made Dov Weisglass indispensable?

"As you know, the cemeteries are full of indispensable people. I don't
want to boast. But the importance of this relationship is that it
enables the president to speak with the prime minister and the prime
minister to speak with the president without their speaking to one
another. You have to understand that presidents and prime ministers
don't prattle every day. For the president to phone the prime minister
is an event. It is an act of state significance. So those
conversations are very heavy. In large measure they are constrained.
Whereas in this channel everything is more direct. Immediate.

"For the Americans, it's convenient. They know they have someone who
is ensconced not in the jaws of the lion but in the very gullet of the
lion. It's also convenient for us. It makes it possible for us to talk
to them in real time, informally. When my conversation with Rice ends,
she knows that I walk six steps to Sharon's desk and I know that she
walks twelve steps to Bush's desk. That creates an intimate
relationship between the two bureaus and prevents a thousand
entanglements."

Have you become one of the family at the White House?

"Look, the first time you enter the White House your heart skips a
beat. Anyone who tells you different is not being truthful. After all,
that's where the world's chief executive sits. But today, after 20
visits, I walk about pretty freely there. They know me well, from the
Marine who stands at the entrance to the secretaries and the girls.
And that makes my job at lot easier. When you are in awe, like a
lawyer making his first appearance before a court, you stammer and you
forget the remarks you prepared. After a time, when you feel free and
relaxed, that is a tremendous advantage. We speak totally freely. I
tell her that something is right or that it's not so. Completely
freely."

Have you ever had occasion to see President Bush?


"I have, but I won't talk about that. Unplanned meetings with the
president are not something one talks about. For them, the concept of
dropping in is the holy of holies."

What impression did you form of him?

"The president is a person of great personal charm. Focused. In
control of himself. A great sense of humor. He likes jokes."

Does he like your jokes? When he sees you, does he expect a good joke?

"He has told some of my jokes to others. We heard about them afterward
at second and thirdhand."

He's said to be limited.

"Why limited? Because he didn't remember the name of the president of
the Czech Republic? That's very primitive criticism. President Bush is
a person of character, with his own inner truth. He is sure of
himself, cool, smiling. He is aware of his power. There is a lot of
similarity between the way he and Arik [Sharon] manage things. They
are both people with a certain inner maturity."

What about the great gap in age and experience?

"True, and I can't tell you how the president handles the question of
health insurance in America. But on the issues having to do with us he
has a very clear worldview. Like Arik, he has a loathing of violence;
a loathing of everything having to do with terrorism and the use of
force. And he has a loathing for untruthfulness and for failure to
carry out commitments. He doesn't accept the Middle Eastern political
style in which you come and say something and then forget what you
said. From that point of view he is very American. He doesn't tolerate
nonsense. He can't stand the Middle Eastern jabbering with nothing
underlying it."

Are you saying that at a certain point in the past two years the
Palestinians simply lost him, that they were erased from his map?

"I will not tell you anything that has not been published. But
according to what has been published, two things happened. The first
was the `Karine A' weapons ship. The second was a certain piece of
intelligence that I sent them that shows clearly Arafat's full
awareness of financial aspects of the perpetration of terrorist acts.
When those things became clear about a person who swore 16,000 times
to the Americans that he would make every effort to fight terrorism,
he was erased. From that moment he was as good as dead."

If so, you were the one who prompted the Americans to adopt a
political policy that is very close to yours: without Arafat, without
terrorism, without the present Palestinian government.

"The Americans were here for four months in 2003. Through [assistant
secretary of state] John Wolf they were involved in the process in the
most intimate way. Wolf reported directly to Rice. Those four months
had tremendous pedagogical value. The Americans saw for themselves
what the Palestinians' most solemn promises really meant. They saw the
Palestinians' detailed working plans and their splendid diagrams and
they saw how nothing came of it. Nothing. Zero. When you add to that
the trauma of September 11 and their understanding that Islamic
terrorism is indivisible, you understand that they reached their
conclusions by themselves. They didn't need us to understand what it's
all about. So, when we came to them and told them that there is no one
to talk to, we didn't have any problems. They already knew that as of
now, there is no one to talk to."

The formaldehyde formula

Is that what you really think - and Sharon, too - that there is no one
to talk to?

"We reached that conclusion after years of thinking otherwise. After
years of attempts at dialogue. But when Arafat undermined Abu Mazen at
the end of the summer of 2003, we reached the sad conclusion that
there is no one to talk to, no one to negotiate with. Hence the
disengagement plan. Because when you're playing solitaire, when there
is no one sitting across from you at the table, you have no choice but
to deal the cards yourself."

In 2001 you were still of a different opinion - you tried to reach an
agreement with the Palestinian leadership.

"Because of his trenchant realism, Arik never believed in permanent
settlements: he didn't believe in the one-fell-swoop approach. Sharon
doesn't think that after a conflict of 104 years, it's possible to
come up with a piece of paper that will end the matter. He thinks the
other side had to undergo a deep and extended sociopolitical change.
But when we entered the Prime Minister's Office, he still believed
that he would be able to achieve a very long-term interim agreement.
An agreement of 25, 20, 15, 10, 5 years. There were some Palestinians
who preferred that approach to the approach of [former prime minister
Ehud] Barak. They were the ones we talked to. But very quickly we
discovered that we were up against a stone wall, that when you get to
the decision-making center, nothing happens."

Still, in 2002 you accepted the initiative of President Bush, the road
map, and the principle of a Palestinian state, didn't you?

"For a great many years the accepted view in the world was that people
turned to terrorism because their situation was bad. So that if you
make things better for them, they will abandon terrorism. The
Palestinian assumption was that when the Palestinian majority gets
national satisfaction, they will lay down their arms and the occupiers
and the occupied will emerge from the trenches and embrace and kiss.
"Arik thought differently. He understood that in the Palestinian case
the majority has no control over the minority. He understood that the
ability of a central Palestinian administration to enforce its will on
the entire Palestinian society is all but nonexistent. He understood
that Palestinian terrorism is in part not national at all, but
religious. Therefore, granting national satisfaction will not solve
the problem of this terrorism. This is the basis of his approach that
first of all the terrorism must be eradicated and only then can we
advance in the national direction. Not to give a political slice in
return for a slice of stopping terrorism, but to insist that the swamp
of terrorism be drained before a political process begins.

"President Bush's speech of June 24, 2002, expressed exactly that
approach. We didn't write it, but it articulated in the best way what
we believed. That is why Sharon accepted the implicit principle of the
speech immediately. He saw it as a historical turnabout. He saw it is
a paramount policy achievement. For the first time the principle was
accepted that before we enter the negotiating room, the pistols have
to be left outside."

But didn't the road map translate that principle into a very crowded
timetable?

"Arik would have preferred that the first stage of the road map go on
for three years, the second stage five years and the third stage six
years. But because the road map stipulated that it was based on
performance and not on sacrosanct dates, he was able to accept it. He
understood that the important thing was the principle. What's
important is the formula that asserts that the eradication of
terrorism precedes the start of the political process."

If you have American backing and you have the principle of the road
map, why go to disengagement?

"Because in the fall of 2003 we understood that everything is stuck.
And even though according to the Americans' reading of the situation,
the blame fell on the Palestinians and not on us, Arik grasped that
this state of affairs would not last. That they wouldn't leave us
alone, wouldn't get off our case. Time was not on our side. There was
international erosion, internal erosion. Domestically, in the
meantime, everything was collapsing. The economy was stagnant, and the
Geneva Initiative garnered broad support. And then we were hit with
letters of officers and letters of pilots and letters of commandos
[letters of refusal to serve in the territories]. These were not weird
kids with green ponytails and a ring in their nose who give off a
strong odor of grass. These were people like Spector's group [Yiftah
Spector, a renowned Air Force pilot who signed the pilot's letter].
Really our finest young people."

What was your main concern in those months, what was the main factor
that pushed you to the disengagement idea?

"The concern was the fact that President Bush's formula was stuck and
this would lead to its ruin. That the international community would
say: You wanted the president's formula and you got it; you wanted to
try Abu Mazen and you tried. It didn't work. And when a formula
doesn't work in reality, you don't change reality, you change the
formula. Therefore, Arik's realistic viewpoint said that it was
possible that the principle that was our historic policy achievement
would be annulled - the principle that eradication of terrorism
precedes a political process. And with the annulment of that
principle, Israel would find itself negotiating with terrorism. And
because once such negotiations start it's very difficult to stop them,
the result would be a Palestinian state with terrorism. And all this
within quite a short time. Not decades or even years, but a few
months."

I still don't see how the disengagement plan helps here. What was the
major importance of the plan from your point of view?

"The disengagement plan is the preservative of the sequence principle.
It is the bottle of formaldehyde within which you place the
president's formula so that it will be preserved for a very lengthy
period. The disengagement is actually formaldehyde. It supplies the
amount of formaldehyde that's necessary so that there will not be a

political process with the Palestinians."

Is what you are saying, then, is that you exchanged the strategy of a
long-term interim agreement for a strategy of long-term interim
situation?

"The American term is to park conveniently. The disengagement plan
makes it possible for Israel to park conveniently in an interim
situation that distances us as far as possible from political
pressure. It legitimizes our contention that there is no negotiating
with the Palestinians. There is a decision here to do the minimum
possible in order to maintain our political situation. The decision is
proving itself. It is making it possible for the Americans to go to
the seething and simmering international community and say to them,
`What do you want.' It also transfers the initiative to our hands. It
compels the world to deal with our idea, with the scenario we wrote.
It places the Palestinians under tremendous pressure. It forces them
into a corner that they hate to be in. It thrusts them into a
situation in which they have to prove their seriousness. There are no
more excuses. There are no more Israeli soldiers spoiling their day.
And for the first time they have a slice of land with total continuity
on which they can race from one end to the other in their Ferrari. And
the whole world is watching them - them, not us. The whole world is
asking what they intend to do with this slice of land."

Maneuver of the century

I want to remind you that there will also be a withdrawal in the West
Bank.

"The withdrawal in Samaria is a token one. We agreed to only so it
wouldn't be said that we concluded our obligation in Gaza."

You gave up the Gaza Strip in order to save the West Bank? Is the Gaza
disengagement meant to allow Israel to continue controlling the
majority of the West Bank?

"Arik doesn't see Gaza today as an area of national interest. He does
see Judea and Samaria as an area of national interest. He thinks
rightly that we are still very very far from the time when we will be
able to reach final-status settlements in Judea and Samaria."

Does the evacuation of the settlements in Gaza strengthen the
settlements in the West Bank or weaken them?

"It doesn't hurt the isolated, remote settlements; it's not relevant
for them. Their future will be determined in many years. When we reach
a final settlement. It's not certain that each and every one of them
will be able to go on existing.

"On the other hand, in regard to the large settlement blocs, thanks to
the disengagement plan, we have in our hands a first-ever American
statement that they will be part of Israel. In years to come, perhaps
decades, when negotiations will be held between Israel and the
Palestinians, the master of the world will pound on the table and say:
We stated already ten years ago that the large blocs are part of
Israel."

If so, Sharon can tell the leaders of the settlers that he is
evacuating 10,000 settlers and in the future he will be compelled to
evacuate another 10,000, but he is strengthening the other 200,000,
strengthening their hold in the soil.

"Arik can say honestly that this is a serious move because of which,
out of 240,000 settlers, 190,000 will not be moved from their place.
Will not be moved."

Is he sacrificing a few of his children in order to ensure that the
others remain permanently where they are?

"At the moment he is not sacrificing anyone in Judea and Samaria.
Until the land is quiet and until negotiations begin, nothing is
happening. And the intention is to fight for every single place. That
struggle can be conducted from a far more convenient point of
departure. Because in regard to the isolated settlements there is an
American commitment stating that we are not dealing with them at the
moment, while for the large blocs there is genuine political
insurance. There is an American commitment such as never existed
before, with regard to 190,000 settlers."

If what you are saying is correct, the settlers themselves should
organize demonstrations of support for Sharon, because he did a
tremendous service to the settlement enterprise.

"They should have danced around and around the Prime Minister's
Office."

And Sharon himself actually didn't undergo a de Gaulle-type reversal.
He didn't make a U-turn. He remained loyal to the approach of the
national camp.

"Arik is the first person who succeeded in taking the ideas of the
national camp and turning them into a political reality that is
accepted by the whole world. After all, when he declared six or seven
years ago that we would never negotiate under fire, he only generated
gales of laughter. Whereas today that same approach guides the
president of the United States. It was passed in the House of
Representatives by a vote of 405-7, and in the Senate by 95-5."

From your point of view, then, your major achievement is to have
frozen the political process legitimately?

"That is exactly what happened. You know, the term `political process'
is a bundle of concepts and commitments. The political process is the
establishment of a Palestinian state with all the security risks that
entails. The political process is the evacuation of settlements, it's
the return of refugees, it's the partition of Jerusalem. And all that
has now been frozen."

So you have carried out the maneuver of the century? And all of it
with authority and permission?

"When you say `maneuver,' it doesn't sound nice. It sounds like you
said one thing and something else came out. But that's the whole
point. After all, what have I been shouting for the past year? That I
found a device, in cooperation with the management of the world, to
ensure that there will be no stopwatch here. That there will be no
timetable to implement the settlers' nightmare. I have postponed that
nightmare indefinitely. Because what I effectively agreed to with the
Americans was that part of the settlements would not be dealt with at
all, and the rest will not be dealt with until the Palestinians turn
into Finns. That is the significance of what we did. The significance
is the freezing of the political process. And when you freeze that
process you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state and you
prevent a discussion about the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem.
Effectively, this whole package that is called the Palestinian state,
with all that it entails, has been removed from our agenda
indefinitely. And all this with authority and permission. All with a
presidential blessing and the ratification of both houses of Congress.
What more could have been anticipated? What more could have been given
to the settlers?"

I return to my previous question: In return for ceding Gaza, you
obtained status quo in Judea and Samaria?

"You keep insisting on the wrong definition. The right definition is
that we created a status quo vis-a-vis the Palestinians. There was a
very difficult package of commitments that Israel was expected to
accept. That package is called a political process. It included
elements we will never agree to accept and elements we cannot accept
at this time. But we succeeded in taking that package and sending it
beyond the hills of time. With the proper management we succeeded in
removing the issue of the political process from the agenda. And we
educated the world to understand that there is no one to talk to. And
we received a no-one-to-talk-to certificate. That certificate says:
(1) There is no one to talk to. (2) As long as there is no one to talk
to, the geographic status quo remains intact. (3) The certificate will
be revoked only when this-and-this happens - when Palestine becomes
Finland. (4) See you then, and shalom."

Dramatic consequences

Dubi Weisglass, will the disengagement plan be implemented?

"I can give you a definitive answer regarding Sharon's intention. His
intention is entirely sincere. He has determination and he has
complete resolve. But contrary to what some say, he is not a dictator.
Everything depends on the Likud Central Committee and the party
convention. I don't know what is liable to happen in those bodies. I
see a political alignment that is not supplying the credit a leader
needs, that doesn't trust him to know where he's going or what's best
for the country."

Does Sharon know where he's going? Can we rely on him?

"He has a very coherent worldview. And he has done everything, seen
everything, had experience in all situations. So with him everything
is under control. Everything is conducted quietly, in proper language,
with no raising of voices. And that quiet projects a tremendous sense
of confidence. A sense that there is someone there to rely on. Someone
who knows what he is going to do."

Is there anything hesitant in him?

"No, he is not hesitant. He is very sure of himself. But with him the
processes are organic. They are not oranges. There is a matter of
ripening. And here he had, after all, the sentiment for the people,
the land, the landscape. But there was no struggle between mind and
heart. With him the heart is always dominant. And when the mind
reached the conclusion that this is what had to be done, it was clear
that he would do it. At bottom he's a bit'honist [one who sees things
through the prism of security]. He has a deep relation to the homeland
and to history and to places, but his overriding principle is
rational. The axiom is to safeguard the lives of the Jewish people.
All the rest is subordinate to that. All the rest is in descending
order."

Aren't you worried, nevertheless, that all of this won't happen? That
political opposition or a violent revolt will thwart the disengagement
plan?

"That could happen. When I hear the voices and the threats, I am
fearful. It's far from clear what will happen. Similarly, when you see
the prime minister being forced to cope with all kinds of [Likud]
faction members who got to the Knesset on his coattails, it's
frustrating. And when you hear this one shouting and that one
screaming and another who is affronted. When you see that such an
essential move is liable to be blocked because of personal and
emotional considerations that are simply not to the point. Because
people don't understand how dramatic the decision we face is. And
because no mechanism has been found that will manifest politically the
desire of the great majority that supports the plan."

Is it really all that dramatic?

"If Sharon's disengagement plan is torpedoed, politically it will be
cause for everlasting regret. Our achievements will be lost. The
international community will lose patience with us. It will take the
same attitude toward us as it does toward Arafat. We will very quickly
find ourselves up against a Palestinian state that uses terror against
us and up against a world that is becoming increasingly hostile. We
will find ourselves in a tragedy."
Document Text
By Ari Shavit, Haaretz

In a certain sense, a superficial one, Ariel Sharon and Dov Weisglass
are an odd couple. Sharon is a rancher from the western Negev,
Weisglass a lawyer from Lilienblum Street in Tel Aviv. Sharon is the
son of a Russian agronomist, Weisglass the son of a Polish fur
merchant. Sharon is flesh of the flesh of the fighting rooted land-
settlement movement, Weisglass is the embodiment of the speculator
immigrant bourgeoisie. Sharon is brutal frontier Zionism, Weisglass is
urban real estate Zionism.

However, in another, deeper sense, the source of the soulmates'
alliance between the farmer and the lawyer is perfectly clear. Between
the fighter and the fixer. Between the crass authenticity of Sharon
and the wheeling and dealing of Weisglass, because when Sharon was a
leper, after Sabra and Chatila, Weisglass stood by his side. When
Sharon found himself in new battlefields in which he was at a complete
loss (commission of inquiry, courts, hostile press), Weisglass fought
his battle. When Sharon understood that the world had changed and was
ruled by new mega-authorities (Aharon Barak, Time magazine, Yedioth
Ahronoth), he also understood that Weisglass was the person who would
know how to represent him before those new super-authorities. He
understood that Weisglass supplemented him.

So that over the years the rural commander developed a growing
dependence on his Tel Aviv lawyer who became a personal advocate, a
family advocate, a policy advocate. The advocate who for the past 30
months has represented Ariel Sharon vis-a-vis the American mega-
authority, the advocate who in the past 30 months, in his official
capacity as a senior adviser to the Prime Minister , has almost single-
handedly conducted the delicate relationship between the White House
and Sycamore Ranch. Which is to say, between the United States of
America and the State of Israel.

Is it Dov Weisglass who brought about Sharon's reversal of policy? Is
he the eminence grise who imposed on the emperor of the settlements
the decision to evacuate settlements? The settlers themselves are
convinced that he is. They are certain that Weisglass is a devious
Rasputin who found some dark way to make the czar do things that the
czar himself, by himself, would never do.

However, Weisglass himself shrugs off these contentions. He doesn't
deny that he supported the disengagement from the start. He doesn't
hide the fact that he placed the facts on Sharon's desk. The political
problem, the economic problem, the problem of refusenik soldiers. And
he made it clear to the boss that the international community will
never let up. That the Americans will not be able to support us for
all time. But in the end I wasn't the one who made the decision,
Weisglass says. The prime minister made the decision. While he, the
bureau chief, was simply there at his side. He, the faithful advocate,
simply sat with his client in the room throughout the entire process.

Weisglass was born in October 1946, in Tel Aviv. He grew up and was
educated in 1950s Ramat Gan, in a family that moved quickly from
poverty to affluence. At age 19, draft age, he was already studying
law. At age 24, he was working in the Moritz-Margolis law firm.
Thirteen years later he (along with his partner, Ami Almagor) bought
the practice from its founders and made it one of the country's
leading law firms. In 1980 he represented Yitzhak Rabin against the
French magazine L'Express. In 1983 he represented Sharon against the
Kahan Commission of Inquiry, which investigated the Sabra-Chatila
massacre. In 1985-86 he represented Sharon in his suit against Time
magazine (Sharon sued the magazine over a report implicating him in
the massacre). At first he specialized in representing security
personnel who testified before commissions of inquiry (Yossi Ginossar,
Shaul Mofaz, Hezi Callo, Alik Ron). He then also specialized in
representing ministerial directors-general accused of corruption
(Shimon Sheves, Moshe Leon, Avigdor Lieberman). Also among his
clients: Ehud Yatom, Rafi Eitan and Avigdor Kahalani. And the Shin Bet
security service and the Mossad espionage agency. Not to mention the
kibbutz movement.

Weisglass's critics claim he is not a distinguished lawyer, that he's
messy, superficial, shoots from the hip, lacks an aura of dignity, is
without a moral center of gravity. Others, though, note his common
sense, his humane understanding. And no one doubts his ability to
charm people he considers important. Or his ability to conclude a
deal, tie up loose ends, make the right call to the right person.
Because the lawyer with a thousand hats is not only a very cordial
fellow, he is also very well-connected, across the length and breadth
of the Israeli establishment.

We begin our conversation at a Tel Aviv cafe and then go on to his run-
down office on Lilienblum Street. Dressed in gray trousers and a white
shirt topped by a shiny bald pate, he looks older than his age.
Quickly, though, he floods me with his historical knowledge and
musical education. He is in total control, and one can accept that or
not, but it can't be ignored, because it is now shaping the reality we
are living.

Daily call to Rice

Tell me about Condoleezza Rice. What sort of woman is she?

"She is an amazing woman. Intelligent, smart, very fair. Both educated
and extraordinarily pleasant. But beneath that deep courtesy and
culture, she can also be very firm. She can be decisive."

Does she ever raise her voice at you, yell at you?

"What do you mean, raise her voice? I'm older than she is, you know.
The Americans don't talk like we do here."

Tell me about the dynamics of the relationship between you, and
whether it's an unusual relationship.

"I am in ongoing and continuous contact with Rice. In complex times it
could be every day, by phone. In less complex times it's a phone call
a week. On average, I meet with her once a month. Since May 2002 I
have met with her more than 20 times. And every meeting is a meeting.
The shortest one was an hour and a half."

What does she call you?

"Dubi."

What do you call her?

"Condy."

And how does it work between you?

"The channel between Rice and me has two main purposes. One is to
advance processes that are initiated, to examine our ideas and their
ideas. The road map, for example, or the disengagement plan. But there
is an equally important function, which is troubleshooting. If
something happens - an unusual military operation, a hitch, a targeted
assassination that succeeded or one that didn't succeed - before it
becomes an imbroglio, she calls me and says, `We saw so-and-so on CNN.
What's going on?' And I say, `Condy, the usual 10 minutes?' She laughs
and we hang up. Ten minutes later, after I find out what happened, I
get back to her and tell her the whole truth. The whole truth. I tell
her and she takes it down: this is what we intended, this is how it
came out. She doesn't get worked up. She believes us. The continuation
is damage control."

Rice looks like a tough cookie. Can you really talk to her freely? Can
you tell her the jokes that you like to tell so much?

"We are always joking. Always. Whenever I come to Washington, I tell
her stories about what's going on in Israel. I speak freely. Almost
the way I'm talking to you. There is no awe, no honor. Each of us cuts
into the other. I wouldn't say we are pals, but our working
relationship is very friendly."

Would you say that the Weisglass-Rice channel is a strategic asset?
Has it made Dov Weisglass indispensable?

"As you know, the cemeteries are full of indispensable people. I don't
want to boast. But the importance of this relationship is that it
enables the president to speak with the prime minister and the prime
minister to speak with the president without their speaking to one
another. You have to understand that presidents and prime ministers
don't prattle every day. For the president to phone the prime minister
is an event. It is an act of state significance. So those
conversations are very heavy. In large measure they are constrained.
Whereas in this channel everything is more direct. Immediate.

"For the Americans, it's convenient. They know they have someone who
is ensconced not in the jaws of the lion but in the very gullet of the
lion. It's also convenient for us. It makes it possible for us to talk
to them in real time, informally. When my conversation with Rice ends,
she knows that I walk six steps to Sharon's desk and I know that she
walks twelve steps to Bush's desk. That creates an intimate
relationship between the two bureaus and prevents a thousand
entanglements."

Have you become one of the family at the White House?

"Look, the first time you enter the White House your heart skips a
beat. Anyone who tells you different is not being truthful. After all,
that's where the world's chief executive sits. But today, after 20
visits, I walk about pretty freely there. They know me well, from the
Marine who stands at the entrance to the secretaries and the girls.
And that makes my job at lot easier. When you are in awe, like a
lawyer making his first appearance before a court, you stammer and you
forget the remarks you prepared. After a time, when you feel free and
relaxed, that is a tremendous advantage. We speak totally freely. I
tell her that something is right or that it's not so. Completely
freely."

Have you ever had occasion to see President Bush?


"I have, but I won't talk about that. Unplanned meetings with the
president are not something one talks about. For them, the concept of
dropping in is the holy of holies."

What impression did you form of him?

"The president is a person of great personal charm. Focused. In
control of himself. A great sense of humor. He likes jokes."

Does he like your jokes? When he sees you, does he expect a good joke?

"He has told some of my jokes to others. We heard about them afterward
at second and thirdhand."

He's said to be limited.

"Why limited? Because he didn't remember the name of the president of
the Czech Republic? That's very primitive criticism. President Bush is
a person of character, with his own inner truth. He is sure of
himself, cool, smiling. He is aware of his power. There is a lot of
similarity between the way he and Arik [Sharon] manage things. They
are both people with a certain inner maturity."

What about the great gap in age and experience?

"True, and I can't tell you how the president handles the question of
health insurance in America. But on the issues having to do with us he
has a very clear worldview. Like Arik, he has a loathing of violence;
a loathing of everything having to do with terrorism and the use of
force. And he has a loathing for untruthfulness and for failure to
carry out commitments. He doesn't accept the Middle Eastern political
style in which you come and say something and then forget what you
said. From that point of view he is very American. He doesn't tolerate
nonsense. He can't stand the Middle Eastern jabbering with nothing
underlying it."

Are you saying that at a certain point in the past two years the
Palestinians simply lost him, that they were erased from his map?

"I will not tell you anything that has not been published. But
according to what has been published, two things happened. The first
was the `Karine A' weapons ship. The second was a certain piece of
intelligence that I sent them that shows clearly Arafat's full
awareness of financial aspects of the perpetration of terrorist acts.
When those things became clear about a person who swore 16,000 times
to the Americans that he would make every effort to fight terrorism,
he was erased. From that moment he was as good as dead."

If so, you were the one who prompted the Americans to adopt a
political policy that is very close to yours: without Arafat, without
terrorism, without the present Palestinian government.

"The Americans were here for four months in 2003. Through [assistant
secretary of state] John Wolf they were involved in the process in the
most intimate way. Wolf reported directly to Rice. Those four months
had tremendous pedagogical value. The Americans saw for themselves
what the Palestinians' most solemn promises really meant. They saw the
Palestinians' detailed working plans and their splendid diagrams and
they saw how nothing came of it. Nothing. Zero. When you add to that
the trauma of September 11 and their understanding that Islamic
terrorism is indivisible, you understand that they reached their
conclusions by themselves. They didn't need us to understand what it's
all about. So, when we came to them and told them that there is no one
to talk to, we didn't have any problems. They already knew that as of
now, there is no one to talk to."

The formaldehyde formula

Is that what you really think - and Sharon, too - that there is no one
to talk to?

"We reached that conclusion after years of thinking otherwise. After
years of attempts at dialogue. But when Arafat undermined Abu Mazen at
the end of the summer of 2003, we reached the sad conclusion that
there is no one to talk to, no one to negotiate with. Hence the
disengagement plan. Because when you're playing solitaire, when there
is no one sitting across from you at the table, you have no choice but
to deal the cards yourself."

In 2001 you were still of a different opinion - you tried to reach an
agreement with the Palestinian leadership.

"Because of his trenchant realism, Arik never believed in permanent
settlements: he didn't believe in the one-fell-swoop approach. Sharon
doesn't think that after a conflict of 104 years, it's possible to
come up with a piece of paper that will end the matter. He thinks the
other side had to undergo a deep and extended sociopolitical change.
But when we entered the Prime Minister's Office, he still believed
that he would be able to achieve a very long-term interim agreement.
An agreement of 25, 20, 15, 10, 5 years. There were some Palestinians
who preferred that approach to the approach of [former prime minister
Ehud] Barak. They were the ones we talked to. But very quickly we
discovered that we were up against a stone wall, that when you get to
the decision-making center, nothing happens."

Still, in 2002 you accepted the initiative of President Bush, the road
map, and the principle of a Palestinian state, didn't you?

"For a great many years the accepted view in the world was that people
turned to terrorism because their situation was bad. So that if you
make things better for them, they will abandon terrorism. The
Palestinian assumption was that when the Palestinian majority gets
national satisfaction, they will lay down their arms and the occupiers
and the occupied will emerge from the trenches and embrace and kiss.
"Arik thought differently. He understood that in the Palestinian case
the majority has no control over the minority. He understood that the
ability of a central Palestinian administration to enforce its will on
the entire Palestinian society is all but nonexistent. He understood
that Palestinian terrorism is in part not national at all, but
religious. Therefore, granting national satisfaction will not solve
the problem of this terrorism. This is the basis of his approach that
first of all the terrorism must be eradicated and only then can we
advance in the national direction. Not to give a political slice in
return for a slice of stopping terrorism, but to insist that the swamp
of terrorism be drained before a political process begins.

"President Bush's speech of June 24, 2002, expressed exactly that
approach. We didn't write it, but it articulated in the best way what
we believed. That is why Sharon accepted the implicit principle of the
speech immediately. He saw it as a historical turnabout. He saw it is
a paramount policy achievement. For the first time the principle was
accepted that before we enter the negotiating room, the pistols have
to be left outside."

But didn't the road map translate that principle into a very crowded
timetable?

"Arik would have preferred that the first stage of the road map go on
for three years, the second stage five years and the third stage six
years. But because the road map stipulated that it was based on
performance and not on sacrosanct dates, he was able to accept it. He
understood that the important thing was the principle. What's
important is the formula that asserts that the eradication of
terrorism precedes the start of the political process."

If you have American backing and you have the principle of the road
map, why go to disengagement?

"Because in the fall of 2003 we understood that everything is stuck.
And even though according to the Americans' reading of the situation,
the blame fell on the Palestinians and not on us, Arik grasped that
this state of affairs would not last. That they wouldn't leave us
alone, wouldn't get off our case. Time was not on our side. There was
international erosion, internal erosion. Domestically, in the
meantime, everything was collapsing. The economy was stagnant, and the
Geneva Initiative garnered broad support. And then we were hit with
letters of officers and letters of pilots and letters of commandos
[letters of refusal to serve in the territories]. These were not weird
kids with green ponytails and a ring in their nose who give off a
strong odor of grass. These were people like Spector's group [Yiftah
Spector, a renowned Air Force pilot who signed the pilot's letter].
Really our finest young people."

What was your main concern in those months, what was the main factor
that pushed you to the disengagement idea?

"The concern was the fact that President Bush's formula was stuck and
this would lead to its ruin. That the international community would
say: You wanted the president's formula and you got it; you wanted to
try Abu Mazen and you tried. It didn't work. And when a formula
doesn't work in reality, you don't change reality, you change the
formula. Therefore, Arik's realistic viewpoint said that it was
possible that the principle that was our historic policy achievement
would be annulled - the principle that eradication of terrorism
precedes a political process. And with the annulment of that
principle, Israel would find itself negotiating with terrorism. And
because once such negotiations start it's very difficult to stop them,
the result would be a Palestinian state with terrorism. And all this
within quite a short time. Not decades or even years, but a few
months."

I still don't see how the disengagement plan helps here. What was the
major importance of the plan from your point of view?

"The disengagement plan is the preservative of the sequence principle.
It is the bottle of formaldehyde within which you place the
president's formula so that it will be preserved for a very lengthy
period. The disengagement is actually formaldehyde. It supplies the
amount of formaldehyde that's necessary so that there will not be a

political process with the Palestinians."

Is what you are saying, then, is that you exchanged the strategy of a
long-term interim agreement for a strategy of long-term interim
situation?

"The American term is to park conveniently. The disengagement plan
makes it possible for Israel to park conveniently in an interim
situation that distances us as far as possible from political
pressure. It legitimizes our contention that there is no negotiating
with the Palestinians. There is a decision here to do the minimum
possible in order to maintain our political situation. The decision is
proving itself. It is making it possible for the Americans to go to
the seething and simmering international community and say to them,
`What do you want.' It also transfers the initiative to our hands. It
compels the world to deal with our idea, with the scenario we wrote.
It places the Palestinians under tremendous pressure. It forces them
into a corner that they hate to be in. It thrusts them into a
situation in which they have to prove their seriousness. There are no
more excuses. There are no more Israeli soldiers spoiling their day.
And for the first time they have a slice of land with total continuity
on which they can race from one end to the other in their Ferrari. And
the whole world is watching them - them, not us. The whole world is
asking what they intend to do with this slice of land."

Maneuver of the century

I want to remind you that there will also be a withdrawal in the West
Bank.

"The withdrawal in Samaria is a token one. We agreed to only so it
wouldn't be said that we concluded our obligation in Gaza."

You gave up the Gaza Strip in order to save the West Bank? Is the Gaza
disengagement meant to allow Israel to continue controlling the
majority of the West Bank?

"Arik doesn't see Gaza today as an area of national interest. He does
see Judea and Samaria as an area of national interest. He thinks
rightly that we are still very very far from the time when we will be
able to reach final-status settlements in Judea and Samaria."

Does the evacuation of the settlements in Gaza strengthen the
settlements in the West Bank or weaken them?

"It doesn't hurt the isolated, remote settlements; it's not relevant
for them. Their future will be determined in many years. When we reach
a final settlement. It's not certain that each and every one of them
will be able to go on existing.

"On the other hand, in regard to the large settlement blocs, thanks to
the disengagement plan, we have in our hands a first-ever American
statement that they will be part of Israel. In years to come, perhaps
decades, when negotiations will be held between Israel and the
Palestinians, the master of the world will pound on the table and say:
We stated already ten years ago that the large blocs are part of
Israel."

If so, Sharon can tell the leaders of the settlers that he is
evacuating 10,000 settlers and in the future he will be compelled to
evacuate another 10,000, but he is strengthening the other 200,000,
strengthening their hold in the soil.

"Arik can say honestly that this is a serious move because of which,
out of 240,000 settlers, 190,000 will not be moved from their place.
Will not be moved."

Is he sacrificing a few of his children in order to ensure that the
others remain permanently where they are?

"At the moment he is not sacrificing anyone in Judea and Samaria.
Until the land is quiet and until negotiations begin, nothing is
happening. And the intention is to fight for every single place. That
struggle can be conducted from a far more convenient point of
departure. Because in regard to the isolated settlements there is an
American commitment stating that we are not dealing with them at the
moment, while for the large blocs there is genuine political
insurance. There is an American commitment such as never existed
before, with regard to 190,000 settlers."

If what you are saying is correct, the settlers themselves should
organize demonstrations of support for Sharon, because he did a
tremendous service to the settlement enterprise.

"They should have danced around and around the Prime Minister's
Office."

And Sharon himself actually didn't undergo a de Gaulle-type reversal.
He didn't make a U-turn. He remained loyal to the approach of the
national camp.

"Arik is the first person who succeeded in taking the ideas of the
national camp and turning them into a political reality that is
accepted by the whole world. After all, when he declared six or seven
years ago that we would never negotiate under fire, he only generated
gales of laughter. Whereas today that same approach guides the
president of the United States. It was passed in the House of
Representatives by a vote of 405-7, and in the Senate by 95-5."

From your point of view, then, your major achievement is to have
frozen the political process legitimately?

"That is exactly what happened. You know, the term `political process'
is a bundle of concepts and commitments. The political process is the
establishment of a Palestinian state with all the security risks that
entails. The political process is the evacuation of settlements, it's
the return of refugees, it's the partition of Jerusalem. And all that
has now been frozen."

So you have carried out the maneuver of the century? And all of it
with authority and permission?

"When you say `maneuver,' it doesn't sound nice. It sounds like you
said one thing and something else came out. But that's the whole
point. After all, what have I been shouting for the past year? That I
found a device, in cooperation with the management of the world, to
ensure that there will be no stopwatch here. That there will be no
timetable to implement the settlers' nightmare. I have postponed that
nightmare indefinitely. Because what I effectively agreed to with the
Americans was that part of the settlements would not be dealt with at
all, and the rest will not be dealt with until the Palestinians turn
into Finns. That is the significance of what we did. The significance
is the freezing of the political process. And when you freeze that
process you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state and you
prevent a discussion about the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem.
Effectively, this whole package that is called the Palestinian state,
with all that it entails, has been removed from our agenda
indefinitely. And all this with authority and permission. All with a
presidential blessing and the ratification of both houses of Congress.
What more could have been anticipated? What more could have been given
to the settlers?"

I return to my previous question: In return for ceding Gaza, you
obtained status quo in Judea and Samaria?

"You keep insisting on the wrong definition. The right definition is
that we created a status quo vis-a-vis the Palestinians. There was a
very difficult package of commitments that Israel was expected to
accept. That package is called a political process. It included
elements we will never agree to accept and elements we cannot accept
at this time. But we succeeded in taking that package and sending it
beyond the hills of time. With the proper management we succeeded in
removing the issue of the political process from the agenda. And we
educated the world to understand that there is no one to talk to. And
we received a no-one-to-talk-to certificate. That certificate says:
(1) There is no one to talk to. (2) As long as there is no one to talk
to, the geographic status quo remains intact. (3) The certificate will
be revoked only when this-and-this happens - when Palestine becomes
Finland. (4) See you then, and shalom."

Dramatic consequences

Dubi Weisglass, will the disengagement plan be implemented?

"I can give you a definitive answer regarding Sharon's intention. His
intention is entirely sincere. He has determination and he has
complete resolve. But contrary to what some say, he is not a dictator.
Everything depends on the Likud Central Committee and the party
convention. I don't know what is liable to happen in those bodies. I
see a political alignment that is not supplying the credit a leader
needs, that doesn't trust him to know where he's going or what's best
for the country."

Does Sharon know where he's going? Can we rely on him?

"He has a very coherent worldview. And he has done everything, seen
everything, had experience in all situations. So with him everything
is under control. Everything is conducted quietly, in proper language,
with no raising of voices. And that quiet projects a tremendous sense
of confidence. A sense that there is someone there to rely on. Someone
who knows what he is going to do."

Is there anything hesitant in him?

"No, he is not hesitant. He is very sure of himself. But with him the
processes are organic. They are not oranges. There is a matter of
ripening. And here he had, after all, the sentiment for the people,
the land, the landscape. But there was no struggle between mind and
heart. With him the heart is always dominant. And when the mind
reached the conclusion that this is what had to be done, it was clear
that he would do it. At bottom he's a bit'honist [one who sees things
through the prism of security]. He has a deep relation to the homeland
and to history and to places, but his overriding principle is
rational. The axiom is to safeguard the lives of the Jewish people.
All the rest is subordinate to that. All the rest is in descending
order."

Aren't you worried, nevertheless, that all of this won't happen? That
political opposition or a violent revolt will thwart the disengagement
plan?

"That could happen. When I hear the voices and the threats, I am
fearful. It's far from clear what will happen. Similarly, when you see
the prime minister being forced to cope with all kinds of [Likud]
faction members who got to the Knesset on his coattails, it's
frustrating. And when you hear this one shouting and that one
screaming and another who is affronted. When you see that such an
essential move is liable to be blocked because of personal and
emotional considerations that are simply not to the point. Because
people don't understand how dramatic the decision we face is. And
because no mechanism has been found that will manifest politically the
desire of the great majority that supports the plan."

Is it really all that dramatic?

"If Sharon's disengagement plan is torpedoed, politically it will be
cause for everlasting regret. Our achievements will be lost. The
international community will lose patience with us. It will take the
same attitude toward us as it does toward Arafat. We will very quickly
find ourselves up against a Palestinian state that uses terror against
us and up against a world that is becoming increasingly hostile. We
will find ourselves in a tragedy."

[dsharavi]

No, it didn't.

[dsharavi]

On May 24, 5:04 pm, HHW <coaster132...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> It's what the man who doesn't lie is saying which matters.

If that's the case, what you say does NOT matter.

[The Peeler]

On Sun, 26 May 2013 15:42:31 -0700 (PDT), dsharavi <dsh...@gmail.com>
wrote:

Do, you got any Deborag? <BBGG>

[The Peeler]

On Mon, 27 May 2013 12:41:14 +0200, The Peeler
<finish...@themoronicRevd.invalid> wrote:

>On Sun, 26 May 2013 20:52:03 -0700, The Rectum, the resident psychopath of
>sci and scj, FAKING his time zone again and IMPERSONATING his master, The

>Peeler, wrote:
>
>
>>>formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political
>>>process with the Palestinians.”
>>>
>>>Got any breaking news later than 2004?
>>
>> Do, you got any Deborag? <BBGG>
>

>Why,are you asking, retard? <BG>

Why, shouldn't I aks psycho? <GG>

[Tell it like it is.]

> relationship between the two bureaus and ...
>
> read more »

Technicalities do not make a document, but they
can, rightly or wrongly, disrupt the making of a document. It's common
sense that abortion, for example, affects a woman's sanity, and
abortions and the behavior that may necessitate an abortion should be
understood. Making an abortion illegal has been made difficult by
technicalities about preserving the health of the mother! Or in case
of rape or incest even if most cases involving abortion are due to
californication. Duh!
The attorney, mentioned in this thread, (and I don't
give a **** what his name is) in spite of his critics, is an attorney,
and what he said or wrote in 2004 was and is valid in 2013. During the
inauguration of the President [Orly Taitz - a competent attorney] had
and continues to have concerns about eligibility on several grounds
eg., his Connecticutt social security card, never a resident of that
state, by-passing the technicalities of American law].
Israel invaded the Gaza region during the
inauguration of a U.S. President. The ugly pictures, including the
unnecessary suffering of children, continue to be accessible over the
www,. Any peace process was made a joke by the conditions mentioned by
the attorney in 2004. .
I admit a fanatical female like yourself can be very asstoot, pardon
my spelling, astute, may the Lord help us when a man is as smart as a
woman. Then he'll be a smart-ass like the ethnocentrics, including
yourself, in this thread. I'd hate to be as smart as a female - I'd
be REALLY DUMB - like Barney and Jim - just another family.. Ask
drahcir what it means to be someone's ass. He shows his everyday
responding to HHW. Jews like you and drahcir strain the gnat from the
soupe du jour while swallowing the Palestinian camel whole. Christ
spoke those words 2,000 years ago. Or was I paraphrasing? Jesus
understood ethnocentricism, He gave the religion of Moses to every
nation that believes in CHRIST through his Spirit. What's an
ethnocentric if not a fanatical Jew or Jihadist. Even the aboriginal
tribes of south America send their kids to be rangers and
conservationists in the outside world so that their "stupid" parents
can continue their aboriginal way of life getting all their needs met
by the forest environment where they originated in the primeval dream
time of God's creation of earth.
Thanks for your usual hard work elucidating technicalities.

[HHW]

On May 24, 1:38 pm, drahcir <s...@sgscc.com> wrote:

> On Fri, 24 May 2013 10:33:10 -0700 (PDT), HHW
>

> <coaster132...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >On May 24, 12:28 pm, HHW <coaster132...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >> "The Significance of the disengagement plan (from Gaza) is the
> >> freezing of the peace process. And when you freeze that process, you
> >> prevent the establishment of a Palestinians state, and you prevent a
> >> discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem. Effectively,
> >> the whole package called the Palestinian State, with all that it
> >> entails, has been moved indefinitely from our agenda. All with (U.S.)
> >> presidential blessings and the ratification of both houses of
> >> Congress."
>
> >Dov Weinglas, spokesman for Ariel Sharon, Ha'aretz, 6 October, 2004
>
> >Re posted to add the citation.
>
> "reposted" is one word.

But you're not even remotely one man.

[Tell it like it is.]

On May 26, 6:00 pm, dsharavi <dshr...@gmail.com> wrote: